SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143375. July 6, 2001.]

RUTH D. BAUTISTA , petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

OFFICE OF THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR, REGION IV,
and SUSAN ALOÑA, respondents.

Reyes Cruz & Santos Law Offices for petitioner.

Dollete Blanco Ejercito and Associates for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Sometime in April 1998, petitioner Ruth D. Bautista issued to private

respondent Susan Aloña Metrobank Check dated 8 May 1998 for
P1,500,000.00 drawn on Metrobank — Cavite City Branch. Petitioner assured
her that the check would be sufficiently funded on the maturity date. On 20
October 1998, private respondent presented the check for payment. The
drawee bank dishonored the check because it was drawn against insufficient
funds. She then made repeated demands on petitioner to make
arrangements for the payment of the check within five working days after
receipt of notice of dishonor from the bank, but that petitioner failed to do
so. Consequently, she filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of
Cavite City. Petitioner then submitted a counter-affidavit asserting in her
defense that presentment of the check within ninety days from due date
thereof was an essential element of the offense of violation of BP 22. Since
the check was presented for payment 166 days after its due date, it was no
longer punishable under BP 22 and therefore the complaint should be
dismissed for lack of merit. Thereafter, the investigating prosecutor issued a
resolution recommending the filing of an Information against the petitioner
for violation of BP 22, which was subsequently approved by the City
Prosecutor. Petitioner filed with the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor
(ORSP) for Region IV a Petition for Review. But it was denied by the ORSP.
The petitioner raised the issue to the Court of Appeals via a petition for
review. The appellate court issued a resolution denying due course outright
and dismissing the petition on the ground that it does not fall under any of
the agencies mentioned in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the instant
petition for certiorari.
The Court ruled that the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial
body; necessarily, its decisions approving the filing of a criminal complaint
are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. However, in the
present recourse, notwithstanding the procedural lapses, the Court gave due
course to the petition, in view of the novel legal question involved, to
prevent further delay of the prosecution of the criminal case below, and
more importantly, to dispel any notion that procedural technicalities are
being used to defeat the substantive rights of petitioner.
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 Thus, the ninety (90)-day period is not among the elements of the
offense under BP 22. Section 2 of BP 22 is clear that a dishonored check
presented within the ninety (90)-day period creates a prima facie
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which is an essential
element of the offense. Since knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to
establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of the
existence of this element from the fact of drawing, issuing or making a
check, the payment of which was subsequently refused for insufficiency of
funds. Thence, the only consequence of the failure to present the check for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date stated is that there arises no
prima faciepresumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But the
prosecution may still prove such knowledge through other evidence.
Whether such evidence is sufficient to sustain probable cause to file the
information is addressed to the sound discretion of the City Prosecutor and is
a matter not controllable by certiorari.
The Resolution of the Court of Appeals was AFFIRMED.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE

DEPARTMENT; OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR; QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION;
HOLDS TRUE ONLY AS IT EXERCISES POWERS AKIN TO THOSE OF COURT. —
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation
performs a quasi-judicial function, citing Cojuangco v. PCGG, Koh v. Court of
Appeals, Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Norte a n d Crespo v.
Mogul. In these cases this Court held that the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement holds true only in
the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court. Here is
where the similarity ends. aIcSED

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY; NO ADJUDICATION

OR RULE-MAKING FUNCTIONS. — A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary
investigation is very different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-
judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a
court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties
through either adjudication or rule-making. . . . [T]he prosecutor in a
preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means
of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and
to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of
the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the
courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

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 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DECISIONS APPROVING FILING OF CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT NOT APPEALABLE TO COURT OF APPEALS. — The Office of the
Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions approving
the filing of a criminal complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43. Since the ORSP has the power to resolve appeals with finality
only where the penalty prescribed for the offense does not exceed prision
correccional, regardless of the imposable fine, the only remedy of petitioner,
in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, is to present her defense in the
trial of the case.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION; COURTS CANNOT INTERFERE WITH DISCRETION OF FISCAL
TO DETERMINE SPECIFICITY AND ADEQUACY OF OFFENSE CHARGED. — It is
well-settled that the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal
to determine the specificity and adequacy of the offense charged. He may
dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or
substance or if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or, he may
otherwise proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in
due and proper form.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION, TO PREVENT FURTHER DELAY OF
PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL CASE; CASE AT BAR. — In the present recourse,
notwithstanding the procedural lapses, we give due course to the petition, in
view of the novel legal question involved, to prevent further delay of the
prosecution of the criminal case below, and more importantly, to dispel any
notion that procedural technicalities are being used to defeat the substantive
rights of petitioner.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 (BOUNCING CHECKS
LAW); TWO DISTINCT ACTS PENALIZED UNDER SECTION 1 THEREOF. — An
analysis of Sec. 1 shows that The Bouncing Checks Law penalizes two (2)
distinct acts: First, making or drawing and issuing any check to apply on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that the drawer does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank; and, second, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank shall fail to keep sufficient
funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; FIRST OFFENSE AND SECOND OFFENSE;
DIFFERENTIATED. — In the first paragraph, the drawer knows that he does
not have sufficient funds to cover the check at the time of its issuance, while
in the second paragraph, the drawer has sufficient funds at the time of
issuance but fails to keep sufficient funds or maintain credit within ninety
(90) days from the date appearing on the check. In both instances, the
offense is consummated by the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of
funds or credit. The check involved in the first offense is worthless at the
time of issuance since the drawer had neither sufficient funds in nor credit
with the drawee bank at the time, while that involved in the second offense
is good when issued as drawer had sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when issued. Under the first offense, the ninety (90)-day
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 presentment period is not expressly provided, while such period is an
express element of the second offense.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF
OFFENSES; EVERY ELEMENT OF OFFENSE MUST BE ALLEGED IN COMPLAINT
OR INFORMATION AND PROVED. — It is fundamental that every element of
the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information, and must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be stated must be determined by reference
to the definitions and the essentials of the specific crimes.
9. CRIMINAL LAW; VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22;
ELEMENTS. — The elements of the offense under BP 22 are (a) the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the
maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. HEcSDa

10. ID.; ID.; NINETY-DAY PRESENTMENT PERIOD NOT AN ELEMENT

THEREOF, ONLY CREATES PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF
INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS. — The ninety (90)-day period is not among these
elements. Section 2 of BP 22 is clear that a dishonored check presented
within the ninety (90)-day period creates a prima facie presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which is an essential element of the
offense. Since knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the
statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of the existence of this
element from the fact of drawing, issuing or making a check, the payment of
which was subsequently refused for insufficiency of funds. The term prima
facie evidence denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is
sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to
counterbalance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction.
11. ID.; ID.; ID; INTENDED TO FACILITATE PROOF OF KNOWLEDGE
AND NOT TO FORECLOSE ADMISSIBILITY OF OTHER EVIDENCE THAT MAY
ALSO PROVE KNOWLEDGE. — The presumption in Sec. 2 is not a conclusive
presumption that forecloses or precludes the presentation of evidence to the
contrary. Neither does the term prima facie evidence preclude the
presentation of other evidence that may sufficiently prove the existence or
knowledge of insufficiency of funds or lack of credit. Surely, the law is not so
circumscribed as to limit proof of knowledge exclusively to the dishonor of
the subject check when presented within the prescribed ninety (90) day
period. It is evident from the deliberations that the presumption in Sec. 2
was intended to facilitate proof of knowledge and not to foreclose
admissibility of other evidence that may also prove such knowledge. Thus,
the only consequence of the failure to present the check for payment within
ninety (90) days from the date stated is that there arises no prima facie
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But the prosecution may
still prove such knowledge through other evidence. Whether such evidence
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 is sufficient to sustain probable cause to file the information is addressed to
the sound discretion of the City Prosecutor and is a matter not controllable
b y certiorari. Certainly, petitioner is not left in a lurch as the prosecution
must prove knowledge without the benefit of the presumption, and she may
present whatever defenses are available to her in the course of the trial.
12. ID.; ID.; ENDORSER OF BAD CHECK MAY BE HELD LIABLE. — An
endorser who passes a bad check may be held liable under BP 22, even
though the presumption of knowledge does not apply to him, if there is
evidence that at the time of endorsement, he was aware of the insufficiency
of funds.
13. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE
AND EVIDENCE THEREOF IS ANALOGOUS TO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
ULTIMATE FACTS AND EVIDENTIARY FACTS IN CIVIL CASES. — The distinction
between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is
analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary
facts in civil cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts
which either form the basis of the primary right and duty or which directly
make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, while evidentiary
facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts. Applying
this analogy to the case at bar, knowledge of insufficiency of funds is the
ultimate fact, or element of the offense that needs to be proved, while
dishonor of the check presented within ninety (90) days is merely the
evidentiary fact of such knowledge.
14. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; COURTS WILL NOT
INTERFERE WITH PROSECUTOR'S DISCRETION TO FILE CRIMINAL CASE WHEN
THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO DO SO. — It is worth reiterating that courts
will not normally interfere with the prosecutor's discretion to file a criminal
case when there is probable cause to do so. Probable cause has been
defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. The prosecutor has ruled that there is probable cause in this
case, and we see no reason to disturb the finding.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J : p

This petition for certiorari presents a new dimension in the ever

controversial Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 or The Bouncing Checks Law. The
question posed is whether the drawer of a check which is dishonored due to
lack of sufficient funds can be prosecuted under BP 22 even if the check is
presented for payment after ninety (90) days from its due date. The
burgeoning jurisprudence on the matter appears silent on this point.
Sometime in April 1998 petitioner Ruth D. Bautista issued to private
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 respondent Susan Aloña Metrobank Check No. 005014037 dated 8 May 1998
for P1,500,000.00 drawn on Metrobank Cavite City Branch. According to
private respondent, petitioner assured her that the check would be
sufficiently funded on the maturity date.
On 20 October 1998 private respondent presented the check for
payment. The drawee bank dishonored the check because it was drawn
against insufficient funds (DAIF).
On 16 March 1999 private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit with
the City Prosecutor of Cavite City. 1 In addition to the details of the issuance
and the dishonor of the check, she also alleged that she made repeated
demands on petitioner to make arrangements for the payment of the check
within five (5) working days after receipt of notice of dishonor from the bank,
but that petitioner failed to do so.
Petitioner then submitted her own counter-affidavit asserting in her
defense that presentment of the check within ninety (90) days from due date
thereof was an essential element of the offense of violation of BP 22. Since
the check was presented for payment 166 days after its due date, it was no
longer punishable under BP 22 and therefore the complaint should be
dismissed for lack of merit. She also claimed that she already assigned
private respondent her condominium unit at Antel Seaview Condominium,
Roxas Boulevard, as full payment for the bounced checks thus extinguishing
her criminal liability.
On 22 April 1999, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution
recommending the filing of an Information against petitioner for violation of
BP 22, which was approved by the City Prosecutor.
On 13 May 1999 petitioner filed with the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor (ORSP) for Region IV a petition for review of the 22 April 1999
resolution. The ORSP denied the petition in a one (1)-page resolution dated
25 June 1999. On 5 July 1999 petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the ORSP also denied on 31 August 1999. According to the ORSP, only
resolutions of prosecutors dismissing a criminal complaint were cognizable
for review by that office, citing Department Order No. 223.
On 1 October 1999 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for review of the resolution of the ORSP, Region IV, dated 22 April 1999 as
well as the order dated 31 August 1999 denying reconsideration. The
appellate court issued the assailed Resolution dated 26 October 1999
denying due course outright and dismissing the petition. 2 According to
respondent appellate court —
A petition for review is appropriate under Rule 42 (1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure) from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, filed in the Court of Appeals.
Rule 43 . . . provides for appeal, via a petition for review . . . from
judgment or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner's "Petition for Reviews of
the ORSP resolution does not fall under any of the agencies mentioned
in Rule 43 . . . It is worth to note that petitioner in her three (3)
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 assigned errors charged the ORSP of "serious error of law and grave
abuse of discretion." The grounds relied upon by petitioner are proper
in a petition for certiorari . . . Even if We treat the "Petition for Review"
as a petition for certiorari, petitioner failed to allege the essential
requirements of a special civil action. Besides, the remedy of petitioner
is in the Regional Trial Court, following the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts . . . (Emphasis supplied).
First, some ground rules. This case went to the Court of Appeals by way
of petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 43 applies to "appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of
Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions." 3
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary
investigation performs a quasi-judicial function, citing Cojuangco v. PCGG, 4
Koh v. Court of Appeals, 5 Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Norte 6
a n d Crespo v. Mogul. 7 In these cases this Court held that the power to
conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this
statement holds true only in the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the
prosecutor is an office in the executive department exercising powers akin
to those of a court. Here is where the similarity ends. AEScHa

A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very

different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has
been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than
a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making." 8
In Luzon Development Bank v. Luzon Development Bank Employees, 9
we held that a voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel,
enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency, hence his decisions and
awards are appealable to the Court of Appeals. This is so because the awards
of voluntary arbitrators become final and executory upon the lapse of the
period to appeal; 10 and since their awards determine the rights of parties,
their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Therefore, the
proper remedy from an award of a voluntary arbitrator is a petition for
review to the Court of Appeals, following Revised Administrative Circular No.
1-95, which provided for a uniform procedure for appellate review of all
adjudications of quasi-judicial entities, which is now embodied in Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does
not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may
be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof. 11 While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to
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 be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment
on the accused, not the fiscal. 12
Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body;
necessarily, its decisions approving the filing of a criminal complaint are not
appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. Since the ORSP has the
power to resolve appeals with finality only where the penalty prescribed for
the offense does not exceed prision correccional, regardless of the
imposable fine, 13 the only remedy of petitioner, in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion, is to present her defense in the trial of the case.
Besides, it is well-settled that the courts cannot interfere with the
discretion of the fiscal to determine the specificity and adequacy of the
offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be
insufficient in form or substance or if he finds no ground to continue with the
inquiry; or, he may otherwise proceed with the investigation if the complaint
is, in his view, in due and proper form. 14
In the present recourse, notwithstanding the procedural lapses, we
give due course to the petition, in view of the novel legal question involved,
to prevent further delay of the prosecution of the criminal case below, and
more importantly, to dispel any notion that procedural technicalities are
being used to defeat the substantive rights of petitioner.
Petitioner is accused of violation of BP 22 the substantive portion of
which reads —
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person
who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such in full
upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
(1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or
draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon,
for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank . . . (Emphasis
supplied).

An analysis of Sec. 1 shows that The Bouncing Checks Law penalizes

two (2) distinct acts: First, making or drawing and issuing any check to apply
on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that the drawer does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank; and, second,
having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank shall fail to keep
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 sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check
if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. 15
In the first paragraph, the drawer knows that he does not have
sufficient funds to cover the check at the time of its issuance, while in the
second paragraph, the drawer has sufficient funds at the time of issuance
but fails to keep sufficient funds or maintain credit within ninety (90) days
from the date appearing on the check. In both instances, the offense is
consummated by the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds or
credit.
The check involved in the first offense is worthless at the time of
issuance since the drawer had neither sufficient funds in nor credit with the
drawee bank at the time, while that involved in the second offense is good
when issued as drawer had sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
when issued. 16 Under the first offense, the ninety (90)-day presentment
period is not expressly provided, while such period is an express element of
the second offense. 17
From the allegations of the complaint, it is clear that petitioner is being
prosecuted for violation of the first paragraph of the offense.
Petitioner asserts that she could not be prosecuted for violation of BP
22 on the simple ground that the subject check was presented 166 days
after the date stated thereon. She cites Sec. 2 of BP 22 which reads —
SECTION 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. —
The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment which is
refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with
such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of
the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the
holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner interprets this provision to mean that the ninety (90)-day
presentment period is an element of the offenses punished in BP 22. She
asseverates that "for a maker or issuer of a check to be covered by B.P. 22,
the check issued by him/her is one that is dishonored when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from date of the check. If the dishonor
occurred after presentment for payment beyond the ninety (90)-day period,
no criminal liability attaches; only a civil case for collection of sum of money
may be filed, if warranted." To bolster this argument, she relies on the view
espoused by Judge David G. Nitafan in his treatise — 18
Although evidentiary in nature, Section 2 of the law must be
taken as furnishing an additional element of the offense defined in the
first paragraph of Section 1 because it provides for the evidentiary fact
of "knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit" which is an element of
the offense defined in said paragraph; otherwise said provision of
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 Section 2 would be rendered without meaning and nugatory. The rule
of statutory construction is that the parts of a statute must be read
together in such a manner as to give effect to all of them and that such
parts shall not be construed as contradicting each other. The same
section cannot be deemed to supply an additional element for the
offense under the second paragraph of Section 1 because the 90-day
presentment period is already a built-in element in the definition of
said offense (Emphasis supplied).
We are not convinced. It is fundamental that every element of the
offense must be alleged in the complaint or information, and must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be stated must be determined by reference to the
definitions and the essentials of the specific crimes. 19
The elements of the offense under BP 22 are (a) the making, drawing
and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker,
drawer or issuer knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 20
The ninety (90)-day period is not among these elements. Section 2 of
BP 22 is clear that a dishonored check presented within the ninety (90)-day
period creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds, which is an essential element of the offense. Since knowledge
involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a
prima facie presumption of the existence of this element from the fact of
drawing, issuing or making a check, the payment of which was subsequently
refused for insufficiency of funds. 21 The term prima facie evidence denotes
evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the
proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counterbalance the
presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction. 22
The presumption in Sec. 2 is not a conclusive presumption that
forecloses or precludes the presentation of evidence to the contrary. 23
Neither does the term prima facie evidence preclude the presentation of
other evidence that may sufficiently prove the existence or knowledge of
insufficiency of funds or lack of credit.
Surely, the law is not so circumscribed as to limit proof of knowledge
exclusively to the dishonor of the subject check when presented within the
prescribed ninety (90) day period. The deliberations on the passage of BP 22
(then known as Cabinet Bill No. 9) between the author, former Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza, and Bataan Assemblyman Pablo Roman prove
insightful —
MR. ROMAN:
. . . Under Section 1, who is the person who may be liable under
this Section? Would it be the maker or the drawer? How about
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 the endorser, Mr. Speaker?
MR. MENDOZA:
Liable.
MR. ROMAN:
The endorser, therefore, under Section 1 is charged with the duty
of knowing at the time he endorses and delivers a check . . .
MR. MENDOZA:

If the endorser is charged for violation of the Act then the fact of
knowledge must be proven by positive evidence because the
presumption of knowledge arises only against the maker or the
drawer. It does not arise as against endorser under the following
section (Emphasis supplied).
MR. ROMAN:
But under Section 1, it says here: "Any person who shall make or
draw or utter or deliver any check." The preposition is
disjunctive, so that any person who delivers any check knowing
at the time of such making or such delivery that the maker or
drawer has no sufficient funds would be liable under Section 1.
MR. MENDOZA:

That is correct Mr. Speaker. But, as I said, while there is liability

even as against endorser, for example, the presumption of
knowledge of insufficient funds arises only against the maker or
drawer under Section 2. TDcCIS

MR. ROMAN:
Yes, Mr. Speaker. It is true; however, under Section 1, endorsers of
checks or bills of exchange would find it necessary since they
may be charged with the knowledge at the time they negotiate
bills of exchange they have no sufficient funds in the bank or
depository.
MR. MENDOZA:

In order that an endorser may be held liable, there must be

evidence showing that at the time he endorsed the check he was
aware that the drawer would not have sufficient funds to cover
the check upon presentation. That evidence must be presented
by the prosecution. However, if the one changed is the drawer,
then that evidence need not be presented by the prosecution
because that fact would be established by presumption under
Section 2 (Emphasis supplied). 24
An endorser who passes a bad check may be held liable under BP 22,
even though the presumption of knowledge does not apply to him, if there is
evidence that at the time of endorsement, he was aware of the insufficiency
of funds. It is evident from the foregoing deliberations that the presumption
in Sec. 2 was intended to facilitate proof of knowledge and not to foreclose
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 admissibility of other evidence that may also prove such knowledge. Thus,
the only consequence of the failure to present the check for payment within
ninety (90) days from the date stated is that there arises no prima facie
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But the prosecution may
still prove such knowledge through other evidence. Whether such evidence
is sufficient to sustain probable cause to file the information is addressed to
the sound discretion of the City Prosecutor and is a matter not controllable
b y certiorari. Certainly, petitioner is not left in a lurch as the prosecution
must prove knowledge without the benefit of the presumption, and she may
present whatever defenses are available to her in the course of the trial.
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence
of these elements is analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate
facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and
substantial facts which either form the basis of the primary right and duty or
which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant,
while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said
ultimate facts. 25 Applying this analogy to the case at bar, knowledge of
insufficiency of funds is the ultimate fact, or element of the offense that
needs to be proved, while dishonor of the check presented within ninety (90)
days is merely the evidentiary fact of such knowledge.
It is worth reiterating that courts will not normally interfere with the
prosecutor's discretion to file a criminal case when there is probable cause to
do so. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. 26 The prosecutor has ruled
that there is probable cause in this case, and we see no reason to disturb the
finding.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 26
October 1999 which dismissed the petition for review questioning the
resolution of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region IV, dated 22
April 1999, and its order dated 31 August 1999 denying reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. CSAaDE

Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., is on official leave.

Footnotes
1. Docketed as I.S. No. 99-302.

2. Resolution penned by Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali, concurred in by

Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., of the
court of Appeals Fourth Division; Rollo , pp. 100-102.
3. Sec. 1, Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

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 4. G.R. Nos. 92319-20, 2 October 1990, 190 SCRA 226.
5. No. L-40428, 17 December 1975, 70 SCRA 298.

6. No. L-29826, 30 September 1976, 73 SCRA 131.

7. G.R. No. 53373, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 462.

8. Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

83578, 16 March 1989, 171 SCRA 348.
9. G.R. No. 120319, 6 October 1995, 249 SCRA 162.

10. Citing Volkschel Labor Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, No. L-
39686, 25 June 1980, 98 SCRA 314.

11. Tandok v. Resultan, G.R. Nos. 59241-44, 5 July 1989, 175 SCRA 37.
12 See Note 8.

13. Department of Justice (DOJ) Department Order No. 223, as amended by DOJ
DO No. 359.
14. Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 103446-47, 30 August 1993, 225
SCRA 725; Crespo v. Mogul, see Note 7.

15. People v. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, 11 December 1987, 156 SCRA
279.
16. Nitafan, David G., Notes and Comments on the Bouncing Checks Law (BP
Blg. 22), 1993 Ed., p. 39.

17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Balitaan v. CFI Batangas, Br. II, 201 Phil. 311 (1982).
20. People v. Laggui , G.R. Nos. 76262-63, 16 March 1989, 171 SCRA 305.
21. Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. 63419, 18 December 1986, 146 SCRA 323.
22. Salonga v. Cruz Paño, G.R. No. 59524, 18 February 1985, 134 SCRA 438.
23. See Note 21.

24. Record of the Batasan Plenary Session No. 70, 4 December 1978, p. 1044.
25. See Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 89114, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA
428.

26. Yap v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68464, 22 March 1993, 220
SCRA 245; Qui v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66865, 13 January
1989, 169 SCRA 137.

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