Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

CASE DIGEST - Reed Vs Reed

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 2

Reed v.

Reed
404 U.S. 71
November 22, 1971

FACTS:
Richard Lynn Reed, a minor, died intestate in Ada County, Idaho, on March 29,
1967. His adoptive parents, who had separated sometime prior to his death, are the
parties to this appeal. Approximately seven months after Richard's death, his mother,
appellant Sally Reed, filed a petition in the Probate Court of Ada County, seeking
appointment as administratrix of her son's estate.

Prior to the date set for a hearing on the mother's petition, appellee Cecil Reed,
the father of the decedent, filed a competing petition seeking to have himself appointed
administrator of the son's estate. The probate court held a joint hearing on the two
petitions and thereafter ordered that letters of administration be issued to appellee Cecil
Reed upon his taking the oath and filing the bond required by law.

The court treated Section 15-312 and 15-314 of the Idaho Code as the
controlling statutes, and read those sections as compelling a preference for Cecil Reed
because he was a male. Section 15-312 designates the persons who are entitled to
administer the estate of one who dies intestate. In making these designations, that
section lists 11 classes of persons who are so entitled, and provides, in substance, that
the order in which those classes are listed in the section shall be determinative of the
relative rights of competing applicants for letters of administration.

ISSUE:
Whether a statute that includes a gender-based provision, preferring males over
females to administer an estate, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution?

RULING:
Yes. The Court held that the Idaho statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other,
merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind
of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily
controversy, the choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis
of sex.

Cited the case of Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (1885); Lindsley v. Natural


Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 (1911); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.
S. 106 (1949); McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U. S. 802 (1969).
The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment does, however, deny to States
the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a
statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of
that statute. A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."

The judgment of the Idaho Supreme Court is reversed.

You might also like