The Road To Pakistan's Dismemberment: Regional Studies January 2015
The Road To Pakistan's Dismemberment: Regional Studies January 2015
The Road To Pakistan's Dismemberment: Regional Studies January 2015
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THE ROAD TO
PAKISTAN’S
DISMEMBERMENT: 1971
Maryam Mastoor
Researcher
at Institute of Regional Studies
Islamabad
FOCUS-IRS 2
CONTENTS
From perplexing ideology to procrustean rule 2
Aching for respectable acceptability 5
The language movement in East Pakistan 7
The nourishment of ‘systemic flaw’—
entrenching autocracy 9
Anti-Politicians and the Rise of
Provincial Politics 10
The Rawalpindi conspiracy case 11
Squeezing the ‘majority population of
East Pakistan’ & Constitution making 12
Over centralization under Ayub 15
En route to ethnic divisions 17
The ‘Ayubocracy’ – The 1962 Constitution 18
East-west disparity 22
Towards the end of ‘United Pakistan’ 27
War of 1965 to the Six points of Mujib 27
Another attempt to tighten the noose —
Yahya Khan’s martial law 31
The 1970 cyclone: Another Moment of Neglect 32
December 1970 Elections — Poles apart 32
Elections 1970: Were they rigged? 34
The end result of ‘embedded autocracy’ —
A political rupture 32
Operation Searchlight — when defenders
became killers 37
Concluding reflections 38
Notes and References 45
THE ROAD TO PAKISTAN’S
DISMEMBERMENT: 1971
MARYAM MASTOOR
The paper is divided into three sections. The first section deals with an ideological
vacuum at the national level from which the call for identity and acceptability
echoed from East Pakistan. After the sudden demise of Quaid-e-Azam in 1948,
there wasn’t any leader of national stature who could determine an appropriate
course for the country and ensure national cohesion. Confusion about the
founding ideology of Pakistan created a structural flaw right in the beginning,
eventually leading to a procrustean rule in Pakistan that tragically ignored the
diversity it contained within its borders. The second section discusses the process
of indoctrinating autocracy in the political system of Pakistan. Autocracy, which
was presumed to suit the ‘genius of people of Pakistan’, led to its dismemberment.
Finally, the last section deliberates upon the events that marked the end of a
united Pakistan.
In the Lahore resolution that was unanimously passed by the All-India Muslim
League, the word ‘states’ rather than ‘state’ had been mentioned. It stated:
It is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim
League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this
country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the
following basic principles, viz that geographically contiguous
units are demarcated into regions which should be so
constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be
necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in
majority as in North-West and Eastern Zones of India, should be
grouped to constitute ‘Independent States’ in which the
constituent units should be autonomous and sovereign.(4)
There was an ambiguity in the Pakistan plan. Later, it was suggested that the
mention of ‘states’ rather than ‘state’ in the Lahore resolution was a ‘typing’
mistake. In an interview with the Associated Press of America in 1940, Quaid-e-
Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah clarified that Pakistan would be a democracy based
on the principles of social justice and equality with autonomy granted to its
‘component states or provinces.’(5) For having clarity about Jinnah’s vision of
Pakistan, his interview with the Associated Press of America is given as under:
Geographically — Pakistan would embrace all of the North
West Frontier, Baluchistan, Sind and the Punjab province in
the North Western India. On the Eastern side of India would be
the other portion of Pakistan of Bengal and Assam.
FOCUS-IRS 3
Hence, Pakistan came into existence in 1947. It emerged as a land where people
could freely practice their religion, be it Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs or Christians.(6)
Pakistan was founded to ensure freedom in practicing religion, to foster equity and
to undo discrimination on the basis of religion, caste or creed.Sindh, Baluchistan,
Punjab, North West Frontier Province (now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) and East
Pakistan, constituted Pakistan. Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah envisaged
the intangible connection of ‘faith’ between the Western and Eastern parts of
Pakistan, powerful enough to keep the country united. Unfortunately, however,
the principles of social justice and equity mentioned by Jinnah as structural
fundamentals for Pakistan were forgotten in the very early years of Pakistan’s
existence.
After independence, the two-nation theory wasn’t enough to unify the
heterogeneous society of Pakistan.(7) For the nascent state of Pakistan, a unifying
ideology to achieve national cohesion was imperative. That unification, however,
was quite naively materialized by spelling out ‘India’s threat’ to the existence of
Pakistan. From Liaquat Ali Khan to Pakistani leaders of today, India’s threat was
and is ‘considered’ as a unifying force for the people of Pakistan. Christine Fair
rightly calls Pakistan an insecure state since birth.(8) Hence, Pakistan was
configured as an ‘anti India’ state.
After the partition, the threat from India was there, but it was over-emphasized
whereas the imperative issue of acknowledging and managing diversity within
Pakistan was left on the back burner. Pashtuns, BalochisPunajbis and Sindhis
represented contrasting traditions. East Pakistan envisioned themselves as the
custodians of the Bengali culture. Their love for their culture was their identity.
Therefore, Bengalis yearned for ‘respect’ of their identity within Pakistan. It is
pertinent to peep into history to gain an understanding of the deep urge among
Bengalis for ‘respect’, prosperity and ‘acceptability.’
FOCUS-IRS 5
physique.’(15) Other than the martial race concept, it would be interesting to note
that in 1857 during the ‘Great Rebellion’, the Bengal Army provided the bulk of
rebel forces against the British.(16) Therefore, in the later years, the British
cautiously avoided recruiting of Bengalis in the Indian Army. Whatever might be
the reason, Bengalis were scarcely recruited in the British Army, as well as in the
Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police Service.
At the time of partition, out of 101 Muslim members of the Indian Civil Service and
Indian Police Service, only 18 had been from Bengal.(17) Later in 1949, a quota of 40
per cent for the inclusion of Bengalis in Civil Service (against 23 per cent for
Punjabis) was introduced to make up for their socio-economic backwardness.(18)
However, it was not sufficient for enabling Bengalis to be a part of the decision-
making cadre of the country. By the mid 1950s, out of 741 top civil servants only 51
were Bengalis.(19)
Table 1
Central Secretariat Elite Posts: 1955
East Bengal West Pakistan
Secretary 0 19
Joint Secretary 3 38
Deputy Secretary 10 123
Under Secretary 38 510
Source: Pakistan Constituent Assembly Debates Vol 1, 7 January 1956, p.1844. Cited in Ian Talbot,
“The Punjabization of Pakistan” in Christophe Jaffrelot, (eds) Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation
(Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2002), p.55
Table 2
Military Elite in Pakistan -1955
East Bengal West Pakistan
Lt Gen 0 3
Maj Gen 0 20
Brig 1 34
Col 1 49
Lt. Col 2 198
Maj 10 590
Naval officers 7 593
Air Force officers 40 640
Source: Cited in, Ian Talbot, “Punjabization of Pakistan”, in Christophe Jaffrelot, (eds) Pakistan:
Nationalism without a Nation (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2002)p.54
One may question at this point, what makes people obstinate enough to adhere to
their ‘own’ language. There might be many explanations of the phenomenon. One
logical interpretation might be that naturally humans want ease in their lives. It
was difficult for Bengalis to adapt to an altogether new language as there were few
people in East Bengal who could speak Urdu. Secondly, the Bengalis wanted to
preserve the literature of Bengali language. A struggle by Sindhi nationalists to
preserve their language, as it is also rich in literature can be considered in this
context. Thirdly, only 21 per cent population of East Pakistan was literate in 1961.
Therefore, it was almost impossible for them to learn a new language. Dissension
on the issue of language in Pakistan laid the foundation of Bangladesh.
In the early years of Pakistan, there was no national party or leader to promote
national cohesion. None of the leaders in Pakistan tried to materialize unity in
diversity. Before national integration could have been achieved, Pakistan was
confronted by a mass scale ethnic movement based on language. Gradually,
provincial politics took root and got strengthened under the strong central
government of General Ayub Khan. In this abysmal situation, there was no leader
who could make Pakistanis into a nation; hence ethnic diversity of each regional
FOCUS-IRS 10
group became their ‘identity’ and was politicized. This occurred simultaneously
around the time when civil and military bureaucracy acquired decision making
positions.
and the Pakistan People’s Party was launched in 1967, as a representative party of
West Pakistan. However, at the centre, there was no political party to speak for the
rights of the entire nation. A few amongst western qualified elite of Pakistan were
affiliated to the Communist Party of Pakistan (1948). However, they neither had
substantial representation at the central level, nor at the provincial level. The
Muslim League was left in the hands of civil servants. There was a continuous
struggle for power between anti-politicians, i.e the civil servants at the Centre and
the politicians at the provincial level.(29) The delay in the formulation of the first
constitution is also attributed to these ‘anti-politicians.’(30)
line with the genius of our people.” He continued in the same strain. The Quaid
gave Akbar Khan a withering look and in his usual style, pointing with his finger,
snubbed him: ‘Look here, you are a soldier. You have no business to criticize the
government. You must concentrate on your profession.”(35) This illustration simply
revealed the mindset of Pakistan’s military officers, who wished for ‘more’ than
their professional duties.
On 16th October 1951, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated by an Afghannational,Said
Akbar, at a public meeting in Rawalpindi. From 1951 to 1958, after the untimely
death of Liaquat Ali Khan, seven prime ministers took to office. Such sudden
changes in the highest command of Pakistan resulted in the making of an
extremely weak and vulnerable political system. There was no nationally accepted
constitutional document available to deal with thearduous problems confronted
by Pakistan.
Karachi. At that time, President Iskander Mirza had stated that regional
autonomy, if granted, would mean complete dismemberment of Pakistan.(43)
This situation led to agitations across the country and eventually taking benefit
from the political turmoil, Iskander Mirza, Pakistan’s first president, abrogated the
Constitution of 1956 and declared Martial Law. He made General Ayub Khan, his
close confidant, the Chief Martial Law administrator. It is interesting to note that
General Ayub’s term as Commander-in-Chief was to end in 1954.(44)
to ensure economic progress and a daunting defence in the country. Ayub wanted
to consolidate the nation by attracting attention on the notion of ‘Indian threat.’
It is imperative in a complex pluralistic society to have strong institutions that can
guarantee people’s representation in the government and ensure civil rights,
regardless of any caste, creed or ethnicity. Otherwise people may attribute their
alienation to the difference in their ethnic identity. Therefore, the absence of a
representative government in Pakistan compelled ethnic communities such as
Bengalis, Sindhis and Balochis to vehemently speak for their rights.
With the passage of time, exclusive preference for Punjabis in the central
administrative structure gave rise to cryptic criticism of Punjabis from other ethnic
groups of Pakistan. In East Pakistan, everyone who came from West Pakistan was
attributed as ‘Shala Punjabi’.(54) In the pre-partition period, British preferred to
recruit Punjabis. They were considered reliable and non-nationalist recruits who
could not bolster a perceived threat from Afghanistan.(55)
Interviews with various army officers, who served in East Pakistan, highlight the
fact that West Pakistanis civil and military officers considered East Pakistan as a
colony of Pakistan. Ayub Khan has written in Friends not Masters that Bengalis are
aggressive owing to their prolonged suppression by the ruling elite.(56) Aggression
often breeds in the lap of injustice. If one assumes that Bengalis were aggressive,
owing to the ‘nurture’ they had, then they might have been given more importance
by the State. Charles Dickens (Great Expectation) has rightly said that, “there is
nothing so finely perceived and so finely felt, as injustice.”
From 1960s onwards, East Pakistan’s struggle for provincial autonomy became
more pronounced. Pakistan was unable to accommodate the centrifugal
movement of East Pakistan as it was not democratic.(57) The East Pakistan
movement was nothing but a sheer outcry of dissatisfaction from the Centre.
FOCUS-IRS 18
that the effective power to govern lies in the hands of democratically elected
representatives.(71)
The constitution of 1962 established ‘Ayubocracy’ in the country. Absence of fair
elections right from 1947 to 1970 led to an era of non-representative decision-
making in the country. In the words of Dr Safdar Mehmood, President Ayub Khan
was solely responsible for the country’s administration.(72) The president was
constitutionally all-powerful in the appointment and dismissal of ministers,
governors and civil administration. Except for judges of the High Courts and the
Supreme Court, all his appointees were directly answerable to him. Pakistan’s
budget was divided constitutionally between “Committed” and “New
Expenditures”. The President had ‘unfettered’ power over the Committed
Expenditure. There was another ‘Unexpected Expenditure’ chargeable by the
President on his discretion from the Central Consolidated Fund.(73)
As far as legislation was concerned, the National Assembly was empowered to
legislate for the Central Subjects of Pakistan and matters falling under provincial
jurisdiction. However, the President was authorized to issue ordinances by having
the force of the Act of the Central Legislature.(74) The constitution of 1962 vested
dictatorial powers in the president, who “virtually commanded the political
system.”(75) Ayub’s philosophy of ‘invincible me’ for the country might be judged as
“personal” expedition, rather than “societal.”(76) Lawrence Ziring calls it a “great
leader” syndrome that had permeated society and political life in Pakistan. “Great
leaders were not above reproach, but they were great and they commanded
obedience.”(77) A presidential referendum was staged on 14th February 1960, in
which the Basic Democrats were asked to either mark ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ on the ballot
paper. Not surprisingly, Ayub Khan was ‘elected’ as the first President of Pakistan
with 95.6 percent votes.(78)
The first test of Ayub’s system was a presidential election of January 1965.
Disgruntled political forces (Council Muslim League being the strongest in Punjab
FOCUS-IRS 22
and Karachi; the Awami League strongest in East Pakistan; the National Awami
Party strongest in North-West Frontier Province, standing for the dissolution of
One Unit Province, and the fundamentalist Jamat-e-Islami) joined hands against
Ayub’s dictatorial system. They nominated Fatima Jinnah as their presidential
candidate, who was the sister of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and enjoyed deep respect
from all quarters of life. She was referred to as “Madr-e-Millat” (Mother of the
Nation).
It seemed as if Ms. Fatima Jinnah was representing the entire Pakistan, since she
enjoyed support from almost all political forces, even from within East Pakistan.
Ironically, Ayub Khan defeated Madr-e-Millat by 63.3 per cent votes.(79) The 80,000
Basic Democrats who were supposed to elect the President for the ‘entire’ country
were easily manipulated.(80) Had the elections been direct, Ms Fatima Jinnah could
have won.(81) There was some outcry of rigging as the entire state machinery was
run by Ayub’s confidants; nonetheless, and albeit timidly, the election results were
accepted.
Contrary to what Jinnah envisaged, autocracy was deeply entrenched in Pakistan’s
polity. The executive branch, the provincial authorities, the legislature and the
department of defence were all under the president. There was no democratic
electoral system; political rights to participate in the political process were
constitutionally withheld; civil rights were restricted and agitation was the only
way left for the people to voice their grievances. One man’s acumen could not deal
with the complicated issues brewing within Pakistan. The language controversy,
which indicated a crevice in the unity of the country, remained unattended. East
Pakistan was left in oblivion.
East-west disparity
The story of Pakistan is the story of ambitious and adventurist
generals denying the people their rights.(82)
— Former Air Martial, Muhammad Asghar Khan, 1983
FOCUS-IRS 23
It might not be wrong to say that Ayub Khan was neglectful of the development of
East Pakistan. Some 2.5 billion dollars earned from export of jute and jute related
goods produced in East Pakistan were transferred to West Pakistan. In total, East
Pakistan’s exports constituted 60 to 70 per cent of the State’s revenue, and it
received just 25-30 per cent of the country’s income.(83) In addition, nearly two-
thirds of the US aid was disbursed in West Pakistan.(84) Most of the industrial
capitalists from India, who had migrated to Pakistan, were settled in Karachi
(West Pakistan).(85) Therefore, Ayub administration’s main focus on industrial
development was of little or no significance for the highly agrarian society of East
Pakistan.
President Ayub, who already had absolute power, also became the chairman of the
National Planning Commission. Ironically, he abolished East Pakistan’s Planning
Board which previously planned for development in East Pakistan.(86) In the period
between 1956 and1961, in semi-public institutions like the Industrial Development
Bank, the share of East Pakistan was just 20 percent; for House Building Finance
Corporation, it was only 12 percent of the total; and for Pakistan Industrial Credit
and Investment Corporation, it was 24 per cent.(87) At the time of Ayub Khan, there
was a gap of 30 per cent in the per capita income of East and West Pakistan. By the
end of the second five year plan (1965), the disparity of per capita income had risen
to 45 percent which eventually rose to 61 percent by the end of Ayub’s term.(88)
The Gross Provincial Product of the two wings also showed aggravating disparity.
In 1949-50, it was 1237.4 crore rupees for East Pakistan and 1209.1 for West
Pakistan. However, in the later years, by 1963-64, it grew to Rs1867.1 crore for East
Pakistan while Rs.2009 crore for West Pakistan. It meant that the Gross Provincial
Product, which was higher in East Pakistan in the early years than that in West
Pakistan, eventually grew in West Pakistan and slumped in East Pakistan in the
later years(see table 3).
FOCUS-IRS 24
Table 3
Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey, 1969-70. Performance Statistics of West Pakistan, April 1969,
Government of West Pakistan.(89)
Table 4
Gross Provincial Product
(at 1959-60 factor cost, in crores of rupees)
East West East West East West East West
YEAR 1949-50 1954-55 1959-60 1963-64
Even in West Pakistan, it was a generally accepted impression that most of the
reward of rapid growth was consumed by a narrow economic elite, which
constituted 22 families in Pakistan. This feeling of relative deprivation resulted in a
mass political movement that demanded peoples’ participation in the political and
economic life of the country.“This sentiment was exploited by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
who launched a new political party, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), promising
to bring “Islamic socialism” to the country.”(90)
Talking about education, an important indicator of development in a country, the
total expenditure on education in united Pakistan increased from less than 1% of
GDP in 1947 to 1.2% in 1958 to 2.6% by 1964.(91) However, school infrastructure in
East Pakistan sharply declined. For every one thousand school-aged children, there
was less than one school in West Pakistan in 1947 compared to three primary
schools in East Pakistan.(92) In the first decade after independence, primary schools
in West Pakistan increased from 8,357 in 1948 to 16,474 in 1958. School availability
in West Pakistan doubled in the primary education sector.(93)
Table 5
Primary education- secondary education in
East and West Pakistan number of schools
Primary Education Secondary Education
EastWest EastWest
1948 29,633 8,413 3,481 2,598
1955 26,000 14,162 3,079 2,264
1960 26,583 17,901 3,053 3,043
1965 27,474 32,589 3,834 4323
1970 28,908 38,900 5694 5600
Source: Mohammad NiazAsadullah, “Educational Disparity in East and West Pakistan, 1947–71: was
East Pakistan Discriminated Against?” Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History, University
of Oxford, Number 63, July 2006.
FOCUS-IRS 26
The table shows inter-regional differences in growth and in the number of schools,
which in turn created disparity in school size. Schools in East and West Pakistan
were almost of the same size in 1948. However, soon and particularly after the
1950s, the figures began to diverge.
A rapid increase in population (see table 6) in East Pakistan gave rise to rampant
poverty (see table on per capita income). This regressive development was not
significantly addressed by the central government.
Table 6
Population growth rate in East and West Pakistan, 1950–75
Period East Pakistan West Pakistan
1950-1955 1.97 1.96
1955-1960 2.25 2.18
1960-1965 2.51 2.32
1965-1970 2.56 2.44
1970-1975 2.57 2.55
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat,
World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision and World Urbanisation Prospects: The 2001 Revision,
http://esa.un.org/unpp
Living conditions in East Pakistan were deplorable. Earlier in the Ayub era, East-
West Exchange Programme was introduced in the Civil Service of Pakistan. It was
overwhelmingly welcomed by the East Pakistanis, but West Pakistanis did not
want to be posted to the ‘distant’ and underdeveloped wing. Eventually, it was
abandoned under pressure from influential bureaucrats in West Pakistan.
However, it was again revived in the last years of the Ayub era.(94)
Notwithstanding the worsening condition in East Pakistan, the government under
Ayub focused all its resources on Defence. In those eleven years, Pakistan allocated
60.69 per cent of its budget for Defence.(95) If in today’s Pakistan, Punjab gets a
lion’s share from funds allocated to provinces owing to its large population, then
FOCUS-IRS 27
why was East Pakistan, being the most populous province of the country, deprived
of its rightful share?
The six points called for making Pakistan a federation with a parliamentary
system, with supremacy of the Legislature directly elected on the basis of universal
adult franchise. The Central government was to maintain Defence and Foreign
Affairs, where all other matters would be dealt in federating units. Both wings
would have two separate currencies easily convertible in each wing. The formula
also called for independence in foreign exchange earnings and capital
management of fiscal affairs by each wing, provided the requirements of central
government are fulfilled through a mutually accepted procedure. The last point
called for maintaining a separate paramilitary force for East Pakistan.(101)
If the points are analyzed with an open mind, they were aimed at humanizing the
living conditions in East Pakistan. They were centred on the management of
financial resources — a demand that East Pakistan should also get an ample share
of its own earnings. Other than that, a provision for maintaining a separate
paramilitary force was levelled. It was an even-handed demand as East Pakistan
was left defenceless in 1965. The six points did not mention a separate Supreme
Court for East Pakistan, an important pillar of parliamentary democracy, and thus
it could have been a federation of Pakistan. In fact, six points, except for the
demand of a paramilitary force, were concurrent with the interview given by the
Quaid to the Associated Press of America.†
According to Ayesha Jalal: “the Awami League’s six points program was a
firecracker in the tinderbox of disillusionments in Ayub’s Pakistan.”(102) The central
government and opposition parties perceived the ‘six points’ as a ‘secessionist
agenda’. Mulana Bhashni, leader of the National Awami Party, believed that six
points would eventually disintegrate the country. He suspected an imperialist
intrigue behind the six-point programme.(103) He inferred Indian involvement in
the so-called conspiracy by indicating the involvement of ‘allies’ of imperials in the
drafting of the six-points programme.(104)
In January 1968, a number of Awami League leaders and East Pakistan officials
were arrested allegedly for conspiring with India for bringing about secession in
the western wing of Pakistan.(105) It was known as the Agartala Conspiracy case.
The Ayub regime arrested 28 people including a naval officer, three senior civil
servants and a number of junior military personnel. The official statement issued
by the government alleged that the persons engaged in the conspiracy met PN
Ojha (First secretary of the Indian High Commission in Dhaka) and visited
Agartala in India to discuss plans with two Indian officers.(106) However, R K Yadev,
an officer of Research and Analysis Wing of Indian Secret Service (RAW), has
indicated in his book, Mission R&AW, that Mujib was not an Indian agent but
some of the people around him were in contact with the Indian intelligence
agency.(107)
Sheikh Mujib and some 34 people were tried under the “Defence of Pakistan Rules”
Act. Mukarram Hussain, a Bengali academician, said that for East Pakistanis it was
another attempt to humiliate the Bengalis by West Pakistanis, as they were “tired”
of hearing about the influence of India and Indian culture on the population of
East Pakistan.(108) He further says that any criticism against the government’s
policies was attributed as an unwarranted influence of ‘infiltrating’ Indian
agents.(109) In Autumn 1969, however, Mujib declared that the six points were not
the words of Quran and ‘thereby not immutable.’(110)
By the end of 1969, the whole country was witnessing relentless resentment against
the dictatorship of the Ayub regime. Both wings were on fire. The political
cauldron was in the making. President Ayub was still adamant to keep the political
parties at bay. Major General Khadim Hussain writes in A Stranger in My Own
Country that in October 1968, during a meeting with the President, when he asked
FOCUS-IRS 30
General Ayub a question about negotiating with political parties in opposition, the
president retorted, “Which buffoon do I talk to.”(111)
In January 1969, the Central Students Action Council was formed. It immediately
launched a country-wide agitation for the withdrawal of the Agartala case.(112) They
drafted 11 points on the basis of six points, which also included demands for the
emancipation of their leaders. This 11-point movement became popular and
asserted enough pressure on the Ayub regime.(113) On the other hand, a mass level
agitation started in West Pakistan, by various political parties, most notably by
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan People’s Party.(114) In March 1969, hundreds of
students and PPP supporters launched an impressive agitation, bringing the whole
province to a halt. Many leaders were arrested and imprisoned in East and West
Pakistan.(115) Bhutto lashed out by calling the system ‘half democratic, half
dictatorial, half a war with India, half a friendship with China and resisting
America by half.”(116)
Ayub Khan, weakened by his deteriorating health as well, was finally ‘requested’ to
step down. Chief of Army Staff,Lieutenant General Muhammad Yahya Khan
assumed power of the State. When Yahya became Commander-in-Chief in
September 1966, he was 52 years old. He jumped over several officers senior to
him. He was more than an occasional drinker and was “accused of
womanizing.”(117) It is presumed that General Peerzada, the principle secretary of
President Yahya, was the real decision maker, as General Yahya was just,
occasionally sober.
betrayal of democracy. He further said that General Yahya was, in fact, a ‘highly
ambitious person.’(119)
Yahya Khan restored West Pakistan into the original four provinces and abolished
the electoral system and called for direct elections on the basis of ‘one person-one
vote’. A ban was imposed on all political activities and many leaders were
imprisoned. However, in January 1970, the ban was lifted. On 28thMarch, Yahya
Khan accepted representation in the National Assembly on the basis of population,
giving East Pakistan 169 seats out of 313. He also conceded the federal form of
government with maximum provincial autonomy. Yahya Khan provisioned that
the National Assembly would prepare the constitution within 120 days of its first
meeting.(120)
By the end of Ayub era, before the announcement of elections, the situation in East
Pakistan became extremely volatile. Soldiers of Pakistan army were attacked by an
angry mob of Bengalis. Therefore, army personnel were instructed to move in
groups along with their weapons.(121) Sadly, aggrieved Bengalis attacked Biharis, in
order to punish them for being sympathetic to the West Pakistanis (the so-called
colonial power). The anger against West Pakistan was at its peak before the
elections. In October 1970, Pakistan was to experience its first direct elections.
However, the elections were delayed; the coastal areas of East Pakistan had been
struck by a cyclone.
It is important to note that the communication system between the two wings was
also inefficient at that time. When the question about delay in sending aid to East
Pakistan is asked to army officers of that time, they retort by saying that disaster
was not that deadly and casualties were exaggerated for seeking sympathy. It is
quite possible that the West Pakistani establishment might have remained
unaware of the actual situation of the post-cyclone East Pakistan.
International response to the tragedy was overwhelming. India, US and other
countries sent volunteers as well as items of daily usage for the East Pakistanis. (123)
Some of the foreign aid that was shipped to Karachi never reached East
Pakistan.(124)Yahya Khan half heartedly ordered the military to establish relief
camps in the cyclone-hit areas. Shahid Hussain, a civil servant appointed to
distribute aid in Bhola island of East Pakistan, is of the view that many soldiers
from Pakistan army refused to handle Bengali dead bodies. The culmination of
these adverse sentiments in Bengalis resulted in a revolting public verdict. Awami
League won a land sliding victory in the first direct national elections of December
1970.
centralized system. Out of 300 general seats, 162 were allocated to East Pakistan.
The Awami League won the majority seats (160) in East Pakistan. In West Pakistan,
out of 138 allocated seats, 81 seats were won by the People’s Party.(125) The turnout
in the entire country had been 59.8 per cent. The turnout in East Pakistan was 56.9
percent.(126) However, Sharmilla Bose in her book, Dead Reckoning, says that as
only 56 electorate in East Pakistan voted, it meant that 42 per cent voter voted for
Awami League.(127)
Yahya Khan was not prepared for such results; he was briefed by ‘secret agencies’
that due to differences amongst the political parties, there would be a ‘hung’
parliament.(128) He thought that he would easily rule the country, given the weak
position of the political setup. Major General Raja Khadim Hussain in his book also
acknowledges the meddling of secret agencies in political affairs.(129) Lured by the
faulty reports of secret agencies, the Yahya administration was a bit loose on
setting the stage for first direct elections.
Pakistan at that time was nothing but an embedded autocracy, where every move
of the political actors, journalists, media persons was ruthlessly under the sceptical
eye of the secret agencies. Crime, in those days, was construed as anything that
spoke against the army and ‘their’ government.
Brig (retd) Bashir Ahmed, who was serving as a Lieutenant Colonel in the 14
Division under Major General Khadim Hussain, seconds the information regarding
the ‘militant wing’ of the Awami League.(131) He is also of the view that elite in East
Pakistan was in favour of Awami League.(132) On the contrary, it is also reported
that the martial law officers of the Eastern command were asked to weaken the
Awami League’s support. Lt Col SD Ahmed, a martial law officer, confided to
Brigadier AR Sadiq that, ‘he had Rs.5 million to play with’ before the elections of
1970.(133)
It is also evident that owing to a huge wave of support for the Awami League, none
of the tactics of control by the embedded autocratic system could work. The
unexpected results of elections perturbed the Yahya administration. Therefore, in
January-February 1971, Operation Blitz was conceived. The main aim of the
operation was to postpone the convening of the National Assembly, to ensure the
reversion of martial rule and impose a ban on all political activity. Bhutto proposed
in February that there can be two solutions to the crises: the postponement of the
National Assembly session or the removal of the 120-day limit to draft
constitution.(134)
Ironically, US Ambassador Farland informed Washington on 28th February 1971
about his detailed meeting with Mujib in which Mujib proposed a Confederation
between East and West Pakistan.(135) The rulers in Pakistan, however, did not pay
heed tothe proposed solutions in an attempt to avert the impending crisis.
The National Assembly was to be summoned on 3rd March 1971. Yahya announced
on 1st March that following the disagreement of the two main parties, i.e. the
Awami League and People’s Party, the National Assembly session was being
postponed for an indefinite period. Governor Ahsan of East Pakistan suggested to
Yahya Khan that the postponement of the National Assembly session would be
devastating; in response, he was ousted from the post.(136) Lt General Sahabzada
Yaqub Khan, the commander of the Eastern Command at that time, was wary of
FOCUS-IRS 35
using force against the citizens of Pakistan; he was also replaced by General Tikka
Khan, the hardliner. Bhutto, the charismatic one, who was alleged to have implicit
support of the military establishment, announced that he would not attend the
National Assembly session.(137)
Operation Searchlight, drafted by Major General Rao Farman Ali and Major
General Khadim Hussain, was revealed to General Hamid and General Tikka Khan
on 20th March. Kamal Hussain, who was part of negotiating team from the Awami
League, writes in his book Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice that on 23rd
March, President Yahya Khan was supposed to attend the discussion held between
Awami League and People’s Party, but instead he attended the ‘Generals
meeting’.(143) It simply showed that the military establishment was not serious in
negotiations. Even before the elections in December 1970, a general told his fellow
officers that “we will not allow those black bastards to rule over us”.(144) How could
negotiations have worked in such a context? The military of any country is trained
to launch operations alone, and not expected to steer the country out of political
crises. In the Dictionary of Social Sciences, the word politician is defined as:
The term politician is most commonly used to refer to a person
actively engaged in the struggle for governmental power and/or
office, whose success largely depends upon the favour of others and
who, to achieve success must therefore be skilled in the arts of
persuasion, negotiation and compromise.(145)
The above definition clearly illustrates that it is the politician who negotiates and
reaches a compromise; his power lies in his being good with the people. On the
contrary, a soldier can only use tactics of fear and intimidation in order to ‘resolve’
any issue. India, which is far more complexly heterogeneous than Pakistan,
cautiously kept its military out of politics. Indian leaders knew that only
democracy can keep them united.
Stephen Cohen notes that Indian military plays no role at all in the decision-
making process of India. Careful observation of the Pakistan military and US
military linkages made Indian leaders more cautious. It is an established norm in
India that contacts of Indian armed forces with other countries are ‘strictly
controlled’. In the Pakistan of 1971, those who were incapable of making a political
FOCUS-IRS 37
breakthrough were the decision makers for the entire nation. Therefore, not
surprisingly, on the night of 25th March 1971, the Pakistani army launched an
operation against its own people, those whom they had once vowed to protect.
aircraft.(150) Brig Bashir (retd) is of the view that General Niazi was not capable of
being promoted to rank of a colonel.(151)
Pakistan was dismembered; for many, it was nothing short of amputating one’s
own arm, but for many of the Generals it was a failed military mission. Even now,
rather than debating why this tragedy happened, many discussions are focused on
strategic and plan failures in the ‘war’ of 1971. Embedded autocracy in the
heterogeneous society of Pakistan led to this self-amputation. The pain of this
tragedy will continue to be felt through the coming generations of Pakistan.
The blame game often highlights Bhutto and Mujib as being responsible for failure
in the talks. But it was not an individual, but a systemic failure. Charismatic
personalities emerged out of this systemic shortfall. Bhutto and Mujib only voiced
the grievances of people emboldened by a non-representative system in Pakistan.
Concluding reflections
On 16th December 1971, when the ruler of Pakistan, General Muhammad Yahya
Khan was having a party at his Peshawar residence, Pakistan got dismembered. (152)
East Pakistan became Bangladesh. It was a moment of amputation for the nation,
but there was no one at the helm of power with whom the people could share the
pain. Bhutto alluded in West Pakistan, after the Pakistani army’s suppression of
East Pakistanis, “Thank God, Pakistan has been saved.”(153)
It was certainly not saving. It was nothing short of leaving the people of the
country defenceless against the army of that very country. On the eve of 25th March
1971, Operation Searchlight was launched in East Pakistan. Eventually, the dark
and merciless night of violence fell upon the eastern province of Pakistan. The
Pakistani army opened fire against their fellow citizens, many Bengali women were
sexually assaulted and Bengalis in revenge brutally killed many soldiers of the
‘occupation forces,’ as well as Biharis for allegedly being sympathetic to West
Pakistan. Ten million East Pakistanis fled to India.(154) Some analysts believe that
the use of force by the State against its own people, who were just demanding their
FOCUS-IRS 39
constitutional right, could have been avoided. The East Pakistan tragedy is and will
continue to be a tormenting question in academic debates.
However, considering the above discussion, it can be said that Pakistan is bound to
dysfunction under the military rule; scathing consequences can occur if it is ever-
indulged in autocracy. For maintaining the integrity and solidarity of the
‘remaining’ country, democratic institutions need to be strengthened, and any
misadventure by the military might be strictly opposed. The tragedy of East
Pakistan is the result of a systemic failure. Each step taken under the autocratic
regime of Ayub led to the secessionist outfall. Some analysts believe that East
Pakistan was destined to secede given the geographical distance of a thousand
miles. However, it might be argued that if it was to secede, then it could have been
a graceful separation. But a political solution could only have been possible if
politicians were the decision makers. Alas, this wasn’t the case in the Pakistan of
1971.
The presence of a charismatic leader in dissatisfied East Pakistan resulted in the
making of a centrifugal movement. If in the heterogeneous society of Pakistan, the
government remains unrepresentative and the provinces are not given their rights,
more episodes of secession might occur. All a dissatisfied province needs is a
charismatic leader. Dissatisfaction renders solidarity among the deprived and
hence, an agitation starts under a leader of the oppressed. It is therefore necessary
for a country to concentrate its energies on strengthening the institutions that may
fairly address the grievances of the people, without any discrimination.
In the autocratic regime of President Ayub, civil liberties were under strict control,
political activity was discouraged, the electoral process was nothing but a sham,
and accountability of the powerful military or civil bureaucracy was out of
question. The Ayub regime exercised maximum power to govern; though he might
have been a nationalist and urged betterment for the country, yet his insistence for
strict conformity in the form of centralization led the country to anarchy.
FOCUS-IRS 40
Economic development under President Ayub benefited a few. In his last decade,
both the wings – East and West – exalted their extreme disapproval for the
economic policies in the country. Poor in East Pakistan became poorer day by day.
Bhutto’s slogan for ‘Roti, Kapraaur Makan’ attracted huge crowds in West
Pakistan.
In the 1970 elections, the political cauldron revealed itself in the form of
contrasting voter aspirations from both wings. The situation was perplexing and
needed keen analysis and understanding on part of the authorities to avoid
bloodshed. Unfortunately, those who could do that were restricted to the
provinces and the Central authority was in the hands of ‘soldiers’ who were
‘trained’ to fight. And they fought.
On the merciless night of 25th March 1971, when all the preparation for battle were
complete, the military operation was launched. Turning back on all previous
efforts on negotiations, a civil war erupted in Pakistan. Defenders became killers
and citizens took up arms against their defenders. It is indeed an unforgettable
tragedy.
In light of this discussion, one might argue that Pakistan’s salvation lies in
democracy. In the case of Pakistan, it is quite appropriate to say that even the
worst kind of democracy is better than best kind of dictatorship. During dictatorial
regimes, Pakistan faced full-scale wars (1965 and 1971) against India, it got
dismembered and it got involved in today’s war against terrorism.
In Pakistan, every experiment with autocracy (1958, 1970, 1977 and 1999) ended
with mass level protest. Therefore, justification of a military coup on the basis of
‘threat to national integrity’ is retroactively faulty. The secret for national solidarity
lies in the doctrine of welfare of the people, and it can only be achieved if
democracy effectively functions, public institutions are strengthened and the
rights of people are protected. Without changing the plight of the people, national
cohesion can never be achieved.
FOCUS-IRS 41
Appendix
THE TEXT OF THE SIX-POINT FORMULA AS ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED, AND
SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED IN THE AWAMI LEAGUE’S MANIFESTO
Point No. 1
Original
The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the basis of the
Lahore Resolution, and Parliamentary form of Government with supremacy of the Legislature
directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise.
Amended
The character of the government shall be federal and parliamentary, in which election to the federal
legislature and to the legislatures of the federating units shall be direct and on the basis of universal
adult franchise. The representation in the federal legislature shall be on the basis of population.
Point No.2
Original
Federal Government shall deal with only two subjects, viz: Defence and Foreign Affairs, and all other
residuary subjects shall vest in the federating states.
Amended
The federal government shall be responsible only for defence and foreign affairs and, subject to the
conditions provided in (3) below, currency.
Point No. 3
Original
A. Two separate but freely convertible currencies for two wings may be introduced, or B. One
currency for the whole country may be maintained. In this case effective constitutional provisions are
to be made to stop flight of capital from East to West. The Pakistan. Separate Banking Reserve is to
be made and separate fiscal and monetary policy to be adopted for East Pakistan.
Amended
There shall be two separate currencies mutually or freely convertible in each wing for each region, or
in the alternative a single currency, subject to the establishment of a federal reserve system in which
there will be regional federal reserve banks which shall devise measures to prevent the transfer of
resources and flight of capital from one region to another.
Point No. 4
Original
The power of taxation and revenue collection shall vest in the federating units and that the Federal
Center will have no such bower. The Federation will have share in the state taxes for meeting their
FOCUS-IRS 42
required expenditure. The Consolidated Federal Fund shall come out of a levy of certain percentage
of all state taxes.
Amended
Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the federating units. The federal government shall be
provided with requisite revenue resources for meeting the requirements of defence and foreign
affairs, which revenue resources would be automatically appropriable by the federal government in
the manner provided and on the basis of ratio to be determined by the procedure laid down in the
Constitution. Such constitutionalprovisions would ensure that the federal government’s revenue
requirements are met consistently with the objective of ensuring control over the fiscal policy by the
governments of the federating units.
Point No. 5
Original
(1) There shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings of the two wings, (2) earnings
of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan Government and that of West Pakistan
under the control of West Pakistan Government, (3) foreign exchange requirement of the Federal
Government shall be met by the two wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed, (4) indigenous
products shall move free of duty between two wings, (5) the Constitution shall empower the unit
Governments to establish trade and commercial relations with, set up trade missions in and enter
into agreements with, foreign countries.
Amended
Constitutional provisions shall be made to enable separate accounts to be maintained of the foreign
exchange earnings of each of the federating units, under the control of the respective governments of
the federating units. The foreign exchange requirements of the federal government shall be met by
the governments of the federating units on the basis of a ratio to be determined in accordance with
the procedure laid down in the Constitution. The Regional governments shall have power under the
Constitution to negotiate foreign trade and aid within the framework of the foreign policy of the
country, which shall be the responsibility of the federal government.
Point No. 6
Original
The setting up of a militia or a paramilitary force for East Pakistan.
Amended
FOCUS-IRS 43
The governments of the federating units shall be empowered to maintain a militia or Paramilitary
force in order to contribute effectively towards national security.
FOCUS-IRS 44
1. See for instance, Raja Khadim Hussain, A Stranger in one’s Own Country, (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2012), Kamal Hossain, Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice, (Karachi:
Oxford University Press, 2013), Kamal Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, East Pakistan Crisis,
(Lahore: Majid Ali Pvt Limited, 1994) etc.
2. Sharmilla Bose, Dead Reckoning, Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War (London: Hurst c &
co Publishers Ltd, 2011).
3. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Great Tragedy, (Lahore: Agha Amir Hussain Publisher).
4. M. BhaskaranNair, Politics in Bangladesh: A Study of Awami League, 1949-58 (New Delhi:
Northern Books, 1990),p.36.
5. Abida Shakoor, Congress-Muslim League Tussle: 1937-40; a Critical Analysis (New Delhi:
Aakar Books, 2003) p.175-176.
6. “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to
any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste
or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state. … We are starting with this
fundamental principle that we are all citizens, and equal citizens, of one state.”—Quaid-e-
Azam’s address to the Constituent Assembly.
7. Taj M Khattak, “Ghosts of December”, The News, 6 December, 2014.
Vice Admiral Taj M Khattak has described the ideological confusion prevalent in Pakistan in
the following words:
"The West Pakistani’s notion of Pakistan was inseparable from the Muslim nation of the
Subcontinent, a nation locked in combat with Hindus. For them safeguarding the Indian
Islamic heritage, exemplified by Allama Iqbal’s poetry, in which Urdu played a major role,
was what Pakistan meant above all. On the other hand, for the East Pakistani, Pakistan was
primarily a place where Muslims would rule and be secure from Hindu domination. Their
view of their Bengali identity and language [were also] exemplified by nationalistic poetry of
Rabindranath Tagore, would contribute to the Pakistan they believed in, which differed
significantly from the perception of their West Pakistani compatriots.”
8. C. Christian Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2014) p.1
FOCUS-IRS 45
9. R. Mukerjee, “The Social Background of Bangladesh’, in Kathleen Gough and Hari P Sharma
(ed.), Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973),
pp.403-04.
10. Rabindranath Trivedi, “How Hindus Became ‘Minority’ in East Bengal turned Bangladesh?
Asian Tribune, 2014-09-05.
11. Kamal, “Bangladesh: Quest…,”ref. 1, p.3.
12. Cited in Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, (London: Hurst, 1999), p.90.
13. Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: An Eye of the Storm (New Haven: Yale University
Press),p.109.
14. Chapter by Akbar S Ahmed, p.141 in Victoria Schofield, (eds) Old Roads New Highways, Fifty
Years of Pakistan, (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1997).
15. Koshick Roy, The Army in British India from Colonial Warfare to Total War 1957-1947,
(London: Bloomsburry Academy).p.78.
16. George Fremont Barnes, The Indian Mutiny 1857-58,( New York: Ospery Publishing), p.90.
17. Richard Sisson and Leo E Rose, War and Secession Pakistan, India and the Creation of
Bangladesh, (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1990), p.10.
18. CJ, Nationalism without a Nation, p.19.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Bengali language in Encyclopaedia Britannica and see LaalWaaz, History of Urdu Language
(Delhi: Mujtabai Press, 1920).
22. For detailed study on language movement see, MehboobHussain, “Students as Pressure
Groups in Pakistan Politics”, Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol XXXIII, No 2,
(2011), pp. 167-171,
23. Constituent Assembly Debates, 24th February 1948, pp.6-7, Cited inSuchetaGhosh, Role of
India in the Emergence of Bangladesh (Calcutta: Minevra Associates Pvt Ltd, 1983), p.14.
24. Rafique Afzal, Selected Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali
Jinnah (1947-48), (Lahore Research Society of Pakistan, 1980), pp.85-86.
25. Cited in “Jinnah Speeches and Statements 1947-1948” Millennium edition, (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1999), p.150 and 158.
26. CIA Fact files.
27. Clarence Maloney, Language and Civilization Change in South Asia, (eds) (Netherlands: Brill
Leiden, 1978), p.147.
28. HamidaKhuhroThe Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969, by Lawrence
ZiringModern Asian Studies, Book Review, Volume 6, Issue 02, March 1972, pp.248-255.
FOCUS-IRS 46
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. HasanZaheer, The Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951 — The First Coup Attempt in Pakistan,
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.210- 215.
32. Ishtiaq Ahmed, Pakistan: The Garrison State, (Karachi: Oxford University Press), p.100.
33. He was a founding member of All India Communist Party and later in 1949, Communist
Party of Pakistan.
34. One of Khan's confidants, Ali, who was a police officer, reported the whole plan to the IG
Police who, through the Governor of NWFP, brought the plan to the knowledge of the
Prime Minister. The case began in the court. According to the law, the conspiracy could
only be established if there was an agreement on the plan. Since, no agreement was
reached, therefore, it was not dealt as conspiracy. After months of trial, finally, the court
declared its judgment. The civilians and the junior army officers were sentenced for four
years in jail and Major General Akbar Khan for 14 years. Estelle Dryland, “Faiz Ahmed Faiz
and the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case” Journal of South Asian Literature, Vol. 27, No. 2,
Perspectives on Socialist Realism in Asian Literature (Summer, Fall 1992), pp.175-185.
35. Ibid.
36. Safdar Mehmood Pakistan, Political Roots and Developments, (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 2000) p.43.
37. 165+10= 175, 135+40=175
38. Ishtiaq, “Pakistan: The Garrison State”, ref.32, p.107.
39. Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan, The Parallel State(Oxon: Taylor and Francis,
2008) p.66.
40. Safdar,“Pakistan, Political Roots …,”ref.36, p.49.
41. Ibid.,p.42.
42. Jayshree Bajoria, “Pakistan's Constitution”, Council of Foreign Relations, Archives, 21 April
2010.
43. Manchester Guardian, 4 April 1957. Cited in Iain Cochrane’s The Causes of the Bangladesh
War 2009, Chapter Two, Economic Disparity, Published by lulu publishers.
44. Ishtiaq, “Pakistan The Garrison State”, ref.32, p.107.
45. SuchetaGhosh, Role of India in the Emergence of Bangladesh (Calcutta: Minerva Associates
Pvt Ltd, 1983) p.21.
46. Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), “Pakistan: Nation, Nationalism and the State”, in Pakistan :
Nationalism without a Nation, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2002) p.18.
FOCUS-IRS 47
47. See for details, ML Ahuja, Handbook of General Elections and Electoral Reforms in India,
1952-1999,( New Delhi: Mital Publications, 2000).
48. The Dawn, 18 January 1956.
49. Interview Brigadier (retd) Zahid. (He was a Captain posted at Comilla, Chittagong in 1970-
71), 5 November 2014.
50. Cited in Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (California: Stanford
University Press,2012), p.72.
51. Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on
Terror, p.35.
52. Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, p.58.
53. Kamal, “Bangladesh: Quest…,”, ref.1, p. 11.
54. Khadim, “A Stranger…,” ref.1, p.15; Interview with Nasir Zaidi, journalist at Jung Newspaper
(June 2014).
55. See, Ian Talbot, “The Punjabization of Pakistan” in Christophe Jaffrelot, (eds) Pakistan:
Nationalism without a Nation, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2002).
56. Ishtiaq, “Pakistan A Garrison State,” ref. 32,p.117 and 210.
57. Christophe, “Pakistan: Nationalism…,” ref.46, p.20.
58. Ayub’s autobiography, pp.233-35.
59. Ibid.
60. Verses by HabibJalib (Urdu Poet), to express deep refutation for Ayub’s constitution of 1962.
61. Asim Ijaz Khwaja and Adnan Qadir, “Local Government Reforms in Pakistan: Context,
Content and Causes” in Harvard Papers, p 388. Available at <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/
fs/akhwaja/papers/ Chapter8.pdf>.
62. Stanley, “Zulfi Bhutto…,” ref.52, p.60.
63. Lawrence Ziring, p.258.
64. Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, p.216.
65. Ibid, p.212.
66. Ishtiaq, “Pakistan a Garrison State,” ref.32, p.118.
67. Salahuddin Ahmed, Bangladesh Past and Present, (New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation,
2004) p.156.
68. “Learning from Gen Azam’s example”, Dawn, 17 May 2012.
69. Merkel Wolfgang, Embedded and Defective Democracies, 2004 Available at:
<http://homepage.univie.ac.at/vedran.dzihic/merkel_ embedded_democracies_2004.pdf>.
70. Figure adapted from Merkel Wolfgang, Embedded in Defective Democracies, 2004.
FOCUS-IRS 48
71. The electoral regime has the central position among the five partial regimes of embedded
democracy, as it is the most obvious expression of the sovereignty of the people, the
participation of citizens and the equal weight allotted to their individual preferences.
Political rights have the function both of enabling organized democratic elections and of
furthering the unorganized pluralistic interests of complex societies. The first two regimes
have to be supplemented by Civil Rights. Even more than the institutionalization of mutual
checks and balances, civil rights are central to the rule of law. These rights protect the
individual against the state executive and against the acts of the elected legislator that
infringe on an individual’s freedom. For granting civil rights, courts have to serve as an
independent authority. They function as constitutional custodians of the legislature and
supervisors of executive conformity to law. The forth partial regime of constitutional
democracy comprises the division of powers and resulting ‘horizontal accountability. It
means that elected authorities are surveyed by a network of relatively autonomous
institutions and may be pinned down to constitutionally defined lawful action. In
presidential system in which the executive and legislators are each independently
legitimized through elections, separation between legislature and executive becomes more
obvious. The fifth and last partial regime stresses the necessity that the elected
representatives are the ones that actually govern. The criterion of the effective power to
govern refers to a feature that may be considered self-evident in old democracies but cannot
be taken for granted in new democracies. This criterion prevents extra constitutional actors
not subject to democratic accountability like military from holding final decision making
power in certain policy domains. –Internal Embeddedness
The partial regimes described can only function effectively in a democracy if they are
mutually embedded. Mutual embeddedness implies two things. First, some partial regimes
support the functioning of another partial regime – for example the partial regimes ‘political
rights’ and ‘civil rights’ support partial regime ‘democratic election’. Second and at the same
time, some partial regimes ensure the political actors do not infringe on the functional
spheres of another regime, for example the last three partial regimes. Functional and
normative interdependence and independence characterize the ‘code of communication’40
between the five partial regimes. The balance between them is fragile and varies from
democracy to Democracy-Every democracy as a whole is embedded in an environment that
encompasses enables and stabilizes the democratic regime. Damage to this environment
often results in either isolated defects or destabilization of the democracy itself. The most
FOCUS-IRS 49
important of these externally embedding rings are the socio economic context, civil society
and the international integration.
72. Safdar, “Pakistan: Political Roots…,”, ref.36, p.55.
73. Ibid, pp.55-57.
74. Ibid, p.56.
75. Ibid, p.59.
76. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (London: Oxford
University Press, 1997) p.253.
77. Lawrence Ziring,Bangladesh: From Mujib to Ershad An interpretive Study, (Dhaka: University
Press, 1994), p.54.
78. Hassan Askari, Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan(Palgrave Macmillan, 2000),
p.98.
79. Khalid B. Sayeed, “1965- An Epoch-Making Year in Pakistan - General Elections and War
with India”, Asian Survey, Vol.6, No.2 (Feb., 1966), pp.78-81.
80. Ibid.
81. Symbol of Democratic Ideals, The Nation, 9July 2009.
82. Cited in, Jones Owen Bennet, Pakistan: An Eye of the Storm(New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2003), p.250.
83. Greg Cashman, Leonard C. Robinson, Introduction to Causes of War, (Maryland: Rowman
and Littlefield Publisher, 2007), p.242.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. MokerromHossain, From Protest to Freedom: A Book for the New Generation: the Birth of
Bangladesh, p.119.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid, p.120.
89. ArjunSengupta, “Regional Disparity and Economic Development of Pakistan: The Facts”,
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.6, No.45 (Nov. 6, 1971), pp.2279-2286.
90. ShahidJavedBurki, “Pakistan’s Economy: Not Quite yet a Failed One”,in Christophe Jaffrelot
(eds), Pakistan Paradox,Forthcoming.
91. Mohammad NiazAsadullah, “Educational Disparity in East and West Pakistan, 1947–71: was
East Pakistan Discriminated Against?”Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History,
University of Oxford, Number 63, July 2006.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
FOCUS-IRS 50
119. Muhammad Asghar Khan, Generals in Politics of Pakistan 1958-1982 (London: Croom helm,
1983), pp14-15.
120. SR Sharma, Bangladesh Crisis and Indian Foreign Policy, (New Delhi: Young Asia, 1978),
pp.22-23.
121. Khadim, “A Stranger…,” ref.1, pp.15-17.
122. Shahid, “What was Once East Pakistan,” ref.94, p.15.
123. Ibid, p.15-19.
124. Ibid.
125. Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi, First 10 General Elections of Pakistan, (Islamabad: Pildat
Publications, 2013).
126. Ibid.
127. Sharmilla Bose, Dead Reckoning, p.171.
128. Report of the HamoodurRehman Commission, pp.124-5.
129. Khadim, “AStranger…,” ref.1, pp 21-22,30.
130. Ibid., p. 28.
131. Interview Brig Bashir Ahmed, June 2014.
132. Ibid.
133. Shahid, “What was Once East Pakistan,” ref.94, p27.
134. Stanley, “Zulfi Bhutto…,” ref.52,p147.
135. BZ Khasro, Myths and Facts Bangladesh liberation War, (New Delhi: Rupa Publication,
2010), p.75-82.
136. Kamal,“Bangladesh: Quest…,ref.1, pp.75-78.
137. Ibid, pp.76-77.
138. Ibid, p.82.
139. Shahid, “What was Once Pakistan,” ref.94, p.37.
140. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Great Tragedy, (Karachi: Pakistan People’s Party, 1971).
141. Richard Sisson, Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of
Bangladesh (Oxford: University of California Press, 1990),p.125. And see Kamal Hussain
p.102 also.
142. Ibid, pp.122-131.
143. Kamal, “Bangladesh: Quest…,” ref.1, p.101.
144. Srinath Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2013), p.35.
FOCUS-IRS 52
145. Gregory Nagy, Jones Professor of Classical Literature and Professor of Comparative
Literature Director Center for Hellenic Studies Gregory Nag, (eds)Greek Literature in the
Classical Period: The Prose of Historiography (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 346.
146. Hassan Abbas, op cit. p. 55.
147. Shahid, “What was Once Pakistan,” ref. 94, p.51.
148. Expression used by Lawrence Ziring, in Pakistan at the Cross Current of History (Islamabad:
Vanguard Publishers, 2004).
149. R K Yadav, Mission R&AW, ( New Delhi: Manas Publication, 2014) p.195-197.
150. Report of the Commission of Inquiry 1971- War as declassified by Government of Pakistan,
Dawn, and Karachi(cited in Hassan Abbas, p.67).
151. Conversations with Brig (retd) Bashir Ahmed, July 2014.
152. Interview, Col (retd) Aziz ulHaque, 28 October 2014. He served as a Captain in East Pakistan
in early 60s.
153. Stanley, “Zulfi Bhutto…,”, ref.52, p.155.
154. Christophe, “Pakistan: Nationalism…,”, ref.46, p. 22.