Constitutional Law Review

POLITICAL LAW (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I)

I. THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
A. Constitution: definition, nature, and concepts
a. Political law
1. The law of public administration
2. Constitutional law
3. Administrative law
4. The law of public corporations
b. Constitutional law
c. Constitution defined
d. Classification of Constitutions
1. Written v. unwritten.
2. Enacted (conventional) v. evolved (cumulative)
3. Rigid v. flexible
B. Parts
1. Constitution of Government
2. Constitution of Sovereignty
3. Constitution of Liberty
C. Amendments and revisions

1. In general
a. R.A. No. 6735
- The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject,
in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;

a.2 Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal,
or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

(b) “Indirect initiative” is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local
legislative body for action.

(c) “Referendum” is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the
purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:

c.1 Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress; and

c.2 Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by
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regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.

(d) “Proposition” is the measure proposed by the voters.

(e) “Plebiscite” is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the
people.

(f) “Petition” is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of signatories. It shall be
in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the
Commission.

Q1. The plebiscite is the election conducted for purposes of referendum?

Q2. A convict who suffers the penalty of temporary absolute disqualification cannot vote in a popular election. But
can he vote in a plebiscite?

SEC. 5. Requirements.—(a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the
total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total
number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years
from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.

SEC. 6. Special Registration.—The Commission on Elections shall set a special registration day at least three (3)
weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.

SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures.—The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list
of voters, voters’ affidavits and voters’ identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall
become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the
purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission.

SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures.—The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and

(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the
Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity.

Cases: Garcia vs. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 279 (1994)

SHORT FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition2 with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The petition states:
I.Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 ng Sangguniang Bayan
para sa pag-anib ng Morong sa SSEZ na walang kondisyon

The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within thirty (30) days after its submission.
Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991.
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In its session of July 6, 1993, the COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground
that its subject is “merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance.”6 On July 13, 1993, the
COMELEC en banc further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Benjamin N. Casiano, to hold
action on the authentication of signatures being gathered by petitioners.

Two Kinds of Legislative Power: Original legislative power is possessed by the sovereign people while derivative
legislative power is that which has been delegated to legislative bodies, and is subordinate to the original power of
the people.

One of the lessons of the people’s sad experience with the government of former President Marcos is the folly of
completely surrendering the power to make laws to the legislature, such that the Constitution thereafter adopted
became “less trusting of public officials than the American Constitution.”—In February 1986, the people took a
direct hand in the determination of their destiny. They toppled down the government of former President Marcos in a
historic bloodless revolution. The Constitution was rewritten to embody the lessons of their sad experience. One of
the lessons is the folly of completely surrendering the power to make laws to the legislature. The result, in the
perceptive words of Father Bernas, is that the new Constitution became “less trusting of public officials than the
American Constitution.” For the first time in 1987, the system of people’s initiative was thus installed in our
fundamental law.

The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative.
Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: “The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body x x x”
An act includes a resolution. Black defines an act as “an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something
done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves,
awards, and determinations x x x.”

It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution.

The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented
by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled “An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.” Thus, its section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions as subjects of
initiatives on local legislations. There can hardly be any doubt that when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 it
intended resolutions to be proper subjects of local initiatives.

The terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
specific matter. 32 An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in
nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

The terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply
adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the
previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act
pursuant to an ordinance
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Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991
which also dealt with local initiative did not change the scope of its coverage. More specifically, the Code did not
limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX, Book I of the Code cited
by respondents merely defines the concept of local initiative as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a
local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the
subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local initiative. It is section 124 of the same Code which does.

Resolutions and Ordinances, Distinguished.—We note that respondents do not give any reason why resolutions
should not be the subject of a local initiative. In truth, the reason lies in the well known distinction between a
resolution and an ordinance—i.e., that a resolution is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion
which is to have only a temporary effect while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct and control matters
applying to persons or things in general. Thus, resolutions are not normally subject to referendum for it may destroy
the efficiency necessary to the successful administration of the business affairs of a city.

The 1987 Constitution is borne of the conviction that people power can be trusted to check
excesses of government. One of the means by which people power can be exercised is thru
initiatives where local ordinances and resolutions can be enacted or repealed. An effort to
trivialize the effectiveness of people’s initiatives ought to be rejected.

PIRMA vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129745, September 23, 1997

SHORT FACTS:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, President of People’s Initiative for Reforms Modernization and Actions
(PIRMA), filed with the COMELEC a petition to amend the Constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials
thru people’s initiative, basing it on Section 2 of Article XVII. Several intervenors opposed the Delfin petition on
the ground that it is cognizable by the COMELEC.

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot
exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

The system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
—The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. Has Congress “provided” for the implementation of the
exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor
Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.

Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6735, the people are not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approve or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the system of initiative—they can only do so with respect to
“laws, ordinances, or resolutions.”—

Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads: SECTION 2. Statement and Policy.—The power of the
people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part,
the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Italics supplied) The inclusion of the word
“Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which
exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That
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section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is
confined only to proposals to AMEND.

The people are not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution” through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or resolutions.”

The Court cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum.—We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in
scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and
Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but
on its nature and character. It is “national initiative,” if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law,
or a law which only Congress can pass. It is “local initiative” if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law,
ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass.

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to
satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void.—It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules
and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the
COMELEC’s power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution,
or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the “completeness” and the “sufficient
standard” tests.

PUNO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution thru
initiative.—I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to the
Constitution thru initiative. Our effort to discover the meaning of R.A. No. 6735 should start with the search of the
intent of our lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is critical for the intent of the legislature is the law and the
controlling factor in its interpretation. Stated otherwise, intent is the essence of the law, the spirit which gives life to
its enactment.

b. Difference between amendment and revision

Case: Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006
SHORT FACTS:

Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was
provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of
Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. The proposed changes will shift the present bicameral-
presidential form of government to unicameral-parliamentary.
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Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution; People’s Initiative; The essence of amendments “directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people —
first, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal, and, second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition; The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face
of the petition, or attached to it, and if so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment.

This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that
every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.

A signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that
he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a
significant potential for fraud.
A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer
having actually examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or
even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the signer’s liking. This danger seems
particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously
has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the
full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic
fraud on the people.

Amendment” and “Revision,” Distinguished: The framers of the Constitution intended, and
wrote, a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision” of the Constitution.—There can
be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction
between “amendment” and “revision” of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that
only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The
framers intended, and wrote, that a people’s initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people
the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as
they are empowered to propose amendments.

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment; A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-
equal branches of government in the present Constitution is reduced into two; A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution—merging the legislative
and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of the government.

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the
separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition
alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature
and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift
from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of
the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a
revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group’s proposed changes, it
is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth
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in the Constitution.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without
affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and
not a revision.—We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for
amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors
fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present
initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The
present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three
co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and
articles of the Constitution.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without
affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and
not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media
companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change
requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision.

There can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision—a change in a

single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment.—
There can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a
single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For
example, the substitution of the word “republican” with “monarchic” or “theocratic” in Section 1,
Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the
fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be
examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the
structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances and the underlying
ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution,

a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision.—

A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with
those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand,
constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative
bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.
The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is “so extensive in its provisions as to
change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of
numerous existing provisions”—the court examines only the number of provisions affected and
does not consider the degree of change;
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The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution
—the main inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such far reaching changes in the
nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.”

Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus,
“a change in the nature of the basic governmental plan” includes change in its fundamental
framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches.” A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that “jeopardize the traditional form of government and
the system of check and balances.”

c. Legal tests
1. Quantitative test
2. Qualitative test
2. Steps in the amendatory process
I. Proposals
a. By congress as a Constituent Assembly
b. By Constitutional Convention
c. By people's initiative
Cases: Santiago vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.127325, March 19, 1997

d. By President during emergency

Case: Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 33 (1976)
FACTS:

On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 to call for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its
primary purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the questions that are to
be asked during the referendum on October 16. The first question is whether or not the citizen wants martial
law to continue, and the second one asks for the approval on several proposed amendments to the existing
Constitution.

The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national referendum in
October 16.

Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the
COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare without
force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution.

Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting that the
power to propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly
conferred to the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the implementation of
Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. They assert that the
incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution and a
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referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the
plebiscite a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and
allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right
of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the issue raised is political
in nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also asserts that at this state of
the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the
referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

ISSUE: WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality of PDs 991 and
1033).

HELD: YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while only 3 maintained it
was of political nature and thus not justiciable.

The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a political one. This is
because the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose amendments to the constitution
resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition.

After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active session, the power to
propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly. The normal
course has not been followed.

Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the president
undertook the proposal of amendments through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect, through a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment procedure raises a
contestable issue.

Amending process of the Constitution raises a judicial question.—The amending process, both as to
proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the
Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by
the legislature, is seriously doubted.

Political questions are associated with the wisdom, not legality, of a particular act.—Political questions are
neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy
refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.

Issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a justiciable question .—
What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing
amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or assume the power of
a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose
amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question.

Presidential exercise of legislative powers a valid act in times of martial law.—The presidential exercise of
legislative powers in times of martial law is now a conceded valid act. That sun clear authority of the
President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions.

It is within constitutional and legal bounds for the President to assume the constituent powers of the interim
National Assembly.—Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to
assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body’s legislative
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functions?

The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the Interim
Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power.

This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that
nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interimNational Assembly not convened and
only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative
upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution. x x x The President’s action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January
1973 and February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly.

e. Submission of Proposals Doctrine of Proper Submission

Cases: Tolentino vs. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 (1971)

SHORT FACTS:
They wanted to restrain COMELEC from holding a plebiscite to submit to the people approval of the amendment
made to the Constitution by the Con-Con reducing the voting age.

Power of judicial review.—The courts may review the validity of an act of the constitutional convention proposing a
particular amendment to the Constitution.

There should be no more doubt regarding the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the
acts of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional convention called for
the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which concededly is at par with the former. As held in
Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress—acting as a constituent assembly—
violates the Constitution of essentially a justiciable one, not political, and hence, subject to judicial review, and, to
the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter should be
deemed modified.

True it is that once convened, this convention became endowed with extraordinary powers generally beyond the
control of any department of the existing government, but the compass of such powers can be coextensive only with
the purpose for which the convention was called and as it is self-evident that the amendments it may propose cannot
have any effect as part of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people, it necessarily follows that
the acts of the convention, its officers and members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds.

Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution contemplates a single election.—In the case at bar, the ultimate question is
this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by the act of
the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court
holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same
Convention must be submitted to the people in a single “election” or plebiscite.

when calling of a plebiscite valid.—In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution
may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of
the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to
form a harmonious whole.

In the context of the present state of things, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of
hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single
proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. Under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, a
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proposal to amendment the Constitution should be submitted to the people not separately from but together with all
the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.

Planas vs. COMELEC, 49 SCRA 105 (1973)

On March 16, 1967 the Congress of the Philippines passed a resolution calling a convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines. Pursuant thereto and to an implementing law (R.A. 6132), the election of delegates to the
convention was held on November 10, 1970. The convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the
constitutional convention was in session, the President of the Philippines issued Proc. No. 1081 placing the entire Philippine
Archipelago under martial law. On November 29, 1972 the convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines. On November 30, 1972 the President of the

At this stage, whether or not there was a valid ratification of the 1972 Constitution cannot be resolved without raising the
legality of the Government under which we are now operating as of January 17, 1973. Hence We would be confronted with a
political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to settle. I accept as a fait ac-compli that the Constitution
adopted on November 30, 1972, has been duly ratified, and I consider that any assault against it as well as the manner of its
ratification has become innocuous.

Having been invested with full force and effect by the approval of an overwhelming majority of the people, to mount an attack
against it now would be nothing less than fighting the windmills in Don Quijote fashion. I do not wish to emulate that unique
literary character and I prefer to take things in the light of the stark realities of the present. I have always adhered to the idea
that the practical approach to any question yields the happiest solution, instead of soaring in flights of fantasies and losing
one’s self in idle metaphysical adventures.

Cases dismissed.

Notes.—The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress. It is a part of the inherent powers of the people—– as the repository of sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours—– to make, and hence, to amend their own fundamental law.

Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but
as competent elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from
the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from the
Constitution—– they are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself.

A. Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions

Case: Gamboa vs. Teves, 652 SCRA 690 (2011)

Does the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to the total common shares only or to the
total outstanding capital stock of PLDT, a public utility?

Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution expressly reserving to Filipinos
specific areas of investment, such as the development of natural resources and ownership of land, educational
institutions and advertising business, is self-executing. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-
executing provisions of the Constitution. The rationale why these constitutional provisions are self-executing was
explained in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, thus:
 Constitutional Law Review

“x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is,
as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless
the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary
rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.”

In Manila Prince Hotel, even the Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, later Chief Justice,
agreed that constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing. Justice Puno stated:

“Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, rather than as requiring future
legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing,
the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress.
Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional
rights but congressional inaction should not suffocate them.

Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches and seizures, the
rights of a person under custodial investigation, the rights of an accused, and the privilege against self-incrimination .
It is recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing
the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the protection of property. The same treatment is accorded to constitutional
provisions forbidding the taking or damaging of property for public use without just compensation.”

There is no dispute that petitioner is a stockholder of PLDT. As such, he has the right to question the subject sale,
which he claims to violate the nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.

If the sale indeed violates the Constitution, then there is a possibility that PLDT’s franchise could be revoked, a dire
consequence directly affecting petitioner’s interest as a stockholder. More importantly, there is no question that the
instant petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. The fundamental and threshold legal issue
in this case, involving the national economy and the economic welfare of the Filipino people, far outweighs any
perceived impediment in the legal personality of the petitioner to bring this action. In Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA
744 (1998), the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a suit on matters of transcendental importance to the
public.

The term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the
election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital
stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.—We agree with petitioner and petitioners-in-
intervention.

Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which
usually have no voting rights, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common
shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term “capital”
shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is
exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.

Undisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or management of the
 Constitutional Law Review

corporation. This is exercised through his vote in the election of directors because it is the board of directors that
controls or manages the corporation.

In the absence of provisions in the articles of incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares, preferred
shares have the same voting rights as common shares. However, preferred shareholders are often excluded from any
control, that is, deprived of the right to vote in the election of directors and on other matters, on the theory that the
preferred shareholders are merely investors in the corporation for income in the same manner as bondholders. In fact,
under the Corporation Code only preferred or redeemable shares can be deprived of the right to vote. Common
shares cannot be deprived of the right to vote in any corporate meeting, and any provision in the articles of
incorporation restricting the right of common shareholders to vote is invalid.

The term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution to include both voting and non-voting shares will
result in the abject surrender of our telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a clear abdication of
the State’s constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to Filipino citizens;

The Court should never open to foreign control what the Constitution has expressly reserved to Filipinos for that
would be a betrayal of the Constitution and of the national interest.—Indisputably, construing the term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution to include both voting and non-voting shares will result in the abject
surrender of our telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a clear abdication of the State’s
constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to Filipino citizens. Such an interpretation certainly runs counter
to the constitutional provision reserving certain areas of investment to Filipino citizens, such as the exploitation of
natural resources as well as the ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising businesses. The Court
should never open to foreign control what the Constitution has expressly reserved to Filipinos for that would be a
betrayal of the Constitution and of the national interest. The Court must perform its solemn duty to defend and
uphold the intent and letter of the Constitution to ensure, in the words of the Constitution, “a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

General provisions
a. Flag of the Philippines
b. Name of the country, national anthem, and national seal
Republic Act No. 8491 Flag and Heraldic Code of the Philippines.
Case: Martinez vs. Lim, A.M. No. P-04-1795, March 25, 200
Flag ceremonies inspire patriotism and evoke the finest sentiments of love of country and people.8 Section 18 of
RA9 8491 provides:

Section 18. All government offices and educational institutions shall henceforth observe the flag-raising ceremony
every Monday morning and the flag lowering ceremony every Friday afternoon. The ceremony shall be simple and
dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine National Anthem.

Pursuant to this mandate, Supreme Court Circular No. 62-2001 (dated September 21, 2001) provides:

All Executive Judges shall supervise the holding of the flag raising and flag lowering ceremonies in their respective
Hall of Justice buildings or courthouses and shall ensure the attendance of all judges and court personnel in the rites.

In deference to these mandates, the Chief State Prosecutor directed the personnel of the OPP to attend the flag
ceremony.
 c. The State may not be sued without its consent (to be discussed in State Immunity)
d. Armed forces of the Philippines
Case: Magdalo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012

SHORT FACTS:
Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its
registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for
participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.

COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO where it held that
Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused registration in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the
Constitution. It is common knowledge that the partys organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and
some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on
July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full
battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to
achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies.

The grant of amnesty shall effect the restoration of civil and political rights or entitlement of the grantees that may
have been suspended, lost or adversely affected by virtue of any executive, administrative or criminal action or
proceedings against the grantee in connection with the subject incidents, including criminal conviction or (sic) any
form, if any.

Further, it must also be underscored that the membership of MAGDALO cannot include military officers and/or
enlisted personnel in active service, as this act would run counter to the express provisions of the Constitution:

ARTICLE XVI – GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 5. (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this
Constitution.

x x x    x x x    x x x

(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime
concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics.

No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote.

(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any
capacity to a civilian position in the Government including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of
their subsidiaries.

e. Police force
Case: Kulayan vs. Tan G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012

SHORT FACTS:
In lieu with the kidnapping of 3 Red Cross staff, the governor of the Province declared Sulu in state of national emergency
pursuant to the Human Security Act and called out the armed forces to do checkpoints, etc. Can he do that under the
Constitution?

Answer. No.
There is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic —this means that when Section 1, Article
VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.—As early as Villena v.
Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939), it has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and
that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive
power, it is granted to the President and no one else. As emphasized by Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena: With
reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible
without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of
Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that “The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.” This means that the President of the Philippines is the
Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is
authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became
known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.

Same; Calling-Out Powers; By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare
martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone.—The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme
Court’s authority to review the factual basis thereof. By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity
than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone. As noted in Villena, “(t)here are certain
constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no
amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is
his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law x x x.

While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times,
supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader; The Constitution does not
require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to
direct military operations and to determine military strategy.—Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section
3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president
the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a
civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that
the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct
military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the
armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the
movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem
most effectual.

Philippine National Police; Regarding the country’s police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: the
State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission; A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor,
exercises operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations.—In addition to
being the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President also acts as the leader of the country’s police forces, under the
mandate of Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that, “The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. ” During the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission on the framing of this provision, Fr. Bernas defended the retention of the word “control,”
employing the same rationale of singularity of the office of the president, as the only Executive under the presidential form of
government. Regarding the country’s police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: “The State shall
establish and maintain one police Kulayan vs. Tan, 675 SCRA 482, G.R. No. 187298 July 3, 2012
 Gamboa vs. Chan G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012

Facts:

Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Admin No. 275 creating Zeñarosa Commission which was formed to
investigate the existence of private army groups in the country in view of eliminating and dismantling them permanently in the
future. Upon conclusion of its investigation, the Commission submitted a confidential report to the office of the
President.Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police
Ilocos Norte conducted surveillance operation against her and her aides and classified her as PAG coddler.

Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP forwarded in the Report’s enumeration of individual maintaining
PAGs. Gamboa’s association with PAG was published and released in the different forms of media, publicly tagging her as a
PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to privacy was violated, Gamboa filed apetition before the RTC for the issuance of writ of
habeas data to destroy the unverified reports fromthe PNP data base and restrain PNP from forwarding baseless reports against
her. The RTC ruled thatthe inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her right to privacy. However, the RTC dismissed
Gamboa’s petition for writ of habeas data saying that Gamboa failed to establish the source of the information.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the forwarding or information or intelligence report by the PNP to the Commission was an unlawful
act that violated petitioner’s right to privacy
2. Whether or not resort to petition for writ of habeas data was proper

HELD: Forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the Commission is NOT an intrusion of
petitioner’s right to privacy.

It is clear that the issuance of AO 275 articulates a legitimate aim which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the
ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the powers
and functions accorded to the Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of
maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities.

Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa
Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and
counteracted their activities.65 One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.

This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG
coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the
Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.

The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the
purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly
authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance
from the latter.

Same; Same; The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. —
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint.

However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, 541 SCRA 456 (2007), this Court underscored that the
right to privacy is not absolute, viz.: With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated,
suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees
respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be
allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry.
In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally
prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not
absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in
Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for
a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately
protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to
proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.

It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information
is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the
privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other.

Private Armies; The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized
by the duly constituted authority.—The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed
groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one police force that is
national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission.

f. Consumer protection
g. Communication Structures
Case: Chavez vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008 (Azcuna Concurring
Opinion)

Freedom of Expression; Telecommunications Industry; Chilling Effect Principle; The challenged National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) warnings violate Sec. 10, Art. XVI of the
Constitution—the regulatory warnings involved in this case work against a balanced flow of information in our communication
structures and do so without respecting freedom of speech by casting a chilling effect on the media.—I vote to GRANT the
petition on the ground that the challenged NTC and DOJ warnings violate Sec. 10, Art. XVI of the Constitution which states:
Sec. 10. The State shall provide the policy environment for the full development of Filipino capability and the emergency of
communication structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of the nation and the balanced flow of information into, out of,
and across the country, in accordance with a policy that respects the freedom of speech and of the press. x x x The regulatory
warnings involved in this case work against a balanced flow of information in our communication structures and do so without
respecting freedom of speech by casting a chilling effect on the media. This is definitely not the policy environment
contemplated by the Constitution.

f. Limitations on mass media and advertising

Executive Order No. 65, s. 2018, 11th Foreign Investment Negative
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