Teori Pemisahan Hukum Dan Moral Austin
Teori Pemisahan Hukum Dan Moral Austin
Teori Pemisahan Hukum Dan Moral Austin
Volume 14 Article 6
Issue 1 Issue 1 - December 1960
12-1960
Part of the Natural Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Samuel E. Stumpf, Austin's Theory of the Separation of Law and Morals, 14 Vanderbilt Law Review 117
(1960)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/6
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
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please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
AUSTIN'S THEORY OF THE SEPARATION OF LAW AND
MORALS
SAMUEL ENOCH STUMPF*
baseball. Because the law contains so many rules, such as traffic laws,
which regulate a person's conduct at points where morality is un-
concerned, and because other laws raise only hypothetical obligations,
pending a person's choice to come under the law's control, positivists
have held that law is quite different from the rules of morality.
But not all the rules of law are of this hypothetical nature. The
most characteristic thing about laws is that they positively command
certain kinds of behaviour, and in these cases the content of the law
is frequently identical with a moral rule. The prohibition against
the use of child labor is surely an expression of a moral sentiment.
Even if the reasons which are used by the moralist for prohibiting
child labor are different from the reasons men use for passing a law
against that practice, in both cases the reasoning is based upon moral
convictions. If, that is, the abuse of children is denounced by the
moralist because it represents a tragic exploitation of a defenseless
minor and a ruthless denial of the rights of the child to a normal
childhood, on the one hand, while the law is justified by the legislator,
on the other hand, on the pragmatic grounds that the prohibition
will produce healthier adults and a stronger society, these are,
nevertheless, both moral arguments. The fact that the law in its
very inception becomes freighted with moral elements is what causes
skepticism in many quarters about the positivistic doctrine of the
separation of morals from the law.
Austin did not deny that moral influences were at work in the
creation of law, but he allowed nowhere in his theory any place for
this moral element when defining the nature of law. In order to main-
tain the sharp distinction between law and morality, he defined law
in its most abstract and severe terms as a command of the sovereign.
It was Austin's reduction of law to a command which has ever since
his time aggravated the debate over the nature of law. This is a
difficult debate because whichever way we choose to think of the
relation between law and morals we come upon undesirable con-
clusions. If we identify law with morality, then whatever is com-
manded by the state would be obeyed not only because it is
commanded but also because the command prescribes morally de-
sirable conduct. If we make such a close identification between law
and morals, however, we run into the danger of losing the basis for
a moral criticism of laws since there would be a confusion between
one's moral and legal obligations. An iniquitous law could not on
principle be criticized because it would already be identified with
morality. The alternative approach is to say that law and morals
represent two separate kinds of rules for behaviour and that they
have no necessary relation to each other. This is a convincing view,
particularly when it is used by those who argue that only by making
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5. PRoVINcE 373.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [VOL, 14
mental there should be no law against it, "for in the case of such
an act, all punishment is groundless."1 It appears then that the
notion of law is not only that law originates in the command of the
sovereign, but that such commands must threaten punishment, and
therefore should be commands only in those cases where there are
grounds, that is, moral grounds, for such a command. What de-
velops from this analysis is that though there seems to be a sharp
distinction between what the law "is" and what it "ought to be,"
between what laws sovereigns actually make and laws they ought
to make, Bentham urges that the very completeness of the idea of
law requires the recognition that the commands of law emerge in the
context of the moral concern of the legislator and society.
In this same vein, Austin identified the areas of law and morals
through a very careful analysis of the kind of acts the law should
consider as offenses. He said, "every act . . .that ought to be an
object of positive law, ought to be an object of the positive morality.
*
. .,"12 Even more interesting is Austin's notion that every act that
ought to be an object of morality "is an object of the law of God."'13
The object of the positive law is therefore the same as the object of
the law of God, the only difference being that the law of God is
concerned with a wider area of offenses than the positive law. At this
point Austin speaks not so much of the intersection of law and morals
but what is even more intimate, their concentric relation: "[T]he
circle embraced by the law of God... is larger than the circle which
can be embraced to advantage by positive law. Inasmuch as the
two circles have one and the same centre, the whole of the region
comprised by the latter is also comprised by the former. But the
whole of the region comprised by the former is not comprised by the
latter."'14 When Austin speaks of law as a command, he is assuming
that in its formation the sovereign has in mind the moral nature of
man, so that the very "is" of law contains some feature of moral
"ought" the moment the law is born. It is not entirely correct to say
that the concern over the "ought" is the concern only of the legislator
and not the legal scientist. Austin explicitly says that "it was not a
5
deviation from my subject to introduce the principle of utility.'
This supreme principle of ethics, both in Bentham and in Austin,
has an intrinsic relation to the very notion of what law is, for as
Austin points out, "I ... should often be unable to explain distinctly
and precisely the scope and purport of a law, without having brought
11. Ibid.
12. PRoviNcE n.163.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. PRovINcE 59.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14
the principle of utility directly before you."'1 6 The idea of command,
apart from some conception of how someone ought to behave is so
abstract that it can hardly have any meaning by itself. Only as the
act of articulating directions to action does command take on mean-
ing, and such directions carry moral implications. For the moment
it makes little difference whether the particular moral content of the
law is acceptable or not, because what needs only to be said here
is that both Bentham and Austin see an intimate relation between
the ideas of morals and of law because they see the intimate relation
between the moral nature of man and the moral concern of law.
The notion of a command cannot be understood apart from one
other way in which law is "bottomed in the nature of man." For
Austin emphasizes that law "in its literal meaning" is a rule laid
down "for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent be-
ing having power over him."' 7 It must be observed that the political
superior from whom a positive law flows is one who not only
possesses power but one who has intelligence, and the person whose
conduct is to be ordered is not simply an entity capable of receiving
signals in the way animals do but has the capacity of intelligence.
By intelligence Austin means the faculty of reason. Thus, the idea
of law is intimately connected with the faculty of reason, both in its
creation and in the object to which it is directed. Law can exist only
where there are intelligences, for as Austin says, "where intelligence
is not, or where it is too bounded to take the name of reason, and,
therefore, is too bounded to conceive the purpose of a law, there is
not the will which law can work on, or which duty can incite or
restrain."'18 This suggests that one of the "necessary" aspects of law
is its rational character and its inevitable connection with purposes,
and especially human purposes. It cannot be assumed that when
men deal with laws their reasoning is different from the way they
reason over moral duties. Nor do we need to think that when their
lives are ordered about by the laws men cease to reflect over the
moral defensibility of the law. The law does not in every case have
to be identical with or in conformity with the rules of morality in
order to show the relation between the two. Austin showed that the
law flows, in an important sense, from human reason which is also
the source of morality. It is not simply that law and morality have
the same source that is important here but, again, that they flow
from the same kind of reasoning, frequently over the identical kinds
of behaviour. Thus, while Austin wished always to say that a law
is a law whether it is good or bad, he certainly did not contemplate
16. Ibid.
17. Id. at 10.
18. Id. at 12.
1960] AUSTIN
that law had no moral characteristics. And what we have tried to,
show is not simply that here and there one can find a moral element
in the law but that the law is "bottomed" in the nature of man and
is the extension of his moral nature, therefore reflecting both man's
strengths and weaknesses.
-that in all governments the sovereigns are not bound by the laws
they make. In America the rulers are bound by the laws they make
and even more significant is the fact that the lawmakers are also
bound by the fundamental law of the Constitution. Austin empha-
sized that there is no legal limitation to the sovereign's power. This
is simply a play on words because it means that there are no laws
when the sovereign begins being a sovereign. First there is a sov-
ereign and then his commands become the law, so it may be theo-
xetically correct that there are no legal limitations to the sovereign.
But again, in constitutional government the constitution is the basic
law and it limits the powers of the sovereign, so that in this case not
even the verbal symmetry in Austin's argument will hold.
Austin's theory of the sovereign is not as bald as his original
statement leads one to suppose. We get the picture of the sovereign
without any legal limitation issuing commands and threatening evil
pains and punishments. In the best criticism of Austin's theory, Sir
Henry Maine writes that Austin's "theory of Sovereignty neglects the
mode in which the result has been arrived at ....And thus it is that,
so far as the restrictions contained in . . . [his] definition of Sov-
.ereignty . . . [is] concerned, the Queen and Parliament of our own
country might direct all weakly children to be put to death .... ,22
Surely this is the first impression one gets from the short version of
Austin's theory. But upon a closer look at his theory we find that
the acts of the sovereign, though capable of no legal limitation,23 are
certainly hemmed in by moral limitations.24 The way in which these
moral limitations affect the sovereign comes out in Austin's careful
analysis of the meaning of the phrase "the source of law."
There is a "loose" way and a "strict" way of defining the word
source, and Austin's view of the sovereign's legal status depends upon
this distinction. For the loose meaning of the source of law is that
whatever influences the shaping of a law is a source of law. But in
the strict sense there is only one source, namely the command of the
sovereign. Again, in the loose sense one can refer to the remote
causes of the law whereas in the strict sense we must look only to the
proximate source of law. Behind the distinction between the loose
and strict interpretation of the source of law lies the even more im-
portant distinction between the "cause" and the "source" of law.
Austin's contention is that there has been a confusion between those
influences which have "caused" a law to be formed and the actual
"source" from which the law, as law, springs. This confusion, he feels,
22. MAwE, EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONs 360 (American ed. Henry Holt
&Co. 1875).
23. PROVIc 230-31, 245, 255-56.
24. Id. at 258-59.
19601 AUSTIN
held that there is a close connection between law and morals, the
effect will be for people to identify their moral obligation with their
legal duties.31 And to say that the law already contains its moral
justification is to stifle any serious criticism of the law. But every-
thing depends upon which end of the argument we are considering.
When law is considered at the point of its creation, the very idea of
law requires that it bear some relation to moral standards. But after
the law has been made, it is still necessary to consider whether it
is morally justifiable. The pressure of moral criticism of law exists
at both points. To argue for the relation of law and morals does
not mean that morality must be or will be reduced to the commands
of the law. But even such an effect is not totally undesirable, for,it
is one of the functions of law to urge those moral actions which men
in their selfishness will not voluntarily undertake, or as Bentham put
it, "to increase the efficacy of private ethics." What is gained by this
analysis is a demonstration that the sovereign cannot separate the
act of making law from a consideration of the requirements of
morality,
is only one true source of law in the juristic sense, namely, the sov-
ereign, or a superior norm. The legal system is a hierarchy of norms
whose regress can be traced back finally to the "basic norm," beyond
which there is no other norm or law. The "basic norm" is ultimately
the source of all laws; it is the starting point of the norm-creating
process. The basic norm is a hypothetical assumption lying behind
the first legislator, the assumption that he is legislating validly; the
basic norm is the norm which authorizes the historically first legisla-
tor. The function of the basic norm is to confer law-creating power
upon the first legislator and on all the other acts (of legislation)
based upon the first act. In Kelsen's theory, everything depends upon
this last statement; for every norm, i.e., every law, is valid only inso-
far as it is based upon the basic norm, or, subsequently, upon some
other norm which issued from the basic norm.
Kelsen likens the basic norm to the transcendental logical prin-
ciples of cognition which are not empirical laws but merely the
conditions of all experience. So, too, the basic norm is itself no posi-
tive rule because it has been made, but is simply presupposed as the
condition of all positive legal norms. The final presupposition is not,
for example, the first constitution, but the validity of that constitu-
tion. The final postulate is that at a given time in history there
existed a condition which validated the first constitution-that con-
dition, not itself an act or statute, is the basic norm. Thus from the
basic norm there emerge types of law, for example, the civil and
criminal law. The criminal law in turn produces a specific statute;
and from that statute specific decisions are arrived at by the court
affecting individuals. The sequence here is from norm to norm, from
law to law. For the constitution, criminal law, statute and decision
are each norms and constitute the hierarchy of norms. These positive
laws become valid only on one assumption, namely, that there is a
basic norm which establishes the supreme law-creating authority. But
this does not mean that the basic norm itself can in any way be
proved to be valid. "The validity of this basic norm is unproved and
must remain so within the sphere of positive law itself." 35 More-
over, this does not mean that the system of laws is a closed logical
system,36 for the laws in this hierarchy are not deduced logically
but are in conformity with the higher norms. Kelsen simply makes
the point that just as one cannot know the empirical world from the
transcendental logical principles but merely by means of them, so
positive law cannot be derived in its content from the basic norm
but can merely be understood by it. Fundamentally, this means
that norms do not in any way correspond to Reality but derive their
35. Id. at 395.
36. Cf. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 141 (1950).
19601 AUSTIN
of the justice of the decision. It is clear that the "slot machine" con-
cept of the law is far too great a-n oversimplification of what law is.
But are we, then, justified 'in saying that the activity by which
judges seek to arrive at a decision and their consideration of what
ought to be the purposes and aims of the law in terms of social policy
are part of the law? To this question the positivists have always re-
plied in the negative, for they have based their science of law on
the description of the "is" and not the "ought to be."
But, again, in terms of the argument of positivism itself, the judicial
concern over what a law is or ought to be and his concern over the
justice of the decision is part of the phenomenon of the law. More-
over, since the positivist holds that' the court is the sovereign then
what the court says and does is the law. The meaning of the term
law therefore includes what the judges do in formulating their "com-
mand," that is, their decision. It' is not accidental that the judges
constantly strive to achieve justice (what the law ought to be). The
judge's engagement in weighing the requirements of justice and
thereby going beyond the mechanical approach of the machine is an
intrinsic part of what the law is. The fact that the judge engages
in these activities is far mor6 intimately related to what law is than
that he writes his opinions with a pen or with a pencil, or that he
walks to the court or drives in a car. All these activities are involved
in the process of rendering a decision, but only the activity in which
he is concerned with the right decision is, among these examples,
truly part of the law. Again, this would have to follow from the
view of sovereignty offered by Austin, for the law is the command
of the sovereign directing, the conduct of those in the habit of obey-:
ing. And just as we saw that Austin's primary legislator was not
free to make laws ih any arbitrary manner, that he was under moral
limitations; so also the judge, still under the influence of that original
moral constraint, is engaged in the activity of realizing the whole
intent of the law-justice. This process is very subtle and is attended
with many dangers. But the dangers suggested in this procedure
indicate something about the nature of law which would otherwise
be overlooked in the interests of having a neat theory. The danger is,
of course, that this interpretation of the judicial function might
open up the courts to the subjective -whims of individual judges. But
this danger has to be put over against the danger that the law will
become irrelevant and that fictions will constantly have to be in-
vented in order to give the semblance of continuity and certainty
in the law. Certainty in law must collide with the quest for justice,
and this collision ought to indicate that the nature of law is mis-
conceived if it is treated as a static structure; for such a static form
cannot reflect the subtle variations in which human beings confront
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14
each other, nor does it recognize that human life is dynamic and
cannot be contained in any partially conceived framework of be-
haviour. The judicial process is an intrinsic part of the law because
it is the means by which the stabilities of the rules are applied to
the dynamic behaviour of men, and this process operates under the
a~gis of the quest for justice. In this sense, what a philosopher
thinks the law ought to be might not be part of the law in the strict
positivistic sense of the word, but what the judge thinks it ought to
be is part of the law. And since the judge is part of the sovereign,
the judicial process must be contained in the definition of law. In this
sense, too, what the law "ought to be" is already an aspect of or is
contained in what the law "is."
he looks to man's nature for the ends of law and indeed for the
understanding of the fuller meaning of law. His severe and cryptic
conception of law as a command is greatly modified when the mean-
ing of law is connected with those fundamental notions which are
"bottomed in the common nature of man. '73 So significant did
Austin hold these notions which go into the making of laws to be
that he said that "it is impossible to consider jurisprudence quite
apart from legislation," and that "if the causes of laws . . . be not
assigned, the laws themselves are unintelligible."7 4 The rather large
section devoted to ethics in his Provinceof JurisprudenceDetermined,
about which he said that "it was not a deviation from my subject
to introduce the principle of utility," certainly shows how close
Austin conceived the relation of law and morals to be. Thus, the
principles of legislation turn out to be fundamental also in under-
standing the prior question of the nature of law.
Not one of the early positivist jurists ever disengaged the idea of
law from the notion of the ends of law successfully. They all begin
by announcing that law and morals are two distinct subjects, that
law is simply a command. But within the same treatise they deal
with the ends or purposes of law. And they deal with the problem of
ends in such a way as to indicate that without such a connection be-
tween "ends" and command, there can be no full understanding of
what is meant by law. Hobbes had raised order or security as the
minimum end and Bentham had pushed far beyond this minimum to
the much wider end of "happiness" or the greatest good for the
greatest number, and Bentham took his cue from "the natural con-
75
stitution of the human frame."
Whereas present day positivists recoil from discussions of morals
and on that account wish to disengage the law from moral concerns,
the founders of this school discovered that they could not sustain
this separation. Even though Bentham and Austin were particularly
concerned to rest their theories on scientific and empirically verifiable
information, they soon found themselves, and with no apology, deal-
ing with morals just the same. Their initial impetus to work out a
new system of jurisprudence had come from their dissatisfaction over
Blackstone's theological conception of man and his attempt to relate
law to these characteristics of human nature. A good idea of the
paradoxical attitude the utilitarians showed on this matter is found
in Gibbon's note on Blackstone's Commentaries. When he came to
that part which deals with "The Nature of Laws in General," Gibbon
wrote:
73. See the lecture, "Uses of Jurisprudence," in PRovINcE 365, 367, 369.
74. 2 LEcTUREs 1113.
75. BENTHAM, TH-E PRINCIPLES OF MoRALS AND LEGISLATION 4 (Blackwell
ed. 1948).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14
I have entirely omitted a metaphysical enquiry upon the nature
of Laws in General ... and a number of sublime terms, which I admire
as much as I can without understanding them. Instead of following this
high a priori road, would it not be better humbly to investigate the de-
sires, fears, passions and opinions of the human being, and to discover
from thence what means an able legislator can employ to connect the
private happiness of each individual with the observance of those laws
which secure the well being of the whole.7 6
the mere notion of order for physical security, provision for keep-
ing promises and contracts, and the security of possessions. For
Bentham, the principle of utility was a radical, creative and "danger-
ous" principle, dangerous precisely because it would call for vast
reform not only in the laws but in the actual behaviour of the
society. 82 Thus, Bentham brought into the law the moral principle
of behaviour, the moral "ought." Since law and morality were for
him concerned with the same conduct, they had to be based upon
the same principle. Since the law was concerned with the behaviour
morality labeled as "ought" to be done, this same principle thereby
also determined what the law ought to be. When jurisprudence
studies a system of laws, according to Bentham's analysis, it is also
studying in "that branch of jurisprudence which contains the art...
of legislation" what the laws ought to be.83 Thus what starts in
Bentham as an attempt to separate law and morals, ends with a most
intimate, natural law-like identification of law and morals. This
was also the case with Bentham's illustrious predecessor, Hobbes, who
when he considered the ends of law went far beyond the original
empirical analysis of man's nature when he said:
[Tihe duty of a sovereign consisteth in the good government of the
people; and although the acts of sovereign power be no injuries to the
subjects who have consented to the same by their implicit wills, yet when
they tend to the hurt of the people in general, they be breaches of
the law of nature, and of the divine law; and consequently the contrary
acts are duties of sovereigns, and required at their hands to the utmost
of their endeavour, by God Almighty, under the pain of eternal death. 84