G.R. No. 165279, June 7, 2011.: Consent Rubi Li vs. Soliman
G.R. No. 165279, June 7, 2011.: Consent Rubi Li vs. Soliman
G.R. No. 165279, June 7, 2011.: Consent Rubi Li vs. Soliman
care for his own welfare, and faced expectation on the part of the doctor
with a choice of undergoing the that the respondents understood very
proposed treatment, or alternative well that the severity of these side
treatment, or none at all, may effects will not be the same for all
intelligently exercise his judgment by patients undergoing the procedure. In
reasonably balancing the probable other words, by the nature of the
risks against the probable benefits. disease itself, each patient’s reaction
to the chemical agents even with pre-
There are four essential treatment laboratory tests cannot be
elements a plaintiff must prove in a precisely determined by the physician.
malpractice action based upon the That death can possibly result from
doctrine of informed consent: “(1) the complications of the treatment or the
physician had a duty to disclose underlying cancer itself, immediately
material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or sometime after the administration
or inadequately disclosed those risks; of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that
(3) as a direct and proximate result of cannot be ruled out, as with most
the failure to disclose, the patient other major medical procedures, but
consented to treatment she otherwise such conclusion can be reasonably
would not have consented to; and (4) drawn from the general side effects of
plaintiff was injured by the proposed chemotherapy already disclosed.
treatment.” The gravamen in an
informed consent case requires the Borromeo vs. Family Care Hospital
plaintiff to point to significant G.R. No. 191018, January 25, 2016.
undisclosed information relating to the
treatment which would have altered Facts:
her decision to undergo it. The patient was complaining of
acute pain and fever for two days. The
Examining the evidence on doctor suspected that the patient
record, we hold that there was might be suffering from acute
adequate disclosure of material risks appendicitis. After several inconclusive
inherent in the chemotherapy tests, the doctor decided to perform
procedure performed with the consent an exploratory laparotomy. After the
of Angelica’s parents. Respondents surgery, the patient’s blood pressure
could not have been unaware in the suddenly dropped. Furthermore, the
course of initial treatment and patient developed petechiae in various
amputation of Angelica’s lower parts of her body. The doctor
extremity, that her immune system suspected that the patient has
was already weak on account of the Disseminated Intravascular
malignant tumor in her knee. When Coagulation, which is a blood disorder.
petitioner informed the respondents Unfortunately, attempts to resuscitate
beforehand of the side effects of the patient failed.
chemotherapy which includes lowered
counts of white and red blood cells, Issue: Whether or not there is
decrease in blood platelets, possible medical malpractice.
kidney or heart damage and skin
darkening, there is reasonable
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LegMed: Medical Jurisprudence
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Rowena and her other relatives,
there is no medical malpractice since namely her husband, her sister and
the cause of the uncontrollable two aunts waited outside the operating
bleeding was a medical disorder, room while Lydia underwent
Disseminated Intravascular operation. While they were waiting,
Coagulation. In this case there is no Dr. Ercillo (anaesthesiologist) went out
proof that the doctor fell short of the of the operating room and instructed
expected standard required under the them to buy tagamet ampules which
circumstances. Rowena's sister immediately bought.
About one hour had passed when Dr.
Standard of Breach — The breach Ercillo came out again this time to ask
referred to in medical malpractice them to buy blood for Lydia. They
cases is the breach of the standard of bought type "A" blood from the St.
care expected of other similarly Gerald Blood Bank and the same was
trained medical professionals acting brought by the attendant into the
under the same circumstances. operating room. After the lapse of a
few hours, Dr. Cruz informed them
B. Medical Negligence that the operation was finished. The
operating staff then went inside the
Cruz vs. C.A. petitioner's clinic to take their snacks.
G.R. No. 122445, November 18, 1997. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was
brought out of the operating room in a
Facts: stretcher and the petitioner asked
Lydia Umali was Diagnosed by Rowena and the other relatives to buy
Dr. Cruz to have a myoma in her additional blood for Lydia.
uterus and scheduled her for a Unfortunately, they were not able to
hysterectomy operation. According to comply with petitioner's order as there
Rowena (Lydia’s daughter), she was no more type "A" blood available
noticed that the clinic was untidy and in the blood bank. Thereafter, a
the window and the floor were very person arrived to donate blood which
dusty prompting her to ask the was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena
attendant for a rag to wipe the window then noticed her mother, who was
and the floor with. Because of the attached to an oxygen tank, gasping
untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried for breath. Apparently the oxygen
to persuade her mother not to proceed supply had run out and Rowena's
with the operation. The following day, husband together with the driver of
before her mother was wheeled into the accused had to go to the San
the operating room, Rowena asked Dr. Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen.
Cruz if the operation could be Lydia was given the fresh supply of
postponed. Dr. Cruz called Lydia into oxygen as soon as it arrived. But at
her office and the two had a around 10:00 o'clock P.M. she went
conversation. Lydia then informed into shock and her blood pressure
Rowena that the petitioner told her dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable
that she must be operated on as condition necessitated her transfer to
scheduled. the San Pablo District Hospital so she
could be connected to a respirator and
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LegMed: Medical Jurisprudence
had little or no time to confer with his father of the family to prevent
anesthesiologist regarding the damage. In the instant case,
anesthesia delivery. This indicates that respondent hospital, apart from a
he was remiss in his professional general denial of its responsibility over
duties towards his patient. Thus, he respondent physicians, failed to
shares equal responsibility for the adduce evidence showing that it
events which resulted in Erlinda's exercised the diligence of a good
condition. father of a family in the hiring and
supervision of the latter. It failed to
Responsibility of the Hospital adduce evidence with regard to the
degree of supervision, which it
Hospitals hire, fire and exercise exercised over its physicians. In
real control over their attending and neglecting to offer such proof, or proof
visiting "consultant" staff. While of a similar nature, respondent
"consultants" are not, technically hospital thereby failed to discharge its
employees, a point which respondent burden under the last paragraph of
hospital asserts in denying all Article 2180. Having failed to do this,
responsibility for the patient's respondent hospital is consequently
condition, the control exercised, the solidarily responsible with its
hiring, and the right to terminate physicians for Erlinda's condition.
consultants all fulfill the important
hallmarks of an employer-employee Damages
relationship, with the exception of the
payment of wages. In assessing At current levels, the
whether such a relationship in fact P8000/monthly amount established by
exists, the control test is determining. the trial court at the time of its
Accordingly, on the basis of the decision would be grossly inadequate
foregoing, we rule that for the purpose to cover the actual costs of home-
of allocating responsibility in medical based care for a comatose individual.
negligence cases, an employer- The calculated amount was not even
employee relationship in effect exists arrived at by looking at the actual cost
between hospitals and their attending of proper hospice care for the patient.
and visiting physicians. What it reflected were the actual
expenses incurred and proved by the
The basis for holding an petitioners after they were forced to
employer solidarily responsible for the bring home the patient to avoid
negligence of its employee is found in mounting hospital bills. And yet
Article 2180 of the Civil Code which ideally, a comatose patient should
considers a person accountable not remain in a hospital or be transferred
only for his own acts but also for those to a hospice specializing in the care of
of others based on the former's the chronically ill for the purpose of
responsibility under a relationship of providing a proper milieu adequate to
patria potestas. Such responsibility meet minimum standards of care.
ceases when the persons or entity Given these considerations, the
concerned prove that they have amount of actual damages recoverable
observed the diligence of a good in suits arising from negligence should
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LegMed: Medical Jurisprudence
The family's moral injury and suffering fever but did not have any colds or
in this case is clearly a real one. For cough.
the foregoing reasons, an award of
P2,000,000.00 in moral damages The following day, the mother of
would be appropriate. the patient informed the doctor that
there were traces of blood in her son’s
Finally, by way of example, sputum. However, the doctor simply
exemplary damages in the amount of nodded and reassured them that it
P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. was due to bronchopneumonia. Later
Considering the length and nature of that morning, the patient vomited
the instant suit we are of the opinion phlegm with blood streaks. He was
that attorney's fees valued at attended to by one of the resident
P100,000.00 are likewise proper. physicians. Several tests were ordered
done on the patient. When the tests
WHEREFORE, the decision and came out, the results showed that the
resolution of the appellate court patient was suffering from Dengue
appealed from are hereby modified so Hemorrhagic Fever.
as to award in favor of petitioners, and
solidarily against private respondents Issue: Whether or not the negligence
the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as of the doctor is the proximate cause
actual damages computed as of the for the patient’s death.
date of promulgation of this decision
plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 Ruling: The Supreme Court held that
up to the time that petitioner Erlinda the doctor is liable for medical
Ramos expires or miraculously malpractice. In determining whether
survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral or not the negligence of the doctor is
damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as the proximate cause for the patient’s
temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 death, the court looked at the nature
each as exemplary damages and of Dengue. The court considered
attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of expert testimony stating that with
the suit. correct and timely diagnosis and
proper medical management, dengue
Casumpang vs. Cortejo fever is not a life threatening disease
G.R. No. 171127, March 11, 2015. and could easily be cured. In fact, the
mortality rate of dengue fever should
Facts: fall to less than 2%. Thus, the
The patient is an 11-year old proximate cause of patient’ death is
boy who initially complained of the failure of the doctor to timely
difficulty in breathing, chest pain, diagnose dengue, despite the presence
stomach pain and fever. The doctor of its characteristic symptoms.
who examined the patient diagnosed
him with bronchopneumonia. Proximate causation refers to the
However, the mother of the patient relation between the negligence or
raised her doubts with the doctor’s breach of the doctor and the resulting
diagnosis since her son had a high injury of the patient. The negligence or
breach must have played an integral
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LegMed: Medical Jurisprudence
Civil Code or the principle of Present are the two factors that
respondeat superior. Even when no determine apparent authority: first,
employment relationship exists but it the hospital's implied manifestation to
is shown that the hospital holds out to the patient which led the latter to
the patient that the doctor is its agent, conclude that the doctor was the
the hospital may still be vicariously hospital's agent; and second, the
liable under Article 2176 in relation to patient’s reliance upon the conduct of
Article 1431 and Article 1869 of the the hospital and the doctor, consistent
Civil Code or the principle of apparent with ordinary care and prudence.
authority. Moreover, regardless of its
relationship with the doctor, the To begin with, PSI could not
hospital may be held directly liable to simply wave off the problem and
the patient for its own negligence or nonchalantly delegate to Dr. Ampil the
failure to follow established standard duty to review what transpired during
of conduct to which it should conform the operation. The purpose of such
as a corporation. review would have been to pinpoint
when, how and by whom two surgical
Nonetheless, to allay the anxiety gauzes were mislaid so that necessary
of the intervenors, the Court holds remedial measures could be taken to
that, in this particular instance, the avert any jeopardy to Natividad’s
concurrent finding of the RTC and the recovery. Certainly, PSI could not
CA that PSI was not the employer of have expected that purpose to be
Dr. Ampil is correct. Control as a achieved by merely hoping that the
determinative factor in testing the person likely to have mislaid the
employer-employee relationship gauzes might be able to retrace his
between doctor and hospital under own steps. By its own standard of
which the hospital could be held corporate conduct, PSI's duty to
vicariously liable to a patient in initiate the review was non-delegable.
medical negligence cases is a requisite
fact to be established by While Dr. Ampil may have had
preponderance of evidence. Here, the primary responsibility of notifying
there was insufficient evidence that Natividad about the missing gauzes,
PSI exercised the power of control or PSI imposed upon itself the separate
wielded such power over the means and independent responsibility of
and the details of the specific process initiating the inquiry into the missing
by which Dr. Ampil applied his skills in gauzes. The purpose of the first would
the treatment of Natividad. have been to apprise Natividad of
Consequently, PSI cannot be held what transpired during her surgery,
vicariously liable for the negligence of while the purpose of the second would
Dr. Ampil under the principle of have been to pinpoint any lapse in
respondeat superior. procedure that led to the gauze count
discrepancy, so as to prevent a
There is, however, ample recurrence thereof and to determine
evidence that the hospital (PSI) held corrective measures that would ensure
out to the patient (Natividad) that the the safety of Natividad. That Dr. Ampil
doctor (Dr. Ampil) was its agent. negligently failed to notify Natividad
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LegMed: Medical Jurisprudence
did not release PSI from its self- All this notwithstanding, we
imposed separate responsibility. make it clear that PSI’s hospital
liability based on ostensible agency
Corollary to its non-delegable and corporate negligence applies only
undertaking to review potential to this case, pro hac vice. It is not
incidents of negligence committed intended to set a precedent and
within its premises, PSI had the duty should not serve as a basis to hold
to take notice of medical records hospitals liable for every form of
prepared by its own staff and negligence of their doctors-consultants
submitted to its custody, especially under any and all circumstances. The
when these bear earmarks of a ruling is unique to this case, for the
surgery gone awry. Thus, the record liability of PSI arose from an implied
taken during the operation of agency with Dr. Ampil and an
Natividad which reported a gauze admitted corporate duty to Natividad.
count discrepancy should have given
PSI sufficient reason to initiate a Other circumstances peculiar to
review. It should not have waited for this case warrant this ruling, not the
Natividad to complain. least of which being that the agony
wrought upon the Aganas has gone on
As it happened, PSI took no for 26 long years, with Natividad
heed of the record of operation and coming to the end of her days racked
consequently did not initiate a review in pain and agony. Such wretchedness
of what transpired during Natividad’s could have been avoided had PSI
operation. Rather, it shirked its simply done what was logical: heed
responsibility and passed it on to the report of a guaze count
others – to Dr. Ampil whom it discrepancy, initiate a review of what
expected to inform Natividad, and to went wrong and take corrective
Natividad herself to complain before it measures to ensure the safety of
took any meaningful step. By its Nativad. Rather, for 26 years, PSI
inaction, therefore, PSI failed its own hemmed and hawed at every turn,
standard of hospital care. It disowning any such responsibility to its
committed corporate negligence. patient. Meanwhile, the options left to
the Aganas have all but dwindled, for
It should be borne in mind that the status of Dr. Ampil can no longer
the corporate negligence ascribed to be ascertained.
PSI is different from the medical
negligence attributed to Dr. Ampil. The The Supreme Court applied the
duties of the hospital are distinct from Captain of the Ship Doctrine in
those of the doctor-consultant upholding the liability of the doctor.
practicing within its premises in The Court stressed that as the lead
relation to the patient; hence, the surgeon, the doctor had the duty to
failure of PSI to fulfill its duties as a remove all foreign objects from the
hospital corporation gave rise to a patient’s body before the closure of
direct liability to the Aganas distinct the incision. At the very least, the
from that of Dr. Ampil. doctor should have informed the
patient of his failure to do so. The act
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LegMed: Medical Jurisprudence
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