THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 224650, July 15, 2020 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. ADOLFO A. GOYALA, JR., RESPONDENT.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

This appeal by certiorari challenges the Decision1 and Resolution2 promulgated by the Court of

Appeals (CA) on September 16, 2015 and May 5, 2016, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 134674
whereby the appellate court reversed and set aside the Orders dated February 13, 20143 and March
26, 20144 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 159 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 152682.
In doing so, the CA ordered the RTC to (a) hold in abeyance further proceedings in said case and
remand the same to the prosecution for purposes of completing the preliminary investigation; (b)
revoke the implementation of the Warrant of Arrest; and (c) continue the proceedings only after the
finality of the preliminary investigation and after proper endorsement.

The Antecedents

AAA,5 a minor, executed with the assistance of her mother a sworn statement dated June 17, 2013
before Police Inspector Ernesto A. Mones of the Pasig City Police accusing Adolfo A. Goyala,
Jr., (respondent) of statutory rape.

After due endorsement to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City (OCP-Pasig City), the
complaint was docketed as IS No. XV-14-INV-13F-02337 and assigned to Assistant City Prosecutor
Pedro M. Oribe (ACP Oribe) as Investigating Prosecutor for preliminary investigation.6

Eventually, respondent executed his Counter-Affidavit on July 30, 2013. On August 16, 2013,
respondent instituted a civil complaint for damages against AAA and her mother.7

On the strength of this civil case, respondent filed a Petition for Suspension on the Ground of
Prejudicial Question before ACP Oribe. Later on, he filed a supplemental Motion to Reiterate Petition
for Suspension on the Ground of Prejudicial Question.8 This motion was denied in a Resolution
dated September 30, 2013.

On November 12, 2013, ACP Oribe issued a Resolution finding probable cause against respondent
and recommending the filing of an Information for Statutory Rape under Art. 266-A(d) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353, also known as the "The Anti-Rape Law
of 1997," in relation to Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 8369, inter alia.9

On November 27, 2013, the Regional Trial Court, Criminal Case Unit received the Information for IS
No. XV-14-INV-13F-02337 and docketed the same as Criminal Case No. 152682-PSG. On even
date, respondent filed an Initial Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration and a Main Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Disqualify ACP Oribe before the OCP-Pasig City.10

On November 29, 2013, respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before the RTC.11
Meanwhile, Pasig City Prosecutor Jacinto G. Ang issued a 1st Indorsement dated 18 December
2013 forwarding the entire record of IS No. XV-14-INV-13F-02337 to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) for further proceedings and inhibited himself from resolving the Motion for
Reconsideration.12

On January 24, 2014, Justice Secretary Leila de Lima issued Department Order No. 173 designating
Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Josefa D. Laurente (SACP Laurente) as Acting Prosecutor of Pasig
City to resolve with finality IS No. XV-14-INV-13F-02337.13

Judgment of the RTC

In its February 13, 2014 Order, the RTC denied respondent's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to
Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.14 It reasoned that once a complaint or Information
is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests in the sound discretion of the court. The
determination of the case is within the trial court's exclusive jurisdiction and competence. It noted
that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry to determine the probable cause for the
issuance of a Warrant of Arrest and the preliminary investigation proper to ascertain whether the
offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of
issuing the Warrant of Arrest is made by the judge.15 The trial court is not bound to adopt the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice, since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the
merits of the case and it may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice.16 Thus, any pending Petition for Review questioning the preliminary investigation
conducted by ACP Oribe is negligible.17

The RTC found that there is probable cause to hold respondent for trial for the offense charged in
the Information. It scrutinized the prosecutor's resolution, as well as the supporting affidavits and
documentary evidence of the parties.18

On February 21, 2014, a Warrant of Arrest was issued.19

On March 3, 2014, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion20 (1) to recall the Order for the issuance of
a Warrant of Arrest until final determination of the instant Omnibus Motion; (2) to strike off the
Information or to dismiss the instant case; (3) in the alternative, to reconsider and set aside the
February 13, 2014 Order and to grant the Motion to Suspend Proceedings and To Hold in Abeyance
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest; (4) in further alternative, to set the case for hearing for determination
of probable cause for the issuance of Warrant of Arrest; and (5) in any event, to suspend issuance
and/or service of any Warrant of Arrest pending final determination of the Omnibus Motion.

The same was denied in the RTC Order dated March 26, 2014.21 Aggrieved, respondent went to
the CA on certiorari to impugn the above-stated orders of the RTC.

Judgment of the CA

As stated, the CA declared void and set aside the February 13, 2014 and March 26, 2014 Orders of
the RTC. It also ordered the RTC to hold in abeyance further proceedings and remand the case to
the OCP-Pasig City for the purpose of resolving with finality the preliminary investigation. Likewise, it
revoked the implementation of the Warrant of Arrest issued by the RTC. Lastly, it ordered the RTC to
resume the proceedings in the criminal case only upon finality of the preliminary investigation and
after due indorsement thereof.22
The CA held that respondent was deprived of his right to a full preliminary investigation preparatory
to the filing of the Information against him. Thus, the proceedings before the RTC should be held in
abeyance until completion of the preliminary investigation. It applied this Court's pronouncement
in Office of the Ombudsman v. Castro (Castro),23 where this Court allegedly held that the filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper. The denial of
the right to file a Motion for Reconsideration renders the preliminary investigation conducted
incomplete. It also cited Torralba v. Sandiganbayan (Torralba),24 where this Court purportedly
declared that the incomplete preliminary investigation warrants that the proceedings be held in
abeyance until completion of such.25

The People of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in its May 5, 2016
Resolution.26 Petitioner argued in its Motion for Reconsideration that the issues in the instant
controversy are already moot and academic because SACP Laurente had already denied
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration in an Undated Order. The CA did not give any merit to the
same considering that respondent manifested that he filed, on October 5, 2015,27 a Petition for
Review before the DOJ against said Undated Order.28

Hence, this recourse.

The Petition

Petitioner contends that the RTC acted within its authority in denying respondent's Motion to
Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest.

First, it argues that the CA mistakenly relied on Torralba and Castro because the facts in said cases
are incongruous to the facts of the instant proceedings. In Torralba, the accused therein were not
served copies of the final resolution of the preliminary investigation against them. They were also not
apprised of a modified memorandum and special audit report which served as basis for their
indictment. They only learned of the resolution against them through daily newspaper accounts
which chronicled the filing of the charges. In contrast, respondent was duly provided with full
information of the basis of the accusation against him for statutory rape. He was not deprived of
legal processes and avenues to contest the initial findings of the OCP-Pasig City. He was able to file
a Motion for Reconsideration to the November 12, 2013 Resolution of ACP Oribe. In fact, he availed
himself of multiple legal avenues to evade his prosecution for statutory rape.29 Meanwhile,
in Castro, this Court, rather than ousting the trial court of its jurisdiction over the criminal case due to
a contrary finding of the prosecutor in its reinvestigation of the case, effectively recognized and
respected the assumed authority of the lower court. Accordingly, Castro cannot advance
respondent's case.30 Rather, petitioner posits that this Court's ruling in People v. Odilao, Jr.
(Odilao)31 is appropriate and decisive on the issue of the court's deferment of the criminal
proceedings in view of a review of the findings of the preliminary investigation. This Court therein
allegedly directed the trial court to proceed with the arraignment of respondent and trial on the merits
on the basis of Section 11,32 Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules).33

Second, petitioner contends that there is no reason to enjoin the criminal prosecution of respondent
because he was afforded the fundamental right to due process. It listed the numerous ways in which
respondent had availed himself of the legal remedies afforded by law.34

Third, petitioner claims that, contrary to the CA's finding, the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion when it denied respondent's Motion for Suspension of Criminal Proceedings. It points out
that respondent's Petition for Certiorari failed to state any factual averment constituting grave abuse
of discretion. It is not grave abuse of discretion for the trial court judge to deny respondent's Motion
to Suspend Proceedings as a finding of probable cause against him was evident from the
magistrate's own determination of such facts.35

In his Comment,36 respondent argues that the preliminary investigation remains incomplete

because his Petition for Review assailing the Undated Order of SACP Laurente denying his Motion
for Reconsideration is pending with the DOJ.37 He rejects petitioner's discussion concerning
the Castro and Torralba cases. He asserts that "[t]here was no issue of an incomplete preliminary
investigation on this aspect of the [Castro] case and petitioner's reliance on the portion cited on page
12 of the Petition is grossly misplaced."38 He also insists that reliance on the Torralba ruling is
proper because it directly discusses the issue of an incomplete preliminary investigation.39 He
disparages petitioner's reliance on Odilao on the ground that it was decided prior to Castro and does
not involve the issue of an incomplete preliminary investigation. For this same reason, he rejects the
reliance on Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.40 and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge
How41 which Odilao cited.42

Respondent also rejects petitioner's invocation of Sec. 11, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure because petitioner allegedly previously argued that the subject of the instant
case is not a Petition for Review.43 Even if the 60-day period stated in Sec. 11, Rule 116 is
applicable, the lapse of such period is allegedly due to petitioner. Further, said period is applied in
relation to an Information already filed in court as against a Petition for Review with the DOJ after
preliminary investigation. Petitioner also argues that the proceedings before the CA is an
interlocutory appeal excluded from the delay contemplated by Sec. 11, Rule 116. In support of his
contention, he cites of Sections 10(a)(3 and 6)44 and 1145 of R.A. No. 8493, or the "Speedy Trial
Act of 1998" as exclusions to the period stated in Sec. 11, Rule 116. He also cites Section 246 of
Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98,47 dated August 11, 1998 (IRR), which states that the period of
pendency of a Motion to Quash shall be excluded. Respondent asserts that, as between R.A. No.
8493 and Sec. 11, Rule 116, the former shall prevail.48

Respondent contends that petitioner's assertion that he was afforded his fundamental right to due
process is off-tangent because it failed to address the main issue – that he was denied his right to
due process of law in the form of a complete preliminary investigation.49 He also takes exception to
petitioner's claim that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion. He
insists that the grave abuse of discretion consists in the denial of his right to due process because
he was deprived of a complete preliminary investigation.50

Finally, respondent claims that since petitioner failed to directly contravene the third directive of the
CA Decision (that the proceedings in the criminal case shall only resume upon finality of the
preliminary investigation and after due indorsement thereof) in either its Motion for Reconsideration
before the CA and in this petition before this Court, petitioner may no longer assail said directive in
the instant appeal. Said directive has become final and irreversible. With the filing and pendency of
the Petition for Review before the DOJ, there is no final resolution. As such, there is no finality of the
preliminary investigation and no due indorsement thereof.51

Inevitably, the sole issue raised in this petition is:

WHETHER THE PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 152682 SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE

HELD IN ABEYANCE DESPITE THE LAPSE OF THE SIXTY (60)-DAY PERIOD PROVIDED FOR
UNDER SECTION 11(C), RULE 116 OF THE 2000 REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is impressed with merit.

Preliminarily, it must be emphasized that, as stated in Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman:52

A person's rights in a preliminary investigation are subject to the limitations of procedural law. These
rights are statutory, not constitutional. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to present
such evidence "as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and
that [the respondent in a criminal complaint] is probably guilty thereof." It does not call for a 'full and
exhaustive display of the parties' evidence[.]' x x x It is the filing of a complaint or information in court
that initiates a criminal action[,]" and carries with it all the accompanying rights of an
accused.53 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied).

In the instant case, it is undisputed that the 60-day period provided under Sec. 11(c), Rule 116 of the
2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure had already lapsed. Thus, there is no longer any reason
to hold in abeyance the criminal proceedings in the case for statutory rape against respondent.

In Aguinaldo v. Ventus (Aguinaldo),54 the Court ruled that the 60-day limitation in Sec. 11(c), Rule
116 is not merely directory, thus:

On the second issue, the Court disagrees with petitioners' contention that the provision of Section 11
(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for arraignment to only sixty (60) days is
merely directory; thus, the estafa case against them cannot proceed until the DOJ resolves their
petition for review with finality.

In Samson v. Judge Daway, the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a
ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the
arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It
follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the
accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

In Diño v. Olivarez, the Court held that it did not sanction an indefinite suspension of the proceedings
in the trial court. Its reliance on the reviewing authority, the Justice Secretary, to decide the appeal at
the soonest possible time was anchored on the rule provided under Department Memorandum Order
No. 12, dated 3 July 2000, which mandates that the period for the disposition of appeals or petitions
for review shall be seventy-five (75) days.

In Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that in a long line of decisions, it has
repeatedly held that while rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary
periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are
necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. After all, rules of procedure do
not exist for the convenience of the litigants, and they are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked
by the mere expedience of invoking "substantial justice." Relaxation or suspension of procedural
rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted only by compelling reasons or
when the purpose of justice requires it.55 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

Here, it must be noted that during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings before the CA, the
pending Motion for Reconsideration questioning the finding of probable cause was resolved against
respondent in an Undated Order. This prompted respondent to appeal the prosecutor's finding of
probable cause to the Department of Justice Secretary. The petition was filed on October 5,
2015.56 Obviously, the 60-day period had long expired and trial must proceed in due course.
In an attempt to further extend the 60-day period, respondent argues that the period that had already
lapsed should not be excluded because the delay that consumed the 60-day period is attributable to
petitioner, following the Speedy Trial Act. This argument fails to persuade. The Speedy Trial Act
finds no application in this case, as the law was passed to impose time limits from arraignment to
promulgation of judgment to ensure the constitutional rights of the accused against vexatious
prosecution. The exclusion of periods included therein is for the purpose of establishing whether or
not there has been acceptable and excusable delay in the compliance with such time limits, and
nothing more. These provisions cannot be used to further extend a period fixed by law. While the 60-
day limitation is indeed a procedural rule that can be relaxed, as recognized
in Aguinaldo, respondent has utterly failed to provide justifiable reasons to further suspend the
criminal proceedings. On the contrary, the suspension has been so long that it becomes
unconscionable to continue it any further.

Also, respondent's argument that the completeness of the preliminary investigation is only achieved
upon the final disposition of the DOJ of the Petition for Review does not persuade. The rules are
clear and unequivocal. Upon the lapse of the 60-day period, the court is bound to arraign the
accused or deny the Motion to Defer Arraignment whether or not the petition before the DOJ has
been resolved. The reason behind this course of action is easy to discern.

As explained in Crespo v. Judge Mogul (Crespo),56 when an Information has been filed in court, the
prosecutor would be stripped of the power to dismiss the case, motu proprio. Instead, the court
acquires the exclusive jurisdiction to decide what to do with the case even if it is against the position
of the public prosecutor or even the Secretary of Justice. The 60-day period was enacted in
recognition of the power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in
criminal cases and such power was never revoked by Crespo.57 As due deference to a co-equal
branch of government, the Rules allow a suspension of a criminal case to give an opportunity to the
Secretary of Justice to rectify, modify, or correct any mistake or error committed by his subordinates.
Be that as it may, the Rules nevertheless see it fit to limit the suspension to only 60 days. Hence,
given the fact that the period has expired and regardless of the status of the appeal before the DOJ,
the court has no discretion but to proceed with the arraignment. The appellate court's disquisition,
therefore, must be reversed considering the intervening events that have transpired.

Accordingly, the other arguments raised by the parties, especially by respondent, have been mooted
by these events.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision and

Resolution promulgated on September 16, 2015 and May 5, 2016, respectively, by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134674; REINSTATES the February 13, 2014 and March 26, 2014
Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 159 and ORDERS the RTC to continue with
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 152682 with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.