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Third Division (G.R. NO. 155690, June 30, 2005) : Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

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501 Phil.

144

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 155690, June 30, 2005 ]
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, AND CAPITOL
MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision[1] dated September 20, 2001 and
the Resolution[2] dated October 18, 2002 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
53479, entitled “Capitol Medical Center, Inc. vs. Hon. Cresenciano B. Trajano, in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and Capitol Medical Center
Employees Association-AFW.”

The factual antecedents as gleaned from the records are:


Capitol Medical Center, Inc., petitioner, is a hospital with address at Panay Avenue corner Scout
Magbanua Street, Quezon City.  Upon the other hand, Capitol Medical Center Employees
Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers, respondent, is a duly registered labor union acting as
the certified collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of petitioner hospital.

On October 2, 1997, respondent union, through its president Jaime N. Ibabao, sent petitioner a
letter requesting a negotiation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

In its reply dated October 10, 1997, petitioner, challenging the union’s legitimacy, refused to
bargain with respondent.  Subsequently or on October 15, 1997, petitioner filed with the Bureau
of Labor Relations (BLR), Department of Labor and Employment, a petition for cancellation of
respondent’s certificate of registration, docketed as NCR-OD-9710-006-IRD.[3]

For its part, on October 29, 1997, respondent filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB), National Capital Region, a notice of strike, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-10-
453-97.  Respondent alleged that petitioner’s refusal to bargain constitutes unfair labor practice.
Despite several conferences and efforts of the designated conciliator-mediator, the parties failed
to reach an amicable settlement.

On November 28, 1997, respondent staged a strike.


On December 4, 1997, former Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, now Associate Justice
of this Court, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ordering all
striking workers to return to work and the management to resume normal operations, thus:

“WHEREFORE, this Office assumes jurisdiction over the labor disputes at Capitol
Medical Center pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended. 
Consequently, all striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four
(24) hours from the receipt of this Order and the management to resume normal
operations and accept back all striking workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike. Further, parties are directed to cease and desist from
committing any act that may exacerbate the situation.

Moreover, parties are hereby directed to submit within 10 days from receipt of this
Order proposals and counter-proposals leading to the conclusion of the collective
bargaining agreement in compliance with aforementioned Resolution of the Office
as affirmed by the Supreme Court.

SO ORDERED.”

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated April 27,
1998.

On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Labor
Secretary’s Orders.  Pursuant to our ruling in St. Martin Funeral Home vs.The National Labor
Relations Commission, et al.,[4] we referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for its
appropriate action and disposition.

Meantime, on October 1, 1998, the Regional Director, in NCR-OD-9710-006-IRD, issued an


Order denying the petition for cancellation of respondent union’s certificate of registration.[5]

On September 20, 2001, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming the Orders of the
Secretary of Labor.  The Court of Appeals held:

“Anent the first issue raised by the petitioner, We find the same untenable. The
public respondent acted well within his duty to order the petitioner hospital to
bargain collectively, for it was the surest way to end the dispute.  In LMG Chemicals
Corporation vs. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, the Hon.
Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Chemical Worker’s Union (G.R. No. 127422, April 17,
2001), the Supreme Court made the following pronouncement, to wit:

‘It is well settled in our jurisprudence that the authority of the Secretary of Labor to
assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions
and controversies arising therefrom.  The power is plenary and discretionary in
nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute.

x x x                                        x x x

Indeed, We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Secretary of


Labor whose power is plenary and includes the resolution of all controversies arising
from the labor dispute.  In fact, he was merely following the directive laid down by
the Supreme Court (Decision dated February 4, 1997) in the case of Capitol Medical
Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-Unified Filipino Service Workers (CMC-
ACE-UFSW) vs. Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma, Undersecretary of the Department
of Labor and Employment, Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance
of Filipino Workers and Capitol Medical Center Incorporated and Dra. Thelma
Clemente, President, ordering petitioner hospital to collectively bargain with the
Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers
(private respondent herein) – the certified bargaining agent.

As earlier mentioned, the petition for cancellation was dismissed by the regional
director in a decision dated September 30, 1998.  x x x.

x x x                                        x x x

Said decision by the regional director was affirmed by the Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations in a resolution dated December 29, 1998, dismissing the appeal of
the petitioner hospital from the said DOLE-NCR’s decision.

Finally, the petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52736) entitled –
Capitol Medical Center, Inc. vs. Hon. Benedictor R. Bitonio, Jr., in his capacity as
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Department of Labor and Employment;
Hon. Maximo B. Lim in his capacity as Regional Director, National Capital Region,
Department of Labor and Employment and Capitol Medical Center Employees
Association (CMCEA-AFW), was dismissed in a decision dated January 11, 2001. 
The motion for reconsideration which was subsequently filed was denied on March
23, 2001.

x x x                                        x x x

In order to allow an employer to validly suspend the bargaining process, there must
be a valid petition for certification election.  The mere filing of a petition does not
ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer (Colegio de San
Juan de Letran vs. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran and Eleanor
Ambas, G.R. No. 141471, September 18, 2000).  If pending a petition for
certification, the collective bargaining is allowed by the Supreme Court to proceed,
with more reason should the collective bargaining (in this case) continue since the
High Court had recognized the respondent as the certified bargaining agent in spite
of several petitions for cancellation filed against it.

x x x                                        x x x

Secondly, We are inclined to agree with the public respondent’s statement that ‘the
primary assumption of jurisdiction may be exercised by this Office even without the
necessity of prior notice or hearing given to any of the parties disputants.’ (page 56
of the Rollo).

x x x                                        x x x

We are also not convinced by the arguments raised by the petitioner with respect to
its third assigned error.  This Court fails to see any supervening event that would
render the execution of the decision of public respondent impossible.  The petitioner
asserts that the respondent union has lost its legitimacy, but at every turn it has been
ruled by the various labor administrative officials that the respondent union is
legitimate.  It has failed to convince the labor administrative officials, We are
likewise not persuaded.  Unless and until the Certificate of Registration of the union
is cancelled, it (union) remains the certified bargaining agent and the Hospital has
the duty to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with it.

x x x                                        x x x

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED, hereby


AFFIRMING the two assailed orders, dated December 4, 1997 and April 27, 1998,
of the public respondent in OS-AJ-0024-97 (NCMB-NCR-NS-10-453-97).

SO ORDERED.”

On October 18, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.


Petitioner contends that its petition for the cancellation of respondent union’s certificate of
registration involves a prejudicial question that should first be settled before the Secretary of
Labor could order the parties to bargain collectively.

We are not persuaded.


As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his comment on the petition, the Secretary of Labor
correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not
preclude collective bargaining, thus:

“That there is a pending cancellation proceedings against the respondent Union is


not a bar to set in motion the mechanics of collective bargaining. If a certification
election may still be ordered despite the pendency of a petition to cancel the union’s
registration certificate (National Union of Bank Employees vs. Minister of Labor, 110
SCRA 274), more so should the collective bargaining process continue despite its
pendency.  We must emphasize that the majority status of the respondent Union is
not affected by the pendency of the Petition for Cancellation pending against it. 
Unless its certificate of registration and its status as the certified bargaining agent are
revoked, the Hospital is, by express provision of the law, duty bound to collectively
bargain with the Union.  Indeed, no less than the Supreme Court already ordered the
Hospital to collectively bargain with the Union when it affirmed the resolution of
this Office dated November 18, 1994 directing the management of the Hospital to
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with the Union.  That was the
categorical directive of the High Court in its Resolution dated February 4, 1997 in
Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-United Filipino Service
Worker vs. Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma, et al., G.R. No. L-118915.”

Moreover, as mentioned earlier, during the pendency of this case before the Court of Appeals,
the Regional Director, in NCR-OD-9710-006-IRD, issued an Order on October 1, 1998 denying
the petition for cancellation of respondent’s certificate of registration.  This Order became final
and executory and recorded in the BLR’s Book of Entries of Judgments on June 3, 1999.

Petitioner also maintains that the Secretary of Labor cannot exercise his powers under Article
263 (g) of the Labor Code without observing the requirements of due process.

Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:


“ART. 263. Strikes, Picketing and Lockouts. –


x x x                                        x x x


(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of
Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration.  Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order.  If
one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or
locked out employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.  The
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of
law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with
such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.

x x x. In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operation of such hospitals,


clinics or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking union or locking-out
employer to provide and maintain an effective skeletal workforce of medical and
other health personnel, whose movement and services shall be unhampered and
unrestricted, as are necessary to insure the proper and adequate protection of the life
and health of its patients, most especially emergency cases, for the duration of the
strike or lockout.  In such cases, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment is mandated to immediately assume, within twenty-four (24) hours
from knowledge of the occurrence of such a strike or lockout, jurisdiction over
the same or certify it to the Commission for compulsory arbitration.  For this
purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such orders,
prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission, under pain of immediate disciplinary action,
including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out
employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal
prosecution against either or both of them.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be


precluded from determining the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to
the national interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction over
any such labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same.

x x x                                        x x x.”

In Magnolia Poultry Employees Union vs. Sanchez,[6] we held that the discretion to assume
jurisdiction may be exercised by the Secretary of Labor and Employment without the necessity
of prior notice or hearing given to any of the parties.  The rationale for his primary assumption
of jurisdiction can justifiably rest on his own consideration of the exigency of the situation in
relation to the national interests.

In sum, petitioner’s submissions are bereft of merit.


WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated September 20, 2001 and
the Resolution dated October 18, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53479 are
AFFIRMED.  Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.


[1]Penned by Justice Ramon Mabutas, Jr. (retired), and concurred in by Justice Roberto A.
Barrios and Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, Annex “A” of the Petition, Rollo at 31-41.

[2] Annex “B”, id. at 42-44.


[3] The petition alleged as ground for cancellation of respondent union’s certificate of
registration its violation of Article 239 of the Labor Code or its failure to submit the annual
financial statements from 1992 to 1996.

[4] G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 494, holding that a petition for certiorari
assailing the decision or order of the Secretary of Labor should be initially filed with the Court
of Appeals, no longer with this Court, pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

[5]Upon appeal, the BLR issued a Resolution dated December 29, 1998 affirmed the Regional
Director’s Order.  Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a
Resolution dated March 4, 1999.  Subsequently, an Entry of Judgment was issued on June 3,
1999.

[6] G.R. No.


76227-28, November 5, 1986, Minute Resolution.  See also C.A. Azucena, Jr., The
Labor Code with Comments and Cases, Vol.II, Fourth Edition 1999, Reprinted 2001 at 452.
Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: October 13, 2014

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