Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22320           July 29, 1968

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners, 

Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners. 

CASTRO, J.:

This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically
directed against the following observation therein made:

We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners
resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their
counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which
has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned
or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for
those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.

Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.".

The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while
submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects
adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged
against their clients.

At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature deliberation
and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer conviction that the
protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause
delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is patent.

After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez'
position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly
by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the
courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue.

Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were
conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-
G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end
the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal
fashion, causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More than eight years
after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied.
In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their counsels,
sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil
case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or
ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene
following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth
Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the
said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the
proper forum for any action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts
of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October
4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying
out the execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or
ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to
issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently
issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil
case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as
justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso
Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still
pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence
in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during
the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order:

When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for hearing,
counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the
motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present
evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion
is therefore deemed submitted for resolution.

Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of
jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez,
now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another
injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch
which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and
their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the
preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no power to interfere by
injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very
day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was
already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the
basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963,
which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution.

The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19,
1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to the
denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to
replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in
the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963,
the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash dividends within five days, but
the promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied
the said motion for reconsideration.
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the
avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular
counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable
that the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies"
projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they
foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that even before,
one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the
second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are
persuaded that justice was practically waylaid.

The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292
as the "proper remedy" when we said that.

In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which
are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is
not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with
the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be
established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of
a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had
already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they
incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the
judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .

And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as having
been instituted for delay.

The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not be
considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the
suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted
to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the
word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for devices to thwart the
controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil
cases were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts
did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without power to
restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court
of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs of
preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal of
the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said
cases they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532
when she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil
case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case, until the said
civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292,
the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition
for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the
said civil case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the
parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel happened
to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's
insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of
the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless,
then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's
propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his
client; its primacy is indisputable.

The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the participation
of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs
are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word
"counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction, so that when we said "counsel" we meant
the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the
execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered
its aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the movants are such
counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar about
the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil
Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision above-
mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he
filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila
presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall
writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over
the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs.
Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above, which,
curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in civil case 7532.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968 is
hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and
severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ., concur. 
Concepcion C.J., voted for denial of the motion for reconsideration. 
Fernando, J., took no part.

Footnotes

See "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration," Annex "G" of Petition for Certiorari with Urgent
1

Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

2
See "Manifestation," Annex "2" of Answer.

3
On February 4, 1961, Damaso Perez and Gregorio Subong elevated the judgment in the
basic civil case 39407 to this Court on a petition for certiorari, which was denied for lack of
merit.
 4
Acosta, et al. vs. Alvendia, et al., L-14598, October 31, 1960; Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs,
Arnado, L-17109, June 30, 1961; Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing Co., Inc. vs.
The National Administrator of Regional Office No. 2, etc., et al., L-20491, August 31, 1965,
and the cases cited therein.

Cabigao vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 182; Philippine National Bank vs. Javellana, 92 Phil. 525;
5

Araneta vs. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 522.

Republic of the Philippines

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984

PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant, 
vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.

Roger Castuciano for complainant.

Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.

AQUINO, J.: ñé+.£ªwph!1

This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband Generoso B.
Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in
1968.

In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation, he became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that she was a
widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was born on November 27, 1972. He
was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony
Garcia was subsisting or undissolved.

Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37,
in a civil ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December 30,1972
(Exh. C and C-1)

The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for more than one
year. In the evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked
permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a vacation in his hometown, Daet,
Camarines Norte. Since then, he has never returned to the conjugal abode.

Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient investigation and
surveillance, she discovered that he was living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located
at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to that place.
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated by Linda Delfin,
their housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their
neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F,
which were confirmed by their testimonies.

Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the head of the
family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H).
Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified
five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing
eyeglasses.

Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married
Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the
purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of
Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's testimony.

He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims that they were paid
witnesses. He declared that he did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress
Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.

On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home because he
could not endure the nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home
(she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her interference with his
professional obligations.

The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint for disbarment
against the respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint. He waived the presentation of
additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any memorandum.

After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the burden of proof.
She has proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous relations with a married woman
separated from her own husband.

Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral
conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married
woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959;
Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).

Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another
woman who had borne him a child. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected
and required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).

WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED. 1äwphï1.ñët

Makasiar, Actg. C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 389             February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO. 

Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.

REGALA, J.:

On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando
Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent
denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the
allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule
127 of the former Rules of Court.

The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the
complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The
respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent
likewise testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on
June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and
disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.

After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with
immorality. The complaint recites:

That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando
Puno were engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a
movie but on their way the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment
before going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R.
Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel,
respondent proposed to complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her
that 'anyway we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered
by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced,
and before they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book
as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant
inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from
outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant
begged respondent not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have
promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his
 overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised
that I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her
panty, and then placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed;
that when respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but
to submit to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00
o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a
birthday party together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958,
respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that
they had better wait until they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1,
1958 and feeling that she was already on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored
respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on
February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child.

That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a
promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present
constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality
and integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the
Philippine Bar.

The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.

A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the
complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that
on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however,
admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November,
1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice
law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence,
respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor
Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral
argument. There was no appearance for the respondents.

Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional
evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo,
Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his
investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the
witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of
Court.

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.

Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She
testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register
as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of
marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and
Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.

Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to
Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a
telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a
letter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant
and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City
in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to
marry her.1äwphï1.ñët

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met
in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters
was likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E),
which was duly identified by the respondent to be his.

Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's
Hospital. This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local
Civil Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and
Children's Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital.

To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter
testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated
by the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated
November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.

The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed
to discredit complainant's testimony.

In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and
complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were
sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant
(pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and
respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)

Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise
of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual
passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .

One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the
old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license
or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice
and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In
re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator
(Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he
took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but
he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs.
Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet
the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is
hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State
voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is
particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State
the very means by which it may assist him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the
complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment
or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of
Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a
lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without
number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil.
567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28,
1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a
matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment.
(Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral
act and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is
important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in
accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics:

... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession
and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is
ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.