Module 5 – Case Digests

Arnel Agustin vs. CA, GR No. 162571, June 15, 2005

Facts
Petitioner Arnel Agustin, allegedly Martin’s biological father, is being sued by respondents Fe
Angela and her son Martin Prollamante for support and support pendente lite before the
Quezon City RTC.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered
into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on
November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel's insistence on abortion, Fe, decided otherwise and gave
birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City. The baby's birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe's repeated requests for
Martin's support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001 while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and
Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe's leg. This
incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has,
since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for
support.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves
to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said motion
by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court.

Issue/s

 Whether the court gravely erred in exercising discretion in denying the petitioner’s
motion to dismiss
 Whether the court erred in directing parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing

Held
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 The foregoing considered, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the

part of the public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which both
denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for DNA
testing. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is
only available "when any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."
 The petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or personal
hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its
decision and resolution, and any error made would have only been an error in
judgment.
 It has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, 37 and the
infringement of privacy of communication 38 where the constitutional right to privacy
has been critically at issue. Petitioner's case involves neither and, as already stated, his
argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His
hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple
reason that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused
whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason
why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences
cannot be ordered to do the same.
Module 5 – Case Digests

Rosendo Herrera vs. Alba, GR No. 148220, June 15, 2005

Facts
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented by his
mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support
and damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with
counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also
denied physical contact with respondent's mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained
acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-
incrimination.

Issue/s
Whether DNA paternity testing violates Herrera’s right against self-incrimination

Held
No. Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a
paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right
against self-incrimination.
This privilege applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in essence taken under duress
(People vs. Olvis,154 SCRA 513, 1987).The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-
incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken
from his body when it may be material.
As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body (as cited
in People vs. Olvis, Supra);the substance emitting from the body of the accused was received as
evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng,23 Phil. 145);morphine forced out of the
mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong,36 Phil. 735);an order by the judge for the
witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed (People vs. Otadora,86 Phil. 244);and the
court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs.
Summers,41 Phil. 62),since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on "testimonial
compulsion."
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Estate of Ong vs. Diaz, GR No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 480

Facts
This is a complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was
filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C.
Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City.
As alleged by Jinky, she and Rogelio got acquainted in November 1993 in Tarlac City and their
friendship later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese
national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal
Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.
Jinky and Reogelio cohabitated. Soon after, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and born
on 25 February 1998. Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky
home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided
for all of minor Joanne's needs — recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor
Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinky's remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to
give support for the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of
the heretofore adverted complaint.
RTC held that Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio Ong with
plaintiff Jinky Diaz and awarded support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed
and that the support should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached majority age.
Rogelio appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, during the pendency of the case, Rogelio's
counsel filed a manifestation informing the Court that Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence,
a Notice of Substitution was filed by said counsel praying that Rogelio be substituted in the case
by the Estate of Rogelio Ong, 14 which motion was accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court remanded the case to the court a quo for the issuance of an order directing
the parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the
paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in coordination with
laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis.

Issue/s
Whether a DNA analysis can still be done even if the person whose DNA is of interest is already
dead
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Held
It can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA
testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a person's
body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood,
saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. 
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may
be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the
impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the
conduct of DNA testing.
Further, citing their ruling in Agustin v. Court of Appeals, the Court explain that:
[F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to
deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally
provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have
long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the
past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this
opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.
Module 5 – Case Digests

Mossessgeld v. CA, G.R. No. 111455, Dec. 23, 1998

Facts
On December 2, 1989, petitioner Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld, single, 31 years of age, gave birth
to a baby boy at the Medical City General Hospital, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.3 It was the
third time that she delivered a child. The presumed father, one Eleazar Siriban Calasan, 42 years
old, a lawyer, married, and a resident of 8632 San Jose St. Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati, Metro
Manila, signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the child's
first name as Jonathan, middle name as Mossesgeld, and last name as Calasan. Both the
presumed father, Eleazar S. Calasan and the mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld, accomplished the
dorsal side of the certificate of live birth stating that the information contained therein were
true and correct. In addition, lawyer Calasan executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the
child.
On December 6, 1989, due to the refusal of the person in charge at the hospital to placing the
presumed father's surname as the child's surname in the certificate of live birth, petitioner
himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for
registration.
On December 28, 1989, the municipal treasurer of Mandaluyong, as officer in charge of the
office of the local civil registrar, rejected the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4, dated
October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing that under Article 176 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the
surname of their mother.
Lawyer Eleazar S. Calasan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 69, a petition for
mandamus to compel the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to register the
certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate son using his surname. RTC denied the petition.
Eleazar then filed a motion for reconsideration. He filed a motion for leave to amend petition
and to admit amended petition, substituting the child's mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the
petitioner. The lower court denied the motion for reconsideration. The appellate court affirmed
said decision.

Issues/s
Whether mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth
of an illegitimate child using the alleged father's surname where the latter admitted paternity
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Held
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines13 provides that "illegitimate children shall use
the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father
admits paternity.
The Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of Article 366 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines giving a natural child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the surname of
the father. The Family Code has limited the classification of children to legitimate and
illegitimate, thereby eliminating the category of acknowledged natural children and natural
children by legal fiction.
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Republic v. Abadilla, 302 SCRA 358 (1999)

Facts
Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor children Emerson and Rafael filed a
Petition for Correction/Cancellation of Entries in the Birth Certificates of the children,
specifically, the entries in the date and place of marriage of Gerson and Luzviminda who both
testified that they are not yet married to each other. The Petition was granted, but the trial
court failed to order the change of the minors' surname from Abadilla to Celestino.

Issue/s
Whether the trial court committed a reversible error when it allowed the deletion of the "date
and place of marriage of parents" from the birth certificates of minors Emerson C. Abadilla and
Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors' surname from "Abadilla" to
"Celestino."

Held
The petition was granted. There was no dispute that Emerson and Rafael are illegitimate
children. Then, the Family Code was already the governing law when they were born. Under
Art. 176 of the Civil Code, illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother.
Resultingly, with the deletion of the entry in the date and place of marriage of the parents, the
corresponding correction with respect to the surname of the children should also be made and
changed to Celestino, the mother's surname.
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Leonardo v. CA, GR No. 125329, September 10, 2003

Facts
Petitioner Ann Brigitt Leonardo was on July 14, 1993 born in Manila to common-law-spouses
Eddie B. Fernandez and Gloria C. Leonardo.  In her birth certificate, her given surname is
that of her mother, Leonardo. 
As petitioner's parents later wanted her to carry the surname of her father, the latter executed
an affidavit of July 29, 1994 to this effect and wrote a letter of August 1, 1994 to the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila requesting for the change of petitioner's registered surname.
The Local Civil Registrar of Manila Lucena D. Dacuan denied the request of petitioner's parents
on the ground that petitioner, being illegitimate, should carry her mother's surname as
provided under Article 176 of the Family Code 5 which took effect on August 3, 1988.  Dacuan
also cited Article 412 of the New Civil Code which provides that no entry in the civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Petitioner's parents appealed the denial of their request for change of petitioner's surname to
the Civil Registrar General, they citing, among others, the following provision of Title XIII
(Use of Surnames), Book I of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners appealed to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) to review
the the denial of the Civil Registrar General’s decision. But NEDA said that they have no power
or authority to do so. Petitioners appealed to the Office of the President, but upheld the
decision of the Civil Registrar General and the Local Civil Registrar of Manila that the
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry must be brought directly before courts
of law.
The petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for reviews. The appellate court held
that Title XIII, Book I of the New Civil Code on the Use of Surnames was not repealed by
the Family Code, citing its repealing clause or Article 254. It held, however, that the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila is not allowed to administratively correct the entry in the Civil
Registry of the City by deleting and changing petitioner's family name LEONARDO to
FERNANDEZ upon the submission of an affidavit of her father recognizing her. It went on to
declare that petitioner could change her surname by judicial action pursuant to Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision was also denied.

Issue/s
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Whether an illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the Family Code, has the right to use
her father's surname

Held
Ruling in the negative, the Supreme Court held that Article 176 of the Family Code provides that
"Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule
regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity.
Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar correctly denied the request for the change of
petitioner's registered surname to that of the surname of the alleged father, even with the
latter's consent. Since petitioner was born an illegitimate child after the Family Code took
effect, she has no right to use her father's surname.

Grace M. Grande v. Patricio T. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014
Module 5 – Case Digests

Facts
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of
time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to
someone else. 3 Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8,
1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999). The children were not expressly recognized by
respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties'
relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her
two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial
Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed
of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio,
ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be
promoted if they are under the sole parental authority and physical custody of [respondent
Antonio]."
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the
RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole
custody to the mother over her illegitimate children. the appellate court ratiocinated that
notwithstanding the father's recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her
sole parental custody over them absent the most compelling of reasons. 10 Since respondent
Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely affected the
welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived
of her sole parental custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made
by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the
universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the
surname "ANTONIO."
Not satisfied with the CA's Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the
minors' surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via
the present petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family Code — as amended by
Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive language — may not be invoked by a
father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their
mother.
Issue/s
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Whether the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon
his recognition of their filiation

Held
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one
must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate
father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion 17 upon the illegitimate
children.
The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an
illegitimate father's surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the
choice on the surnames by which they will be known.
The Court has taken note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged thirteen (13) and
fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their names changed to
"Antonio." However, since these letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial
court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against
petitioner. A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the children's choice of
surname by the trial court is necessary.
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In Re Petition for Change of Name of Julian Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, GR No. 155966,
March 30, 2005

Facts
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa
Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their
son so that the child's name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they
will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in
Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not
carried in a person's name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated
against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his
sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different
surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore's Mandarin language since they do not have
the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the name of
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.
The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. 2 The trial court found that the reason given
for the change of name sought in the petition — that is, that petitioner Julian may be
discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle name — did not fall
within the grounds recognized by law. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision but this was denied.

Issue/s
Whether the court erred in denying the petition to change the name of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang

Held
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. The touchstone for the grant of a
change of name is that there be 'proper and reasonable cause' for which the change is sought.
15 To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when
the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
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change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when
the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
The Court observed that the petititon does not simply seek to change the name of the minor
petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle
name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name.
It is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he
reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate
the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice
him in his rights under our laws.
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In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, Honorato Catindig,
Petitioner, GR No. 148311, March 31, 2005

Facts
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name
Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother's surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be
changed to "Catindig," his surname. The trial court granted the adoption.
Petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should
be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. The trial
court denied the motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the same of his biological mother as his middle name.

Issue/s
Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when
she is subsequently adopted by her natural father

Held
Yes, the Court found merit in the petition. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie's continued use of her mother's
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that
Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide
that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can
well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
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Uyguangco v. CA 178 SCRA 684 (1989)

Facts
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children
(her co-petitioners herein), and considerable properties which they divided among themselves.
Claiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario, and having been left out in the
extrajudicial settlement of his estate, Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition
against all the petitioners.
Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao and
that at the age of 15 he moved to his father's hometown at Medina, Misamis Oriental, at the
latter's urging and also of Dorotea and his half-brothers. Here he received support from his
father while he was studying at the Medina High School, where he eventually graduated. He
was also assigned by his father, without objection from the rest of the family, as storekeeper at
the Uyguangco store in Mananom from 1967 to 1973.
In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners elicited an admission
from Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 to show that he
was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. These are "the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or (in) any authentic writing." The petitioners thereupon
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the private respondent could no longer
prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code.
Specifically, the petitioners argued that the only evidence allowed under Article 278 to prove
the private respondent's claim was not available to him as he himself had admitted. Neither
could he now resort to the provisions of Article 285 because he was already an adult when his
alleged father died in 1975, and his claim did not come under the exceptions.
The trial court said that respondent could still be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate
child despite the death of the claimed father and in the absence of the documentary evidence
required by the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals sustained this decision.

Issue
Whether a person should be allowed to prove that s/he is an illegitimate child of his claimed
parent, who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the Civil
Code
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Held
It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce
evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove
his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The
simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the
claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation.
In her Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy explains the
rationale of the rule, thus: "It is a truism that unlike legitimate children who are publicly
recognized, illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the
legitimate family being aware of their existence. Who then can be sure of their filiation but the
parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be the illegitimate child of a certain
person is not really the child of the latter? The putative parent should thus be given the
opportunity to affirm or deny the child's filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is
already dead."
The problem of the private respondent is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation under the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his
alleged father's death in 1975.