Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

SC Judgments Eburary 1

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 2

JUDGMENTS FROM FEBURARY 1, 2022

The State of Sikkim V. Jasbir Singh & Anr.


BENCH- DY CHANDRACHUD AND SURYA KANT
HELD-
First, the provisions of Chapter VI of the Army Act indicate that where an offence is created by the Act itself
it would be exclusively triable by a court-martial. Second, where a ‘civil offence’ is also an offence under the
Army Act or is deemed to be an offence under the Act, both the ordinary criminal court as well as court-
martial would have jurisdiction to try the person committing the offence. The third category (referred to in
Section 70) consists of the offences of murder, culpable homicide not amounting to murder or rape committed
by a person subject to the Army Act against a person who is not subject to military, naval or air force law .
Subject to the three exceptions which are set out in Section 70, such offences are not triable by a court-martial
but by an ordinary criminal court.
Where there exists concurrent jurisdiction in the court-martial and in the ordinary criminal court,
primarily the discretion of conducting the court-martial in preference to a trial by the ordinary criminal court is
entrusted to the designated officer under Section 125. The designated officer has been conferred with the
discretion “to decide before which court the proceedings shall be instituted”. Moreover, Section 125 has a
conjunctive requirement which is amplified by the expression “and, if that officer decides that they should be
instituted before a court-martial”. Thus, the conjunctive requirement 36 under Section 125 is that the
competent officer has the discretion to decide before which court the proceedings shall be instituted and if the
officer exercises that discretion to institute proceedings before a court-martial, then the officer will direct that
the accused be detained in military custody. Section 125, in other words, not only recognizes that an element of
discretion has been vested in the designated officer, but it also postulates that the designated officer should
have decided that the proceedings be instituted by the court-martial in which event the court-martial would
take place.
The Supreme Court, while allowing an Appeal filed by the State of Sikkim, held that a case involving charges
of murder falls in the category where there is a concurrent jurisdiction between the Court-martial and the
ordinary criminal Court, and that the Sessions Court was competent to exercise its jurisdiction under the
Cr.P.C. The Court while reversing the Judgment of the High Court held that the consequence of the decision of
the High Court was to foist an obligation on the Army Authorities to hold a Court-martial, despite a clear and
unequivocal submission to the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court. Accordingly, the Court directed that the Trial
be proceeded before the Sessions Court, and also directed transfer of the Accused / Respondent from military
custody to civil custody to face trial.
M/s Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited V. M/s Hitro Energy Solutions Private Limited
BENCH- DY Chandrachud, Surya kant, Vikram Nath
ISSUE- Whether the appellant is an operational creditor under the IBC even though it was a ‘purchaser’;
SECTION- Section 5(20) of the IBC defines “operational creditor” in the following terms:
“(20) “operational creditor” means a person to whom an operational debt is owed and includes any person to
whom such debt has been legally assigned or transferred;”
Section 5(21) defines the meaning of “operational debt”.
Section 5(21), as it stood at the relevant time, was as follows: “(21) “operational debt” means a claim in
respect of the provision of goods or services including employment or a debt in respect of the re-payment of
dues arising under any law for the time being in force and payable to the Central Government, any State
Government or any local authority;”
HELD-
The Supreme Court reiterated its Judgment in B.K. Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta &
Associates (2019) 11 SCC 633, and held that limitation for filing an Application u/S. 9 IBC does not
commence when the debt becomes due, but only when a default occurs. It was also held that a “purchaser” is
an operational creditor, since an ‘operational debt’ will include a debt arising from a contract in relation to the
supply of goods or services from the corporate debtor. Accordingly, the Court set aside the Order of the
NCLAT, which dismissed the Application u/S. 9 filed by the Appellant.

Similarly, in the present case, the phrase “in respect of” in Section 5(21) has to be interpreted in a broad and
purposive manner in order to include all those who provide or receive operational services from the corporate
debtor, which ultimately lead to an operational debt. In the present case, the appellant clearly sought an
operational service from the Proprietary Concern when it contracted with them for PART E 40 the supply of
light fittings.
The appellant is an operational creditor under the IBC, since an ‘operational debt’ will include a debt arising
from a contract in relation to the supply of goods or services from the corporate debtor;

You might also like