CONFLICT RESOLUTION Individual Assignment
CONFLICT RESOLUTION Individual Assignment
CONFLICT RESOLUTION Individual Assignment
STUDIES
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE (HONOURS) PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES
STUDENT NAME: MWASHITA CAXTON STUDENT NO: L0202850N
TOPIC: NEGOTIATION
As negotiation is a process which every party when coming to the table of discussion has certain
objectives in mind which are aimed to be achieved at the end of the process and to achieve them
needs certain strategies to be employed in the process of negotiation for the mission to be a
success and these options of strategies puts the negotiator in a dilemma.
Negotiator’s dilemma, according to Lax et Sebenius, (1986) is the inherent tension between
using cooperative and competitive tactics in negotiation. A choice the negotiator must make
between following competitive strategy or cooperative strategy when engaging another partner
who have two dimensions which are value creating and value claiming or adversarial behaviors.
The value creating behaviors are those used by negotiators to come to a cooperative, win-win
situation and they possess the following characteristics and behaviors, cooperative, open and
honest, seek and find common ground, don’t criticize, share information freely and they look for
numerous options for both parties without compromise.
The adversarial or value claiming approach typically involves misleading the other party about
ones’ concerns and minimal requirements, exaggerating diverging positions, concealing,
exercising threat of sanctions and defecting. Lax et Sebenius, (1986) view the adversarial aim as
to win at negotiating, and thus make the other lose where one must start high and concede
slowly, and exaggerate the value of concessions minimizing the benefits of the other’s
concessions, concealing information, argue forcefully on behalf of the principles that imply
favorable settlements, make commitments to accept only highly favorable agreements and be
willing to outwait the other fellow.
Putnam, (1994) in his productive conflict negotiation journal is of the notion that negotiators face
a tactical dilemma at each stage of the negotiating process in the adoption of the most adapted
strategy as they are interdependent and the result of the disputed resources for one party depends
on the moves of the other party. He also adds that resorting in isolation to a cooperative tactic put
the negotiator at risk of being exploited by the other party. If one negotiator impulses a
cooperative strategy, he immediately places himself in a vulnerable position and risks losing the
greatest share of the disputed outcomes and if the other party, acting rationally decides on his
part to claim the largest value.
Negotiators can ignore or try to minimize this tension by resorting to problem solving tactics, yet
they cannot completely escape the dilemma. Every negotiation is characterized by elements of
cooperation and competition: for instance, once the pie has been enlarged, the question of the
division of the gains remains, and still presents a potential for disputes.
Thompson and Hastie (1990) are of the opinion that the dilemma of the negotiator has different
scenarios which keeps the negotiator unsettled about the decision he is to take. He posits that if
both parties choose to create value that is they compete, they both receive a superior mutual
outcome both parties are likely to come up with a good outcome. On the other hand, if both
parties decide to jointly claim value, that is they all cooperate, they end up with the less desirable
outcome which will be a mediocre value for both parties.
In addition to the dilemma, the negotiators can deny the dilemma when their attitude is
exemplified by the win-win philosophy that produces the mutual gains or principled negotiation
scenario (Wilson 1992). He also assets that the assumption of a complete elimination of hostility
between the partners is highly questionable if taken literally, the win-win negotiation appears
elusive and inapplicable.
Cutcher-Gershenfeld, (1994) argue that the dilemma can be overcome when the partners try to
change the rules of the game by resorting to the assistance of a mediator who will usher in the
ways which are suitable for negotiation without any stress to the negotiator himself while Wilson
(1992) seconded the notion and stressed that the negotiators are encouraged to explore the
reconciliation of their respective interests rather than engage in a contest over fixed positions
thereby overcoming the dilemma I negotiation.
Rather than presenting a single package or negotiating the issues one by one, the manager might
put together three packages, such as the following, and ask the candidate to choose among them
where he offered package ‘A’ with $100,000, one remote workday per week and three-year
contract. The second package “B’ $95,000, one remote workday per week and two-year contract
and package ‘C” $90,000, two remote workdays per week and one-year contract
The manager values each package equally and if the candidate chose any one of them without
negotiating further he would be very pleased. Moreover, all three offers are fairly aggressive on
the issue of commuting, the manager’s main concern however, is package C which gives the
candidate room to try to negotiate for three remote workdays per week in exchange for a lower
salary.
Suppose the candidate responds to the three offers by saying he likes Package B best but that the
salary is too low. This choice makes it clear that he is flexible on remote workdays and contract
duration, and more concerned about salary. The parties can then bargain further on salary and are
more likely to reach a mutually beneficial agreement than if they negotiated a single offer.
(Leonardelli, Gu, McRuer, Medvec, and Galinsky 2019).
In wrapping up the dilemmas faced by negotiators, Heider (1958) documented that two people
can be connected by a third party, who strengthens or disturbs the relationship among the two
when the negotiation is not bound by trust in practice. This also adds to Carnevale & Isen (1986)
notion that negotiators may sometimes behave less cooperatively when they have visual access
to one another than when they do not thus overcoming the dilemma.
Conclusion
Negotiators play interactive roles between rival parties in contending to a desired outcome either
for the good of one or for all. In this enormous interface, Tactics to employ and the consequences
of those tactics in achieving the desired goals remains a dilemma to the negotiator hence the need
to pacify each party in the negotiation process in order to reach a consensus.
References
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