Animal Bodies Technobodies
Animal Bodies Technobodies
Animal Bodies Technobodies
Maneesha Deckhat
INTRODUCTION
t Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. I would like to thank the editors of the
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism for their careful editorial assistance.
become more frequent.' These calls find a robust response in two recent
anthologies: Animal Subjects: An Ethical Reader in a Posthuman World, edited
by Jodey Castricano; 2 and Bits of Life: Feminism at the Intersections ofMedia,
Bioscience, and Technology, edited by Anneke Smelik and Nina Lykke.3 Both
texts take cultural studies as their primary organizing anchor, taking care to
highlight and appreciate the interdisciplinarity of the field and its relationship
to feminist studies in excavating ideas and valuations of difference, alterity, and
abject status.4 As if to embody this connection between cultural studies,
feminism, and posthumanism, both texts emphasize the influence of the
writings of Donna Haraway in the genealogy of the questions they seek to map,
especially her famous cyborg figure; this figure acts as a signifier of the
technologically mediated nature of human and animal bodies and thus as a
reminder of the fallacy of biological determinism-a stark boundary between
human, animal, and machine-as well as other scientific metanarratives. 5
Animal Subjects, true to its name, focuses on the animalized dimensions of the
cyborg and posthuman studies, highlighting the precariousness of the human-
animal and nature-culture binaries by showcasing "the question of the animal"
in an array of cultural and legal practices. 6 Bits of Life concentrates more on the
human-machine side of the cyborg phenomenon, devoting itself to unearthing
current imaginings of the "bits of life" of human "technobodies"-human
bodies molded by technological matrices of various sorts-such as genes, cells,
eggs, and sperm. It is also more focused on representations of these "bits of
life" in the media.
In what follows, I introduce both texts through their reliance on Haraway's
work as a theoretical departure point. I then discuss individual contributions in
both Animal Subjects and Bits of Life, commending both for their commitment
to the analysis of cultural practices and the charting of new directions in
posthumanist theory. Within these discussions, I provide my view of the
collections' individual shortcomings, and also include a section noting the
limits of their posthumanist analysis from a feminist intersectional perspective.
Finally, I close with a discussion of the collective possibilities that arise from
Animal Subjects and Bits ofLife for developing feminist posthumanist studies.
I. CARY WOLFE, ANIMAL RITES: AMERICAN CULTURE, THE DISCOURSE OF SPECIES, AND
POSTHUMANIST THEORY (2003); Sara Salih, Filling Up the Space Between Mankind and Ape: Racism,
Speciesism and the Androphilic Ape, ARIEL, Jan. 2007, at 95.
2. ANIMAL SUBJECTS: AN ETHICAL READER IN A POSTHUMAN WORLD (Jodey Castricano ed.,
2008) [hereinafter ANIMAL SUBJECTS].
3. BITS OF LIFE: FEMINISM AT THE INTERSECTIONS OF MEDIA, BIOSCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
(Anneke Smelik & Nina Lykke eds., 2008) [hereinafter BITS OF LIFE].
4. Jodey Castricano, Introduction:Animal Subjects in a Posthuman World, in ANIMAL SUBJECTS,
supra note 2, at 1, 5-6; Nina Lykke, Feminist Cultural Studies of Technoscience: Portrait of an
Implosion, in BITS OF LIFE, supra note 3, at 3, 3.
5. Castricano, supra note 4, at 12.
6. Id. at 2.
2009] Book Review: Animal Subjects and Bits ofLife
7. Id. at 7.
8. Donna Haraway, Chicken, in ANIMAL SUBJECTS, supranote 2, at 33.
9. Id. at 34-37.
10. Haraway provides statistics documenting the number of chickens killed worldwide for food and
slaughtered as prophylaxis against avian flu and also discusses the genetic engineering and exploitative
conditions on factory farms. See id. at 34-36.
11. Id. at 34 (describing "the naturalcultural contractual arrangements that domesticated both
bipedal hominids and winged gallinaceous avians").
12. Maneesha Deckha, The Salience of Species Difference for Feminist Theory, 17 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 5 (2006).
13. Haraway, supranote 8, at 34.
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 20:505
Haraway's early placement in the volume not only signals the theoretical
and practical dimensions provided by different essays in the collection but also
highlights Castricano's contention "that social and cultural analyses are more
often than not the site of multiple contradictions."' 14 Theoretically-oriented
offerings include arguments refashioning the complex concepts of personhood,
moral space, representation, and deconstruction to be more inclusive of
animals. Contributions that address more discrete topics cover the controversies
of animal experimentation, animals in entertainment, and the configurations of
animal advocacy and anti-cruelty prosecution. Leading with Haraway's essay,
however short, nicely intimates the diversity of contributions to come and their
uncovering of the contradictions in our treatment of animals. Chicken also
facilitates understanding of the contradictory attitudes we hold toward animals
in Western culture where, for example, we might treat a particular animal as a
member of our families, but think nothing of consuming the flesh of another
animal in this family member's presence.' 5 Introducing Haraway's essay,
Castricano notes that the Chicken Little figure Haraway harnesses for
subversive ends is no longer the rascal bearer of implausible forecasts about
imminent doom ("the sky is falling"), but the passionate advocate/victim of the
dangers of technoscientific assaults in agriculture to human health and, of
course, the unspeakable suffering that is visited daily on the bodies of chickens
in factory farms. 16 Haraway's deployment of the figure contradicts our standard
cultural narrative and thus accentuates her critique through irony. As
Castricano states, Haraway's ironic intervention is just one method of
illuminating the paradoxes we encounter once we engage in cultural critique in
general.
Bits of Life centers Haraway's work through There Are Always More
Things Going on than You Thought!: Methodologies as Thinking Technologies:
Interview with Donna Haraway, an interview Nina Lykke, Randi Markussen,
and Finn Olesen conducted with Haraway in 1999 that was first published in
2000 in Denmark. For those who did not encounter the Danish version or the
English translation in the Haraway Reader,17 the interview offers Haraway's
views on her writing style (worthy of note: she means to be clear!) as well as
perennial questions that trouble feminists who aim to model deconstructive
commitments in their writing but also desire a cohesive piece of scholarship.
Haraway speaks from her experience on handling the paradox of reifying
categories one means to deconstruct through the writing process, thus
appreciating standpoint feminism while dissociating from it. She also describes
how she locates herself within science studies, especially given the influence of 18
Bruno Latour on the field, as gendered analysis has been minimal in his work.
While somewhat older now, the interview is productive in facilitating the
editors' hope to lay out for the reader "frameworks and approaches that have
been a major inspiration for the development of feminist cultural studies of
technoscience." 1 9
The choice on the part of both collections to center on Haraway's work is
revealing of her well-deserved prominence in matters of gender, technology,
species, and posthumanism. It should be noted, however, that Haraway herself
declines the posthuman and posthumanist label: "I never wanted to be
posthuman, or posthumanist, any more than I wanted to be postfeminist., 20 For
Haraway, the "post" in these terms intimates the fallacy that humanism
achieved its objectives of equality and dignity for all humans. More
importantly, Haraway states that "it is the patterns of relationality and, in Karen
Barad's terms, intra-actions at many scales of space-time that need rethinking,
not getting beyond one troubled category for a worse one even more likely to
go postal." 21 In her focus on relationality, Haraway stresses the importance of
understanding ourselves and our species as beings who come to be by the
process of what she calls "becoming-with., 22 This refers to the ongoing
constitution of humans through our "intra- and interaction" with other species
such that "species of all kinds, living and not, are consequent on a subject- and
object-shaping dance of encounters." 23 For Haraway, species are not knowable,
intact entities before these encounters, but take shape through them.
Haraway wants to focus our attention on relationality rather than labels.
Although she herself rejects the category of "posthuman" and "posthumanist"
she does accept the term "posthumanities" as a "useful notion for tracking
scholarly conversations" in this area. 24 It appears to be in this sense that the
collections use the terms, that is, not to suggest that human injustices have been
well-managed and are no longer at issue, but to signal a commitment to go
beyond an anthropocentric focus and question the stability of the human
boundary. Karen Barad, whose proposal for relationality Haraway endorses,
uses the "posthumanist" term this way herself and even features it in the title of
18. Nina Lykke et al., "There Are Always More Things Going On Than You Thought!":
Methodologies as Thinking Technologies: Interview with Donna Haraway,as reprintedin BITS OF LIFE,
supra note 3, at 32, 38-41.
19. Id. at 32.
20. DONNA J. HARAWAY, WHEN SPECIES MEET 17 (2008).
21. Id.
22. This is a term she borrows from Vinciane Despret, The Body We Care For: Figures of
Anthropo-zoo-genesis, BODY & SOCIETY, June 2004, at 111, 122. See HARAWAY, supra note 20, at 17
n.19.
23. HARAWAY, supra note 20, at 4.
24. Id. at 17 n.21.
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 20:505
A. Animals in CulturalPractices
Lesli Bisgould, one legal practitioner to whom readers are treated, employs
her analysis of the notorious cat torture case in Toronto as an heuristic device to
understand our "inter-species moral schizophrenia," a term she explicitly
borrows from legal scholar Gary Francione.28 Bisgould, arguably Canada's
leading animal law practitioner and advocate, immerses us in the facts of the
case as if reading a legal factum and then uses those facts to deliver a nutshell
critique of Canadian anti-cruelty law that readers new to this area will find
useful. The case she discusses is one in which a postsecondary fine arts student
and his friends filmed themselves brutally torturing a cat, Kensington. 29 They
25. See Karen Barad, Living in a Posthumanist Material World: Lessons from Schrodinger'sCat,
in BITS OF LIFE, supra note 3, at 165, 173.
26. Id. at 172-73.
27. Castricano, supra note 4, at 2-3.
28. Lesli Bisgould, Power and Irony: One Tortured Cat and Many Twisted Angles to Our Moral
Schizophrenia About Animals, in ANIMAL SUBJECTS, supra note 2, at 259, 259.
29. As Bisgould tells us, Kensington received her name posthumously and was named "after the
neighbourhood in which she was killed." Id. at 260.
2009] Book Review: Animal Subjects and Bits ofLife
were caught and charged with cruelty to animals under the Canadian Criminal
Code. As a defense, the student argued that he believed in animal rights and
tortured Kensington to make the political point that torture of all animals is
wrong, whether it is the type of animal normally showered with love and
affection as a companion (i.e., a cat or dog) or the type of animal routinely
tortured in slaughterhouses (i.e., those labeled as "meat"). As Bisgould notes,
most torture and exploitation of animals, such as that which takes place in the
slaughterhouse, does not come under the purview of anti-cruelty offenses
because, as human-purposed industries, the killing is not seen to 30constitute
"unnecessary' suffering" under the typical definition of this offense.
In addition to dismissing the student's explanation for his brutal actions,
Bisgould showcases the irony in a prosecution that had to charge the student
with something other than animal cruelty-mischief, in this case-in order to
proceed with an indictable offence. Bisgould's point here is that offences
against another's property are treated more seriously than offences against an
animal in and of itself. While this is an important point to make, it should be
noted that her view that the "[t]he animal cruelty offence is an offence against
the animal herself' is questionable. 3 1 As Francione has argued with respect to
U.S. jurisdictions, although anti-cruelty offences purport to be a singular area in
the law where animal interests matter, the animus, purposes, and impact of
these offenses are still human- and property-oriented. 32 Bisgould's essay leaves
the reader with a solid understanding of the pitfalls of anti-cruelty legislation
and a memorable example of the difficulty of securing convictions and
imposing substantial penalties.
In addition to legal analysis, a number of the essays provide close readings
of certain normalized cultural uses of animals. John Sorenson's essay on
Marineland, a marine animal exhibition park in the city of Niagara Falls in
Ontario, Canada, is one of the collection's most engaging. Simply titled,
Monsters: The Case of Marineland, the essay provides a devastating critique of
33. John Sorenson, Monsters: The Case of Marineland,in ANIMAL SUBJECTS, supranote 2, at 195,
196.
34. Anne Innis Dagg, Blame and Shame? How Can We Reduce Unproductive Animal
Experimentation?, in ANIMAL SUBJECTS, supra note 2, at 271.
35. Id. at 280.
36. Id. at 278-80.
37. Id. at 281-82.
2009] Book Review: Animal Subjects and Bits of Life
Sheep and the New Argument from Nature, Angus Taylor unpacks the "new
argument from nature" that scientific narratives have generated to uphold and
legitimate the boundary between humans and animals. 38 The new argument
from nature is different from the old one, which insisted that animals did not
count because of some assumed biological defect and thereby defended
drawing lines to demarcate their moral exclusion. 39 In contrast, the new
argument from nature does not engage in contestations about shared or not
shared capacities or the specialness or uniqueness of humans. Rather, as Taylor
explains:
What counts is not the capacity to suffer or even, in the last analysis,
the capacity to reason, but rather the ecological niche of one's species.
It is right that we hunt, kill, eat, exploit and experiment on members of
other species for the simple reason that that's how nature works: it's us
against them, and luckily for us, in a world of predators and prey, we
are the top predators.4 °
While Taylor addresses this new, naturalized, "intuitive" basis for
exclusion, other essays theorize new reasons for inclusion. In Animals as
Persons, David Sztybel plots a different path for the application of personhood
to animals than the standard argumentation on this front. 41 Instead of relying on
understandable yet problematic arguments from sameness (i.e., to the extent an
animal reasons or feels as a human does, it deserves moral consideration)
proffered by other posthumanist scholars,42 Sztybel relies on the personal
experience each animal has with pleasure and pain, explicitly harnessing the
"person" in "personal" to make his point. While his paradigm for personhood is
more responsive to the sameness critique and demotes reason from its usual
cultural pedestal in the theorization of moral status, Sztybel does not fully
escape the concerns of feminist animal advocates regarding the exclusion of
creatures who do not share a particular trait.43 This is because having a
"personal" experience for Sztybel still depends on having sentient ability. 44
38. Angus Taylor, Electric Sheep and the New Argumentfrom Nature, in ANIMAL SUBJECTS, supra
note 2, at 177.
39. Id. at 182.
40. Id. at 181-82.
41. David Sztybel, Animals as Persons,in ANIMAL SUBJECTS, supra note 2, at 241.
42. See, for example, Tom Regan's work, which Sztybel discusses: TOM REGAN, EMPTY CAGES:
FACING THE CHALLENGE OF ANIMAL RIGHTS (2004).
43. Carol Adams and Josephine Donovan have been instrumental in introducing this critique within
the literature. Their ecofeminist work has emphasized an ethic of care as an avenue to theorizing about
animals instead of the classic deontological and utilitiarian theories associated with masculinist modes
of conceptualizing ethics and animals. Adams and Donovan prefer this route for several reasons. One
criticism of the more classic approaches is that their reliance on rational arguments to make the case for
animals is troubling. Rational arguments, by definition, use reason as their persuasive tool. Recall that
the capacity for reason has been exceedingly privileged in Western thought as a marker of personhood
and ethical status. Adams and Donovan find it defeating for animal theorists advancing a posthumanist
critique to rely on the very capacity that has served as a critical factor to exclude animals from moral
consideration. Arguments that would afford animals ethical consideration based on their sentience and
the capacity to suffer are also problematic. While not privileging the capacity to reason, requiring that
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 20:505
animals posses a certain trait, sentience or otherwise, is an argument from sameness giving rise to the
inherent exclusion sameness arguments entail. Animals are included to the extent they are shown to be
the same as humans, i.e., have the capacity to reason, suffer, use tools, and so on. Instead, ecofeminists
such as Adams and Donovan seek to topple reason from its privileged cultural status and elevate
affect/feeling/emotion in its place as a site to mine for ethical instruction and guidance. This aspect of
ecofeminist critique thus reflects the tenets of intersectionality, which aim to respect difference in and of
itself and attend to that difference in ethical deliberation, rather than argue that certain beings (animals)
should be morally respected to the extent they are similar to normalized moral persons (humans). Their
critique of reason-based arguments is closely related to the concerns they have regarding rights-based
rather than relational models in general. See Josephine Donovan & Carol J. Adams, Introductionto THE
FEMINIST CARE TRADITION IN ANIMAL ETHICS: A READER 1, 4-6 (Josephine Donovan & Carol Adams
eds., 2007); Introduction to BEYOND ANIMAL RIGHTS: A FEMINIST CARING ETHIC FOR THE TREATMENT
OF ANIMALS 14-16 (Josephine Donovan & Carol J. Adams eds., 2000). For further examples of ethic-of-
care analysis linking feminism with animal issues, see generally ANIMALS AND WOMEN: FEMINIST
THEORETICAL EXPLORATIONS (Carol J. Adams & Josephine Donovan eds., 1995).
44. Sztybel, supra note 41, at 248-49. This is problematic because moral consideration continues to
depend on possessing a particular trait. While sentience may be more inclusive than reason, it still
excludes the non-sentient. A new line is drawn. This is not to diminish the importance of sentience and
of attending to pain and suffering, as sentience-based theories advocate, to eliminate these
physical/mental states and improve well-being. But a theory that privileges sentience follows the logic
that a being must share a particular trait, however important, to matter to the rest of us. Moreover,
theories of sameness always risk being already anthropocentric despite our best intentions, since human
beings are always the ones who define what sentience is and who has it.
45. Michael Allen Fox & Lesley McLean, Animals in Moral Space, in ANIMAL SUBJECTS, supra
note 2, at 145, 159.
46. Id. at 169.
47. Johanna Tito, On Animal Immortality: An Argument for the PossibilityofAnimal Immortality in
Light ofthe History of Philosophy, in ANIMAL SUBJECTS, supranote 2, at 285.
2009] Book Review: Animal Subjects and Bits ofLife
animal and human, and around the need for humans to empathize, love, and
"get a feel" for a singular animal's experience and suffering.48 Tito's account of
immortality lies not in an abstract idea of the soul, but in the ongoing ability to
love a particular animal in our life. As love for animals and humans in our lives
persists, so do they, even after they have died.49 Both Sztybel and Tito take
long-standing questions and ideas-whether animals are persons, the
importance of a soul for moral recognition-and chart new directions.
Also theoretically edifying is Paola Cavalieri's A Missed Opportunity:
Humanism, Anti-humanism and the Animal Question, which enriches the body
of posthumanist animal ethics by asking why there is "such a persistent lack of
interest in the animal question from French philosophical circles" given their
penchant for deconstruction of metaphysical humanism and analyses of
power. 50 She considers the work of Foucault, Levinas, and Derrida to illustrate
her argument and takes care to make her critique intelligible even to new
readers of these comparatively abstract theorists. Cavalieri's discussion of
Derrida is particularly illuminating in its challenge to his image as a theoretical
friend to animal advocates and posthumanist scholars. 51 Cavalieri reveals
Derrida's privileging of "cognitive endowment" as a marker of moral status
and dismantles his argument resisting the demands of the Great Ape Project, an
initiative to extend rights to all great apes (not just humans), which Cavalieri,
52
along with Peter Singer, has championed.
Derrida's concerns overlap with the problem of line-drawing discussed
earlier in relation to Sztybel's contribution. The Great Ape Project proposes
extending moral consideration to certain animals--Great Apes-based on their
likeness to non-"marginal humans," i.e., those with full cognitive capacity. 53 As
Cavalieri tells us, Derrida is disturbed by the proposal's focus on a certain
threshold of cognitive capacity not for its exclusion of other animals, but for its
exclusion of marginal humans, i.e., those who fall below the threshold
(typically infants and people with mental disabilities). 4 Cavalieri, one of the
Great Ape Project's main proponents, does not defend this exclusion, but in her
reply to Derrida, places it in context as an understandable step toward gaining
some moral recognition for some animals. 55 The line-drawing conundrum
presented by the Great Ape Project in terms of its anti-egalitarian ramifications
for marginal humans and non-Great Ape animals alike gives rise to just one of
many interesting theoretical exchanges in which Cavalieri engages with
Foucault, Levinas, and Derrida. Cavalieri's excellent discussion of all three
theorists is accessible and thus compelling, a feat which other essays in the
collection navigating philosophical texts do not accomplish as easily.
C. Whither CulturalStudies?
60. Jose van Dijck, MyLifeBits: The Computer as Memory Machine, in BITS OF LIFE, supra note 3,
at 113.
61. Jenny Sunden, What if (Frankenstein's)Monster Was A Girl?: Reproductive and Subjectivity in
the DigitalAge,in BITS OF LIFE, supra note 3, at 147.
62. Anneke Smelik, Inner, Outer and Virtual Space in Science Fiction Films and Medical
Documentaries, in BITS OF LIFE, supranote 3, at 129.
63. Van Dijck, supra note 60, at 113.
64. Id. at 124-25.
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 20:505
digitization might alter, if at all, the gendered roles of traditional photo taking
and storage, which delegate to men the handling of sophisticated equipment,
like cameras, while women take charge of the organization and display of the
printed images in shoeboxes and albums. 65 Within this cultural studies analysis
of everyday life, photography, as so many cultural practices, emerges as an
activity divided by gender according to perceptions of who is more suited to
handle machines and technology and who is more suited to create and maintain
families, nurturing home environments, and relationships. Van Dijck presents
what I would hazard most readers of the text hope to find-an analysis replete
with interesting observations that link new technology to cultural studies'
preoccupation with embodiment, self-making, and gender.
The Bits ofLife reader is also rewarded with engaging examples of feminist
film studies critique. Mette Bryld and Nina Lykke revisit the formative work of
Swedish filmmaker Lennart Nilsson in constructing a narrative for the process
of human fertilization in From Rambo Sperm to Egg Queens: Two Versions of
Lennart Nilsson 's Film on Human Reproduction.66 They discuss how the film
projected gendered roles and traits onto the sperm, egg, and female body to
naturalize the image in our cultural imaginaries of sperm competing valiantly to
fertilize the egg, who demurely and passively waits for the winning swimmer to
find her.67 The authors contrast the revised contemporary versions of his work
in Sweden and the United States, noting how the U.S. PBS version has
responded to feminist criticism of the fallacy of the "Rambo sperm" narrative
by replacing it with the more accurate, if nonetheless similarly culturally
mediated and genetically deterministic, "Egg Queen" story.68 The PBS version
now, through "grammar and plot structure," reverses its gaze and tells the story
from the female perspective, centering the female body as the action hero(ine)
to which the hopeful sperm must be sensitive in order to be successful. 69 While
it is now "the matriarchally described egg that sets the agenda" in the
docimentary, the narrative remains problematic because it is invested in
essentializing both male and female bodies and in ascribing DNA an
70
omnipotent power to construct our bodily experiences.
Similarly, in the smartly named Screening the Gene: Hollywood Cinema
and the Genetic Imaginary, Jackie Stacey analyzes the contributions the films
The analysis in Bits of Life is neatly set up with two opening essays
introducing the field of feminist cultural studies of technoscience by Nina
Lykke and Maureen McNeil. Lykke's Feminist Cultural Studies of
Technoscience: Portraitof an Implosion lays out
some interdisciplinary key dynamics of the field, to make things easier
for readers of Bits of Life who are not familiar with the ways in which
feminism, cultural studies, and technoscience studies-that is, the
central components of feminist cultural studies78of technoscience-
have clashed as well as merged in recent decades.
Lykke provides succinct descriptions of these areas and their insights,
differences, and overlaps, which span such concepts as embodiment, identity
production, attention to popular culture, culturally situated scientific narratives,
and technology as cultural practice. These descriptions quickly and ably equip
the new reader to navigate the more issue-specific discussions to come. For the
sophisticated reader, they also serve as a useful roadmap documenting the
emergence of the field. In the end, we gain the helpful understanding of
feminist cultural studies of technoscience as "bring[ing] together the founding
acts of deconstruction of all the other overlapping areas. Thus it connects the
displacement of positivist notions of technoscience, the discarding of beliefs 79
in
technological determinism, and the explosion of elitist notions of culture.,
Building on Lykke's essay, McNeil's piece concentrates on one of the
areas Lykke maps by charting "the trails that have constituted the 'cultural turn'
in science and technology studies" to consider "its contours, its orientations,
and its political significance, particularly for feminism." 80 McNeil immediately
emphasizes the uncertainty surrounding the definition of cultural studies of
technoscience, and directs the reader to the multiple ways in which the field has
been defined.8 1 She nonetheless outlines five different disciplines which have
combined to create the transdisciplinary field: cultural anthropology, literary
studies of science, studies of visual culture, British cultural studies, and
feminist science fiction studies. 82 There is some redundancy with Lykke's
essay, but overall both authors deftly distill the theoretical heritage and
confluences that have generated the area of feminist cultural studies of
technoscience.
In contrast to Animal Subjects, which loses its focus on cultural studies,
Bits of Life adheres to the departure point of feminist cultural studies of
technoscience traced in its opening chapters. After reading the collection, one is
left with a sense of immersion in this subfield of feminist studies, cultural
studies, and science studies. None of the essays detracts from this impression.
However, the liberal use, in several essays, of unfamiliar or undefined terms
that leave one with a sense that the author is in conversation with a certain
(narrow) circle of academic interlocutors does slightly impair the enjoyment
and edification the reader receives from this type of immersion. Sometimes, it
is a matter of jargon. At other times, it is a matter of the subject area; quantum
physics, for example, needs more explanation for readers new to the field than
perhaps a single chapter can provide, no matter how capable the author. 83 And
sometimes it is both:
By my agential realist account, concepts like "life state" or "alive-
ness" are not merely ideational; rather, they are specific material
configurations. And the semantic and ontological indeterminacy is
In the same vein, Bits of Life foregrounds feminist analysis, but it features a
version which gives primacy (probably inadvertently) to gender differentiation;
other grounds of difference important to mainstream feminism, after its
contemporary reworking through critiques of intersectionality, are only briefly
mentioned. Heteronormativity, racism, and ethnocentrism are infrequently-
mentioned concepts when Bits of Life is compared to other contemporary
feminist collections despite "the political commitment to cultures and
subjectivities of 'inappropriate/d others' and marginalized groups" that inform
both feminist studies and cultural studies. 90 Moreover, for a collection
concentrating on posthuman analysis, particularly one with Haraway's
interventions in the foreground, it stays firmly wed to technocultural
mediations of humans; rarely are animals mentioned in the context of
"inappropriate/d others" or otherwise. Parenthood and Kinship in IVF for
Humans and Animals by Amade M'Charek and Grietje Keller is an important
exception. 9 1 To be fair, Bits of Life sets for itself the ambitious project of
dissecting the intersections of multiple disciplines, and by and large it achieves
its goal. Yet, for the reader who takes the editors at face value when they state
that the collection "is grounded in questions about today's biocultures, which
pertain neither to humanist bodily integrity nor to the anthropological
assumption that human bodies are the only ones that matter,"
92
as highlighted on
the collection's back cover, disappointment may ensue.
Interestingly, the closing piece in Bits of Life escapes this disconnect. In
"The Politics of Life as Bios/Zoe," Rosi Braidotti develops what she calls
"sustainable nomad ethics." These ethics focus not only on the concept of
sustainability as endurance over time, but also on cultivating affectivity, or the
capacity for feeling and emotion, particularly joy and desire, as a being endures
so that the "subject's potentia-the capacity to express her or his freedom"--is
promoted. 93 For Braidotti, then, promoting potentia is what it would mean to be
ethical, and it is an "approach [that] cannot be dissociated from considerations
of power." 94 Braidotti is clear that such considerations include dismantling the
biased bios/zoe binary where "[tjhe relationship to animal life," which
"constitutes one of those qualitative distinctions upon which Western reason
erected its empire," is questioned.9 5 She notes more fully:
CULTURE BORDERLANDs 72, 72-73, 80-85 (Jennifer Wolch & Jody Emel eds., 1998), is an example
of scholarship that approaches questions of race and the human-animal divide through a cultural studies
lens.
90. Lykke, supra note 4, at 8.
91. Amade M'Charek & Grietje Keller, Parenthoodand Kinship in IVFfor Humans and Animals:
On Traveling Bits of Life in the Age of Genetics, in BITS OF LIFE, supra note 3, at 61.
92. BITS OF LIFE, supra note 3 (text quoted from back cover).
93. Rosi Braidotti, The Politics of Life as Bios/Zoe, in BITS OF LIFE, supra note 3, at 177, 184-86.
94. Id. at 183.
95. Id. at 177.
2009] Book Review: Animal Subjects and Bits of Life
96. Id.
97. Id. at 183.
98. Castricano, supra note 4, at 7.
99. Anneke Smelik & Nina Lykke, Introduction to BITS OF LIFE, supra note 3, at ix, xiv.
100. Id. at xv.
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base, and provide compelling, illustrative case studies in the process. Reading
them together, one senses an unprecedented momentum in the development of
posthuman analysis within cultural studies. The texts accomplish what Rosi
Braidotti advocates in her ethic of the sustainable nomadic ethic to subvert the
bios/zoe binary. "Instead of falling back on sedimented habits of thought,
[these texts] have proposed a leap forward into the complexities and paradoxes
of our time." 10 1 It remains to be seen whether cultural studies and other areas of
theoretical inquiry will take this posthumanist leap and leave the unexamined
fictions of what it means to be human far, far behind.
Feminism informed by intersectionality can and should be at the front of
the theoretical pack preparing to take this leap. As Carol Adams, Josephine
Donovan, and other ecofeminists have shown, continuities between the
exploitation of women and exploitation of animals abound. 10 2 As a theoretical
vantage point explicitly committed to deconstructing difference and attending
to marginalized subjectivities, feminism needs to center "the human" as a social
construction that must be investigated rather than place the human subject at
the center of its investigations. Creating this type of feminist posthumanist
studies will take time and an epochal shift in our sensibilities about humanness.
Confronting the paradoxes in how we treat beings we perceive as either not
fully human or non-human requires an openness most of us are not ready to
extend.
The question of whether open minds or open hearts are the answer to this
paradox engages the debate in animal ethics, prompted by ecofeminists,
regarding the animus for this type of monumental change. Does it come from
convincing people through rational arguments or from moving people through
their emotions and relationships with non-humans? 10 3 It is difficult to resolve
this debate. We see examples of both routes in the collection, often in the same
contribution. 104 My own sense is that both open hearts and minds are needed,
coupled with the widespread recognition that faculties for reason and emotion
are integrated rather than dichotomous concepts exhibited by both human and
nonhuman animals.' 05 Laws, too, should change. Here again, various proposals
have been proffered in animal law literature. Scholars have grappled with how
to rework or dismantle the current property paradigm for animals. Some insist
that a property status is incompatible with a legal respect for animals. 0 6 Other
scholars, doubtful that the current reverence for property will abate anytime
soon, argue that the property category can be rehabilitated to be more respectful
and protective of animals.'0 7 More recently, the capabilities approach, widely
discussed in human development circles as a barometer of well-being and guide 08
for legal and policy change in the global South, has been applied to animals.'
While such a widespread reordering of rights, entitlements, and capabilities
is certainly rare, there has been some recent movement in the international
arena for reforming the status of posthuman entities. Spain, for example,
recently became the first country to endorse the Great Ape Project. 10 9 This
follows and expands New Zealand's move in 1999 to stop experimentation on
nonhuman Great Apes for human (Great Ape) benefit. 110 Ecuador, at the time
of this writing, has voted in favor of a new constitution that would accord rights
to forests, rivers, air, and islands."' Both these proposals elevate posthuman
entities from being the objects of property rights to the subjects who possess
rights. Given the current anthropocentric legal landscape and the attendant
propertied legal paradigm for nonhumans that facilitates their instrumental use,
112
these are remarkable initiatives.
This is not to say that they are not beset by their own set of tensions and
paradoxes. Adding to the debate Cavalieri outlines in her essay, 113 it is arguable
that the Great Ape Project is not much removed from an anthropocentric order
since the rationale given for extending human rights to them is their similarity
to humans. Moreover, it may be that a discourse analysis of the debates in
Ecuador over the need for constitutional protection of the environment would
reveal a heavy undercurrent of the romanticized view of Nature, strictly cut-off
from an equally essentialist concept of Culture. This is the precise binary that
106. CAVALIERI, supra note 52; REGAN, supra note 42; STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE:
TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000); Gary Francione, Taking Sentience Seriously I J.
ANIMAL. L. & ETHICS 1 (2006).
107. David Favre, Integrating Animal Interests into our Legal System, 10 ANIMAL L. 87 (2004);
David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownershipfor Animals, 50 DUKE L.J. 473 (2000).
108. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES
MEMBERSHIP, 392-407 (2006).
109. See Great Ape Project News & Information, supra note 52.
110. For a description and critique of the limits of this law, see Peter Sankoff, Five Years of the
"New" Animal Welfare Regime: Lessons Learned from New Zealand's Decision to Modernize its
Animal Welfare Legislation, I I ANIMAL L. 7 (2005).
111. Clare Kendall, A New Law of Nature, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Sept. 24, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/sep/24/equador.conservation; Heather Tomko, Ecuador's
Constitutional Amendment Will Benefit Environment, TARTAN, Oct. 13, 2008, http://www.thetartan.
org/2008/l0/13/forum/ecuador; Alex Witze, The Great Beyond, Sept. 29, 2008, http://blogs.nature.com/
news/thegreatbeyond/2008/09/ecuador._grants-rights to-natur.html (posted on behalf of Amber Dance).
112. I would still categorize the Great Ape Project as non-anthropocentric if: 1) we understand that
term to mean giving attention and respect to nonhuman beings; and/or 2) we accept that in the context of
the abysmal treatment of nonhumans (such as animals) that any legal reform measure that extends
positive legal recognition (rights or otherwise) to them is a welcome development irrespective of the
measure's strategic reliance on the logic of sameness to humans. See Cavalieri, supra note 50.
113. Id.
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 20:505
114. Marie Fox, Re-thinking Kinship: Law's Construction of the Animal Body, in 57 CuRRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 469 (Jane Holder, Coin O'Cinneide & Michael Freeman eds., 2004).
115. HARAWAY, supra note 20, at 15.