Third Division (G.R. NO. 155690, June 30, 2005) : Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Third Division (G.R. NO. 155690, June 30, 2005) : Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Third Division (G.R. NO. 155690, June 30, 2005) : Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
144
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 155690, June 30, 2005 ]
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, AND CAPITOL
MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision[1] dated September 20, 2001 and
the Resolution[2] dated October 18, 2002 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
53479, entitled “Capitol Medical Center, Inc. vs. Hon. Cresenciano B. Trajano, in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and Capitol Medical Center
Employees Association-AFW.”
Capitol Medical Center, Inc., petitioner, is a hospital with address at Panay Avenue corner Scout
Magbanua Street, Quezon City. Upon the other hand, Capitol Medical Center Employees
Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers, respondent, is a duly registered labor union acting as
the certified collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of petitioner hospital.
On October 2, 1997, respondent union, through its president Jaime N. Ibabao, sent petitioner a
letter requesting a negotiation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
In its reply dated October 10, 1997, petitioner, challenging the union’s legitimacy, refused to
bargain with respondent. Subsequently or on October 15, 1997, petitioner filed with the Bureau
of Labor Relations (BLR), Department of Labor and Employment, a petition for cancellation of
respondent’s certificate of registration, docketed as NCR-OD-9710-006-IRD.[3]
For its part, on October 29, 1997, respondent filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB), National Capital Region, a notice of strike, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-10-
453-97. Respondent alleged that petitioner’s refusal to bargain constitutes unfair labor practice.
Despite several conferences and efforts of the designated conciliator-mediator, the parties failed
to reach an amicable settlement.
“WHEREFORE, this Office assumes jurisdiction over the labor disputes at Capitol
Medical Center pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended.
Consequently, all striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four
(24) hours from the receipt of this Order and the management to resume normal
operations and accept back all striking workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike. Further, parties are directed to cease and desist from
committing any act that may exacerbate the situation.
Moreover, parties are hereby directed to submit within 10 days from receipt of this
Order proposals and counter-proposals leading to the conclusion of the collective
bargaining agreement in compliance with aforementioned Resolution of the Office
as affirmed by the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated April 27,
1998.
On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Labor
Secretary’s Orders. Pursuant to our ruling in St. Martin Funeral Home vs.The National Labor
Relations Commission, et al.,[4] we referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for its
appropriate action and disposition.
On September 20, 2001, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming the Orders of the
Secretary of Labor. The Court of Appeals held:
“Anent the first issue raised by the petitioner, We find the same untenable. The
public respondent acted well within his duty to order the petitioner hospital to
bargain collectively, for it was the surest way to end the dispute. In LMG Chemicals
Corporation vs. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, the Hon.
Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Chemical Worker’s Union (G.R. No. 127422, April 17,
2001), the Supreme Court made the following pronouncement, to wit:
‘It is well settled in our jurisprudence that the authority of the Secretary of Labor to
assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions
and controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary and discretionary in
nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute.
x x x x x x
As earlier mentioned, the petition for cancellation was dismissed by the regional
director in a decision dated September 30, 1998. x x x.
Said decision by the regional director was affirmed by the Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations in a resolution dated December 29, 1998, dismissing the appeal of
the petitioner hospital from the said DOLE-NCR’s decision.
Finally, the petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52736) entitled –
Capitol Medical Center, Inc. vs. Hon. Benedictor R. Bitonio, Jr., in his capacity as
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Department of Labor and Employment;
Hon. Maximo B. Lim in his capacity as Regional Director, National Capital Region,
Department of Labor and Employment and Capitol Medical Center Employees
Association (CMCEA-AFW), was dismissed in a decision dated January 11, 2001.
The motion for reconsideration which was subsequently filed was denied on March
23, 2001.
In order to allow an employer to validly suspend the bargaining process, there must
be a valid petition for certification election. The mere filing of a petition does not
ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer (Colegio de San
Juan de Letran vs. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran and Eleanor
Ambas, G.R. No. 141471, September 18, 2000). If pending a petition for
certification, the collective bargaining is allowed by the Supreme Court to proceed,
with more reason should the collective bargaining (in this case) continue since the
High Court had recognized the respondent as the certified bargaining agent in spite
of several petitions for cancellation filed against it.
Secondly, We are inclined to agree with the public respondent’s statement that ‘the
primary assumption of jurisdiction may be exercised by this Office even without the
necessity of prior notice or hearing given to any of the parties disputants.’ (page 56
of the Rollo).
We are also not convinced by the arguments raised by the petitioner with respect to
its third assigned error. This Court fails to see any supervening event that would
render the execution of the decision of public respondent impossible. The petitioner
asserts that the respondent union has lost its legitimacy, but at every turn it has been
ruled by the various labor administrative officials that the respondent union is
legitimate. It has failed to convince the labor administrative officials, We are
likewise not persuaded. Unless and until the Certificate of Registration of the union
is cancelled, it (union) remains the certified bargaining agent and the Hospital has
the duty to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with it.
SO ORDERED.”
On October 18, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner contends that its petition for the cancellation of respondent union’s certificate of
registration involves a prejudicial question that should first be settled before the Secretary of
Labor could order the parties to bargain collectively.
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his comment on the petition, the Secretary of Labor
correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not
preclude collective bargaining, thus:
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, during the pendency of this case before the Court of Appeals,
the Regional Director, in NCR-OD-9710-006-IRD, issued an Order on October 1, 1998 denying
the petition for cancellation of respondent’s certificate of registration. This Order became final
and executory and recorded in the BLR’s Book of Entries of Judgments on June 3, 1999.
Petitioner also maintains that the Secretary of Labor cannot exercise his powers under Article
263 (g) of the Labor Code without observing the requirements of due process.
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of
Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If
one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or
locked out employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of
law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with
such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
x x x x x x.”
In Magnolia Poultry Employees Union vs. Sanchez,[6] we held that the discretion to assume
jurisdiction may be exercised by the Secretary of Labor and Employment without the necessity
of prior notice or hearing given to any of the parties. The rationale for his primary assumption
of jurisdiction can justifiably rest on his own consideration of the exigency of the situation in
relation to the national interests.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated September 20, 2001 and
the Resolution dated October 18, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53479 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[1]Penned by Justice Ramon Mabutas, Jr. (retired), and concurred in by Justice Roberto A.
Barrios and Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, Annex “A” of the Petition, Rollo at 31-41.
[3] The petition alleged as ground for cancellation of respondent union’s certificate of
registration its violation of Article 239 of the Labor Code or its failure to submit the annual
financial statements from 1992 to 1996.
[4] G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 494, holding that a petition for certiorari
assailing the decision or order of the Secretary of Labor should be initially filed with the Court
of Appeals, no longer with this Court, pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
[5]Upon appeal, the BLR issued a Resolution dated December 29, 1998 affirmed the Regional
Director’s Order. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a
Resolution dated March 4, 1999. Subsequently, an Entry of Judgment was issued on June 3,
1999.
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