Plaintiff-Appellees Defendant-Appellant Solicitor General Felix V Makasiar Solicitor Antonio M Martinez Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino
Plaintiff-Appellees Defendant-Appellant Solicitor General Felix V Makasiar Solicitor Antonio M Martinez Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino
Plaintiff-Appellees Defendant-Appellant Solicitor General Felix V Makasiar Solicitor Antonio M Martinez Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino
DECISION
ANTONIO, J : p
Kind: — ROHM-Revolver
Make: — German
SN: — 64
Cal: — .22"
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial
Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish
information regarding smuggling activities wanted persons, loose firearms,
subversives and other similar subjects that night affect the peace and order
condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was
temporarily authorized to possess an ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64,
for his personal protection while in the performance of official duties.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his
above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent,
with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he
was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decisions in
People v. Macarandang 2 and People v. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while
conceding that on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really
been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial
Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with
authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint,
nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968,
criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the
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ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang
a n d Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People v. Mapa, supra. The
court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the
accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People
v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed
the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it was
shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and
ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the
Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the
said firearm and ammunition. We there held that while it is true that the
Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit,
nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
"peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as
Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection
of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer"
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under section 879
of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements
relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held
that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use
of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful
purpose of the battalion commander and must be deemed incident to or
necessarily included in the duty and power of said military commander to
effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the
doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained
the judgment of conviction on the following ground:
"The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed,
'it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument
or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition. (Sec. 878, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section
provides that 'firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of
the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails,' are not
covered 'when such firearms are in possession of such officials and
public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.' (Sec.
879, Revised Administrative Code.)
'The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret
agent. As such he is not exempt. . . ."
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the
Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial
Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid
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down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958).
Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in
1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on
the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction
stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero
doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he
accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why
under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system
. . ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part
of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretatio
legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and
Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at
the time appellant was found by possession of the firearm in question and
when he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was
overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the
old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the
construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the
punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant was conferred his
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to
possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in
Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to
his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit
therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be
punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and
appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio.
Zaldivar, Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ ., concur.
Fernando, J ., did not take part.
Footnotes