SANDOVAL V HRET

614 SCRA 793

Judicial Review of Decisions of Electoral Tribunal

GIST:

SANDOVAL v. HRET, G.R. No. 190067 (March 9, 2010) EN BANC It is hornbook doctrine that the Court’s
jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon a showing of
grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal. Absent such grave abuse of discretion, the
Supreme Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunal’s exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction.
The abuse in discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

FACTS

On 19 May 2007, after the canvass of votes, as evidenced by the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and
Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for the Member of the House of Representatives, the Board of
Canvassers of the Legislative District of Malabon City-Navotas proclaimed protestee Sandoval [herein
petitioner] the winning candidate for the Office of the Member of the House of Representatives with
Seventy-one Thousand Four Hundred Ninety (71,490) votes as against protestant Lacson-Noel who
obtained the second highest number of votes with Seventy Thousand Three Hundred Thirty-One
(70,331) votes; or a winning margin of One Thousand One Hundred Fifty-Nine (1,159) votes. Per the
Summary Statement of Votes, the distribution of all votes legally cast in the district is as follows:

SANDOVAL, Alvin S. - 71,490

LACSON-NOEL, Josephine Veronique R. - 70,331

FRANCISCO, Maritoni Z. - 35,634

CINCO, Roberto T. - 412

Refusing to concede defeat, protestant Lacson-Noel filed the instant Petition of Protest on 29 May 2007,
and alleged in substance that "the results [of the election] do not reflect the true will of the voters as
they are but products of various fraudulent and illegal acts, schemes and machinations employed by
[protestee] Sandoval, his agents and supporters, with the connivance or conspiracy of the Board of
Election Inspectors (BEIs), which defrauded and deprived [her] of lawful votes cast at the precinct level."
Specifically, protestant Lacson-Noel assails the results of election in 623 precincts (441 from Malabon
City and 182 from Navotas) out of the 1,437 total number of precincts in the Lone Legislative District of
Malabon City-Navotas on the following grounds:

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 a. Misreading, miscounting and/or miscrediting of votes [in favor of protestee Sandoval and/or
ballots intended for protestant Lacson-Noel were not counted in her favor] x x x.
b. Misappreciation of ballots in violation of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code and case law
[such as the non-counting of protestant Lacson-Noel's maiden surname "Lacson" in her favor] x
x x.
c. x x x written-by-One ballots, in pairs or in groups of ballots [were counted in favor of protestee].
d. The use of either fake, spurious ballots or genuine but manufactured ballots to increase
protestee Sandoval's votes. x x x.
e. The use of manufactured election returns which are prepared x x x prior to the start of voting
and/or counting.
f. Manipulation, alteration and falsification of the votes and related data in the election returns
and/or vote padding in favor of protestee Sandoval and vote-shaving from protestant Lacson-
Noel's votes.

Protestant Lacson-Noel claims that she would have obtained a greater number of votes if not for the
fraud and irregularities that marred the election. She posits that "[t]here is a need for a recount, revision
and due appreciation of the ballots and examination or scrutiny of election documents in the [623]
protested precincts," as the result thereof "will affect the presumptive results of the congressional
elections in the Malabon City-Navotas Legislative District in a very substantial degree as to overcome
protestee Sandoval's presumptive lead." Consequently, protestant Lacson-Noel prays that, after the
revision and appreciation of ballots and due hearing, judgment be rendered annulling the proclamation
of protestee Sandoval; and declaring her the duly elected Representative of the Lone Legislative District
of Malabon City-Navotas.

On 12 November 2008, protestant Lacson-Noel opposed the preceding motion on the ground that the
same was merely another dilatory move to delay the resolution of the instant election protest case. She
argued that per HRET Rules, protestee Sandoval had already used up the time allocated him and that he
"squandered the time given him to present his evidence" by presenting party revisors as witnesses
whose opinions on the authenticity of the subject ballots allegedly bear no evidentiary weight. Further,
she contended that (1) the period of two months to be reckoned from 2 September 2008 within which
the presentation of protestee Sandoval's evidence must be concluded, including the filing of his [Formal
Offer of Evidence], had already expired on 3 November 2008; (2) four of the 13 hearing dates set by the
Hearing Commissioner were cancelled upon the instance of protestee Sandoval; and (3) the
presentation of additional evidence beyond 3 November 2008 is in direct contravention of Rule 59 of
the 2004 HRET Rule of Procedure providing for a period of only two months, from inception, to conclude
the presentation of a party's evidence.

Despite the opposition, in Resolution No. 08-342 issued on 24 November 2008, the Tribunal resolved to
grant protestee Sandoval's motion with the necessary warning that no further extension shall be given.
Accordingly, an additional period of ten (10) days was set within which to present his additional
evidence. In granting the prayer for additional time, the Tribunal took into consideration the provision of
the HRET Rules where, in the interest of justice and meritorious grounds, it may grant an extension of
ten (10) days for a party to present his evidence. The Tribunal further directed the Hearing

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Commissioner assigned to the present case to set successive dates, not to exceed ten (10) days, for the
presentation of protestee Sandoval's additional evidence and to issue the corresponding subpoena
duces tecum and ad testificandum to the witnesses concerned.

Issue:

Whether or not the SC’s jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals can be
exercised.

Ruling

It is hornbook principle that this Court's jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals
is exercised only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal. Absent such
grave abuse of discretion, this Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunal’s exercise of its
discretion or jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined in Villarosa v. House
Representatives Electoral Tribunal as follows:

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.

Petitioner mainly assails the Tribunal's denial of his pleas for an additional period of time within which to
make his formal offer of evidence. However, a review of the proceedings will reveal that the HRET acted
in accordance with its rules of procedure and well within its jurisdiction.
Petitioner commenced presentation of his evidence on September 2, 2008. Further hearings were
scheduled for September 15, 18, 23 and 25, 2008. He was able to present evidence on September 15, 18,
and 25, 2008, but the hearing set for September 23, 2008 was canceled upon motion of petitioner. On
September 29, 2008, the Hearing Commissioner set additional hearings for October 2, 13, 27, 28, 29 and
31, 2008 and November 3, 2008, for reception of petitioner's evidence. However, due to unavailability of
petitioner's counsel, no hearings were held on the dates set for the whole month of October. Hearings only
resumed on November 3 and 11, 2008 and, on the latter date, petitioner moved that he be allowed more
time to present additional witnesses. Despite opposition from respondent Lacson-Noel, the Tribunal issued
Resolution No. 08-342 dated November 24, 2008, granting petitioner an additional period of ten (10) days
within which to present evidence, with the warning that no further extension shall be given. The Hearing
Commissioner notified the parties that further hearings will be held on December 10 and 11, 2008. Said
hearing dates were utilized by petitioner.

Nevertheless, in utter disregard of the Tribunal's warning, petitioner again filed on December 18, 2008 a
Manifestation and Motion (with Prayer for Suspension of the Period to File Protestee's Formal Offer of
Evidence), praying for more time to present more witnesses, and that he be allowed to file his Formal
Offer of Evidence upon completion of presentation of his evidence. Respondent Lacson-Noel opposed
said motion, pointing out that the additional period of ten (10) days granted to petitioner lapsed on
December 24, 2008. Thus, on January 22, 2009, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 09-009, pointing out

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that despite the additional period of ten days granted to him and the lapse of more than three (3)
months reckoned from September 2, 2008, petitioner had not completed the presentation of his
evidence. Since the last day of the extension granted to him was on December 23, 2008 and said period
lapsed without petitioner completing presentation of his evidence including formal offer thereof, he was
deemed to have waived the same.

Such action of the HRET was not a denial of petitioner's right to due process. In Villarosa,8 it was held,
thus:

The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in
support of one’s defense. To be heard does not mean verbal arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process.

It is quite clear from the foregoing narration of how the proceedings were conducted that petitioner was
given all the opportunity to be heard. So many hearing dates were set for his presentation of evidence,
but he merely wasted a good number of those days. He was granted an extension of time so he could
file his formal offer of evidence, but he still failed to fulfill his responsibility.

Note that the 2004 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal provide for a definite period
of time within which a party should complete or terminate his presentation of evidence, to wit:

Rule 59. Time Limit for Presentation of Evidence. - Each party is given a period of twenty (20)
working days, preferably successive, to complete the presentation of his evidence, including the
formal offer thereof. Unless provided otherwise, this period is terminated within two (2)
months, which shall begin to run from the first date set for the presentation of the party's
evidence, either before the Tribunal or before a Hearing Commissioner. Once commenced,
presentation of the evidence-in-chief shall continue every working day until completed or until
the period granted for such purpose is exhausted. Upon motion based on meritorious grounds,
the Tribunal may grant a ten-day extension of the period herein fixed.

The hearing for any particular day or days may be postponed or cancelled upon the request of the party
presenting evidence, provided, however, that the delay caused by such postponement or cancellation
shall be charged to said party's period for presenting evidence.

xxxx

The rule cannot be any clearer that parties are mandated to complete the presentation of their evidence
within a period of two (2) months, which shall begin to run from the first date set for the presentation of

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the party's evidence. In this case, petitioner's presentation of evidence should have been terminated by
November 2, 2008. It was petitioner's and/or his counsel's duty to always have the foregoing rule or
time limit in mind in planning and scheduling the presentation of his testimonial and documentary
evidence. Petitioner had actually been accorded leniency because on November 24, 2008, which was
already beyond the two-month time limit under Rule 59, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 08-342
granting him an additional ten days for presentation of evidence including a formal offer thereof.
Petitioner had been sufficiently warned that that would be the last extension, but he chose not to heed
such warning and failed to use the additional time wisely. Only petitioner deserves to be blamed for the
woes that befell him.

In Hofer v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, a case that is closely analogous to the instant
petition, the Court emphasized that "[p]rocedural rules in election cases are designed to achieve not
only a correct but also an expeditious determination of the popular will of the electorate." Thus, the
time limit set by the rules is not something to be taken lightly, for it was stressed in the same case that
"the observance of the HRET Rules in conjunction with our own Rules of Court, must be taken seriously."
Quoting Baltazar v. Commission of Elections, The Court reiterated in Hofer that:

By their very nature and given the public interest involved in the determination of the results of
an election, the controversies arising from the canvass must be resolved speedily, otherwise the
will of the electorate would be frustrated. And the delay brought about by the tactics resorted
to by petitioner is precisely the very evil sought to be prevented by election statutes and
controlling case law on the matter.