PHIMCO Industries, Inc. v. PILA, August 11, 2010
PHIMCO Industries, Inc. v. PILA, August 11, 2010
PHIMCO Industries, Inc. v. PILA, August 11, 2010
DECISION
BRION, J : p
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly
summarized below.
PHIMCO is a corporation engaged in the production of matches, with
principal address at Phimco Compound, Felix Manalo St., Sta. Ana, Manila.
Respondent Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA) is the duly authorized
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bargaining representative of PHIMCO's daily-paid workers. The 47
individually named respondents are PILA officers and members.
When the last collective bargaining agreement was about to expire on
December 31, 1994, PHIMCO and PILA negotiated for its renewal. The
negotiation resulted in a deadlock on economic issues, mainly due to
disagreements on salary increases and benefits.
On March 9, 1995, PILA filed with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike on the ground of the bargaining
deadlock. Seven (7) days later, or on March 16, 1995, the union conducted a
strike vote; a majority of the union members voted for a strike as its
response to the bargaining impasse. On March 17, 1995, PILA filed the strike
vote results with the NCMB. Thirty-five (35) days later, or on April 21, 1995,
PILA staged a strike.
On May 3, 1995, PHIMCO filed with the NLRC a petition for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO ), to enjoin the strikers from
preventing — through force, intimidation and coercion — the ingress and
egress of non-striking employees into and from the company premises. On
May 15, 1995, the NLRC issued an ex-parte TRO, effective for a period of
twenty (20) days, or until June 5, 1995.
On June 23, 1995, PHIMCO sent a letter to thirty-six (36) union
members, directing them to explain within twenty-four (24) hours why they
should not be dismissed for the illegal acts they committed during the strike.
Three days later, or on June 26, 1995, the thirty-six (36) union members
were informed of their dismissal.
On July 6, 1995, PILA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and
illegal dismissal (illegal dismissal case) with the NLRC. The case was
docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-07-04705-95, and raffled to Labor
Arbiter (LA) Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr.
On July 7, 1995, then Acting Labor Secretary Jose S. Brillantes assumed
jurisdiction over the labor dispute, and ordered all the striking employees
(except those who were handed termination papers on June 26, 1995) to
return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the order. The
Secretary ordered PHIMCO to accept the striking employees, under the same
terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. 4 On the same day, PILA
ended its strike. AEDISC
In this light, the core issue in the present case is whether the CA
correctly ruled that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
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ruling that the union's strike was legal.
OUR RULING
We find the petition partly meritorious.
Requisites of a valid strike
A strike is the most powerful weapon of workers in their struggle with
management in the course of setting their terms and conditions of
employment. Because it is premised on the concept of economic war
between labor and management, it is a weapon that can either breathe life
to or destroy the union and its members, and one that must also necessarily
affect management and its members. 14
In light of these effects, the decision to declare a strike must be
exercised responsibly and must always rest on rational basis, free from
emotionalism, and unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of hot heads; it
must focus on legitimate union interests. To be legitimate, a strike should
not be antithetical to public welfare, and must be pursued within legal
bounds. The right to strike as a means of attaining social justice is never
meant to oppress or destroy anyone, least of all, the employer. 15
Since strikes affect not only the relationship between labor and
management but also the general peace and progress of the community, the
law has provided limitations on the right to strike. Procedurally, for a strike
to be valid, it must comply with Article 263 16 of the Labor Code, which
requires that: (a) a notice of strike be filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in
case of unfair labor practice; (b) a strike vote be approved by a majority of
the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by
secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) a notice be given
to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the
intended strike.
These requirements are mandatory, and the union's failure to comply
renders the strike illegal. 17 The 15 to 30-day cooling-off period is designed
to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute with the
assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, while the seven-day strike ban
is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected
strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members. 18
In the present case, the respondents fully satisfied the legal procedural
requirements; a strike notice was filed on March 9, 1995; a strike vote was
reached on March 16, 1995; notification of the strike vote was filed with the
DOLE on March 17, 1995; and the actual strike was launched only on April
25, 1995. cHDaEI
8. Folder 4, with pictures taken during the strike, showing that non-
striking employees failed to enter the company premises as a result of the
respondents' refusal to let them in; 28
9. Affidavit of Joaquin Aguilar stating that the pictures presented by
Cinco were taken during the strike; 29
10. Pictures taken by Aguilar during the strike, showing non-striking
employees being refused entry by the respondents; 30
11. Joint affidavit of Orlando Marfil and Rodolfo Digo, identifying the
pictures they took during the strike, showing that the respondents blocked
ingress to and egress from the company premises; 31 and,
12. Testimonies of PHIMCO employees Rodolfo Eva, Aguilar and
Cinco, as well as those of PILA officers Maximo Pedro and Leonida Catalan.
For the Respondents
1. Affidavit of Leonida Catalan, stating that the PILA strike complied
with all the legal requirements, and the strike/picket was conducted
peacefully with no incident of any illegality; 32
2. Affidavit of Maximo Pedro, stating that the strike/picket was
conducted peacefully; the picket was always moving with no acts of illegality
having been committed during the strike; 33
3. Certification of Police Station Commander Bienvenido de los
Reyes that during the strike there was no report of any untoward incident; 34
4. Certification of Rev. Father Erick Adeviso of Dambanang Bayan
Parish Church that the strike was peaceful and without any untoward
incident; 35
5. Certification of Priest-in-Charge Angelito Fausto of the Philippine
Independent Church in Punta, Santa Ana, that the strike complied with all
the requirements for a lawful strike, and the strikers conducted themselves
in a peaceful manner; 36
6. Clearance issued by Punong Barangay Mario O. dela Rosa and
Barangay Secretary Pascual Gesmundo, Jr. that the strike from April 21 to
July 7, 1995 was conducted in an orderly manner with no complaints filed; 37
and,
7. Testimonies at the compulsory arbitration proceedings.
In its resolution of December 29, 1998, 38 the NLRC declared that "the
string of proofs" the company presented was "overwhelmingly
counterbalanced by the numerous pieces of evidence adduced by
respondents . . . all depicting a common story that respondents put up a
peaceful moving picket, and did not commit any illegal acts . . . specifically
obstructing the ingress to and egress from the company premises[.]" 39
In this regard, PHIMCO employees Rodolfo Eva and Joaquin Aguilar, and
the company's Human Resources Manager Francis Ferdinand Cinco testified
during the compulsory arbitration hearings:
ATTY. REYES:
Because at that time, there was a moving picket at the gate that
is why the bus was not able to enter. 45
MR. PEDRO:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. CHUA:
Can you tell us if these (sic) group of managers headed by
Francis Cinco entered the compound of PHIMCO on that day,
when they tried to enter? CSaIAc
MR. PEDRO:
No, sir. They were not able to enter. 49
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CHUA:
Despite having been escorted by police Delos Reyes, you still did
not give way, and instead proceeded with your moving picket?
MR. PEDRO:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. CHUA:
In short, these people were not able to enter the premises of
PHIMCO, Yes or No.
MR. PEDRO:
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Yes, sir. 50
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CHUA:
Madam witness, even if Major Delos Reyes instructed you to give
way so as to allow the employees and managers to enter the
premises, you and your co-employees did not give way?
MS. CATALAN:
No sir.
ATTY. CHUA:
The managers and the employees were not able to enter the
premises?
MS. CATALAN:
Yes, sir. 51
The NLRC resolution itself noted the above testimonial evidence, "all
building up a scenario that the moving picket put up by [the] respondents
obstructed the ingress to and egress from the company premises [,]" 52 yet
it ignored the clear import of the testimonies as to the true nature of the
picket. Contrary to the NLRC characterization that it was a "peaceful moving
picket," it stood, in fact, as an obstruction to the company's points of ingress
and egress.
Significantly, the testimonies adduced were validated by the
photographs taken of the strike area, capturing the strike in its various
stages and showing how the strikers actually conducted the picket. While the
picket was moving, it was maintained so close to the company gates that it
virtually constituted an obstruction, especially when the strikers joined
hands, as described by Aguilar, or were moving in circles, hand-to-shoulder,
as shown by the photographs, that, for all intents and purposes, blocked the
free ingress to and egress from the company premises. In fact, on closer
examination, it could be seen that the respondents were conducting the
picket right at the company gates. 53 aAIcEH
Further, PHIMCO employee Rodolfo Eva testified that on May 22, 1995,
a company coaster or bus attempted to enter the PHIMCO compound but it
was refused entry by the "moving picket." 67 Cinco, the company personnel
manager, also testified that on May 27, 1995, when the NLRC TRO was in
force, he and other employees tried to enter the PHIMCO compound, but
they were not allowed entry; on May 29, 1995, Cinco was with the PHIMCO
production manager in a pick-up and they tried to enter the company
compound but, again, they were not allowed by the strikers. 68 Another
employee, Joaquin Aguilar, when asked how the strikers blocked the ingress
of the company, replied that the strikers "hold around, joining hands, moving
picket" and, because of the moving picket, no employee or vehicle could
come in and go out of the premises. 69
The evidence adduced in the present case cannot be ignored. On
balance, it supports the company's submission that the respondent PILA
officers and members committed acts during the strike prohibited under
Article 264 (e) of the Labor Code. The testimonies of non-striking employees,
who were prevented from gaining entry into the company premises, and
confirmed no less by two officers of the union, are on record.
The photographs of the strike scene, also on record, depict the true
character of the picket; while moving, it, in fact, constituted a human
blockade, obstructing free ingress to and egress from the company
premises, reinforced by benches planted directly in front of the company
gates. The photographs do not lie — these photographs clearly show that the
picketers were going in circles, without any break in their ranks or closely
bunched together, right in front of the gates. Thus, company vehicles were
unable to enter the company compound, and were backed up several meters
into the street leading to the company gates.
Despite all these clear pieces of evidence of illegal obstruction, the
NLRC looked the other way and chose not to see the unmistakable violations
of the law on strikes by the union and its respondent officers and members.
Needless to say, while the law protects the rights of the laborer, it authorizes
neither the oppression nor the destruction of the employer. 70 For grossly
ignoring the evidence before it, the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion; for supporting these gross NLRC errors, the CA committed its own
reversible error.
Liabilities of union
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officers and members
In the determination of the liabilities of the individual respondents, the
applicable provision is Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. — (a) . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In all cases, the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required; substantial evidence, available under the attendant
circumstances, suffices to justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
on participating workers and union officers as above described. 73
In the present case, respondents Erlinda Vazquez, Ricardo Sacristan,
Leonida Catalan, Maximo Pedro, Nathaniela Dimaculangan, Rodolfo Mojico,
Romeo Caramanza, Reynaldo Ganitano, Alberto Basconcillo, and Ramon
Falcis stand to be dismissed as participating union officers , pursuant to
Article 264 (a), paragraph 3, of the Labor Code. This provision imposes the
penalty of dismissal on "any union officer who knowingly participates in an
illegal strike." The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union
officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. 74
PHIMCO was able to individually identify the participating union
members thru the affidavits of PHIMCO employees Martimer Panis 75 and
Rodrigo A. Ortiz, 76 and Personnel Manager Francis Ferdinand Cinco, 77 and
the photographs 78 of Joaquin Aguilar. Identified were respondents Angelita
Balosa, Danilo Banaag, Abraham Caday, Alfonso Claudio, Francisco Dalisay,
Angelito Dejan, Philip Garces, Nicanor Ilagan, Florencio Libongcogon,
Nemesio Mamonong, Teofilo Manalili, Alfredo Pearson, Mario Perea, Renato
Ramos, Mariano Rosales, Pablo Sarmiento, Rodolfo Tolentino, Felipe Villareal,
Arsenio Zamora, Danilo Baltazar, Roger Caber, Reynaldo Camarin, Bernardo
Cuadra, Angelito de Guzman, Gerardo Feliciano, Alex Ibañez, Benjamin Juan,
Sr., Ramon Macaalay, Gonzalo Manalili, Raul Miciano, Hilario Peña, Teresa
Permocillo, Ernesto Rio, Rodolfo Sanidad, Rafael Sta. Ana, Julian Tuguin and
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Amelia Zamora as the union members who actively participated in the strike
by blocking the ingress to and egress from the company premises and
preventing the passage of non-striking employees. For participating in
illegally blocking ingress to and egress from company premises, these union
members stand to be dismissed for their illegal acts in the conduct of the
union's strike.
PHIMCO failed to observe due
process
We find, however, that PHIMCO violated the requirements of due
process of the Labor Code when it dismissed the respondents.
Under Article 277 (b) 79 of the Labor Code, the employer must send the
employee, who is about to be terminated, a written notice stating the
cause/s for termination and must give the employee the opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself.
We explained in Suico v. National Labor Relations Commission, 80 that
Article 277 (b), in relation to Article 264 (a) and (e) of the Labor Code
recognizes the right to due process of all workers, without distinction as to
the cause of their termination, even if the cause was their supposed
involvement in strike-related violence prohibited under Article 264 (a) and
(e) of the Labor Code.
To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an
employee, an employer must furnish him or her with two (2) written notices:
(1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving the
employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another
written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify the employer's decision to dismiss
the employee. 81
In the present case, PHIMCO sent a letter, on June 23, 1995, to thirty-
six (36) union members, generally directing them to explain within twenty-
four (24) hours why they should not be dismissed for the illegal acts they
committed during the strike; three days later, or on June 26, 1995, the thirty-
six (36) union members were informed of their dismissal from employment.
We do not find this company procedure to be sufficient compliance
with the due process requirements that the law guards zealously. It does not
appear from the evidence that the union officers were specifically informed
of the charges against them and given the chance to explain and present
their side. Without the specifications they had to respond to, they were
arbitrarily separated from work in total disregard of their rights to due
process and security of tenure. EDISTc
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
*Spelled as "Nathaniel Dimaculangan" in other parts of the record.
6.Id. at 81-101.
7.Id. at 102-137.
8.Id. at 138-177.
9.Id. at 178-202.
10.Supra note 2.
11.Supra note 3.
12.Rollo , pp. 204-214.
14.Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 95494-97, September 7, 1995, 248
SCRA 95, 104-105.
15.Asso. of Independent Unions in the Phil. v. NLRC, 364 Phil. 697, 707 (1999).
(d) The notice must be in accordance with such implementing rules and
regulations as the [Secretary] of Labor and Employment may promulgate.
(e) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the [Department] to
exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary
settlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the
requisite number of days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor
union may strike or the employer may declare a lockout.
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total
union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret
ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare
a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the
corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by
secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid
for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds
considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The [Department] may
at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the
conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall
furnish the [Department] the results of the voting at least seven days before
the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein
provided.
17.Piñero v. National Labor Relations Commission, 480 Phil. 534, 542 (2004);
Grand Boulevard Hotel v. GLOWHRAIN, 454 Phil. 463,488 (2003).
18.Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. NLRC, 496 Phil. 707, 717 (2005), citing Primer on
Strike, Picketing and Lockout, National Conciliation and Mediation Board —
Department of Labor and Employment, Intramuros, Manila, 1996 ed., p. 6.
19.Sukhothai Cuisine and Restaurant v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150437, July 17,
2006, 495 SCRA 336; Asso. of Independent Unions in the Philippines v. NLRC,
supra note 15.
20.Rollo , pp. 67-74; LA decision, pp. 8-15.
21.Exhibits "A" to "A-105."
22.Exhibit "D."
23.Exhibit "D-2."
24.Exhibit "D-3."
35.Exhibit "12."
36.Exhibit "13."
37.Exhibit "14."
38.Supra note 6.
39.Rollo , p. 92; NLRC resolution, p. 12, par. 1.
45.TSN dated June 28, 1995, testimony of Rodolfo Eva, a union officer.
46.TSN dated August 27, 1996, p. 8, testimony of Francis Ferdinand Cinco.
49.TSN dated July 30, 1997, pp. 5-8, testimony of Maximo Pedro.
55.Id. at 121-124.
58.2 C.A. Azucena, The Labor Code, with Comment and Cases, p. 612 (2007), citing
31 Am. Jur. 249, p. 955.
59.Rollo , p. 94; NLRC resolution, p. 14, par. 2.
72.Id. at 328.
73.Asso. of Independent Unions in the Phil. v. NLRC, supra note 15, at 709.
74.Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc.,
supra note 41 at 458-459; Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 103560, July 6, 1995, 245 SCRA 627, 641.
75.Exhibit "36."
76.Exhibit "38."
77.Exhibit "5."
78.Exhibits "6" to "6-M," "37" to "37-M," "39" to "40-A."
83.Ancheta v. Destiny Financial Plans, Inc., G.R. No. 179702, February 16, 2010;
RTG Construction, Inc. v. Facto, G.R. No. 163872, December 21, 2009;
Formantes v. Duncan Pharmaceuticals, Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 170661,
December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 268, 287; Jose, Jr. v. Michaelmar Phils., Inc.,
G.R. No. 169606, November 27, 2009, 606 SCRA 116, 136; Faeldonia v. Tong
Yak Groceries, G.R. No. 182499, October 2, 2009. See also Suico v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 146762, 153584 & 163793, January
30, 2007, 513 SCRA 325, 347.