Republic of the Philippines who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites

SUPREME COURT held on December 24,1967 (Annex "A", List of Exhibits).

Manila
The records also disclose that on April 25, 1972, respondent
FIRST DIVISION (then plaintiff) filed a complaint for recognition and support
against petitioner (then defendant) with the Court of First
G.R. No. L-49542 September 12, 1980 Instance of Davao, Branch IX. This case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 263 (p. 1, ROA).
ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, petitioner,
vs. Defendant (now petitioner) Macadangdang filed his answer on
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH June 30, 1972, opposing plaintiff's claim and praying for its
MEJIAS, respondents. dismissal (p. 3, ROA).

On August 9, 1972, the lower court in a pre-trial conference,

issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing certain stipulations,
MAKASIAR, J.: admissions and factual issues on which both parties agreed
(pp. 4, 5, and 6, ROA). Correspondingly, upon agreement of
the parties, an amended complaint was filed by plaintiff on
This petition for review seeks to set aside the decision of the
October 17, 1972 (pp. 7,8 and 9, ROA).
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 54618-R which reversed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX
dismissing the action for recognition and support filed by In its decision rendered on February 27, 1973, the lower court
respondent Elizabeth Mejias against petitioner Antonio dismissed the complaint,. The decision invoked positive
Macadangdang, and which found minor Rolando to be the provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities
illegitimate son of petitioner who was ordered to give a monthly (pp. 10-18, ROA).
support of P350.00 until his alleged son reaches the age of
majority (p. 47, rec.; p. 10, ROA). On April 18, 1973, plaintiff appealed the CFI decision to the
Court of Appeals (p. 59, In her appeal, appellant assigned
The records show that respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a these errors:
married woman, her husband being Crispin Anahaw (pp. 61-
62, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972; pp. 10-11, Brief for Respondent [P. 1. The Honorable Trial Court erred in applying
198, rec.]) She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner in the instant case the provisions of Arts. 255
Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967 (p. 38, t.s.n., and 256 of the Civil Code and Secs. 4[a], 4[b]
June 7, 1972 in CC No. 109). She also alleges that due to the and 4[c], Rule 131, of the Revised Rules of
affair, she and her husband separated in 1967 (p. 63, t.s.n., Court (p. 18, rec.);
Sept. 21, 1972). On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days
following the illicit encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy 2. The Honorable Trial Court erred in holding
that plaintiff-appellant cannot validly question
 the legitimacy of her son, Rolando Q — What did you feel as a result of
Macadangdang, by a collateral attack without the incident where Antonio
joining her legal husband as a party in the Macadangdang used pill and took
instant case (p. 18, rec.). advantage of your womanhood?

In its decision handed down on June 2, 1978, the Court of A — I felt worried, mentally
Appeals reversed the lower court's decision (p. 47, and thus shocked and humiliated.
declared minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio
Macadangdang (p. 52, rec.). Q — If these feelings: worries, mental
shock and humiliation, if estimated in
On November 6, 1978, the Court of Appeals denied appellant's monetary figures, how much win be the
motions for reconsideration for lack of merit. (p. 56, rec.). amount?

Hence, petitioner filed this petition on January 12, 1979. A — Ten thousand pesos, sir.

The issues boil down to: Q — And because of the

incidental what happened to
1. Whether or not the child Rolando is your with Crispin Anahaw.
conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of
the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin xxx xxx xxx
Anahaw; and
WITNESS:
2. Whether or not the wife may institute an
action that would bastardize her child without A — We separate, sir. (pp. 61-63,
giving her husband, the legally presumed T.s.n., Civil Case No. 263, Sept. 21,
father, an opportunity to be heard. 1972; emphasis supplied).

The crucial point that should be emphasized and should be From the foregoing line of questions and answers, it can be
straightened out from the very beginning is the fact that gleaned that respondent's answers were given with
respondent's initial illicit affair with petitioner occurred spontaneity and with a clear understanding of the questions
sometime in March, 1967 and that by reason thereof, she and posed. There cannot be any other meaning or interpretation of
her husband separated. This fact surfaced from the testimony the word "incident" other than that of the initial contact between
of respondent herself in the hearing of September 21, 1972 petitioner and respondent. Even a layman would understand
when this case was still in the lower court. The pertinent the clear sense of the question posed before respondent and
portions of her testimony are thus quoted: her categorical and spontaneous answer which does not leave
any room for interpretation. It must be noted that the very
By Atty. Fernandez:
question of her counsel conveys the assumption of an existing general rule. This case invoked the same ruling in the previous
between respondent and her husband. case of Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company, etc., supra.

The finding of the Court of Appeals that respondent and her In the recent case of Francisca Alsua-Betts, et al. vs. Court of
husband were separated in 1965 cannot therefore be Appeals, et al. (L-46430-31, July 30, 1979), which petitioner
considered conclusive and binding on this Court. It is based aptly invokes, this Court thus emphasized:
solely on the testimony of respondent which is self-serving.
Nothing in the records shows that her statement was ... But what should not be ignored by lawyers
confirmed or corroborated by another witness and the same and litigants alike is the more basic principle
cannot be treated as borne out by the record or that which is that the "findings of fact" described as "final" or
based on substantial evidence. It is not even confirmed by her "conclusive" are those borne out by the record
own husband, who was not impleaded. or those which are based upon substantial
evidence. The general rule laid down by the
In the case of Tolentino vs. De Jesus (L-32797, 56 SCRA 167 Supreme Court does not declare the absolute
[1974], this Court restated that the findings of facts of the Court correctness of all the findings of fact made by
of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme the Court of Appeals. There are exceptions to
Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely the general rule, where we have reviewed the
on speculation, surmise, and conjectures; (2) the inference findings of fact of the Court of Appeals ...
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of (emphasis supplied).
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the The following provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of
case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both Court should be borne in mind:
appellant and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and
of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on eighty days following the celebration of the
which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as marriage, and before three hundred days
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed following its dissolution or the separation of the
by the respondent; and (9) when the finding of facts of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and
is contradicted by evidence on record [Pioneer Insurance and
Against this presumption, no evidence shall be
Surety Corporation vs. Yap, L-36232, December 19, 1974;
admitted other than that of the physical
Roque vs. Buan, L-22459, 21 SCRA 642 (1967); Ramos vs.
impossibility of the husband's having access to
Pepsi-cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, L-225533, 19
his wife within the first one hundred and twenty
SCRA 289 (1967); emphasis supplied].
days of the three hundred which preceded the
birth of the child.
Again, in Roque vs. Buan, supra, this Court reiterated the
aforestated doctrine adding four more exceptions to the
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband; the husband's having access to his wife within
the first one hundred and twenty days of the
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were three hundred which preceded the birth of the
separately, in such a way that access was not child.
possible;
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
[1] By the impotence of the husband
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed
legitimate, although the mother may have [2] By the fact that the husband and the wife
declared against its legitimacy or may have were living separately, in such a way that
been sentenced as an adulteress. access was not possible;

Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or [3] By the serious illness of the husband;
about the time of the conception of the child,
but there was no physical impossibility of (b) The child shall be presumed legitimate
access between her and her husband as set although the mother may have declared
forth in article 255, the child is prima against its legitimacy or may have been
facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears sentenced as an adulteress.
highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the
child is that of the husband. For the purposes (c) Should the wife commit adultery at or about
of this article, the wife's adultery need not be the time of the conception of the child, but there
proved in a criminal case. was no physical impossibility of access
between her and her husband as set forth
xxx xxx xxx above, the child is presumed legitimate, unless
it appears highly improbable, for ethnic
Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of reasons, that the child is that of the husband.
legitimacy — For the purpose of the rule, the wife's adultery
need not be proved in a criminal case. ... (Rule
(a) Children born after one hundred eighty days 131, Rules of Court).
following the celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following its Whether or not respondent and her husband were separated
dissolution or the separation of the spouses would be immaterial to the resolution of the status of the child
shall be presumed legitimate. Rolando. What should really matter is the fact that during the
initial one hundred twenty days of the three hundred which
Against presumption no evidence be admitted preceded the birth of the renamed child, no concrete or even
other than that of the physical impossibility of substantial proof was presented to establish physical
impossibility of access between respondent and her spouse. days following the alleged separation between aforenamed
From her very revealing testimony, respondent declared that spouses.
she was bringing two sacks of rice to Samal for her children;
that her four children by her husband in her mother's house in Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child
the said town; that her alleged estranged husband also lived in Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of
her mother's place (p. 73, pp. 21 & 22, 64 & 65, t.s.n., Sept. respondent and her husband.
21, 1972). It should also be noted that even during her affair
with petitioner and right after her delivery, respondent went to The fact that the child was born a mere seven (7) months after
her mother's house in Samal for treatment. Thus, in the direct the initial sexual contact between petitioner and respondent is
examination of Patrocinia Avila (the boy's yaya), the following another proof that the said child was not of petitioner since,
came out: from indications, he came out as a normal full-term baby.

Q — Why were you taking care It must be stressed that the child under question has no birth
of the child Rolando, where was certificate of Baptism (attached in the List of Exhibits) which
Elizabeth Mejias? was prepared in the absence of the alleged father [petitioner].
Note again that he was born on October 30, 1967. Between
A — Because Elizabeth went to her March, 1967 and October 30, 1967, the time difference is
parents in Same Davao del Norte for clearly 7 months. The baby Rolando could have been born
treatment because she had a relapse prematurely. But such is not the case. Respondent underwent
(p. 13, t.s.n., of Sept. 21, 1972). a normal nine-month pregnancy. Respondent herself and
the yaya, Patrocinia Avila, declared that the baby was born in
From the foregoing and since respondent and her husband the rented house at Carpenter Street, which birth was
continued to live in the same province, the fact remains that obvisouly normal; that he was such a healthy baby that barely
there was always the possibility of access to each other. As 5 days after his birth, he was already cared for by
has already been pointed out, respondent's self-serving said yaya when respondent became sick (pp. 28, 29 & 43,
statements were never corroborated nor confirmed by any t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972); and that when he was between 15 days
other evidence, more particularly that of her husband. and 2 months of age, respondent left him to the care of
the yaya when the former left for Samal for treatment and
The baby boy subject of this controversy was born on October returned only in February, 1968 (pp. 30-32, t.s.n., Sept. 21,
30, 1967, only seven (7) months after March, 1967 when the 1972). From the aforestated facts, it can be indubitably said
"incident" or first illicit intercourse between respondent and that the child was a full-term baby at birth, normally delivered,
petitioner took place, and also, seven months from their and raised normally by the yaya. If it were otherwise or if he
separation (if there really was a separation). It must be noted were born prematurely, he would have needed special care
that as of March, 1967, respondent and Crispin Anahaw had like being placed in an incubator in a clinic or hospital and
already four children; hence, they had been married years attended to by a physician, not just a mere yaya. These all
before such date (t.s.n., pp. 21-22, Sept. 21, 1972). The birth point to the fact that the baby who was born on October 30,
of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days 1967 or 7 months from the first sexual encounter between
following the celebration of the said marriage and before 300
petitioner and respondent was conceived as early as January, This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that
1967. How then could he be the child of petitioner? there is sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period
of conception. Hence, proof of the physical impossibility of
In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its such sexual union prevents the application of the presumption
pronouncements on the value of baptismal certificates. It thus (Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code,
ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be Vol. 1, p. 513 citing Bevilaqua, Familia p. 311).
considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove
the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption
specified — but not the veracity of the states or declarations of legitimacy, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that
made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship there was no access as could have enabled the husband to be
(Paa vs. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case the father of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed
of Fortus vs. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this where personal access is not disproved, unless such
Court held that a baptismal administered, in conformity with the presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary; where
rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband must
child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and be taken to be the father of the child (Tolentino, citing Madden,
statements contained in the certificate that concern the Persons and Domestic Relations, pp. 340-341).
relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and
statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore, there must
indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law. be physical impossibility of access by the husband to the wife
during the period of conception. The law expressly refers to
The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of physical impossibility. Hence, a circumstance which makes
respondent and her spouse. This presumption becomes sexual relations improbable, cannot defeat the presumption of
conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical legitimacy; but it may be proved as a circumstance to
impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 corroborate proof of physical impossibility of access (Tolentino,
days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This citing Bonet 352; 4 Valverde 408).
presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted
or refuted by only one evidence — the physical impossibility of Impotence refers to the inability of the male organ to
access between husband and wife within the first 120 days of copulation, to perform its proper function (Bouvier's Law
the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This physical Dictionary 514). As defined in the celebrated case of Menciano
impossibility of access may be caused by any of these: vs. San Jose (89 Phil. 63), impotency is the physical inability to
have sexual intercourse. It is not synonymous with sterility.
1. Impotence of the husband; Sterility refers to the inability to procreate, whereas, impotence
refers to the physical inability to perform the act of sexual
2. Living separately in such a way that access intercourse. In respect of the impotency of the husband of the
was impossible and mother of a child, to overcome the presumption of legitimacy
on conception or birth in wedlock or to show illegitimacy, it has
3. Serious illness of the husband. been held or recognized that the evidence or proof must be
clear or satisfactory: clear, satisfactory and convincing,
irresistible or positive (S.C. — Tarleton vs. Thompson, 118 N.Y. S. 863, 160 Misc. 830) and there is the presumption that
S.E. 421, 125 SC 182, cited in 10 C.J.S. 50). a child so born is the child of the husband and is legitimate
even though the wife was guilty of infidelity during the possible
The separation between the spouses must be such as to make period of conception (N.Y. Dieterich vs. Dieterich, 278 N.Y. S.
sexual access impossible. This may take place when they 645, Misc. 714; both cited in 10 C.J.S., pp. 18,19 & 20).
reside in different countries or provinces, and they have never
been together during the period of conception (Estate of Benito So firm was this presumption originally that it cannot be
Marcelo, 60 Phil. 442). Or, the husband may be in prison rebutted unless the husband was incapable of procreation or
during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual was absent beyond the four seas, that is, absent from the
union took place through corrupt violation of or allowed by realm, during the whole period of the wife's pregnancy (10
prison regulations (1 Manresa 492-500). C.J.S. p. 20).

The illness of the husband must be of such a nature as to The presumption of legitimacy of children born during wedlock
exclude the possibility of his having sexual intercourse with his obtains, notwithstanding the husband and wife voluntarily
wife; such as, when because of a injury, he was placed in a separate and live apart, unless the contrary is shown (Ala.
plaster cast, and it was inconceivable to have sexual Franks vs. State, 161 So. 549, 26 . App. 430) and this includes
intercourse without the most severe pain (Tolentino, citing children born after the separation [10 C.J.S. pp. 23 & 24;
Commissioner vs. Hotel 256 App. Div. 352, 9 N.Y. Supp. p. emphasis supplied].
515); or the illness produced temporary or permanent
impotence, making copulation impossible (Tolentino, citing Q. It must be stressed that Article 256 of the Civil Code which
Bonet 352). provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
Thus, in the case of Andal vs. Macaraig (89 Phil. 165), this been sentenced as an adulteress has been adopted for two
Court ruled that just because tuberculosis is advanced in a solid reasons. First, in a fit of anger, or to arouse jealousy in
man does not necessarily mean that he is incapable of sexual the husband, the wife may have made this declaration (Power
intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from vs. State, 95 N.E., 660). Second, the article is established as a
tuberculosis can do the carnal act even in the most crucial guaranty in favor of the children whose condition should not be
stage of health because then they seemed to be more inclined under the mercy of the passions of their parents. The husband
to sexual intercourse. The fact that the wife had illicit whose honor if offended, that is, being aware of his wife's
intercourse with a man other than her husband during the adultery, may obtain from the guilty spouse by means of
initial period, does not preclude cohabitation between said coercion, a confession against the legitimacy of the child which
husband and wife. may really be only a confession of her guilt. Or the wife, out of
vengeance and spite, may declare the as not her husband's
Significantly American courts have made definite although the statement be false. But there is another reason
pronouncements or rulings on the issues under consideration. which is more powerful, demanding the exclusion of proof of
The policy of the law is to confer legitimacy upon children born confession or adultery, and it is, that at the moment of
in wedlock when access of the husband at the time of conception, it cannot be determined when a woman cohabits
conception was not impossible (N.Y. Milone vs. Milone, 290 during the same period with two men, by whom the child was
begotten, it being possible that it be the husband himself At this juncture, it must be pointed out that only the husband
(Manresa, Vol. I, pp. 503-504). can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the
one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
Hence, in general, good morals and public policy require that a infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to
mother should not be permitted to assert the illegitimacy of a conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or
child born in wedlock in order to obtain some benefit for herself economic interest involved (Tolentino, citing Bevilaqua,
(N.Y. — Flint vs. Pierce, 136 N.Y. S. 1056, cited in 10 C.J.S. Familia, p. 314).
77).
The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born
The law is not willing that the child be declared illegitimate to in wedlock belongs only to the alleged father, who is the
suit the whims and purposes of either parent, nor Merely upon husband of the mother and can be exercised only by him or his
evidence that no actual act of sexual intercourse occurred heirs, within a fixed time, and in certain cases, and only in a
between husband and wife at or about the time the wife direct suit brought for the purpose (La — Ducasse vs.
became pregnant. Thus, where the husband denies having Ducasse, 45 So. 565, 120 La. 731; Saloy's Succ. 10 So. 872,
any intercourse with his wife, the child was still presumed 44 La. Ann., cited in 10 C.J.S. 77; emphasis supplied).
legitimate (Lynn vs. State, 47 Ohio App. 158,191 N.E. 100).
Thus the mother has no right to disavow a child because
With respect to Article 257 aforequoted, it must be emphasized maternity is never uncertain; she can only contest the Identity
that adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the of the child (La — Eloi vs. Mader, 1 Rollo. 581, 38 Am. D. 192).
presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still
possible that the child is that of the husband (Tolentino, citing 1 Formerly, declarations of a wife that her husband was not the
Vera 170; 4 Borja 23-24). father of a child in wedlock were held to be admissible in
evidence; but the general rule now is that they are inadmissible
It has, therefore, been held that the admission of the wife's to bastardize the child, regardless of statutory provisions
testimony on the point would be unseemly and scandalous, not obviating incompetency on the ground of interest, or the fact
only because it reveals immoral conduct on her part, but also that the conception was antenuptial. The rule is said to be
because of the effect it may have on the child, who is in no founded in decency, morality and public policy (Wallace vs.
fault, but who nevertheless must be the chief sufferer thereby Wallace 137 Iowa 37,114 N.W. 527,14 L.R.A. [N.S.] 544,126
(7 Am. Jur. Sec. 21, pp. 641-642). Am. St. Rep. 253,15 Ann. Cas. 761, Am. Jur. 26).

In the case of a child born or conceived in wedlock, evidence From the foregoing, particularly the testimony of respondent
of the infidelity or adultery of the wife and mother is not and her witnesses, this Court has every reason to believe that
admissible to show illegitimacy, if there is no proof of the Crispin Anahaw was not actually separated from Elizabeth
husband's impotency or non-access to his wife (Iowa — Mejias; that he was a very potent man, having had four
Craven vs. Selway, 246 N.W. 821, cited in 10 C.J.S. 36). children with his wife; that even if he and were even separately
(which the latter failed to prove anyway) and assuming, for
argument's sake, that they were really separated, there was
the possibility of physical access to each other considering
their proximity to each other and considering further that It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised
respondent still visited and recuperated in her mother's house attempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of her
in Samal where her spouse resided with her children. reckless behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit
Moreover, Crispin Anahaw did not have any serious illness or lover and above all — her own son. For this Court to allow,
any illness whatsoever which would have rendered him much less consent to, the bastardization of respondent's son
incapable of having sexual act with his wife. No substantial would give rise to serious and far-reaching consequences on
evidence whatsoever was brought out to negate the society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married women
aforestated facts. who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then
exploit the children born during such immoral relations by
Crispin Anahaw served as a refuge after respondent's reckless using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This
and immoral pursuits or a "buffer" after her flings. And she would be the form of wrecking the stability of two families. This
deliberately did not include nor present her husband in this would be a severe assault on morality.
case because she could not risk her scheme. She had to be
certain that such scheme to bastardize her own son for her And as between the paternity by the husband and the paternity
selfish motives would not be thwarted. by the paramour, all the circumstances being equal, the law is
inclined to follow the former; hence, the child is thus given the
This Court finds no other recourse except to deny respondent's benefit of legitimacy.
claim to declare her son Rolando the illegitimate child of
petitioner. From all indications, respondent has paraded Finally, Article 220 of the Civil Code reinforces the aforesaid
herself as a woman of highly questionable character. A principle when it provides thus:
married woman who, on first meeting, rides with a total
stranger who is married towards nightfall, sleeps in his house Art. 220. In case of doubt, an presumptions
in the presence of his children, then lives with him after their favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every of
initial sexual contact — the atmosphere for which she herself law or facts leans toward the validity of
provided — is patently immoral and hedonistic. Although her marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
husband was a very potent man, she readily indulged in an bonds, the legitimacy of children the community
instant illicit relationship with a married man she had never of property during marriage, the authority of
known before. parents over their children, and the validity of
defense for any member of the family in case of
Respondent had shown total lack of or genuine concern for her unlawful aggression.
child (Rolando) for, even after birth, she left him in the care of
a yaya for several months. This is not the normal instinct and WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF
behavior of a mother who has the safety and welfare of her APPEALS DATED JUNE 2, 1978, AND ITS RESOLUTION
child foremost in her mind. The filing of this case itself shows DATED NOVEMBER 6, 1978 ARE HEREBY REVERSED AND
how she is capable of sacrificing the psycho-social future SET ASIDE. COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
(reputation) of the child in exchange for some monetary
consideration. This is blatant shamelessness. SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.