CHINA’S SHARP POWER IN AFRICA

China’s Global Sharp Power

The Trappings of the Mauritius
Safe City Project
ROUKAYA KASENALLY

China has entered the global stage with a bang—as a provider of affordable goods, a
development partner, and a growing (and often assertive) presence in international governance
systems. It cannot be ignored as a global player, but beyond the pomp and fluff, it is crucial to
understand what are the actual incentives behind China’s growing leadership role—be it in
the area of technology, military, economics, or culture.

Africa was long considered by the Global North as a forgotten continent, an unequal partner
in multiple asymmetries of trade, development, and information. But China has assiduously
courted Africa, and its presence is far from a novelty. In its 2006 white paper on Africa,
China premised its relational power on the principles of “sincerity, friendship, mutual
benefit, shared prosperity, mutual support and common development.”1 It unabashedly
engages with African countries, openly dangling what seem like advantageous concessionary
loans, striking deals behind closed doors, and offering “generous” knowledge transfer. China
has supported major infrastructure projects such as roads, dams, hospitals, airports, and ports.
These visible aspects of development shape public sentiment. According to the latest round
of the Afrobarometer survey of public opinion, China ranks second to the United States as
“the best model for future development.”2

However, China’s accelerated presence and aggressive method of engagement give cause
for concern. Its conspicuous presence in Africa has coincided with citizens’ demands for
greater political accountability and transparency facilitated by the internet and mobile
technology. Initially tolerated, in recent years these demands have been suppressed in
a host of African countries by measures ranging from social media taxes, introduction
of cybersecurity legislation, and internet shutdowns to invasive online surveillance. In
addition, cameras are popping up at busy intersections and quiet neighborhoods as part of
“Safe City” projects officially promoted to combat crime, vandalism, and other antisocial
behavior.

“Safe Cities” are an evolution of the smart cities concept initially advanced by the
World Bank as a means of ensuring greater municipal efficiency. However, China’s leading
role in the global spread of smart and safe cities prompts concern. Commentators point to
China’s export of authoritarianism and its facilitation by tech companies such as Huawei,
ZTE, Dahua, Hikvision, and others.3 Steven Feldstein particularly spotlights the role of
2

Huawei in “offering advanced equipment [and] technological support to set up, operate
and manage these systems.”4

Safe Cities are spreading rapidly across Asia, Latin America, Central Europe, and Africa.
Twelve countries within sub-Saharan Africa have a Safe City. Examples are Kenya and Uganda,
which Freedom House classifies as “partly free” and “not free,” respectively.5 Mauritius is an
island celebrated as a shining example of democracy in Africa, yet it too is falling prey to this
technology, and the Mauritius Safe City Project (MSCP) is replete with red flags.

For a project that will use public funds to repay a loan contracted by the Export-Import
(Exim) Bank of China, the MSCP is shrouded in opacity. The project is estimated to cost
US$455 million spread over twenty years.6 It involves public data that will be collected using
intrusive technology such as facial recognition. Yet there has been no public discussion
about its adoption and implementation. Why was it set up? Whom does it serve? Why
is there so little information in the public domain? What are the financing mechanisms
involved? Who are the key stakeholders and what are their roles?

China in Mauritius: A Snapshot

Mauritius established diplomatic relations with China a half century ago, shortly after
achieving independence. Mauritius has a small but thriving Sino-Mauritian population
whose ancestors came to the island as traders and merchants. Trade, culture, and knowledge
transfer have to a large extent underlain the bilateral relationship through Chinese cultural
centers, people-to-people networks, capacity-building programs, expertise in fishing, and
scholarship programs. In 2016, a Confucius Institute and a branch of the Bank of China
opened, and talks for a free-trade agreement began. The agreement was signed in 2021, the
first between China and an African nation. In the words of an ex-diplomat who worked
closely on China-Mauritius relations, “China has a real soft point for Mauritius and has
been very generous over the years towards us.”7

Likewise, at the World Political Parties Summit sponsored by China on July 6, 2021, the
Mauritian prime minister poured praise on the “CCP as the architect of modern China”
and congratulated it “for its strong leadership, avant-garde vision, hard work, discipline and
tenacity.”8 An ex-cadre of the Militant Socialist Movement (MSM) confirmed that the
MSM, the prime minister’s party, has had very strong ties with the CCP since the MSM’s
founding in 1983.

Mauritius also has strong ties to India. Roughly 70 percent of the Mauritian population
has Indian ancestry and retains linguistic, cultural, or religious connections to India. India
has been generous in its tax treaties, credit lines, and knowledge transfer, and appears to
be vying with China to curry favor with Mauritius. In recent years, India has financed a
number of large infrastructure projects in Mauritius, such as a light-railway metro. India

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signed a free-trade agreement with Mauritius shortly after China did and is developing one
of Mauritius’s outer islands, Agaléga. The Indian and Mauritian governments have denied
setting up a military facility on Agaléga and have explained India’s presence there as part of
India’s Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) policy.9 With a major US military
installation already in the vicinity on Diego Garcia, these developments signify intensifying
geostrategic competition around Mauritius.

The Mauritius Safe City Project: Safety and Surveillance

Researching the MSCP was like finding scattered pieces to a complex puzzle. The first
question that came to mind was, How did Mauritius get to a Safe City project? There
was little public information concerning the MSCP. I therefore approached a range of
stakeholders, including members of parliament, ex−political party cadres, journalists,
and civil-society groups. An insider with knowledge of the project pointed me to an
unsolicited bid from Huawei to the government of Mauritius in 2015. Prior to that, there
had been some discussion about upgrading the existing closed-circuit television network
of the Mauritian police. But this simple upgrade rapidly morphed into a large Safe City
project (see figure 1). The first public mention of the project occurred in 2016, during the
presentation of the 2016/17 National Budget:

Government is coming up with a Safe City Project on a pilot basis. In that context, smart
cameras would be installed with special focus on major public areas, along main roads and
motorways, pedestrian walkways and principal traffic centres. These cameras would be a
powerful and effective tool to combat crimes and drugs proliferation, [and] assist in more
effective traffic and road safety management.10

How did Huawei convince the government to embrace the concept of a full-blown Safe
City? The MSCP coincided with a spat between the current ruling government and
two of its major allies, the US and the United Kingdom. In 2015, Mauritius, under the
leadership of the current ruling party, initiated legal proceedings against the UK in the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. Mauritius won a succession of battles toward
recognition of Diego Garcia and the Chagos Islands as Mauritian territory. The Diego Garcia
case seems to have soured the relationship with the US and UK to the point that the current
prime minister has referred to them as “hypocrites and champions of double talk.”11 With
Mauritius’s traditional partners out in the cold, it was perhaps an ideal moment for a
further and stronger rapprochement with China.

In late 2017, the cabinet decided that the Mauritian police should contract with Mauritius
Telecom for the latter to operate the MSCP. Matters then accelerated when Mauritius
Telecom entered a “preferential buyer credit loan agreement” with the Exim Bank of
China with the government of Mauritius acting as guarantor.12 The loan agreement is for
a period of twenty years effective from April 1, 2018. To date, there has been no disclosure

Hoover Institution  •  Stanford University

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Figure 1. A Safe City camera in operation in Mauritius

Source: Photo taken by the author.

regarding the tenure of the contracts between Mauritius Telecom and the Exim Bank
of China, or between Mauritius Telecom and the Mauritian police; both are deemed
confidential.

The official rationale for the MSCP referred to public safety and security. But several of the
stakeholders whom I interviewed found it difficult to justify the presence of a Safe City
on a small island like Mauritius that is usually sheltered from high levels of crime and
other types of banditry. Moreover, one cannot help but notice the decline in Mauritius’s
democratic credentials over the last ten years. In fact, the decline accelerated beginning
in 2017, which coincides with the implementation of the MSCP. Are they linked in
any way?

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Over the last two decades, a change in political culture has gripped certain mainstream
political parties in Mauritius. They have become extremely leader-centric, and power
and decisions are concentrated, focused on big money and growing levels of cronyism.13
A clique-like mentality has affected governance, causing corruption, nepotism, and
impunity to rise. Two recent reports document the island’s democratic backsliding.14
A series of increasingly authoritarian measures have reined in civil liberties, including
the introduction of a biometric ID card in 2013, arrests of journalists in 2019, multiple
suspensions of a commercial radio station’s license in 2020, and the political capture of key
institutions including the legislature, where opposition members of parliament have been
recurrently expelled (2020−21). In early 2021, matters worsened when the Information
and Communication Technologies (ICT) Authority published a consultation paper with
proposals that pose a danger to both civil liberties and political rights, insofar as they point
toward the establishment of a digital surveillance system.15 More recently, the Cybersecurity
and Cybercrime Act (2021) and the Independent Broadcasting Authority (Amendment)
Act (2021) were adopted in the Mauritian parliament despite wide public protest.16 They aim
to punitively constrain content.

The Nexus between Opacity and Corruption

Opacity is a defining feature of many of the Safe Cities that China is supporting. In the
case of Mauritius, the project was closed from the outset and, according to stakeholders
who have inside knowledge of the MSCP, even certain government ministers were kept
in the dark. A trickle of information leaked out because of existing systems of horizontal
accountability, namely the Mauritian parliament and the National Audit Office (NAO).

Officially, the MSCP falls under the jurisdiction of the Mauritius Police Force, which itself is
under the Prime Minister’s Office. However, questions surround the architecture of the MSCP.
There are multiple players within the MSCP—the Mauritius Police Force, Mauritius Telecom,
and Huawei—and the responsibility of each is unclear.

The government of Mauritius selected Mauritius Telecom to provide “security equipment,

related hardware and software and licenses to the Government of Mauritius for a contractual
period of 20 years.”17 It avoided competitive bidding requirements in the Public Procurement
Act (PPA) by invoking Section 3(1)(a) of the PPA, which states “this Act shall not apply to
procurement undertaken to protect national security or defence, where the Prime Minister so
determines.”18 But why did the government undertake this course of action and specifically
select Mauritius Telecom? Were there no other possible competitive telecom bidders?

An informant close to the MSCP is convinced that the choice was deliberate due to the
very close relationship between the current top management of Mauritius Telecom and
the closed and influential group that manages the MSCP. Further elaborating on the
matter, the informant mentioned that Mauritius Telecom was part of the early deliberations

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in 2015 and even part of a delegation that visited China in connection with the rollout of the
MSCP. Furthermore, its status as a private company puts it outside public and parliamentary
scrutiny.

Several Parliamentary Questions (PQs) in 2018 and 2019 requested information on the
contractual nature of the loan between Mauritius Telecom and the Exim Bank of China,
the safety and privacy of data, and the overall cost of the project. In its recently released
report for the 2019−20 period, NAO sheds light on aspects of the MSCP that are troubling,
especially with regard to contract management, expenditure management, and deliverables
not attained. Two elements stand out. The first confirms the opacity around the MSCP:
“The lease agreements were not made available to the NAO officers as the Police explained
that the agreements could not be provided due to a clause of mutual disclosure under the
terms and conditions of the agreement.”19 The second deals with nonaccountability and
the way that funds were disbursed and used during three fiscal years (2017/18, 2018/19, and
2019/20) of the MSCP. MUR 760 million (approximately US$25 million) in spending had no
corresponding payment vouchers or supporting documents.

A stakeholder with inside knowledge of the MSCP links this opacity directly to corruption.
According to this source, big infrastructure-related projects fetching millions of dollars
in contract money can encourage corruption since the final cost of these projects may far
exceed the original estimate. These overruns are at times justified as deviations within
the project. Although it is unclear whether this is the case with the MSCP, the opacity
and confidentiality surrounding the project cast doubt on whether the principles of good
governance have been adhered to.

Data Ownership, Storage, and Use: Under Whose Jurisdiction?

Data is key to the success of the MSCP. Mauritius has currently one of the best data-protection
laws in Africa as well as a Data Protection Office. One of its strengths is that it aims to
strengthen the personal autonomy of data subjects and the control they have over their
personal data. However, section 44 of this Data Protection Act stipulates: “Personal data shall
be exempt from any provision of this Act where the non-application of such provision would,
in the opinion of the Prime Minister, be required for the purpose of safeguarding national
security, defence or public security.”20 This provision gives one person, the prime minister,
the authority to reverse the Act’s personal data privacy protections and, according to the
Code of Practice for the Operation of the Safe City System(s), it applies to MSCP data.21 Some
who follow the MSCP closely do not discount the potential for abuse, misuse, or even
manipulation.

It is unclear who stores and ultimately controls the data. The government has maintained
that the Mauritius Police Force will operate the cameras and have custody of data collected.22
However, during a recent trial, officers from the Mauritius Police Force testified that the

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Figure 2. Distribution and storage of data in Mauritius

HD cameras: 4,000

Box cameras: Dome cameras: 1,000

3,000

Status of Captured Videos Location Storage Time Frame

Footage sent to 71 police Respective jurisdictions 24 hours

stations

Main Command and Control Second floor, Shri Atal Bihari 30 days
Centre (MCCC) of the Vajpayee Tower, Ebene
Mauritian police

Government Online Centre

National Computer Board

Ministry of ICT

data is in fact held by Mauritius Telecom. Mauritius Telecom was quick to release a public
statement saying that the data is stored at the Government Online Centre—a public body
under the aegis of the ICT ministry (see figure 2).23 So, who really has custody of the MSCP
data? This lack of clarity can easily allow for the manipulation and misuse of data—a grim
prospect for those who cherish their civil liberties and political rights.

Hoover Institution  •  Stanford University

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The Mauritian Police, the MSCP, and the Citizens

Despite the ambiguity and contradiction over who stores and ultimately controls data from
the MSCP, the Mauritius Police Force remains a key player. Round 8 of the Afrobarometer
Mauritius survey reported that nearly half (44.5 percent) of respondents trust the police
“just a little” or “not at all.”24 This comports with a national sentiment that the
police (or at least its higher echelons) are at the behest of those in power and unable
to exert independence in the exercise of their duties. 25 This low public trust puts into
question the ability of the MSCP to ensure the security and safety of citizens. Key
opposition party leaders, antigovernment protesters, and even common citizens fear that
sensitive data could be handed over to the government for political reasons. For instance,
the Leader of the Opposition (a constitutional position) has on numerous occasions
publicly expressed concern about surveillance and about misuse and manipulation of
data. 26 In light of the antidemocratic measures that the country has witnessed in the
last five years, the worry is that the MSCP might become a tool for political control,
manipulation, and oppression.

What of the training of the Mauritius Police Force to operate the MSCP? Judging from the
impressive fleet of intelligent video and traffic surveillance cameras, the radio communications
system, and the centralized command and control center, one may assume that extensive
training has been provided. But by whom? Huawei? Other technicians from China? When
the government promoted the MSCP in 2018 and 2019 as a state-of-the-art project, a deputy
commissioner of police was featured in a Huawei promotional video, praising Huawei.

The Huawei-China Connection?

After the unsolicited bid by Huawei, what began as a simple upgrade to the existing
Mauritius Police Force CCTV network turned into a full-blown Safe City project, all
behind closed doors. In addition to benefiting from the “preferential buyer credit loan
agreement” with the Exim Bank of China, Huawei is an important player in the rollout and
perhaps management of the MSCP.27 Promotional material on Huawei’s Safe Cities website
pitches the Mauritian case as building a “safe Mauritius, the inspiration for heaven.”28
Moreover, Huawei has grown into more than just a simple ICT vendor. It has launched
several initiatives and programs ranging from the Huawei Academy (under the aegis of the
University of Mauritius) to content partnerships with local media houses. Moreover, the
Chinese ambassador attends most of the formal events that Huawei organizes.

Feldstein speaks to Huawei’s strategy when he says, “Huawei is directly pitching the Safe
City model to national security agencies, and China’s Exim Bank appears to be sweetening
the deal with subsidized loans.”29 Though the MSCP contract is not publicly available, it
would be consistent with Chinese practice for the subsidized loan agreement from the
Exim Bank of China to direct the government of Mauritius to contract Chinese firms (such
as Huawei) to provide infrastructure as well as technical and other support to the MSCP.30

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Too Many Gray Areas

MSCP is costing the Mauritian taxpayer millions of dollars for which very little to no
information can be found in the public domain. Knowledgeable observers believe that this
opacity is deliberate and invites corruption. Those who see cameras at busy crossroads, in
their neighborhoods, or in front of their homes worry about the justifications for these
cameras and their locations. Are they being watched? Tracked? Will citizens grow self-
conscious and start to adjust their behavior or censor themselves? What will happen to the
cherished political rights and civil liberties that the island has built its reputation on?

Lessons Learned
China’s well-oiled rhetoric of helping Africa bridge its digital divide needs to be viewed with
guarded enthusiasm. Africa’s digital infrastructure is increasingly at risk as China rolls out
its technology hardware and software, offers attractive concessionary loans, and promotes
digital sovereignty. One of the most damaging outcomes, as exemplified by the MSCP, is a
culture of opacity and impunity. Therefore, it is imperative that key stakeholders within and
across African countries double down to push back against such projects. As with the MSCP,
they must ask questions such as Who does it serve? Why an unsolicited bid? Who are the
key players? Is it a priority project? This pushback should be not solely against China but also
against national governments and local elites who thrive on such opaque and closed dealings.

The MSCP case also highlights the importance of institutional checks and balances. A
confidentiality clause was systematically invoked as a shield against questions pertaining
to contract details. Confidentiality clauses are a recurrent feature in large infrastructure
projects funded by China. This must end, and the doctrine of public interest must prevail.
In the case of Mauritius, institutions such as the parliament, the National Audit Office, and
the media drew attention to the MSCP’s underlying issues. However, even these institutions
had limited success in piercing the triple armor of confidentiality, opacity, and impunity.

Last, the MSCP should serve as a cautionary tale for other countries contemplating
similar projects. Sharing knowledge and experiences concerning Safe Cities is essential to
bolstering democratic governance and combating malign and opaque practices in Africa
and beyond.

NOTES
1 ​The People’s Republic of China, China’s African Policy (Beijing: PRC, 2006).

2 ​Edem Selormey, “Africans’ Perceptions about China,” Afrobarometer, 2020, 9, https://­afrobarometer​.­org​/­sites​

/­default​/­f iles​/­africa​-­china​_­relations​-­3sept20​.­pdf.

3 ​Jonathan Hillman and Maesea McCalpin, “Watching Huawei’s ‘Safe Cities,’ ” Center for Strategic & International
Studies, 2019, https://­www​.­csis​.­org​/­analysis​/­watching​-­huaweis​-­safe​-­cities; Bulelani Jili, “The Spread of Surveillance

Hoover Institution  •  Stanford University

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Technology in Africa Stirs Security Concerns,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2020, https://­africacenter​.­org​
/­spotlight​/­surveillance​-­technology​-­in​-­africa​-­security​- ­concerns; and Steven Feldstein, “Testimony before the
US-China Economic Security Review Commission Hearing on China’s Strategic Aims in Africa,” US-China Economic
Security Review Commission, 2020, https://­w ww​.­uscc​.­gov​/­sites​/­default​/­f iles​/­Feldstein​_­Testimony​.­pdf.

4 ​Steven Feldstein, The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology Is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 230.

5 ​Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz, “Freedom in the World 2021: Democracy under Siege,” Freedom House, 2021,
https://­freedomhouse​.­org ​/­report​/­freedom​-­world​/­2021​/­democracy​-­under​-­siege.

6 ​“Sixth National Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard),” Mauritius National Assembly, April 23, 2019, 41,
https://­mauritiusassembly​.­govmu​.­org ​/­Documents​/­Hansard​/­2019​/­hansard0419​.­pdf.

7 ​Anonymous informant, telephone interview, September 24, 2021.

8 ​GIS (Government Information Service) Mauritius, “Bilateral relations: PM participates in CPC and World Political
Parties Summit,” video posted on Facebook, July 6, 2021, https://­sw​-­ke​.­facebook​.­com​/­GIS​.­Mauritius​/­videos​
/­bilateral​-­relations​-­pm​-­participates​-­in​-­cpc​-­and​-­world​-­political​-­parties​-­summit​/­225285059415678.

9 ​Kate Sullivan de Estrada, “Putting the SAGAR Vision to the Test,” The Hindu, April 22, 2020, https://­w ww​
.­thehindu​.­com​/­opinion​/­op​-­ed​/­putting​-­the​-­sagar​-­vision​-­to​-­the​-­test​/­article31399219​.­ece.

10 ​Pravind Jugnauth, “A New Era of Development: Budget Speech 2016/2017,” Republic of Mauritius, Ministry of
Finance, July 29, 2016, 28, https://­w ww​.­fscmauritius​.­org​/­media​/­2332​/­budgetspeech2016​-­17​.­pdf.

11 ​BBC News, “Chagos Islands Dispute: Mauritius Calls US and UK ‘Hypocrites,’ ” British Broadcasting Corporation,
October 19, 2020, https://­w ww​.­bbc​.­com​/­news​/­world​-­africa​-­5 4598084.

12 ​Mauritius Telecom, “A Vision That Has Changed the Landscape: Annual Report,” Dokumen, 2018, 124,
https://­dokumen​.­tips​/­documents​/­a​-­vision​-­that​-­has​-­changed​-­the​-­landscape​-­mauritius​-­telecom​-­employees​-­of​
-­mauritius​.­html.

13 ​Roukaya Kasenally, “Political Leadership in Mauritius: The Trappings of the Poster Child Syndrome,”
in The Mauritian Paradox: Fifty Years of Development, Diversity and Democracy, eds. Ramola Ramtohul and
Thomas Eriksen (Reduit: University of Mauritius Press, 2018); and Roukaya Kasenally and Ramola Ramtohul,
The Cost of Parliamentary Politics in Mauritius (London: Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2020).

14 ​V-Dem Institute, “Autocratization Turns Viral: Democracy Report 2021,” University of Gothenburg, 2021, 22,
https://­w ww​.­v​- ­dem​.­net​/­f iles​/­25​/­DR%202021​.­pdf; and Louis Amedee Darga, “Mauritians’ Assessment of Election
Quality Took a Hit in 2019,” Afrobarometer, 2021, https://­afrobarometer​.­org​/­publications​/­ad453​-­mauritians​
-­assessment​-­election​-­quality​-­took​-­hit​-­2019.

15 ​Information and Communication Technologies Authorities, “Consultation Paper on Proposed Amendments to

the ICT Act for Regulating the Use and Addressing the Abuse and Misuse of Social Media in Mauritius” (Port Louis:
ICTA, 2021), https://­w ww​.­icta​.­mu​/­documents​/­2021​/­10​/­Social​_­Media​_­Public ​_­Consultation​.­pdf.

16 ​The Cybersecurity and Cybercrime Act 2021, Mauritius Assembly, accessed December 4, 2021, https://­mauritius​
assembly​.­govmu​.­org ​/­Documents​/­Acts​/­2021​/­act1621​.­p df; and the Independent Broadcasting Authority
(Amendment) Act 2021, Mauritius Assembly, accessed December 4, 2021, https://­mauritiusassembly​.­govmu​.­org​
/­Documents​/­Acts​/­2021​/­act1821​.­pdf.

17 ​Mauritius Telecom, “A Vision That Has Changed the Landscape,” 124.

18 ​Public Procurement Act of 2006, Government of Mauritius, last updated December 8, 2021, https://­ppo​.­govmu​
.­org ​/­Documents​/­PPA​/­PPA ​.­pdf.

Roukaya Kasenally  •  The Trappings of the Mauritius Safe City Project

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19 ​“Report of the Director of Audit on the Accounts of the Government for the Financial Year 2019−20,” National
Audit Office, Republic of Mauritius, 2021, 165, https://­nao​.­govmu​.­org​/­Documents​/­Reports​/­2019​_ ­20​/­AR​_ ­2019​_ ­20​
_­Mauritius​.­pdf.

20 ​The Data Protection Act 2017, Government of Mauritius, January 15, 2018, 62, https://­dataprotection​.­govmu​
.­org ​/­Documents​/­DPA ​_ ­2017​_­updated​.­pdf ​?­c sf​=­1&e​=­0rlrff.

21 ​Data Protection Office, “Code of Practice for the Operation of the Safe City System(s),” Mauritius Police Force,
2020, https://­dataprotection​.­govmu​.­org​/­Documents​/­Code%20of%20Practice%20for%20the%20operation%20of​
%20the%20Safe%20City%20System%28s%29%20by%20MPF​.­PDF.

22 ​“Sixth National Assembly,” 9.

23 ​“Affaire Kistnen: Mauritius Telecom Indique que les Données des Images Safe City Sont Stockées sur les
Serveurs au Government Online Centre,” Zinfos Moris, December 10, 2020, https://­w ww​.­zinfos​-­moris​.­com​/­Affaire​
-­Kistnen​-­Mauritius​-­Telecom​-­indique​-­que​-­les​-­donnees​-­des​-­images​-­Safe​-­City​-­sont​-­stockees​-­sur​-­les​-­serveurs​-­au​
_­a19261​.­html.

24 ​Straconsult, “Afrobarometer Round 8 Survey in Mauritius, 2020,” Afrobarometer, 45, https://­afrobarometer​.­org​

/­sites​/­default​/­f iles​/­publications​/­Summary%20of%20results​/­summary​_­of​_­results​-­mauritius ​_­r8​-­afrobarometer​
-­25feb21​.­pdf.

25 ​Nishan Degnarain, “Mauritius in Crisis as Militarized Police Deployed against Peaceful Protestors,” Forbes,
January 11, 2021, https://­w ww​.­forbes​.­com​/­sites​/­nishandegnarain​/­2021​/­01​/­11​/­mauritius​-­in​- ­crisis​-­as​-­militarized​
-­police ​- ­deployed​-­against​-­peaceful​-­protestors​/­​?­sh​=­9e9a7c8bc482.

26 ​Xavier-Luc Duval, “Prévient contre les Dérives du Safe City,” Défi Media Info, June 10, 2018, https://­defimedia​
.­info​/­xavier​-­luc​-­duval​-­previent​-­contre​-­les​-­derives​-­du​-­safe​-­city.

27 ​Mauritius Telecom, “A Vision That Has Changed the Landscape,” 124.

28 ​“Safe Mauritius, the Inspiration for Heaven,” Huawei, October 2018, https://­e​.­huawei​.­com​/­en​/­publications​

/­global​/­ict​-­new​-­horizons​-­podcasts​/­Stories​/­mauritius.

29 ​Feldstein, Rise of Digital Repression, 238.

30 ​Ammar A. Malik, Bradley Parks, Brooke Russell, Joyce Jiahui Lin, Katherine Walsh, Kyra Solomon, Sheng Zhang,
Thai-Binh Elston, and Seth Goodman, “Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a New Global Dataset of
13,427 Chinese Development Projects,” AidData at William & Mary, September 2021, https://­docs​.­aiddata​.­org​
/­ad4​/­pdfs​/­Banking​_­on​_­the​_­Belt​_­and​_­Road​_ ­​_­Insights​_­from​_­a ​_­new​_ ­global​_­dataset​_­of​_­13427​_­Chinese​
_­development ​_­projects​.­pdf.

Hoover Institution  •  Stanford University

 13

Copyright © 2022 by Roukaya Kasenally

28 27 26 25 24 23 22   7 6 5 4 3 2 1

The views expressed in this essay are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff,
officers, or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution.

Hoover Institution  •  Stanford University

 The Hoover Institution’s project on China’s Global Sharp
About the Author Power (CGSP) tracks, documents, and analyzes how China’s
Communist party-state operates in the shadows to shape
and control information flows, coerce governments and
corporations, infiltrate and corrupt political systems, and
exploit, disrupt, and debase civic institutions, particularly
in open and democratic societies. Through its research
and global partnerships, CGSP produces papers, lectures,
conferences, workshops, publications, and web-accessible
resources to educate opinion leaders and policy makers
so that they may pursue diverse, balanced, and vigilant
ROUKAYA KASENALLY relationships with China, tailored to their circumstances.
Roukaya Kasenally is a democracy
scholar and associate professor at For more information about this Hoover Institution project, visit
the University of Mauritius. She is us online at www​.­hoover​.­org​/­research​-­teams​/­chinas​-­global​-­sharp​
the current chair of the Electoral -­power​-­project.
Institute for Sustainable Democracy
in Africa (EISA), a board member
of West African Democracy Radio
(WADR), and a member of the
International Advisory Board of the
Electoral Integrity Project (EIP).

Hoover Institution, Stanford University Hoover Institution in Washington

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Author Name  •  Essay Title