SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS PRE-MID CASE DIGESTS

Atty. Luardo | 8:00 - 10:00 PM Thurs | MC

CHANGE OF NAME & CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

RULE 103 AND 108

General Considerations

GR: no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without judicial order;
EXC: (1) clerical or typographical errors; (2) first name or nickname; (3) day and month in the date
of birth; and (4) sex

Republic v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-32181 March 5, 1986

DOCTRINES: If the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. The appropriate proceeding
must be adversarial.

FACTS: Respondent Leonor Valencia filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation
and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. The
petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil status and nationality or citizenship of respondents, and may
only be allowed if a proper suit is filed, and sufficient evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations of the
petition or to disprove the same.

The substantial changes consist of their nationality from “Chinese” to “Filipino” and their status from “Legitimate” to
Illegitimate”, and changing also the status of the mother from “married” to “single”.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing the publication of
the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the city and
province of Cebu, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and notice thereof, duly served on the Solicitor
General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and Go Eng.

Two of the oppositors are the Solicitor General and the Local Civil Registrar. The former merely opposed while the
latter filed a motion to dismiss.

The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction of entry in the Civil
Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and
innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc., and not
changes or corrections involving civil status, nationality, or citizenship which are substantial and controversial. As a
response, Valencia argued that substantial changes can be made in the civil registry concerning civil status
provided that (1) the proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations of the
petition or to disprove the same; that respondents have complied with these requirements by filing the present
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court and that they have caused reasonable notice to be given to the persons named in the petition and
have also caused the order for the hearings of their petition to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province

The Local Civil Registrar filed a motion to dismiss on the ground the petition seeks to change the nationality or
citizenship of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status from "Legitimate" to
Illegitimate", and changing also the status of the mother from "married" to "single" the corrections sought are not
merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and status of the petitioning minors and the
status of their mother.

For context, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that "No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without a judicial order.".

ISSUE: Whether the chosen proceeding is appropriate.

RULING: Yes, the chosen proceeding is appropriate because the changes to be made are substantial.

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless
and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a
right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used.

A remedy or proceeding is appropriate if the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have
been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite
party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.

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In proceedings involving changes in the records of birth, the following is the procedure:
1. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to — (1) issue an order fixing the time and
place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
2. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: — (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having
or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the
record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be
described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil
Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and
the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversarial.

Here, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil
Registry of the City of Cebu was filed by respondent Leonor Valencia on January 27, 1970, and pursuant to the
order of the trial court dated February 4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof
was duly served on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The order likewise set the case for
hearing and directed the local civil registrar and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest under
the entries whose corrections were sought, to file their opposition to the said petition. An opposition to the petition
was consequently filed by the Republic on February 26, 1970. Thereafter a full blown trial followed with respondent
Leonor Valencia testifying and presenting her documentary evidence in support of her petition. The Republic on the
other hand cross-examined respondent Leonor Valencia.

As such, the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation
and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded
proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action

Eleosida v. LCR of Quezon City, G.R. No. 130277, May 9, 2002

DOCTRINES: Nature of procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
Summary Adversary

correction sought to be made in the civil register is rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
clerical nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial

● An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed
and considered.

● ICAB: changes sought for not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would
affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of
their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in
accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements
are complied with.

FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking to
correct the following entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: 1) the surname "Borbon"
should be changed to "Eleosida;" 2) the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and 3) the
informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of
her petition, petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock on May 24, 1992; that she and the boy's
father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the mother's
surname. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents.

The trial court dismissed the petition. It is an established jurisprudence that, only clerical errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature like: misspelled name, occupation of the parents, etc., may be the subject of a judicial order
(contemplated under Article 412 of the New Civil Code), authorizing changes or corrections and: not as may affect
the civil status, nationality or citizenship of the persons involved.

In the present case, it is very clear that the changes desired by the petitioner will ultimately affect the civil status of
Charles Christian, as she wants the Court to direct the Civil Registrar of Quezon City to substitute her maiden
name, Eleosida, with that of borbon; to delete the information supplied in ITEM 12, respecting the date and place of
marriage of parents, on the ground that she was never married to respondent Carlos Villeba Borbon and amend the
information in ITEM 14, respecting the name of the informant, from Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon to Ma. Lourdes B.
Eleosida, and is indicative of petitioner's intention and device to establish that Charles Christian civil status as
illegitimate.

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Petitioner fled the instant petition for review raising the issue:

ISSUE: Whether corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code, in
relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are substantial and not
merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.

RULING: Yes. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to
be adopted is adversary.

In Republic vs. Valencia it was held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true
facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered. The Court further laid down the procedural requirements to make the proceedings under Rule 108
adversary:

The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:

SEC. 3. Parties . — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication . — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice, file his opposition thereto.

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register are — (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to — (1) issue an order fixing the
time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled
to oppose the petition: — (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of
birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as 'summary.' . . .

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the
record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described
as 'summary.'

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless
errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos
Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now
allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate
procedural requirements are complied with. The records show that upon receipt of the petition, the trial court
issued a notice of hearing setting the hearing on June 26, 1997 at 8:30 in the morning at Room 118, Hall of
Justice, Quezon City. The trial court likewise ordered the publication of said notice once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation and its posting in selected places in Metro Manila. The
notice stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition during said hearing and all other persons having or claiming
any interest thereon shall also appear and show if there is any reason why the petition should not be granted.
Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Solicitor General were all
furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing together with a copy of the petition. On June 26, 1997, the trial
court issued a second order giving the petitioner an opportunity to show compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements and to present evidence during the hearing set on July 23, 1997.

The foregoing satisfy all the requirements of Rule 108 to make it an adversary proceeding. It was therefore an
error for the trial court to dismiss the petition motu proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to
support her petition and all the other persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the same.

Remedies under Rule 103 and 108 not interchangeable

Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2011

DOCTRINES: When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and

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controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,
a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.

FACTS: Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna
Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on
March 26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed a Petition to
change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The notice setting the petition for hearing on
November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper and a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG).

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by
Order of July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question
of law. The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of the respondent’s
parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any
change in civil status of a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.

The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondent’s parents’ date of marriage and the name of
respondent’s father from the entries in respondent’s birth certificate, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for change of name involves the change of respondent’s civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate and, therefore should be made through the appropriate adversarial proceeding.

RULING: Yes, the petition for a change of name involves the change of respondent’s civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate and, therefore should be made through the appropriate adversarial proceeding.

A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds.
Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds.
The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It
seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s
supplication. Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108
applies.

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which
the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding. As earlier stated,
however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon
City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil
registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.

The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for
the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court
allowing the change of one’s name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds.

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory remedies, respondent
cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside from improper venue, he
failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case.

Also, Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given
to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons
who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as
creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent
Section 5, which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an
opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).

In fine, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.

Retroactive effect of R.A. 10172

Republic v. Unabia, G.R. No. 213346, February 11, 2019

(read also the separate concurring opinion of J. Leonen, especially his discussions on the differences
between “sex” and “gender”)

DOCTRINES:
SEX GENDER

Sex is a biological concept. Gender is a social concept.

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 Sex refers to the biological distinctions between males Gender pertains to the social elaboration of biological
and females, and is based primarily on a person’s sex. It highlights the socially constructed differences
capability to reproduce. It encompasses those that are between men and women influenced by the different
biologically determined. norms and standards of societies, varying from one
society to the other.

FACTS: On February 11, 2009, respondent Miller Omandam Unabia filed before the RTC Special Proceeding No.
2009-018, which is a "Petition for Correction of Entries on the Birth Certificate of Mellie Umandam Unabia," claiming
that his Birth Certificate contained errors in that the name entered therein was "Mellie Umandam Unabia", when it
should properly have been written as "Miller Omandam Unabia"; that the gender was erroneously entered as
"female" instead of "male"; and that his father's middle initial was erroneously indicated as "U" when it should have
been "O". In support of the petition, respondent attached the following documentary evidence to the petition:

1. Medical Certificate;
2. Police Clearance;
3. Voter's Identification;
4. Baptismal Certificate;
5. National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Clearance;
6. Transcript of Records;
7. Mother's Birth Certificate; and
8. Father's Birth Certificate.

After satisfying the jurisdictional requirements, trial ensued. Respondent took the witness stand as the lone witness.
To support the claim for change of entry as to gender, a Medical Certificate was presented which was supposedly
issued by a physician of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center, Dr. Andresul A. Labis (Dr. Labis), which certificate
stated that respondent was "phenotypically male"; however, the physician was not presented in court to testify on
his findings and identify the document.

Ruling of RTC: it ruled that it has been clearly established by the petitioner that there are erroneous entries in his
birth [certificate]. That since the petitioner was born, he was a ma[l]e. He is also known to his friends and relatives
as Miller Omandam Unabia. His middle name spelled as an 'O' and not a 'U'. As shown from the birth certificate of
the father indeed the latter's middle name is an 'O'.

There is a need to correct the erroneous entries in the birth certificate of the petitioner to avoid confusion to his
person. The correction is also necessary to reveal his true identity as not to create doubt [as] to his person.

Petitioner appealed before the CA, arguing that respondent failed to state a valid ground for change of name; that
the petition failed to state the aliases by which respondent was known; that respondent failed to exhaust
administrative remedies; and that respondent failed to present the physician who allegedly issued the medical
certificate stating that respondent was male.

Ruling of CA: It affirmed the RTC’s decision

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred on a question of law when it affirmed the decision of the RTC granting
Unabia’s petition for correction of entries.

RULING: No, the CA did not err on a question of law when it affirmed the decision of the RTC.

When Special Proceeding No. 2009-018 was filed in 2009, the governing law then was the original, unamended RA
9048. There was no provision then for the administrative correction or change of clerical or typographical errors or
mistakes in the civil registry entries of the day and month in the date of birth or sex of individuals, but only clerical or
typographical errors and change of first names or nicknames. Administrative corrections or changes relating to the
date of birth or sex of individuals was authorized only with the passage in 2012 of RA 10172. Even then, the
amendments under RA 10172 should still apply, the law being remedial in nature. Moreover, under Section 11 of RA
9048, retroactive application is allowed "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code and other laws."

Petitioner questions the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Labis, Medical Officer III of the Northern Mindanao
Medical Center under the Department of Health, claiming that it failed to include a certification that respondent "has
not undergone sex change or sex transplant" as required by Section 5 of RA 9048, as amended, and that Dr. Labis
was not presented in court in order that his qualifications may be established and so that he may identify and
authenticate the medical certificate. However, the said Medical Certificate is a public document, the same having
been issued by a public officer in the performance of official duty; as such, it constitutes prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. Under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, "[d]ocuments consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution
and of the date of the latter."

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There was therefore no need to further identify and authenticate Dr. Labis' Medical Certificate. "A public document,
by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a
notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a
private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court."

On the other hand, while the trial court did not seem to make any material observation in its pronouncement
regarding respondent's physical appearance or otherwise to support its finding that the latter was male, the record
will support a finding that respondent was indeed male. In his photograph attached to the record, it will be observed
particularly that respondent's Adam's apple - or, in medical terms, his laryngeal prominence - was quite evident and
prominent. This can only indicate that respondent is male, because anatomically, only men possess an Adam's
apple.

As for petitioner's argument that the medical certificate failed to specifically certify that respondent "has not
undergone sex change or sex transplant" as required by law, suffice it to state that this is no longer required with
the certification by Dr. Labis that respondent is "phenotypically male", meaning that respondent's entire physical,
physiological, and biochemical makeup - as determined both genetically and environmentally - is male, which thus
presupposes that he did not undergo sex reassignment. In other words, as determined genetically and
environmentally, from conception to birth, respondent's entire being, from the physical, to the physiological, to the
biochemical - meaning that all the chemical processes and substances occurring within respondent - was
undoubtedly male. He was conceived and born male, he looks male, and he functions biologically as a male.

Thus, in respondent's case, the Court must do away with the requirement of no-sex change certification. The same
is true with respondent's failure to include his known aliases in his petition, simply because there appear to be none
at all; the bottom line issue is his gender as entered in the public record, not really his name.

Nonetheless, it must be laid down as a rule that when there is a medical finding that the petitioner in a case for
correction of erroneous entry as to gender is phenotypically male or female, the no-sex change or transplant
certification becomes mere surplusage.

Finally, suffice it to state that, as correctly declared by the CA, respondent was actually using the name Miller
Omandam Unabia; that "Miller" and "Mellie" and "Omandam" and "Umandam" were confusingly similar; and that
respondent's medical certificate shows that he is phenotypically male. The CA thus properly held that respondent's
birth certificate contained clerical errors in its entries necessitating its rectification.

Having disposed of the case in the foregoing manner, the other issues raised by the parties are deemed irrelevant
and need not be passed upon. As far as the Court is concerned, it has been satisfactorily shown that indeed, there
have been serious errors with respect to specific entries in respondent's birth record - errors that urgently need to
be rectified with alacrity, if justice is to be served.

JUSTICE LEONEN’S SEPARATE DECISION:

There is no iota of doubt that respondent was conceived and born male. However, to prevent confusion, certain
clarifications must be made.

The terms "sex" and "gender" refer to two (2) different ideas having vast differences. These cannot be used
interchangeably. while gender is a social concept.

Determining a person's sex mainly depends on "a combination of anatomical, endocrinal[,] and chromosomal
features." "Chromosomes are the structures that carry genes which in turn transmit hereditary characteristics from
parents to offspring."

Conversely, gender is the result of the norms and standards imposed by society. It is a changing concept that differs
in every society. While most individuals are biologically born as male or female, the behavioral standard enforced in
a given society affects one's gender identity. Exactly how one is taught how to interact with others of the same or
opposite sex usually defines one's gender identity.

In its Petition, the Republic of the Philippines assailed the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals, which ordered the correction of respondent's sex from male to female. It argued that an individual's true
gender is not determined by a simple visual observation and examination. Respondent countered that the evidence
on record supported the findings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. In support of his contention,
he submitted a Medical Certificate, which certified him to be "phenotypically male. "

The majority noted that based on respondent's photograph attached to the record, his Adam's apple was quite
evident and prominent, which can only mean that respondent is male, because anatomically, only men possess an
Adam's apple.

I regret that I cannot agree with the factual premise for determining the biological sex of respondent.

I, however, agree with the majority that Republic Act No. 10172, being remedial in nature, retroactively apply here.
Settled is the rule that procedural laws have a retroactive effect, but may only be applied to cases or actions

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pending and undetermined when they were enacted.

Remedial laws or procedural laws are statutes concerning modes of procedure "designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases." These laws "do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of
the remedy or confirmation of such rights[.]" Thus, remedial laws do not fall within the proscription against
retroactive operation of statutes.

Republic Act No. 9048 was the governing law when respondent filed his Petition. Under this law, the concerned city
or municipal civil registrar or consul general may administratively correct or change clerical or typographical errors,
provided that it does not involve a change in the nationality, age, status, or sex of the petitioner.
While respondent's appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted into law.
Republic Act No. 10172 amended Republic Act No. 9048 in the sense that clerical errors regarding one's sex may
now be administratively corrected.

In its Decision, the Court of Appeals applied Republic Act No. 10172 and ruled that respondent had presented all
the necessary documents to prove that there was a clerical error regarding his sex.

The Court of Appeals correctly applied Republic Act No. 10172. As a procedural law, it neither creates nor
eliminates vested rights. Instead, it merely reinforces and confirms people's right to have the entries in their birth
certificates corrected. It reaffirms their right to remove any cloud of doubt on their identity.

Petition under Rule 103

1. Who may file petition (Sec. 1 & 2)

Republic v. CA and Wong, G.R. No. L-97906, May 21, 1992

DOCTRINES:
● To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason
therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
● In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the
sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best
evidence available.
● Section 1 of Rule 103, in specifying the parties who may avail of said remedy, uses the generic term "persons"
to signify all natural persons regardless of status. If a legitimate person may, under certain judicially accepted
exceptional circumstances, petition the court for a change of name, the Court does not see any legal basis or
logic in discriminating against the availment of such a remedy by an adopted child.

FACTS: Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala.
When he was but two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., he and his sister were, with the
consent of their natural parents, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized
Filipinos.

Upon reaching the age of 22, herein private respondent, by then married and a junior Engineering student, filed a
petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that:
● His use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same
suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community,
and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality;
● He is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and
● His adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.

The trial court resolved the matter in favor of private respondent which was affirmed in full by the CA.

The Solicitor General contends that private respondent's allegations of ridicule and/or isolation from family and
friends were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition for change of name. He claims that for private
respondent to cast aside the name of his adoptive father is crass ingratitude to the memory of the latter and his
adoptive mother who is still alive, despite her consent to the petition for change of name. Further, the Solicitor
General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong to his old name violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code,
which requires an adoptive child to use the surname of the adopter, and would identify him with his parents by
nature, thus giving the impression that he has severed his relationship with his adoptive parents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name are valid,
sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition.

RULING: YES, the reasons given by private respondent for change of name are sufficient to warrant the granting of
the petition.

A change of name is a special proceeding to establish the status of a person involving his relation with others, that
is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. It is a proceeding in rem and, as such, strict
compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, is essential in order to vest the court with

7
jurisdiction thereover. For this purpose, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in
the civil register.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for the purpose of identification, and a
change of name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of reasons
adduced and the consequences that will likely follow; it is a privilege which may be granted only upon a showing of
a proper or reasonable cause or compelling reason therefor.

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefor
but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name
which have been held valid are:
(a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(c) When the change will avoid confusion;
(d) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien
parentage;
(e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and
(f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was
for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to
the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all
the best evidence available. Summarizing, in special proceedings for change of name, what is involved is not a
mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety
of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with
the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.

While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an adopted child shall
bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the
adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings. The purpose of an adoption
proceeding is to effect this new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the change of
name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an incident than the object of the proceeding. The
welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the determination of an application for adoption.

A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law only by way of exception to the mandatory
provisions of the Civil Code on the use of surnames. The law fixes the surnames that may be used by a person, at
least inceptively, and it may be changed only upon judicial permission granted in the exercise of sound discretion.
Section 1 of Rule 103, in specifying the parties who may avail of said remedy, uses the generic term
"persons" to signify all natural persons regardless of status. If a legitimate person may, under certain judicially
accepted exceptional circumstances, petition the court for a change of name, the Court does not see any legal
basis or logic in discriminating against the availment of such a remedy by an adopted child. In other words, Article
365 is not an exception, much less can it bar resort to Rule 103.

From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of his adopter mother Concepcion Ty-Wong, the lower courts discern
that said appellee was prompted to file the petition for change of name because of the embarrassment and ridicule
his family name 'Wong' brings in his dealings with his relatives and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and living in a
Muslim community. Another cause is his desire to improve his social and business life. It has been held that in the
absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a
former alien nationality which only hamper social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for change of
name. Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to improve his social standing as long as in doing so, he
does not cause prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of other persons. Nothing whatsoever is shown in
the record of this case that such prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of other persons would result in the
change of petitioner's name.

It is not fair to construe the desired reversion of private respondent to the use of the name of his parents by nature
as crass ingratitude. Before he filed the petition for change of name, asked for his adoptive mother's permission to
do so and this was confirmed by his adoptive mother. As proof of her assent to the filing of said petition (her
husband having already passed away), Concepcion Ty Vda. de Wong executed an affidavit. There could be no
other plausible reason for private respondent to first secure his adoptive mother's consent before resorting to the
questioned legal recourse other than the parental respect and reverence which is owed by and to be expected of a
dutiful child. If private respondent was such an ingrate, as the Solicitor General would have us believe, he would not
have bothered to seek his adoptive mother's counsel. In the same breath, had his adoptive mother regarded him as
an ungrateful adoptee, she would not have executed the affidavit, much less testify in his behalf at the hearing of
his petition.

Moreover, worthy of note is the fact that private respondent's adoptive mother emphasized that she executed the
above affidavit "without affecting the legal adoption granted by the Court on September 9, 1967, making him as one
of my legal and compulsory heir(s)." This is incontrovertible proof that she never entertained any misgivings and
reservations with respect to her consent to his petition. This likewise dispels any possible confusion as to private

8
respondent's legal status or adoptive paternity and his successional rights. Concordantly, the Court held that a
change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties
flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship: what is altered is only the name.

Therefore, the decision of the CA granting the petition of change of name is affirmed in toto.

Calderon v. Republic, G.R. No. L-18127, April 5, 1967 (compare with Republic v. Marcos)

DOCTRINES:
A petition to change the name of an infant, as in this case, should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the
best interest of the child. Justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his
social standing as long as in so doing he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other
people.

While it can be argued that the child is till a minor and the petition should not be granted because of that fact
because the child may or may not be aware of the effects of the situation, the court said that should not be the
case, because a change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or affect a change in,
one's existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family
rights and duties where none before was existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or
citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is that word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from others and which he bears as a label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.

FACTS:
1. Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, a minor, through her mother and natural guardian, Corazon Adolfo
Calderdon, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying that her name "Gertrudes
Josefina del Prado" be changed to "Getrudes Josefina Calderon."
a. It is alleged in the petition that the petitioner is an illegitimate child, born on March 17, 1956, out of
a bigamous marriage contracted by Manuel del Prado with Corazon Adolfo;
b. that the surname "Del Prado" which the petitioner carries is a stigma of illegitimacy, by reason of
which she has become the subject of unfair comments;
c. that the surname which the petitioner carries would constitute a handicap in her life in later years,
and would give cause for constant irritation in her social relations with other people;
d. that petitioner is living with her mother who is now married to Engineer Romeo C. Calderon; and
e. that it is the desire of the petitioner to have her surname changed from "Del Prado" to "Calderon
"which is the surname of her foster father, the husband of her mother.
2. The Provincial Fiscal of Davao, filed an opposition to the petition upon the ground that the change of
surname of the petition is unwarranted, considering that said petitioner was born out of a bigamous
marriage and as such she has the status of an acknowledged natural child by legal fiction and under the
law she should bear the surname of her father Manuel del Prado;
3. After hearing the court a quo issued an order, granting the petition and ordering the change of the name of
the petitioner from "Gertrudes Josefina, del Prado," to "Gertrudes Josefina Calderon."
4. From the above-mentioned order the provincial fiscal, representing the Solicitor General, appealed to this
Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition to change the name be granted

RULING: Yes (The name be changed),the petition to change the name be granted.

A petition to change the name of an infant, as in this case, should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the
best interest of the child. Justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his
social standing as long as in so doing he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other
people.

When the mother of the petitioner filed the instant petition she had in mind what she believed was for the best
interest of her child considering that her husband Romeo C. Calderon is the one supporting the child and that he is
agreeable to the child's using his surname. The mother had considered the generous attitude of her husband as an
opportunity for her to promote the personality, and enhance the dignity, of her daughter, by eliminating what
constitutes a stigma of illegitimacy which her child would continue to bear if her surname is that of her illegitimate
father.

Therefore, the petition to change the name be granted

NOTES:We agree with the lower court when it said that "While it is true that the Code provides that a natural child by legal fiction as the
petitioner herein shall principally enjoy the surname of the father, yet, this does not mean that such child is prohibited by law, from
taking another surname with the latters consent and for justifiable reasons." If under the law a legitimate child may secure a change of his
name through judicial proceedings, upon a showing of a "proper and reasonable cause", We do not see any reason why a natural child
cannot do the same.

The purpose of the law in allowing a change of name, as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, is to give a person
an opportunity to improve his personality and to promote his interests. We are satisfied that the facts and circumstances as borne out by
the record amply justify the change of the surname of the petitioner, as ordered by the lower court . We have held that the matter whether to

9
grant or deny a petition for a change of name is left to the sound discretion of the court, and in the present case We believe that the court a quo
has exercised its discretion in a judicious way when it granted the petition.

ON THE ARGUMENT OF MINORITY of the CHILD:

The court essentially claims that it is okay still to change the name of the child while she is still a child because a
change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or affect a change in, one's existing
family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family rights and
duties where none before was existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship. What is
altered is only the name, which is that word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others
and which he bears as a label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him

Republic v. Marcos, G.R. No. L-31065, February 15, 1990 (compare with Calderon v. Republic)

DOCTRINES:
● The petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change his/her name, even if it may
be signed and verified by some other person on his behalf. The decision to change her name, the reason
for the change, and the choice of a new name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It must be her
personal decision. No one else may make it for her
● For a publication of a petition for a change of name to be valid, the title thereof should include, first, his real
name, and second, his aliases, if any
● A change of name is a mere privilege and not a matter of right

FACTS: A verified petition was filed by private respondent Pang Cha Quen, alleging that she is a Chinese married
to Alfredo de la Cruz, a Filipino citizen. She had resided in Baguio since birth and by a previous marriage to Sia
Bian, a Chinese citizen as well, she gave birth to May Sia alis Manman Huang in Manila. She registered her
daughter as an alien under the name of Mary Pang, using her maternal surname because the child’s father had
abandoned them. Her daughter had used the name of “Mary Pang” at home and in school. When Pang Cha
married Alfredo, Alfredo was recognized as the stepfather of Mary and as Mary has grown to love and recognize
her stepfather, she desires to adopt and use the surname of Alfredo. Alfredo gave his conformity by signing at the
bottom of the pleading wherein Pang Cha alleged that that the petition was not made for the purpose of concealing
a crime as her ten-year old daughter has not committed any, nor to evade the execution of a judgment as she has
never been sued in court, and the petition is not intended to cause damage or prejudice to any third person. She
prayed that her daughter be allowed to change her name from May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to Mary Pang
De la Cruz.

The respondent judge issued an order setting the hearing of the petition and inviting interested persons to appear
and show cause they the petition should not be granted. The order also directed that it be published in a newspaper
of general circulation and that copies be furnished to the Solicitor General and the City Attorney of Baguio. Upon
receipt of evidence, respondent judge authorized the change of the minor’s name,

The government, through the SolGen, appealed to the SC on the ground that the court’s order was contrary tp law.

ISSUE # 1: W/n the respondent judge acquired jurisdiction over the case? NO

RULING: The caption of the petition and the published order of the court did not include the name of “Mary Pang as
one of the names that the minor has allegedly been using. The court held in the case of Jesus Siong v Republic
that for a publication or a petition for a change of name to be valid, the title should include, first, his real name, and
second, his aliases, if any. The purpose of which is to allow the ordinary reader of the case to proceed reading the
contents of the order because of the familiarity of the names in the body.

In this case, the omission of her other alias — "Mary Pang" — in the captions of the court's order and of the petition
defeats the purpose of the publication. In view of that defect, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
subject of the proceedings, i.e., the various names and aliases of the petitioner which she wished to change to
"Mary Pang De la Cruz.

Hence, the respondent judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE # 2: W/n the respondent judge erred in granting the change of name by Mary? YES

RULING: The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of name:

● when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

● when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
● when the change will avoid confusion
● having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of his alien
parentage
● a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and not to
prejudice anybody

10
As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the reasons offered for changing the name of
petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz
as her own father"; (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of security; and (3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this
petition, and has signified his conformity at the foot of this pleading".

Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule is that a change of name should not be
permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another where none actually exists. Furthermore,
the court held in the case of Padilla v Republic that our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the
surname of a person not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who is not
their father, can result in confusion of their paternity.

Another reason for disallowing the change of name is that it was filed by the improper party. Clearly, the petition for
change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified
by some other person on his behalf. In this case, however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia.

Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have reached the age of
majority, may file the petition to change her name. The decision to change her name, the reason for the change,
and the choice of a new name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It must be her personal decision. No one
else may make it for her. The reason is obvious. When she grows up to adulthood, she may not want to use her
stepfather's surname, nor any of the aliases chosen for her by her mother. The State has an interest in the name
borne by each individual for purposes of identification and the same should not be changed for trivial reasons like
the instant case. A change of name is a mere privilege and not a matter of right.

Because the petition to change the name of the minor May Sia is not supported by weighty reasons, the trial court
erred in granting it.

COMPARISON: CALDERON vs. CA and REPUBLIC vs. MARCOS

MAIN ISSUE: WON the petition to change name be granted

CALDERON vs. CA REPUBLIC vs. MARCOS

SIMILARITIES

1. Both filed by their mothers FOR their children;

2. Both are illegitimate children and minor at the time of the filing of the petition;
3. They want to petition the change of last name of their children to the last name
of their new husbands;
4. WHY? Because in both cases, the daughters grew up with and called the new
husband as their fathers, even though the same are not their biological fathers;
5. Both NEW husbands/fathers also approve of this change to their last names.

DIFFERENCES

AS TO THE LAST In Calderon, the child initially used the last In Republic, the child initially used the last
NAME USED name of the biological father because they name of the mother because she claims
were said to be married but then that that the biological father abandoned them.
marriage was rescinded because it was a
bigamous marriage.

WHEN THE CHILD In Calderon, the child was born during the In Republic, the child was born out of
WAS BORN subsistence of a bigamous marraige wedlock.
between her parents.

RULING In Calderon, the change of name was In Republic, the change of name was not
granted. granted.

As to the MINORITY In Calderon, SolGen expresses an In Republic, it became one of the reasons
of the children apprehension that because the petitioner why the petition was not granted because
here is of tender age, who cannot as yet the court ruled that the petition for change
understand and appreciate the value of the of name must be filed by the person
change of her name, may be prejudiced in desiring to change his/her name, even if it
her rights under the law. BUT THE COURT may be signed and verified by some other
pronounced through Judge Makalintal the person on his behalf. In this case,
following: however, the petition was filed by Pang
Cha Quen not by May Sia.
But a change of name as authorized under
Rule 103 does not by itself define, or Hence, only May Sia herself, alias
affect a change in, one's existing family Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when

11
 relations, or in the rights and duties she shall have reached the age of
flowing therefrom; nor does it create majority, may file the petition to change
new family rights and duties where her name. The decision to change her
none before was existing. It does not name, the reason for the change, and the
alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or choice of a new name and surname shall
citizenship. What is altered is only the be hers alone to make. It must be her
name, which is that word or combination of personal decision. No one else may make
words by which a person is distinguished it for her.
from others and which he bears as a label
or appellation for the convenience of the
world at large in addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him.

ACTUAL RULINGS A petition to change the name of an infant, REASONS: (1) that "her daughter grew up
as in this case, should be granted only with, and learned to love and recognize
where to do so is clearly for the best Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father"; (2)
interest of the child. Justice dictates that to afford her daughter a feeling of security;
every person be allowed to avail of any and (3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to
opportunity to improve his social standing this petition, and has signified his
as long as in so doing he does not cause conformity at the foot of this pleading".
prejudice or injury to the interests of the
State or of other people. Clearly, these are not valid reasons for
a change of name. The general rule is
When the mother of the petitioner filed the that a change of name should not be
instant petition she had in mind what she permitted if it will give a false impression
believed was for the best interest of her of family relationship to another where
child considering that her husband Romeo none actually exists. Furthermore, the
C. Calderon is the one supporting the child court held in the case of Padilla v
and that he is agreeable to the child's Republic that our laws do not authorize
using his surname. The mother had legitimate children to adopt the surname
considered the generous attitude of her of a person not their father, for to allow
husband as an opportunity for her to them to adopt the surname of their
promote the personality. mother's husband, who is not their father,
can result in confusion of their paternity.

Tin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-20997, April 27, 1967

DOCTRINES: Philippine citizenship of the applicant is not a prerequisite for a petition to change name; and that,
accordingly, an alien may petition for a change of name. However, only aliens domiciled in the Philippines may
apply for change of name in the Courts thereof.

FACTS: Petition to change the name of Ong Huan Tin to Teresita Tan (Special Proceeding 03521, Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court). Due publication was had. The petition was set for hearing. But, before the petition could
be heard on the merits, the court, motu proprio, in its order of November 6, 1962 expressed the opinion "that an
alien cannot avail himself of the provisions of our Rules of Court relating to change of name" and thereupon denied
the petition. A move to reconsider was rejected in the court's order of November 24, 1962. Offshoot is the present
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not an alien may petition for a change of name.

RULING: YES. In a recent judicial test (In the Petition for the Change of Name of JOSELITO YU, G. R. L-20874,
May 25, 1966) we held that Philippine citizenship of the applicant is not a prerequisite for a petition to change
name; and that, accordingly, an alien may petition for a change of name. There, this Court declared:

"Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change of name. [Neither does
Republic Act No. 1386 of the Philippine Commission from which the Rule has been adopted.] Section 1 provides that
'a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the court of First Instance of the province in which
he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.' Here, the word 'person' is a
generic term which is not limited to Filipino citizens but embraces all natural persons. The rule does not even require
that the citizenship of the petitioner be stated in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified, signed by the
petitioner or some other person in his behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of filing; (b) the cause for which the
change of name is sought; and (c) the name asked for (Section 2). The rule is clear and affords no room for
interpretation. It sets forth all the requirements, and Filipino citizenship is not one of them.

Furthermore, as held by this Court in several cases, in which pertinently enough the petitioners were aliens, the
change is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will likely follow. In not one of those cases, however, has it been ruled that an alien is not entitled
to file a petition at all."

12
Nonetheless, it is not to say that every alien in this country may petition for a change of name.
Change of name — under our law — is a special proceeding to establish the status of a person involving his
relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. The petition
therefore is directed against all. It is in rem. So it is that under Section 3 of Rule 103, publication of the petition is
required.
The broad general doctrine is that the status of an alien individual is governed and controlled by the lex domicilii.
Implicit in this precept is that an alien may be allowed to change his name here only if he be domiciled in the
Philippines. And "domicile" means permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent."
An alien who temporarily stays in the Philippines may not therefore avail of the right to change his name. It is to
say that change of name is not temporary in nature; the new name may not be shunted aside at will.
We, accordingly, lay down the rule that only aliens domiciled in the Philippines may apply for change of name in
the Courts thereof.
Considering that the petition herein complies with the requisites set forth in the Rules of Court, we vote to set
aside the orders of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of November 6, 1962 and November 24, 1962;
and to direct said Court to proceed with the hearing and determination of Special Proceeding 03521,
entitled "In the Matter of the Petition to Change Name of Ong Huan Tin to Teresita Tan." No costs. So ordered.

Kok v. Republic, G.R. No. L-27621, August 30, 1973

DOCTRINES: Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a petition for a change of name
shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be changed, or some other person on his behalf.

Jurisdictional requirements, re: petition for change of name.—Then again, to confer jurisdiction on the court, since
petitions for change of name are proceedings in rem, strict compliance with the requirements is essential, namely,
that such verified petition should be published for 3 successive weeks in some newspapers of general circulation in
the province; and that both the title or caption of the petition and its body shall recite (1) the name or names or
aliases of the applicant; (2) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and (3) the new name asked for. The
reason for these requirements is that a change of name is a matter of public interest. x x x Failure to comply with
these jurisdictional requirements, renders the proceedings a nullity.

Change of name of wife and minor children of husband-father cannot be made on a mere motion.—To allow the
change of name of the wife and other minor children of petitioner-appellee, upon a mere motion as an incident in
the proceedings for the change of name of petitioner-appellee, will not only deprive the government of the required
filing fees therefor but will also dispense with the aforesaid essential requirements respecting the recitals in the title
of the petition and the publication to apprise persons, who may be in possession of adverse information or evidence
against the grant of the petition, so that they will come forward with such information or evidence in order to protect
public interest as well as the interest of private individuals who may be prejudiced by the change of name of the
petitioner

FACTS: Petitioner, Secan Kok a prosperous businessman, is a Chinese citizen, born of Chinese parents in Amoy,
China, on September 7, 1917. Sometime in 1928, the petitioner came to the Philippines.

Petitioner's true and correct Chinese name is Cua Kian Kok but by clerical mistake committed by the immigration
official who prepared his registration papers, he is officially called Secan Kok.

On May 18, 1964, Secan Kok filed a petition to change his name and that of his daughter Marilyn Se respectively to
Antonio Cuakok and Gloria Cuakok, although his petition mentions his other minor children, namely Perfecto,
Romeo, Betty, Tomas, Daniel and Antonio, Jr. as having been born out of his marriage in the Catholic church on
August 2, 1947 at Cotabato City, without, significantly, mentioning the name of his wife.

On January 13, 1965, petitioner-appellee filed the amended petition with the corrected verification, but containing
the same allegations and the same prayer per direction of the TC to amend the petition.

On July 28, 1965, the court granted the petition. The name of the petitioner, Secan Kok, is hereby changed to
Antonio Cuakok Petitioner's daughter's name, Marilyn, is hereby changed to Gloria Cuakok.

On January 7, 1966, petitioner-appellee filed a motion for supplemental judgment, alleging that the Bureau of
Immigration refused to change the surname of his wife Lucia O. Tee and their aforesaid six (6) minor children to
Cuakok.

On January 10, 1966, the government, thru the Assistant City Fiscal, opposed the motion on the ground that
(a) the order dated July 28, 1965 of the trial court authorizing the change of his name and the name of his daughter
has long become final and therefore can no longer be supplemented; and
(b) that his wife Lucia O. Tee, being of age, should file a separate petition to change her name, such a petition
being an individual and personal matter and not a collective one.

13
On Mar 30, 1966, the court granted the supplemental judgment.

The government filed an MR for the said Order by the TC and was granted on May 12, 1966. However, upon MR of
the petitioner-appellee, the court set aside the previous order and reinstated the Mar. 30, 1966 order on Sept. 1,
1966 order which was appealed by the state. (phlegmatic mn ni si court uy)

ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the petition.

RULING: NO. The rules are very explicit. Sec 2 of Rule 103 of the RoC provides that a petition for a change of
name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be changed, or some other person on his
behalf. There is a need, therefore, for a separate petition to be filed by the wife Lucia O. Tee, who is already of age,
on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children.

In addition, Sec. 3 of rule 103 of the ROC provides that to confer jurisdiction on the court, since petitions for
change of name are proceedings in rem, strict compliance with the requirements is essential, namely, that such
verified petition should be published for three (3) successive weeks in some newspapers of general circulation in
the province; and that both the title or caption of the petition and its body shall recite:
(1) the name or names or aliases of the applicant;
(2) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and
(3) the new name asked for.

The reason for these requirements is that a change of name is a matter of public interest. The petitioner might be in
the rogues' gallery or hiding to avoid service of sentence or compliance with a judgment in a criminal case, or could
have escaped from prison; or if an alien, he might have given cause for deportation or might be one against whom
an order of deportation was issued or that the new name the petitioner desires to adopt may be similar to that of a
respectable person and the latter might have evidence that petitioner is of unsavory reputation that might impair his
own good name. Being a privilege and not a right, a change of name lies within the discretion of the court to give or
withhold.

To allow the change of name of the wife and other minor children of petitioner-appellee, upon a mere motion as an
incident in the proceedings for the change of name of petitioner-appellee, will not only deprive the government of
the required filing fees therefor but will also dispense with the aforesaid essential requirements respecting the
recitals in the title of the petition and the publication to apprise persons, who may be in possession of adverse
information or evidence against the grant of the petition, so that they will come forward with such information or
evidence in order to protect public interest as well as the interest of private individuals who may be prejudiced by
the change of name of the petitioner.

Since there is a total absence of a petition signed by Lucia O. Tee and her other minor children and the
publication thereof, the challenged orders dated March 30, 1966 and September 3, 1966 are completely void ab
initio.

Inasmuch as petitioner-appellee's own petition and the publication of the same do not include all his names and
aliases, the new name he desires to bear as well as those of his minor daughter Marilyn Se, the trial court likewise
acquired no jurisdiction over his petition and the decision granting his petition is similarly void ab initio
and could be attacked collaterally, vitiated as it was by a fatal flaw — lack of jurisdiction.

Venue: RTC with territorial jurisdiction over the residence of the petitioner (Sec. 1)

Contents of petition (Sec. 2)

a. caption of petition should include:(1) applicant’s real name, (2) his aliases or other names, if any, and (3)
the name he seeks to adopt

Republic v. Zosa, G.R. No. L-48762, September 12, 1988

DOCTRINES: In a petition for change of name the title of the petition should include the (1) applicant's real name,
(2) his aliases or other names, if any, and (3) the name sought to be adopted even if these data are found in the
body of the petition. For the publication to be valid and effective, the published order should reproduce the title of
the petition containing the data already stated and should contain correct information as to (1) the name or names
of the applicant; (2) the cause for the changed name, and (3) the new name asked for

JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN PUBLICATION OF ORDER. — For the publication to be valid and

effective, the published order should reproduce the title of the petition containing the data already stated and should
contain correct information as to (1) the name or names of the applicant; (2) the cause for the changed name, and
(3) the new name asked for

FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE NAME SOUGHT TO BE ADOPTED RENDERS COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION

FACTS: Respondent Lee King Sing filed a petition with the CFI of Samar for change of name to “Antonio C. Lee”.
(See full text for the petition, the pertinent part looks like this)

14
The lower court issued an order setting the petition for hearing. Said order was subsequently published in the
Leyte Forum on February 22, March 1, and March 3, 1977.

Petitioner through the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the name sought
to be adopted by respondent and other names by which he is known are not indicated or included in the
title of the petition.
● The respondent filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss.
● The lower court denied the aforesaid motion.

After trial and hearing, the court granted the petition; hence, the instant appeal, petitioner raising a lone assignment
of error: THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SAMAR ERRED IN TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL DEFECT IN THE
PETITION AND PUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE OF HEARING."

ISSUE: Whether there was substantial defect in the petition and publication of the notice of hearing (due to the
name sought to be adopted by respondent and other names by which he is known not being indicated or included
in the title of the petition)

RULING: Yes.

The proceeding for a change of name is a proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition for
change of name is acquired after due publication of the order containing certain data, among which is the
name sought to be adopted, a matter which should be indicated in the title of the petition

In a petition for change of name the title of the petition should include (1) the applicant's real name, (2) his aliases
or other names, if any, and (3) the name sought to be adopted even if these data are found in the body of the
petition. For the publication to be valid and effective, the published order should reproduce the title of the petition
containing the data already stated and should contain correct information as to (1) the name or names of the
applicant; (2) the cause for the changed name, and (3) the new name asked for.

The reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted by and the other names or
aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition or in the caption of the published order is that the ordinary reader
only glances fleetingly at the caption of the published order or the title of the petition in a special
proceeding. Only if the caption or the title strikes him does he proceed to read the contents of the order.
And the probability is great that he does not at all notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if these
are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition. The non-inclusion of all the names or aliases of the
applicant in the caption of the order or in the title of the petition defeats the very purpose of the required publication

In the present case, the petition itself, as well as the order published, carries the following title "In Re: Petition for
Change of Name Lee King Sing, Petitioner." It does not contain the name (Antonio C. Lee) sought to be adopted
and the names by which petitioner was known to his friends and associates. The title should have read "In the
Matter of the Change of Name of Lee King Sing, otherwise known as Antonio or Tony to Antonio C. Lee, Lee
King Sing, Petitioner."

The petition does not indicate in its title or caption that herein respondent desires to change his name to Antonio C.
Lee. The published order setting his petition for hearing reproduced that defective title. The failure to include the
name sought to be adopted in the title of the petition nor in the title or caption of the notices published in the
newspapers renders the trial court without jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition

Hence, considering that the title of the petition in this case and the order setting it for hearing are defective, the
lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the proceeding

Procedure after petition is filed

a. Court issues order setting case for initial hearing and directing its publications (Sec. 3)

b. Publication (Sec. 3)

Siong v. Republic, G.R. No. L-20306, March 31, 1966

DOCTRINES: CHANGE OF NAME; NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS; JURISDICTION HOW ACQUIRED. — Change

of name is a judicial proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition thereof, by law, is acquired
after publication of the "order reciting the purpose of the petition" and the "date and place for the hearing thereof"

15
for three (3) successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. (Art. 376, Civil Code; Sections 1 and 3, Rule
103, Rules of Court.) Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object "to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established."
(Grey Alba et al., vs. de la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, 62).

FACTS TO BE RECITED IN THE PUBLICATION. — For the publication to be effective it must give a correct
information. To inform, the publication should recite, amongst others the following facts: (1) the name or names of
the applicant, (2) the cause for which the change of name is sought, and (3) the new name asked for. (Sec. 2, Rule
103, Rules of Court.)||| (In re: Jesus Ng Yao Siong v. Republic, G.R. No. L-20306, [March 31, 1966], 123 PHIL
318-324)

POWER OF COURT TO GIVE OR WITHHOLD CONSENT. — Change of name is not a right. It is a privilege. (Ong
Peng Oan vs. Republic, 54 Off. Gaz., No. 8, pp. 2527, 2528.) The court may give or withhold its consent.

REAL NAME OF PERSON; VARIANCE BETWEEN NAME RECORDED IN THE CIVIL REGISTER AND THAT
GIVEN IN THE CHURCH RECORDS; NAME THAT MAY BE CHANGED. — By Article 408 of the Civil Code a
person's birth must be entered in the civil register. So it is that the civil register records his name. That name in the
civil register, for legal purposes, is his real name (Chomi vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 52 Off. Gaz., No. 15 pp.
6541, 6543.) A name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the
community — when at variance with that entered in the civil register — is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his
real name. Therefore, for purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code, the
only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register.

FAILURE TO STATE TRUE NAME AND ALIASES IN HEADING OF PETITION. — For a publication of a petition for
a change of name, to be valid, the title thereof should include, first, his real name, and second, his aliases, if any.
This is a strict requirement of publication and non-compliance therewith is fatal. The court acquires no jurisdiction to
hear the case. (Tan vs. Republic, L-16384, April 26, 1962.)

ALIENS; USE OF ALIASES WITHOUT JUDICIAL AUTHORITY. — The use of aliases, without judicial authority,
violates Section 1 of commonwealth Act 142, punishable with imprisonment ranging from 1 month to 6 months
pursuant to Section 4 of said statute. In the present case, since petitioner was never authorized to see an alias by a
competent court, his application for a change of name could not be lawfully granted. To grant the same is to
sanction an unlawful act which might reach the proportions of a crime.

PROPER AND REASONABLE CAUSE FOR A CHANGE OF NAME; CONFUSION IN SCHOOL RECORDS AND
EMBARRASSMENT IN DEALINGS WITH PUBLIC. — Petitioner's claim that his various names caused much
confusion in the school records and unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him in his dealings with the public
does not constitute proper and reasonable justification to legally authorize a change of name for him. For indeed
he had been using these names all along. And that use naturally facilitates his transactions with others who knew
him by the one name or the other.

FACTS: Petitioner, a Chinese resident of Dumaguete City, bears a number of names:1 (1) Jesus Ng, in his birth
certificate and certificate of residence (2) Jesus Uy Keng Lee, in his school records,, (3) Uy Keng Lee Jesus, also in
his school records, (4) Keng Lee Uy, to his friends and to the general public, (5) Uy Keng Lee, in his income tax
returns, and (6) Jesus Ng Yao Siong, in his alien certificate of registration. These divers names, so his petition
avers, "had caused much confusion in his school records and unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him in his
dealings with the public". To obviate all these, petitioner would want to be known only by one name — Keng Lee Uy
— and accordingly petitioned that the Negros Oriental court authorize the change of all the other names to Keng
Lee Uy. The city attorney of Dumaguete opposed the petition, alleged that there is no necessity for the change of
name and that petitioner is guilty of a violation of the laws regarding the use of names and surnames. The judgment
— after hearing — went for petitioner. The Republic appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is necessity for the change of name to Keng Lee Uy| and that petitioner is guilty of a
violation of the laws regarding the use of names and surname

RULING: YES. The petition for change of name is not being supported by weighty reasons, the condition for the
grant thereof is non-existent; and, nothing is left for the court but to dismiss said petition.

Rules of Court in relation to Article 376 & Article 408 of the Civil Code
RULE 103 Change of Name
Section 2. Contents of petition. — A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person
desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3)
years prior to the date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

16
(c) The name asked for.

Section 3. Order for hearing. — If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order
reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of
the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper
of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not
be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) month after the last publication of the notice.

Section 5. Judgment. — Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has
been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable
cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the
prayer of the petition.

Article 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

Article 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. (326a)

In a proceeding for a change of name the following question may crop up: What is the name to be changed? By
Article 408 of the Civil Code a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. So it is that the civil register
records his name. That name in the civil register, for legal purposes, is his real name. And correctly so, because the
civil register is an official record of the civil status of persons. A name given to a person in the church records or
elsewhere or by which he is known in the community — when at variance with that entered in the civil register — is
unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.

We therefore rule that for purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code, the
only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register.

ON THE PETITIONER’S APPLICATION AND ORDER AND THE ACTUAL PUBLICATION OF A PETITION

The order of publication herein — based on the petition — was published in "The Negros Times", a weekly
newspaper in Dumaguete City. The title of this case was there printed as follows: "In the matter of the change of
name of Jesus Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Ng Yao Siong, petitioner." But Jesus Ng Yao Siong, the name appearing in
the petition, the order of publication, and the publication itself, is not the true name of petitioner. As heretofore
stated, his name appearing in the civil register is merely "Jesus Ng" without the Yao Siong. The name to be
changed, if any, is Jesus Ng — not Jesus Ng Yao Siong. It thus results that there is no name to be changed in the
petition.
It is our view that this failure in the heading of the application to give the true name sought to be changed is
fundamental.
Petitioner's other names are recited in the body of the order of publication, as actually published, thus.
"ORDER
A verified petition having been filed by Jesus Ng Yao Siong, thru Atty. Baltazar V. Loo,
praying that the name Jesus Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Ng, Jesus Uy Keng Lee and Uy Keng Lee
Jesus be changed to KENG LEE UY; . . ."
Petitioner himself admits that he is known by all these names. This gives rise to the necessity of including his
aliases in the title of the petition — not only in the body thereof. So that, the title of this petition should read "In the
matter of the change of name of Jesus Ng, otherwise known as Jesus Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Uy Keng Lee, Uy
Keng Lee Jesus, Keng Lee Uy and Uy Keng Lee" (this last being the name he uses in his income tax returns).
The reason for this is obvious. Notices in the newspapers, like the one under consideration, usually appear in the
back pages. The reader, as is to be expected, merely glances at the title of the petition. It is only after he has
satisfied himself that the title interests him, that he proceeds to read down further. The probability is that the
portions in the publication heretofore quoted will escape the reader's notice. The purpose for which the
publication is made, that is, to inform, may thus be unserved

For a publication of a petition for a change of name, to be valid, the title thereof should include, first, his real name,
and second, his aliases, if any. This is a strict requirement of publication and non-compliance therewith is fatal. The
court acquires no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ON THE UNAUTHORIZED USE OF ALIAS

The admitted fact that petitioner had been using aliases ushers us to another problem: Can a court of justice
lawfully grant an application for a change of name where he has violated a law regarding the use of aliases? This
poser comes to the fore, because petitioner was never authorized to use an alias by a competent court pursuant to
the provision of Commonwealth Act 142, entitled "An act to regulate the use of aliases." With reference to the name

17
Uy Keng Lee Jesus or Jesus Uy Keng Lee which he has used in school, or Keng Lee Uy by which he is known to
his friends and the general public, or Uy Keng Lee which he uses in his income tax returns, or Jesus Ng Yao Siong
which appears in his alien certificate of registration, none of these names is a "pseudonym for literary purposes", or
a name "by which he had been known since his childhood" or "authorized by a competent court”

The use of aliases, without judicial authority, violates Section 1 of commonwealth Act 142, punishable with
imprisonment ranging from 1 month to 6 months pursuant to Section 4 of said statute. In the present case, since
petitioner was never authorized to use an alias by a competent court, his application for a change of name could
not be lawfully granted. To grant the same is to sanction an unlawful act which might reach the proportions of a
crime

ON PROPER AND REASONABLE CAUSE FOR THE CHANGE OF NAME

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be "proper and reasonable cause" for which the
change is sought.
The petition and petitioner's testimony are one in the claim that his various names caused much confusion in the
school records and unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him in his dealings with the public. This does not
constitute proper and reasonable justification to legally authorize a change of name for him. For indeed he had
been using these names all along. And that use naturally facilitates his transactions with others who knew him by
the one name or the other. Again we say that the petition not being supported by weighty reasons, the condition
for the grant thereof is non-existent; and, nothing is left for the court but to dismiss said petition.
Change of name is a matter of public interest. Petitioner might be in the gallery of wanted criminals; he could be in
hiding to avoid service of sentence or compliance with a judgment in a criminal case; he could have escaped a
penal institution into which he had been confined. If an alien, he might have given cause for deportation or might be
one against whom an order of deportation had actually been issued. And again the new name petitioner desires to
adopt may be similar to that of a respectable person. The latter may have evidence that petitioner is with unsavory
reputation. Naturally, it is to the interest of the person actually enjoying the good name to protect it against possible
mistaken reference to him as the petitioner.

The appealed judgment and to dismiss the petition absent proper and reasonable cause.

c. Opposition, if any

d. Hearing (initial hearing, then presentation of evidence) (Sec. 4)

e. Judgment (Sec. 5)

5. Grounds (“proper and reasonable cause”) for grant of change of name

Republic v. Lim, G.R. No. 15388, January 13, 2004

DOCTRINES: Rule 108 provides procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in Civil Registry. The
proceedings in Rule 108 could either be:

● Summary (in nature) – if correction sought is merely clerical

● Adversary (in nature) – if rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party (these are
deemed substantial)

Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 are not applicable in
this case since this constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate
child. Lim, by being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth.

While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname, there is no such requirement for the continued
use of a surname which a person has already been using since childhood.

FACTS: Lim claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan
City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays
that they be corrected.

During the hearing, Lim claims the following:

1. That her surname “Yu” was misspelled as “Yo”. She has been using “Yu” in all her school records and in her
marriage certificate.
2. That her father’s name in her birth record was written as “Yo Diu To (Co Tian)” when it should have been
“Yu Dio To (Co Tian)”.
3. Her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and
mother never got married. (Deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. That her being a
registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.

18
 4. It was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should have
been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the correction of the citizenship of respondent Chule Y. Lim from
“Chinese” to “Filipino” despite the fact that respondent never demonstrated any compliance with the legal
requirements for election of citizenship.

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in allowing respondent to continue using her father’s surname despite its
finding that respondent is an illegitimate child.

RULING:

1st Issue – No, CA did not err in ordering the correction of the citizenship of respondent Chule Y. Lim from
“Chinese” to “Filipino” despite the fact that respondent never demonstrated any compliance with the legal
requirements for election of citizenship.

Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 are not applicable in
this case since this constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate
child,

In this case, Lim, by being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino
upon birth. She is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority. The records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She
registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship

Hence, CA did not err.

2nd Issue – No, CA did not err in allowing respondent to continue using her father’s surname despite its finding
that respondent is an illegitimate child.

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates the use of aliases, allows a person to use a name "by
which he has been known since childhood". While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname,
there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been using since
childhood.

The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship remains
valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future
mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general.

In this case, what CA allowed was the correction of her father’s misspelled surname which she has been using ever
since she can remember. The court held that prohibiting the respondent to use her father’s surname would only sow
confusion. The Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of
future mischief. In respondent's case, the change in the surname that she has been using for 40 years would even
avoid confusion to her community in general.

Hence, CA did not err.

Discussion related to Rule 108 of Rules of Court

Republic did not cite as error respondent's recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Republic's failure to cite this
error amounts to a recognition that this case properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
considering that the proceeding can be appropriately classified as adversarial.

Rule 108 provides procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in Civil Registry. The proceedings in Rule 108
could either be:

● Summary (in nature) – if correction sought is merely clerical

● Adversary (in nature) – if rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party (these are
deemed substantial)

Adversary Suit/Proceeding – is a proceeding

● where all relevant facts have been fully & properly developed
● where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case
● where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered

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 Woman may resume use of maiden name after dissolution of marriage, need of petition for correction
under Rule 103

Yasin v. Hon. Judge, Shari’a District Court, G.R. No. 94986, February 23, 1995

DOCTRINE: When the marriage ties no longer exists—as in the case of death of the husband, or divorce as
authorized by the Muslim Code—the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil
status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband’s name is optional and not obligatory
for her.

Thus, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be applied to
judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname. In the absence of
a specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by
competent proof, such petition for confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name
must be given due course and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law

FACTS: On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari’a District Court in Zamboanga City a “Petition to resume
the use of maiden name” (Sp. Proc. No. 06-3). Among others, the petition avers that:

1. She is of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslim Filipino and a resident of Suterville, Zamboanga City;
2. She was formerly married to Hadji Idris Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino, in accordance with Muslim rites and
customs;
3. They were granted a decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, in accordance with
Islamic Law;
4. The divorce rites were officiated by Ustadz Sharif Jain Jali as evidenced by his Certification, dated March 13,
1984, a copy of which was attached as an Annex to the petition to form an integral part thereof; and
5. The former husband, Hadji Idris Yasin had contracted another marriage to another woman.

Petitioner invoked Article 143, par. 1(c) of Presidential Decree 1083 (Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines), which provides that the Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions
for the cancellation or correction of entries in the Muslim Registries; in relation to Article 371, par. 2 of the New
Civil Code, which provides:

Article 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden
name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However,
she may choose to continue employing her former husband’s surname, unless:

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Thus, petitioner prayed that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name, Hatima Centi y Saul.

Shari’a Court: On July 4, 1990, the respondent court issued an order stating that the petition filed was not
sufficient in form and substance in accordance with Section 2(a) and Section 3, Rule 103, Rules of Court,
because the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted were not properly indicated in the title
thereof, which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Petitioner was then ordered to
amend the petition within one (1) week from receipt of the order to reflect the said formal requirements.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court, but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her
marriage by divorce under the PD 1083, and after marriage of her former husband to another woman.

The motion was denied by the respondent court on the ground that the petition is substantially for change of name
and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103, Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the petition
is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner's maiden name and surname.

ISSUE: Whether, in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines—when the husband is married again to another woman; and the former wife desires to resume her
maiden name or surname—the former wife is required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the
formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court

RULING: NO. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the true and real name of a person is that given to him and
entered in the civil register. While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name
or surname without judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true and official name
recorded in the Civil Register.

In this case, petitioner’s registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. Petitioner does not seek to change her registered
maiden name; but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the
dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim

20
law.

Pursuant to Art. 54 of PD 1086, divorce severs the marriage bond. Further, Art. 187 of PD 1086 provides that the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the Rules of Court, and other existing laws, insofar as they are not inconsistent with
the provisions of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, shall be applied suppletorily.

Under the Civil Code, the use of the husband’s surname during the marriage (Art. 370, NCC), after annulment of
the marriage (Art. 371, NCC), and after the death of the husband (Art. 373, Civil Code) is permissive and not
obligatory; except in case of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code).

When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband’s name by
prefixing the word “Mrs.” before her husband’s full name or by adding her husband’s surname to her maiden first
name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, NCC). Accordingly, when petitioner married her husband, she did not
change her name, but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname
of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it.

Similarly, when the marriage ties no longer exists—as in the case of death of the husband, or divorce as
authorized by the Muslim Code—the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change
in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband’s name is
optional and not obligatory for her. (Art. 373, NCC).

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court found the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by
petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding, since the law requires her to do
so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in
accordance with Muslim laws.

Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right, nevertheless, no law
or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be obtained. In view of such circumstances, the
onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be applied to
judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname. In the
absence of a specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been
alleged supported by competent proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such
petition for confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given
due course and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.

Petition was GRANTED. Petitioner was authorized to resume her maiden name and surname on grounds of her
divorce from her former husband and subsequent marriage of the latter to another woman.

Petition under Rule 108

Who may file petition (Sec. 1)

Lee v. CA, G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001

DOCTRINES:
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN CIVIL REGISTRY; PROPER TO ESTABLISH THAT
PETITIONERS ARE NOT THE CHILDREN OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' MOTHER. — It is precisely the province
of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in
the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was
impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records.
Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn
legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to
establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all
between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.

SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS MAY BE CORRECTED PROVIDED THE PARTIES AGGRIEVED AVAIL OF THE
APPROPRIATE ADVERSARY PROCEEDING. — Further sanctioning private respondents' resort to Rule 108, the
Court of Appeals adverted to our ruling in the leading case of Republic vs. Valencia where the Court ordered the
correction in the nationality and civil status of petitioner's minor children as stated in their records of birth from
"Chinese" to "Filipino," and "legitimate" to "illegitimate," respectively. Although recognizing that the changes or
corrections sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, this Court, sitting
en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. In the said
case, we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register
under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary
proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied with.

LABAYO-ROWE VS. REPUBLIC (168 SCRA 294) DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO IMPLEAD ALL
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES; DOES NOT EXCLUDE RECOURSE TO RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF

21
COURT. — In the cited case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic, the reason we declared null and void the portion of the
lower court's order directing the change of Labayo-Rowe's civil status and the affiliation of one of her children as
appearing in the latter's record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was inappropriate to effect such changes, but
because Labayo-Rowe's petition before the lower court failed to implead all indispensable parties to the case. Far
from petitioners' theory, this does not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect
substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil register. The only requisite is that the proceedings under
Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding.

PROCEEDINGS, NOT SUMMARY. — It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy granted upon mere application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when
the statute expressly provides. Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure outlined in Rule
108 is not a summary proceeding per se. The procedure includes:
1. The publication of the petition three (3) times,i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4)
2. inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation or
correction (Sec. 3).
3. The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5).
4. Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing
that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).

APPROPRIATE ADVERSARY PROCEEDING TO EFFECT SUBSTANTIAL CORRECTIONS AND CHANGES

WHEN ALL PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS ARE COMPLIED WITH. — Rule 108, when all the procedural
requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and
changes in entries of the civil register.

CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS, REMOVED FROM THE AMBIT OF RULE 108. — Republic Act No.
9048 which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil
Code. The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be
corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general.
The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of
the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections
in entries of the civil register.

PERIOD FOR FILING PETITION. — Inasmuch as no law or rule specifically prescribes a fixed time for filing the
special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the following provision of the
New Civil Code that applies: "Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws
must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues."

Synopsis from FullText:

FACTS: Private respondents, legitimate children of Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng, filed in 1992 and in 1993
two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners
praying that the entry of the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother be substituted with the name "Tiu Chuan,"
their true birth mother and mistress of their father, Lee Tek Sheng. They alleged that after the death of their mother
on May 9, 1989, their father insisted that all his children, including all the petitioners, be included in the obituary
notice of their mother's death. Investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) disclosed that
Lee Tek Sheng falsified all the entries in the birth certificate of petitioners and made it appear that Keh Shiok
Cheng, instead of Tiu Chuan, delivered petitioners.

Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground that the petitions under Rule 108 can not assail legitimacy and filiation,
that these were essentially an action to impugn legitimacy that cannot be filed before the death of the father and
that the same has already prescribed. Both motions were denied. Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals reiterating their allegations in their motions to dismiss with the additional ground of forum-shopping
asserting that private respondents had filed complaints for falsification against them and their father, a petition to
cancel their father's naturalization certificate and a petition for partition of their mother Keh Shiok Cheng's estate.

RULING: The Court held that substantial errors may be corrected in a petition for correction of entries in the civil
registry:
1. where the aggrieved parties avail of the appropriate adversary proceedings;
2. that the petitions filed in the case at bar is not a collateral attack on the legitimacy of private respondents
but to establish that private respondents are not the children of Lee Tek Sheng;
3. where there is no specific law or rule specifically prescribing the period for filing of an action or petition the
same must be brought within 5 years from the time the right of action accrues pursuant to Article 1149 of
the Civil Code.

In the case at bar, the cause of action of private respondents accrued in 1989 when they discovered the falsified
entries in petitioners' birth certificates and that they filed the petitions in 1992 and 1993, both within the five (5) year
prescriptive period; and that there is no forum-shopping where there is no identity of parties, rights or causes of
action and reliefs among the cases filed.

FACTS: Private respondent filed 2 separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records

22
of birth of the petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and
by substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly the petitioners' true birth mother.

Thereafter, Lee Tek Sheng facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of a young girl named Tiu Chuan who
later on became his concubine. Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave
birth their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it
appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.

The husband instituted that they include the names of the children . Their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified
the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
Because of this report, private respondents filed petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners'
records of birth with the lower courts.

The petitioners, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss both petitions on the grounds, among others that the
resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2)
the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn
has already prescribed.. Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is improper since
private respondents seek to have the entry for the name of petitioners' mother changed from "Keh Shiok Cheng" to
"Tiu Chuan" who is a completely different person. What private respondents therefore seek is not merely a
correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek Sheng's legitimate wife, Keh Shiok
Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a "bastardization of petitioners." Court of Appeals dismissed their
petition

ISSUES:
1. Whether the resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is proper.? YES
2. Whether the proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108 is
summary in nature? YES
3. Whether substantial corrections in entries of the civil register may be effected by means of Rule 108 in
relation to Article 412? YES

RULING:
1st Issue - YES, it is proper.

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.

In the case at bar, the petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of
birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to
have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention
that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to
declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that petitioner are not Keh
Shiok Cheng’s children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng
and petitioners.

2nd Issue - YES, it can be summary in nature but it can also cease to do so and takes the characteristics of an
adversary proceeding.

Under Rule 108, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction
of an entry in the civil register are —
(1) the civil registrar, and
(2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby.

Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to —
(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and
(2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.

The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: —

(1) the civil registrar, and
(2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

"If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in
the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be
described as "summary." There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil
Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be canceled and/or corrected and
the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.

Here, the SC cited Republic vs. Valencia. SC said that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in
the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate
adversary proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are complied with.

23
In the case at bar, SC agreed with CA that the proceedings taken in both petitions for cancellation and/or correction
of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in the lower courts are appropriate adversary proceedings. In the
instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth was filed by private respondents.
Pursuant to the order of the RTC Manila, a copy of the order setting the case for hearing was ordered published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In the
RTC-Kalookan, there was an actual publication of the order setting the case for hearing in "Media Update" once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In both cases notices of the orders were ordered served upon the Solicitor
General, the Civil Registrars of Manila and Kalookan and upon the petitioners herein.

Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the Civil Registrars and the other respondents in the case below
to file their oppositions to the said petitions. A motion to dismiss was consequently filed by herein petitioners
Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the
RTC-Manila, and an opposition was filed by Emma Lee in the RTC- Kalookan. In view of the foregoing, SC held that
the petitions filed by the private respondents in the courts below by way of a special proceeding for cancellation
and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the requisite parties, notices and publications could very well
be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.

Summary in Nature Adversary Proceeding

If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or Changes which may affect the civil status from
correction of entries in the civil register] is merely to legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial
correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or and controversial alterations which can only be allowed
obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a after appropriate adversary proceedings depending
summary procedure, issue an order for the correction upon the nature of the issues involved and wherein all
of a mistake. the parties who may be affected by the entries are
notified or represented and evidence is submitted to
prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the
contrary admitted.

3rd Issue - YES, substantial corrections in entries of the civil register may be effected by means of Rule 108 in
relation to Article 412.

It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections or changes must
be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned that the procedure contemplated for obtaining such
judicial order is summary in nature. Further, Republic Act No. 9048 (cannot be applied in the case at bar because of
its prospective application but this can be used for future reference) which was passed by Congress on February 8,
2001 substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. —
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical
errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations."

To clarify, clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without
need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove
from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is
left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. It
may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress' response to the confusion wrought by the failure to
delineate as to what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or
innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a
substantial kind. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate
adversary proceeding. RA 9048 cannot be applied in the case since it is prospective in application.

Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

DOCTRINES: Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines
does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a
divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of
foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property
relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.

FACTS: Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national. She later filed for divorce against her
husband, and a divorce decree was issued by a Japanese court.

In 2012, she sought the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila by

24
virtue of the said divorce decree. She later amended her petition for the judicial recognition of the divorce decree.

RTC denied Marelyn's petition, arguing that the divorce obtained by Marelyn in Japan should not be recognized.
The RTC held that based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right
to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners,
or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized
as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and
duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations,
including marriages."

Upon appeal, the CA overturned RTC's ruling. CA held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree
may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. As such, it would be
height of injustice to consider Manelyn as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to
her and can legally have another wife.

OSG's motion for recommendation was denied by CA. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to
remarry.

RULING: Yes. Although the SC held that a Filipino may initiate divorce against a foreign spouse, Marelyn's case
was still remanded to the RTC to allow Marelyn to present evidence as proof of the relevant Japanese law on
divorce.

Substantive Aspect:
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.

2. Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988. As modified, Article 26 now
states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry under
Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there
be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino
spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.

A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in similar circumstances as a Filipino
who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instances, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce
decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are
severed by operation on the latter's national law.

25
 Case Name Supreme Court Ruling on Divorce

Republic of the Phils. v. The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
Orbecido III
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or

her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Dacasin v. Dacasin and Van Already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by
Dorn v. Judge Romillo the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody
and property relation, respectively.

Fujiki v. Marinay, et al. Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but
a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized
under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the
Family Code.

Medina v. Koike This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.
and Garcia v. Recio, the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse
must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for
appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve
the pertinent factual issues.

Procedural Aspect:
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not
suffice. The fact of divorce must still first be proven. Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of
foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.

Going back, the Supreme Court held that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond
while the other remains bound to it.

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese
Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu
the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce
Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment
decreeing the divorce.

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible a a written
act of the foreign court. As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was
the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.

26
The foregoing notwithstanding, the SC cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to
recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in
the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila. Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the
pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to
know by reason of their judicial function.

Venue: RTC with territorial jurisdiction of the place where the corresponding LCR is found (Sec. 1)

Entries subject to cancellation or correction (Sec. 2, Rule 108)

Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007 (compare with the Cagandahan case)

DOCTRINES:

CHANGE OF NAME
The state has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for the purpose of identification. A change
of name is a privilege, not a right.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of
first name to the city or municipal registrar or consul general. The correction or change can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without need for a judicial order.

The grounds for which change of first name be allowed:

1. First name or nickname is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
2. The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has
been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
3. The change will avoid confusion.

RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally
change his name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.
He must also show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.

CHANGE OF SEX
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the chage of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.
Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant by examining the genitals of
the infant.

FACTS: Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC,
alleging:

1. That he is a male transsexual that is anatomically male but feels, thinks, and acts as a female and that he
had always identified himself with girls since childhood;
2. He underwent sex reassignment in BKK, Thailand and that this was attested to by a PH doctor.
3. Since then, he lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married.
4. He sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel” to “Mely” and his sex from
“male” to “female”

RTC granted the petition; more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity and that no harm, injury or
prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition.

Republic, thru OSG file a petition for certiorari with the CA, saying that no law allows the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. CA agreed and reversed RTC.

ISSUE: Whether Silverio’s petition should be granted.

RULING: No, Silverio’s petition should not be granted. No law allows the change of entries in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration.

Art. 402, CC4 was amended by RA 9048 insofar as clerical and typographical errors are involved. The correction of
such matters can now be made thru admin proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.

Under Rule 108, the entries that may be corrected are those provided under Arts. 407 and 408 of the NCC. To
correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. Sex reassignment is
not among those acts or events mentioned in Art. 408 (eg. Legitimations, naturalizations, etc). Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

27
Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. A correction in the
civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for
which Rule 108 will apply.

No reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers correction on the ground of sex
reassignment. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding
to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and
civil status. However, despite, Art. 413 NCC, there is no such special law in the PH governing sex reassignment
and its effects.

Moreover, Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
immutable.

The RTC did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. Also, the wrong venue.

Art. 376, CC1 was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). RA 9048 no governs the change of first name. it
vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal registrar or
consul general concerned.

The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 and 108, until
and unless an admin petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. Also filed in the wrong
venue as the proper venue under RA 9048 was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth
certificate is kept.

Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008 (compare with the Silverio case)

DOCTRINES:
SILVERIO CAGANDAHAN

basis for the 1. That he is a male transsexual 1. Her Certificate of Live Birth
correction or change that is anatomically male but indicates she is female, but while
of entry feels, thinks, and acts as a she was growing up she
female and that he had always developed secondary male
identified himself with girls since characteristics and was
childhood; diagnosed with Congenital
2. He underwent sex Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH).
reassignment in BKK, Thailand 2. As a child she was also diagnosed
and that this was attested to by a with clitoral hypertrophy and was
PH doctor. found to have small ovaries. Later,
3. Since then, he lived as a female her ovarian structures were
and was in fact engaged to be minimized, she stopped growing
married. and had no breast or menstrual
4. He sought to have his name in development.
his birth certificate changed from 3. For all intents and appearances
“Rommel” to “Mely” and his sex as well as in mind and emotion,
from “male” to “female” she has become male.
5. He also presented Dr. 4. He presented testimonial evidence
Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his on the veracity condition from an
American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, expert ( Dr. Michael Sionzon )
as witnesses. a. He further testified that
respondent's condition is
permanent and
recommended the change
of gender because
respondent has made up
her mind, adjusted to her
chosen role as male, and
the gender change would
be advantageous to her.

Ruling: The petition for the correction of the The petition or the correction of the
entry in the birth certificate was not entry in the birth certificate was

28
 granted for theff reasons: granted for the ff reasons:

NO Law Allows The Change of Entry Court considered the medical condition of
In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On petitioner Cagandahan. They determined
the Ground of Sex Reassignment the basis for a change of the entry of his
birth certificate based on medical
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil testimony and scietinfic development
registry involving the change of sex is not showing that Cagandahan to be other than
a mere clerical or typographical error. It is female.
a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the SC is of the view that where the person is
Rules of Court. biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender
The acts, events or factual errors classification would be what the individual,
contemplated under Article 407 of the like Jennifer Cagandahan, having reached
Civil Code include even those that occur the age of majority, with good reason
after birth. However, no reasonable thinks of his/her sex.
interpretation of the provision can
justify the conclusion that it covers the In so ruling SC gave respect to (1) the
correction on the ground of sex diversity of nature; and (2) how an
reassignment. individual deals with what nature has
handed out. In other words, we respect
To correct simply means "to make or set respondent's congenital condition and his
aright; to remove the faults or error from" mature decision to be a male. Life is
while to change means "to replace already difficult for the ordinary person.
something with something else of the SCcannot but respect how respondent
same kind or with something that serves deals with his unordinary state and thus
as a substitute." help make his life easier, considering the
unique circumstances in this case.
The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his
first name and sex, were all correct. No
correction is necessary.

Neither May Entries in the Birth

Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be
Changed on the Ground of Equity
As for respondent's change of name
The changes sought by petitioner will under Rule 103,
have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences. First, SC has held that a change of name is
even the trial court itself found that the not a matter of right but of judicial
petition was but petitioner’s first step discretion, to be exercised in the light
towards his eventual marriage to his male of the reasons adduced and the
fiancé. However, marriage, one of the consequences that will follow. The trial
most sacred social institutions, is a court's grant of respondent's change of
special contract of permanent union name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a
between a man and a woman. One of its change of a feminine name to a masculine
essential requisites is the legal capacity name. Considering the consequence that
of the contracting parties who must be a respondent's change of name merely
male and a female. To grant the changes recognizes his preferred gender, we find
sought by petitioner will substantially merit in respondent's change of name.
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on Such a change will conform with the
marriage and family relations. It will allow change of the entry in his birth
the union of a man with another man who certificate from female to male.
has undergone sex reassignment (a
male-to-female post-operative Jennifer to Jeff <3
transsexual).

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the Siniloan,
Laguna RTC to change her gender from female to male and her name to “Jeff.” The petition alleges:

5. Her Certificate of Live Birth indicates she is female, but while she was growing up she developed
secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH).
6. As a child she was also diagnosed with clitoral hypertrophy and was found to have small ovaries. Later, her
ovarian structures were minimized, she stopped growing and had no breast or menstrual development.
7. For all intents and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become male.

29
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for 3 consecutive weeks and was posted in
conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear on his behalf.

Jennifer Cagandahan’s evidence: testimony of Dr. Michael Siozon of the UP-PGH Department of Psychiatry.

1. He issued a medical certificate diagnosing Jennifer Cagandahan with CAH.

2. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her
female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and male.
3. This condition is very rare, that Jennifer Cagandahan’s uterus is not fully developed because of lack of
female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. Jennifer Cagandahan’s condition is permanent.
4. He recommended the change of gender because Jennifer Cagandahan has made up her mind, adjusted to
her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.

Republic, through the OSG, argues:

1. The petition does not comply with Rules 103 and 108 of the ROC because the local civil registrar of Pakil,
Laguna was not impleaded.
2. Correction of entry under Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate.
3. Jennifer Cagandahan’s medical condition does not make her male.

Jennifer Cagandahan argues that although the local civil registrar was not impleaded, the LCR was furnished a
copy of the Petition, the Order to publish, and all pleadings, orders and processes; that Jennifer Cagandahan is
actually male, so the Birth Certificate must be corrected to reflect his true gender; that the change of sex/gender is
allowed under R108. Jennifer Cagandahan substantially complied with the requirements of the ROC.

ISSUE: Whether the Rules of Court allow the change of gender and of name on the ground of Jennifer
Cagandahan’s medical condition?

RULING: Yes, the courts should allow the change of gender and of name because the change is conformable to
Jennifer Cagandahan’s condition.

The NCC provides that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order (Art. 412).
RA No. 9048 amended this so that corrections of clerical or typographical errors can now be made through
administrative proceedings. Therefore, R108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections. Under RA
No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It
is a substantial change for which R108 applies. The entries correctable under R108 are those provided in the NCC,
Arts. 407 and 408:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Art. 407 contemplates even events
that occur after birth.

In this case, Jennifer Cagandahan has CAH, which causes the early or inappropriate appearance of
male characteristics. A person with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A
newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has: A swollen clitoris with the urethral
opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; Normal internal
structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; As the child
grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure
to menstruate at puberty.

About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH. CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex
anatomy. Intersexuality – Term applied to human beings who cannot be classified either male or female.

The determining factor: what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her
sex.

30
SC is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like Jennifer Cagandahan, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex.

Jennifer Cagandahan here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels
of androgen there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. She here has
simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with.
He could have undergone treatment to force his body into the categorical mold of a female, but he has not. Instead,
nature has taken its course.

The Court will not consider Jennifer Cagandahan as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to
become female. He is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the
pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of
action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation.

In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent"and in the absence of evidence to show that
classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection
under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent's position and his personal judgment
of being a male.

Therefore, a change of name is a matter of judicial discretion. The Trial Court correctly granted the change of
name, considering that the change from feminine to masculine name merely recognizes his preferred
gender.

Parties who should be impleaded (to make the proceedings adversarial) (Sec. 3)

Barco v. CA, G.R. No. 120587, January 20, 2004

DOCTRINES: A petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person. The
decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established.

FACTS: Nadina was first married to Francisco. They separated in fact by February 1977 and obtained a divorce
decree by the Catholic Diocese of Bacolod City. Soon, Nadina gave birth to June. June carried the last name of
Francisco and it was stated in the birth certificate that Francisco was the father.

Despite the notation in June's birth certificate, Nadina subsequently claimed that all along, the real father of her
child was Armando Gustilo ("Gustilo"), a former Congressman with whom she maintained relationship. Gustilo was
previously married but his first wife died. Gustilo and Nadina were first married before Nadina obtained the judicial
declaration declaring her marriage to Francisco as null.

It was on 1983 that Nadina filed in her own name a petition for Correction
of Entries in the Certificate of Birth of her daughter June with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Makati. She
alleged that Gustilo was the real father of June. Francisco cannot be the father because they did not engage in
sexual congree within the first 20 days of the 300 days preceding the birth of June. The following changes were
requested: (1) June’s full name should be June Salvacion Gustilo and that (2) Gustilo be named as father rather
than Francisco. Gustilo filed a Constancia acknowledging June as his child.

The petitioner was docketed as a special proceeding. An order setting the case was published. Nadina amended
the petition by impleading the “two fathers”. Accordingly, RTC amended its order to reflect the additional impleaded
parties.

RTC granted the petition. Barco only contested the decision of the RTC after the estate proceedings of Gustilo was
instituted. Barco claimed that she had a legal interest because she had a child with Gustilo. She contested the
decision of RTC on the ground that RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person since she was not impleaded
as a defendant and that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the action since the action involves a substantial
change in the birth certificate.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Barco.
2. Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over Nadina’s petition.

RULING:

1st Issue – Yes, RTC acquired jurisdiction over Barco.

A petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person. The decision on the
petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of

31
such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide it.

It is accepted Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the
petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her ward's
share in the estate of her father. However, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires
notice by publication.

Hence, RTC acquired jurisdiction over Barco.

2nd Issue – Yes, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Nadina’s petition.

It has been established by laws and jurisprudence that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded
in. the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule. Any further attempt to limit the scope
of application of Rule 108 runs against the wall of judicial precedent cemented by legislative affirmation.

Here, Nadina filed a petition before the RTC to change the name of her child as well as the name of the father
written on the birth certificate of June. These are substantial changes to the birth certificate which is allowed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Hence, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Nadina’s petition.

Republic v. Kho, G.R. No. 170340, June 29, 2007 (reiterating Barco v. CA)

DOCTRINES: The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as "AN ACT
AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A
CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME
IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF JUDICIAL ORDER," has been considered to lend legislative
affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil
registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108.

The obvious effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction of clerical or
typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108
the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.

When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding
necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied. 18 The pertinent
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court read:

SEC. 3. Parties . — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil registrar is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication . — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice, file his opposition thereto.

FACTS: Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a
verified petition for correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth
certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of
some entries in their birth certificates.

● Carlito requested the correction in his birth certificate of the citizenship of his mother to Filipino instead
of Chinese, as well as the deletion of the word ‘married’ opposite the phrase Date of marriage of parents
because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally married.

● The same request to delete the married status of their parents from their respective birth certificates
was made by Carlitos siblings Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.

● birth certificates of Carlitos children: he prayed that the date of his and his wifes marriage be corrected
from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate.

The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.

Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition in which it was additionally prayed that Carlito’s second name of ‘John’
be deleted from his record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlito’s father in his (Carlitos)

32
marriage certificate be corrected from John Kho to Juan Kho and Filipino to Chinese, respectively.

Procedural aspect:

● petition was published for three consecutive weeks in Mindanao Daily Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of
general circulation
● after wpublication, it was set for hearing
● the city civil registrar 5 stated her observations and suggestions to the proposed corrections in the birth
records of Carlito and his siblings but interposed no objections to the other amendments.
● Hearing (with OSG)
● Respondents presented documentary evidence
○ showing compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition.
● They also presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies
○ of Carlito and his mother, Epifania.

During the same hearing, an additional correction in the birth certificates of Carlito's children was requested
to the effect that the first name of their mother be rectified from "Maribel" to "Marivel".

By decision, the trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries in the record of birth
of Carlito, as follows: (1) change the citizenship of his mother from Chinese to Filipino; (2) delete John from his
name; and (3) delete the word married opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered
to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira. Additionally,
the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates of the minor children of Carlito to reflect the date of
marriage of Carlito and Marivel Dogmoc (Marivel) as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989, and the name
Maribel as Marivel.

Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, faulting the trial court in granting the
petition for correction of entries in the subject documents despite the failure of respondents to implead the
minors mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with
regard to the questioned married status of Carlito and his siblings parents, and the latters citizenship.

Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the name Carlito John Kho to Carlito Kho for
non-compliance with jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the decision of the
trial court.

In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought by respondents were substantial in
nature, they could only be granted through an adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as
Marivel and respondents parents, should have been notified or impleaded.

Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to change Carlitos name under Section 2 of Rule 103
of the Rules of Court were not satisfied because the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlitos prior three-year bona
fide residence in Butuan City, and that the title of the petition did not state Carlitos aliases and his true name as
Carlito John I. Kho. Petitioner concludes that the same jurisdictional defects attached to the change of name of
Carlitos father.

ISSUE: Whether an adversarial proceeding is necessary since the changes sought by respondents were
substantial in nature in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and respondents’ parents, should have been
notified or impleaded

RULING: The changes sought to be change entail substantial and controversial amendments. Clearly, the changes
sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding. However, this Court ruled, and has since repeatedly ruled,
that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108.

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably
substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature.
However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as
the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.

When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding
necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied The pertinent provisions of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court read:

33
 SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil registrar is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court
shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

There is no dispute that the trial courts Order setting the petition for hearing and directing any person or entity
having interest in the petition to oppose it was posted as well as published for the required period; that notices of
hearings were duly served on the Solicitor General, the city prosecutor of Butuan and the local civil registrar; and
that trial was conducted on January 31, 2002 during which the public prosecutor, acting in behalf of the OSG,
actively participated by cross-examining Carlito and Epifania.

Whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlitos parents rendered the trial short of the required
adversary proceeding and the trial courts judgment void.

A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals where the Court ruled that the publication of
the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable party.

It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition to correct certain entries in the
civil registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein.

With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate of marriage shows that indeed they
were married on January 21, 2000, not on April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date April
27, 1989 was supplied by his helper, adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time his sons were born
because his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999. Given the evidence presented by respondents, the CA
observed that the minors were illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring about no change at all in the
nature of their filiation.

With respect to Carlitos mother, it bears noting that she declared at the witness stand that she was not married to
Juan Kho who died in 1959. Again, that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor.

The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlitos and his siblings birth certificates of the entry
Married opposite the date of marriage of their parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued on November
24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and Epifania had been
living together as common law couple since 1935 but have never contracted marriage legally.

A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to respondents Amended Petition, likewise
stated that it has no record of marriage between Juan Kho and Epifania. Under the circumstances, the deletion of
the word Married opposite the date of marriage of parents is warranted.

With respect to the correction in Carlitos birth certificate of his name from Carlito John to Carlito, the same
was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. More importantly, Carlitos official transcript of record
from the Urious College in Butuan City, certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service Commission, and voter
registration record satisfactorily show that he has been known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to
arise from the dropping of the second name.

The correction of the mothers citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as appearing in Carlitos birth record was
also proper. Of note is the fact that during the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not deem
fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to oppose the correction prayed for, which certainly was not respondents
fault, does not in any way change the adversarial nature of the proceedings.

Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlitos siblings uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as
Filipino. To disallow the correction in Carlitos birth record of his mothers citizenship would perpetuate an
inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the siblings who are unquestionably born of the same mother and
father.

Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of the name of Carlitos wife from
Maribel to Marivel. The mistake is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also
obvious to the understanding considering that the name reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlito and his wife is
Marivel.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, G.R. No. L-53417, December 8, 1988

DOCTRINES: Clerical errors which might be corrected through judicial sanction under the said article should be

34
those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of names clearly misspelled, occupation of parents,
errors that are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, errors made by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake
in copying or writing.

However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well
as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved.

FACTS: On November 18, 1970, petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe filed a petition for the correction of entries in
the civil registry with the then CFI of Pampanga. She asked the court to order the Local Civil Registrar of San
Fernando, Pampanga to correct the entries in the birth certificates of her children Vicente L. Miclat, Jr. and Victoria
Miclat especially with regard to petitioner's name which appears in both certificates as "Beatriz Labayo-Labayu and
as regards her civil status and date of marriage which appears in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat as "married"
with the year appearing "1953 Bulan."

Judge Malcolm Sarmiento, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, granted the petition and set
the case for hearing. At the hearing, petitioner testified that her nickname is Beatriz and Emperatriz J. Labayo is her
real name; that the entry in Victoria Miclat's birth certificate stating her civil status as "married" is not correct
because she was never married to Vicente Miclat, the father of her child; that the date and place of marriage
appearing in the said birth certificate as 1953-Bulan is not true as they were never married; that the questioned
entries were reported by Vicente Miclat; and that she is at present married to an American by the name of William
Rowe.

Finding merit in the petition, the presiding judge issued an order directing the local civil registrar of San Fernando,
Pampanga to correct the entries. In its appeal, the Republic questions the propriety of the lower court's order to
correct the civil status and the date and place of marriage of the petitioner below as appearing in the birth certificate
of Victoria Miclat.

ISSUE: Whether or not the correction of entries in the civil registry involving the civil status of the mother at the time
of the birth of her child may be made under a summary procedure.

RULING: No. The correction of entries in the civil registry involving the civil status of the mother at the time of the
birth of her child may not be made under a summary procedure.

Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that "(n)o entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without judicial
order." It has been held that the corrections contemplated in Article 412 include only corrections of mistakes that are
clerical in nature. Clerical errors which might be corrected through judicial sanction under the said article should be
those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of names clearly misspelled, occupation of parents,
errors that are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, errors made by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake
in copying or writing.

However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well
as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved.

As earlier noted, the petition for correction of entries in the civil registry which is now before this Court on appeal by
the Republic does not only involve the correction of petitioner Labayo's name and surname registered as "Beatriz
Labayo/Beatriz Labayo in the birth certificates of her children. The petition also seeks the change of her status from
"married" to "not married" at the time of her daughter's birth, thereby changing the status of her child Victoria Miclat
from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." The change of petitioner's name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayo to
Emperatriz Labayo is a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is appropriate. The Republic,
however, is appealing the part of the questioned Order which directed as well the change of the petitioner's status
from "married" to "not married" and Victoria Miclat's filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate."

The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would be
changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarassment
resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter.

Thus, the correction of entries in the civil registry involving the civil status of the mother at the time of the birth of
her child may not be made under a summary procedure.

Procedure after petition is filed

Court issues order setting case for initial hearing and directing its publication (Sec. 4)

Co v. The Civil Registrar of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 24, 2004

DOCTRINES: The proceedings in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are summary if the entries in the civil register
sought to be corrected are clerical or innocuous in nature. However, where such entries to be corrected or
changed are substantial: i.e., the status and nationality of the petitioners or the citizenship of their parents,

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the proceedings are adversarial in nature.

FACTS: Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. His application was
granted, and he was conferred Phil. citizenship under P.D. No. 1055. Co Boon Peng took his oath and his children,
Hubert and Arlene Co finished college and earned their respective degrees from Philippine schools.
The children then filed for a Petition under Rule 108 for the Correction of Entries in their Birth Certificate. They
alleged that upon the grant of naturalization to their father, they became Filipino Citizens through the derivative
mode of naturalization.

However, the court a quo issued an order dismissing the petition outright on the ground that the petition was
insufficient, solely because the petitioner’s father Co Boon Peng applied for naturalization under the LOI No. 270
and was conferred Phil. Citizenship by naturalization under PD. No. 1055 and not under Commonwealth Act (CA)
No. 473. The petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration, however, this was denied by the RTC stating that LOI
No. 270 and CA 473 are statutes relating to the same subject matter but these do not provide the same beneficial
effects with respect to the minor children. The court a quo stressed that legislative grants, whether they be of
property, rights or privileges, whether granted to corporations or individuals, must be strictly construed against the
grantee and in favor of the grantor.

The petitioner now contends that the trial court erred in holding that their petition was insufficient. They assert that
contrary to the ruling of the trial court, they are qualified to claim the benefit of Section 15 of CA No. 473, which
provides that minor children of persons naturalized thereunder who were born in the Philippines shall likewise be
considered citizens thereof. The petitioners invoke the rule that statutes in pari materia are to be read together.

They posit that CA No. 473 and LOI No. 270 should be harmonized and reconciled since "all statutes relating to the
same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, and should be construed
together as they constitute one law."

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the case.
2. Whether or not Rule 108 is the appropriate remedy in this case.

RULING:
1st Issue – Yes, the trial court erred in dismissing the case.

The rule on statutory construction provides that:

Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because enactments of the same legislature on the
same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or complementary
to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing
legislations on the subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto.

Statutes in pari materia, although in apparent conflict, are so far as reasonably possible construed to be in harmony
with each other.

LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified aliens residing in the Philippines.
While they provide for different procedures, CA No. 473 governs naturalization by judicial decree while LOI No. 270
governs naturalization by presidential decree; both statutes have the same purpose and objective: to enable aliens
permanently residing in the Philippines, who, having demonstrated and developed love for and loyalty to the
Philippines, as well as affinity to the culture, tradition and ideals of the Filipino people, and contributed to the
economic, social and cultural development of our country, to be integrated into the national fabric by being granted
Filipino citizenship. Under the LOI, the procedure for the acquisition of citizenship by naturalization is more
expeditious, less cumbersome and less expensive. The sooner qualified aliens are naturalized, the faster they are
able to integrate themselves into the national fabric, and are thus able to contribute to the cultural, social and
political well- being of the country and its people.

Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners correctly posit, statutes in pari materia. Absent any
express repeal of Section 15 of CA No. 473 in LOI No. 270, the said provision should be read into the latter law as
an integral part thereof, not being inconsistent with its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of CA No. 473,9 which extends
the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized thereunder, should be similarly applied
to the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in this case.

2nd Issue – Yes, the petitioners’ recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is appropriate. The court
approved Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to provide for a procedure to implement the law.

The proceedings in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are summary if the entries in the civil register sought to be
corrected are clerical or innocuous in nature. However, where such entries sought to be corrected or
changed are substantial: i.e., status and nationality of the petitioners or the citizenship of their parents, the
proceedings are adversarial in nature.

In this case, the petitioners alleged in their petition that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng, who was
naturalized as a Filipino citizen, but that their certificates of birth still indicate that he is a Chinese national. In view

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of their father’s naturalization, they pray that the entries in their certificates of birth relating to the citizenship of their
father be changed from "Chinese" to "Filipino."

The petitioners’ recourse to the procedure in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended, being appropriate, it
behooved the trial court to do its duty under Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, namely:
Sec. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the person named in the petition.
The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province.

After hearing, the court shall issue an order either dismissing the petition or issue an order granting the same. In
either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate
the same in the certificates of birth of the petitioners. The judgment of the court shall form part of the records of the
local civil register.

b. Service of notices to all parties (Sec. 4)

c. Publication (Sec. 4)
(1) Failure to implead an unknown party cured by publication
CASE: Barco v. CA, supra
Opposition, if any (Sec. 5)
Hearing (initial hearing, then presentation of evidence)
Judgment in the form of an order (Sec. 7)
Service of order to appropriate LCR (Sec. 7)

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