Oposa v.

Factoran 224 SCRA 792

FACTS:

 The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents and Philippine Ecological
Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural resources.
 Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Children of Factoran were one of
the petitioners
 The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn." It prayed for the cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country and cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
 Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of
continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration
that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.
 Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action (legal standing)
against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government
 RTC – granted the motion to dismiss. Judge further ruled that the granting of the
relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited
by the fundamental law of the land.
 Plaintiff filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and asked to rescind and set aside the dismissal order
on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only
represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.
 Petitioner’s contentions:
 Based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations),
Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
 Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to
safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
 TLAs are not contracts thus not violative of non-impairment clause
 Respondent’s contention:
 They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae."
 Cancellation of TLAs cannot be done without due process of law

ISSUE:

Whether the said petitioners (minors) have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth."

RULING:

 SC stated that the case before it is a tax payer and class suit.
 The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
 Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
 Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.

RTC Decision:
 The SC agreed with the defendant. Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data.
 Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed
with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken
cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers"
 Granting such prayer or cancellation would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.

 The SC do not agree with the trial court that the plaintiffs failed to allege a
specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data.
 Specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law.
 Case has a special and unique element
 The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.
 Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be
irreversiby disrupted.
 The right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by
virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
 A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action
 The SC find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well
as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights
 Intergenerational responsibility – every generation has the right to conserve and
preserve the environment for the next generation to come.
  Sec 15 and 16, Art. 2 is still a human right that is in a different category. Basic
and inherent rights in human beings therefore it need not be written in the
Constitution.
Kaya sya nilagay sa Art 2 para maging mandato or polisiya ng government.

The SC emphasized Sec 16, Art 2 - Imposable right and self executing
povision
 Political Question Issue:
What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation.
The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

 Non-impairment of contracts clause issue:

Two jurisprudence were cited by the SC which emphasized that License is not a
contracts thus non impairment clause cannot be invoked.
 The instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring
the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses.
 Section 16, Article II is said to be self-executory because as a matter of fact,
these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape TanonStrait, et al v.

Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al

FACTS:
 Petitioners, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the
petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait.
 Together with Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal
guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who
allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine
species.
 They use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. as basis for their claim, asserting their right to
enforce international and domestic environmental laws enacted for their benefit
under the concept of stipulation pour autrui ( gives the third-party beneficiary a
cause of action against the promisor for specific performance)
 Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through
this case, this court will have the opportunity to lower the threshold for locus
standi as an exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction."
 Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN
Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others.
 In this case, petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Service Contract-46
 The Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX.
This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon
Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing
of seismic and magnetic data.
 JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys,
as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait.
 On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-
46 for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a
block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.
 JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of
the project.
 Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well,
with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu
Province.
  This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008. The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null
and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether petitioners have legal standing before courts

2. Whether President Arroyo may be impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner
3. Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is violative of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and statutes

RULING:

1. Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners have no legal standing to
file any kind of petition.

The SC agree that petitioners in G.R. No. 181527, namely, Central Visayas Fisherfolk
Development Center,. Engarcial, Yanong, and Labid, have standing both as real parties
in interest and as representatives of subsistence fisherfolks of the Municipalities of
Aloguinsan and Pinamungahan, Cebu, and their families, and the present and future
generations of Filipinos whose rights are similarly affected. The activities undertaken
under Service Contract 46 (SC-46) directly affected their source of livelihood, primarily
felt through the significant reduction of their fish harvest.The actual, direct, and material
damage they suffered, which has potential long-term effects transcending generations,
is a proper subject of a legal suit.

To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including future

generations, is dangerous for three reasons:

First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in
the suit, putting into. question its representativeness.

Second, varying interests may potentially result in arguments that are bordering on
political issues, the resolutions of which do not fall upon this court.

Third, automatically allowing a class or citizen's suit on behalf of minors and

generations yet unborn may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex
issue, especially in light of the impossibility of determining future generation's true
interests on the matter.

The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims
lies in its potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights.

It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are. At best, humans can
only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and
seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product of guesswork, and
representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent,
rational, scientific, well-founded arguments" on behalf of those they represent.

2. No. Under the rules, if the consent of a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she
shall be impleaded as a defendant. In this case, a President cannot be impleaded
because her functions need her full devotion. The unwilling party’s name cannot be
simply included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and consent, as such would
be a denial of due process.

Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party to this suit. As a

co-equal constitutional department, it cannot be assumed that the President needs to
enforce policy directions by suing his or her alter-egos. The procedural situation caused
by petitioners may have gained public attention, but its legal absurdity borders on the
contemptuous. The Former President's name should be stricken out of the title of this
case.

3.Yes. SC-46 violates Republic Act No. ·7586 or the National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992, and Presidential Decree No. 1234, which declared
Tañon Strait as a protected seascape. It is unconstitutional because it violates the
fourth paragraph of Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Service contracts involving foreign corporations or entities have been banned by

the 1987 Constitution. JAPEX is Japanese owned. It cannot be considered a
 technical and financial assistance agreement validly executed under Par. 4 of the
same provision.
In La Bugal case, SC explained that Sec.2 (4), Article 12 of the Constitution has
an exception. Service contracts involving foreign corporations are subject to
certain conditions.
Service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum
and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among
which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will
set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain
a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly
before an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been
vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and
can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to
Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if any. (Emphasis in the original,
citation omitted)
Based on the standards pronounced in La Bugal, SC-46' S validity must be
tested against three important points: (a) whether SC-46 was crafted in
accordance with a general law that provides standards, terms, and conditions; (b)
whether SC-46 was signed by the President for and on behalf of the government;
and (c) whether it was reported by the President to Congress within 30 days of
execution.

(a) The general law referred to as a possible basis for SC-46's validity is Presidential
Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. It is my opinion that
this law is unconstitutional in that it allows service contracts, contrary to Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution

SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. The Main Opinion
emphasizes an important point, which is that SC-46 did not merely involve exploratory
activities, but also provided the rights and obligations of the parties should it be
discovered that there is oil in commercial quantities in the area.

(b)Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was not the signatory to SC-46, contrary
to the requirement set by paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2 for service contracts
involving the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 was entered into by then Department of
Energy Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr., on behalf of the government. I agree with the
Main Opinion that in cases where the Constitution or law requires the President to act
personally on the matter, the duty cannot be delegated to another public official.

La Bugal highlights the importance of the President's involvement, being one of the
constitutional safeguards against abuse and corruption, as not mere formality

(c)Public respondents also failed to show that Congress was subsequently informed of
the execution and existence of SC-46. The reporting requirement is an equally
important requisite to the validity of any service contract involving the exploration,
development, and utilization of Philippine petroleum.

4. SC-46, aside from not having complied with the 1987 Constitution, is also null
and void for being violative of environmental laws protecting Tañon Strait.

As a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234,43 Tañon Strait is

covered by the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.

Pursuant to this law, any proposed activity in Tañon Strait must undergo an
Environmental Impact Assessment:

SEC. 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are outside
the scope of the management plan for protected areas shall be subject to an
environmental impact assessment as required by law before they are adopted, and the
results thereof shall be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.

The same provision further requires that an Environmental Compliance Certificate be

secured under the Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment System before arty
project is implemented.
In projects involving the exploration or utilization of energy resources, the National
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 additionally requires that a program be
approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, which shall be
publicly accessible. The program shall also be submitted to the President, who in turn
will recommend the program to Congress. Furthermore, Congress must enact a law
specifically allowing the exploitation of energy resources found within a protected area
such as Tañon Strait

Public respondents argue that SC-46 complied with the procedural requirements of
obtaining an Environmental Compliance Certificate.48 At any rate, they assert that the
activities covered by SC-46 fell under Section 14 of the National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992, which they interpret to be an exception to Section 12.

Section 14 is not an exception to Section 12, but instead provides additional

requirements for cases involving Philippine energy resources.

ARIGO, ET.AL. V. SWIFT, ET.AL., G.R. NO. 206510, SEPTEMBER 16, 2014 (EN
BANC)

FACTS:

 The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern
Philippines) language which means "long reef exposed at low tide."
 In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of
Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11,
1988.
 In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was
recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing excellent
examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life.
 On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, otherwise
known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the
protection and conservation of the globally significant economic, biological,
sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into
perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations."
  The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US
Navy.
 In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the
Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine
ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.
 On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port
of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while
transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of
South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of
Palawan.
 The above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their
respective sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet
unborn, filed the present petition agairtst Scott H. Swift in his capacity as
Commander of the US 7th Fleet and other respondents.
 Petitioners claims that the incident violate their constitutional rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the
institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation
of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not the waiver of State Immunity is applied properly in the said
case?

RULING:

1. Locus standi is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he

has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged,
and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.”
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public
right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first
time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law.”
 We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be
written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an
issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.Such right
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to
minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows
the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in
the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the
principle that humans are stewards of nature."

2. The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign
immunity or non-suability of the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution which states:

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it
is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties.

The waiver of State immunity under Visiting Forces Agreement applies only to criminal
jurisdiction and not special civil actions such as the Writ of Kalikasan. The Court
found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is
indeed absolute. In the same vein, the Court cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of
damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067.

In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case
against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed
separately:
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance of the
writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative
actions.

It is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal

jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a
petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

MMDA v. CONCERNED CITIZENS in MANILA BAY

TOPIC: Environmental Law, Mandamus, PD1152

FACTS:

 Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government

agencies, among them the petitioners MMDA, for the cleanup, rehabilitation,
and protection of the Manila Bay.
 The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically PD 1152.
 Respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the
pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:

(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);

(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);

(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);

(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);

(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);

(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);

(8) Executive Order No. 192;

(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);

(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and

(12) International Law

 RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant-

government agencies to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.
 Petitioners MMDA, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the
cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.
 Apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds, petitioners also asserted
that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act, which can be
compelled by mandamus.
 The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in
toto. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the cleanup of

specific pollution incidents?
2. Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up and
rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

RULING:

Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate
solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the
exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA,
in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill
should be located by undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which
entail the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that
petitioners’ duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does
not require the exercise of discretion.

Issue 1:

PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to
confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. The underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water
is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding

petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot
escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the
Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.

Issue 2:

Yes, petitioners may be compelled.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of
putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterised as
discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by
law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the conclusion that
these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform
certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection,
and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to
perform these duties.

The petition is DENIED.

OH CHO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS:

 Oh Cho applied for the registration of a residential lot located in the municipality
of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.
 The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to
the lot, and on his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public
domain.
 Oh Cho and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application
for registration on January 17, 1940.
 OSG reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the lower
court, committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the
applicant.
 Oh Cho invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be
applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land
Act (C.A. No. 141).

ISSUE:

1. WON Oh Cho has the right to claim a title.

2. WON he is entitled to decree or registration of the lot, because he is alien
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain

RULING:

1st issue:

 SC ruled in the negative

 Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the
Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in
interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, under the laws, orders and decrease promulgated by the Spanish
Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under the
Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496).
  All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant belong to the public domain.
 An exception is that a land should have been in the possession of an occupant
and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession
would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest.

2nd issue:

 The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate
predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant
of such benefits.
 The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they
had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894.
 This applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do.
 The only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked
to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person
to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is
disqualified.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. CA

FACTS:

“failure to prove possession according to the manner and no. of years required by law”

 Respondent Aquilino Cariño filed a petition for registration for Lot 6 which is a
sugar land claimed to be owned by his mother of whom after she died he
became the administrator of the property in behalf of his brothers and sisters.
 By virtue of a deed of extrajudicial settlement, he became the sole owner of
the property.
 Report from the land investigator showed that the lot is agricultural in
nature.
  Respondent claims that the improvements introduced were in the form of
bamboo clumps, sugarcane and mango trees with the house of the tenant; that
the land is free from claim and conflict and is not covered by existing
public land application and no patent or title has been issued to it; that the
respondent is on continuous, open and exclusive possession of the land as
inherited from his deceased mother.
 Respondent is the sole witness for his petition and the only oppositor is the
Bureau of Lands.
 The trial court granted the petition of the respondent.
 CA affirmed the trial court's decision.
 The petitioner filed a review for certiorari contending that the respondent failed
to submit proof of his fee simple title and has not overthrown the
presumption that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the
state.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent established proof of his muniment of title to merit
registration of land in his favor?

RULING:

 The petition of the respondent is covered by the Land Registration Act

providing that a person alleging in his petition or application ownership in fee
simple must present muniments of title to substantiate his claim of
ownership, presenting evidence of his possession in the concept of an owner
in a manner and number of years required by law. The manner shall be open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property known as
agricultural land of the public domain for 30 years preceding the filing of
application for confirmation (Commonwealth Act No. 141).
 Possession of public land however long never confers title upon the possessor
unless occupant of the same is under claim of ownership for the required period.
  Even in the absence of opposition the court can deny registration of land under
the Torrens System on ground that an applicant failed to establish his
ownership by a fee simple on the property sought to be registered.
 The respondent only traced his own possession in the land in 1949 by virtue of
extrajudicial settlement and order and at the same time he filed his
application for registration in 1975 thus he was in possession of said land only
for 26 years.
 His mere allegation that his mother was in possession of the land since 1911 is
self serving and hearsay and is inadmissible as evidence.
 The tax receipts and tax declaration he offered as evidence do not substantiate
clear proof of ownership. Thus, with his failure to prove that his predecessor-in-
interest occupied the land under the condition laid down by law, he can only
establish his possession of the land from 1949.
 Respondent failed to prove his muniment of title for the registration of the land
under the Registration Act with failure to present convincing and positive proof of
his continuous, open, uninterrupted and notorious occupation of lot 6 in the
concept of an owner for at least 30 years.

LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOC., INC. v. RAMOS

FACTS:

 The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) is an exception to the rule that
participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos.
Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
 RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the
effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation
organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in
South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
  On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative
Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
 Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA
between the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground
that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore
and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII
Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
 In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration
company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is
owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an
Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in
Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is
still pending before the Court of Appeals.
 EO 279, issued by former President Cory Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes
the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither
technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR)
Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.
 WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty
between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of
Australian investments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-
owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service
contract that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral
resources.

RULING:
First Issue:

 RA 7942 is Unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations

to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
 Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine
which states that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that,
―the exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State.
 Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973
Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for
the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources.
 By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through
license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987
Constitution.
 Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity
investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within
a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire
over the country‘s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to
exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.
 The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or
other forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter.
 The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial
assistance. The management and the operation of the mining activities by
foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the
evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
 The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an
exception to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is
reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed
strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
  Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service
contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and technical
agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions
actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial
ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
 The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign
contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a
service contract.
 By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the
mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the
nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing
but bare title thereto.
 The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention
of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for
corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and
utilization of Philippine natural resources.
 When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a
belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are
unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected,
must fail with them.
 Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are
limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large
scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils.

Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract

The FTAA between the WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise
unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.

Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive
right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that
may be produced from the contract area.
 Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that WMCP shall provide all financing,
technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.

These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant
WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the
State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are
abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental
law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from
which they spring must be struck down.

REPUBLIC v DE LA PAZ

FACTS:

 Respondents Dela Paz filed an application to register a parcel of land covering

almost 25,800 square kilometres situated in Taguig, under Presidential Decree
No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
 Together with the application, they also submitted their:
(1) Special power of attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela
Paz to file the application;
(2) Conversion Consolidated plan of subject land with the annotation that it was
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development
(3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084;
(4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate;
(5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466;
(6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987;
(7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay
dated March 10, 1979;
(8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any land patent or any
public land appilcation; and
(9) Certification by the Office of the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila, that the tax on the real property for the year 2003 has been paid.
  They alleged that they came into the possession of the land thru their parents
(Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob and Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng
mga Pag-aari ng Namatay) who have been continuous, uninterrupted, open,
public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner since 1987.
 The Republic (Petitioner) opposed the application on the ground that they have
not been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the
same, in the concept of owner.
(1) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land
in question for a period of not less than thirty (30) years;
(2) that the muniments of title, and/or the tax declarations and tax payments
receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the
land applied for; and
(3) that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging
to the Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic,
there was no other oppositor to the application.
 RTC ruled in favour of the Respondents.
 The Republic interposed an Appeal to the CA, but it was also denied, the court
reasoning that Respondents have established their right to the parcel of
land.
 Petitioner then appeals to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the continuous, uninterrupted, open, public and adverse possession
was sufficiently established by evidence.

2. Whether the land is part of the alienable part of public domain.

RULING:

1. No. It has not been sufficiently established.

Civil Law: Land Registration
1st Issue:
Respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bonafide claim of ownership
from June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right
to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the

lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.

The reliance on the Conversion Consolidated plan of subject land with the annotation
is misplaced. The SC cited a case which stated that such insufficient and does not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains
part of the inalienable public domain.

an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government,

such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative
action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative
act or statute.

The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands
applied for are alienable and disposable. Another issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. must present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
Respondents have not presented tangible proof to establish this kind of
possession. At best, they have only given a tax declaration on 1949, but this is merely
indicia of ownership.

testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot.
However, their testimonies failed to establish respondents’ predecessors-in-interest'
possession and occupation of subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

no clear evidence was presented to show Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership

and that he had been in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the period
of possession required by law. It is a rule that general statements that are mere
conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice

REPUBLIC v CA L-43938

FACTS:

 Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria,
Benjamin and Eduardo applied for the registration of a parcel of land.
 According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-
9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in
1964.
 The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as
to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of
Lots 6-9 on the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it by the
successors-in-interest of James Kelly. Been in actual, continuous and exclusive
possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of
adits (entrance to an underground mine), its affidavits of annual
assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side
cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.
 The Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry
Development also opposed as to lots 1-9.
 Both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by
virtue of prescription. Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father
shortly after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was
possessed by her parents under claim of ownership. Alberto said he
received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto. She was
corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier
possession of the land by Alberto's father. Balbalio presented her tax
declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, Alberto his
tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964.
 Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the
Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on
December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining
recorder of Baguio.
 These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by
Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such
as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon.
 The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that
the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by
reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of
1935 and 1973.
 Trial Court: The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had
failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be
registered.
 CA: Reversed the trial court. Affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over
the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and
Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Basis of CA Ruling: The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is “no
conflict of interest” between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of
the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that
the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything
underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.
  Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and
agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also
difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.

Issue:

Whether respondent court’s decision, i.e. “the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the
land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by
virtue of their mining claim,” is correct.

Ruling:

 No.
 Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in
question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired
before the 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of
its adoption.
 The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents
by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
 The use of the land could not be shared simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
 It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already
vested in Benguet and Atok at that time.
 Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth
Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those
agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights.
 The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and
under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain.
 By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even
the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land
or the obtention of a patent over it.
 As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to
transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
 The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself
cannot be half agricultural and half mineral.
 The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely
mineral or completely agricultural.
 In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified
as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral —
once the mining claims were perfected.
 As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it
did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it
was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully
occupying the surface.
 This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is
intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply
reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private
land devoted to “agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any
purpose other than mining.”
 Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are
discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or
utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such
minerals belong.
 The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights
over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes
simultaneously.
 The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land,
whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be
discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the
exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
 The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private
party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will
impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein.
  For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just
compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation
proceedings.

REPUBLIC v LEE

Facts:

 Maria Lee filed before the CFI of Pangasinan, an application for registration in
her favor of a parcel of land.
 The Director of Lands, in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, filed
an opposition, alleging that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest
have acquired the land under any of the Spanish titles or any other recognized
mode for the acquisition of title; that neither have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land in concept of owner at least thirty
(30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is
a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines
 CFI in favor of Lee
 CA affirmed CFI decision
 Lee contends that she was able to prove her title to the land in question through
documentary evidence consisting of Deeds of Sale and tax declarations and
receipts as well as her testimony

ISSUE:

WON Lee is able to provide sufficient and substantial evidence as complying with the
requirement of law for confirmation of her ownership of the land in dispute?

Ruling:

SC in favor of the Republic.

It is held that it is incumbent upon the respondent to prove that her predecessor-in-
interest is the persons of Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan have been in adverse,
continuous, open, public, peaceful possession in the concept of an owner for 20 years
which she failed to provide a clear and convincing evidence to prove. Her bare
allegations do not constitute substantial proof. Respondent failed to comply with the
requirements of the law to confirm her title on the land applied for registration. Lower
court decision was set aside.

The bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in
possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in private respondent's
declaration is hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this
nature.

Underlying Principle: All lands not acquired from the government belong to the state as
part of public domain.

Equally basic is the rule that no public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from government. A

SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES V. YAP

FACTS:

FIRST CASE:

 Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the

National Reservation Survey of Boracay Island, which identified several lots
as being occupied or claimed by named persons.
 President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring
Boracay Island as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos
later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982,
to implement Proclamation No. 18018.
 Precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes
 Because of this, it raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
 notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial.
 Respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief.
 The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
 RTC - rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants.
- Respondents-claimants have a right to have their occupied lands titled in their
name.
- Neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands
in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.
- Cited also Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for
acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those
forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.
 CA - held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration
that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest
reserve.
 OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.

SECOND CASE:

 During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred
(400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land
(alienable and disposable).
 Petitioners-claimants filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 106426 It infringed on
their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. In continued possession of
their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also
invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building
internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. No need for a
proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. The island is
 deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926, known as the first Public Land Act.
 The OSG opposed and argued that they do not have a vested right over their
occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest
land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, it is
inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable
lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the
lots for disposition.

ISSUE:

 Whether Proclamation No. 18018 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal
obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to
their occupied lands in Boracay Island.
 Whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and
petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay.

RULING:

 Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

 The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
 The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application
is alienable or disposable. (incontrovertible evidence)
-A positive act of the government declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required.
-A certification from the government that have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.
 In this case, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The the Court
cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006.
 If the SC accepted the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines,
except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and
disposable lands.
 Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not
create a presumption that the land is alienable. It is a plain error.
 The term "public land" in Act 926 referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands.
 Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
 Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
 Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 (or PTA Circular
No. 3-82) as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
proclamation or circular did not convert Boracay into an agricultural
land. Nothing in the law is prescribed (not a positive act) If Pres. Marcos
intended to classify such land, he would have identified specific limits of
each as Pres. Arroyo did in Proc. No. 1064. 64 other islands was also
covered by said Proc. No. 1801. That could not have been, and is clearly
beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
 It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of
Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Merely
exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain.
Not unconstitutional and does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law.
 Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar
the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still
remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
 CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had never
been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no
prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law.
 Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over
the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141 namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide
claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
 Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail
because of the absence of the second element of alienable and
disposable land. (Also, these 3 laws did not convert portions of Boracay
Island intoa and Agricultural land)
 Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands
which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove
the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945. The continued
possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay.
 Tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to
prove the first element of possession.
In Re: Application For Land Registration, Suprema T. Dumo, Petitioner, V. Republic Of
The Philippines, Respondent

FACTS:

The Heirs of Espinas filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession

and Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the Heirs of
Trinidad. They alleged that the they are the heirs of Marcelino Espinas and the Subject
Property was purchased by Espinas from Carlos Calica through a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 19 October 1943. That it had exercised acts of dominion & had also been
paying realty taxes.

Meanwhile, the heirs of Trinidad alleged that the land belonged to her mother,
who purchased the lots from Florencio Mabalay in August 1951. Mabalay was Dumo’s
maternal grandfather and purchased the properties from Carlos Calica. Additionally,
Dumo, one of the heirs of Trinidad, filed an application for registration of two parcels of
land, and further alleged that through a Deed of Partition with Absolute Sale dated 6
February 1987, she acquired the subject lots from her siblings.

The heirs of Espinas opposed Dumo’s application for land registration on the
ground that the properties sought to be registered by Dumo are involved in the accion
reivindicatoria case.

Ruling of the RTC: The Regional Trial Court rendered its Joint Decision, finding that the
Subject Property was owned by the heirs of Espinas. The RTC ordered the dismissal of
Dumo’s land registration application on the ground of lack of registerable title, and
ordered Dumo to restore ownership and possession of the lots to the heirs of Espinas.

Ruling of the CA: The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s decision dismissing the
application for land registration of Dumo, and finding that she failed to demonstrate that
she and her predecessors-in interest possessed the property in the manner required by
law to merit the grant of her application for land registration. However, it modified the
decision of the RTC insofar as it found that the Subject Property still belonged to the
public domain, and the heirs of Espinas were not able to establish their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a
bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, it was erroneous for the
RTC to declare the heirs of Espinas as the owners of the Subject Property.

ISSUE/S:

(1) Whether or not the questioned lot is part of the alienable and disposable land of
public domain, and the determination of this is essential for land registration?

(2) Whether or not Dumo has the right to register the land because she and her
predecessors-in-interest have already acquired the land through prescription.

(3) Whether or not Dumo and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a
bonafide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

Ruling of the SC:

In the first issue, the Supreme Court held that Dumo failed to submit any of the
documents required to prove that the land she seeks to register is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. There are two (2) documents which must be
presented: first, a copy of the original classification approved by the Secretary of the
DENR and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records, and
second, a certificate of land classification status issued by the CENRO or the PENRO
based on the land classification approved by the DENR Secretary. In an application for
land registration, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
State owns the land applied for, and proving that the land has already been classified as
alienable and disposable. To overcome the presumption that the land belongs to the
State, the applicant must prove by clear and incontrovertible evidence at the time of
application that the land has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
The second issue, the Supreme Court reiterated that acquisitive prescription only
applies to private lands as expressly provided in Article 1113 of the Civil Code. To
register land acquired by prescription under PD No. 1529 (in relation to the Civil Code of
the Philippines), the applicant must prove that the land is not merely alienable and
disposable, but that it has also been converted into patrimonial property of the State.
Prescription will start to run only from the time the land has become patrimonial.

In the last issue, the Supreme Court relied on the Court of Appeals findings that Dumo
and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land only from 1948,
which is the earliest date of the tax declaration presented by Dumo. This fact is
expressly admitted by Dumo. Thus, from this admission alone, it is clear that she failed
to prove her and her predecessors-in-interest’s possession and occupation of the land
for the duration required by law — from 12 June 1945 or earlier.

Laguna Lake Development Authrity v CA

Facts:

*Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This
Government Agency is supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared
policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly named, within
the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic
development.

*Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain
sections of Republic Act No. 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of
Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined
with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply,
irrigation, fisheries, and the like.

*the land and waters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring
judicious management to their optimal utilization to insure renewability and to preserve
the ecological balance, the competing options for the use of such resources and
conflicting jurisdictions over such uses having created undue constraints on the
institutional capabilities of the Authority in the light of the limited powers vested in it by
its charter, Executive Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and
powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region".

*It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface
water for any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

*RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake
region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters.

Issue:

*Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region?

Ruling:

*The SC ruled that LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the
LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a
special law, while the latter is a general law.

*the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local
Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for
revenue purposes. (limited to)

Tano v. Socrates

Facts:

 *On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted
an ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto
Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998.
  Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of
Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing,
buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
 Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the
court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the
ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their
livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation
of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

RULING:

 No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that
the challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the
Constitution and applicable laws.
 There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims
primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on
the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth.
 The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use
of marine resources is not at all absolute.
 In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state
and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,
their “exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
 In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the
enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of
mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively
carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.
 In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC
and the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the
exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be
doubted.