EFFECTING CHECKS AND BALANCES OF POWERS IN THE LOCAL

GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN NIGERIA: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ON THE

EXPERIENCE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE

Dr. Ugwuanyi, Bartholomew Ikechukwu Department of Public

Administration, Institute of Management and Technology

Keywords: Arms of government, checks and balances of powers,

executives’ legislators, local government, separation of powers.

INTRODUCTION
In almost all contemporary governmental systems, particularly in
democratic climes, there exists separation of powers among the three
arms of government. These three arms are the legislative arm that
makes the laws, the executive arm that implements the laws and the
judiciary arm that interprets the laws. In essence, governmental powers
are shared among these three arms. The idea of sharing of powers
among these different arms of government is popularly known as the
doctrine of separation of powers (Ese, 2008).
TOPIC: CRITICALLY ASSES THE PRACTICE OF CHECK AND BALANCES IN
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA

Democracy and a basic condition for good governance. Its existence is

also necessary for preserving the liberty of individual, for avoiding
tyranny and corruption arising from the opportunities that unseparated
powers offer (Ogoloma, 2012). In Nigeria and as a democracy with a
federal governmental arrangement, the doctrine of separation of
powers among the three arms of government is a fundamental
constitutional principle and applies at both the federal, the state and
the local government tiers. Relevant sections of the 1999 Nigeria
constitution place each of the basic powers of government in a
separate arm. Section 4, 5 and 6 of the constitution highlights the
legislative, executive and judicial powers respectively. However, of very
serious importance still is the practical operation of its corollary
principle of checks and balances of powers. This principle entails that
the three arms acts as checks on the powers of each other with the
ultimate objective of ensuring a balance in the strength and weight of
their powers and their exercise. In this case, each arm has and uses its
powers to keep the others from exceeding their powers. This essentially
constitutes the real value of the doctrine of separation of powers. The
constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria provides for a system of
checks and balances to restrict the powers of each arm of government
at both the federal, state and local government tiers. Generally, for
instance, the executive arm can veto bills passed by the legislature
while the latter can override the veto by the former. Again, the
executive can check the judiciary through its power to appoint or
remove judges while the judiciary can declare laws made by the
legislature and certain executive actions unconstitutional (Ifeanyi,
2005). In these ways, the three arms at the different tiers achieve
workable checks and balances with no one branch holding all the
governmental powers. We shall, however, in this study focus on the
discussion of the checks and balances as it should obtain at the local
government level and the constraints to its effective operation
particularly on the required constitutional checks by the legislative arm
on the executive arm. We note, however, that even though the
operation of the principle of checks and balances at both the state and
national government tiers may experience roughly similar constraints
as there exists, significantly, similar political behaviours or processes at
those levels, we however, feel impelled to take this focus and emphasis
because the local government constitutes a veritable base for the
development and expression of political liberty and democratic values.
Further, we believe that on the executive arm lies the greatest potential
and practice of power and with the possibility of its abuse. In line with
the above stated focus, the basic objectives of the study are then to
generally discuss the requirements and relevance of the doctrines of
separation of powers and checks and balances and to, specifically,
discourse the constraints to effective checks on the powers of the
executive arm by the legislative arm and the implications for good
governance. Our other objective is to explore and suggest ways of
improving the operational mechanism of the legislative checks on the
executive arm.

CLARIFICATION OF THE MAJOR CONCEPTS

1. LOCAL GOVERNMEN: Local government is a unit of government

below the central, regional or state levels established by law to exercise
political authority through a representative council within a defined
geographical area (Olise, and Nwabu, 1990). It is, as well, a system of
local administration instituted to maintain law and order, provide
limited range of social amenities and encourage co-operation and
participation of inhabitants towards improvement of their conditions of
living (Emezi, 1981). In Nigerian federal structure, local government is
popularly regarded as Journal of Policy and Development Studies, the
third tier of government and its existence is clearly guaranteed by the
federal constitution of 1999 as it provides in section 7(1) thus; The
system of local government by democratically elected local government
councils is under this constitution guaranteed and, accordingly, the
government of every state shall, subject to section 8 of this
constitution, ensure their existence under a law which provides for the
establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such
councils. Presently, there are 774 local government areas in Nigeria.
These local government areas, following the introduction of 1976 local
government reform, are uniform in nature and structure (Ofoeze,
2002). The local government as a third tier of government in Nigeria is
expected to play the role of promoting the democratic ideals of the
society and co-ordinating development programs at the local level.
Over all, the tier occupies a very strategic position in the overall
development process of the nation.

2. Separation of powers: Separation of powers refers to the division of

governmental powers and the assignment of their exercise to distinct
branches or arms. Specifically, it entails the division of the legislative,
executive and judicial functions of government among separate and
independent bodies (Ikenga, 2005). The basic purpose of separation of
powers is to prevent the concentration of powers in one arm of
government and provide for checks and balances among the different
arms. Again, and according to John Locke, one of the foremost
proponents of the doctrine of separation of powers, the foundation of
liberty lay in not only the specialization of government functions but
the assignment of their executions to different hands or institutions
(Torsten, 1997; Appodarai, 1968). Further, the doctrine, in practice,
forstalls the temptation to corruption that exists where, for instance,
the same persons who have the powers to make laws also have in their
hands, the powers to execute them. Indeed, as noted by Montesquieu
and quoted in Moses (2011), the basic justification for the doctrine of
separation of powers is that the chances of dictatorship or tyranny are
reduced in so far as governmental powers are separated in terms of
institutions and personnel. Hence, according to Ikenga (2005),
separation of powers is a liberty – sensitive concept. Ogoloma (2012:
129) argues similarly as he notes thus; One condition of liberty is the
separation of the legislature from the executive and the existence of an
independent and impartial judiciary.

Again, in modern times, separation of powers is a convenient means of

coping with the increasing business of government of the state. This
point becomes very understandable if one imagines the law giver
(legislature) being the executor (Executive) and the judge (Judiciary)
simultaneously. This is why in a government of separated powers, the
legislature only makes laws, the executive arm enforces the laws so
made while the judiciary arm interprets the laws. This arrangement, no
doubt, leads to greater efficiency and effectiveness in public or
government administration. The Nigerian constitution embodies the
characteristics of the separation of powers doctrine through its
provisions for the three arms of government and its manifest
assignment of duties and functions to them at the various tiers of
government. Indeed, the constitutional Journal of Policy and
Development Studies provisions for the three arms of government each
entrusted with its own responsibilities, the provisions against overlap of
personnel and functions among the arms and the different modes of
selection of members of each arm are clear manifestations of the
features of separation of powers in Nigeria.

3.CHECKS AND BALANCES OF POWERS: While separation of powers

creates the different arms of government and assigns them
responsibilities and powers, checks and balances emphasizes the power
of any of the arms to check the activities of the others. For example,
the power of the executive, the legislature or judiciary to check the
activities of one another Indeed, the extent to which the separation of
powers applies in reality and is useful depends on the ability and
willingness of the arms to check and balance the activities and exercise
of their respective powers.

Checks in this context referring to the ability and responsibility of each

arm to monitor the activities of other arm(s) and balances referring to
the ability and responsibility of each arm to use its power to limit the
powers of other arm(s) whether at to general scope or in particular
cases. It is perhaps for the relevance of the principle of checks and
balances that Dibie (2005) argues that the principle is the major
argument for the separation of powers and notes specifically that
effective operation of checks and balances prevents arbitrary exercise
of power by any arm, controls power and ensures orderliness and
efficiency in the exercise of governmental powers. THE KEY FUNCTIONS
OF THE THREE ARMS OF GOVERNMENT AT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LEVEL

1. THE EXECUTIVE: This arm is usually composed of the chairman of

the local government, the vice chairman, the secretary, the supervisors
and the career officers. The executive arm is the executor of local
government policies, projects and programs. The executive normally
puts into action all the resolutions and laws of the local government
council and as such it is seen to be at the head of the affairs of the local
government system (Okolie and Eze, 2006). It is necessary to note,
however, that the chairman as the chief executive and accounting
officer of the local government pilots the activities/actions of the
executive arm.

2. THE LEGISLATURE: Members of the local government legislature are

called councilors and they are democratically elected for a specific
period of time usually ranging between 2 to 4 years These councilors
represent the political wards which make Journal of Policy and
Development Studies the local government area. From the Handbook
on Local Government Administration (1999), the legislative arm of the
local government formulates the bye-laws and the guiding principles
for an effective and efficient local government administration. Other
very important functions of the legislative arm are the ones relating to
the exercise of checks on the powers of the executive arm. These
functions, as articulated in the works of West (2011), Ugwu (2010),
Okolie, and Eze (2006), Moses (2011) Ofoeze (2002) and others include
the following:- 1. Debating, approving or amending the budget of the
local government: The legislature has to approve the budget prepared
by the executive before it becomes operational. This is done to ensure
that each project contained therein is feasible, desirable and likely to
facilitate the meaningful development of the local government area.
The scrutiny too ensures that adequate provision is made for the
execution of each project such that it is not likely to be abandoned and
also that development projects are not unduly concentrated in
particular sections of the local government.

2. Monitoring the implementation of projects and programmes: This

oversight function is required to ensure that projects are executed
according to approvals given to them by the legislature. In cases of any
observed discrepancy in the course of implementation, the legislature
can summon (by means of motion) the local government chairman or
any other relevant official of the executive arm of the local government
to explain the observed discrepancy. 3. Examining the local government
statement of income and expenditure: The legislature is expected to
examine, periodically, the statement of income and expenditure
rendered by the chairman of the local government to ensure
accountability and adherence to performance ethics and standards. 4.
Amending or repealing obnoxious bye-laws made by the executive: This
is done to ensure that bye-laws are not arbitrarily made and enforced.
5. Ensuring that all accounting officers account to the Public Accounts
Committee: This is done to ensure that all monies voted for each
department is actually spent and to ultimately hold the heads of
departments liable if such monies are misappropriated. Indeed, the
public accounts committee is one of the most powerful standing
committees in the legislature whose main responsibility is to monitor
and scrutinize government expenditure and income. 6. Impeachment of
the chairman: The legislative arm has the power to impeach the local
government chairman if he is found guilty of gross misconduct within
the context of the existing laws of the federation. Impeachment is,
however, an instrument of last resort designed to enhance public
probity and accountability and need not to be employed frivolously,
selfishly or as a tool for personal vendetta or political victimization. 7.
Ratifying the appointment of supervisors and other political
appointees: The supervisors appointed by the chairman shall have to be
ratified by the legislature through a simple majority vote of the
councilors in session. The ratification is essentially aimed at ensuring
that competent men and women are appointed by the executive to
manage the affairs of the local government area.

3. THE JUDICIARY: The judiciary is the arm of government that

interprets the bye-laws and dispenses justice. However, the judiciary,
arm of government is non-existing at local government level, The
judicial activities at local government level are performed under the
state judicial system and hence controlled from outside the local
government. For instance, the magistrates Journal of Policy and
Development Studies Vol. 9, No. 5, November 2015 17 derive their
authority and power by virtue of their appointment by the state Judicial
Service Commission (Okolie and Eze, 2006). For this, the executive and
the legislature are seen to constitute the major arms of government in
the local government (Otobasi, 2011; Okolie and Eze, 2006).
CONSTRAINTS TO EFFECTIVE CHECKS ON THE EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE
POWERS BY THE LEGISLATURE

Statutorily, the legislature is required to exercise checks on the

activities and powers of the executive. However, in practice, the
legislative arm has been observed not to exercise significant checks on
the exercise of executive powers as a result of the following factors:- 1.
The Councilors’ and executives’ membership of the same political party:
Varied political party membership of the councilors and the executives
encourages freedom of opinion that is essential to a liberal democratic
system as the opposition in ideas among them is usually a factor in
controlling the exercise of executive powers. Indeed, the strength of
the opposition in the legislature is one factor that determines the
degree and extent of checks on the executive. Where the opposition is
weak, the system of checks is likely to be undermined or eroded owing
to the immense leverage that the executive enjoys in dominating and
influencing the legislature. Unfortunately, in most local governments in
Nigeria, members of the legislature and, as well as, the executive
belong to the same political party. In such cases, there is, very
commonly, “an unholy” consensus by the councilors to allow the
executive exercise its powers without significant checks as they see
themselves as members of one family. Onyishi and Okeke (2012:203) in
this respect observes specifically thus: In most local governments in
Nigeria, the executives and the legislatures are from the same political
background, share the same philosophy and as such see themselves as
a family. The implication of this is that there are, often times, no
criticism of executive actions particularly when such actions are
percieved to be in the overall interest of the party (Omenma, 2011).
This scenario obtains in most states and local government areas being
controlled by the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) or the All Progressive
Congress (APC) in Nigeria. In such places there is apparent executive
dominance due partly to the ruling party’s majoritarian influence and
the weakness, fragmentation or even absence of opposition parties.
This, in extreme cases, could lead to the total subordination of the
legislature to the executive arm. In such areas too, any conflict arising
from the legislature’s attempt to check the powers of the executives is
usually intervened in and “suppressed” by the party executive,
concerned political godfathers and even the governor of the state to
the overall detriment of effective checks and balances. 2.
Manipulated/fraudulent elections: Elections in Nigeria are usually
characterized by manipulation and pervasive fraud (Yakubu, 1999;
Ogundiya and Babal, 2004). Such fraud that is pervasive in the Nigerian
electoral process, often times, leads to situations where people without
the natural zeal to serve and are not versed in the act of debate and
constructive criticisms are elected into the legislative arm. Likely too is
that the local government chairmen elected through the same
fraudulent process may be intolerant to opposition, checks and
criticism and may lack, as well, a sense of accountability, integrity and
humility to subject themselves to scrutiny and control by the
legislature. Of great£er implication is a situation where the local
government chairman is the political godfather of the councilors and
who, as such, has been instrumental to Journal of Policy and
Development Studies Vol. 9, No. 5, November 2015 18 their election
into the legislative council. This is because the chairman usually by
virtue of that status controls the leadership of the legislative council
and consequently could easily cajole the councilors to “feel better and
secured” serving his particularistic interests (Onyishi and Okeke, 2012).
In this case, the legislators will cease to have the courage and the
inclination to challenge and check the power abuses by the chairman.
Thus, sacrificing the noble role of checking the exercise of executive
powers in preference to the protection of the personal interests of the
chairman who is their political godfather (Ofoeze, 2002). It is frequently
observed in local governments where there is extreme control of the
leadership of the legislature by the executive that legislative sessions
are not usually convened without intimating the chairman and briefing
him on the issues to be discussed. In some cases, the chairman may,
where he understands that such a session would be used to discuss
checks on his power, uses his “authority” to stop such a session from
holding. Further in this respect of manipulation of election is that the
chairmen of local governments elected fraudulently through the active
assistance by the state governors, principally through the use of state
electoral commission, are, in most cases, assured of their respective
governor’s protection. For this, such chairmen disregard or resist
checks by the legislators with impunity. Onyishi and Okeke (2012: 212)
in this respect specifically observe that; ….. due to the bond existing
between the executive chairmen and the state governors, the former
can afford to initiate and implement projects without reference to the
local government legislative council in as much they have the backing of
their respective state governors. The legislators on the other hand, in
realization of the “secured” or “protected” position of the chairman
given the governor’s support behind him may become less willing and
eager to attempt exercising checks on the powers of the executive
particularly in financial matters (Omenma, 2011). What, generally, the
councilors would prefer to do in such circumstance is to serve, with
greater might, the chairman on the anticipation of a better chance to
gain financially or through other corrupt reciprocal exchanges like
gaining a higher political elevation (Omenma, 2011). It is necessary to
observe that a state governor would always want not only to ensure
that his party controls all the local governments areas in the state but
to also install his preferred chairmanship candidate in all the local
government areas in the state for purposes of ensuring their loyalty and
control and for strengthening his political support base particularly and
that of his party generally. Another aspect of the problem associated
with the manipulation of elections into the local government council is
that politicians at higher levels (the Senators, members of House of
Representative, Ministers etc) who see election of stooges into their
respective local government councils as an opportunity to control and
consolidate their “political home base” desperately manipulate
elections to ensure that such caliber of politicians are elected into
political offices (Eme, 2011). This, explains the poor and wrong
membership input into the legislative and the executive arms of the
local government which makes checks on the executive a herculean
task. This is because such legislators, for instance, cannot exercise any
meaningful check on the executive as they are easily inclined to act the
script of their political godfathers which is usually geared towards
“peace, stability and continuity”. Such executives too are likely to be
impevious to criticism and control from the legislature and would be
inclined more to allowing controls or checks from their political
godfathers. It is worthy to note that manipulation of election in the
local government system even extends to the election of the principal
officers of the legislative house like the speaker, the chief Journal of
Policy and Development Studies Vol. 9, No. 5, November 2015 19 whip
and the majority leader. Such manipulation, most often, results to the
emergence of weak leadership of the legislature. Such a weak
leadership usually lacks the vibrancy and dynamism and will power to
effectively check the power abuses of the executive and would easily be
turned into a rubber stamp for executive actions. 3. Undue informal
closeness between the executives and the legislators: Most often, the
personal closeness of the legislators to the chairman is such that the
former almost pay visits to the personal house of the latter or daily
basis. In some cases too, the legislators even pay homage to the
chairman before moving into the legislative chamber for a
parliamentary session. Such visits, most often, are used to peddle
rumors of alleged antiparty or “anti-chairman” activities of fellow
councilors that do often result to victimization of the affected persons
by the executive. All such extreme informal relationships are done in
the attempt to show loyalty and “good boy” stuff and to curry favour.
The ultimate effect of such acts is the weakening of the solidarity of the
legislators and their zeal and commitment to exercise checks on the
executive arm. 4. Prebendalism: Basically, prebendalism refers to the
pattern of political behaviour which reflects as its justifying principle
that the offices of the state may be competed for and used for the
personal benefit of the office holders as well as that of their reference
or support groups (Joseph, 1987). In Nigeria, state offices are primarily
regarded as prebends that can be used by office holders to generate
material benefits or personal wealth and less for state service (Joseph,
1987; Egbo, 2003; Eme and Anyakide, 2012; Dike, 2001). Following the
entrenched prebendal culture in Nigeria, the legislators and the
executives have come to see their elections into offices as essentially an
invitation or selection to come and share for themselves the national
cake (Amujiri, 2012; Halidu, 2012). This orientation, no doubt,
incumbates no effective zeal on the legislatures to act as watch dog
over the exercise of executive powers and for the executive arm too to
subject its actions to legislative checks. For instance, in most situations,
the prevalent orientation is for the legislators to play down the normal
or constitutional legislative processes and duties and to engage more in
“co-operation” or “understanding” with the executive arm as such will
give them the greater opportunity to amass wealth or get a greater
share of the “national cake” (Ofoeze, 2002). Indeed, as Ogbuene (2011)
observes, the legislators are more preoccupied with lining their
personal pockets than engaging in the more urgent legislative duties.
For instance, when impeachment proceedings are initiated against the
chairman for acts bordering on power abuse, the executive chairman
will resort to, and successfully so, in assuaging the councilors by bribing
them with large chunks of money (Ofoeze, 2002). On acceptance of
such financial gratification, the impeachment efforts or proceeding will,
“fizzle out naturally”. In most cases, such proceedings is not initiated at
all even in the circumstance of glaring or apparent power abuses as a
result of regular and substantial financial gratifications from the
executive. Another manifestation of the prebendal culture is a situation
where the councilors approve the budget of their local government
without debating or vetting the content because they have been given
reasonable amounts of money as bribes. Indeed, in very many cases,
once the councilors get the expected gratification, the budget, any how
it is, would be approved and the chairman would be left free and
unfettered to even further inflate, manipulate and twist the budget as
he wishes to the utter neglect of prudent appropriation of the tax
payers money. In essence, the prebendal instinct among the
legislatures does not allow for effective scrutiny of the budget and
other financial appropriation by the executive arm. Ofoeze (2002) notes
that due to this inadequate checks on the expenditure level, pattern
and focus of the executive arm, the chairmen have the opportunity to
award contracts to themselves, their companies and their fellow-party
stalwarts in total disregard of the due process for contract awards.
Omenma (2011) Journal of Policy and Development Studies Vol. 9, No.
5, November 2015 20 observes too that, following the prebendal
orientation, most council members see their membership of the council
as an opportunity for self enrichment and are, therefore, very willing to
condone the aberrations or abuses in the exercise of executive powers.
Thus, once the chairman “plays ball” or “co-operates”, all his actions or
decisions gets automatic endorsement. This substantially explains, for
instance, why appointments of supervisors by the chairman are ratified
without proper scrutiny and why there is usually no insistence for the
chairman to render periodic statement of income and expenditure and
why there is no thorough examination of such where it is even given at
all. Onyishi and Okeke (2012) in this respect observe that generally
before any executive action or decision gets councilors’ official stamp,
the executive chairmen must “play ball”. Indeed, according to them,
this has become the rule rather than the exception. Infact, the
prependal interest among the councilors is such that on “satisfactory
financial gratification” the councilors, for instance, do even go to the
personal house of the local government chairman to approve a bill or
even a budget without any formal debate and in total disregard of the
basic parliamentary procedures as it should be carried out in the
legislative chamber. Onyishi and Okeke (2012:210) specifically in this
respect observes thus; ……even some council speakers mobilize their
council members to go to the executive chairman’s offices or personal
house to approve a bill or budget without mere introduction in the
council floor for debate” At such occasions, as described above, lavish
entertainment replaces the normal house business of debate, criticism
and amendment of a budget or a bill as may be found necessary. In all,
the prebendal attitude weakens the development of the legislative arm
into a strong institution that can effectively check the exercise of
powers of the executive and, as well, nurtures and reinforces the zeal
and tendency by the executive to resist checks and control by the
legislature. 5. Lack of Mastery of Legislative Proceedings: In most local
government areas in Nigeria, the councilors lack adequate knowledge
of the basic parliamentary procedures of originating a debate, motions,
bills or amendments (Omenma, 2011; Onyishi and Okeke, 2012).
Ogbuene (2010) in the same vein observes that the legislators appear
not to have proper idea of their statutory functions or roles in the local
government system. The consequence of this poor knowledge of
legislative proceedings is that the councilors are not confident to
initiate or participate in proceedings particularly the ones relating to
criticizing, scrutinizing and checking executive actions. The poor
knowledge of the parliamentary procedures is, in most cases, a result of
low level of educational background of most

yhhof the councilors (Eme, 2011; Onyishi and Okeke, 2012).

ENHANCING EFFECTIVE CHECKS OF THE EXECUTIVE POWERS BY THE
LEGISLATIVE ARM: THE IMPERATIVE MEASURES:

1. The legislative arm should maintain its independence from the

executive arm by not getting into unnecessary closeness and co-
operation with the executives and the executive arm too should not
induce the legislative arm to have such close and subordinate
relationship to it as such would vitiate independent status of the
legislature arm. Doing this effectively, however, depends on the extent
to which political office holders are willing and actually eschew
prebendal tendencies. In this case, therefore, there is the need for a
change in the mind set of the legislators and the executives from
prebendalism to the ideal practice of using public office to serve the
people.

2. There is the need for government to ensure that there is both intra-
party and inter-party democracy to ensure free and fair election of the
members of the executive and the legislature. Such free and fair
election will, to a reasonable extent, guarantee the election of credible
and committed people into the legislative and the executives arms of
the local government.

3. There is the need to strengthen the legislative capacity for

undertaking the rigorous legislative duties particularly as it relates to its
functions of checking the exercise of executive powers. This could be
achieved through organizing trainings, workshops and conferences for
the legislators. Very importantly, such training should aim at building in
the legislators a spirit of community service and effective
representation of the electorates. In respect of the regularity of such
training, at least one training programme or workshop is recommended
for the councilors yearly. Such will enrich their knowledge of the
legislative procedures and proceedings.

4. There is the need for the existence of varied political party

membership among the political office holders in the local government
as such creates room for opposition and criticism that is necessary for
effective checks on the powers of the executive by the legislature. Such
varied political party membership can only evolve and exist naturally in
the atmosphere of free and fair electoral conducts in multi-party
election.

5. Very importantly, the tendency to hijack and control the legislative

leadership by the executive need to be resisted by the former and
equally seriously eschewed by the latter. Indeed, in the interest of the
overall good governance of the local government areas, the political
leadership, particularly the executive leadership, must be committed
towards ensuring that it keeps to its constitutionally assigned functions
while still subjecting the exercise of its powers to the required
constitutional checks and scrutiny by the legislature. Conclusion: Power
corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Hence the
requirement of the doctrine of separation of powers in all
governmental systems, particularly in modern democratic governance.
This is because it prevents power from being overly concentrated in
one arm of government and its consequent likely abuse. However,
forestalling abuse of powers even in a government of separated powers
depends essentially on the extent to which the principle of checks and
balances obtain among the different arms of government.
Unfortunately, the operation of this principle in the local government
system in Nigeria particularly as it concerns the legislature and
executive is seriously constrained by some factors. The possibility of
enhancing the operation of the principle is, therefore, dependent on
the extent to which the identified constraints are tackled or
surmounted. Indeed, it is only the extent to which this can be done that
we shall have less abuse of power by the executive and more of overall
good governance.

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