SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127768. November 19, 1999.]

UNITED AIRLINES , petitioner, vs . WILLIE J. UY , respondent.

Quisumbing Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.

Ramon U. Ampil for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Respondent herein was a passenger of petitioner United Airlines' Flight No. 819
for the San Francisco-Manila route. Before embarking for his trip to Manila, he suffered
insult, embarrassment and humiliating treatment in the hands of petitioner's
employees. Upon arrival in Manila, he discovered that one of his bags had been slashed
and its contents stolen. Respondent noti ed petitioner of his loss and requested
reimbursement thereof. Respondent instead mailed a check representing payment of
his loss based on the maximum liability of US$9.70 per pound. Thinking that the
amount was grossly inadequate respondent through his lawyer demanded an out-of-
court settlement of P1,000,000.00. Petitioner did not accede to his demand.
Respondent led a complaint for damages against petitioner United Airlines. Petitioner
led a complaint on the ground that respondent's cause of action had prescribed,
invoking Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention. The trial court ordered the dismissal of the
action. Despite the late ling of his notice of appeal, the Court of Appeals entertained
the appeal based on equity and justice, and reversed the decision of the trial court. The
issues to be resolved in this petition for review on certiorari are whether the notice of
appeal to the appellate court was timely led, and whether Art. 29 of the Warsaw
Convention should apply herein.
The Supreme Court ruled that although the notice of appeal was led two days
late, the case should be given due course because of the unique and peculiar facts of
the case and the serious question of law it poses. Respondent led his complaint
beyond the period prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for ling a claim for damages.
However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately ling an
action because petitioner airline gave him the runaround, answering his letters but not
giving in to his demands. Hence, despite the express mandate of Art. 29 of the Warsaw
Convention that an action for damages should be led within two years from arrival to
the place of destination, such rule shall not be applied in the instant case because of
the delaying tactics employed by petitioner airline itself. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals was a rmed and the case was remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; LIMITATION OF THE

PERIOD; PURPOSE THEREOF. — Section 1 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that "a party may appeal by certiorari, from a judgment of the Court
of Appeals, by ling with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, within fteen (15)
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 days from notice of judgment or of the denial of his motion for reconsideration led in
due time . . ." This Rule however should not be interpreted as "to sacri ce the
substantial right of the appellant in the sophisticated altar of technicalities with
impairment of the sacred principles of justice." It should be borne in mind that the real
purpose behind the limitation of the period of appeal is to forestall or avoid an
unreasonable delay in the administration of justice. Thus, the Court has ruled that delay
in the ling of a notice of appeal does not justify the dismissal of the appeal where the
circumstances of the case show that there is no intent to delay the administration of
justice on the part of appellant's counsel, or when there are no substantial rights
affected, or when appellant's counsel committed a mistake in the computation of the
period of appeal, an error not attributable to negligence or bad faith.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN NOT APPLICABLE. — In the instant case, respondent
led his notice of appeal two (2) days later than the prescribed period. Although his
counsel failed to give the reason for the delay, the Court is inclined to give due course
to his appeal due to the unique and peculiar facts of the case and the serious question
of law it poses. In the now almost trite but still good principle, technicality, when it
deserts its proper o ce as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration.
3. CIVIL LAW; TRANSPORTATION; WARSAW CONVENTION; DOES NOT
PRECLUDE THE OPERATION OF THE CIVIL CODE AND OTHER PERTINENT LAWS. —
American jurisprudence has declared that "Art. 29 (2) of the Warsaw Convention was
not intended to permit forums to consider local limitation tolling provisions but only to
let local law determine whether an action had been commenced within the two-year
period, since the method of commencing a suit varies from country to country." Within
our jurisdiction the Court has held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or
ignored, depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. Thus, this Court has
ruled that the Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other
breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its o cers and employees, or for
some particular or exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked
to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger
and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. Likewise, this
Court has held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code
and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from
liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of
carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found
or established.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; TWO-YEAR LIMITATION; WHEN MAY NOT BAR ACTION; CASE
AT BAR. — Respondent's failure to le his complaint within the two (2)-year limitation of
the Warsaw Convention does not bar his action since petitioner airline may still be held
liable for breach of other provisions of the Civil Code which prescribe a different period
or procedure for instituting the action, speci cally, Art. 1146 thereof which prescribes
four (4) years for filing an action based on torts.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION THEREOF CONSTRUED; NOT PRESENT IN
CASE AT BAR. — The travaux preparatories of the Warsaw Convention reveal that the
delegates thereto intended the two (2)-year limitation incorporated in Art. 29 as an
absolute bar to suit and not to be made subject to the various tolling provisions of the
laws of the forum. This therefore forecloses the application of our own rules on
interruption of prescriptive periods. Article 29, par. (2), was intended only to let local
laws determine whether an action had been commenced within the two (2)-year period,
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 and within our jurisdiction an action shall be deemed commenced upon the ling of a
complaint. Since it is indisputable that respondent led the present action beyond the
two (2)-year time frame his second cause of action must be barred. Nonetheless, it
cannot be doubted that respondent exerted efforts to immediately convey his loss to
petitioner, even employed the services of two (2) lawyers to follow up his claims, and
that the ling of the action itself was delayed because of petitioner's evasion.
Respondent led his complaint more than two (2) years later, beyond the period of
limitation prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for ling a claim for damages.
However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately ling an
action because petitioner airline gave him the runaround, answering his letters but not
giving in to his demands. True, respondent should have already led an action at the
rst instance when his claims were denied by petitioner but the same could only be due
to his desire to make an out-of-court settlement for which he cannot be faulted. Hence,
despite the express mandate of Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention that an action for
damages should be led within two (2) years from the arrival at the place of
destination, such rule shall not be applied in the instant case because of the delaying
tactics employed by petitioner airline itself. Thus, private respondent's second cause of
action cannot be considered as time-barred under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention. IDSaTE

DECISION

BELLOSILLO , J : p

UNITED AIRLINES assails in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
the 29 August 1995 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39761 which
reversed the 7 August 1992 order issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12410
1 granting petitioner's motion to dismiss based on prescription of cause of action. The
issues sought to be resolved are whether the notice of appeal to the appellate court
was timely led, and whether Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention 2 should apply to the
case at bar. prcd

On 13 October 1989 respondent Willie J. Uy, a revenue passenger on United

Airlines Flight No. 819 for the San Francisco — Manila route, checked in together with
his luggage one piece of which was as found to be overweight at the airline counter. To
his utter humiliation, an employee of petitioner rebuked him saying that he should have
known the maximum weight allowance to be 70 kgs. per bag and that he should have
packed his things accordingly. Then, in a loud voice in front of the milling crowd, she
told respondent to repack his things and transfer some of them from the overweight
luggage to the lighter ones. Not wishing to create further scene, respondent acceded
only to nd his luggage still overweight. The airline then billed him overweight charges
which he offered to pay with a miscellaneous charge order (MCO) or an airline pre-paid
credit. However, the airline's employee, and later its airport supervisor, adamantly
refused to honor the MCO pointing out that there were con icting gures listed on it.
Despite the explanation from respondent that the last gure written on the MCO
represented his balance, petitioner's employees did not accommodate him. Faced with
the prospect of leaving without his luggage, respondent paid the overweight charges
with his American Express credit card.
Respondent's troubles did not end there. Upon arrival in Manila, he discovered
that one of his bags had been slashed and its contents stolen. He particularized his
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 losses to be around US $5,310.00. In a letter dated 16 October 1989 respondent
bewailed the insult, embarrassment and humiliating treatment he suffered in the hands
of United Airlines employees, noti ed petitioner of his loss and requested
reimbursement thereof. Petitioner United Airlines, through Central Baggage Specialist
Joan Kroll, did not refute any of respondent's allegations and mailed a check
representing the payment of his loss based on the maximum liability of US $9.70 per
pound. Respondent, thinking the amount to be grossly inadequate to compensate him
for his losses, as well as for the indignities he was subjected to, sent two (2) more
letters to petitioner airline, one dated 4 January 1990 through a certain Atty. Pesigan,
and another dated 28 October 1991 through Atty. Ramon U. Ampil demanding an out-
of-court settlement of P1,000,000.00. Petitioner United Airlines did not accede to his
demands.
Consequently, on 9 June 1992 respondent led a complaint for damages against
United Airlines alleging that he was a person of good station, sitting in the board of
directors of several top 500 corporations and holding senior executive positions for
such similar rms; 3 that petitioner airline accorded him ill and shabby treatment to his
extreme embarrassment and humiliation; and, as such he should be paid moral
damages of at least P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages of at least P500,000.00, plus
attorney's fees of at least P50,000.00. Similarly, he alleged that the damage to his
luggage and its stolen contents amounted to around $5,310.00, and requested
reimbursement therefor.
United Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondent's
cause of action had prescribed, invoking Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention which
provides —
Art. 29 (1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is
not brought within two (2) years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the
destination, or from the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from
the date on which the transportation stopped.
(2) The method of calculating the period of limitation shall be
determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.

Respondent countered that par. (1) of Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention must be
reconciled with par. (2) thereof which states that "the method of calculating the period
of limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted."
Interpreting thus, respondent noted that according to Philippine laws the prescription
of actions is interrupted "when they are led before the court, when there is a written
extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment
of the debt by the debtor." 4 Since he made several demands upon United Airlines: rst ,
through his personal letter dated 16 October 1989; second, through a letter dated 4
January 1990 from Atty. Pesigan; and, nally , through a letter dated 28 October 1991
written for him by Atty. Ampil, the two (2)-year period of limitation had not yet been
exhausted. prLL

On 2 August 1992 the trial court ordered the dismissal of the action holding that
the language of Art. 29 is clear that the action must be brought within two (2) years
from the date of arrival at the destination. It held that although the second paragraph of
Art. 29 speaks of deference to the law of the local court in "calculating the period of
limitation," the same does not refer to the local forum's rules in interrupting the
prescriptive period but only to the rules of determining the time in which the action may
be deemed commenced, and within our jurisdiction the action shall be deemed
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 "brought" or commenced by the ling of a complaint. Hence, the trial court concluded
that Art. 29 excludes the application of our interruption rules.
Respondent received a copy of the dismissal order on 17 August 1992. On 31
August 1992, or fourteen (14) days later, he moved for the reconsideration of the trial
court's order. The trial court denied the motion and respondent received copy of the
denial order on 28 September 1992. Two (2) days later, on 1 October 1992 respondent
filed his notice of appeal.
United Airlines once again moved for the dismissal of the case this time pointing
out that respondent's fteen (15)-day period to appeal had already elapsed. Petitioner
argued that having used fourteen (14) days of the reglementary period for appeal,
respondent Uy had only one (1) day remaining to perfect his appeal, and since he led
his notice of appeal two (2) days later, he failed to meet the deadline.
In its questioned Decision dated 29 August 1995 5 the appellate court gave due
course to the appeal holding that respondent's delay of two (2) days in ling his notice
of appeal did not hinder it from reviewing the appealed order of dismissal since
jurisprudence dictates that an appeal may be entertained despite procedural lapses
anchored on equity and justice.
On the applicability of the Warsaw Convention, the appellate court ruled that the
Warsaw Convention did not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent
laws. Respondent's failure to le his complaint within the two (2)-year limitation
provided in the Warsaw Convention did not bar his action since he could still hold
petitioner liable for breach of other provisions of the Civil Code which prescribe a
different period or procedure for instituting an action. Further, under Philippine laws,
prescription of actions is interrupted where, among others, there is a written
extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and since respondent Uy sent several demand
letters to petitioner United Airlines, the running of the two (2)-year prescriptive period
was in effect suspended. Hence, the appellate court ruled that respondent's cause of
action had not yet prescribed and ordered the records remanded to the Quezon City
trial court for further proceedings.
Petitioner now contends that the appellate court erred in assuming jurisdiction
over respondent's appeal since it is clear that the notice of appeal was led out of time.
It argues that the courts relax the stringent rule on perfection of appeals only when
there are extraordinary circumstances, e.g., when the Republic stands to lose hundreds
of hectares of land already titled and used for educational purposes; when the counsel
of record was already dead; and wherein appellant was the owner of the trademark for
more than thirty (30) years, and the circumstances of the present case do not compare
to the above exceptional cases. 6
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "a party
may appeal by certiorari, from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, by ling with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, within fteen (15) days from notice of judgment
or of the denial of his motion for reconsideration led in due time . . ." This Rule however
should not be interpreted as "to sacri ce the substantial right of the appellant in the
sophisticated altar of technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice."
7 It should be borne in mind that the real purpose behind the limitation of the period of
appeal is to forestall or avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice.
Thus, we have ruled that delay in the ling of a notice of appeal does not justify the
dismissal of the appeal where the circumstances of the case show that there is no
intent to delay the administration of justice on the part of appellant's counsel, 8 or when
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 there are no substantial rights affected, 9 or when appellant's counsel committed a
mistake in the computation of the period of appeal, an error not attributable to
negligence or bad faith. 1 0
In the instant case, respondent led his notice of appeal two (2) days later than
the prescribed period. Although his counsel failed to give the reason for the delay, we
are inclined to give due course to his appeal due to the unique and peculiar facts of the
case and the serious question of law it poses. In the now almost trite but still good
principle, technicality, when it deserts its proper o ce as an aid to justice and becomes
its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration. 11
Petitioner likewise contends that the appellate court erred in ruling that
respondent's cause of action has not prescribed since delegates to the Warsaw
Convention clearly intended the two (2)-year limitation incorporated in Art. 29 as an
absolute bar to suit and not to be made subject to the various tolling provisions of the
laws of the forum. Petitioner argues that in construing the second paragraph of Art. 29
private respondent cannot read into it Philippine rules on interruption of prescriptive
periods and state that his extrajudicial demand has interrupted the period of
prescription. 1 2 American jurisprudence has declared that "Art. 29 (2) was not intended
to permit forums to consider local limitation tolling provisions but only to let local law
determine whether an action had been commenced within the two-year period, since
the method of commencing a suit varies from country to country." 1 3
Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied,
or ignored, depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. 14 Thus, we have
ruled that the Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other
breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its o cers and employees, or for
some particular or exceptional type of damage. 15 Neither may the Convention be
invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a
passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. 16
Likewise, we have held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil
Code and other pertinent laws. 17 It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier
from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract
of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is
found or established. 18
Respondent's complaint reveals that he is suing on two (2) causes of action: (a)
the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioner's employees at the
San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment and social
humiliation; and, (b) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of his personal effects
amounting to US $5,310.00.
While his second cause of action — an action for damages arising from theft or
damage to property or goods — is well within the bounds of the Warsaw Convention,
his rst cause of action — an action for damages arising from the misconduct of the
airline employees and the violation of respondent's rights as passenger — clearly is not.
Consequently, insofar as the rst cause of action is concerned, respondent's
failure to le his complaint within the two (2)-year limitation of the Warsaw Convention
does not bar his action since petitioner airline may still be held liable for breach of other
provisions of the Civil Code which prescribe a different period or procedure for
instituting the action, speci cally, Art. 1146 thereof which prescribes four (4) years for
filing an action based on torts. cdrep

As for respondent's second cause of action, indeed the travaux preparatories of

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 the Warsaw Convention reveal that the delegates thereto intended the two (2)-year
limitation incorporated in Art. 29 as an absolute bar to suit and not to be made subject
to the various tolling provisions of the laws of the forum. This therefore forecloses the
application of our own rules on interruption of prescriptive periods. Article 29, par. (2),
was intended only to let local laws determine whether an action had been commenced
within the two (2)-year period, and within our jurisdiction an action shall be deemed
commenced upon the ling of a complaint. Since it is indisputable that respondent led
the present action beyond the two (2)-year time frame, his second cause of action must
be barred. Nonetheless, it cannot be doubted that respondent exerted efforts to
immediately convey his loss to petitioner, even employed the services of two (2)
lawyers to follow up his claims, and that the ling of the action itself was delayed
because of petitioner's evasion.
In this regard, Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 1 9 is instructive. In this
case of PAL, private respondent led an action for damages against petitioner airline
for the breakage of the front glass of the microwave oven which she shipped under PAL
Air Waybill No. 0-79-1013008-3. Petitioner averred that, the action having been led
seven (7) months after her arrival at her port of destination, she failed to comply with
par. 12, subpar. (a) (1), of the Air Waybill which expressly provided that the person
entitled to delivery must make a complaint to the carrier in writing in case of visible
damage to the goods, immediately after discovery of the damage and at the latest
within 14 days from receipt of the goods. Despite non-compliance therewith the Court
held that by private respondent's immediate submission of a formal claim to petitioner,
which however was not immediately entertained as it was referred from one employee
to another, she was deemed to have substantially complied with the requirement. The
Court noted that with private respondent's own zealous efforts in pursuing her claim it
was clearly not her fault that the letter of demand for damages could only be led, after
months of exasperating follow-up of the claim, on 13 August 1990, and that if there
was any failure at all to file the formal claim within the prescriptive period contemplated
in the Air Waybill, this was largely because of the carrier's own doing, the consequences
of which could not in all fairness be attributed to private respondent.
In the same vein must we rule upon the circumstances brought before us. Verily,
respondent led his complaint more than two (2) years later, beyond the period of
limitation prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for ling a claim for damages.
However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately ling an
action because petitioner airline gave him the runaround, answering his letters but not
giving in to his demands. True, respondent should have already led an action at the
rst instance when his claims were denied by petitioner but the same could only be due
to his desire to make an out-of-court settlement for which he cannot be faulted. Hence,
despite the express mandate of Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention that an action for
damages should be led within two (2) years from the arrival at the place of
destination, such rule shall not be applied in the instant case because of the delaying
tactics employed by petitioner airline itself. Thus, private respondent's second cause of
action cannot be considered as time-barred under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting
aside the appealed order of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss the
complaint, as well as its Resolution denying reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Let the
records of the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings taking
its bearings from this disquisition.
SO ORDERED. cdtai

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 Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. RTC-Br. 97, Quezon City.

2. Convention for the Uni cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air. Philippine adherence embodied in Presidential Proclamation No. 201 signed on
23 September 1965 by President Ramon Magsaysay.
3. Willie J. Uy is a graduate of Master of Business Administration of the Ateneo Graduate
School of Business, and Bachelor of Science and Marketing Management from De La
Salle University as well as of Xavier School and Council High School of Idaho, USA. He is
presently the Vice President for Operations of Phinma Property Holdings Corporation;
Senior Vice-President/Chief Operating O cer of Phinma-Dee Construction Venture
Corporation; Vice-President and General Manager of Trans-Oceanic Insurance Agencies,
Inc; Treasurer of Phinma Fisheries, Inc.; Treasurer/Director of Uni-Products Company,
Inc.; Asst. Vice-Pres./Asst. Treasurer of Phinma Consultants, Inc; Asst. Treasurer of
Filmag (PHILS), Inc.; Vice-President of Fil-House of Consumer Products, Inc.; Vice-Pres.
of Mariposa Properties, Inc.; Director of SANAEA International Corp.; and, Director of
Southeast Asia Tour & Travel Corp.; Asst. Corporate Secretary/Director of Harrison
Industrial Corporation.
4. Art. 1155, Civil Code.

5. With Justice Ruben T. Reyes as ponente and Justices Antonio M. Martinez and Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, concurring.

6. Rollo, p. 18.
7. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Espiritu, No. L-35401, 20 January 1976, 69 SCRA 36.
8. De las Alas v. Court of Appeals , No. L-38006, 16 May 1978, 83 SCRA 200; American
Home Assurance Company v. Court of Appeals , No. L-45026, 12 November 1981, 109
SCRA 180.
9. Margate v. Court of Appeals, No. L-42366, 15 December 1982, 119 SCRA 259.
10. Ibid.
11. See Note 7.
12. Ibid.
13. Split End Ltd. v. Dimerco Express (Phils.), 19 Avi. 18363, as cited in Petition; Rollo, p. 12.
14. Alitalia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71929, 4 December 1990, 192 SCRA 9.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Cathay Paci c Airways Ltd: v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 60501, 5 March 1993, 219
SCRA 520; Luna v. Northwestern Airways , G.R. Nos. 100374-75, 27 November 1992, 216
SCRA 107.
18. Ibid.

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 19. G.R. No. 119706, 14 March 1996, 255 SCRA 48.

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