Plaintiff-Appellee Respondent: People of The Philippines, Martin Simon Sunga

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 93028. July 29, 1994.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTIN

SIMON y SUNGA, ** respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF WITNESS; WHEN MADE

POSITIVELY, STRAIGHTFORWARD AND CORROBORATED, DESERVES GREATER
WEIGHT; CASE AT BAR. — After an assiduous review and calibration of the
evidence adduced by both parties, we are morally certain that appellant was
caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The
prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant, on
October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez.
The latter himself creditably testified as to how the sale took place and his
testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As between the
straightforward, positive and corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare
denials and negative testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves
greater weight and is more entitled to credence.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCREPANCY ON MINOR MATTER; NEITHER AFFECTS

INTEGRITY OF THE EVIDENCE NOT THAT OF THE WITNESS. — Appellant would
want to make a capital of the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to him, is the
matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags from him since, in
open court, Pejoro asserted that he had nothing to do with the confiscation of
the marijuana, but in the aforementioned "Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one who seized the same. Suffice it to
say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the marijuana will not
really matter since such is not an element of the offense with which appellant is
charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was confiscated from
the possession of appellant. even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution
committed an error on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such
an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither
impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor
reflects on the witnesses' honesty. Besides, there was clearly a mere
imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant that he did not take part
in the physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant, but he
participated in the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as the investigator of
their unit.
3. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ENTRAPMENT; WHEN MAY BE RELIED UPON
BY THE COURT. — The Court is aware that the practice of entrapping drug
traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake,
harassment, extortion and abuse. Nonetheless, such causes for judicial
apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case at bar. Appellant's
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entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance
was conducted by the team before the buy-bust operation was effected. No ill
motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are
presumed to have regularly performed their official duty. Such lack of dubious
motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses,
should prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of
having been framed, erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi.
To top it all, appellant was caught red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and
while there was a delimited chance for him to controvert the charge, he does
not appear to have plausibly done so.
4. ID.; ID.; WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEIZURE, WHEN VALID; CASE AT
BAR. — Appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any
barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the lack of
pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not
reported to or booked in the custody of any barangay official or police
authorities. These are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires
that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay
official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of pictures. On
the contrary, the police enforcers having caught appellant in flagrante delicto,
they were not only authorized but were also under the obligation to effect a
warrantless arrest and seizure.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; WHEN OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF A
PERSON UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; INADMISSIBLE; CASE AT BAR. —
Contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report prepared by the
police in connection with his apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for selling two tea bags of
suspected marijuana dried leaves and the confiscation of another two tea bags
of suspected marijuana dried leaves." Below these remarks was affixed
appellant's signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the seized property,
hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant wherein he acknowledged the
confiscation of the marked bills from him. However, we find and hereby declare
the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's conformance
to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of
the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a person
under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being
nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel. Although
appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that he waived his right
to counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel,
hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from
him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence. Besides, the
arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be concocted to
implicate a suspect.
6. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; RULE; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR.
— The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence
to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation
of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. The evidence on
record is bereft of any support for appellants allegation of maltreatment. Two
doctors, one for the prosecution and the other for the defense, testified on the
absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily injury, abrasions or
contusions on the person of appellant. What is evident is that the cause of his
abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had been suffering even
before his arrest. His own brother even corroborated that fact, saying that
appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer. Furthermore, if it is true
that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever for
not divulging the same to his brother who went to see him at the camp after his
arrest and during his detention there. Significantly, he also did not even report
the matter to the authorities nor file appropriate charges against the alleged
malefactors despite the opportunity to do so and with the legal services of
counsel being available to him. Such omissions funnel down to the conclusion
that appellant's story is a pure fabrication.
7. CRIMINAL LAW; VIOLATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT; ELEMENT;
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Notwithstanding the objectionability of the
aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his
predicament from his predicament since his criminal participation in the illegal
sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense
of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the
selling transaction which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug
from the seller. In the present case, and in light of the preceding discussion,
this sale has been ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt. Appellant
then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total
stranger. We take this opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that
drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that class
of crimes that may be committed at any time and in any place. It is not contrary
to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger, for what
matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but their
agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana
leaves. While there may be instances where such sale could be improbable,
taking into consideration the diverse circumstances of person, time and place,
as well as the incredibility of how the accused supposedly acted on that
occasion, we can safely say that those exceptional particulars are not present
in this case.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 7659; PENALTY; CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. — Probably through
oversight, an error on the matter of imposable penalties appears to have been
committed in the drafting of the aforesaid law, thereby calling for and
necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship. As applied to the
present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now further amended,
imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall unlawfully sell,
administer, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug. That penalty, according to the amendment to Section 20 of the
law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or
marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, the penalty shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity. In
other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty
of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum
of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the
minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more.
The same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited and
regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting
provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, we hereby hold that the
penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the
quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision correccional to
reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the
fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a
manner favorable to the accused. 3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the
dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the imposable range of
penalties under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law
provides that the penalty shall be taken from said range " depending upon the
quantity" of the drugs involved in the case. The penalty in said second
paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that
is, prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a
situation, the Code provides that each one shall form a period, with the lightest
of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as
the maximum period. Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances determine which period of such
complex penalty shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the
second paragraph of Section 20, however, is its specific mandate, above
quoted, that the penalty shall instead depend upon the quantity of the drug
subject of the criminal transaction. Accordingly, by way of exception to Article
77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No.
7659, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a
principal imposable penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved.
Thereby, the modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since
each component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed
separately as determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the
modifying circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that
component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained. It would, therefore, be in
line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context of our aforesaid disposition
thereon that, unless there are compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities
of the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided into three, with the
resulting quotient, and double or treble the same, to be respectively quotient,
and double or treble the same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the
penalty proportionately among the three aforesaid periods according to the
severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the
penalty to be imposed shall be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams,
prision mayor; and 500 to 749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine
is imposed as a conjuncture penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the
case at bar, the penalty of prision correccional is consequently indicated but,
again, another preliminary and cognate issue has first to be resolved.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE FOR GRADUATING PENALTIES; APPLICATION IN

SPECIAL LAWS, WHEN ALLOWED; RATIONALE; CASE AT BAR. — Prision
correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as a divisible
penalty, it consists of three periods as provided in the text of and illustrated in
the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question is whether or not in
determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be taken from the
penalty of prision correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating,
aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability should be taken
into account. The Court is not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held
that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on
mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot
and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases,
however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws
involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished
thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those
in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws
concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it
would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying
circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in
accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code. This is also the rationale for
the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the graduation
of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special
laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated
in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory
effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the
former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or
a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application. The
situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and
ostensibly punished under special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken
from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily,
with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties
native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision
correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be
both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this later. For the nonce,
we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No.
6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be
taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
10. ID.; MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; APPLICATION IN SPECIAL LAW,
CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. — While not squarely in issue in this case, but
because this aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of modifying
circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating
circumstances should be considered and applied only if they affect the periods
and the degrees of the penalties within rational limits. Prefatorily, what
ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the
degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as
applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the
crime and the nature of the participation of the accused. However, under
paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced
by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as
provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees,
or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in
toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second
paragraph of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results
which could not have been contemplated by the legislature. Thus, paragraph 5
of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner
not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts
shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the
crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the
penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which
follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and
since the complex penalty in this case consists of three discrete penalties in
their full extent, that is, prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion
temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto
mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two
degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the
penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale. The Court rules,
therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine
the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by
degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable
penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the
three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be
considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty
should in any event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the
seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to
have efficiency rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged
from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is
accordingly addressed to Congress.
11. ID.; INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW; WHEN APPLICABLE. — The final
query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the
case now before us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in
nor has appellant committed any act which would put him within the exceptions
to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua
or death, provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will
exceed one year of imprisonment. The more important aspect, however, is how
the indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained. It is true that Section 1 of said
law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an offense under the
Revised Penal Code, states that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same" We
hold that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense
under a special law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is
without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding
illustrations, such that it may be said that the "offense is punished" under that
law. There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on
indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws was necessary because
of the nature of the former type of penalties under said laws which were not
included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code,
hence there could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the rule for felonies
therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore
provided, this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last
examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier
noted, this holding is but an application and is justified under the rule of
contemporanea expositio. Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal
Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and
effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at
prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the
medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in
the effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to
determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section 1
which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."
(Emphasis ours.) A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of
context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim that qui haeret in litera
haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has never gone only skin-deep in its
construction of Act No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions.
Thus, with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its
coverage "persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life
imprisonment," we have held that what is considered is the penalty actually
imposed and not the penalty imposable under the law, and that reclusion
perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law states is "life
imprisonment." What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition,
therefore, is that under the concurrence of the principles of literal
interpretation, which have been rationalized by comparative decisions of this
Court; of historical interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law
and related to contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation,
considering the interrelation of the penalties in the Code as supplemented by
Act No. 4103 in an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum
of the indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next lower to
that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming
ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with
laws, which is the best mode of interpretation.
12. ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — The
Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, and
should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused. The "minimum"
sentence is merely a period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and
not of right, the prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance of his
sentence outside of his confinement. It does not constitute the totality of the
penalty since thereafter he still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence
under set conditions. That minimum is only the period when the convict's
eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his release on parole may
readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration may be
ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served the minimum sentence. It is
thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should be
begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of arresto
mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum
range we have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the
Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum
sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of
prision correccional. The difference, which could thereby even involve only one
day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in the judicial teapot.
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
1. CRIMINAL LAW; INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW; CONSTRUED; CASE
AT BAR. — The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No. 7659
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their
technical terms, hence also their technical signification and effects, then what
should govern is the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
which directs that: "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."
Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised
Penal Code for the offenses penalized under the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No.
6425), as amended, the latter offenses would now be considered as punished
under the Revised Penal code for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended by Act
No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also provides that: " if the offense is punished by
any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by
said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by
the same ." (Emphasis supplied). There are, therefore, two categories of
offenses which should be taken into account in the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1) offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code,
and (2) offenses punished by other laws (or special laws). The offenses
punished by the Revised Penal Code are those defined and penalized in Book II
thereof, which is thus appropriately titled CRIMES AND PENALTIES. To simplify
further, a crime is deemed punished under the Revised Penal Code if it is
defined by it, and none other, as a crime and is punished by a penalty which is
included in the classification of Penalties in Chapter II, Title III of Book I thereof.
On the other hand, an offense is considered punished under any other law (or
special law) if it is not defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by
such other law. It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal
Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the said Code,
and it is deemed punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty
therefor are found in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from
the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense
in the special law punished by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The
reason is quite simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and
imposes a penalty therefor, although it adopts the Code's nomenclature of
penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the
Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense thereunder an offense
"punished or punishable" by the Revised Penal Code.
2. ID.; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT; IMPOSABLE PENALTY; CASE AT BAR. —
The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for the
Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is a complex one composed of three
distinct penalties, viz., prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion
temporal, and that pursuant to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code, each
should form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as
the medium, and the most severe as the maximum, yet, considering that under
the said second paragraph of Section 20 the penalty depends on the quantity of
the drug subject of the criminal transaction, then by way of exception to Article
77 of the Revised Penal Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20, as
amended, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a
principal penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereafter,
applying the modifying circumstances pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code, the proper period of the component penalty shall then be fixed. To
illustrate, if by the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana below 250
grams) the proper principal penalty should be prision correccional, but there is
one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, then the penalty to be
imposed should be prision correccional in its minimum period. Yet, the majority
opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares: "The Court rules, therefore, that
while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of
the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case
should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or
lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component
penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event
be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug
offenses." Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion
temporal — if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of the
drugs involved — by two degrees, or to prision correccional, if there are two or
more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance is present
(paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal code) or if there is a privileged
mitigating circumstance of, say, minority (Article 68, Revised Penal Code), or
under circumstances covered by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if
the proper penalty to be imposed is prision mayor, regardless of the fact that a
reduction by two degrees is proper, it should only be reduced by one degree
because the rule does not allow a reduction beyond prision correccional.
Finally, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision correccional, no reduction
at all would be allowed. I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and
unfair. It is arbitrary because within the same second paragraph involving the
same range of penalty, we both allow and disallow the application of Article
64(5), Article 68, and Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the
disallowance, viz., in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses,
is unconvincing because Section 20 of the Dangerous Drug Act, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses by
providing quantity as basis for the determination of the proper penalty and
limiting fine only to cases punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It is unfair
because an accused who is found guilty of possessing MORE dangerous drugs
— say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be imposed
would be reclusion temporal — may only be sentenced to six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional minimum because of privileged mitigating
circumstances. Yet, an accused who is found guilty of possession of only one (1)
gram of marijuana — in which case the penalty to be imposed is prision
correccional — would not be entitled to a reduction thereof even if he has the
same number of privileged mitigating circumstances as the former has. Also, if
the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority of the
accused, then he is entitled to the reduction of the penalty as a matter of right
pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads: "ART. 68. Penalty
to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the
offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the
provisions of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the
following rules shall be observed: 1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine
years of age, who is not exempted from Liability by reason of the court having
declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be
imposed, but always Lower by two degrees at Least than that prescribed by
Law for the crime which he committed. 2. Upon a person over fifteen and under
eighteen years of age the penalty next Lower than that prescribed by law shall
be imposed, but always in the proper period." I do not think that as to the
second paragraph of Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by
Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty to apply the Revised Penal
Code in one aspect and not to apply it in another.
DECISION
REGALADO, J : p
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on

November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
under an indictment alleging that on or about October 22, 1988, at Barangay
Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of
P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found
positive for marijuana. 1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989,
after his rearrest following his escape from Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga where he was voluntarily detained, 2 he pleaded not guilty. He
voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference, 3 after which trial on the
merits ensued and was duly concluded. LibLex
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later

identified as NARCOM operative, informed the police unit at Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a certain " Alyas Pusa" at
Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante, Commanding
Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-bust
team composed of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and Sgt.
Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked money
from Bustamante, the team, together with their informant, proceeded to Sto.
Cristo after they had coordinated with the police authorities and barangay
officers thereof. When they reached the place, the confidential informer pointed
out appellant to Lopez who consequently approached appellant and asked him
if he had marijuana. Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to
buy two tea bags. Appellant then left and, upon returning shortly thereafter,
handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him the marked
money amounting to P40.00 as payment. Lopez then scratched his head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around ten to fifteen
meters away, and the team closed in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was
the head of the back-up team, arrested appellant. The latter was then brought
by the team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board a jeep
and he was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the
investigator. 4
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the deal
that transpired between Lopez and the appellant. He also averred that he was
the one who confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from
appellant. 5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of
the buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest from the rest of the other
members, that is, around two hundred meters away from his companions. He
did not actually see the sale that transpired between Lopez and appellant but
he saw his teammates accosting appellant after the latter's arrest. He was
likewise the one who conducted the custodial investigation of appellant wherein
the latter was apprised of his rights to remain silent, to information and to
counsel. Appellant, however, orally waived his right to counsel. 6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated" which appellant signed, admitting therein the confiscation
of four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Pejoro likewise
informed the court below that, originally, what he placed on the receipt was
that only one marijuana leaf was confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However,
Lopez and Villaruz corrected his entry by telling him to put "two", instead of
"one" and "40", instead of "20". He agreed to the correction since they were the
ones who were personally and directly involved in the purchase of the
marijuana and the arrest of the appellant. 7
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant

at 5:30 P.M. of the day after the latter's apprehension, and the results were
practically normal except for his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also
did not find any trace of physical injury on the person of the appellant. The next
day, he again examined appellant due to the latter's complaint of gastro-
intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara discovered that
appellant has a history of peptic ulcer, which causes him to experience
abdominal pain and consequently vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant
came back with the same complaint but, except for the gastro-intestinal pain,
his physical condition remained normal. 8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant
facts, claiming that on the day in question, at around 4:30 P.M., he was
watching television with the members of his family in their house when three
persons, whom he had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying on the
assurance that they would just inquire about something from him at their
detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was told that they were
going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a different
route. While on board, he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to
alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached
the camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was
boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then
compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to
him. He denied knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and
insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the
reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered at the
hands of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office but
claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure the maltreatment to
which he was being subjected. After escaping, he proceeded to the house of his
uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching the place at around
6:30 or 7:30 P.M. There, he consulted a quack doctor and, later, he was
accompanied by his sister to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at
Floridablanca, Pampanga where he was confined for three days. 9
Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant

was hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga after undergoing abdominal pain
and vomiting of blood. He likewise confirmed that appellant had been suffering
from peptic ulcer even before the latter's arrest. 10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-
Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that
she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her
examination revealed that the caused for this ailment was appellant's peptic
ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or
contusion on his body. 11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial
court rendered judgment convicting appellant for a violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to
pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves were likewise
ordered confiscated in favor of the Government. 12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of

the lower court, contending in his assignment of errors that the latter erred in
(1) not upholding his defense of "frame-up," (2) not declaring Exhibit "G"
(Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3)
convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 13
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory and
evidence is to the effect that appellant actually sold only two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea bags were merely confiscated
subsequently from his possession, 14 the latter not being in any way connected
with the sale, the information alleges that he sold and delivered four tea bags
of marijuana dried leaves. 15 In view thereof, the issue presented for resolution
in this appeal is merely the act of selling the two tea gabs allegedly committed
by appellant, and does not include the disparate and distinct issue of illegal
possession of the other two tea bags which separate offense is not charged
herein. 16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be

clearly and unmistakably established. 17 To sell means to give, whether for
money or any other material consideration. 18 It must, therefore, be established
beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in
exchange for two twenty-peso bills. LLpr
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by

both parties, we are morally certain that appellant was caught in flagrante
delicto engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was
able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988,
did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself
creditably testified as to how the sale took place and his testimony was amply
corroborated by his teammates. As between the straightforward, positive and
corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative testimony
of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight and is more
entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the
utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and
abuse. 19 Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not
obtain in the case at bar. Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not effected
in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team before the
buy-bust operation was effected. 20 No ill motive was or could be attributed to
them, aside from the fact that they are presumed to have regularly performed
their official duty. 21 Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving
and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed, 22 erected as it
is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. To top it all, appellant was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance
for him to controvert the charge, he does not appear to have plausibly done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of
the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp
Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist therein, 23
confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four
tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and had a total weight of
3.8 grams of marijuana. 24 Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully
proved with certainty and conclusiveness. 25
Appellant would want to make a capital of the alleged inconsistencies and
improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Foremost,
according to him, is the matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea
bags from him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that he had nothing to do
with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the aforementioned "Receipt of
Property Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one who seized the same. 26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the
marijuana will not really matter since such is not an element of the offense with
which appellant is charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana
was confiscated from the possession of appellant. even, assuming arguendo
that the prosecution committed an error on who actually seized the marijuana
from appellant, such an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and,
as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a
whole nor reflects on the witnesses' honesty. 27 Besides, there was clearly a
mere imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant that he did not take
part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant, but he
participated in the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as the investigator of
their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills allegedly
confiscated from him were not powdered for finger-printing purposes contrary
to the normal procedure in buy-bust operation. 28 This omission has been
satisfactorily explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:
"Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in
conducting such operation you do not anymore provide a powder
(sic) on the object so as to determine the thumbmark or identity
of the persons taking hold of the object?
A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations because

we are lacking that kind of material in our office since that item
can be purchased only in Manila and only few are producing that,
sir. Cdpr
xxx xxx xxx

Q: It is not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime Laboratory,
CIS, as well as the office of NICA?
A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make a

request for that powder because they themselves, are using that
in their own work, sir." 29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark that
money bills used for entrapment purposes can under no mode of rationalization
be fatal to the case of the prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act
punishes "any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions." 30 The
dusting of said bills with phosphorescent power is only an evidentiary technique
for identification purposes, which identification can be supplied by other
species of evidence.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any
barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the lack of
pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not
reported to or booked in the custody of any barangay official or police
authorities. 31 These are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires
that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay
official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of pictures. On
the contrary, the police enforcers having caught appellant in flagrante delicto,
they were not only authorized but were also under the obligation to effect a
warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report
prepared by the police in connection with his apprehension. Said Booking Sheet
and Arrest Report 32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for selling
two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the confiscation of
another two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves." Below these
remarks was affixed appellant's signature. In the same manner, the receipt for
the seized property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant wherein
he acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills from him. 33
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits

inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's conformance to these documents are
declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They
were obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation
for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to show
that he was assisted by counsel. 34 Although appellant manifested during the
custodial investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not
made in writing and in the presence of counsel, 35 hence whatever
incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from him, either
verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence. 36 Besides, the arrest report
is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant

cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament from his predicament since
his criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently
proven. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs
requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction 37 which happens
the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. 38 In the present case,
and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond
any peradventure of doubt. cdphil
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell

marijuana to a total stranger. 39 We take this opportunity to once again
reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in
this case, belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at any time
and in any place. 40 It is not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to
sell to a total stranger, 41 for what matters is not an existing familiarity
between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the
sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves. 42 While there may be instances
where such sale could be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse
circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the incredibility of how the
accused supposedly acted on that occasion, we can safely say that those
exceptional particulars are not present in this case.
Finally, appellant contends that he as subjected to physical and mental
torture by the arresting officers which caused him to escape from Camp Olivas
the night he was placed under custody. 43 This he asserts to support his
explanation as to how his signatures on the documents earlier discussed were
supposedly obtained by force and coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for
evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. 44
The evidence on record is bereft of any support for appellants allegation of
maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the prosecution 45 and the other for the
defense, 46 testified on the absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily
injury, abrasions or contusions on the person of appellant. What is evident is
that the cause of his abdominal pain was hi peptic ulcer from which he had
been suffering even before his arrest. 47 His own brother even corroborated
that fact, saying that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer. 48
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he
had no reason whatsoever for not divulging the same to his brother who went
to see him at the camp after his arrest and during his detention there. 49
Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to the authorities nor file
appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors despite the opportunity to
do so 50 and with the legal services of counsel being available to him. Such
omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellant's story is a pure
fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations
that his arrest was baseless and premeditated for the NARCOM agents were
determined to arrest him at all costs. 51 Premeditated or not, appellant's arrest
was only the culmination, the final act needed for his isolation from society and
it was providential that it came about after he was caught in the very act of
illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly, this opinion cold have concluded
on a note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. However, Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, was further amended by Republic Act No. 7659
effective December 31, 1993, 52 which supervenience necessarily affects the
original disposition of this case and entails additional questions of law which we
shall now resolve.
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the

adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect:
"SECTION 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are
hereby amended to read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
'SECTION 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Prohibited Drugs . — The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.'
xxx xxx xxx

"SECTION 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to
read as follows:
'SECTION 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and

Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime . — The
penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article Ii
and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be
applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following
quantities:
xxx xxx xxx
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana.
xxx xxx xxx

'Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the
foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional t o reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity.'"

1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of
four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact,
stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial
inquiry would be whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act No.
7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty
provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. llcd
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit
originally amendatory and in substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of
the Revised Penal Code, 53 it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of
said Code the beneficent provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be
given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws. 54 The exception
in said article would not apply to those convicted of drug offenses since
habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of the
crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or
falsification. 55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could
neither have then been involved nor invoked in the present case, a corollary
question would be whether this court, at the present stage, can sua sponte
apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on
appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs .
Moran, et al., ante., thus:
". . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code,
declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable
to persons accused of a felony, would be useless and nugatory if the
courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty,
irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as
would also all provisions relating to the prescriptive of the crime and
the penalty."
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced

penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has already become final and
executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder, then practice,
procedure and pragmatic considerations would warrant and necessitate the
matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of habeas
corpus. 56
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable
penalties appears to have been committed in the drafting of the aforesaid law,
thereby calling for and necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now
further amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall
unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug. That penalty, according to the amendment to
Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or more
of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, the
penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending
upon the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the

penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the
maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also
as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or
more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited
and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting
provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, 57 we hereby hold that the
penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the
quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision correccional to
reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the
fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a
manner favorable to the accused.
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8
grams, hence covered by the imposable range of penalties under the second
paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law provides that the penalty
shall be taken from said range " depending upon the quantity" of the drugs
involved in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a
complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that is, prision correccional,
prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the Code provides
that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum,
the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum period. 58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and

aggravating circumstances determine which period of such complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of
Section 20, however, is its specific mandate, above quoted, that the penalty
shall instead depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal
transaction. 59 Accordingly, by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code and
to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the
aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable
penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the modifying
circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since each component
penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as
determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying
circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that component penalty,
as shall hereafter be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the

context of our aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless there are compelling
reasons for a deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second
paragraph be divided into three, with the resulting quotient, and double or
treble the same, to be respectively quotient, and double or treble the same, to
be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty proportionately among the
three aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana
involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision
correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to 749 grams,
reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a conjuncture penalty
only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. 60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the

case at bar, the penalty of prision correccional is consequently indicated but,
again, another preliminary and cognate issue has first to be resolved.
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years

and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three periods as provided in the text of
and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question is
whether or not in determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be
taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or absence of
mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability
should be taken into account. cdrep
The Court is not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in
imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should
not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however,
reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved
provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and
which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised
Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned
did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would
consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying
circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in
accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the
provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be
given supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the
latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties
provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal
Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked
where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special
law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined
in and ostensibly punished under special law, the penalty therefor is actually
taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and,
necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of
penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of
prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty
under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision
correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64
of the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating
circumstance.
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes

in the penalties imposed for offenses under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the
United States but differently from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal
Code and its Spanish origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of
penalties with definitive durations, such as imprisonment for one year or for
one to five years but without division into periods or any technical statutory
cognomen. This is the special law contemplated in and referred to at the time
laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law 61 were passed during the American
regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would

direct that an offense thereunder shall be punished under the Revised Penal
Code and in the same manner provided therein. Inceptively, for instance,
Commonwealth Act No. 303 62 penalizing non-payment of salaries and wages
with the periodicity prescribed therein, provided:
"SECTION 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or
laborer as required by section one of this act, shall prima facie be
considered a fraud committed by such employer against his employee
or laborer by means of false pretenses similar to those mentioned in
article three hundred and fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two
(a) of the Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the same
manner as therein provided." 63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein
were specifically punished by the penalties as technically named and
understood in the Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by Republic Act
No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto mayor
to death; 64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the
penalties run from arresto mayor to prision mayor; and Presidential Decree No.
1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving firearms), the
penalties wherefore may involve prision mayor, reclusion temporal, reclusion
perpetua or death.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14
years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months, when
committed without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things; not
less than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years, when committed
with violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and
life imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special
law are different from and are without reference or relation to those under the
Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the
application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory
provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code.
In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example,
Republic Act No. 5639. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and 8
months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the
medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised
Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other
penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the
law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code,
therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws
of the same formulation. cdrep
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the
correlative effects thereof under the Revised penal Code, as well as other
statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the
Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic act No.
1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866.
While these are special laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder
are those provided for in the Revised Penal Code lucidly reveals the statutory
intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code
the corresponding application to said special laws, in the absence of any
express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold otherwise would
be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an integrated system of
penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which could never have been
the intendment of Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda, 65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential

Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it
was contended by the prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised
Penal Code should not apply to said special law. We said therein that —
"We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a
special law entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal
Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the
classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised
Penal Code , which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in
special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as
an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense
of theft of large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject to
applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal
Code . . . Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, applicable, . . ."
(Emphasis supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on

penalties in the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act No. 6425, in this case
involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we have this more recent pronouncement:
". . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code shall be 'supplementary' to special laws, this
Court held that where the special law expressly grants to the court
discretion in applying the penalty prescribed for the offense, there is
no room for the application of the provisions of the Code. . .
"The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No.

1623, contains no explicit grant of discretion to the Court in the
application of the penalty prescribed by the law. In such case, the court
must be guided by the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code
concerning the application of penalties which distill the 'deep legal
though and centuries of experience in the administration of criminal
laws.'" (Emphasis ours.) 66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs

Act as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659 by the incorporation and
prescription therein of the technical penalties defined in and constituting
integral parts of the three scales of penalties in the Code, 67 with much more
reason should the provisions of said Code on the appreciation and effects of all
attendant modifying circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise, the
different kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for graduating such
penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act No.
6425, except if they would result in absurdities as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is
involved in the discussion on the role of modifying circumstances, we have
perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating circumstances should be
considered and applied only if they affect the periods and the degrees of the
penalties within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and

consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules
in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are
the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the
accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more
ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the
penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged
mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the
penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles
64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper
penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated
by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a

penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding
paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence,
when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be
imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise
consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If
this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this case consists
of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision correccional,
prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto
menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further
reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three
penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the
scale. LexLib
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be

appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even
reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for
this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of
Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and
that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not
to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res
magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law
may continue to have efficiency rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution
cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the
concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is

applicable to the case now before us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses
are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which would put him
within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not
involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of course, that the penalty as
ultimately resolved will exceed one year of imprisonment. 68 The more
important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be
ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate

sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that "if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same" We hold that this quoted portion of the
section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the penalty
imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal
Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be said that
the "offense is punished" under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on

indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws was necessary because
of the nature of the former type of penalties under said laws which were not
included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code,
hence there could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the rule for felonies
therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore
provided, this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last
examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier
noted, this holding is but an application and is justified under the rule of
contemporanea expositio. 69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No.
7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in
their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In
fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, we have
applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision
correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium
period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in the effect
punished by and under the Revised Penal Code . Correlatively, to determine the
minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs
that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules
of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." (Emphasis ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but also
an admission of the hornbook maxim that qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice.
Fortunately, this Court has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act
No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with regard to
the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its coverage "persons convicted
of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment," we have held
that what is considered is the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty
imposable under the law, 70 and that reclusion perpetua is likewise embraced
therein although what the law states is "life imprisonment."
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is

that under the concurrence of the principles of literal interpretation, which have
been rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court; of historical
interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law and related to
contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation, considering the
interrelation of the penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in
an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next lower to that
prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming
ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with
laws, which is the best mode of interpretation. 71
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of

compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused. 72 The
"minimum" sentence is merely a period at which, and not before, as a matter of
grace and not of right, the prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance
of his sentence outside of his confinement. 73 It does not constitute the totality
of the penalty since thereafter he still has to continue serving the rest of his
sentence under set conditions. That minimum is only the period when the
convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his release on parole
may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration
may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served the minimum
sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant
should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of
arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the
maximum range we have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of
the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the
minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1
day of prision correccional. The difference, which could thereby even involve
only one day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in the
judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of

conviction rendered by the court a quo against accused-appellant Martin Simon
y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he
hereby is, sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the
minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as the maximum thereof. LibLex
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
Davide, Jr., see separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J ., dissenting:
I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in appropriate cases where
the penalty to be imposed would be prision correccional pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 16 of R.A.
No. 7659, the sentence to be meted out, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (Act No. 4103, as amended), should be that whose minimum is within the
range of the penalty next lower, i.e., arresto mayor; and (b) the presence of two
or more mitigating circumstances not offset by any mitigating circumstances or
of a privileged mitigating circumstance shall not reduce the penalty by one or
two degrees if the penalty to be imposed, taking into account the quantity of
the dangerous drugs involved, would be prision correccional. cdphil
The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No. 7659
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their
technical terms, hence also their technical signification and effects, then what
should govern is the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
which directs that:
"in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense."

Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the
Revised Penal Code for the offenses penalized under the Dangerous Drugs Act
(R.A. No. 6425), as amended, the latter offenses would now be considered as
punished under the Revised Penal code for purposes of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended

by Act No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also provides that:
"if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same."
(Emphasis supplied).
There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which should be taken

into account in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1) offenses
punished by the Revised Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by other laws
(or special laws).
The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are those defined and
penalized in Book II thereof, which is thus appropriately titled CRIMES AND
PENALTIES. To simplify further, a crime is deemed punished under the Revised
Penal Code if it is defined by it, and none other, as a crime and is punished by a
penalty which is included in the classification of Penalties in Chapter II, Title III
of Book I thereof.
On the other hand, an offense is considered punished under any other law
(or special law) if it is not defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code but
by such other law.
It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if

both its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the said Code, and it is
deemed punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are
found in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the Revised
Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense in the
special law punished by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The
reason is quite simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and
imposes a penalty therefor, although it adopts the Code's nomenclature of
penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the
Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense thereunder an offense
"punished or punishable" by the Revised Penal Code. LexLib
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted
the penalties prescribed by the Revised Penal Code in drug cases, offenses
related to drugs should now be considered as punished under the Revised Penal
Code. If that were so, then we are also bound, ineluctably, to declare that such
offenses are mala in se and to apply the Articles of the Revised Penal Code
regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature of participation (Article
16), accessory penalties (Articles 40-45), application of penalties to principals,
accomplices, and accessories (Article 46 et seq.), complex crimes (Article 48),
and graduation of penalties (Article 61), among others. We cannot do otherwise
without being drawn to an inconsistent posture which is extremely hard to
justify.
I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act
of the penalties in the Revised Penal Code does not make an offense under the
Dangerous Drugs Act an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code.
Consequently, where the proper penalty to be imposed under Section 20 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is prision correccional, then, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the indeterminate sentence to be meted on the accused should
be that whose minimum should not be less than the minimum prescribed by
the special law (the Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six (6) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional.
II
The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for
the Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is a complex one composed of three
distinct penalties, viz., prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion
temporal, and that pursuant to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code, each
should form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as
the medium, and the most severe as the maximum, yet, considering that under
the said second paragraph of Section 20 the penalty depends on the quantity of
the drug subject of the criminal transaction, then by way of exception to Article
77 of the Revised Penal Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20, as
amended, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a
principal penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereafter,
applying the modifying circumstances pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code, the proper period of the component penalty shall then be fixed.
To illustrate, if by the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana

below 250 grams) the proper principal penalty should be prision correccional,
but there is one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, then the penalty
to be imposed should be prision correccional in its minimum period. Yet, the
majority opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares:
"The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances
may be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding
penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should
such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or
lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three
component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each
be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest
penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not to
depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses."
Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion temporal —
if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of the drugs
involved — by two degrees, or to prision correccional, if there are two or more
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance is present
(paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal code) or if there is a privileged
mitigating circumstance of, say, minority (Article 68, Revised Penal Code), or
under circumstances covered by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if
the proper penalty to be imposed is prision mayor, regardless of the fact that a
reduction by two degrees is proper, it should only be reduced by one degree
because the rule does not allow a reduction beyond prision correccional. Finally,
if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision correccional, no reduction at all
would be allowed.
I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary
because within the same second paragraph involving the same range of
penalty, we both allow and disallow the application of Article 64(5), Article 68,
and Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the disallowance, viz.,
in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses, is unconvincing
because Section 20 of the Dangerous Drug Act, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses by providing quantity
as basis for the determination of the proper penalty and limiting fine only to
cases punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It is unfair because an
accused who is found guilty of possessing MORE dangerous drugs — say 500 to
749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be imposed would be
reclusion temporal — may only be sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day
o f prision correccional minimum because of privileged mitigating
circumstances. Yet, an accused who is found guilty of possession of only one (1)
gram of marijuana — in which case the penalty to be imposed is prision
correccional — would not be entitled to a reduction thereof even if he has the
same number of privileged mitigating circumstances as the former has. prLL
Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority

of the accused, then he is entitled to the reduction of the penalty as a matter of
right pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
"ARTICLE 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under
eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minor under eighteen
years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph
next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be
observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age,

who is not exempted from Liability by reason of the court having
declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty
shall be imposed, but always Lower by two degrees at Least than
that prescribed by Law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of

age the penalty next Lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period."
I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of the

Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, we can be at
liberty to apply the Revised Penal Code in one aspect and not to apply it in
another.
Feliciano and Quiason, JJ ., dissent.
Footnotes
** This case was initially raffled to the Second Division of the Court but due to the
novelty and importance of the issues raised on the effects of R.A. No. 7659 in
amending R.A. No. 6425, the same was referred to and accepted by the
Court en banc pursuant to Circular No. 2-89 and Bar Matter No. 209, as
amended.
1. Original Record, 2; Criminal Case No. G-2320, Regional Trial Court, Branch 51,
Guagua, Pampanga.
2. Ibid., 11.
3. Ibid., 23.
4. TSN, April 6, 1989, 5-32.
5. Ibid., May 5, 1989, 2.

6. Ibid., May 24, 1989, 18; May 5, 1989, 11.
7. Ibid., May 24, 1989, 21-24.
8. Ibid., June 14, 1989, 3-22.

9. Ibid., July 10, 1989, 5-26.
10. Ibid., July 17, 1989, 8-16.
11. Ibid., August 18, 1989, 36, 41-43, 47-49.

12. Original Record, 174-175; per Judge Arsenio P. Roman.
13. Brief for Accused-Appellant, 3; Rollo, 54.
14. Exhibits F and G, Folder of Exhibits; TSN, July 10, 1989, 53.
15. Original Record, 2.

16. See People vs. Salamat, G.R. No. 103295, August 20, 1993.
17. People vs. Alilin , G.R. No. 84363, March 4, 1992, 206 SCRA 772.
18. See People vs. Querrer, G.R. No. 87147, July 15, 1992, 211 SCRA 502.
19. People vs. Lati, G.R. No. 70393, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA 336.
20. TSN, May 5, 1989, 5.
21. Sec. 3(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.

22. See People vs. Labra, G.R. No. 98427, November 20, 1992, 215 SCRA 822.
23. TSN, August 18, 1989, 3.
24. Ibid., id., 12; Exhibit M, Folder of Exhibits.
25. People vs. Celiz, et al., G.R. No. 92849, October 20, 1992, 214 SCRA 755.
26. Brief for Accused-Appellant, 4-5; Rollo, 55-56.
27. People vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 86495, May 13, 1992, 209 SCRA 1.
29. TSN, May 5, 1989, 7.
30. People vs. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990, 188 SCRA 376.
31. Brief for Accused-Appellant, 6-7; Rollo, 57-58.
32. Exhibit F, Folder of Exhibits.
33. Exhibit G, ibid.

34. People vs. Mauyao , G.R. No. 84525, April 26, 1992, 207 SCRA 732.
35. TSN, May 5, 1989, 11.
36. Sec. 12 (1), Art. III, 1987 Constitution.

37. People vs. Rumeral, G.R. No. 86320, August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA 194.
38. People vs. Sibug, G.R. No. 108520, January 24, 1994.

40. People vs. Tandoy, G.R. No. 80505, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 28.
41. Cf. People vs. Cina , G.R. No. 88220, October 1, 1990, 190 SCRA 199.
42. People vs. Consuelo , G.R. No. 77755, April 18, 1990, 184 SCRA 402.
43. TSN, June 10, 1989, 12-13.

44. People vs. Eslaban , G.R. Nos. 101211-12, February 8, 1993, 218 SCRA 534.
45. TSN, June 14, 1989, 22.
46. Ibid., August 18, 1989, 48.

47. Ibid., July 17, 1989, 15-16.
48. Ibid., October 23, 1988, 15-16.
49. Ibid., July 17, 1989, 22; October 23, 1988, 15.
50. Ibid., July 10, 1989, 26-27.
52. Sec. 28 of Republic Act No. 7659 provides that it "shall take effect fifteen (15)
days after its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation," and it was so published in the December 16, 1993 issues of the
Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and Philippine Time Journal.
53. Title Five, Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs.
54. U.S. vs. Hocbo, 12 Phil. 304 (1908); U.S. vs. Parrone, 24 Phil. 29 (1913); U.S. vs.
Almencion, 25 Phil. 648 (1913); People vs. Moran, et al., 44 Phil. 387 (1923);
People vs. Parel, 44 Phil. 437 (1923); People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225 (1935).
55. Article 62 (5), Revised Penal Code.
56. See Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741 (1948); Gumabon, et al. vs.
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 420.
57. Lopez and Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 100 Phil. 850 (1957).
58. Article 77, Revised Penal Code.

59. This graduated scheme of penalties is not stated with regard and does not
apply to the quantities and their penalties provided in the first paragraph, the
penalties therein being the same regardless of whether the quantities exceed
those specified therein.
60. Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 20, R.A. No. 7659.
61. Act No. 4103, effective on December 5, 1933.
62. Effective on June 9, 1938.

63. See a similar format in P.D. No. 330 which penalizes the illegal taking of timber
and forest products under Arts. 308, 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
by reference.
64. In fact, the penalty for officers or ranking leaders was prision mayor to death,
just like the penalty for treason by a resident alien under Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code.
65. G.R. No. 51368, November 6, 1081, 109 SCRA 35.
66. People vs. Tsang Hin Wai, et al., G.R. No. 66389, September 8, 1986, 144 SCRA
22. in his sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No. 891 as Chairman of the
Special Committee on the Death Penalty, Senator Arturo M. Tolentino made
this enlightening explanation as reported in the records of the Senate and
which is pertinent to our present discussion: ". . . Article 190, referring to
prohibited drugs, actually was repealed by the enactment of a special law
referring to drugs. But since we were only amending the Revised Penal Code
in this proposed bill or draft, we reincorporated Article 190 in an amended
form. . . . It reincorporates and amends Article 190 on the importation,
manufacture, sale, administration upon another, or distribution of prohibited
drugs, planting or cultivation of any plant, which is a source of prohibited
drugs, maintenance of a den, dive or similar place, as defined in the
Dangerous Drugs Law" (9th CRP, 1st Regular Session, Vol. 1, No. 71, 12).
67. See Articles 25, 70 and 71, Revised Penal Code.
68. Section 2, Act No. 4103, as amended.
69. Contemporaneous exposition, or construction; a construction drawn from the

time when, and the circumstances under which, the subject-matter to be
construed, such as a custom or statute, originated (Black's Law Dictionary,
4th ed., 390).
70. People vs. Roque, et al., 90 Phil. 142 (1951); People vs. Dimalanta, 92 Phil. 239
(1952); People vs. Moises, et al., G.R. L-32495, August 13, 1975, 66 SCRA
151.
71. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi modus
(Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 953).

72. People vs. Nang Kay, 88 Phil. 515 (1951).
73. 24 C.J.S., Indeterminate Sentence, Sec. 1993, 1217-1218.

Plaintiff-Appellee Respondent: People of The Philippines, Martin Simon Sunga

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Plaintiff-Appellee Respondent: People of The Philippines, Martin Simon Sunga

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Plaintiff-Appellee Respondent: People of The Philippines, Martin Simon Sunga

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 93028. July 29, 1994.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiﬀ-appellee, vs. MARTIN

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF WITNESS; WHEN MADE

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCREPANCY ON MINOR MATTER; NEITHER AFFECTS

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE FOR GRADUATING PENALTIES; APPLICATION IN

Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on

The evidence on record shows that a conﬁdential informant, later

Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical oﬃcer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant

Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testiﬁed to the fact that appellant

Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of

To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be

After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by

A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations because

xxx xxx xxx

A: Our oﬃce is only adjacent to those oﬃces but we cannot make a

However, we ﬁnd and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits

Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant

Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell

The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the

'SECTION 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and

xxx xxx xxx

'SECTION 20. Application of Penalties, Conﬁscation and

5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana.

xxx xxx xxx

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If the judgment which could be aﬀected and modiﬁed by the reduced

In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the

Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and

It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the

Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the

4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years

5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes

Subsequently, a diﬀerent pattern emerged whereby a special law would

In People vs. Macatanda, 65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential

More particularly with regard to the suppletory eﬀect of the rules on

"The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No.

Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs

Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and

Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a

The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be

6. The ﬁnal query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is

It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate

There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on

What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is

The Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of

ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of

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Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended

There are, therefore, two categories of oﬀenses which should be taken

It is thus clear that an oﬀense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if

To illustrate, if by the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana

Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority

1. Upon a person under ﬁfteen but over nine years of age,

2. Upon a person over ﬁfteen and under eighteen years of

I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of the

5. Ibid., May 5, 1989, 2.

8. Ibid., June 14, 1989, 3-22.