Small Wars & Insurgencies

ISSN: 0959-2318 (Print) 1743-9558 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fswi20

The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

(1996–2001): ‘War-Making and State-Making’ as an
Insurgency Strategy

S. Yaqub Ibrahimi

To cite this article: S. Yaqub Ibrahimi (2017) The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
(1996–2001): ‘War-Making and State-Making’ as an Insurgency Strategy, Small Wars &
Insurgencies, 28:6, 947-972, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2017.1374598

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2017.1374598

Published online: 30 Oct 2017.

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 Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2017
VOL. 28, NO. 6, 947–972
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2017.1374598

The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

(1996–2001): ‘War-Making and State-Making’ as an
Insurgency Strategy
S. Yaqub Ibrahimi
Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada
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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the institutional and functional aspects of the Taliban’s Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). The Taliban’s coercive approach and its entire reliance
on “war-making” to “state-making” shows the difficulty of the transformation of
an insurgent group into a state structure. The Taliban was primarily capable of
establishing a two-track system of governance. However, the assessment of the
IEA’s institutional and functional capabilities shows that the military–political
organization formed by the Taliban lacked statehood in all three areas of legitimacy,
authority and capacity.

ARTICLE HISTORY  Received 26 September 2016; Accepted 17 August 2017

KEYWORDS  Insurgency; civil war; Taliban; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan; war-making; state-making;
Afghanistan

Introduction
The Taliban first emerged as an insurgent group in the midst of the Afghan civil
war in 1994, it transformed into a state structure called the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan (IEA) in 1996, and returned to insurgency in 2001. The existing lit-
erature mainly examines the Taliban as an insurgent and militant Islamist group
and focuses on its changing strategies in Afghanistan.1 Yet, the IEA the Taliban
formed in 1996 is rarely researched as a state structure. This paper focuses on
the IEA and examines its institutional and functional aspects through the state
studies lens.
Following the capturing of Kabul in September 1996, the Taliban formed a
two-track governance system, a political-military leadership council called the
Supreme Council in Kandahar and an executive bureau called the Council of

CONTACT  S. Yaqub Ibrahimi  sy.ibrahimi@carleton.com

© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
 948   S. Y. IBRAHIMI

Ministers in Kabul. The Supreme Council represented the Taliban as an insurgent

group, while the Council of Ministers reflected the group’s efforts to transform
into a state structure. This paper addresses two interconnected questions: what
did the IEA look like and how did it function? Further, considering the IEA’s entire
reliance on military means of the state formation, this paper asks why the Taliban
decided to rely basically on ‘war making’ as a ‘state making’ strategy? Was it a
choice or a default situation?
This paper argues that the IEA’s entire reliance on the violent means of
state-making was a default situation produced by the civil war and linked to
the nature of the Taliban as an insurgent group.2 Drawing on theories of the
formation of the state, I investigate the institutional aspect of the IEA by focus-
ing on its formation, structure, personality, and the territory, and measure its
functional aspect by three variables, namely, legitimacy, authority, and capacity.3
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While capable of capturing territory, the IEA entirely failed in producing regu-
lar governance and a state system. It fell short in all aspects of stateness. The
IEA lacked both internal and external legitimacy, had poor authority, and was
incapable of producing basic services.
The theoretical arguments of this paper are supported by original data
belonging to the IEA and its internal rival, the Northern Alliance (NA), also
known as the National United Front, which led the Islamic State of Afghanistan
(ISA) in the 1990s. Data are collected from the IEA and NA’s official publications
and legislations archived in Afghanistan Information Center based in Kabul
University. The empirical finding of this paper shows that while suffering from
a severe institutional fragility, the IEA was, functionally, a war-based entity – it
was basically a ‘war-making’ structure. But despite its specialty at war, the IEA
was incapable of eliminating its internal rival, militarily. Thus, while the IEA was
successful in ‘war-making’ internally, it was incapable of ‘state making’ at its very
minimum stage. Therefore, the IEA was incapable of successfully claiming its
status as ‘the sole source of the right to use violence’ in Afghanistan, and lacked
the capability to protect its clients and acquire the necessary means of govern-
ance.4 The IEA’s institutional fragility and its functional shortage were the results
of its entire concentration and investment on war, the insurgent characteristic
of its structure, and lack of resources.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the following part, I the-
orize the state. Next, I examine the formation of the IEA and its institutional
characteristics. This part explains what the IEA looked like. The subsequent three
parts investigate the functional aspects of the IEA by examining its legitimacy,
authority, and capacity. In conclusion, I discuss the contribution of this paper.

Theorizing the state

By the state, this article refers to sovereign state which is ‘the assumption that
the government of a state is internally supreme and externally independent’. The
 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES   949

state consists of two specific aspects, an institutional aspect, and a functional

one.5 The institutional aspect of the state includes the state’s institutions, per-
sonality, hierarchy, and the structure through which the state functions. Thus,
the institutional aspect of the state is basically about what a state looks like.6
The functional aspect of the state includes the legitimate provision of the public
goods of security, services, and justice in return for taxation.7 The state, then,
can be defined as a territorially specific entity that functions through various
hierarchies and institutions to fulfill its fundamental duties. Those duties include
maintaining effective and legitimate institutions of government; preserving the
monopoly over the use of violence within a given territory, providing security
and basic services to the citizens in return of taxation.8 The state’s institutional
aspect, then, can be examined by than assessment of its structure, institutions,
and hierarchies, and its functional capabilities can be measured by three varia-
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bles, namely, legitimacy, authority, and capacity.9

Weber (1919) defines the state as a form of human community that lay claim
to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory.10
All other organizations, within a state, can use violence only insofar as the State
permits them to do so.11 Therefore, the state is the sole source of the right to use
violence in a given territory.12 However, in order to prevent social disorder and
anti-state uprisings, the use of violence by the state has to be legitimate and
people should obey it primarily by consent, rather than coercion. Therefore, a
durable state requires what Weber calls it a ‘legitimate authority’. He identifies
three major sources of a ‘legitimate authority’, namely, traditional, charismatic
and rational-legal.13 The traditional rule is based on customs and traditions and
is exercised by patriarchs and patrimonial rulers.14 The charismatic rule is based
on the charisma of a leader and is exercised by individuals such as prophets, the
elected warlords, the ‘great demagogues’ and party leaders.15 And the rational-
legal authority is based on impersonal rational rules, or ‘a person’s willingness
to carry out statutory duties obediently.’16 This type of authority is practiced
by the validity of legal status and practical competence. Weber describes this
authority as the main characteristic of modern states.17
Likewise, Tilly (1985) describes the state as a relatively centralized, differen-
tiated organization the officials of which claim control over the chiefly concen-
trated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous
territory.18 Accordingly, Tilly’s conception of the state is similar to Weber’s polit-
ical organization that lay claim to the monopoly of physical violence within a
particular territory.19 However, Tilly goes further and elaborates different ele-
ments of the state more concretely. The state, according to Tilly, carries out
four major duties: ‘war making’ or the elimination of the state’s external ene-
mies; ‘state making’ or the elimination of the state’s internal rivals; protection
or the elimination/neutralization of the enemies of its clients; and extraction
or ‘acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities’.20 War-making
yields armies, navies, and supporting services. State-making produces durable
 950   S. Y. IBRAHIMI

instruments of surveillance and control within the territory. Protection relies on

the organization of war-making and state-making and functions through spe-
cific state institutions such as courts and parliaments. Extraction brings fiscal and
accounting structures into being.21 Yet, the state’s all four duties depend on the
state’s tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of coercion. Therefore,
the main purpose of those who monopolize the means of violence is primarily
the elimination of their internal rivals which strengthens their ability to extract
resources and protect their supporters.22 Accordingly, Tilly’s theorization of the
state includes two specific pillars: first, the concentration and the particular
combination of capital and coercion within the state. Second, the interplay of
war-making states on the international stage.23
Finally, Mann (1984) organizes the main features of the state into two cat-
egories, an institutional category which includes a number of elements that
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define what a state looks like, and a functional category that describes what a
state does.24 The institutional aspect of the state includes the state’s institutions,
personality, and a defined territory, while its functional aspect includes activities
that a state is assigned to fulfill.25 Mann (1984) characterizes three ideological,
military and economic bases for the state that determine its function.26 The
ideology deals, basically, with the legitimacy, the military is about authority, and
economy relates to the capacity of the state. These three measures determine
whether a political entity enjoys statehood or not.
Considering Weber and Tilly’s conceptualization of the state and Mann’s cat-
egorization of the institutional and functional aspects of this political organi-
zation, I examine, first the institutional charactristics of the IEA and next focus
on its functional aspect by measuring its legitimacy, authority and capacity.27
In this conception, legitimacy refers to the extent to which a state enjoys pop-
ular support domestically and acceptance internationally.28 Legitimacy, in this
sense, refers to both internal and external legitimacy. Authority refers to a state’s
capability in exercising a monopoly over the use of legitimate violence within
in its territory.29 Authority, in this sense, refers to the state’s security/military
institutions and its capability of providing security within its sovereign borders,
enacting legislation over a population, and providing a secure environment to
its citizens.30 Finally, capacity includes the human and financial resources that
a state has at its disposal.31 Capacity, in this sense, refers to the availability of
vital resources, the state’s economic size and the state capability of acquiring
necessary means of governance and provision of basic services.

IEA’s formation and its institutional feature

The Taliban emerged, primarily, as an insurgent group in the midst of
Afghanistan’s civil war, in 1994 in the southern province of Kandahar. The emer-
gence of the Taliban, like all other warring groups in Afghanistan, had both
internal and external causes. Internally, the group was the product of a civil
 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES   951

war in which ex-mujahidin and rebel groups fought one. Following the defeat
of Najibullah’s government in April 1992, the central authority in Afghanistan
was extremely disintegrated, the society was turned into the anarchical state
of ‘war of all against all’ and no authority was capable of carrying out its end of
‘the social contract’. The anarchic environment had produced a political vacuum
within the country and a lack of central governance which a group such as the
Taliban was emerged to fill.
Externally, the Taliban’s formation was the product of the regional politics,
particularly Pakistan’s regional ambitions. Evidence shows Pakistan’s ISI field
officers, Pakistani Frontier Corps, and regular Pakistani armed forces personnel
were directly involved in supporting the Taliban.32 Pakistan’s main purpose of
sponsoring the Taliban was to create a regime in Kabul which would be favorable
to Islamabad and to open an economic bloc extending as far as Central Asia.33
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Having a favorable regime in Kabul would give Pakistan strategic depth and
the opening of a trade route would bolster Pakistan’s hard-pressed economy
and give the country greater strategic weight in its confrontation with India.34
However, the IEA’s officials never admitted, publicly, the direct military sup-
port of Pakistan. Rather, in the IEA’s official statements, Pakistan was stated as
a ‘good’ ally and important supporter with an ‘an unbreakable and deep histor-
ical, cultural, religious and economic, unbreakable.’35 A Sharia issue in March
1998, responding to the NA’s leaders’ accusation of Pakistan’s involvement in
Afghanistan stated:
Pakistan was considered as an important supporter of the mujahidin during jihad
[the anti-Soviet war of the 1980s] and sheltered millions of [Afghan] refugees in
its territory and still welcome them. The Muslim nation of Afghanistan certainly
values Pakistan’s brotherly approach and is highly satisfied of it.36
Despite the Taliban’s official denial of Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan
during the IEA’s rule, almost all publicly accessible international documents and
reliable scholarly work confirm creation, funding, and mobilization of the Taliban
by Pakistan. Pakistan was not the only country whose nationals joined and sup-
ported militarily the Taliban. Thousands of Arab, African, East Asian and Central
Asian jihadis fought for the Taliban.37 Most of those fighters were organized,
equipped and trained by al-Qaeda. Integration of the 055 Brigade of al-Qaeda
which included around 2000 trained soldiers, into the Taliban force is a concrete
example of the Taliban’s reliance on foreign fighters, particularly al-Qaeda.38
Historically, the Taliban first emerged as a group of 30 madrassa students in a
reaction to a local warlord who had abducted and repeatedly raped two teenage
girls. In March 1994, the 30 Talibs/Taliban attacked the warlord’s camp, freed
the girls and hanged the commander from the barrel of a tank.39 Following the
‘heroic’ event, the Taliban crossed the border into Pakistan where the number of
the group increased to 200 in few months. Mobilized under Mullah Mohammad
Omar’s command, these Talibs crossed the border into Afghanistan and took
the control of Spinbuldak district of Kandahar province from Hekmatyar’s men
 952   S. Y. IBRAHIMI

in October 1994.40 Only, in next three months, the group took control of 12 of
Afghanistan’s 31 provinces.
Following this victory, the Taliban organized a gathering of some 1200 Islamic
clerics in Kandahar from 20 March to 4 April 1996. The Taliban’s leader, Mullah
Mohammad Omer, was entitled in this gathering as the Amir al-Momenin, the
Commander of the Faithful.41 According to Islamic tradition, Amir-al-Momenin is
a political leader who has a religiously legitimate authority over people living in
a territory controlled by his followers. Obeying Amir-al-Momenin is fardh (God’s
demand and must be practiced). Therefore, anyone who refused bayat (oath of
allegiance) to Amir-al-Momenin ‘would be called a rebel according to sharia. It
would be a fardh to execute him/her’.42 In addition to entitling Mullah Omer as
Amir-al-Momenin, some sources claim that the gathering renamed Afghanistan
‘the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ (IEA).43 However, a review of the Taliban’s
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official publications shows the term IEA was first used on 29 October 1997, a
year after the Taliban captured Kabul. According to the Sharia, the renaming of
Afghanistan was ordered by Mullah Omer on 13 October 1997. However, it is
not explained why the IEA’s public announcement took more than two weeks:
In accordance with His Excellency Amir al-Momenin’s guidance of October 13, 1997,
from this time on the Islamic State of Afghanistan will be named as the Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan. All organizations and governmental institutions and the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s citizens should do all their efforts to spread this
message.44
Before the announcement, the Sharia constantly called the regime of the Taliban
‘the Islamic State of Afghanistan.’45 The new title, Emirate, was justified by state-
ments attributed to Islamic clerics:
The famous Alim and the principle of Rahat Abad Madrasa, Mawlana Rahat Gul,
welcomed His Excellency Amir al-Momenin’s substitution of the Islamic State of
Afghanistan with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. He characterized the Islamic
Emirate as the continuation of Islamic Caliphate. He said that the term ‘state’ can
be used both for Islamic and non-Islamic governments. But the term Emirate is
specifically assigned to Islamic governments. According to him, the current gov-
ernment of Afghanistan is not a state, but an Emirate …46
After capturing Kabul, the Taliban produced a two-track government, a leader-
ship council (the Supreme Council) based in Kandahar and a Council of Ministers
(the Kabul Council) based in Kabul. Mullah Omer himself acted as the head of
the state.47 The Supreme Council had six members and directly led by Mullah
Omer, and the Council of Ministers worked under the direct supervision of the
Supreme Council. The Supreme Council had two subsidiary branches, an Ulema
Shura or the Council of Clerics and a Military Council that consulted, respectively,
the country’s religious and military affairs and worked directly under Mullah
Omer’s command.
Besides the Supreme Council’s political and moral supremacy, all ‘administra-
tive’ and ‘executive’ affairs were legally assigned to the Council of Ministers led by
an individual called Rayees al-Wazara, the Chairman of the Council of Minister.48
 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES   953

The rights and duties of the council were specified in a law entitled the Council
of Ministers’ Act which was published in the Official Gazette on 2 May 2001.
According to this act, the Council of the Ministers of the IEA was described as ‘the
highest executive and administrative bureau of the government’.49 According to
this act, the Council of Ministers was responsible for enforcing Sharia, lead the
IEA’s internal and foreign policies, and manage and lead the country’s defen-
sive affairs and its army. It was also considered responsible for organizing the
country’s social, economic, cultural, and administrative affairs in Kabul and the
provinces.50 If the Council of Ministers was given all authorities and respon-
sibilities described in the Council of Ministers Act, then the Supreme Council
would turn into a ceremonial body. Nonetheless, empirical evidence shows that
the Supreme Council never stopped intervening in all major and minor affairs
of the country from war-making to decision-making to issuing orders on all
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internal and external affairs.51 Therefore, although assigning the executive and
administrative affairs of the IEA to a Council of Ministers, legally, the Supreme
Council with an Amir al-Momenin at its head remained as the most influential
and decisive body of the IEA, in practice.

The functional aspects of the IEA

While the previous section examined the IEA’s institutional formation, this
section evaluates how those institutions functioned. As discussed in previous
parts, the state is a territorially specific entity that functions through various
institutions, hierarchy, and procedures. These functions include preserving the
monopoly over the legitimate use of violence within a given territory, provid-
ing protection to its clients, maintaining effective and legitimate institutions
of governance that meet basic welfare needs of the citizens and acquiring the
necessary means to fulfill these fundamental duties.52 The degree of the state’s
capability for meeting those functional requirements depends on nature of the
governance and the state’s capability to rule the country, control its borders,
and provide its citizens with security, justice, and services. Therefore, the state’s
functional capability is measured by legitimacy, authority, and capacity.53

Legitimacy
Poor internal and lack of external legitimacy was the main characteristic of the
IEA. Internally, the IEA lacked a broad-based popular support and externally
it was an unrecognized political organization in the international community.
Internally, considering Weber’s articulation of the three basic sources of legit-
imacy, i.e. traditional, charismatic and rational-legal, the IEA relied on traditional
sources of legitimacy and enforced them by coercion.54 The IEA legitimated
its authority, in particular, on the basis of Islam. Although the IEA’s behavior
was also based on the tradition of authority in Afghanistan according to which
 954   S. Y. IBRAHIMI

Pashtuns dominantly ruled the country, Islam was the main source of legitimacy.
The religious source of the Taliban’s rule was emphasized in official statements
and documents. For example, Sharia’s first issue begins with:
‘The Islamic Movement of the Taliban is a revolutionary and religious movement …
One can only expect from the Islamic Movement of the Taliban which is sprouted
of the Islamic madrasas … the creation of a Sharia-based Islamic regime.’55
Following the capturing of Kabul in September 1996, a Sharia editorial
emphasizes:
Our platform is an Islamic one. We will follow this platform step by step. Every
member of our Islamic movement is obliged to follow this platform … From its
outset, our Islamic movement has promised to the Mujahid nation of Afghanistan
of establishing an Islamic regime, enforcing Sharia …56
Another issue of Sharia describes the IEA as a legitimate state on the basis of a
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number of religious reasons:

The Taliban’s uprising is supported by a large number of Islamic scholars, the IEA
enforces Sharia completely … and the majority of the IEA’s leadership and officials
are Sunni individuals and clerics.57
The Taliban leadership emphasized that the IEA would enforce Sharia in
Afghanistan by any means possible. As Mawlawi Wakil Ahmad Motawakkil, then
the spokesman of the IEA, stated once that ‘for enforcing Islamic principles, the
IEA will not have any tolerance’.58
The IEA used Islam as a restrictive political source of legitimation to forbid
any political activity opposed to the Taliban. The regime propagated that, with
a pure Islamic regime in place, there is no need for any alternative political
mechanisms such as a modern party or traditional tribal system.59 In an official
statement published on the Sharia, for instance, Mullah Omer emphasized that
‘with the Taliban being in power there is no need for any kind of “elders’ grand
council,’ Loya Jirga, or any other ‘third party.’’60 The IEA also emphasized that,
with Islam being the legitimizing source of governance, it does not need to
use ethnic, tribal, or sectarian politics.61 For example, through two separate
statements, Mullah Omer, and the IEA’s Minister of Information and Culture,
Mawlawi Qudratullah Jamal, emphasized on the IEA’s sole Islamic identity in
which ethnic and sectarian lines are not important:
‘The Islamic Movement of the Taliban is inclusive of all ethnic groups, and therefore
it represents the country’s faithful nation … the Taliban movement is an Islamic
movement, and the leadership and members of this movement never think about
ethnic and sectarian basis. In accordance with the Islamic Sharia, it respects all
ethnic groups.’62 ‘It is a recognized reality that the IEA’s policies and platform are
in accordance with Islam in which there is no majority and minority.’63
Almost all publicly accessible data and direct evidence and eyewitnesses of the
time Taliban ruled Afghanistan confirm that the IEA was a religious regime which
enforced Sharia in its most severe sense and by coercion. However, despite
the Taliban’s claim of being ethnically tolerant, there is numerous empirical
 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES   955

data and evidence that indicate the IEA’s ethnic-based behavior. The IEA was
entirely dominated by Pashtuns with other ethnic groups being excluded from
the IEA’s political and leadership arenas. For example, non-Pashtuns were largely
excluded from the IEA’s both governing councils, the Supreme Council and
the Council of Ministers. Of the six original members of the Supreme Council,
five were Pashtuns and only one, Maulvi Sayed Ghiasuddin, was a Tajik from
Badakhshan. Likewise, out of 17 members of the Council of Ministers in 1998,
only two were non-Pashtuns.64 Furthermore, the IEA appointed provincial gover-
nors and administrators of districts, cities, and towns from the center, Kandahar
or Kabul, depending on the importance of the position. These administrators,
particularly the governors of provinces and districts, were dominantly Pashtuns.
In Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif – none of which have a Pashtun majority –
the Taliban’s representatives such as governors, mayors, police chiefs and other
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senior administrators were invariably Pashtuns who either did not speak Farsi,
the lingua franca of these cities or spoke it poorly.65 Overall, one can claim that
Sharia was the major legitimizing basis of the IEA which was led exclusively by
Pashtun mullahs who in most parts of Afghanistan followed a parallel Islamic
and ethnic politics.
The IEA relied on a specific interpretation of Islamic Sharia, Deobandism,
which is the subcontinental branch of the Islamist ideology. Deobandism follows
a Salafist egalitarian model and like all Islamist schools seeks to emulate the
life and times of the Prophet Mohammed.66 It rejects all forms of ijtihad – the
use of reason to create innovations in sharia in response to new conditions.67
The Deobandi philosophy was founded in 1867 at the Dar ul-Ulum (Abode of
Islamic Learning) madrassa in Deoband, India. Deobandi madrassas flourished
across South Asia, and they were officially supported in Pakistan when President
Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq assumed control of the Pakistani government in 1977.68
The Taliban members were students at these madrassas that were broadly con-
trolled by Pakistani Islamist parties, particularly, the Jamaat Islami Pakistan (JIP),
led by Qazi Hussein Ahmad, and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami Pakistan (JUIP) led
by Maulana Fazl ul-Rahman.69
All characteristics of Deobandism were found in exaggerated form among
the Afghan Taliban which was fundamentally alien in Afghanistan. The IEA’s
Deobandi interpretation of sharia was reflected in the IEA’s legislations, policies
and procedures. The IEA enforced numerous law decrees in accordance with the
group’s interpretation of sharia. To make sure that these decrees were imple-
mented in Afghanistan, the IEA established a religious police called Amr-e-Bil
Marouf Wa Nahi Anil Munker or The General Department for the Preservation of
Virtues and the Elimination of Vice.70 The organization had ‘thousands of inform-
ers in the army, government ministries, and hospitals who monitored foreigners
and Western aid agencies’.71 Most of these informers were teenagers and recent
graduates of the Pakistani madrassas. They patrolled the streets, making sure
 956   S. Y. IBRAHIMI

that the people go to the mosque at the time of daily prayers, women are cov-
ered from head to toe with the burka, and men have not shaved their beard.72
Although Afghanistan is an Islamic country and Islam has functioned as a
source of legitimacy and jurisprudence for centuries, the Taliban’s interpretation
of Islam and its coercive approach to enforcing it was not broadly welcomed in
the country. Except for individuals who joined the Taliban, the rest of the Afghan
population, even the rural religious communities, did not tend to freely follow
the Taliban’s Islamism. Further, the IEA was not considered a legitimate author-
ity by all rival parties that also considered themselves as Islamic organizations.
The Payam-e-Mujahid, the official publication of Jamyat-e-Islami, the Taliban’s
internal rival, for example, questioned the main legitimizing source of the IEA.73
An Islamic fatwa published on this paper described the Taliban as a rebellion
group that disobeys a religiously legitimate government, the Islamic State of
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Afghanistan, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani:

On the basis of Sharia, Rabbani’s government has not lost its legitimacy. Therefore
disobedience of it is a subject to execution.74
While Islam has been a generally accepted source of political legitimation in
Afghanistan, such statements indicate a high degree of disagreement and con-
tradiction on interstation of Islamic Sharia in this country.
In addition to its poor internal legitimacy, the IEA lacked external legitimacy in
the sense that it was not officially recognized by the international community as
the sole source of authority in Afghanistan. In many international organizations,
including the United Nations, Rabbani’s ISA represented Afghanistan. In some
countries, such as the United States, the Afghanistan diplomatic mission was
suspended, however, consulate duties, despite the IEA’s constant complaints,
were delivered by the ISA.75 The international community’s rejection of per-
forming any intention for the recognition of the IEA was based on three issues:
the violation of the women and human rights by the IEA, the Taliban’s associa-
tion with al-Qaeda, and the IEA’s constant emphasis on resolving Afghanistan
problem by military means. However, the IEA refused all those accusations.76
Only three countries, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates,
extended the IEA official recognition and the latter two soon downgraded it.77
Therefore, from its outset in September 1996 until its collapse in December 2001,
the IEA largely invested in diplomatic activities and propaganda to convince
the international community to recognize it as the legitimate and sovereign
authority in Afghanistan. Those activities are broadly covered in the Sharia. For
example, after the Taliban captured Mazar-e-Sharif, the capital of the ISA, the
Sharia wrote:
Will still the UN seek excuse [in recognizing IEA as the legitimate authority in
Afghanistan]? Will it still propagate against the IEA? Will it create a Capital for
Rabbani overseas?78
 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES   957

Subsequent editorials of the Sharia blamed the United Nations for continuously
ignoring the IEA’s achievements in stabilizing the country and creating ‘a central
authority’:
It has been years since Rabbani’s regime is toppled. Nevertheless, Afghanistan’s
seat in the UN is still assigned to the toppled regime … as long as Afghanistan’s
seat is dominated by Rabbani, his regime will claim legitimacy and receive weap-
ons and military support from abroad … Despite its claim of supporting the peace
process in Afghanistan, the UN officially recognizes an illegitimate regime and
assigns Afghanistan’s seat in the United Nations to it.79
Moreover, in diplomatic meetings between the IEA officials and any Western
official, the main issue the former brought on the table was the official rec-
ognition of the IEA.80 For example, following his visit to the United States in
September 2000, in an interview with the Voice of America, the IEA’s Deputy
Foreign Minister, Mawlawi Abdurrahman Zahid, described the purpose of his
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visit as conveying a ‘realistic picture of developments’ in Afghanistan to convince

the international community to officially recognize the IEA:
The international community should not ignore the official recognition of the
IEA. The IEA has provided all conditions necessary for the formal recognition. The
international community should not ignore this reality …81
However, after a subsequent visit to the US, another IEA diplomat, Mullah Abdul
Hakim Mujahid, pessimistically expressed that the case of the recognition was
massively influenced by the case of bin Laden’s presence in Afghanistan:
During the meeting, their [the Americans’] concentration was on Osama bin Laden.
We said … we are working on the fourth statement on bin Laden … But the point
is that the American government has launched a massive propaganda, and exag-
gerates on bin Laden.82
Thus, despite the IEA’s extended attempts, neither the US nor other Western
countries showed any serious intention to recognize the IEA as the sole sover-
eign reality of Afghanistan. By contrast, Rabbani’s ISA continuously represented
Afghanistan in the UN and other international organizations. For example, the
Deputy Foreign Minister of the ISA, Dr. Abdullah, attended the UN General
Assembly in 1997 as the official representative of Afghanistan, and Rabbani
represented Afghanistan at the annual conference of the Non-Allied countries
in South Africa in September 1998.83
In addition to its failed attempt for international recognition, the IEA
remained isolated in the region too. During its five-year-rule on Afghanistan,
the IEA entirely failed to win possible allies while creating, even more, new ene-
mies. The movement had no friend in the region, except Pakistan. Iran cut its
relationship with the IEA due to the Taliban’s anti-Shiite campaign. Central Asian
states were frightened of the spread of the Taliban’s Islamism into their societies.
Likewise, Russia was fearful of the IEA’s fundamentalist version of Islam and
reinforced its hostility to the Taliban when the IEA granted separatist Chechens
full diplomatic recognition in 2000.84 The Saudis recalled their diplomatic staff
 958   S. Y. IBRAHIMI

from Kabul in 1998 after the Taliban refused their request to expel a Saudi citizen,
bin Laden, from Afghanistan. Moreover, India was deeply against the Taliban
because of the group’s pro-Pakistani strategy. Beyond the region, the United
States’ post-Cold War disengagement policy toward Afghanistan turned to hos-
tility and direct engagement in the wake of the al-Qaeda attacks in 1998 on
two US embassies in East Africa that began with a cruise missile strike against
an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan and continued with political and
economic sanctions on Taliban.85 Further, the Buddhist states, including Japan
which was providing Afghanistan with hundreds of millions of dollars in human-
itarian aid, condemned the IEA’s policy after the Taliban blew up the Bamiyan
Buddhas in March 2001.86

Authority
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The IEA, unlike traditional authoritarian regimes that lack in legitimacy but enjoy
authority, neither had the capability of exercising a monopoly over the use of
force in Afghanistan nor was it capable of providing a secure environment to
its clients. The IEA was involved in an unending armed combat with its internal
rival but lacked a sufficient force to eliminate it entirely. In other words, the IEA
invested and concentrated massively on ‘war making’ with the purpose of ‘state
making’. However, it never enjoyed the sufficient war machine to eliminate its
rival and acquire the means of building a state that could provide protection and
welfare to its clients. Empirical data and evidence show that the IEA’s security
force was organized as a traditional tribal militia force, a Lashkar, rather than a
regular army.87 It was basically formed as an insurgent force during the civil war
in Afghanistan rather than an army structure that is able to regularly respond
to internal threats, control borders and provide a governed and secure space
to the population living in the country.88
As conceptualized, a state in order to meet its basic requirements of elim-
inating/neutralizing its internal and external enemies and secure its territory,
borders and citizens needs a ‘physical force’. The ‘physical force’ in the modern
world, as Tilly articulates, is a modern military force, or an army.89 In other words,
‘state making’ in the contemporary world needs a ‘war making’ apparatus, which
in the modern era is a regular army.90
Although the IEA benefited from young and quickly moving combatants who
captured territory surprisingly fast, its military structure was far from being a
regular army. The IEA’s war-making affairs were basically conducted by a tradi-
tionally organized militia force similar to an insurgent militia. Therefore, it was
not successful in producing durable instruments of surveillance and control to
provide security and protection on the one hand and control the state’s territory
and borders on the other.91 The IEA itself admitted publicly the lack of a regular
army in Afghanistan and repeatedly emphasized on the need to organize its
military force as an ‘Islamic army:’
 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES   959

Following the defeat of the Communist regime and the establishment of an Islamic
administration and due to the jihadi parties’ lack of a united administration and
program, Afghanistan’s powerful army was looted by militiamen … its logisti-
cal infrastructure was looted and its modern and sophisticated machinery was
destroyed … Considering the IEA’s armed forces victories, and with regard to our
time’s need [for states having a central army] the IEA has started the rebuilding of
the ‘national Islamic army’ … The Army is the soul of a nation … [In order to build
an army that could defend Afghanistan], first, we have to create a sound [military]
base made of righteous and faithful officers and individuals.92
In order to show the IEA’s concentration on reviving and reinforcing the army,
the Sharia opened a new page on 4 March 1998, entitled Urdu, the Army, which
covered the Taliban’s activities in rebuilding Afghanistan’s army, and its technical,
logistical, combatant and infrastructural development.93 Nevertheless, neither
the Urdu page in the Sharia nor ‘the Urdu,’ a special magazine published by
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the IEA’s Ministry of National Defense, characterized what the ‘Islamic Army’
would look like and how would it function. The Urdu only highlighted the Islamic
army’s ultimate goal: the stabilization of Afghanistan through the enforcement
of Sharia.94
The IEA’s armed forces’ tactical decisions, including the provision of money;
fuel; food; transport; weapons and ammunition for combatant units, were
mainly implemented by the Supreme Council’s Military branch, the Military
Council, based in Kandahar. Although a few months before its complete collapse,
the IEA published the Council of the Ministers’ Act in May 2001, according to
which the miniseries based in Kabul were considered as leading executive and
administrative organizations of the IEA, including its army and security force,
the IEA was basically managed traditionally and by the Supreme Council.95 Thus,
apart from general strategies, key appointments and the allocation of funds
for offensives that were decided directly by Mullah Omar, the Military Council
consulted and determined the armed forces’ tactical and daily activities.96 This
had created numerous overlaps on decision-making which in turn had made
the development of a uniform security system almost impossible.
The overlap and its outcome were largely evident in the armed forces’ struc-
ture and their operations. Under the Military Council consultancy and supervi-
sion, individual commanders, mainly from Pashtun areas, were responsible for
recruiting men, paying them and looking after their needs in the field. These
commanders acquired the resources to do so directly from the Military Council.97
The individual commanders directed their affiliated combatant units into the
battlefields and took care of them as tribally loyal military units. There was no
regular military structure with a hierarchy of officers and commanders, while
unit commanders were being shifted around.98 The Taliban’s 25,000 to 30,000
armed forces, in this sense, resembled a local insurgency or a traditional tribal
militia force, a Lashkar, rather than a regular army.99 Therefore, the IEA’s poorly
equipped and trained armed force; its tribal organization and its lack of a mean-
ingful hierarchical structure, did not allow for a disciplined army to be created.
 960   S. Y. IBRAHIMI

However, the IEA claimed that its armed forces captured more than 90–95% of
Afghanistan’s territory and emphasized on its capability of providing a secure
environment and defending the country.
The IEA has a complete control over the 95 percent of Afghanistan’s territory.
It also controls the countries gateways, borders, and public establishments. The
IEA, under a united Islamic regime, serves the people and provides them with job
opportunities in a secure and peaceful environment …100
Nevertheless, empirical data shows that the IEA’s control over the claimed ter-
ritory was not stable as the war never stopped in those areas. The continuation
of the war in Afghanistan in this period (1996–2001) is broadly reported by the
Sharia itself.101 Data show that there was no absolute victory to anyone with
the either side of the war having the capability of quickly preparing itself for
new attacks following every defeat.102 The Taliban captured territory surprisingly
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quick, however, considering the complex aspects of war in Afghanistan, the IEA’s
reliance on Arab and Pakistani military and financial support and the Taliban’s
overlapping structure and command system, there was no guarantee how long
the IEA could maintain control over the areas it captured.
The IEA’s security and military weakness made it heavily dependent on for-
eign fighters and the military support it received from Pakistan and the Arab
jihadis. Evidence shows that between 1994 and 1999 over 80,000 Pakistanis
fought with the Taliban which included ISI field officers, Pakistani Frontier Corps,
regular Pakistani armed forces personnel and madrasa students.103 The presence
of Pakistani combatants in Taliban’s structure is also supported by empirical data.
Payam-e-Mujahid, for instance, reports the capturing of hundreds of Pakistanis
by the Northern Alliance in northern Afghanistan. The paper reports that a UN
Security Council special envoy traveled to Afghanistan in July 1997 to investigate
Pakistan’s intervention in Afghanistan affairs. The Envoy observed more than 400
Pakistani citizens captured in Faryab, Balkh and Panjshir provinces by the NA.104
Other sources, including the US. government data, also confirm the involvement
of Pakistani government in supporting and supplying the IEA for political and
strategic purposes. Two US. intelligence reports/cables documented in ‘national
security archive’ at George Washington University, for instance, highlights the
Pakistani government’s direct support of the Taliban in the second half of the
1900s:
The Pakistan Inter-Service Intelligence is supplying the Taliban forces with muni-
tions, fuel, and food. The Pakistani ISI is currently using a private sector trans-
portation company to funnel supplies to Taliban forces in Kabul, Afghanistan.’105
‘Pakistan provides both military and financial assistance to the Taliban financial
and military assistance, but speculates that because ‘Pakistan fears a complete
Taliban victory may incite irredentist aspirations within its own Pashtun popula-
tion [Pakistan] will likely attempt to pressure the Taliban into moderating some
of its policies.106
Another US. ‘intelligence information report’ indicates that Pakistan uses sizable
numbers of its Frontier Corps in Taliban’s operations in Afghanistan:
 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES   961

These Frontier Corps elements are utilized in command and control; training; and
when necessary – combat. Elements of Pakistan’s regular army force are not used
because the army is predominantly Punjabi, who have different features as com-
pared to the Pashtun and other Afghan tribes.107
Pakistan was not the only country whose nationals joined and supported the
Taliban, militarily. Thousands of Arab, African, and East Asian and Central Asian
Muslim jihadis fought for the Taliban.108 Most of those fighters were organized,
equipped and trained by al-Qaeda. Integration of the 055 Brigade of al-Qaeda
which included around 2000 trained soldiers, into the Taliban force is a concrete
example of the Taliban’s reliance on foreign fighters, particularly al-Qaeda.109
Services in this unit, based in Khairkhana in northern Kabul, constituted part of
the training of militants who came to Afghanistan, and the unit also supplied
the most committed and effective part of the Taliban military.110 Findings show
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that between 2000 and 3000 Arabs under the command of Osama bin Laden
fought for the Taliban, as did the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Pakistani
Sipahi-i-Sahaba, Lashkar-i-Jangavi, Harakat-ul-Mujahidin, and some Chechen
and Uyghur jihadi networks.111 The Taliban received financial and military sup-
port from these organizations in return for providing them with sanctuaries in
Afghanistan.
The IEA used all support it received from foreigners in the war against the
NA. It also attempted to provide security by coercion in areas it controlled.
Comparing with the chaotic situation of the country in the early 1990s, Taliban
was not doing so badly in bringing order in areas it controlled. However, they
enforced Sharia, to create order, so severely that was not broadly supported in
Afghanistan. Therefore, although the IEA was quick in capturing territory and
severe in law enforcement, one can hardly predict how the situation would
develop if the IEA was not toppled by external force. However, considering the
Taliban’s shortage of resources to cover the cost of war, its poorly developed
armed and law enforcement forces, the IEA’s unfamiliarity with modern ways
of warfare and control, and the quickly changing nature of war in Afghanistan
the IEA’s poor and limited authority in Afghanistan, the IEA’s poor and limited
authority could not change for years.

Capacity
As discussed, the state capacity primarily depends on its size of the economy
and its capability for acquiring the means of governance or the extraction of
resources.112 Smaller the pool of resources and fiscal instruments, the more
difficult is the work of extracting resources to sustain the war and other gov-
ernmental activities.113 The IEA’s capacity, in this sense, was massively affected
by its very small economy and the low administrative capability for acquiring
resources and providing basic services.
 962   S. Y. IBRAHIMI

When the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996, it inherited a totally

collapsed state with its infrastructure destroyed, its wealth looted and its pro-
fessionals fled the country as a result of the civil war. Therefore, two major prob-
lems challenged the IEA’s capacity: a small economy and a weak administration.
The IEA’s source of the legal economy was too small to manage a state and
its administrative institutions were filled with Mullahs roughly with a madrasa
education.114
The IEA’s regular source of revenue produced some 40% of the state’s costs
and, therefore, its economy was largely dependent on illegal revenues such as
its drug economy and foreign aid.115 According to new findings, the per capita
income of the 25 million population, in this period, was under $200, and the
country was close to a total economic collapse.116 The IEA had no annual budget
but it appeared to spend $300 million a year, nearly all of it on war.117 The IEA’s
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largest official source of revenue was the transit trade between Afghanistan and
Pakistan which had an estimated turnover of $4.5 billion, with the Taliban receiv-
ing between $100 and $130 million per year which covered roughly between
33 and 43% of its costs.118
Due to the shortage of official revenue, the IEA relied mainly on three unof-
ficial sources: drug, the Pakistanis, and bin Laden.119 The IEA controlled 96%
of Afghanistan’s poppy fields making opium its largest source of taxation.120
Taxes on opium exports became one of the mainstays of Taliban’s income and
its war economy.121 By 2000, Afghanistan accounted for an estimated 75% of
the world’s supply, and in 2000 it grew an estimated 3276 tons of opium from
poppy cultivation on 82,171 hectares.122 The IEA, due to international pressures,
banned the poppy cultivation in mid-2000 by issuing a ‘counternarcotic act’.123
However, in previous years, it extracted a large amount of money by imposing
taxation on the poppy trade by leveling the ushr, a 25% tax on all agricultural
production.124 This brought in some $15 million a year from the $60 million
Afghan growers and traders earned from opium exports out of a business worth
$40 billion in Europe alone.125
The second unofficial source of the IEA’s revenue was the financial support
it received from the Pakistanis, particularly from the Pakistani Army and the ISI.
Pakistan, in addition to its official trade relations with IEA, largely contributed to
the Taliban costs of war. ISI, for instance, had prepared a budget of some 2 billion
rupees (US$5 million) for logistical supports for the Taliban.126 In addition to ISI’s
direct financial injection to the IEA, it provided the group with massive mili-
tary and logistical supplies. A majority of the Taliban combatants were trained
by Pakistani elements, and Pakistan’s civil and military presence was apparent
everywhere in Afghanistan. For instance, in its April and May 2001 report, the
Human Rights Watch, highlighted that as many as thirty trucks a day were cross-
ing the Pakistan border, and sources from inside Afghanistan reported that some
of these convoys were carrying artillery shells, tank rounds, and rocket-propelled
 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES   963

grenades.127 Further, a 1997 report of the UN secretary-general confirmed such

deliveries from Pakistan to Afghanistan.128
The third major source of IEA’s revenue was the financial supports it received
from Arab jihadis, particularly bin Laden. According to a 9/11 Commission staff
monograph, once bin Laden moved to Afghanistan he provided a considerable
part of the IEA’s costs, paying it an amount between $10 and $20 million per
year. The monograph emphasized that IEA’s reliance on bin Laden increased
over time: ‘As time passed, it appeared that the Taliban relied on al-Qaeda for
an ever-greater share of their needs, such as arms, goods, and vehicles’.129 The
IEA’s lack of sufficient sources of revenue largely affected the state’s capacity in
providing basic services.
The IEA spent all its revenue on ‘war making’ and the elimination of its inter-
nal rival, the NA. According to the IEA’s official data, the state’s investment on
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development and services providing projects was extremely small. According

to an IEA’s official report, the government invested, in the 2000 fiscal year some
$800,000 from internal resources to complete 766 reconstruction and economic
development projects, including the reconstruction of agricultural stores,
powers stations and systems, post offices and a number of government estab-
lishments in Kabul and beyond. This report claims a $100,000 increase in IEA’s
investment on development projects in the subsequent year.130 Other reports
indicate the IEA’s engagement in very small development and service provid-
ing projects such rebuilding a few public libraries and madrasas, responding
to emergency needs and reconstruction of some urban streets and provincial
governmental establishments.131
The IEA’s severe economic situation was intensified by international economic
sanctions that were imposed because of the Taliban’s violation of human rights
and its association with bin Laden and his terrorist group. In a public statement,
the IEA expressing the women’s situation in Afghanistan, rejected the accusation
of violation of women’s rights and indicated its need for humanitarian assistance:
The accusation of the violation of women’s rights by the IEA is just a lie … the
educated Afghan women expressed their wishes in a glorious ceremony on the
women international day on March 8 in Kabul … and called on the world that
instead of economic sanctions which have increased the food prices and there-
fore the women problem, the international community should solve the existing
problems in front of women in Afghanistan by launching humanitarian assistance
projects …132
In a subsequent statement, the IEA rejected the existence of any terrorist activ-
ities in Afghanistan highlighting that the sanctions had enormous impacts on
the IEA as a state and its citizens.133 Moreover, in a press conference in Islamabad,
the IEA’s ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zayeef described the
humanitarian costs of the sanctions on Afghanistan as ‘massive’ by highlighting
a few examples:
 964   S. Y. IBRAHIMI

The sanctions have stopped the Ariana Airline which transported medicine into
Afghanistan. It also affected people’s life by stopping post and telecommunication
services, and enhancing the food price.134
Considering the economic problems and the low service providing capability of
the IEA, almost all basic services depended on international organizations’ aid.
For example, more than half of Kabul’s 1.2 million people benefited in some way
from NGO handouts.135 Food distribution, health care, and the city’s fragile water
distribution network, for instance, heavily depended on emergency aid.136 These
services were largely affected when Taliban closed all NGO offices in July 1998,
after those organizations refused to relocate to a disused former polytechnic
college.137 Taliban’s purpose of moving the NGOs in a specified place was to
keep their activities under control. As a response to Taliban’s decision, the NGOs
decided to stop services and leave Afghanistan, which highly affected people’s
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already deteriorated living situation. However, the Taliban leadership reacted to

the termination of NGOs services comfortably. For example, the IEA’s Planning
Minister, Qari Din Mohammed, in a response to people’s concerns about the
termination of NGO services in Kabul stated as ‘we Muslims believe that God
the Almighty will feed everybody one way or another. If the foreign NGOs leave
then it is their decision. We have not expelled them’.138
Even if Afghanistan’s state institutions were not destroyed, the Taliban did
not have the administrative capability to run them. Almost all IEA’s authorities
were armed mullahs with nearly no administrative knowledge or expertise.139
Because most educated and professional Afghans had left the country during
the course of the war, the shortage of trained and skilled professionals in the
IEA was severe. Almost all cabinet ministers, deputies, and provincial governors
were mullahs roughly with a madrasa education who simultaneously acted as
military commanders. For example, the Health Minister, Mullah Mohammed
Abbas, served as a Taliban commander in Mazar and Herat in 1997 until he
returned to his job as Minister six months later.140 Likewise, the Governor of the
State Bank, Mullah Ehsanullah Ehsan, commanded an elite force of some 1000
Kandahari Taliban, and the Governor of Herat, Mullah Abdul Razaq, led military
offensives all over the country.141 Moreover, the IEA replaced all senior Tajik,
Uzbek and Hazara bureaucrats with Pashtuns, whether qualified or not.142 The
appointment of uneducated and inexperienced militant mullahs in the IEA’s
administration created a situation in which ministries ceased to function and
provincial and district administrations turned into military bases.
The absence of skilled professionals in the IEA was very obvious in all areas of
governance. For example, the IEA’s negotiating team with the oil companies that
were competing over a pipeline which was planned to connect Central Asia’s
natural gas and oil to Pakistan was composed of nine mullahs and one engi-
neer.143 The Taliban’s lack of administrative capacity is well reflected in a 1997
note by the Pakistani journalist, Ahmed Rashid, on the IEA’s Ministry of Finance,
 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES   965

The Ministry of Finance can barely put together a budget, and not just because
funds are scarce. The Ministry has no qualified economists: the minister and his
deputy are mullahs with a madrasa education. The ministry’s own budget for the
fiscal year that began in February 1997 was $1000000.144

Conclusion
The IEA emerged as a ‘war-making’ organization in the midst of the civil war in
Afghanistan. It sought to develop a regular state through eliminating its internal
rivals militarily. Therefore, it basically planned to make the state through a ‘war
making’ campaign. However, the IEA never acquired the meaningful war-making
institutions and instruments that are necessary for state-making. The IEA, in this
sense, was a primitive war-making institution built of traditional tribal militia
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units with overlapping two-track governing institutions at its top.

Regardless of its progress at war and quickly capturing of territory, the IEA
was unsuccessful in its ultimate goal of eliminating its internal rival, the NA,
militarily. Further, the IEA was incapable of providing a secure environment to
its citizens by ending the war and securing its borders to prevent the infiltration
of regional jihadis into Afghanistan. In addition, the IEA’s economic size was too
small to manage a state and it lacked the required administrative capability to
manage resources it had at its disposal, to produce new sources of revenue and
to provide basic services.
Overall, the IEA was, institutionally based on a two-track governing system
that almost entirely concentrated and invested on war-making with a failed
effort to state-making. Thus, it lacked the required institutions and personnel
to form a state with, and functionally, the IEA fell short in all three measures of
statehood including legitimacy, authority, and capacity.
The Taliban’s ‘state-making’ campaign indicates the difficulty of the transfor-
mation of an insurgent group into a state structure by relying on physical force
alone. This indicates the importance of ‘political inclusion’ on state-building in
war-torn societies. Finding shows that a dominant insurgent group, such as the
Taliban, might capture a large part of a given territory through war-making for a
short period, however, it cannot eliminate the other insurgent group(s) entirely
and forever. Therefore, as Weber articulates, a dominant force in order to survive
for a longer period of time does not impose its rule by coercion alone.145 The
IEA’s failed attempt at state-making through war-making, alone, affected all
aspects of its statehood. As a result, reliance on ‘war-making’ did not result into
making a state in the case of the Taliban.
Nevertheless, examining the IEA within the framework of state studies will
contribute to both the political development of Afghanistan and studies of
the insurgency. Since its creation in 1893, the development of the sovereign
state of Afghanistan is partly confused with the development of ruling parties.
The Taliban’s rule over Afghanistan is one of the most confusing parts of this
 966   S. Y. IBRAHIMI

history. Political scientists and journalists have mostly used the Taliban and the
IEA interchangeably which has made the understanding of the development
of the state in Afghanistan, in this period (1996–2001), confusing. Studying the
IEA within the state studies framework can help to fill this gap. This examina-
tion also contributes to the insurgency studies indicating the difficulty, if not
impossibility, of the transformation of an insurgent group into a state structure
through violent means, alone.

Notes
1.  Coady and Solomon, “Afghanistan’s Arrested Development”; Crews and Tarzi,
The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan; D’Souza “Talking to the Taliban”; Drissel,
“Reframing the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan”; Jason and DuPee, “Analysing
the New Taliban Code of Conduct”; Mahendrarajah, “Conceptual Failure”; Maley,
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Fundamentalism Reborn?; Matinuddin, Taliban Phenomenon; and Rashid, Taliban.

2.  For the definition of the state see Weber, The Vocation Lectures, 33, 34; and Mann,
“The Autonomous Power of the State,” 185–213.
3.  E.g. Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State”; Weber, The Vocation Lectures,
32–100; Tilly, “War Making and State Making”; Jackson, “Surrogate Sovereignty?”;
Collier, “The Political Economy of State Failure,” 220; and Milliken and Krause,
“State Collapse, State Failure…,” 753.
4. Tilly, “War Making and State Making,” 181; and Weber, The Vocation Lectures, 33, 34.
5.  Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State,” 185–213; and Milliken and Krause,
“State Collapse, State Failure…,” 753.
6.  Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State,” 188.
7.  Jackson, “Surrogate Sovereignty?” 2; Collier, “The Political Economy of State
Failure,” 220; and Milliken and Krause, “State Collapse, State Failure…,” 753.
8. These aspects are discussed in the main scholarly work on state, including
Weber, The Vocation Lectures; Tilly, “War Making and State Making”; Mann, “The
Autonomous Power of the State”; Carment et al., Security, Development, and the
Fragile State; Patrick, Weak Links, 8.
9.  For a detailed conceptualization of the state and stateness see Carment et al.,
Security, Development, and the Fragile State, 85; and Patrick, Weak Links, 8.
10. Weber, The Vocation Lectures, 33.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 34.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Tilly, “War Making and State Making,” 170.
19. Weber, The Vocation Lectures, 33.
20. Tilly, “War Making and State Making,” 181.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 17–20.
24. Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State,” 185–213.
25. Ibid., 188.
 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES   967

26. Ibid.
27. See Carment et al., Security, Development, and the Fragile State, 85.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 88.
30. Ibid., 86.
31. Ibid.
32. Mori DocID: 800277, “Secret, Noforn…,”; From [Excised] to DIA, “[Excised], Pakistan
Interservice Intelligence…,”; and From [Excised] to DIA, “IIR [Excised] Pakistan
Involvement,” 2.
33. Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History, 201; and Boase, Islam and Global Dialogue, 85.
34. Ewans, Afghanistan, 202.
35. Sharia, 3(11), March 4, 1998, pp. 1, 2; Sharia 5(51), July 22, 2000, p. 1; and Sharia,
5(11), February 7, 2001, pp. 1, 2.
36. Sharia, 3(11), March 4, 1998, pp. 1, 2.
37. Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, 162.
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38. Ould Mohamedou, Understanding Al-Qaeda, 49.

39. Rashid, Taliban, 25.
40. Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban…, 118.
41. Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban…, 154; and Barfield, Afghanistan, 261.
42. Ibid.
43. See for example, Davi, “The Taliban Published Mullah Omer’s Biography.”
44. Sharia 2(43), October 29, 1997, p. 1.
45. See for instance Saria 1(48), December 2, 1996, pp.1, 2; Sharia 2(1), January 2
1997, p. 1; Sharia 2(3), January 16, 1997, p. 1; Sharia 2(5) January 31, 1997, p. 1;
Sharia 2(7), February 2, 1997, p. 1; Sharia 2(12), March 26, 1997, p. 1; and Sharia,
2(38), September 24, 1997, pp. 1, 2.
46. Sharia, 2(44), November 5 1997, pp. 1, 4.
47. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, xv.
48. Sharia 5(9), February 2, 2000, p. 1.
49. The Council of Ministers Act, article 3.
50. Ibid., articles 1, 2, and 6.
51. For example, Sharia, 3(5), August 16, 1998, pp. 1, 4; Sharia 6(18), March 11, 2001,
pp. 1, 4; Sharia 3(57), 23 August, 1998: 1; Sharia 5(68), September 19, 2000, pp. 1,
4; and Sharia, 6(50), July 11, 2001, p. 1.
52. Patrick, Weak Links, 8.
53. Weber, The Vocation Lectures; Tilly, “War Making and State Making”; Mann, “The
Autonomous Power of the State”; and Carment et al., Security, Development, and
the Fragile State.
54. Weber, The Vocation Lectures, 34; Weber, “The Three Types of Legitimate Rule,”
pp. 1–11; Underhill, Countering Global Terrorism, 62; and Johnson and Mason,
“Democracy in Afghanistan is….”
55. Sharia 1(1), January 1, 1995, pp. 1, 2.
56. Sharia 1(39) September 28, 1996, p. 1.
57. Sharia 5(58), August 15, 2000, pp. 1, 2.
58. Sharia 3(21), April 19, 1998, p. 1.
59. Sharia, 5(57), August 12, 2000, p. 1, 2.
60. Sharia, 3(48), July 22, 1998, p. 1.
61. Sharia 3(55), 16 August 1998, p. 1.
62. Sharia, 3(5), August 16, 1998, pp. 1, 4.
63. Sharia 5(91), December 9, 2000, p. 4.
 968   S. Y. IBRAHIMI

64. Rashid, Taliban, pp. 98, 222–225; and Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History,
192.
65. Rashid, Taliban, 98, 99.
66. Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency,” 72.
67. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India; and Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan,
xv.
68. Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency,” 72.
69. Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban…, 119.
70. Ibid., 154.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Payam-e-Mujahid, 2(26, 27, 28, 29), 30 August, 4 September, 11 September, 13
September 1997.
74. Payam-e-Mujahid 2(5) April 3, 1997, p. 1.
75. See for example, Sharia 3(55), August 16, 1998, p. 1; Sharia, 3(22), April 22, 1998,
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pp. 1, 2; Payam-e-Mujahid, 2(25), August 27, 1997, p. 6; and Payam-e-Mujahid,

2(25), August 27, 1997, p. 6.
76. Sharia, 5(89) December 2, 2000, pp. 1, 4; (Sharia 5(26), April 9, 2000, p. 4. Sharia
5(54), August 1, 2000, pp. 1, 4; (Sharia 5(9), February 2, 2000, pp. 1, 2; Khelaphat,
July–August 2000, pp. 54–56; and Khelaphat, May–June 2001, pp. 13, 33, 34.
77. Barfield, Afghanistan, 264.
78. Sharia 3(55), August 16, 1998, p. 1.
79. Sharia 4(64), September 2, 1999, pp. 1, 2.
80. Sharia, 5(9), February 2, 200, pp. 1, 2; Sharia 5(31), April 30, 2000, pp. 1, 2; and
Sharia 5(43), June 25, 2000, p. 1.
81. Sharia 5(68), September 19, 2000, pp. 1, 4.
82. Sharia, 5(12), February 11, 2001, p. 1, 4.
83. Payam-e-Mujahid, 2(24), September 3, 1998; Payam-e-Mujahin 2(31–32),
September 25 & October 2, 1997; and Payam-e-Mujahid 2(12), May 23, 1998, p. 1.
84. Sharia, 5(38), May 24, 2000, p. 1; and Sharia 5(6), January 23, 2000, p. 1.
85. Barfield, Afghanistan, 265, 266.
86. Ibid.
87. Rashid, Taliban, 100.
88. See Sharia 3(19), April 1, 1998: 1; Sharia 3(53), August 9, 1998; Sharia 3(54),
August 12, 1998; Sharia 3(55), August 16, 1998:1; Sharia 3(55), 16 August 1998,
p. 1; Sharia 3(58), August 26, 1998, p. 1; Sharia 4(56) August 4, 1999, p. 1. And
Payam-e-Mujahid 3(31), October 21, 2000; Payam-e-Mujahid 3(33), November
4, 2000; Payam-e-Mujahid 4(16) July 6, 2000; Payame-e-Mujahid 4(47) February
8, 2001; Payam-e-Mujahid 5(12), June 7, 2001, p. 2; and Payam-e-Mujahid 5(25),
September 6, 2001.
89. Tilly, “War Making and State Making,” 170–181.
90. Ibid., 181; and Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 17–20.
91. Tilly, “War Making and State Making,” 181.
92. Sharia, 3(6), February 15, 1998, pp. 1, 2.
93. Sharia, 3(11), March 5, 1998, p. 4 – subsequent issues.
94. See Urdu 1, 1997, p. 2; and Urdu 2, 2001.
95. The Council of Ministers Act.
96. Rashi, Taliban, 99, 100.
97. Rashid, Taliban, 100.
98. Ibid., 99.
99. Ibid., 100.
 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES   969

100. Sharia 6(11), February 7, 2001, p. 1.

101. See for example, Sharia 3(19), April 1, 1998, p. 1; Sharia 3(53), August 9, 1998;
Sharia 3(54), August 12, 1998; Sharia 3(55), August 16, 1998, p. 1; Sharia 3(55),
16 August 1998:1; Sharia 3(58), August 26, 1998, p. 1; and Sharia 4(56) August
4, 1999, p. 1.
102. Payam-e-Mujahid 3(31), October 21, 2000; Payam-e-Mujahid 3(33), November
4, 2000; Payam-e-Mujahid 4(16) July 6, 2000; 4(47) February 8, 2001; Payam-
e-Mujahid 5(12), June 7, 2001: 2; Payam-e-Mujahid 5(25), September 6, 2001;
Payam-e-Mujahin 2(29), October 8, 1998, p. 1; and Payam Mujahid, 2(16) July
9, 1998, p. 1.
103. Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, 322; and Rashid, “Pakistan and the Taliban,”
72–89.
104. Payam-e-Mujahin 2(18) July 3, 1997, p. 6.
105. Mori DocID: 800277, “Secret, Noforn….”
106. From [Excised] to DIA, “[Excised], Pakistan Interservice Intelligence….”
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107. From [Excised] to DIA, “IIR [Excised] Pakistan Involvement,” 2.

108. Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, 162.
109. Ould Mohamedou, Understanding Al-Qaeda, 49.
110. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, xv.
111. Ibid., xvi; and Rashid, “Afghanistan Resistance Leader Feared.”
112. Tilly, “War Making and State Making,” 182.
113. Ibid., 182.
114. Semple, “Rhetoric, Ideology, and…,” 6.
115. Del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States, 167; and Skaine, Women of Afghanistan,
57.
116. Ibid.
117. Chouvy, Opium, 52.
118. Ibid.; and Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban… 178.
119. Chouvy, Opium, 52.
120. Ibid., 52.
121. Ibid., 52.
122. Thourni, “The Rise of Two Drug Tigers,” 130.
123. The Counternarcotic Act, articles, 1–5.
124. Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban…, 177.
125. Ibid.
126. Rashid, Taliban, 72.
127. Human Rights Watch, Pakistan’s Support of the Taliban.
128. U.N. Secretary General, “The Situation in Afghanistan,” para. 18.
129. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “Al Qaeda’s
Means and Methods,” 28.
130. Sharia 5(15), February 23, 2000, pp. 1, 4.
131. Sharia 5(26), April 9, 2000, p. 1; Sharia 3(12), March 8, 1998, p. 1; Sharia 3(8),
February 18, 1998, p. 1; Sharia, 3(9) February 22, 1998, p. 1; and Sharia, 3(9),
March 4, 1998.
132. Sharia 5(26), April 9, 2000, p. 4.
133. Sharia 5(40), June 11, 2000, pp. 1, 4.
134. Sharia, 5(89) December 2, 2000, pp. 1, 4.
135. Rashid, Taliban, pp. 64, 65.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
138. Rashid, Taliban, 72.
 970   S. Y. IBRAHIMI

139. Semple, “Rhetoric, Ideology, and…,” 6.

140. Rashid, Taliban, 100, 101.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid., 101.
143. Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban…, 176, 177.
144. Ibid., 176.
145. Weber, The Vocation Lectures, 33.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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