Combat Air Power 1996
Combat Air Power 1996
Combat Air Power 1996
September 1996
COMBAT AIR POWER
Joint Mission
Assessments Needed
Before Making
Program and Budget
Decisions
G A O
years
1921 - 1996
GAO/NSIAD-96-177
United States
GAO General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
Comptroller General
of the United States
B-272206
Congressional Committees
The Department of Defense plans to spend over $300 billion on programs already in progress to
modernize its combat air power capabilities over the next 15 to 20 years. Hundreds of billions of
dollars more will likely be required for programs, such as the Joint Strike Fighter, that are still
being defined or that can be expected to be started over the next several years. The Department
will face difficult decisions as it attempts to cover the high cost of these and other defense
acquisitions when the nation is moving toward a balanced budget.
This comprehensive report on U.S. air power examines whether the Secretary of Defense has
sufficient information from a joint perspective to prioritize programs, objectively weigh the
merits of new program investments, and decide whether current programs should receive
continued funding. To provide context for this assessment, we summarize major changes in U.S.
air power capabilities since 1991 and the broad capabilities of potential adversaries. We build
on and synthesize the findings of six individual air power reviews that we conducted over the
past 2 years and draw from other GAO reports on air power weapons programs.
This report was prepared under the direction of Richard Davis, Director, National Security
Analysis, who may be reached on (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any questions. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Charles A. Bowsher
Comptroller General
of the United States
B-272206
No other nation relies as heavily on combat air power for its military
Purpose strength or has invested as much in it as the United States. The
Department of Defense (DOD) has initiated major acquisition programs
estimated to cost over $300 billion to modernize its combat air power
forces over the next 15 to 20 years. These forces include about 5,900
fighter and attack aircraft, including long-range bombers equipped for
conventional missions and attack helicopters; specialized combat support
aircraft; advanced weapons for the combat aircraft; long-range missiles;
theater air defense forces; and other key air power assets.
Title 10 of the U.S. Code and DOD’s functions directive authorize each of
Background the military services to acquire air power assets to meet its
responsibilities. DOD’s current air power assets, many of which perform
multiple missions, were largely developed through the military services’
investments of hundreds of billions of dollars primarily to acquire
autonomous combat air power capabilities in preparation for a global war
with the Soviet Union. The Air Force acquired bombers to deliver nuclear
strikes and fighter and attack aircraft for conventional and theater-nuclear
missions in the major land theaters, principally Europe. The Navy built an
extensive carrier-based aviation force to control the seas and project
power into the Soviet Union’s maritime flanks. The Army developed attack
1
These include interdiction, air superiority, close support, air refueling, suppression of enemy air
defenses, and surveillance and reconnaissance.
helicopters to provide air support to its ground troops. The Marine Corps
acquired fighter and attack aircraft and attack helicopters to support its
ground forces in their areas of operation. While each service had many
similar capabilities, each also largely operated within its own spheres.
Today, the geographic areas of operations for combat air power that
characterized much of the Cold War no longer apply. The air power
components of the four services are now focused on joint operations with
a strategy of preparing to fight two major regional conflicts versus a global
war. Most of the likely theaters of operation are small enough that, with
available refueling support, all types of aircraft can reach most targets.
The individual services have always been the primary players in the
acquisition process based on their broad responsibilities to organize, train,
and equip their forces under title 10 of the U.S. Code. However, to achieve
a stronger joint orientation in DOD, Congress enacted the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
This act gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
commanders in chief (CINC) of the combatant commands stronger roles in
Department matters, including the acquisition process. As principal
military adviser to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is now expected
to advise the Secretary on the priority of requirements identified by the
CINCs and the extent to which program recommendations and budget
proposals of the military departments conform with these priorities. The
Chairman is also expected to submit to the Secretary alternative program
recommendations and budget proposals to achieve greater conformance
with CINC priorities. Subsequent legislation has given the Chairman
additional responsibilities to examine ways DOD can eliminate or reduce
duplicative capabilities and to assess military requirements for defense
acquisition programs from a joint warfighting military perspective.
GAO believes that the Chairman could better advise the Secretary of
Defense on air power programs and budgets if he conducted more
comprehensive assessments in key mission areas. Broader assessments
that tackle the more controversial air power issues would enable the
Chairman to better assist the Secretary of Defense to make the difficult
trade-off decisions that will likely be required. However, certain
long-standing obstacles must be overcome if the key challenges related to
air power are to be met head on. The Chairman must be the strong
advocate for the joint perspective that the Goldwater-Nichols legislation
intended. The well-being of the U.S. military as a whole must be placed
above the interests of the individual services. And if circumstances change
and program adjustments are needed, the Secretary and the Chairman
must be willing to challenge the strong constituencies that develop around
major acquisition programs. If DOD is to shape its force smartly within the
bounds of likely budgets, existing levels of redundancy in capability must
be questioned, and no program, once begun, should be considered
irrevocable.
Principal Findings
Despite Downsizing, U.S. The United States has made many significant improvements to its combat
Air Power Capabilities air power capabilities in recent years. Although DOD has reduced its total
Remain Formidable combat aircraft about 28 percent since the end of the Persian Gulf War, the
military services continue to retain about 5,900 advanced combat aircraft.
These aircraft are increasingly being supplemented by other air power
assets such as long-range cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and
theater air defense forces.
Additionally, DOD has more than tripled its inventory of long-range missiles
to attack ground targets and has improved the range and accuracy of many
of them. Funds are also being spent to advance U.S. forces’ ability to
identify targets and communicate information quickly to combatant units.
These advances are expected to further enhance the capabilities of current
forces. Figure 1 highlights several significant advances in U.S. air power
capabilities since fiscal year 1991.
Figure 1: Increases in Key U.S. Combat Air Power Capabilities Since the End of Fiscal Year 1991
Night-capable
Night-capable aircra
aircraft 961
Note: Long-range missiles include the Tomahawk cruise missile and the Army Tactical Missile
System. Night-fighting aircraft include new and existing aircraft equipped with infrared detection
devices or with cockpits that permit use of night-vision goggles. The precision-guided munition
(PGM)-capable aircraft include new or existing aircraft equipped to autonomously employ PGMs
using laser designators.
Potential Adversaries’ Although potential adversaries possess capabilities that threaten U.S. air
Capabilities Are Likely to power missions, the severity of these threats appears to be limited.
Remain Limited Potential adversaries’ air defense capabilities cannot currently prevent
U.S. air power from achieving military objectives. Their conventional
offensive air power capabilities are judged to be limited until at least early
in the next century. Projections are that the countries in question are likely
to improve their defensive and offensive capabilities only marginally over
at least the next 10 years.
Costly Modernization The services are proceeding with costly acquisition programs to attain
Programs Planned Without greater capabilities in mission areas where U.S. capabilities are already
Sufficient Analysis of substantial. The long-range modernization of DOD’s combat air power
centers on four extremely expensive aircraft development programs—the
Needs and Capabilities Navy’s $81 billion, 1,000-plane F/A-18E/F fighter/attack aircraft; the Air
Force’s $70 billion, 438-plane F-22 air superiority fighter; the Army’s
$45 billion, 1,292-plane Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter; and
the Air Force/Navy 2,978-plane Joint Strike Fighter that is still being
defined. Based on DOD’s goals for the Joint Strike Fighter, the
Congressional Budget Office estimates the program could cost
$165 billion, excluding inflation. Table 1 summarizes acquisition cost
estimates for combat aircraft, weapons (including PGMs, theater air
defense weapons, and close support artillery), and support systems such
as surveillance and reconnaissance assets. (A more detailed list is in
app. III.)
DOD faces a major challenge in attempting to pay for all of the programs as
planned. While DOD believes these modernization plans are affordable, a
1996 Congressional Budget Office analysis of the F/A-18E/F, F-22, and
Joint Strike Fighter costs and likely funding available for these programs
raises serious doubts and indicates that about $3 billion (1997 dollars)
more will be required annually than may be available during the period
2002-2020.
Joint Warfighting DOD has taken steps to improve the information the Secretary of Defense
Assessments Need to Be and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have to assess air power
More Comprehensive plans, programs, and budgets. To enhance the information available on
combat requirements and capabilities, DOD has initiated major studies
related to deep attack weapons, close support of ground forces,
reconnaissance forces, and electronic warfare. It also expanded the role of
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and established 10 joint
warfighting capability assessment teams to support the deliberations of
the Council. These assessment teams have identified ways to improve the
interoperability of forces in joint operations, and their assessments have
contributed to some decisions that could help to avoid future levels of
redundancy. However, the assessment teams thus far have had little
impact in identifying unneeded overlaps and duplication in existing
capabilities or in weighing the relative merits of alternative ways to
recapitalize U.S. air power forces. GAO also found little evidence that the
Council, with the support of the assessment teams, has developed specific
proposals to shift resources among the services to enhance total force
capability.
To ensure the future viability of U.S. air power, the Secretary of Defense
Recommendations will need to make decisions in at least two critical areas—how best to
reduce duplications and overlaps in existing capabilities without
unacceptable effects on force capabilities and how to recapitalize the
force in the most cost-effective way. To make such decisions, the
Secretary must have better information from a joint perspective.
Accordingly, GAO recommends that the Secretary, along with the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop an assessment process that yields
more comprehensive information in key mission areas. This can be done
by broadening the current joint warfare capabilities assessment process or
developing an alternative mechanism.
In written comments (see app. IV) on a draft of this report, DOD partially
Agency Comments concurred with GAO’s recommendations. While DOD said it disagreed with
and GAO’s Evaluation many of GAO’s findings, most of that disagreement centered on two
principal points: (1) the Secretary of Defense is not receiving adequate
advice, particularly from a joint perspective, to support decision-making
on combat air power programs, and (2) ongoing major combat aircraft
acquisition programs lack sufficient analysis of needs and capabilities.
DOD said it has taken many steps in recent years to improve the extent and
quality of joint military advice and cited the joint warfighting capability
assessment process as an example. It said the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary receive comprehensive advice on combat air power programs
through DOD’s planning, programming, and budgeting system and systems
acquisition process. The Department’s response noted that both the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff scrutinize major acquisition programs and that joint military force
assessments and recommendations are provided. DOD acknowledged that
the quality of analytical support can be improved but said that the extent
of support available has not been insufficient for decision-making.
GAO acknowledges that steps have been taken to provide improved joint
advice to the Secretary and that DOD decision support systems provide
information for making decisions on major acquisition programs. GAO does
not believe, however, the information is comprehensive enough to support
resource allocation decisions across service and mission lines. Much of
the information is developed by the individual services and is limited in
scope. Only a very limited amount of information is available on joint
requirements for performing missions, such as interdiction and close
support, and on the aggregate capabilities available to meet those
requirements. DOD’s initiation of the deep attack weapons mix study and,
more recently, a study to assess close support capabilities suggests that
DOD is, in fact, beginning to seek more comprehensive information about
cross-service needs and capabilities, as our recommendation suggests.
While joint warfighting capability assessment teams have been
established, DOD is not using these teams to identify unnecessary or overly
redundant combat air power capabilities among the services. Moreover,
DOD has not used the teams to help develop specific proposals or strategies
to recapitalize U.S. air power forces, a major combat air power issue
identified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Information on
issues such as recapitalization alternatives and redundancies in
capabilities, developed from a joint warfighting perspective, could be
invaluable to decisionmakers who must allocate defense resources among
competing needs to achieve maximum force effectiveness.
Executive Summary 4
Chapter 1 20
U.S. Combat Air Power 20
Introduction Key Guidance Affecting Combat Air Power Forces 21
DOD Roles and Responsibilities 22
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 24
Chapter 2 26
Combat Air Power Force Structure Has Been Changing 26
U.S. Air Power Is Combat Air Power Capabilities Continue to Be Improved 32
Formidable and Specialized Aircraft Are Receiving Upgrades 36
Integration and Interoperability Offer Enhancement Across 38
Improving Mission Areas
Conclusions 39
Chapter 3 40
Current Threats to U.S. Air Power Are Limited 40
Capabilities of Arms Transfers Are Down in a Market Now Dominated by United 42
Potential Adversaries States and Its Allies
High Costs and Export Restrictions May Limit Advances in 46
Are Limited and Will Capability
Likely Be Slowly A Capable Force Requires More Than Advanced Weapons 48
Improved Conclusions 48
Chapter 4 49
Planned Investments Pose a Financial Challenge 49
Air Power DOD Has Planned Major Investments Without Adequately 51
Modernization Defined Requirements
Some Investments Are Proceeding Without Clear Justification 53
Programs Are Not Additional Capability May Not Be Needed in Some Mission Areas 53
Based on Joint Conclusions 58
Assessments
Chapter 5 60
Key Defense Legislation Has Sought to Better Integrate the 60
Decisions on Air Military Forces
Power Programs and New Oversight Process Has Had a Limited Impact 63
DOD Must Overcome Certain Obstacles to Achieve a Stronger 68
Priorities Require Joint Orientation
Comprehensive Joint Conclusions 71
Assessments
Chapter 6 73
Conclusions 73
Conclusions, Recommendations 75
Recommendations, Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 76
and Agency
Comments and Our
Evaluation
Appendixes Appendix I: Combat Air Power Systems 80
Appendix II: Aircraft Inventory Levels (1991 and 1996) 82
Appendix III: Major Combat Air Power Program Funding Status 84
Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense 85
Appendix V: Major Contributors to This Report 91
Abbreviations
Introduction
Air power has played a pivotal role in America’s military force since World
War I when aircraft were first used in combat. In World War II, it was
indispensable to U.S. forces to achieve victory. After the war, the
Department of the Navy invested in longer-range aircraft and larger
aircraft carriers to provide worldwide coverage from the sea. With the
proven success of air power and development of the
intercontinental-range bomber, the Department of the Air Force was
established in 1947, with the Air Force taking its place alongside the other
three services. During the Cold War, America’s air power was a critical
element of both its nuclear deterrent forces and its conventional combat
forces. A massive U.S. aerospace industry developed, giving the United
States a research, development, and production base that has dramatically
advanced airframes, propulsion, avionics, weapons, and communications,
and helped shape and broaden the role of air power in U.S. military
strategy.
Today the Department of Defense (DOD) has what some refer to as the
“four air forces,” with each of the services possessing large numbers of
aircraft. Air power includes not only fixed-wing aircraft but also attack
helicopters, long-range missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other
assets that give the United States the ability to maintain air superiority and
to project power worldwide through the air. During the Persian Gulf War,
the unparalleled capabilities of these forces were demonstrated as U.S.
and coalition forces dominated the conflict.
In addition to these fighter and attack aircraft, DOD has other important
combat aviation elements, including over 1,500 specialized support
aircraft, such as those used for refueling, command and control,
reconnaissance, and suppressing enemy air defenses, and about 250
aircraft in its special operations forces. Appendix I identifies the principal
aircraft, long-range missiles, and other weapons and assets that were
covered by our review.
Two key DOD documents that provide guidance concerning the planning
Key Guidance for and use of combat air power are the Secretary of Defense’s Defense
Affecting Combat Air Planning Guidance and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s current
Power Forces National Military Strategy dated 1995. These documents build on the
strategy, plans, and programs identified in the Bottom-Up Review.
and surveillance; refueling; and global lift. The ability of combat aircraft to
respond quickly to regional contingencies makes them particularly
important in the post-Cold War era.
The authority of the military departments to acquire air power and other
DOD Roles and assets stems from their broad legislative responsibilities to prepare forces
Responsibilities for the effective prosecution of war (Title 10 U.S. Code). DOD Directive
5100.1, which identifies the functions of the DOD and its major
components, authorizes the military departments to develop and procure
weapons, equipment, and supplies essential to fulfilling their assigned
functions. Under the directive, the Army’s primary functions include the
preparation of forces to defeat enemy land forces and seize, occupy, and
defend land areas; the Navy’s and/or Marine Corps’ functions include the
preparation of forces to gain and maintain general naval supremacy and
prosecute a naval campaign; and the Air Force, the preparation of forces
to gain and maintain air supremacy and air interdiction of enemy land
forces and communications. The Marine Corps is also expected to conduct
amphibious operations. All services are authorized to develop capabilities
to attack land targets through the air to accomplish their primary
missions.1 The directive also states that the military departments are to
fulfill the current and future operational requirements of the combatant
1
For a more detailed discussion of service roles, missions and functions, see Roles and Functions of
U.S. Combat Forces: Past, Present, and Prospects, Congressional Research Service, Report No. 93-72S,
Jan. 21, 1993.
The individual services have always had the primary role in weapons
acquisition. In an attempt to strengthen the joint orientation of the
Department, Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This act, which amended title 10, gave
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders
stronger roles in Department matters, including weapons acquisition. It
designated the Chairman as principal military adviser to the President, the
National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense and gave him
several broad authorities. For example, the Chairman is expected to
provide for strategic direction of the armed forces, prepare strategic plans,
perform net assessments of the capabilities of U.S. and allied armed forces
compared with those of potential adversaries, and advise the Secretary on
the requirements, programs, and budgets of the military departments in
terms of the joint perspective.
The overall objective of this review was to assess whether the Secretary of
Objectives, Scope, Defense has sufficient information from a joint perspective to help him
and Methodology decide whether new investments in combat air power should be made,
whether programmed investments should continue to be funded, and what
priority should be given to competing programs. To gain a broad
perspective on the context in which these decisions are made, we sought
to determine (1) how U.S. air power capabilities have changed since the
end of fiscal year 1991; (2) what potential threat adversary forces pose to
U.S. air power; (3) what contribution combat air power modernization
programs will make to aggregate U.S. capabilities; and (4) how joint
warfighting assessments are used to support the Secretary in making air
power decisions.
The scope of our review included (1) fighter and attack aircraft, including
attack helicopters and long-range bombers equipped for conventional
missions; (2) key specialized support aircraft that enhance the capability
of combat aircraft; (3) munitions employed by combat aircraft; and
(4) other major systems—particularly long-range missiles, theater air
defense systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles—that perform missions
traditionally assigned to combat aircraft. Our scope did not encompass
assets dedicated primarily to airlift, such as the C-17 and V-22 aircraft, and
U.S. special operations forces. Also, the potential contribution of allied
forces was not considered.
We reviewed in detail six key mission areas in which combat air power
plays a prominent role:
2
Directions for Defense (Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,
May 24, 1995).
While force downsizing may give the appearance of a loss in capability, the
United States continues to retain in its conventional inventory about 5,900
modern fighter and attack aircraft, including 178 long-range bombers and
1,732 attack helicopters, and over 1,500 specialized support aircraft. It also
has growing inventories of advanced precision air-to-air and air-to-ground
weapons for its combat aircraft to carry and an expanding arsenal of
accurate long-range surface-to-surface missiles to strike ground targets.
Inventory levels for the aircraft included in our review are shown in
appendix II.
DOD has spent billions of dollars in recent years to make its current
frontline combat aircraft and helicopters more efficient and effective.
These enhancements include improved navigation, night fighting, target
acquisition, and self-protection capabilities as well as more aircraft
capable of using advanced munitions. Specialized support aircraft used for
air refueling and surveillance and reconnaissance, which are vital to the
effectiveness of combat aircraft, have also been improved, while forces for
suppressing enemy air defenses are being restructured. Additionally,
advances in the ability of U.S. forces to identify targets and communicate
that information quickly to combatant units should further enhance the
capabilities of current forces.
The size and composition of the U.S. combat air power force structure
Combat Air Power have changed considerably since fiscal year 1991, the year the Persian Gulf
Force Structure Has War ended. Cutbacks in the number of combat aircraft adopted by the
Been Changing Bush administration and further cutbacks by the Clinton administration in
its 1993 Bottom-Up Review are scheduled to be completed in 1997. While
the number of fighter and attack aircraft, including B-1B bombers and
attack helicopters, is being reduced about 28 percent from 1991 levels,
other new and emerging elements of combat air power, such as long-range
missiles and theater air defense forces, have grown in number and
capability. Specialized support aircraft have experienced varying levels of
change in their inventory.
Fighter and Attack Aircraft Changes in aviation needs since the end of the Cold War, coupled with
Inventories Are Smaller cuts in defense spending, have led DOD to reduce its combat aircraft
inventory. These changes have been most pronounced for Air Force, Navy,
and Marine Corps fixed-wing fighter and attack aircraft and Air Force
bombers—from about 6,400 in 1991 to about 4,160 in 1996. DOD considers
about 65 percent of these aircraft as authorized to combat units to perform
Figure 2.1: Changes in DOD Fighter and Attack Aircraft Inventory, Fiscal Years 1991 Through 1996
Aircraft inventory
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Fiscal year
Note: Figures are as of the end of the fiscal year. Figures for 1996 are projections.
Persian Gulf War, including about 70 F-15E strike fighters, about 250 F-16
multimission fighters, and 200 F/A-18 fighter and attack aircraft. Changes
in inventory levels by aircraft model are shown in appendix II.
Some important capabilities are being retired as these older aircraft are
removed from the inventory. For example, the Navy will lose the payload,
range, and all-weather capability of the A-6, and the Air Force will lose the
speed and nighttime-precision bombing capability of the F-111. DOD
believes, however, that it can do without these assets, given the dangers it
expects to face and the high costs of upgrades, operations, and support
that it can avoid by retiring these aircraft.
Figure 2.2: Changes in Army and Marine Corps Attack Helicopter Inventory
1,500
1,000
500
0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Fiscal year
Long-Range Missile From fiscal years 1991 through 1996, about $4.5 billion was appropriated
Inventories Increasing to acquire long-range missiles, and the combined inventories of these
missiles more than tripled from 1,133 to over 3,750. (This does not include
conventional air-launched cruise missiles as inventory data on those
weapons is classified.) The Navy Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile and
the Army tactical missile system (ATACMS) have been used to attack a
variety of fixed targets, including air defense and communications sites,
often in high-threat environments. The Gulf War and subsequent
contingency operations, including, most recently, September 1996 attacks
on Iraqi military installations, have demonstrated that long-range missiles
can carry out some of the missions of strike aircraft while they reduce the
risk of pilot losses and aircraft attrition.
Specialized Aircraft DOD has not reduced its inventories of combat support aircraft used for
Inventories Have nonlethal suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and air refueling to the
Experienced Varying same extent as its fixed-wing combat forces. Inventory levels of
specialized surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft have been reduced
Changes significantly but will be replaced by other reconnaissance assets.
Figure 2.3 shows the changes in the inventory levels for these type of
specialized aircraft.
Figure 2.3: Fiscal Year 1996 Specialized Aircraft Inventories as a Percent of Fiscal Year 1991 Inventories
Nonlethal SEAD
Air refueling
Surveillance and
reconnaissance
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percent of 1991 fleet size
Though DOD’s aviation force is smaller today, many of the combat aircraft
Combat Air Power are newer and more highly capable, allowing for greater flexibility in the
Capabilities Continue employment of force across a broader range of operating environments.
to Be Improved Acting on lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War and
recommendations made by organizations such as the Defense Science
Board, DOD has taken steps to make many of the remaining combat aircraft
more capable, to include improvements such as autonomous navigation,
night fighting, target acquisition, and self-protection and the employment
of advanced munitions. Based on aircraft performance during the Gulf
War, DOD has identified these capabilities as vital to the efficiency and
effectiveness of attack aircraft. Advances in miniaturizing and
modularizing subsystems have allowed DOD to enhance aircraft capabilities
within existing airframes, overcoming concerns about space and weight
limitations. Theater air defense systems are also being improved as
concern increases about cruise and ballistic missiles armed with weapons
of mass destruction. Similarly, DOD has enhanced the capabilities of
specialized support aircraft and long-range missiles and plans further
improvements to these systems.
Navigation, Night Fighting, Congress has mandated that all DOD aircraft be able to use the global
and Targeting Capabilities positioning system by the end of fiscal year 2000. This system allows for
of Combat Aircraft precise positioning and navigation across a broad range of missions,
contributing to better situational awareness and more efficient use of
Continue to Be Enhanced forces. It also can be used to deliver munitions accurately in all weather
conditions.
1
Pods are detachable compartments that house electronic equipment used for such functions as
targeting, navigation, and self-protection.
A-10 or AV-8B2 Harrier aircraft were used during the Gulf War, but today
A-10 pilots can use night vision goggles, and the night attack AV-8B is
equipped with a navigation forward-looking infrared pod, and its pilots are
equipped with night vision goggles. The number of night-capable
helicopters has grown by more than 500 as more Apaches and Kiowa
Warriors have entered the Army fleet and more AH-1W Cobra helicopters
have entered the Marine Corps fleet. The change in night fighting
capability since 1991 for selected aircraft types is shown in figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Increase in Night Fighting Capability Since Fiscal Year 1991
Number of aircraft
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Attack helicopters F/A-18 A-10 F-16C/D
Today, more than 600 F-15Es and F-16s can use all or part of LANTIRN for
night fighting. The Air Force plans to equip 250 F-16s with cockpit changes
that will enable their pilots to use night vision goggles to complement the
LANTIRN capability. Inventories of night-capable F/A-18 aircraft have grown
2
Night-capable AV-8B aircraft were in the inventory at the time of the Gulf War. However, since pilots
had not been trained in the use of the system, no night-capable AV-8Bs were used in the war.
by more than 350 from 1991 to 1996, as DOD invested hundreds of millions
of dollars in forward-looking infrared pods. More than 250 A-10 attack
aircraft have been equipped for night operations. Although about 355
night-capable Navy A-6 and Air Force F-111F aircraft will be gone from the
inventory by the end of fiscal year 1996, overall, DOD increased the number
of night-capable combat aircraft by over 900. Beginning in 1996, many
Navy F-14 aircraft started receiving LANTIRN and night vision cockpit
modifications.
Self-Defense Capabilities To enhance the survivability of attack aircraft, the services are equipping
of Combat Aircraft Are them with new self-protection jammers, upgraded radar warning receivers,
Being Improved and increased expendable countermeasures. In past work, we have noted
performance problems with many of these systems. In addition, the Air
Force is currently adding towed decoys to further enhance the
survivability of its F-16s. Also, the Marine Corps plans to (1) add a missile
warning system to its AV-8B and AH-1W aircraft to alert aircraft crews of a
missile attack and (2) install the combined interrogator transponder on its
F-18C/D aircraft to enable crews to identify other aircraft beyond visual
range as either friendly or hostile. This identification capability is expected
to reduce the incidence of fratricide. During the Gulf War, only the Air
Force F-15 had this capability.
More Combat Aircraft Can Equipping aircraft with the subsystems needed to employ advanced
Use Advanced Munitions munitions is a critical force enhancement that DOD considers necessary to
successfully execute its military strategy. DOD is making a sizable
investment in such weapons. For example, it estimates it will spend over
$15 billion on five major precision-guided munitions (PGM) for its combat
aircraft—the joint stand-off weapon (JSOW), the joint direct attack
munition (JDAM), the Longbow Hellfire missile, the sensor fused weapon,
and the joint air-to-surface standoff missile. Additionally, other PGMs for
aircraft valued at nearly $4 billion entered the inventory from 1992 through
1996.
More than nine times as many F-16s and, with the growth in F-15E
inventory, one-and-a-half times as many F-15Es can employ PGMs in 1996
than could do so in 1991.3 Overall, DOD estimates it has about twice as
many aircraft capable of employing these types of weapons as it did during
the Gulf War. The Hellfire missile has given more Army and Marine Corps
helicopters a PGM capability. Future PGM development will concentrate on
3
For these purposes, a PGM capability is the autonomous ability to employ laser-guided munitions.
New Threats Force Growth In response to the growing threat of theater ballistic missiles that are used
in Air Defense in regional conflicts and can be armed with weapons of mass destruction,
DOD is increasing funding to upgrade existing and planned air defense
systems—a critical component of U.S. air superiority forces—and plans
more advanced developments as the threat evolves. The Army’s Patriot
PAC-3 and upgrades to the Navy’s area defense system will provide the
near-term response to this threat. Upgrades to the Air Force E-3 and Navy
E-2C surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft should also enhance
capabilities to counter the long-range cruise missile threat through
improved detection of cruise missiles en route to their targets. The
Space-Based Infrared System is also being developed to aid in missile
warning and missile defense. DOD plans to spend over $6 billion during the
next 5 years to develop future theater missile defense systems, including
the theater high-altitude air defense system.
Long-Range Missiles Offer Since the Gulf War, the Navy has improved its Tomahawk missile’s
More Capability operational responsiveness, target penetration, range, and accuracy. It has
added global positioning system guidance and redesigned the warhead and
engine in the missile’s block III configuration that entered service in 1993.
The Navy will upgrade or remanufacture existing Tomahawk missiles with
(1) jam-resistant global positioning system receivers and an inertial
navigation system to guide the missile throughout the mission and (2) a
forward-looking terminal sensor to autonomously attack targets. These
missiles are expected to enter service around 2000.
The ATACMS block IA, scheduled for delivery in fiscal year 1998, is an
upgrade that will nearly double the range of the missile and increase its
accuracy. More advanced versions of the ATACMS—block II and IIA—will
use the brilliant anti-armor submunition, which is scheduled to enter
service after the turn of the century. This submunition will give the missile
the ability to acquire, track, and home on operating armored vehicles deep
into enemy territory.
The services are also selectively upgrading their specialized aviation assets
Specialized Aircraft for surveillance and reconnaissance, SEADs, and air refueling. Coupled with
Are Receiving force restructuring, DOD expects these upgrades to enhance combat
Upgrades operations and expand opportunities to perform joint operations and
provide cross-service support.
Surveillance and DOD has identified battlefield surveillance as a critical force enhancement
Reconnaissance needed to improve the capabilities, flexibility, and lethality of general
Capabilities Are Being purpose forces and ensure the successful execution of the National
Military Strategy. The Air Force and Navy have improved existing sensors
Improved that enhance the capability of current surveillance and reconnaissance
aircraft—the U-2R, RC-135V/W, and EP-3E—to provide intelligence
support to combat forces. Heading the list of battlefield surveillance
improvements, as shown in the Secretary of Defense’s annual report, is the
E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System. With its synthetic
aperture radar and moving target indicator, this system is designed to
provide wide area, real-time information on the movement of enemy
forces to air and ground units. Also, DOD has invested hundreds of millions
of dollars, and plans to invest about $1.5 billion more over the next
5 years, to develop and procure unmanned aerial vehicles. DOD expects
that these vehicles will provide complementary battlefield reconnaissance
and reduce the need for manned reconnaissance aircraft to penetrate
enemy airspace.
The Air Force is improving its E-3 and the Navy its Hawkeye E-2C aerial
surveillance and control aircraft in their roles as early warning and
airborne command and control platforms. For the E-3, $220 million was
appropriated for fiscal year 1996 to improve the aircraft’s capabilities.
Annual modification expenditures for the E-2C more than doubled in 1995
from those in 1991, despite a shrinking inventory. The Air Force RC-135
and Navy EP-3E signals intelligence aircraft are also being upgraded to
improve the collection and dissemination of intelligence data.
DOD Is Restructuring Its SEAD—the synergistic use of radar and communications jamming and of
Electronic Warfare Forces destruction through the use of antiradiation missiles—is recognized to be
a critical component of air operations, as it improves the survivability of
other U.S. aircraft in combat areas. In establishing funding priorities, DOD
has decided to retire certain Air Force SEAD aircraft—the F-4G and
EF-111A jammer—and replace them with a new Air Force system, the high
speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) targeting system on the F-16C, and an
When the Air Force completes the retirement of its most capable lethal
SEAD aircraft, the F-4G, at the end of fiscal year 1996, it will primarily rely
on 72 F-16C aircraft equipped with the HARM targeting system. However,
the EA-6B, which will replace the EF-111 in the Air Force’s nonlethal SEAD
role, can also target and fire HARM missiles. It also has a
communications-jamming capability that will allow it to supplement the
Air Force’s heavily burdened communications jammer, the EC-130H
Compass Call. The Air Force has also decided to upgrade its EC-130H fleet
to meet new threats.
Recognizing that too few EA-6B aircraft may be available to meet both Air
Force and Navy needs, DOD plans to retain 12 EF-111s in the active
inventory through the end of 1998, when additional upgraded EA-6Bs
should be available. Though the performance of the two platforms is not
the same, and the multiservice use of the same platform will entail some
logistics support challenges, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
believes that retiring the EF-111 represents a “prudent risk” that DOD can
take to more fully fund higher priority needs. DOD believes the SEAD
mission is important and will retain about 140 radar and communications
jamming aircraft and over 800 aircraft able to fire antiradiation missiles in
its force structure.
Cross-Service Air From the end of 1991 through 1996, the Air Force will have replaced the
Refueling Capability engines on 126 KC-135 tankers at a cost of over $20 million per aircraft.
Continues to Grow These reengined aircraft offer up to 50 percent greater fuel off-load
capacity and quieter, cleaner, and more fuel-efficient performance with
lower maintenance requirements. The Air Force is considering the same
upgrades to about 140 more KC-135s.
4
Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses May Be Too Low
(GAO/NSIAD-96-128, April 10, 1996).
There has been debate as to whether the success of the coalition air forces
Integration and during the Gulf War was an evolutionary or revolutionary advancement in
Interoperability Offer the conduct of air warfare. While many combat technologies—stealth,
Enhancement Across night fighting, and PGMs—proved valuable, delays in the processing of
intelligence and targeting information, and difficulty in communicating
Mission Areas that information to the forces that could use it, minimized the full impact
of advanced combat technologies. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff has stated that the development of a “system of systems”—the
integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance with precision
force through the more rapid processing and transfer of targeting and
other information—offers the greatest enhancement in joint warfighting
capability.
5
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Tactical Air Warfare, Nov. 30, 1993.
is to link all air defense forces to provide the faster transfer of targeting
information.
1
Potential adversaries were identified through discussions with DOD representatives. We have
intentionally not identified these countries to keep this report unclassified.
until the middle of the next decade, if at all. Though the threat to military
forces from conventionally armed missiles is low, the possibility that such
weapons could be used for political purposes—and possibly armed with
nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads—may affect the employment of
U.S. forces.
The volume of arms transfers has fallen significantly in recent years and is
Arms Transfers Are not expected to reach its former levels any time soon. The principal
Down in a Market nations selling and buying arms are the United States and its allies. Since
Now Dominated by potential adversaries depend on foreign technology to improve their
capabilities, changes in the arms market could have a substantial effect on
United States and Its their ability to modernize their forces.
Allies
The value of the cross-border transfer of conventional arms fell by more
than two-thirds from 1987 to 1994—from almost $79 billion to $22 billion
in 1994 dollars worldwide, according to the latest available data from the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). The share of the
international arms market held by the former Soviet Union, now shown as
Russia, and China has fallen from a combined 40 percent to about
10 percent over the same period. At the same time, the share of the arms
market held by the United States and several close allies has grown from
43 percent to 79 percent of all transfers (See fig. 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Trend in the Worldwide Transfer of Conventional Arms (Constant 1994 Dollars in Billions)
100
80
60
40
20
0
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a primary supplier of arms to
the Third World, often providing weapons without charging for them. Now
Russia generally requires payment, often in hard currency, for the
weapons it transfers. The latest available ACDA data show worldwide
Soviet Union/Russian transfers fell from $23.1 billion in 1987 to $1.3 billion
in 1994. China also reduced its arms exports over that period.2 Agreements
for future deliveries also fell for Russia and China from the levels of the
1980s. However, Russia has increased the value of its agreements for
future weapons deliveries since 1992.
2
An August 15, 1996, Congressional Research Service report on conventional arms transfers shows an
increase in transfers in 1995 over 1994. The percentage of the market held by Russia and China
increased to 13 percent. The United States and its allies remained the dominant suppliers of arms and
developing countries friendly to the United States were the principal recipients.
While overall arms transfers have fallen, those who have been buying have
shown a preference for American and Western European equipment.
Buyers prefer proven high quality weapons that are accompanied by good
logistics support. For the most recent 3-year period available, 1992 to 1994,
the arms market in terms of actual arms transfers has been dominated on
the seller side by the United States and a few of its North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies, and on the buyer side by allies of the United
States in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Transfers to the Middle
East by supplier are shown in figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Arms Transfer Deliveries to the Middle East by Source (1992-94)
sources, and some of that total also went to U.S. Gulf War allies in the
Middle East.
The pattern for arms sales agreements for future deliveries is similar; that
is, the United States and its NATO allies are the dominant suppliers (see
fig. 3.3).
Figure 3.3: Agreements for Future Deliveries to the Middle East by Source (1992-94)
U.S.and
U.S. andallies
Allies 92%
(92%)
Rest of World 4%
From 1992 to 1994, almost 92 percent of the value of sales agreements for
future conventional arms deliveries to the Middle East were made by the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Only 8 percent
of agreements for future Middle East deliveries originated from Russia,
China, or the rest of the world.
the Cold War ended. Development programs have been slowed in many
cases, and major weapon production programs have been subject to delay,
reduction, or cancellation. Although arms producers want to continue
exports to protect domestic jobs and reduce the cost of modernizing their
own forces, they are presently finding few large buyers. Arms deliveries to
India have fallen substantially and transfers to Pakistan have fallen since
1990. The buying spree of America’s Persian Gulf allies has also slowed. At
the same time, potential adversaries that may desire advanced weapons
have not been obtaining them or placing orders with producers, in part
because of economic constraints and internationally imposed limits on
arms transfers.
Weapons Prices Increase The high technology weapons that could seriously threaten U.S. air power
While Potential are expensive, no matter what the source. For example, each aircraft that
Adversaries’ Economies is part of the original Eurofighter 2000 tactical aircraft contract is
projected to cost about $75 million. An advanced surface-to-air system like
Stagnate the Patriot PAC-3 costs over $100 million per battery. Nations that depend
on export sales of selected commodities to finance their militaries or that
have closed economies could find it much harder to afford high
technology systems. The more likely course for these nations is to upgrade
their existing equipment, either by mixing new components with their old
systems or through other upgrade programs from arms suppliers. Although
such attempts could offer new challenges to the United States and its
allies, they would be less threatening than more modern equipment.
International Agreements Part of the National Military Strategy entails increasing cooperation with
Could Inhibit Capability regional allies while containing regional powers not friendly to the United
Enhancements States and its allies. Conventional arms control is part of this strategy.
Some international agreements/collaborations and domestic weapons
export policies are designed to limit the opportunities for regional powers
DOD’s plans for modernizing its air power forces call for spending several
hundred billion dollars on new air power programs to further enhance U.S
capabilities that are already formidable. These programs, which are likely
to be a significant challenge to pay for, are proceeding even though DOD
has not sufficiently assessed joint mission requirements. Without such
assessments, the Secretary of Defense does not have the information
needed to accurately assess the need for and priority of planned
modernization programs.
The largest segment of DOD’s planned air power investments reflects the
plan to replace aging fighter and attack aircraft. With the large defense
buildup of the 1980s and the changed national security environment of the
1990s, in recent years DOD has significantly cut back on the procurement of
such aircraft. These aircraft, which include the F-15s, F-16s, and
F/A-18C/Ds for which production lines remain open, are highly capable
aircraft. Nevertheless, DOD plans to replace them with more advanced and
costly systems, but not necessarily on a one-for-one basis. The costs to
replace the older model aircraft with new ones are projected to be quite
substantial in the next decade. In fact, DOD estimates that it will spend
about as much to procure combat aircraft in the next decade as it spent
during the 1980s force buildup, even with the figures adjusted for inflation.
1
Defense Infrastructure: Budget Estimates for 1996-2001 Offer Little Savings for Modernization
(GAO/NSIAD-96-131, Apr. 1996).
2
Acquisition Reform: Efforts to Reduce the Cost to Manage and Oversee DOD Contracts
(GAO/NSIAD-96-106, Apr. 1996).
DOD has done little analysis to establish joint mission area requirements for
DOD Has Planned some specific combat air power missions or to plan the aggregate
Major Investments capabilities needed by each of the services to meet those requirements.
Without Adequately Studies that may provide such information on several key air power
missions have been initiated but were not completed at the end of our
Defined Requirements review. Without such analyses, decisions on the need for new weapon
systems, major modifications, and added capabilities evolve from a
requirements generation process that encourages each service to maintain
its own view of how its own capabilities should be enhanced to meet
warfighting needs.
In its May 1995 report, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the
Armed Forces substantiated what our reviews of defense programs have
3
Modernizing Tactical Aircraft, Statement of Cindy Williams, Assistant Director, National Security
Division, Congressional Budget Office, before the Subcommittee on Military Research and
Development and the Subcommittee on Military Procurement, Committee on National Security, House
of Representatives, June 27, 1996.
found, that “each Service is fully engaged in trying to deliver to the CINCs
what the Service views as the best possible set of its specific
capabilities—without taking into account the similar capabilities provided
by the other Services.” The analyses used to generate weapon system
requirements for new acquisition programs are most often narrowly
focused. They do not fully consider whether the capabilities of the other
services to perform a given mission mitigate the need for a new acquisition
or major modification.
4
An acquisition program that is not a highly sensitive program and that is estimated to require
research, development, test, and evaluation expenditures of more than $355 million (in fiscal year 1996
constant dollars) or procurement expenditures of more than $2.135 billion (in fiscal year 1996 constant
dollars).
DOD has defended its requirements generation system, saying the services
have valid complementary requirements in many of the mission areas. In
its opinion, the overlapping capabilities acquired add to the options
available to U.S. leadership in a crisis and allow combatant commanders
to tailor a military response to any contingency. We acknowledge that
flexibility is important to respond to contingencies and that a certain
amount of overlapping capability is needed. The question is whether, in
the post-Cold War era, the United States needs or can afford to sustain
current levels of redundancy. Advanced combat systems are not only
costly to acquire, they are also expensive to operate and maintain. For
example, DOD data indicates that the annual direct cost to operate and
support an F-14 in the active inventory is about $2.2 million, an F-18 about
$1.7 million, an F-15 about $3.2 million, and an F-16 about $2.2 million.
These figures include the cost of the aircrews.
5
For example, only 3 of the 12 close support programs we reviewed were classified as major defense
programs subject to JROC review. The other nine programs, with estimated costs totaling over
$5 billion for fiscal years 1996 through 2001, were not reviewed.
In the area of air-to-air combat—a critical mission to achieve and retain air
superiority—over 600 combat-designated F-14 and F-15 fighter aircraft are
dedicated to this mission. This number far exceeds the quantity and quality
of fighter aircraft potential adversaries are projected to have. In addition,
about 1,900 other combat designated multirole fighter aircraft, such as
F-16s and F/A-18C/Ds, while not dedicated to air superiority missions, are
very capable air superiority fighters. These aircraft could assist F-14s and
F-15s to defeat enemy fighters before being used for other missions such
as interdiction and close support. The capabilities of these fighter aircraft
have also been enhanced extensively with the procurement of advanced
weapons—particularly over 7,400 advanced medium range air-to-air
missiles—and through continuing improvements to these weapons and to
support platforms, such as airborne warning and control system aircraft,
that help the fighters locate, identify, track, and attack enemy aircraft at
great distances. Despite the unparalleled U.S. air-to-air capabilities, the Air
Force plans to begin to replace its F-15s with 438 F-22 fighters in 2004, at
Changed Security Given the current security environment, the extensive aggregate
Environment Appears to capabilities U.S. forces now possess may lessen the need to proceed with
Lessen Need for Some several key modernization programs as currently planned, since the
capabilities being acquired are not urgently needed. The two most
Programs prominent examples are the planned production of F-22 air superiority
fighters and modifications to the B-1 bombers.
The Air Force is proceeding with plans to begin to acquire F-22 air
superiority fighter aircraft in fiscal year 1999 and rapidly accelerate the
pace of production to 48 aircraft per year. This is being done despite the
services’ unmatched capabilities in air-to-air combat. The Air Force
initiated the F-22 (advanced tactical fighter) program in 1981 to meet the
projected threat of the mid-1990s. Since the F-22 entered engineering and
manufacturing development, the severity of the projected threat in terms
of quantities and capabilities has declined. Instead of confronting
thousands of modern Soviet fighters, U.S. air forces now expect to
confront potential adversaries that have few fighters with the capability to
challenge the F-15, the current U.S. frontline fighter. Further, our analysis,
reported in March 1994, indicated that the current inventory of F-15s can
be economically maintained in a structurally sound condition until 2015 or
later. Thus, the planned rapid increase in the rate of production to achieve
In the case of the B-1B bomber, DOD needs to reexamine the need to keep
this aircraft in the inventory and make several billion dollars of
modifications to it. With the Cold War over and a reduction in the
requirement for a large fleet of manned penetrating bombers that can
deliver nuclear warheads in a global nuclear war, the B-1B will no longer
be part of the U.S. nuclear force. The Air Force plans to modify its fleet of
95 B-1Bs to increase their conventional capability and sustainability. The
B1Bs can currently carry only the 500-pound unguided, general-purpose
bomb and cluster munitions; but after the modification, the B-1Bs will be
able to carry more types of conventional ordnance. Several factors make
the continued need for B-1Bs questionable. First, DOD considers its current
capability sufficient to meet its requirement to interdict enemy targets
identified in two major regional conflicts. Second, our analysis of Air
Force targeting data indicates the modified B-1B would strike a very small
percentage of the Air Force’s designated targets. Third, combatant
command officials stated they would use far fewer B-1Bs than DOD cites as
necessary. Fourth, other Air Force and Navy aircraft can launch the same
munitions as the modified B-1B and others.
6
Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned (GAO/NSIAD-94-118,
Mar. 1994) and Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22 Aircraft Should
Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 1995) discuss the issues of the F-15’s capabilities and
concurrency planned in the development and production of the F-22.
issues surrounding the B-1 are discussed in our report on the bomber
force, which we expect to issue shortly.
Viable, Less Costly Analysis suggests that viable, less costly program alternatives may be
Program Alternatives May available for some mission areas. The Navy’s planned purchase of 1,000
Be Available F/A-18E/F fighter aircraft at an estimated cost (as of Dec. 1995) of
$81 billion is a case in point. The F/A-18E/F is intended to replace
F/A-18C/D aircraft and to perform Navy and Marine Corps fighter escort,
interdiction, fleet air defense, and close support missions. The aircraft’s
origins are traceable to a 1988 study that identified upgrade options to the
F/A-18C/D in performing these missions. However, the operational
deficiencies in the F/A-18C/Ds that the Navy cited in justifying the
F/A-18E/F either have not materialized as projected or can be corrected
with nonstructural changes to the F/A-18C/D. Furthermore, the
F/A-18E/F’s operational capabilities will only be marginally improved over
the F/A-18C/D. In addition, while the F/A-18E/F will have increased range
over the F/A-18C/D, the F/A-18C/D range will exceed the range required by
the F/A-18E/F’s system specifications, and the F/A-18E/F’s range increase
is achieved at the expense of its combat performance. Also, modifications
to increase the F/A-18E/F’s payload have created a problem when
weapons are released from the aircraft that may reduce the F/A-18E/F’s
potential payload capability.
Over the years, the Navy has improved the operational capabilities of the
F/A-18C/D so that procuring more of them, rather than the new model
F/A-18E/F aircraft, could be the most cost-effective approach to
modernizing the Navy’s combat aircraft fleet in the mid-term. In this
regard, additional upgrades, should they be needed, could be made to the
F/A-18C/D, which would further improve its capabilities. These upgrades
include a larger fuel tank for more range and strengthened landing gear to
increase carrier recovery payload. Then, for the long term, the Joint Strike
Fighter could be an alternative to the F/A-18E/F. The Joint Strike Fighter’s
operational capabilities are projected by DOD to be equal or superior to the
F/A-18E/F at a lower unit cost.
DOD continues to support both the F/A-18E/F and the Comanche programs.
It said it is convinced that the fundamental reasons to develop the
F/A-18E/F remain valid, but provided us no new data or information to
support this. Regarding the Comanche, DOD believes it considered a wide
range of alternatives before deciding on the Comanche. DOD’s positions are
discussed in our reports on the F/A-18E/F and Army aviation
modernization.7
DOD faces considerable funding challenges in modernizing its forces for the
Conclusions next century under its current plans. This is particularly so with fighter
and attack aircraft, where the replacement of many aircraft scheduled for
retirement in the next decade with costly new aircraft would require
substantial resources. To ensure a viable combat-ready force in the future,
DOD needs to deliberately consider the need for and priority of major
investments in relation to joint requirements and aggregate service
capabilities. Each represents a major long-term commitment and therefore
7
Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost
(GAO/NSIAD-96-98, June 18, 1996) and Army Aviation: Modernization Strategy Needs to Be Reassessed
(GAO/NSIAD-95-9, Nov. 21, 1994).
National Security Act of In many respects, the circumstances leading Congress to enact the
1947 Sought Integration of National Security Act of 1947 parallel those surrounding the current
Military Capabilities debate over defense spending and modernization priorities. The military
services’ lack of unified policy and planning during World War II, when the
Army and Navy existed as separate military organizations reporting to the
President, led to this major piece of defense legislation. This act created a
National Military Establishment (later renamed the Department of
Defense) to provide policy direction over the individual services and
formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In enacting this legislation,
Congress sought to better integrate the distinct military capabilities of the
services. The services subsequently agreed in 1948 on their respective
Goldwater-Nichols Almost 40 years after the National Security Act sought to better integrate
Legislation Attempted to military capabilities, concerns over the need for a stronger joint
Strengthen DOD’s Joint orientation in the Department of Defense arose. Concerns about a
perceived imbalance between service and joint advice ultimately led to the
Orientation Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
(Goldwater-Nichols). A major Senate Armed Services Committee report
leading to the legislation pointed out that (1) the military services were not
articulating DOD’s strategic goals or establishing priorities; (2) the military
services dominated the force planning, programming, and budgeting
process; (3) the Joint Chiefs of Staff system was not yielding meaningful
recommendations on issues affecting more than one service, and the
services retained an effective veto over nearly every Joint Chiefs action;
and (4) DOD’s excessive functional orientation was inhibiting the
integration of service capabilities along missions lines. This report
concluded that inadequate integration could lead to unwarranted
duplication, gaps in warfighting capability, and unrealistic plans.
Although DOD officials believe that progress has been made toward a
stronger joint orientation within DOD, some of the key provisions of
Goldwater-Nichols aimed at preventing unnecessary overlap and
duplication have not had the intended effect. For example, to ensure
reexamination of opportunities to reduce overlap and duplication,
Goldwater-Nichols directed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to
periodically report to the Secretary of Defense his recommendations on
how the assigned functions of the armed services should be changed to
avoid undue redundancy. The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1993 added additional matters for the Chairman to consider in his report,
including the extent to which the armed forces’ efficiency would be
enhanced by the elimination or reduction of duplication in capabilities of
DOD components. The Chairman completed two reviews—the most recent
in 1993—but neither has led to significant changes in service roles,
missions, and functions involving combat air power.
The Commission concluded in its report that joint thought and action
needed to become a compelling reality throughout DOD if the objectives of
Goldwater-Nichols were to be realized. It recommended various actions to
improve the management structures and decision support processes
related to DOD’s requirements development and budgeting. A key
conclusion in this regard was that the JROC and OSD staff needed to have a
greater ability and willingness to address DOD needs in the aggregate.
Accordingly, the Commission recommended that the JROC’s charter over
joint requirements formulation be strengthened. It also recommended that
DOD increase the technical and analytic capacity of the Joint Staff to better
assist the Chairman and Vice Chairman. The Secretary of Defense
requested more study of several key Commission proposals. Many of these
studies were still underway or the results were under consideration within
DOD at the completion of our review.
Since the spring of 1994, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint
New Oversight Chiefs of Staff have taken steps to implement a process to assess U.S.
Process Has Had a warfighting needs and capabilities from a joint perspective. This process,
Limited Impact which has centered around the JROC, is intended to provide the Chairman,
and ultimately the Secretary of Defense and the Congress, with a joint
view on program and budget issues. Both the Chairman and Vice
Chairman recognized that the requirements generation and resource
allocation processes depended heavily on each service’s assessment of its
individual needs and priorities and that requirements had not been
sufficiently reviewed from a joint perspective.
In response to these concerns, the JROC’s role was expanded and a new
process to assess warfighting capabilities from a joint mission perspective
was established to support the JROC’s deliberations. While this process has
contributed to changes that should improve joint warfighting, its role is
still evolving, and its impact on air power programs and budgets has been
limited.
JROC’s Role Has Expanded Between 1986 and 1994, the JROC served as the principal forum for senior
military leaders to review and validate mission need statements for major
defense acquisition programs. Approved mission statements are reviewed
by the Defense Acquisition Board, which decides whether concept studies
of solutions should be performed.
In early 1994, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Vice
Chairman to expand the JROC charter to more fully support the Chairman
in executing his statutory responsibilities. In addition to validating mission
needs statements for major defense acquisition programs, Council
responsibilities now include assisting the Chairman in (1) assessing joint
warfighting capabilities, (2) assigning a joint priority among major
weapons meeting valid requirements, and (3) assessing the extent to
which the military departments’ program recommendations and budget
proposals conform with established priorities. Under the Fiscal Year 1996
Defense Authorization Act, title 10 of U.S. Code was amended to include
the JROC and its functions. The function of assigning priorities was revised
and expanded through this legislation to include assisting the Chairman in
identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements
JROC
The Fiscal Year 1996 Defense Authorization Act also designated the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Chairman of the JROC. Other
Council members include an Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps officer in
the grade of general and a Navy admiral. The Chairman can delegate his
functions only to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who for
years has chaired the Council. In executing its responsibilities, JROC does
not vote, but rather develops a consensus, or unanimity, in the positions it
takes.
New Assessment Process To assist the JROC in advising the Chairman on joint warfighting
Established to Improve capabilities, the joint warfighting capability assessment (JWCA) process
Joint Perspective was established in April 1994. Under this process, 10 assessment teams
have been established in selected mission areas (see fig. 5.2).
Strike
Information warfare
Regional engagement/presence
Joint readiness
The Chairman uses the information from the JWCA team assessments to
develop two key documents—the Chairman’s Program Recommendations,
which contains his recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for
consideration in developing the Defense Planning Guidance, and the
Chairman’s Program Assessment, which contains alternative program
recommendations and budget proposals for the Secretary’s consideration
in refining the defense program and budget.
JWCA Process Has The JWCA process has been in existence over 2 years and is still evolving.
Improved Dialogue on Representatives of both the Joint Staff and OSD believe that the process has
Joint Issues led to more systematic and extensive discussions of joint issues among the
top military leadership. They also believe that JWCA briefings have led to
more informed and extensive discussions of joint issues within the JROC.
Progress has been made on some interoperability issues as a result of the
process. For example, in response to a JROC tasking, a JWCA team combined
with Joint Staff elements to assess the interoperability of intelligence
sensors and processors, fusion, and communication systems. According to
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the team’s recommendations will
improve the interoperability among the individual services’ platforms so
that data can be provided in a more timely manner to the battlefield.
JWCA teams have also, on at least one occasion, been used in conjunction
with other DOD elements to study key issues for the Secretary of Defense.
In 1994, in response to a request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
JROC chairman formed a study group using representatives of three JWCA
teams and several offices within OSD to examine issues related to precision
strikes on targets and required intelligence support. The study group
briefed the JROC on its findings and recommendations concerning
databases, battlespace coverage, joint targeting doctrine, battle damage
assessment, and other areas. A key recommendation was that intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance and command, control, and
communications considerations be fully integrated early into the weapon
system acquisition process. To implement this recommendation, the group
devised revisions to DOD acquisition regulations that have been adopted.
JWCA Process Has Not While the new JWCA process has raised the level of attention and sensitivity
Tackled Controversial Air to joint issues, we found little evidence that the process is identifying
Power Issues unnecessary or overly redundant air power capabilities, confronting the
According to representatives from several JWCA teams, the teams have not
been identifying tradeoffs among combat air power forces or programs to
reduce redundancies. We were told that, unless specifically directed by the
JROC, the JWCA teams are not empowered to develop such proposals. The
primary example cited to us of an impact the JWCA teams had on reducing
overlap among the services was DOD’s decision to retire the Air Force’s
EF-111 radar jamming aircraft and consolidate the services’ airborne radar
jamming capabilities into one platform—the Navy’s EA-6B. Documentation
provided us, however, only indicates that the JWCA process became
involved subsequent to the approval of the consolidation, when the Deputy
Secretary of Defense asked the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to study the associated operational issues. The air superiority JWCA team
performed the study, which included evaluating the performance of the
EA-6B, developing an integrated operational concept for the consolidation,
proposing a transition schedule, and assessing the requirement for
upgrades to the EA-6B.
Joint Staff officials told us JWCA teams have not examined the affordability
of individual weapon systems in their assessments. Moreover, according to
one Joint Staff official, attempts to raise these larger, more controversial
issues have not led to specific JWCA assessment mandates from the JROC.
For example, the JWCA teams elevated recapitalization and affordability
issues to the JROC in December 1995. At these meetings, the issue of the
affordability of acquiring high-priced aircraft, particularly after the turn of
the century under projected budgets, was raised. According to Joint Staff
officials, the top 20 most expensive acquisition programs—half of them
aircraft—were presented to the JROC during these meetings. Although the
JROC and the services conceptually agreed on the need to scrutinize the
cost of tactical aircraft, the JROC has not taken any concrete actions or
directed the JWCA teams to further study the affordability issue.
Additionally, we found little evidence that the JROC, with the support of the
JWCA process, has developed specific proposals to transfer resources from
one service to another to meet higher priority needs. A review of Future
Years Defense Program data also indicates no notable shifts in acquisition
funding among the services between fiscal years 1994 and 2001. A key goal
of the JROC, according to the Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, is to enhance force capability by assisting the Chairman in
proposing cross-service transfers of resources. Additionally, Joint Staff
officials told us the JWCA teams have not developed proposals to shift
funding among programs to reflect higher priorities from a joint
perspective.
In assessing the impact of the JROC and the JWCA process on combat air
power, we examined two important ultimate outputs of the process—the
Chairman’s Program Assessment and Program Recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense. Under its broadened mandate, the JROC has been
made a focal point for addressing joint warfighting needs. It is expected to
support the Chairman in advising the Secretary by making specific
programmatic recommendations that will, among other things, lead to
increased joint warfighting capability and reduce unnecessary
redundancies and marginally effective systems, within existing budget
levels. However, in reviewing the Chairman’s 1994 and 1995 program
assessments and 1995 program recommendations, we found little to
suggest that this type of advice is being provided. The documents did not
offer specific substantive proposals to reduce or eliminate duplication
among existing service systems or otherwise aid in addressing the problem
of funding recapitalization. In fact, the Chairman’s 1995 Program
Assessment indicates an inability on the Chairman’s part, at least at that
point, to propose changes in service programs and budgets. While the
Chairman expressed serious concerns in his assessment about the need
for and cost of recapitalizing warfighting capabilities and said that the
power of joint operations allows for the identification of programs to be
canceled or reduced, his advice was to defer to the services to make such
choices.
DOD must overcome several obstacles that have inhibited JWCA teams and
DOD Must Overcome others that try to assess joint mission requirements and the services’
Certain Obstacles to aggregate capabilities to fulfill combat missions. In addition to scarce
Achieve a Stronger information on joint mission requirements and aggregate service
capabilities discussed in chapter 4, impediments include (1) weak
Joint Orientation analytical tools and databases to assist in-depth joint mission area
analyses, (2) weaknesses in DOD’s decision making support processes, and
(3) the services’ resistance to changes affecting their programs.
Better Analytical Tools and DOD officials acknowledge that current analytical tools, such as computer
Data Are Needed to models and war games used in warfighting analyses, should be improved if
Improve Joint Assessments they are to be effectively used to analyze joint warfighting. They told us
these tools often do not accurately represent all aspects of a truly joint
force, frequently focus on either land or naval aspects, and often do not
consider the contribution of surveillance and reconnaissance and
command and control assets to the warfighter. Some models are grounded
in Cold War theory and must be augmented with other evaluations to
minimize their inherent deficiencies.
In addition to problems with models and data, the Roles and Missions
Commission identified a need to improve analytical capabilities in both the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. Commission staff
said that there has been too much reliance on the services for analytical
support and that the Joint Staff should improve its abilities to look broadly
across systems and services in conducting analyses. Recognizing the need
for more information and analytical support, the Joint Staff has contracted
for studies to support the JWCA assessments. According to Joint Staff data,
by the end of fiscal year 1996, DOD will have awarded about $24 million in
contracts to support the teams.
Decision-making Support In its May 1995 report, the Roles and Missions Commission faulted the
Process Limitations Create decision support processes DOD uses to develop requirements and make
Problems resource allocation decisions. It cited a need for the JROC and OSD staff to
have a greater ability to address DOD needs in the aggregate. The
Commission also presented ideas and recommendations to improve DOD’s
decision-making processes to enable management to better develop
requirements from a joint perspective. These included (1) changes to the
information support network that would enable DOD to assess forces and
capabilities by mission area and (2) changes to the weapons acquisition
process that would enable joint warfighting concerns to be considered
when requirements for new weapons are first being established. These and
many other Commission proposals were still under assessment within DOD
at the completion of our review.
DOD, in its comments on a draft of our report, indicated that it believes the
OSD and Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff oversight of service
programs and budgets is quite rigorous. Several OSD program analysts we
interviewed did not share this view. They described the oversight as very
limited and the JWCA process as contributing very little to programming
and budgeting decisions. Roles and Missions Commission staff also
stressed to us that, based on their years of experience in OSD, the Secretary
needs stronger independent advisory support from the OSD staff.
Desire to Have Consensus DOD has reduced its force structure and terminated some weapon
Can Inhibit Needed programs to reflect changes in the National Military Strategy and reduced
Changes defense budgets. But further attempts to cancel weapon programs and
reduce unnecessary overlaps and duplications among forces are likely to
generate considerable debate and resistance within DOD. Because such
initiatives can threaten service plans and budgets, the tendency has been
to avoid debates involving tradeoffs among the services’ systems. The
potential effects of program reductions or cancellations on careers, the
distribution of funds to localities, jobs, and the industrial base also serve
as disincentives for comprehensive assessments and dialogue on program
alternatives.
While DOD acknowledges the need to consider joint requirements and the
Conclusions services’ aggregate capabilities in defense planning, programming, and
budgeting, its decision support systems have not yielded the information
needed from a joint perspective to help the Secretary make some very
difficult decisions. Measures intended to improve the advice provided by
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have met with limited success.
The Secretary does not have enough comprehensive information on joint
mission requirements and aggregate capabilities to help him establish
recapitalization priorities and reduce duplications and overlaps in existing
capabilities without unacceptable effects on force capabilities. The
Chairman would be in a better position to provide such advice if joint
warfighting assessments examined such issues.
Efforts are underway that could provide the Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other decisionmakers with
improved information to make the difficult force structure and
modernization choices needed. However, the desire to reach consensus
with the service chiefs—or in the case of the JROC the practice of reaching
consensus among its members—could present a formidable obstacle to
efforts by DOD officials to make significant changes to major
modernization programs and to identify and eliminate unnecessary or
overly redundant capabilities. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff need to be more willing to take decisive actions
on modernization programs that do not provide a clearly substantial
payoff in force capability.
During the Cold War, the military services invested hundreds of billions of
dollars to develop largely autonomous combat air power capabilities,
primarily to prepare for a global war with the Soviet Union. The Air Force
acquired bombers to deliver massive nuclear strikes against the Soviets
and fighter and attack aircraft for conventional and theater-nuclear
missions in the major land theaters, principally Europe. The Navy built an
extensive carrier-based aviation force focused on controlling the seas and
projecting power into the maritime flanks of the Soviet Union. The Army
developed attack helicopters to provide air support to its ground troops.
The Marine Corps acquired fighter and attack aircraft and attack
helicopters to support its ground forces in their areas of operation. While
the United States ended up with four essentially autonomous air forces
with many similar capabilities, each also largely operated within its own
warfighting domains.
DOD has not been adequately examining its combat air power force
Conclusions structure and its modernization plans and programs from a joint
perspective. The forces of the services are increasingly operating jointly
and in concert with allies in a regional versus a global environment.
However, DOD’s decision support systems do not provide sufficient
information from a joint perspective to enable the Secretary of Defense,
It is true that the overlapping and often redundant air power capabilities of
the current force structure provide combatant commanders with
operational flexibility to respond to any circumstance. The question is
whether, in the post-Cold War era, the United States needs, or can afford,
the current levels of overlap and redundancy. This is not easily answered
because DOD has not fully examined the joint requirements for key
warfighting missions areas or the aggregate capabilities of the services to
meet those requirements. From our reviews of interdiction, air-to-air
combat, and close support of ground forces, it is evident that U.S.
capabilities are quite substantial even without further enhancement. For
the interdiction mission, our analysis and the analysis of others showed
that the services have more than enough capability to hit identified ground
targets for the two major regional conflicts used in force planning.
Planned investments in some cases may be adding little needed military
capability at a very high cost.
While it may be desirable for DOD to scale back its air power modernization
plans and reduce overlapping capabilities, the challenging question is,
how. Such courses of action require tough choices, particularly when the
military strategy is to win quickly and decisively in two nearly
simultaneous major regional conflicts. Even with a more comprehensive
understanding of joint requirements and the capabilities of the services to
meet those requirements, the Secretary will likely continue to find it
difficult to make decisions that could increase warfighting risks and affect
programs, careers, jobs, and the industrial base. But without such an
understanding, there may be little hope that these tough decisions will be
made.
needed to fulfill air power missions and what is the most cost-effective
mix of air power assets to meet the needs of the combatant commanders
within DOD’s budgets. DOD has initiated several broad studies that should
provide added information. These include a deep attack/weapons mix
study that includes interdiction and close support operations, a
reconnaissance force mix study, and an electronic warfare mission area
analysis.
DOD has not routinely reviewed the justification for weapon modernization
programs based on their contribution to the aggregate capabilities of the
military to meet mission requirements. In our May 1996 report on DOD
interdiction capabilities and modernization plans, we recommended that
the Secretary of Defense do such reviews. DOD agreed with our
recommendation. Based on our review of other missions, such reviews are
needed for other key mission areas as well. Because many assets
contribute to more than one mission area, cross-mission analyses will
need to be part of the process.
The urgent need for such assessments is underscored by the reality that
significant outlays will be required in the next decade to finance DOD’s
combat air power modernization programs as currently planned. Over the
past few years, we have reviewed the Department’s major air power
modernization programs—the F/A-18E/F, the F-22, the Comanche, and the
B-1B bomber modification programs—within the context of the post-Cold
War security environment. Our work leading to this culminating report has
served to reinforce the theme of these earlier assessments—namely, that
DOD should revisit the program justifications for these programs because
the circumstances and assumptions upon which they were based have
changed. Although extensive resources have already been invested in
these programs, past investment decisions should not be considered
irreversible but rather should be considered in the light of new
information. The extensive long-term financial commitment needed to
fund all of these programs makes it imperative that these key
programs—and possibly others—be reconsidered since the future viability
of U.S. combat air power could be at risk if it is not smartly modernized
within likely budgets.
make such decisions, the Secretary must have better information coming
from a joint perspective. Accordingly, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense, along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop an
assessment process that yields more comprehensive information in key
mission areas. This can be done by broadening the current joint warfare
capabilities assessment process or developing an alternative mechanism.
DOD said many steps had been taken in recent years to improve the extent
and quality of joint military advice and cited the JWCA process as an
We agree that steps have been taken to provide improved joint advice to
the Secretary. We also recognize that DOD decision support systems
provide information for making planning, programming, and budgeting
decisions on major acquisition programs. We do not, however, believe the
information is sufficiently comprehensive to support resource allocation
decisions across service and mission lines. Much of the information is
developed by the individual services and limited in scope. Only a very
limited amount of information is available on joint requirements for
performing missions, such as interdiction and close support, and on the
aggregate capabilities available to meet those requirements. DOD’s
initiation of the deep attack weapons mix study and, more recently, a
study to assess close support capabilities, suggest that it is, in fact, seeking
more comprehensive information about cross-service needs and
capabilities as our recommendation suggests. While joint warfighting
capability assessment teams have been established, DOD has not been
using these teams to identify unnecessary or overly redundant combat air
power capabilities among the services; nor has the Department used the
teams to help develop specific proposals or strategies for recapitalizing
U.S. air power forces, a major combat air power issue identified by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Information on issues such as
redundancies in capabilities and on recapitalization alternatives,
developed from a joint warfighting perspective, would be invaluable to
decisionmakers in allocating defense resources among competing needs to
achieve maximum force effectiveness.
With regard to the analyses of needs and capabilities behind combat air
power weapons acquisition programs, we recognize that the services
conduct considerable analyses to identify mission needs and justify new
weapons program proposals. These analyses, however, are not based on
assessments of the aggregate capabilities of the services to perform
warfighting missions, nor does DOD routinely review service modernization
proposals and programs from such a perspective. The Commission on
Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces made similar observations. More
typically service analyses tend to justify specific modernization programs
by showing the additional capabilities they could provide rather than
assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative means of meeting an identified
need. A 1995 study done at the request of the Chairman of the JROC, also
identified this as a problem. The study team found that analyses done to
support JROC decisions frequently concentrate only on the capability of the
DOD component’s proposed system to fill stated gaps in warfighter needs.
Potential alternatives are given little consideration. Additionally, as
pointed out in Chapter 4 of this report, under DOD’s requirements
generation process, only program proposals that meet DOD’s major defense
acquisition program criteria are reviewed and validated by the JROC. Many
service modernization proposals and programs are not reviewed as they
do not meet this criteria.
System Air superiority Interdiction Close support Reconnaissance Refueling Other mission
Aircraft
Army
AH-64 X X
AH-1 X X
RC-12 X
OH-58D X X X
Navy/Marine Corps
A-6 X X X
AH-1W X X
AV-8B X X
E/A-6B X
ES-3 X X
F-14 X X X X
F/A-18 X X X X
KC-130 X X
P-3C X
S –3 X X
Air Force
A-10/OA10 X X X
E-3 X
B-1B X
B-2 X
B-52 X
EF-111 X
F-4G X
F-15 X
F-15E X X X
F-16 X X X X
F-117 X
E-8 X
KC-10 X X
H/MC-130 X X
KC-135 X X
U-2 X
DOD
Unmanned aerial
vehicles X
(continued)
System Air superiority Interdiction Close support Reconnaissance Refueling Other mission
Weapons
Long-range missiles X X
Air-to-air missiles X
Air-to-surface
missiles X X X
Gravity bombs X X
JDAM/ JSOW X X X
Laser-guided bombs X X X
Patriot PAC-3 X
Note: This table only includes aircraft which were in the scope of our review.
Source: DOD’s Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Summary Tables, December 31, 1995, except
for the Comanche, joint air-to-surface standoff missile, Patriot, Navy (lower tier) theater ballistic
missile defense, and theater high altitude air defense programs. The figures for these programs
are based on data we acquired during our reviews of the programs.
U.S. Combat Air Power: Aging Refueling Aircraft Are Costly to Maintain
and Operate (GAO/NSIAD-96-160, Aug. 1996).
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