BIMSTEC Digital 9 04 2021
BIMSTEC Digital 9 04 2021
BIMSTEC Digital 9 04 2021
BIMSTEC
STRENGTHENING
REGIONAL SOLIDARITY
ACROSS THE BAY OF BENGAL
EDITORS
RAKHAHARI CHATTERJI
ANASUA BASU RAY CHAUDHURY
© 2021 Observer Research Foundation All rights reserved. No part of this
publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means
without permission in writing from ORF.
ISBN: 978-81-948115-0-3
CONTENTS
FOREWORD 7
M. Shahidul Islam
PREFACE 9
Sunjoy Joshi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 11
INTRODUCTION 12
Rakhahari Chatterji and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury
I
wish to express my sincere gratitude to the Observer Research
Foundation (ORF) for taking the initiative to publish this
volume of essays on strengthening BIMSTEC solidarity, as part
of the Kolkata Colloquium that it organised in November 2019
in collaboration with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, New Delhi, the
Centre for New Economic Diplomacy, and the UK’s Department for
International Development.
M. Shahidul Islam
Secretary General, BIMSTEC
December 2020
8
PREFACE
C
onnectivity—critical to building communities and societies,
and for their economic and social development—has
always been central to human enterprise. Sadly for South
Asia, however, the region’s history of colonisation turned
connectivity on its head, making it a predatory exercise that disrupted
the vibrant cultural, economic and social linkages that had sustained
this part of the world for centuries. Even as the previous century saw the
region emerge into a modern community of nations, both the renewal of
old networks and the establishment of meaningful new networks became
subservient to more immediate national concerns.
How do nations, economies, and societies adapt to both the most primeval
and the most modern technology-induced transformations? In a world
where multilateralism is seeing signs of flailing, can regional institutions
such as BIMSTEC step up to serve as vanguards of efforts to respond
to these unprecedented challenges? Can such regional institutions help
catalyse the latent potential of individual countries towards achieving
collective goals? This volume of essays cuts across various issues related
to politics, society, economy, culture, public health, connectivity and
strategy. It is an attempt to understand BIMSTEC and help determine
its potential. I have no doubt that this volume will make a significant
10
contribution to the larger focus on a sustainable future for the BIMSTEC
countries.
Sunjoy Joshi
Chairperson, Observer Research Foundation
December 2020
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
T
his collection is a result of an international conference
entitled “Reimaging BIMSTEC,” held on 28-29 November
2019 in Kolkata, West Bengal as part of Kolkata Colloquium
2019. Observer Research Foundation (ORF). Kolkata
chapter organised this flagship programme in collaboration with Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), New Delhi and Centre for New Economic
Diplomacy and Department for International Development (DFID), U.K.
We are indebted to the collaborators for their support for the Conference.
We extend our sincere gratitude to Mr. Peter Rimmele, Resident
Representative, KAS; Dr. Pankaj Madan, KAS, New Delhi; Dr. Duncan
Overfield, Head, DIFD, New Delhi and M. Shahidul Islam, Secretary
General, BIMSTEC, Dhaka, Bangladesh for their encouragement and
support. We are thankful to all the contributors for sharing their valuable
views in this volume. We owe a debt of gratitude to Mr. Sunjoy Joshi,
Chairman, ORF; Dr. Samir Saran, President, ORF; Professor. Harsh.V.
Pant, Director, Studies & Head, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF, New
Delhi and Dr. Nilanjan Ghosh, Director, ORF, Kolkata Chapter without
whose constant cooperation and encouragement it would not have
been possible to complete this volume. Finally, we wish to thank all our
colleagues for their support and particularly, Sohini Bose and Sohini
Nayak, Junior Fellow, ORF, Kolkata Chapter for their editorial help.
Introduction
T
he Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) was established in 1997,
and over the next 23 years, its membership has expanded,
declarations were made and intentions expressed. However,
not much has changed on the ground, even as the world has gone through
drastic changes—marked by a huge push towards globalisation, a global
financial crisis, China’s departure from its “hide your strength, bide your
time” strategy to the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) and, most recently,
the COVID-19 pandemic. Together, these events have changed the face of
the world, perhaps irreversibly.
Under such circumstances, what should a country like India do? Until
now, India has been only a casual participant in regional arrangements.
While the policies aimed at achieving strategic autonomy and economic
self-sufficiency were helpful in the past, they were short-lived—disrupted
by wars, oil shocks, and terrorism, from the 1960s through the 1980s. The
prospects held out by globalisation from the 1990s to the first decade
of the present century have dwindled drastically. Situated in this new
strategic and economic environment, India must reconceptualise its role
within the neighbourhood. Incidentally, this problem is not limited to
India and also affects neighbouring states in the region. These countries,
which together make up BIMSTEC, should therefore work towards a
strategy of “institutional hedging,”2 to protect their individual interests as
well as shape up a regional order that works for all the members involved.
Despite these concerns, there are grounds for optimism for the future
of BIMSTEC. The recent resurgence of strategic and economic interests
in the Bay, as part of a larger maritime strategic space, namely, the Indo-
Pacific, has helped BIMSTEC gain salience as a promising sub-regional
grouping. The Bay, being the key transit route between the Indian and
the Pacific Oceans, is located at the intersection of Indian and Chinese
strategic interests, affecting all other BIMSTEC member-countries.
Additionally, the Bay is plagued by a variety of non-traditional security
threats, such as illegal migration and armed piracy. Consequently, the
important issues of freedom of navigation in the waters, controlling
transnational threats, harnessing and sharing the Bay’s natural wealth,
and promoting infrastructural and people-to-people connectivity
become common to the BIMSTEC member countries.
With regard to India’s role in the region, it has been argued that the
14
country must refrain from assuming a “big brother” posture, instead
projecting itself as a compatriot and an equal partner to other BIMSTEC
member-countries. This will help reduce its trust deficit and ensure
better integration in the region. Considering its “Look/Act East Policy,”
India has a major stake in bringing together South and Southeast
Asian countries in this common endeavour, which will have long-term
consequences for the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
18
Section 7, “The Indo-Pacific,” addresses the following key questions: In
what ways can BIMSTEC enter into collaborative ventures with other
regional/subregional organisations to further integrate the Indo-Pacific?
What are the multiple avenues in which BIMSTEC members can increase
or initiate cooperation for impact that goes beyond the Bay? In a situation
where many non-littoral powers are now major stakeholders in the Bay,
what is the possibility of extending the Bay in the broader context of the
Indo-Pacific? Looking beyond the institutional dimension of BIMSTEC,
C. Raja Mohan, in “The Bay of Bengal in the Emerging Indo-Pacific,”
discusses the growing strategic significance of the Bay against the
backdrop of the new and increasingly contested geography of the Indo-
Pacific. In “BIMSTEC’s Future within the Geostrategic Narrative of the
‘Indo-Pacific’,” Gareth Price discusses the challenges to BIMSTEC in the
context of the fast-changing international milieu in the Indo-Pacific. In
their joint paper “BIMSTEC Plus: Towards a Bay of Bengal Community,”
Sohini Bose and Sohini Nayak explore the idea of “BIMSTEC Plus”
and granting Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore the status of observers
within the BIMSTEC. Christian Wagner, in “BIMSTEC: Regionalism,
Introduction
The final section of the volume, “Voices from Media,” examines the
role of media and its assessment of BIMSTEC. What is its perception
of BIMSTEC as a new strategic framework in the region? What role
can the media play in bringing BIMSTEC closer to the people? Which
sectors of BIMSTEC have received the most media attention from the
media? In this section, leading media practitioners address these and
other questions, attempting to find possible answers: Bertil Lintner in
“BIMSTEC and the Role of Media,” Haroon Habib in “Developing a Role
for the Media in BIMSTEC,” Subir Bhaumik in “Encouraging Media
Development and Cooperation in the BIMSTEC Region,” Tshering Dorji
in “Finding Solutions to BIMSTEC Region’s Challenges: How the Media
Can Help,” and Chandni Jayatilleke in “Resurrecting BIMSTEC through
the Media.”
19
Reimagining BIMSTEC: Strengthening Regional Solidarity across the
Bay of Bengal provides a comprehensive view of the significance of
BIMSTEC as a trans-national organisation as well as the opportunities
and challenges presented by the changing geopolitical, geoeconomic
and geostrategic landscape, where the politics of resource consternation
dominates the logic of cross-border cooperation. This monograph may
be used for reference and will serve as a useful resource for academic
institutions, think tanks, and government and non-government agencies
in the area of foreign-policy formulation. Indeed, connectivity is now
one of the dominating agenda of development cooperation in the Bay of
Bengal region, and this volume will be of value to current literature.
Introduction
Endnotes
1
Ashley Tellis, “Covid-19 Knocks on American Hegemony,” The National
Bureau of Asian Research, May 04, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.
org/2020/05/04/covid-19-knocks-on-american-hegemony-pub-81719.
2
Mie Oba, “Further Development of Asian Regionalism: Institutional
Hedging in an Uncertain Era,” Journal of Contemporary East Asian
Studies, https:// doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1688905.
3
Mark Beeson, “Why has leadership in the Asia Pacific proved to be so
elusive?” Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev., doi 10.1007/s41111-017-0074-y.
4
See, Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957).
20
SECTION 1
HISTORICAL AND
CULTURAL LINKAGES
Looking East: A Brief History
of Connections in the Bay of
Bengal Region
Ronojoy Sen
Introduction
F
or long, the Bay of Bengal was regarded as the “neglected” sea.
However, a series of recent studies, notably Sunil Amrith’s
work, have thrown the spotlight on the Bay.1 This essay
identifies four broad themes to map the history of the Bay of
Bengal and its role in connecting the Indian subcontinent to Southeast
Asia: trade or movement of goods; the role of empire or imperial
ambitions; the migration or movement of people; and the circulation of
ideas. None of these, however, are discrete themes; they are intimately
intertwined.
This essay will try to expand the last point by focusing on the idea of
‘Greater India,’ which grew out of the Greater India Society founded in
Calcutta (now Kolkata) on 10 October 1926 and its journal, the Journal
of Greater India Society, which was published from 1934 to 1959. The
‘Greater India’ idea significantly influenced India’s engagement with
Southeast Asia in the 20th century. Arguably, it also provides an unstated
context for India’s current foreign policy initiatives in the wider Bay of
Bengal region.
Historical and Cultural Linkages
First, this section will focus on the importance of trade. The nature of
the monsoon winds has for centuries facilitated the movement of ships
across the Bay of Bengal, and beginning in the 6th century, trade between
India and Southeast Asia had flourished. Spices were the most profitable
goods that were exported from Southeast Asia, while cloth was one of the
principal exports from India along with other produce such as pepper.
The Sinologist Haraprasad Ray has documented as many as six varieties
of textile that were being exported from Bengal in the 15th century.
The trade networks also provided a vehicle for the spread of cultural
influences, as well as religious—Hindu, Buddhist and later Muslim—from
the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia.
Third, it is worth noting that the movement of people across the Bay
increased significantly from the 19th century. An estimated 30 million
people crossed the Bay of Bengal from 1840 to 1940. Much of the
migration, however, was a circular one. The introduction of steamships
by British India Steamship Company in the 1860s revolutionised the
scale of migration. The annual number of passenger journeys between
South India and Malaya (today’s Malaysia) in both directions grew from
an average of 15,000 in the 1870s to nearly 40,000 by the end of the 1880s.
The numbers would peak in the mid-1920s, with 150,000 people arriving
in Malaya from India and 300,000 in Ceylon.
Tagore’s many journeys eastward, particularly his 1924 visit to China and
his travels in 1927 to Singapore and then onwards to Malaya, Bali and Java,
also had an enormous influence on the ideas of the Greater India Society.
Tagore wrote about his travels in Southeast Asia in Java Yatrir Patra or
Letters from Java. The Greater India Society was inaugurated in 1926
by a group of Bengali intellectuals who invited Tagore to be its Purodha
Conclusion
The Second World War and the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia
shattered the balance of power in the Bay of Bengal region. Because
the Japanese did not advance beyond the eastern frontiers of India, an
imaginary line was drawn across the Bay between India and Southeast
Asia. The establishment of the Southeast Asia Command under Lord
The division between South Asia and Southeast Asia lasted well beyond
the Second World War and the creation of nation-states in the wake of
decolonisation. Regional institutions, such as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the way area studies was structured during
the Cold War years, solidified this division. BIMSTEC is one attempt to
revive the long moribund connections, whose loss Tagore had lamented
and the Greater Indian Society had somewhat problematically sought to
study and valorise.
27
Endnotes
1
Sunil S. Amrith, Crossing the Bay of Bengal: The furies of nature and the
fortunes of migrants (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).
2
Stephen Hay, Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in
Japan, China and India (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp.
34-5.
3
Asian Ideas of East and West, pp. 43-44
4
Cited in Kwa Chong-Guan ed., Early Southeast Asia Viewed From
India: An Anthology of Articles from the Journal of the Greater India
Society (New Delhi: Manohar, 2013), pp. 5.
5
Indiradevi Chaudhurani and Supriya Roy trans., Letters From Java:
Rabindranath Tagore’s Tour of South-East Asia 1927, (Kolkata: Visva-
Bharati, 2010), pp. 230.
6
Chong-Guan, Early Southeast Asia Viewed From India, pp. 18.
7
R.C. Majumdar, Hindu Colonies in the Far East (Calcutta: Firma KLM,
28 1963), pp. x.
8
R.C. Majumdar, Ancient Indian Colonies in the Far East, vol. 1(Lahore:
The Panjab Sanskrit Book Depot, 1927), pp. 21.
9
Carolien Stolte and Harald Fischer-Tiné, “Imagining Asia in India:
Nationalism and Internationalism (Ca. 1905–1940),” Comparative Studies
in Society and History 54:1 (2012): 91.
10
Susan Bayly, “Imagining ‘Greater India’: French and Indian Visions of
Colonialism in the Indic Mode.” Modern Asian Studies 38: 3 (2004): 736.
Sarvani Gooptu
Introduction
T
he concept of ‘regional cooperation’ refers to the
political and institutional mechanisms that countries in a
geographical region devise to find and strengthen common
interests as well as promote their national interests,
through mutual cooperation and dialogue.1 Perhaps the easiest way to
establishing commonalities in order to ensure stability of cooperation is
through the reiteration of shared histories and heritage; the caveat is that
in remembering the past, one needs to be conscious of the sentiments of
peoples and nations.
Colonial rule, despite its noxious impact on the political and economic
life of the colonised, aided the spontaneous desire of the colonised to
use the tools of imperial communication, i.e. road and water transport,
to explore their neighbouring countries. This essay examines memoirs,
travelogues and analyses published in Bengali periodicals and books in
the period 1870s to 1940s to show the emergence of cosmopolitan and
nationalist ideas amongst the colonised people of the subcontinent in
their quest for discovery of the similar within the dissimilar.
Historical and Cultural Linkages
In this context, this essay argues that the Bengali intellectuals writing in
late 19th and 20th century and many more journalists and writers who were
inspired by them found their source of inspiration in not only nationalism
but also in universalism, in the creation of a noble/nobler India
(Mahattara Bharat)10 which would provide leadership for a troubled Asia.
This cosmopolitanism was less a political project or practice but more a
philosophy or worldview or even an attitude or disposition as Vertovec
and Cohen (2002),11 and Ulrich Beck (2011) have similarly pointed out.12
their affinity with the land they visited or resided in, as an extension
of their homeland, as part of a common Asia and a part of the empire.
Burma aroused greatest interest since it was a partner in the colonial
agenda, modernised by British policies just like India was, but with
the difference since its monarchy and the erstwhile ruling classes were
displaced by an “aggressive British Indian state”13 and replaced with a
huge administrative support staff as well as private players from India
through a forced/encouraged migration policy.14 The focus on Sri Lanka
was on its scenic beauty for travellers and on Buddhist pilgrimage sites
due to a reawakened world interest in Buddhism. Thailand was “strange”
to the writers, not simply due to differences in customs and behaviour
but because of its miraculous escape from colonisation despite being a
neighbour.
In the late 19th century, when Burma was linked with India by a common
British imperial rule, it seemed imperative for those domiciled in Rangoon
to “familiarize the readers (back home in India) with Burma whose fate
is closely tied up with that of India, since the British are masters of both
32
countries,” as Mrinalini Raha wrote in Antahpur in 1902.15 Others like
Girindranath Sarkar, described the life and culture of Bengalis in Burma
in Prabashi 16 and another Rangoon resident, Pushpalata Debi wrote of
her travels in Burma and Malaya in Mahila in 1903.17 There is a sense of
belonging to Burma, not just due to territorial proximity but because
as easterners they share certain values, and they were both suffering
colonisation.
Sri Lanka (or the Singhal Kingdom) represents interest in being so close
yet having differences in natural and human resources though there is
a stress on comparative development which is ascribed to adherence
to Buddhist principles. Anagarika Dharmapala’s visits to India, and
in particular, Calcutta, led to this interest in Sinhalese Buddhism.
Comparing Calcutta’s magnificence to that of Colombo in 1884, Ta Pra
Cha (pseudonym) writes in his ‘Travel to Singhal’ in Nabajiban, that
Colombo’s importance is because it is a port where ships from all countries
halt yet “it can hardly compare with the magnificence of Chowringhee,
though Singhal is more well to do than Bengal...”21 A travelogue by Raja
33
Munidra Deb describes the journey by a group of distinguished men to
Sri Lanka who explore the magnificence of the Buddhist architecture
there22 while Rukmini Kanta Chakraborty’s description of travel by
rail in Sri Lanka in 1892 compliments British initiative and Singhalese
virtues.23 Even in children’s magazines, Sri Lanka appears in translations
of Sinhalese stories or in Buddhist stories based there.24
Thailand was interesting for writers since it was little known to Indians
as the series of translations of ‘Travel in Siam’ by Jyotirindranath
Tagore shows, when he discusses the journey of the Grand Duke Boris
Vladimirovich of Russia, as if he was a part of it,25 or when Narendra Dev
writes a descriptive series on Thailand.26
Descriptions of the culture, art and literature of these countries were also
part of the programme of education of the readers undertaken by these
literary figures. There was much greater concentration on discussion of
art in the East Asian countries of China and Japan, whereas descriptions
of dramatic performances in Burma and Thailand were an inevitable part
of the travelogues.27 Rabindranath Tagore played an important role in this
sphere when he travelled to Burma three times in 1916, 1924, and 1927. By
then he was already a world renowned figure whose deep appreciation
for Burmese culture went a long way in popularising it. Besides Shwe
34
Dagon and other pagodas, what struck all those writing on Burma were
its people and their lifestyle. Not simply those living in Burma but even
those visiting it for a short period mention what they call “women’s
freedom in Burma”, albeit some of them in a disapproving tone.28
Today, in pursuit of regional cooperation, there is need once again for the
sage judgement of leading intellectuals and to remind ourselves of the
fruitful personal interactions between Asian nations in the not so distant
past.
35
Endnotes
1
The concept of ‘Regional Cooperation’, IGI Global Dictionary,
https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/exploring-landscapes-in-
regional-convergence/55672#.
2
T.A.Keenleyside, “Nationalist Indian attitudes towards Asia: a troublesome
legacy for Post independence foreign policy”, Pacific Affairs, 55/ 2(1982):
201.
3
Ashis Nandy, “A New Cosmopolitanism: Towards a dialogue of Asian
civilizations” in Kuan-Hsing Chen (ed.) Trajectories: Inter-Asia Cultural
Studies (London: Routledge, 1998), 145.
4
ProsenjitDuara, “Foreword” in Kwa Chong Guan (ed.) Early South East
Asia viewed from India: an anthology of articles from Journal of Greater India
Society, (New Delhi: Manohar, 2013), 8.
5
Stolte Carolien and Fischer-Tine Harald, “Imagining Asia in India:
Nationalism and Internationalism -c.a. 1905-1940”, Comparative Studies in
36 Society and History, 54/1 (2012): 65-92.
6
Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global
Empires (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2006), 275.
7
Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma and India some aspects of Intellectual life under
Colonialism (Shimla: IIAS, 1990) and Thant Myint-U, Where China Meets
India: Burma and the new crossroads of Asia (London: Faber and Faber, 2011).
8
Rabindranath Tagore, Nationalism, (Calcutta: Rupa and Company,
1917/1992).
9
Kakuzo Okakura, The Ideals of the East with Special reference to the Art of
Japan (New York,: E.P.Dutton and Co., 1904), 212.
10
Ramananda Chattopadhyay, “Mahattara Bharat”, Prabasi, 25/1 (1925): 119-
124.
Vertovec Steven and Cohen Robin (eds.), Conceiving Cosmopolitanism,
11
13
Thant Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 3-11.
14
Uma Shankar Singh, “Indians in Burma I”, and Parimal Kumar Das, ‘Indians
in Burma II’ in I.J.Bahadur Singh (ed.) Indians in South East Asia, (New
Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1982), 98-99; 117.
15
Mrinalini Raha, “Brahmadesher Kotha”, Antahpur, 5/8 (1902): 161-4.
16
Girindranath Sarkar, “Brahmadeshe Bangali”, Prabasi, 8 /9 (1901): 347-
350.
17
Pushpabala Debi, “Malay Rajya”,Mahila, 9/3 (1903): 71-72.
18
Suu Kyi Burma and India some aspects of Intellectual life under Colonialism
and Thant Myint-U Where China Meets India: Burma and the new crossroads
of Asia.
19
Sarala Debi Chaudhurani, “Burma Jatra”, Bharatvarsha, 19/ 1/5 (1931):773.
20
Sarala Debi Chowdhurani, “Shwe Dagon”, Bharatvarsha, 20/1/2 (1932):
260-266.
21
Ta Pra Cha., “Singhal Yatra”, Nabajiban, 1/2 (1884): 8-9.
22
Kumar Munindradeb Roy, “Singhal Dvip”, Bharatvarsha, 15/ 2/ 5 and 15/ 2
/6 (1927): 683-732; 811-824.
37
23
Rukmini Kanta Chakraborty, “Singhal Bhraman”, Sadhana, 2 (1892): 48-
49.
24
Jyotirmoyee Debi, “Dushtu Gemunu”, Sandesh, 8/2 (1920): 40-44.
25
Jyotindranath Tagore, “Shyam Rajye Bhraman”, Prabasi, 10/6 (1910): 546.
26
Narendra Dev, “Shyambhoomi”, Bharatvarsha, 12/1 /5 (1924): 761-773;
12/ 1/6 (1927): 901-910.
27
Anon, “Brahmadeshiya Natok o Natokabhnoy”, Bharati, 2/7 (1877):306-
14; Paresh Chandra Sen, “Machchagirir Padamule”, Bharatvarsha, 15/ 1/5
(1927): 785.
28
Anon, “Brahmadeshe Srtiswadhinata”, Mahila, 12/9 (1907): 196-198;
Anon., “Brahma Mahila”, Bamabodhini Patrika, 6/2/393 (1870): 213-216;
Kalachand Dalal, “Brahmadesher Ramani”, Bharati, 35/8 (1911): 801-804;
Mrinalini Raha, “Barmadesher Kotha”, Antahpur, 5/8 (1902); Sarala Debi
Chowdhurani, “Burma Jatra”Bharatvarsha,19/ 1/5 (1931): 779-780.
29
Santidev Ghosh, Jiboner Dhrubatara (Calcutta: Ananda Publishers,
1996).
30
Chittaranjan Bandopadhyay, Rabindra Prasanga: Anandabazar Patrika V.3
(Calcutta: Ananda Publishers, 1996), 313-14
Lipi Ghosh
Introduction
W
ithin a subregion such as BIMSTEC, with cross-
border geographical linkages between the nations,
culture transcends national boundaries. In
reimagining BIMSTEC, the cultural history of its
members can be used to forge contemporary convergences and strengthen
people-to-people contact across the border. Against this background, this
chapter focuses on the importance of cultural tourism in BIMSTEC. It
is a subset of tourism that focuses on a country’s or region’s culture—
encompassing lifestyle, art, architecture, religion and other elements
of a nation’s or region’s identity. Cultural tourism has a positive social
impact: it establishes and reinforces identity and builds new prospects in
the tourism sector. This chapter on cultural tourism between India and
Myanmar, based on the linkages between the two nations—specifically,
heritage architectures.1 In the heritage culture of India and Myanmar,
ethnicity and religion are two of the most important aspects, with the
majority of the structures pertaining to Hinduism, Buddhism and Taiism.
Historical and Cultural Linkages
40
41
In his book, Kohima: The Story of the Greatest Battle, Arthur Swinson
writes about the decisive and historic battle of Kohima, fought during
World War II, for the control of the strategic Moreh–Imphal–Kohima–
Dimapur route. Fergal Keane’s book, Road of Bones: The Siege of Kohima
1944 The Epic Story of the Last Great Stand of Empire, is another pioneer
work that throws light on the forest routes stretching from Kohima to
Myanmar(See Map 3).In 1944, Subash Chandra Bose stayed in Naga
Hills, which we know from reference of Veer Sambhudhan Phonglo and
Jaya Thaosen.1
42
43
Ralph Fytch, an English missionary from the late Mughal period, wrote
of Tripura’s land connectivity to Chittagong. “From Satgaon, I travelled
by the country of the king of Tiperra with whom the Mogen have
almost continual wars.”2 Later, at the end of 17th century, Jean-Baptiste
Tavernier (1605–89), a French traveller, wrote about Tippera and its
extended connection with Arakan (See Map 5).
44
The heritage architectures of India and Myanmar are proof of the cultural
interactions between the two nations and the transmission of Hinduism
and Buddhism across their borders. These architectures can be classified
under five categories.
46
48
Kyaiktiyo Golden Rock Temple, Myanmar / Pagoda Architecture in Bagan Ancient City
Photo Credit: Author (erstwhile Pagan), Moulmein, Myanmar /
Photo Credit: Author
Recommendation
Based on the above discussion, this essay proposes three new types of
tourism that should be promoted between India and Myanmar:
Both India and Myanmar have several significant Hindu and Buddhist
heritage temple architectures, as noted above. Important sites of Hindu
and Buddhist religious tours can be explored and developed for people of
both countries, similar to the Buddha Gaya Pilgrimage Tours.
Further, a Tai circuit can include Taungyi and other major cities of
Myanmar as well, such as Hsipaw, Lashio, Kengtungand Tachileik.
It can connect these cities with Dibrugarh, Sibsagar, Naharkatia and
Mansai to complete an “India–Myanmar Tai Heritage Tourism.” Within
this, heritage architectural sites can be lucrative tourist attractions,
especially if combined with exposition about their historical and cultural
significance.
The Stilwell Road, originally called Ledo Road, is a 769-km long highway
that links Northeastern India with the Burma Road. If developed, this
can become an attractive tourism trail, with several war museums in
proximity. Further, BIMSTEC can consider reviving its Southern Silk
Route.
Conclusion
Since the inception of BIMSTEC in 1997, tourism has been one of the 14
sectors of cooperation amongst its member states. The first Roundtable
and Workshop of Tourism Ministers, held in Kolkata in 2005, adopted
the Plan of Action for Tourism Development and Promotion for the
BIMSTEC region.
For India and Myanmar, in particular, heritage tourism will not only
50
broaden the interaction between the two nations but also open up new
avenues for soft-power diplomacy. This idea of heritage architecture and
cultural tourism can further be extended to all countries of BIMSTEC,
to encourage renewed peace and cooperation amongst the member
countries.
Endnotes
1
April 14, 1944, is a red-letter day for India. It was in Moirang in Manipur
that the flag of India was first hoisted on Indian soil on April 14, 1944
by the Indian National Army. During World War II, Moirang was the
headquarters of Azad Hind Fauz. Col. Shaukat Malik of the Indian
National Army hoisted the Tricolour for the second time on Indian
soil on 14 April 1944, in Moirang with the help of Manipuris like Shri
Mairembam Koireng Singh who were members of the INA.Netaji Subash
Chandra Bose, the enigmatic freedom fighter, stayed with the Nagas for
over two months in 1944 during the invasion of British India by the Azad
Hind Fauz. “Delhi Chalo Last Camp in Nagaland,”says Netaji was with
the Nagas during the Battle of Kohima.
2
Ralph Fytch, as quoted in Sheetal Chandra Chakraborty compiled
and Purnendu Gupta edited Tripurar Pracheen Itihas(Agartala: Naba
Chandana Prakashani, 2017),89.
3
G.E.Harvey, History of Burma (UK: Laurier Books Ltd:UK, 2000), 3-4. 51
4
www.google.com/search?q=Bagan+Ancient+City+pagoda+architect
accessed on September5, 2010.
C. Joshua Thomas
Introduction
T
here remains a paucity of research on the Bay of Bengal
Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation (BIMSTEC), established in June 1997 to secure
“rapid economic development” and accelerate “economic
growth and social progresses” of the sub-region.1 More than two decades
since the group’s inception, stakeholders are facing the challenge of
reinforcing BIMSTEC’s strengths while addressing its weaknesses, so
that it can fulfill its mission more effectively.
a. Academic/Education Diplomacy
b. Tourism Diplomacy
In 2017, the Union government set targets to double the tourism growth
rate in the Northeastern states, from the 5.2 percent that they recorded
between that year and 2020. Although the Ministry of Tourism has
taken steps with BIMSTEC and ASEAN countries to devise packages to
increase tourist inflow in India’s Northeast, the results are yet to be seen.
In 2017, the Northeastern states, combined, received 7.7 million domestic
(Indian) tourists and 160,000 foreign tourists.
c. Festival Diplomacy
d. Publications Diplomacy
Endnotes
1.
BIMSTEC, The Road Ahead, Research Information Systems for
Developing Countries, 2016, accessed on 28th January 2020, http://ris.
org.in/pdf/BIMSTEC%20Report.pdf.
2.
The Union and State governments have taken various initiatives for the
overall development of the Northeastern states, like the transformational
infrastructure project – the Bogibeel Bridge, rail-cum-road Bridge at 4.94
km. This bridge facilitates the quick movement of vehicles and economy
access for the people of Dhemaji to Dibrugarh in the state of Assam. It also
provides direct connectivity from Dibrughar to Itanagar and its railway
track will reduce the travel distance by 705 km. It was inaugurated on
25 December 2018. (See, The Assam Tribune, 25 December 2018). The
renewed thrust on India’s Act East Policy and on ASEAN has given
the region an important position in India’s foreign policy. Further,
the ‘NITI Forum for North East’ was constituted in February 2020 to
ensure sustainable economic growth of the region, as outlined in five
58
development missions for promoting sectors like, horticulture, tourism,
food processing, bamboo-based handicraft, and medium-scale industries
with focus on ‘Make in Northeast’. The focus of these development
projects, according to NITI forum, is the concept of HIRA –Highways,
Internet ways, Railways and Airways. (See, https://economictimes.
indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/niti-outlines-five-development-
missions-for-northeast/articleshow/63698967.cms?from=mdr).
3.
Ambassador Rajiv K. Bhatia, keynote address at the international seminar
on “BCIM: Sub-Regional Cooperation for Development of the Peripheral
Areas” held at the ICSSR-NERC, Shillong on November 27, 2014, https://
icwa.in/showfile.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=3775&lid=158&arch=1&sh_
arch=1
4.
BIMSTEC, The Road Ahead, op.cit.
5.
Shashi Tharoor, Keynote address at the international seminar on
North-East and BIMSTEC- A Retrospect” held at ICSSR-NERC &
NEHU, Shillong. 9th April 2010, https://hcidhaka.gov.in/
6.
Rajiv K. Bhatia, “Progressing Diplomacy for Development,” Gateway
House, May 12, 2016, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/the-unfolding-
story-diplomacy-for-development/
7.
M.P. Bezbaruah was a civil servant from Northeast and headed the
department of tourism at the Government of India. He wrote widely
on issues related to the promotion of tourism in Northeast India, and
his book, Indian Tourism Beyond the Millennium (New Delhi: Gyan
Publishing House, 1999) is widely referred to by the government.
8.
Pupul Jayakar (1915 – 1997) was a distinguished cultural activist and
writer, best known for her work on the revival of traditional and village
arts, handloom, and handicraft in post-independence India. She organised
a series of Indian arts festivals in the 1980s in France, the US and Japan
that helped popularize Indian arts in the West. She was a founder and
trustee of the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts (IGNCA)
(1985), and the National Institute of Fashion Technology (NIFT) (1990).
See, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pupul_Jayakar
9.
Saransha, Information Bulletin, Embassy of India, Kathmandu, vol.
4, issue 4, Feb-March 2017, https://www.indembkathmandu.gov.in/
59
docs/15379436623.pdf
10.
C. Joshua Thomas & Deigracia Nongkynrih, “North-East India
and BIMSTEC: A Reality Check,” in Prabir De (ed.), Twenty Years of
BIMSTEC, Promoting Regional Cooperation and Integration in the Bay of
Bengal Region, (New Delhi: K.K. Publishers Pvt Ltd., 2018).
11.
B.G. Verghese, “Borders Matters More than Boundaries from North
East Looking Out,” Man and Society: A Journal of North East Studies,
(spring), Shillong: 2004.
CONNECTING
NATIONS
BIMSTEC and Regional
Connectivity: Opportunities
for Bangladesh
Ashish Banik
B
angladesh has always been keen to promote regional and
sub-regional initiatives, and has extended continuous
support to endeavours to enhance connectivity under the
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) framework. Bangladesh’s active
role during the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC), the promotion of the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,
Nepal (BBIN) Initiative, and the establishment of the BIMSTEC agenda
is widely recognised. BIMSTEC, designed to engage and connect South
Asia and Southeast Asia, has offered Bangladesh unique opportunities to
expand its ‘Look East’ policy by building a multi-layered connection with
other countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia to attain their common
aspirations of socio-economic development.
BIMSTEC was established in 1997, yet there were only three summits
until 2017 and no ministerial meetings between 2014 and 2017.1 The
Connectivity
62
Several BIMSTEC member states already have bilateral and regional
arrangements with each other, and have divergent views, priorities and
interests on many issues, including national interest and regional and
international aspirations. Nevertheless, it is imperative for the member
states to reach a convergence, at least at the operational level, in their
political, security and economic outlook to expedite the process of free
trade agreement and security cooperation in the long run. Countries
involved in BIMSTEC are not only divergent in views and outlooks on
various issues but many of them are caught in the middle of overlapping
spheres of influence due to the rise of China, and the role of EU, Russia and
US in South and South East Asia. The condition itself requires a proactive
role from the pivot states to promote the agenda of this regional grouping.
Here, the role of a pivotal power, India, in the grouping to forward the
development vision with other pivot states is vital and crucial. India, with
its geographic size, economic opportunities, diplomatic assets, might
take creative and innovative initiatives to generate dividend for partner
countries to make this initiative a successful one.
63
The BIMSTEC FTA and Agreements on Services and Investment and
Trade Facilitation are yet to be finalised. M. Shahidul Islam, Secretary
General of BIMSTEC states that the implementation of the FTA is
expected to boost intra-BIMSTEC trade to US$240 billion from the
current estimated US$40 billion by linking the BIMSTEC connectivity
plan with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Connectivity Plan
2025.3 Despite this potential, intra-regional trade is low due to many
hurdles, such as tariff barriers, lack of connectivity and transportation
problems.4 The BIMSTEC Motor Vehicle Agreement (MVA) and Coastal
Shipping Agreement, proposed, will contribute significantly to bypass
these drawbacks and boost intra-regional trade. The implementation
process of these agreements might have been planned drawing good
lessons and experiences from the available regional and bilateral transit
agreements on trade which will definitely reduce time, cost to expedite
the process and easily contribute to develop consensus on contentious
issues to move forward.5
While the Joint River Commission is entrusted to deal with water related
matters between India and Bangladesh, it has no mandate over similar
issues with Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar. BIMSTEC could provide the
opportunity for Bangladesh to discuss water issues with these countries
as well. A common understanding on water resources and its sharing
throughout the region will help in flood control and management, and
can ensure the continued availability of water in lean period for people
in the region. In addition, the member countries can also explore the
establishment of waterways to facilitate trade amongst themselves in the
Ganga Brahmaputra and Meghna and Mekong Basin.
• Security Cooperation
65
trafficking, an issue that has plagued the region for a long time. BIMSTEC
member states must come together to eliminate these threats, and the
BIMSTEC Convention on Cooperation in Combating International
Terrorism, Transnational Organised Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking,
signed in Myanmar in December 2009, is one way forward.
Experts in Bangladesh hold the view that the BIMSTEC initiative might
be a means to boost regional and inter-regional integration by connecting
several initiatives. The multimodal BIMSTEC MVA can be linked to the
Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor,
the Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project and other sub-
regional development projects to create shared opportunities for trade
and investment, tourism, energy and resource management, and national
security for all states in the region. From a wider perspective, BIMSTEC
initiatives can fit well into the Asian Development Bank’s proposed plans
66
for trans-Asia road and rail networks. Bangladesh also sees BIMSTEC
as an opportunity to bridge its trade gaps with other member countries.
In 2018-19, Bangladesh’s imports from India amounted to US$ 8621
million and exports to India totaled US$873.30 million.8 Similarly,
Bangladesh’s total imports from Bhutan in 2015 was around US$25
million while its exports to that country were only around US$2 million.
Nepal’s exports to Bangladesh totaled US$35.6 million in 2015 compared
to its imports amounted US$26.41 million.9 The total trade deficit
between Bangladesh and Myanmar was amounted BDT 3,091cr in
view of the total exports and imports from the fiscal years 2010-11
to 2015-16. 10
Challenges
Endnotes
1
Nazia Hussain, Comment on “BIMSTEC: Re-modelling for a Bigger
Role?,” RSIS Commentary, Comment Posted November 12, 2018, https://
www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/CO18187.pdf
2
M Shahidul Islam, “BIMSTEC — as it evolves to transform itself
into a platform of regional cooperation,” The Financial Express, 2
October 2019. https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/public/views/
bimstec-as-it-evolves-to-transform-itself-into-a-platform-of-regional-
cooperation-1570029759
https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/views/bimstec-as-it-evolves-to-
transform-itself-into-a-platform-of-regional-cooperation-1570029759
3
“Implementation of Free Trade Agreement can help grow intra-
BIMSTEC trade”, Economic Times, 24 Sep 2018 https://economictimes.
indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/implementati.on-of-free-
trade-agreement-can-help-grow-intra-bimstec-trade
official/articleshow/65932903.cms?utm_
68
source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
4
A. Didar Singh “Rationale for a BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement,”
Regional Brief, (New Delhi: Delhi Policy Group), August 2018, https://
www.delhipolicygroup.org/uploads_dpg/publication_file/rationale-for-
a-bimstec-free-trade-agreement-1112.pdf
5
Smruti Pattanaik, “Transforming Eastern South Asia: Relevance of
BIMSTEC,” Strategic Analysis, 42(2018): 4, pp. 423–425. https://doi.org
/10.1080/09700161.2018.1482618
6
Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury and Sohini Nayak, “Strengthening
Connectivity in the BBIN” in BBIN: Opportunities and Challenges,
ed. Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury and Nilanjan Ghosh et al. (Kolkata:
Observer Research Foundation, 2018), pp 18
7
Ambassador Humayun Kabir, Interview by Author, Dhaka, 29
September 2019.
8
Abbas Uddin Noyon, “Bangladesh-India trade relations under strain”
The Business Standard, 5 July, 2020, https://tbsnews.net/economy/trade/
bangladesh-india-trade-relations-under-strain-102277
9
Vikash Kumar, “Sub-Regionalism in South Asia: A Case study of the
Bangladesh – Bhutan-Nepal India Motor Vehicle Agreement,” Strategic
Analysis 41, no 1 (2016), pp. 6. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2016.12
49180
10
Asif Showkat Kallol , “Bangladesh-Myanmar trade remains healthy
amidst Rohingya crisis,” Dhaka Tribune, 17 October 2017.
69
F
ounded in 1997, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is a
seven-nation grouping that acts as a bridge between South
and Southeast Asia. BIMSTEC has 14 areas of cooperation,
including technology and the associated fields of connectivity,
biotechnology, information and communication technology and food
processing.1 Given the disruptions caused by the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic in several sectors, BIMSTEC countries are expected to be
engaged in deeper technological cooperation since such solutions have
the potential to mitigate economic disruptions and contribute to a ‘new
normal’ in diplomacy in the post-pandemic world.
Contextualising BIMSTEC
The percentage share of BIMSTEC’s trade with the rest of the world
has increased over the past two decades (see Figure 1). Although the
figures had stagnated from 2004-2010 (with the global financial crisis
causing a dip between 2007 and 2009), there has been a steady growth
in the last decade. Technology is set to play an important role in shaping
the region’s global integration and its overall prosperity. The COVID-19
crisis has highlighted the importance of digital technologies and, thus,
technological cooperation is poised to become more important as the
BIMSTEC countries try to increase their share in global trade and
navigate towards holistic regional development.
Sri Lanka is the lead country for BIMSTEC’s technology sector and its
technological advancement indicators have been impressive in the last
few years. Sri Lanka was ranked in AT Kearney’s Top 25 destinations to
invest in their Global Services Location Index for 2017 and 2019, and this
is mainly due to the country’s digital economy strategy.8 This is majorly
due to its economic advantages owing to low labour costs, skilled talent
base and strategic location.
At the 2016 BRICS Trade Fair and Exhibition held in India, the BIMSTEC
countries showcased their technological advances through innovators,
startups and other companies. The aim of the exhibition was the exchange
of technological expertise to overcome developmental challenges. The
BIMSTEC countries also participated at the fair, discussing the scope of
74
technological developments, essentially because of the SAARC’s dormant
nature.12 These developments included basic research and development,
and applied research and technology management, with a stress on
intellectual property rights, technology forecasting and intermediation.13
First, in 2004, the member countries moved from traditional science and
technology areas, such as agriculture and environment, to more advanced
forms, such as food processing and clean energy. Emphasis was laid
on information and communication technology to be used extensively
through enhancing resource sharing.15
BIMSTEC’s greatest drawback has been that its free trade initiatives
overlap with those of ASEAN and SAARC. National, bilateral and regional
priorities and initiatives must be aligned accordingly, and any overlaps
with the ASEAN and the South Asia Sub-regional Economic Cooperation
groupings must be consistent with the integration objectives of the
organisations.21
77
Endnotes
1
Biswajit Nag and Debdeep De, “Asian Integration Process and
BIMSTEC,” CSIRD - Centre for Studies in International Relations and
Development, Discussion Paper #35, (October 2007), https://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.2819875
2
Estiaque Bari, “Value Chains in BIMSTEC Region: Current Status,
Possibilities and Challenges,” Centre for Policy Dialogue, http://hdl.
handle.net/11540/8888
3
Joshua Paul Meltzer, “A New Digital Trade Agenda,” E15 Expert
Group on the Digital Economy (The E15 Initiative, August 2015),http://
e15initiative.org/publications/a-new-digital-trade-agenda/
4
Asian Development Bank (2020), “Asia Regional Integration Centre
database,“https://data.adb.org/dataset/asia-regional-integration-center-
economic-and-financial-indicators-database
5
“Fourth BIMSTEC Summit Declaration, 30-31 August 2018, Kathmandu,
78 Nepal”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nepal, https://drive.google.com/
file/d/0Bw5iVdDDVNCRTko2ek02Y1F0T3hQemM1NTdjUy1icGZUOG
Mw/view
6
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Beyond Rajapaksa’s Visit, Are India and
Sri Lanka Really on the Same Page?“, The Diplomat, 13 February 2020,
https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/beyond-rajapaksas-visit-are-india-
and-sri-lanka-really-on-the-same-page/
7
Nilanjan Ghosh, “Time for BIMSTEC to realize Potential”, Mail Today,
17 February 2020, https://epaper.mailtoday.in/c/49078245
8
AT Kearney, “At Kearney’s 2019 GSLI Resonates with Digital Change,”
June 13, 2019, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/at-kearneys-
2019-global-services-location-index-gsli-resonates-with-digital-
change-300867002.html.
9
Portulans Institute, “The Network Readiness Index 2019,” https://
networkreadinessindex.org/
10
“The Network Readiness Index 2019”
11
Ministry of Telecommunications and Digital Infrastructure, “Sri Lanka
National Digital Policy 2020 - 2025,” October 7,2019, http://www.mdiit.
gov.lk/index.php/en/component/jdownloads/send/6-legislation/76-
national-digital-policy?option=com_jdownloads
12
Research and Information System for Developing Countries,
“BIMSTEC: The Road Ahead,” http://ris.org.in/pdf/BIMSTEC%20
Report.pdf.
13
Research and Information System for Developing Countries,
“BIMSTEC: The Road Ahead”
14
“BIMSTEC: Challenges and Implications for India,” The Kootneeti,
September 13, 2018, https://thekootneeti.in/2018/09/13/bimstec-
challenges-and-implications-for-india/.
15
“BIMSTEC Summit Declaration,” Ministry of External Affairs, July 31,
2004, https:// bimstec.org/?page_id=942.
16
“Technology,” BIMSTEC, https://bimstec.org/?page_id=266.
17
Kapil Patil, “BIMSTEC and S&T Cooperation:A Long Way Ahead,”
National Security, Vol.III Issue I, https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/
files/national-security-vol-3-issue-1-essay-KPatil.pdf.
18
Press Information Bureau, “Third BIMSTEC Summit Declaration,”
https://pib.gov.in/ newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=104505.
79
19
World Trade Centre Mumbai, “BIMSTEC - A Vibrant Economic Bloc,”
http://www. wtcmumbai.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/BIMSTEC-
for-web.pdf.
20
“India Mobile Congress 2018 concludes,” Smart Governance, October
27, 2018, http://www.smartgovernance.in/india-mobile-congress-2018-
concludes/
21
Moe Thuzar, Rahul Mishra, Francis
Hutchinson, Francis Tin Maung Maung, Termsak
Chalermpalanupap, “Connecting South and Southeast Asia:
Implementation challenges and coordination arrangements,”
ADBI Working Paper, No. 501: (2016), https://www.econstor.eu/
bitstream/10419/115319/1/798250453.pdf
22
Jonty Bloom, “Will coronavirus reverse globalisation?,” BBC, April 2,
2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-52104978
23
Shankhyaneel Sarkar, “China firmly denies covering up outbreak,
delaying action,” Hindustan Times, May 16, 2020, https://www.
hindustantimes.com/world-news/china-firmly-denies-covering-up-
outbreak-delaying-action/story-fiOeiG7IXLxFn73xxSSeJI.html
24
Saikiran Kannan, “How coronavirus will fuel manufacturing exodus
from China,” India Today, April 23, 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/
business/story/how-coronavirus-will-fuel-manufacturing-exodus-
from-china-1670330-2020-04-23
25
Malyaban Ghosh & Bimal Mukherjee, “Global firms look to shift from
China to India,” Livemint, April 22, 2020, https://www.livemint.com/
industry/manufacturing/global-firms-look-to-shift-from-china-to-
india-11587494725838.html.
26
Yogesh Gupta, “Shift of supply chains from China accelerates” The
Tribune, May 8, 2020, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/
shift-of-supply-chains-from-china-accelerates-81847
27
Soumya Bhowmick, “Rethinking globalization in a post Covid-19
world,” Asia Times, April 10, 2020, https://asiatimes.com/2020/04/
rethinking-globalization-in-a-post-covid-19-world/
80
I
n recent years, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) has gained
prominence and visibility. While India’s oldest engagement
has always been with its immediate neighbourhood in South
Asia, the “dysfunctionality” of the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation as a regional grouping has made BIMSTEC India’s most
“natural choice to fulfil key foreign policy priorities”.1 Strengthening
trade and connectivity among the BIMSTEC members are the priority
areas for cooperation as these are crucial elements for facilitating greater
regional economic integration.
Poor connectivity and high transaction costs are among the most
critical barriers to regional trade in BIMSTEC. Except for Sri Lanka
and Thailand, all other BIMSTEC member countries are connected via
land ports, and landlocked Nepal and Bhutan also require transit access
through their neighbouring countries to participate in international
trade using the nearest seaports. The contiguous geography of the region
makes land transport and transit especially important for connectivity.
However, despite sharing common land borders, trade between India and
Bangladesh, India and Myanmar, or even India and Thailand is currently
largely undertaken by the sea route.
• Road Transport
The transaction costs of trading across land borders are high due to
poor infrastructure, lack of automation and archaic transport protocols.
The quality of the road network in the BIMSTEC region is poor and
82
inadequate to operate modern transport. It has often been observed that
while member states are developing their own national road networks,
little attention is paid to the demands of the neighbouring country or its
own international trading community.2 The border link roads, port link
roads, and arterial links to borders and ports are in poor condition and are
congested. There are also some stretches with missing road links, which
restricts the opportunities of land-based trade within the region. This
is particularly true for road stretches in Myanmar. Although both India
and Thailand have been providing technical and financial assistance to
upgrade border roads in Myanmar, the progress has been limited.3
• Maritime Transport
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal signed the MVA in June 2015 to
enable the seamless movement of passenger and containerised cargo
vehicles across the borders of the four countries.8 Bangladesh, India and
Nepal have already ratified the BBIN MVA and have agreed to begin
implementing it even as they await Bhutan’s ratification. Trial runs for
cargo vehicles under the MVA were conducted in 2016.9 Even though
84
the Asian Development Bank has been providing technical, advisory and
financial support to the BBIN MVA, its implementation continues to stall.
was subsequently signed in November 2015.a,11 The two sides also agreed
on the use of vessels up to 6000 gross tonnage of the river sea vessel
category for bilateral coastal shipping.b The agreement declared the
Haldia Dock Complex as a transshipment port for containerised cargo
originating from or destined for Bangladesh.12 The shipping agreement
has also made way for Indian goods reaching the Chittagong Port to be
delivered to India’s northeast.c,13
Since its signing, the scope of the CSA has been expanded to cater to the
growing needs of trade. In October 2018, the two governments agreed to
increase ports of call and signed an agreement on the use of Chittagong
and Mongla Ports in Bangladesh for the movement of goods to and
from India.14 Recently, there have been concerns from India about the
lack of cost-efficiency while adhering to the restrictions of using river
sea vessels of only 6000 GT between India and Bangladesh. However,
this restriction is also likely to be lifted when the agreement is due for
renewal in 2020.15
85
• BIMSTEC Motor Vehicle Agreement
a
The standard operating procedure contains provisions that stipulate that India and
Bangladesh shall render the same treatment to the other country’s vessels as it would
to its national vessels used in international sea transportation.
b
Article II of the CSA covers only Indian and Bangladeshi flag vessels that comply
with river sea vessel or equivalent standards to run services between the two countries.
c
For instance, cargo from Kolkata to Chittagong or Mongla can be delivered through
multimodal transport (rail, road or inland waterways) to either destinations within
Bangladesh or India’s northeast. Bangladesh has allowed the use of the following routes
for such purposes: Chittagong/Mongla to Agartala in Tripura, Chittagong/Mongla to
Dawki in Meghalaya and Chittagong/Mongla to Sutarkandi in Assam.
of the MVA for the Regulation of Passenger and Cargo Vehicular Traffic
between the BIMSTEC member countries. The text was drafted by India
and is awaiting finalisation.16 The agreement also intends to integrate
existing bilateral, trilateral and multilateral connectivity projects, such
as the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project and the Trilateral
Highway under the MVA.17
However, like the BBIN MVA, ratifying the BIMSTEC MVA might not
be easy as Bhutan will likely have concerns, and the inordinate delays
in implementing the BBIN MVA may be a drag on the BIMSTEC MVA.
• Infrastructure Upgradation
Endnotes
1
Ministry of External Affairs, India-BIMSTEC, New Delhi, Government
of India, 2020, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/BIMSTEC_
June_2020.pdf.
2
Asian Development Report, Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Transport Infrastructure
and Logistics Study (BTILS), January 2008, South Australia, Asian
Development Bank, 2008 https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/
project-document/65311/38396-01-reg-tacr.pdf.
3
Asian Development Report, Updating and Enhancement of the BIMSTEC
Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study, July 2018, Philippines, Asian
Development Bank, 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.22617/RPT157680-2.
4
“Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study
(BTILS), January 2008”
5
Nisha Taneja et al. “India–Pakistan Trade and Regionalism in South 89
Asia.” International Studies 50, no. (2013): 318-342.
6
SAARC Secretariat, SAARC Regional Multimodal Transport Study, June
2006, Kathmandu, SAARC Secretariat, 2006, http://www.sasec.asia/
uploads/publications/SRMTS_Final.pdf.
7
“Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study
(BTILS), January 2008” Also see, “Updating and Enhancement of the
BIMSTEC Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study, July 2018”
8
Ministry of External Affairs, Joint Statement on the Meeting of the
Ministers of Transport of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal on the
Motor Vehicles Agreement, 15 June 2015, New Delhi, Government
of India, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25365/
Joint_Statement_on_the_meeting_of_the_Ministers_of_Transport_
of_Bangladesh_Bhutan_India_and_Nepal_on_the_Motor_Vehicles_
Agreement.
9
Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Government of India,
https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1516737
10
G. Padmaja, “The Potentials of India-Bangladesh Coastal Shipping,”
South Asia Journal, 26 June 2016, http://southasiajournal.net/the-
potentials-of-india-bangladesh-coastal-shipping/.
11
Bikash Singh, “India, Bangladesh sign SOP to operationalise Agreement
on Coastal Shipping,” The Economic Times, 16 November 2015, https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/transportation/shipping-/-
transport/india-bangladesh-sign-sop-to-operationalise-agreement-on-
coastal-shipping/articleshow/49802539.cms?from=mdr.
12
Ministry of Shipping, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/
PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1563330.
13
Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, “Enhancing India-Bangladesh maritime
connectivity in the Bay of Bengal Possibilities and challenges,” The
Diplomatist, 3 January 2020, https://diplomatist.com/2020/01/03/
enhancing-india-bangladesh-maritime-connectivity-in-the-bay-of-
bengal-possibilities-and-challenges/.
14
The MoU on movement of passenger and cruise vessels on the
waterways and coastal routes between the two countries is expected to be
operationalized soon to facilitate tourism between the two countries. See
90
High Commission of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of
India, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_Banglades_2019.
pdf.
15
P. Manoj, “India Bangladesh coastal shipping pact may be thrown
open to larger ships”, Hindu Business Line, 16 September 2019, https://
www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/logistics/india-bangladesh-
coastal-shipping-pact-may-be-thrown-open-to-larger-ships/
article29429603.ecei
16
“Transport and Communication”, Areas of Cooperation, BIMSTEC,
last updated 17 July 2019, https://bimstec.org/?page_id=270.
17
Moushumi Das Gupta and Jayanth Jacob, “Trade between Bay of
Bengal Countries to become Easier as Draft Motor Vehicle Pact Ready,”
Hindustan Times, 12 May 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/
india-news/trade-between-bay-of-bengal-countries-to-become-easier-
as-draft-motor-vehicle-pact-ready/story-sr9u12qyLV1tTD4cJJUsPJ.
html#:~:text=An%20agreement%20that%20improves%20
road,%2C%20Thailand%2C%20and%20Sri%20Lanka.
18
Ministry of Shipping, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/newsite/.
19
“Transport and Communication, Areas of Cooperation, BIMSTEC , 17
July 2019”
20
“Bimstec talks Highlight Cooperation,” Bangkok Post, 1 September
2018, https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/1531854/bimstec-talks-
highlight-cooperation.
21
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, TIR Handbook:
Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under cover
of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention, 1975), Eleventh Revised Edition, New
York and Geneva, UNECE, 2018, https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/
DAM/tir/handbook/english/newtirhand/TIR-6Rev11e.pdf.
22
“Updating and Enhancement of the BIMSTEC Transport Infrastructure
and Logistics Study, July 2018”
91
K. Yhome
L
ocated at the crossroads of Asia, Myanmar plays a critical
role in connectivity networks in the north-south and east-
west direction. The Southeast Asian nation is aware of its
geostrategic location and has been actively participating
in various bilateral, subregional and regional connectivity initiatives.
One such project is the seven-member Bay of Bengal Initiative for
Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), of
which Myanmar is a member. Myanmar shares land and maritime
boundaries with three BIMSTEC members (Bangladesh, India and
Thailand) and is a key connector of these countries, on land and at sea.
This report situates Myanmar in road transport, and energy and maritime
connectivity within the BIMSTEC region by assessing how dynamics
within that country and cooperation with other BIMSTEC members in
connectivity infrastructure are shaping the grouping’s prospects of land
connectivity.
Land connectivity
In the context of BIMSTEC’s road connectivity, the most significant
initiative is the ongoing India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway
project where Myanmar’s location plays a crucial role in connecting the
three nations. Myanmar is the only country besides India without whose
participation it is difficult to imagine land connectivity of all BIMSTEC
members. The BIMSTEC transport infrastructure report, prepared by
the Asian Development Bank (ADB)1 and approved by the BIMSTEC
Ministerial Meeting in 2017, identified six road initiatives in Myanmar
Connectivity
as priority projects. Of the six projects, five are part of the Trilateral
Highway project—three projects connecting Myanmar to Thailand (new
border link Mae Sot/Myawaddy, Myawaddy–Kawkareik road and the
construction of Kawkareik–Eindu road) and two link Myanmar to India
(Yagyi–Kalewa road improvement and bridges on the Kalewa–Tamu
road).
The priority projects that will connect Myanmar with Thailand have been
gradually upgraded in recent years, with funding from Thailand and the
ADB. The second Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge, linking Mae Sot in
Thailand and Myawaddy in Myanmar, opened to traffic in October 2019.2
While the bridge is part of the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC)
that aims to link Myanmar and Vietnam through Thailand and Laos, it is
also important in the context of BIMSTEC connectivity because it will
link the remaining member countries to Thailand via Myanmar. Along
with the opening of the new bridge, the implementation of the cross-
border transport facilitation agreement between Myanmar and Thailand
last year, which allows goods vehicles from both sides to cross the border
93
and stay for 30 days, has further boosted cross-border trade between the
two countries.3 The Mae Sot-Myawaddy route is the busiest trade point,
carrying around 70 percent of trade between Myanmar and Thailand.4
In the meantime, like at the Thai-Myanmar border, there have also been
other important agreements between India and Myanmar in facilitating
travel through the land border, such as the land border crossing
agreement that was signed in May 2018.12 India and Myanmar opened
two land border crossing points at Tamu-Moreh and Rihkhawdar-
Zowkhawthar as international border gates in August 2018.13 During
the visit of Myanmar’s President Win Myint to India in February 2020,
the two countries committed to the early conclusion of discussions on
the pending bilateral Motor Vehicles Agreement (MVA) to facilitate
the cross-border movement of vehicles. Even as the MVA remains in
the pipeline, other developments have indicated progress, such as the
MoU signed between India and Myanmar private operators to launch
a coordinated bus service between Imphal and Mandalay in February
2020.14 With Myanmar entering into new land border crossings with two
Energy cooperation
Recognising that a single electricity grid will benefit all member countries
since it will ensure affordability and efficient power transmission, the
BIMSTEC nations signed a MoU for the establishment of the BIMSTEC
Grid Interconnection in 2018. In what appears to be a major step towards
achieving power exchange through cross-border interconnections, the
subregional grouping has been working on connecting a 3,000-kilometre-
long power grid from Myanmar and Thailand to India,15 which was
announced at a conference on energy cooperation in the BIMSTEC
subregion organised by the BIMSTEC Secretariat in Dhaka. Currently,
power grid interconnections are operational between India and
Bangladesh, India and Bhutan, and India and Nepal.16 Myanmar has
cross-border electricity trade with two BIMSTEC members, India and
Thailand. India has supplied electricity to Myanmar’s border town
95
of Tamu, which is not connected to the country’s national grid, and
Thailand’s Chaing Rai has supplied electricity to Myanmar’s border town
of Tachileik.17 Of the three BIMSTEC members with which Myanmar
shares a land border, there is no cross-border electricity trade with
Bangladesh.
Geopolitical concerns
With the country in the midst of major political, social and economic
transitions, marked by conflicts between the Myanmar government and
the ethnic minorities over resource sharing and social and environmental
issues, connectivity infrastructure projects may continue to face delays.
At the same time, as Myanmar gradually links itself with neighbouring
countries, these will act as important nodes for connectivity schemes,
including BIMSTEC connectivity. Myanmar’s increasing bilateral
agreements in strengthening connectivity with its neighbours could be
steppingstones for subregional and regional connectivity. For instance,
Myanmar’s border land crossing agreements with India and Thailand
will create the ground for a trilateral MVA and, thus, bilateral agreements
can form the base for cooperation at the subregional and regional level.
Endnotes
1
Asian Development Bank, Updating and Enhancement of the BIMSTEC
Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study, Final Report, Asian
Development Bank, July 2018, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/
publication/439106/updating-bimstec-transport-logistics-study.pdf
2
“Thailand hopes new Mae Sot bridge will boost trade with Myanmar”,
Bangkok Post, October 30, 2019, https://www.bangkokpost.com/
business/1783214/thailand-hopes-new-mae-sot-bridge-will-boost-
trade-with-myanmar
3
“Southeast Asia’s trans-regional corridor takes shape”, Nikkei
Asian Review, December 2, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/
Transportation/Southeast-Asia-s-trans-regional-corridor-takes-shape
4
“Myanmar-Thai border trade set to continue growing this year”, The
Myanmar Times, February 14, 2020, https://www.mmtimes.com/news/
myanmar-thai-border-trade-set-continue-growing-year.html
98 5
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Kingdom of Thailand, “Minister of
Foreign Affairs attends the Handover Ceremony of the Myawaddy –
Kawkareik Road and the Inauguration Ceremony of the Construction of
the 2nd Thai – Myanmar Friendship Bridge”, September 1, 2015, http://
www.mfa.go.th/main/en/media-center/28/59695-Minister-of-Foreign-
Affairs-attends-the-Handover-C.html
6
“Eindu-Kawkareik road improvement project expected to be completed
in 12 months”, Global New Light of Myanmar, May 31, 2020, https://www.
globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/eindu-kawkareik-road-improvement-
project-expected-to-be-completed-in-12-months/
7
“Myanmar asks Thailand to solve its road bottlenecks”, Bangkok Post,
February 3, 2017, https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/1192232/
myanmar-asks-thailand-to-solve-its-road-bottlenecks
8
“Thailand offers $51m highway upgrade, as trade mission boosts bilateral
ties”, Frontier Myanmar, February 6, 2017, https://www.frontiermyanmar.
net/en/thailand-offers-51m-highway-upgrade-as-trade-mission-boosts-
bilateral-ties/
9
“Parliament approves ADB loan proposal for expressway project amid
criticism for overcosting”, Eleven Myanmar, July 30, 2020, https://
elevenmyanmar.com/news/parliament-approves-adb-loan-proposal-
for-expressway-project-amid-criticism-for-overcosting
10
“India, Myanmar to build bridges, sign pact for 69”, The Hindu,
August 29, 2016, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/India-
Myanmar-to-build-bridges-sign-pact-for-69/article14596559.ece
11
“NHAI awards Yagyi-Kalewa highway contract”, Foreign Investors
on India, April 13, 2018, http://www.fii-news.com/nhai-awards-yagyi-
kalewa-highway-contract/
12
“India, Myanmar sign seven agreements as Sushma Swaraj meets Suu
Kyi”, The Hindustan Times, May 11, 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.
com/india-news/india-myanmar-sign-seven-agreements-as-sushma-
swaraj-meets-suu-kyi/story-8l1tjIozB7YqT04t4rIgaJ.html
13
“Myanmar officially opens Indo-Myanmar land border, special land
entry permissions abolished”, The Indian Express, August 8, 2018, https://
indianexpress.com/article/india/myanmar-officially-opens-indo-
myanmar-land-border-special-land-entry-permissions-abolished/
99
14
“Imp-Mandalay bus service from April 7”, The Sangai Express, February
19, 2020, https://www.thesangaiexpress.com/Encyc/2020/2/19/By-Our-
Staff-ReporterIMPHAL-Feb-18-Imphal-Mandalay-bus-service-would-
be-launched-on-April-7-this-year-announced-Chief-Minister-N-Biren-
on-the-floor-of-the-State-Assembly-today-Biren-who-is-also-.html
15
“3,000 kilometre long power grid from Myanmar-Thailand to India:
BIMSTEC”, DDNews, February 25, 2020, http://ddnews.gov.in/
business/3000-kilometre-long-power-grid-myanmar-thailand-india-
bimstec#:~:text=3%2C000%20kilometre%20long%20power%20
grid%20from%20Myanmar%2DThailand%20to%20India%3A%20
BIMSTEC,-25%2D02%2D2020&text=Bay%20of%20Bengal%20
Initiative%20for,from%20Myanmar%2DThailand%20to%20India.
16
Integrated Research and Action for Development (IRADE),
“Prospects of Regional Energy Cooperation and Cross Border Energy
Trade in the BIMSTEC Region”, Integrated Research and Action for
Development (IRADE), February 2020, https://irade.org/BIMSTEC%20
Background%20Paper_February%202020.pdf
17
“Prospects of Regional Energy Cooperation and Cross Border Energy
Sujeev Shakya
I
n South Asia, ceremonies are important, and ceremonial statuses
even more so. It is difficult to convert ceremonial value into action
and words from speeches and presentations into real action.
The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is now a 23-year-old club that has
remained largely ceremonial. But there is now an opportunity to revive
the grouping in its silver jubilee year in 2022 so that it does not face the
same fate as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.
No Better Time
Third, the loss of Hong Kong as a financial and business hub will make
Singapore more important as it consolidates its status in the region.
Singapore should capitalise on this by becoming the key interface for
BIMSTEC business and economic ambitions.
Finally, the recent standoff between China and India, which resulted in
punitive economic actions, will likely push other countries in the region
to build a ‘third force’ to maintain ties with both countries without
102
necessarily aligning with either. Countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan,
Myanmar and Nepal will need to find a common way to handle their the
two big neighbours, China and India.
The economic potential of East South Asia—the region spanning the Bay
of Bengal, northeast India and its adjoining areas—makes a strong case
for regional integration. Nepal, Bhutan, and the Himalayan region were
historically connected via Kolkata and Dhaka to the Bay of Bengal until
the middle of the 20th century. Organisations like BIMSTEC can play a
key role in promoting integration in East South Asia.2
hubs out of China in the post pandemic era. The BIMSTEC region is the
ideal alternate location for this shift.5 Trade routes and supply chains will
be the new business plans for multinational enterprises in the days to
come. This is why increased cooperation is crucial so that resilient and
reliable supply chains can be developed in the BIMSTEC region and turn
it into a hub. The member countries must develop a sustainable regional
group that can take advantage of the momentum on the diversifying
manufacturing locations.6
Making It Happen
Endnotes
1
Sujeev Shakya, Unleashing the Vajra: Nepal’s Journey Between India and
China, (Kathmandu: Penguin House, 16 December 2019), pp. 312.
2
Sujeev Shakya, “Unleashing East South Asia,” Carnegie India, February
15, 2017, https://carnegieindia.org/2017/02/15/unleashing-east-south-
asia-event-5518.
3
Sujeev Shakya, “South Asia must embrace frontier opportunities,”
Nikkei Asian Review, April 20, 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/
Sujeev-Shakya-South-Asia-must-embrace-frontier-opportunities.
4
Shakya, Unleashing the Vajra
5
Rekha Dixit, “Opportunity for BIMSTEC as manufacturing shifts
post-COVID-19: MoS MEA,” The Week, June 30, 2020, https://www.
theweek.in/news/biz-tech/2020/06/30/opportunity-for-bimstec-as-
manufacturing-shifts-post-covid-19-mos-mea.html.
6
“Opportunity for BIMSTEC as manufacturing shifts post-COVID-19:
MoS MEA” 105
Robin Ramcharan
T
he Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) lacks a clear
human right and values framework, which is necessary
if the grouping is to transcend being merely a vehicle for
connectivity on functional lines. Such a values framework is found in
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which has been adopted by
all countries and encompasses the aspirations of BIMSTEC. Although it
is not specifically stated, the SDGs aim to achieve fundamental human
rights goals, which must be at the centre of all BIMSTEC endeavours
under the purview of BIMSTEC.
The four BIMSTEC summits also did not articulate a shared set of
values. At the first summit in Bangkok in 2004, BIMSTEC leaders
resolved to foster a sense of community that will lead to the economic
and social development of the entire region.6 They agreed to enhance
“people-to-people contact” and to explore “the expansion of BIMSTEC
cooperation into the areas of culture, education…” and other areas.7 The
second summit in New Delhi in 2008 saw an agreement “to continue
and strengthen our cooperation on poverty alleviation in the context
of ensuring food security for the vulnerable people in the region”, “to
It took until the last summit in Kathmandu, Nepal, in 2018 for an affirmation
of the “solemn commitment to making the Bay of Bengal Region peaceful,
prosperous and sustainable by building on our common strengths
through our collective efforts,” the recognition that “the eradication of
poverty is the greatest regional challenge in realization of development
objectives and expressing firm commitment to working together for the
implementation of the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development.” The
member countries also stated their “faith unequivocally in the principles
and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations” and agreed to work
108
together to present a united voice to safeguard collective interests for a
just, rules-based, equitable and transparent world order. They also noted
their commitment to the eradication poverty in the Bay of Bengal Region
by 2030 in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, called
for the effective implementation of the BIMSTEC Poverty Plan of Action
and to gear up efforts of all sectors to contribute to the overarching goal
of poverty alleviation.10
Ministerial declarations held between 1997 and 2018 also do not reveal
any concern for values and rights.11 Instead, the engagement centered
on the 14 identified sectors of cooperation— trade, technology, energy,
transport, tourism, fisheries, agriculture, public health, poverty
alleviation, counter-terrorism, environment, culture, people-to-people
contact, and climate change.
In the impending ‘Cold War’ between China and the US, battles over
human rights will take a prominent place. There have been calls for
an alliance of democracies to lead the world and counter the rise of
autocratic global powers. According to former NATO Secretary General
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a “D10,” akin to the G7 and including Australia,
India and South Korea, is necessary because “authoritarian forces, such
as in Russia and China…. geopolitically they have the wind in their sails.
Free societies put the individual and freedom first; but autocracies put
the regime first.”12 BIMSTEC cannot avoid this tussle and must clearly
articulate a human rights framework to establish where it stands.
values, histories, ways of life, and destinies that are interlinked” and that
BIMSTEC represents a common space for peace and development”. For
India, “it is a natural platform to fulfill our key foreign policy priorities of
“Neighborhood First” and “Act East” [emphasis added].13
110
SDGs’ Values Framework
The SDGs hold the potential to complement the regional rights regime,
which is centered on the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on
Human Rights and the ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights. The SDGs
make some important connections between sustainable development and
existing individual human rights obligations—SDG 2.1 (ending hunger
and access to safe nutrition) reiterates obligations in Article 11 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICESCR); and new
The potential for the SDGs, especially Goal 16, to advance human rights
protection was captured by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, which, commenting after the adoption of the SDGs,
noted that “The novelty factor is heightened because this is no drab
vision of institutions, but one that touches centrally on the connection
between the structures of power and the people that they should serve.”17
Goal 16 marks a step forward inasmuch as it recognises the roles that
peace, justice and good governance have to play in development. The
UN Economic and Social Commission for the Asia Pacific has noted that
SDG 16 provides “the framework for peace, justice for all, and strong
institutions – which are fundamental for accelerating progress of other
SDGs.”18
111
The SDGs are consistent with states’ preference for engagement in
dialogue rather than confrontation over substantive and controversial
rights issues. Dialogue is also the basic modus operandi of the Universal
Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council, to which all states
report every five years.19
mainstreaming the SDGs into its core instruments, in its summits and in
ministerial discussions. Several steps can be taken towards achieving this
goal:
Second, the Secretary General should call upon the BIMSTEC Network
of Policy Think Tanks, established at the third Summit, to draft a concept
note for discussion in workshops and conferences. In doing so, they can
make linkages between each of the 14 sectoral areas of cooperation and
the following SDGs that are directly relevant and can help establish a
rights and values framework:
• SDG 1: No poverty
• SDG 7: Affordable and clean energy
• SDG 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth
112
• SDG 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure
• SDG 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities
• SDG 13: Climate Action
• SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
Third, the Secretary General should offer the refined concept note for
deliberation at a leaders’ retreat. India can play a leadership role given
that it “accords utmost priority to BIMSTEC. It fulfills our key foreign
policy priorities of “Neighbourhood First” and ‘Act East’”.22
Conclusion
Endnotes
1
Lungtaen Gyatso, “Culture: An Expression of Values,” in Prabir De
(ed.), Twenty Years of BIMSTEC: Promoting Regional Cooperation and
Integration in the Bay of Bengal Region, (New Delhi: KW Publication,
2018) 69-77
2
BIMSTEC, “About BIMSTEC,” https://bimstec.org/?page_id=189
3
“Declaration on the Establishment of The Bangladesh-India-Sri Lanka-
Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIST-EC),” June 6, 1997, https://drive.
google.com/file/d/0B8Fv9wDGJqx2NkJTVzlZek5va0U/view
4
“Memorandum of Association on the Establishment of the BIMSTEC
Permanent Secretariat,” March 4, 2014 https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_
lTPgQOdX9WuJoKPYCQQzdshRgTOS0C9/view
5
“Memorandum of Understanding for Establishment of the BIMSTEC
Grid Interconnection,” August 31, 2018, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1
114 G4WyI7ExgTt6WK4WXaL8j_4wHXyB5WCo/view
6
“BIMST-EC Summit Declaration,” July 31, 2004, https://drive.google.
com/file/d/0B8Fv9wDGJqx2OTFab3NtWTB3RFk/view
7
“BIMST-EC Summit Declaration”
8
“Second BIMSTEC Summit Declaration,” November 13, 2008, https://
drive.google.com/file/d/0B8Fv9wDGJqx2NXJUUklXckt6MTA/view
9
“Third BIMSTEC Summit Declaration,” March 4, 2014, https://drive.
google.com/file/d/0B8Fv9wDGJqx2OTFab3NtWTB3RFk/view
10
“Fourth BIMSTEC Summit Declaration,” August 30-31, 2018, https://
drive.google.com/file/d/0Bw5iVdDDVNCRTko2ek02Y1F0T3hQemM1
NTdjUy1icGZUOGMw/view.
11
BIMSTEC, “Ministerial Declarations,” https://bimstec.org/?page_
id=945
12
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “The Need for an Alliance of Democracies
to Lead a New World Order,” Alliance of Democracies, https://mailchi.
mp/1bcb1537f28c/eml1ntm060.
13
Constantino Xavier, “Bridging the Bay of Bengal: Toward a Stronger
BIMSTEC,” Carnegie India, February 22, 2018, https://carnegieindia.
org/2018/02/22/ bridging-bay-of-bengal-toward-stronger-bimstec-
pub-75610
14
“BIMSTEC Leaders’ Retreat 2016 Outcome Document,”
October 16, 2016, https://drive.google.com/file/
d/0B8Fv9wDGJqx2UGxPT2RfVTVLX3M/view
15
Markus Kaltenborn, Markus Krajewski, and Heike Kuhn (eds.),
Sustainable Development Goals and Human Rights, Interdisciplinary
Studies in Human Rights 5 (Cham: Springer, 2020), 2, https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-030-30469-0
16
“Tying Human Rights and Sustainable Development Goals Together
in a Mutually Reinforcing Way,” The Danish Institute for Human Rights,
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/wgp/ WGP-20/
Statements_and_Presentations/Danish_Institute_for_Human_Rights_
Birgitte_Feining.pdf
17
Alan Whaites, “Achieving the impossible: Can we be SDG 16 believers?,”
GovNet Background Paper, no. 2, Organisation for Economic Co-operation
115
and Development, 2016, 2, http://www.oecd.org/dac/accountable-
effective-institutions/Achieving%20the%20Impossible%20can%20
we%20be%20SDG16%20believers.pdf
18
“16: Peace, Justice, Inclusive Institutions,” United Nations Asia-Pacific
Regional Coordination Mechanism, United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations Development
Programme, United Nations Children’s Fund, United Nations Human
Rights Office of the High Commissioner, United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime, 2018, 1, https://www.unescap.org/apfsd/6/document/
sdgprofiles/SDG16Profile.pdf
19
Universal Periodic Review Info, “What is the UPR?,” https://www.upr-
info.org/en/upr-process/what-is-it
20
Alexandra Ivanovic, Hannah Cooper and Athena M.Nguyen,
“Institutionalisation of SDG 16: More a trickle than a cascade?,” Social
Alternatives, Volume 37, no.1, 2018, 49-58, https://search.informit.com.
au/documentSummary;dn=573739209017957;res=IELAPA;type=pdf
21
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization, Volume 52,
116
Maritime Order,
Connectivity,
and Blue Economy
Connecting the
Coasts: The BIMSTEC
Experience
P.V. Rao
P
orts and ships are the key agents of a country’s maritime
transactions. An important aspect of the transport
infrastructure is coastal shipping, which enables the speedy
movement of cargo along the coastal domains. The same is
true for the Bay of Bengal (BoB) where coasts are integral to the Bay’s
economic development. Plans are being made to increase the maritime
connectivity of BIMSTEC’s littoral states. Also assuming priority at both
national and subregional levels are the multimodal transport modes
linking BIMSTEC states across land and sea routes. Indeed, BoB is best
suited to synergise the land and the sea into a cohesive regional trade and
transport hub.
Nepal from the Kolkata port. A more recent instance is the delivery of
dry chillies from the Guntur district of Andhra Pradesh to Beanpole in
Bangladesh.6 Indeed, Bangladesh of late has taken proactive measures
to improve transport linkages with its immediate neighbours. India,
Nepal and Bhutan are allowed to use the Chittagong and Mongla ports as
transit routes to their overseas destinations. Dhaka allows India to use its
Ashugunj river port to ferry basic commodities like food and cement to
the NER states. The fact that 56 rivers flow between India and Bangladesh
is seen as offering ample scope for interstate river transportation. While
not all these rivers are useful for navigation, there are also geo-political
and the security related issues that hamper the full potential of these
rivers to ferry cargo between the adjacent BoB littorals. The drive to
modernise Indian port capabilities is gradually releasing the pressure
on road transportation, but more importantly reducing dependence on
transit movement from Asian ports like Colombo and Singapore which
have higher drafts and efficient logistics capable of saving shipping time
and costs. The inability of Indian ports as well as those of Bangladesh
to handle bigger vessels is forcing their trading communities to offload
122
cargo at one of the advanced ports and ferry the goods by feeder services
to their smaller ports like Chittagong or Mangalore. The rapid integration
of national economies with the drivers of globalisation is transforming the
coastal profile. Coasts are compelled to cater to transnational economic
forces: FDI, free trade zones, mega ports and ship yards, containerised
shipping, Multinational Companies dealing with energy, deep-sea fishing
corporations and other foreign stakeholders.
124
Endnotes
1
“Decide, Defend and Promote, Need to differentiate short sea shipping
and international shipping”,https://www.cslships.com/en/our-values/
our-environment/short-sea-shipping, 2013. Visited July 20, 2020
2
Asian Development Bank, Updating and Enhancement of the BIMSTEC
Infrastructure and Logistics Study, Final Study, July, 2018.https://www.
adb.org/publications/updating-bimstec-transport-infrastructure-
logistics-study. Visited August 27, 2020
3
S. K. Mohanty and Priyadarshi Dash, Regional Cooperation for
Infrastructure Development, RIS, New Delhi, 2013, p.22
4
http://sagarmala.gov.in/sites/default/files/Sagarmala-Post-November-
2019-Edition-Viewpoint.pdf. Visited July 19, 2020
5
“Bangladesh feeder service begins,” The Hindu, March 25, 2016
6
“Parcel train with dry chilies chugs to Bangladesh,” The Hindu, July 14,
2020
7
Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, Pratnashree Basu, Sreeparna Banerjee 125
and Sohini Bose, India’s Maritime Connectivity, Importance of the Bay of
Bengal, (New Delhi:Observer Research Foundation, March 2018), p. 111.
Rohan Masakorala
Introduction
T
he transportation industry has four modes: ocean or
waterways, air, road, and rail. The cheapest of them, which
gives connectivity across continents, is ocean shipping.
Indeed, 90 percent of global trade connects through a
merchant shipping fleet which now consists of over 55,000 ocean
vessels. These ships carry bulk cargo, break bulk cargo, liquid cargo, gas,
and containerised cargo as commodities and finished and semi-finished
cargo.
Source: https://porteconomicsmanagement.org/
127
When one tracks global shipping traffic, major trunk lanes can be
identified as well as sub-routes throughout the oceans of the world,
along with a port network. It is the market size that first determines the
global maritime traffic allocations. Bigger economies such as the US,
Europe, China and Japan carry large volumes of maritime cargo through
a number of mega ports to connect their large populations and facilitate
global supply chains. As the buying power of consumers have increased
over the years, so too have the size of markets and the volumes of trade.
The Asian countries, led by China, have for many years served as the
production centres of the world’s merchandise cargo; the western
markets, meanwhile, are mostly high-end industrial markets. However,
this pattern is increasingly changing as Asia becomes more prosperous
and consumption by the middle-class expands. Projections say that Asia
will be home to nearly three billion middle-class people by 2030. This would
be 10 times more than North America’s middle-class population, and five
times more than that of Europe paving the way for demand expansion for
merchandise goods and raw material.2
Understanding the Global Shipping industry and Connectivity in the Indian Ocean
Maritime Order, Connectivity, and Blue Economy
Source: Jean-Paul Rodriguez and Theo Notteboom, “International Passages and land corridors”,
https://porteconomicsmanagement.org/?page_id=317
Understanding the Global Shipping industry and Connectivity in the Indian Ocean
Maritime Order, Connectivity, and Blue Economy
Understanding the Global Shipping industry and Connectivity in the Indian Ocean
Maritime Order, Connectivity, and Blue Economy
Understanding the Global Shipping industry and Connectivity in the Indian Ocean
Maritime Order, Connectivity, and Blue Economy
Relevance to BIMSTEC
131
Understanding the Global Shipping industry and Connectivity in the Indian Ocean
Maritime Order, Connectivity, and Blue Economy
Conclusion
Understanding the Global Shipping industry and Connectivity in the Indian Ocean
Maritime Order, Connectivity, and Blue Economy
Endnotes
1
Based on Papers submitted to Colombo International Maritime
conference 2015.www.cimc.lk; Papers submitted to Colombo
International maritime conference 2016. www.cimc.lk
2
Linda Yueh, “The rise of global middle class”, 18 June 2013, https://
www.bbc.com/news/ business-22956470#:~:text=Its%20middle%20
class%20is%20forecast,rest%20of%20the%20emerging%20world.
3
“Short -sea shipping in Bay of Bengal takes baby steps,” http://www.
ipcs.org/article/india/short-sea-shipping-in-bay-of-bengal-takes-baby-
steps-5386.html
4
Matías Herrera Dappe and Ancor Suárez-Alemán, Competitiveness
of South Asia’s Container Ports A Comprehensive Assessment of
Performance, Drivers, and Costs, (Washington DC: The World Bank
Group, 2016), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/
handle/10986/24333/9781464808920.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y
5
Competitiveness of South Asia’s Container Ports 133
6
“Short -sea shipping in Bay of Bengal takes baby steps,”, op.cit.
Understanding the Global Shipping industry and Connectivity in the Indian Ocean
Blue Economy in the
Bay of Bengal
Abhijit Singh
Introduction
I
n recent years, ‘Blue Economy’ (BE) has emerged as a new
paradigm for coastal management and development of marine
resources. The concept, based on the idea of a healthy ocean
supporting productive and sustainable ecosystems, is bringing
about an integration of ocean activities with the principles of social
inclusion, environmental sustainability, and innovative, dynamic
business models.1 BE’s central proposition is that the ecological health
and productivity of marine and coastal ecosystems can be increased by
shifting to a more sustainable economic model that taps their national
potential – from generating renewable energy and promoting ecotourism,
to sustainable fisheries and transport.2 The idea involves a transition
from a conventional economy to a “Blue” or sustainable economy in
the marine space involving significant investment. While promising,
however, BE has risks and challenges.3
In the Indian Ocean Region, enthusiasm for the BE has been palpable.
At the third ministerial conference of the Indian Ocean Rim Association
(IORA) in Dhaka in 2019, participants unanimously called for sustainable
use of the blue economy resources.4 The Dhaka Declaration included
ideas, principles and norms of BE, to ensure a balanced approach
between conservation and development5 emphasising food and nutrition
security, mitigation and adaptation of climate change, and generation of
sustainable and inclusive livelihoods.
Maritime Order, Connectivity, and Blue Economy
But marine harvesting has been a vexed issue in the Bay of Bengal. Since
the late 1960s, the region has been plagued by a problem of overfishing.
There are over 400,000 fishing boats, with over 4.5 million people
employed in fisheries and associated activities and around 6 million
tonnes of fish are caught annually, with a value of USD4 billion.9 Over
the years, licensed fishing activities (both mechanised trawlers and non-
motorised boats) have severely damaged the natural habitat of the region,
leading to a sharp decline in fish stocks.10 Popular fish species such as the
Hilsa, West Bengal’s favourite seafood, are on the verge of extinction. To
make matters worse, devastating practices like bottom trawling and the
use of seine nets in shallow spaces like the Palk Bay have further depleted
To add to the grim picture, many Bay countries, including India, run huge
subsidy programmes to support smaller fishers.12 The sops on offer such
as supply of fuel, motorisation of boats, and provision of gear are helpful
for the coastal communities, but have led to overcapacity and overfishing,
resulting in a significant rise in illegal fishing. The other problem affecting
the ecology of the Bay of Bengal is hydrocarbon exploitation. Rich in
hydrocarbon (with oil and gas finds in India, Bangladesh and Myanmar),
the Bay has witnessed oil and gas exploration on an unprecedented scale
in recent years.13 A high-risk industry, oil and gas development causes
much pollution and environmental hazard in the region.
Meanwhile, shipping activity along the coastline and in the busy Sea Lanes
of Communications (SLOCs) has contaminated the marine environment.
Oil and residue discharge from cargo and feeder ships are a major
contributor to pollution. The amount of synthetic trash generated in the
136
Bay is also rising exponentially, with India’s coastal regions witnessing
their most rapid expansion of plastic pollution.14 Studies show that of the
USD 13 billion in annual estimated damage to the marine ecosystem, a
significant portion comes from Asia’s seas, including the Bay of Bengal.15
Unfortunately, Bay states have not been able to arrest the decline
in marine health. Notwithstanding nascent efforts to partner with
international organisations such as the Global Environment Facility, the
Asian Development Bank, and the Food and Agriculture Organization, the
countries in the region have yet to come around to effectively addressing
the challenges to marine governance: unsustainable fishing, pollution
and destruction of habitat, and vulnerability of coastal communities to a
changing climate.16
The problem, seemingly, is that many Bay states have policies that
encourage resource exploitation, often in breach of sustainability norms.17
Despite pronouncements by national governments supporting BE goals
and principles, ecosystem preservation and community development
Ocean Governance
Some say that the situation vis-à-vis BE can only improve once the private
sector agrees to participate. Private participation in important Blue areas,
such as deep-sea mining and offshore energy, is crucial to creating the
momentum needed by marine scientific and economic initiatives. Yet,
industry has been skeptical, seeing little scope for profit generation. The
private sector’s reluctance in this segment is a key impediment in the
larger BE endeavour.22 For instance, the three pillars of marine research
— observation, experimentation and modeling — across the marine-
A Question of Priorities
Since India’s vision differs considerably from other Bay littorals, it has
not been easy to develop a comprehensive pan-regional view of what
constitutes sustainable processes. Notwithstanding grand declarations
by national governments, the focus largely remains on leveraging
resources, rather than on making good on the sustainability imperative.
In the rush to harness ocean resources, the vital need for inclusive social
development, environmental balance and ecological security is being
The Blue model is unlikely to deliver results in the Bay of Bengal, unless it
is implemented in ways that truly balance between the need for economic
growth and nurturing sustainable ecosystems. Bay states must move to
harmonise their BE approaches to develop an integrated strategy. This
goes beyond agreeing upon a common definition, syncing procedures
and operating principles. What the capitals in the region need is to
collectively invest in technology and innovation that would enable Blue
sectors to develop processes and technologies to boost BE productivity,
whilst still preserving the Bay’s marine ecosystem. The Blue revolution
must recognise opportunities to unlock the seas’ latent potential, yet
allow the regional habitat the space it needs to regenerate.
140
The private sector must play a bigger role to support the nascent BE
initiatives in the region. Governments must provide incentives to catalyse
private investment in green infrastructure, technology, and innovative
practices to reduce environmental risks and ecological stress, enhance
sustainable development and human well-being, and sustainably manage
coasts and oceans. There must be a framework in place, comprising green-
friendly technology, as well as institutional processes and production
and management systems to create new asset classes that would reduce
investment risk, and help transition to a genuine Blue Economy future.
Endnotes
1
V.N.Attri and N.Bohler-Muller, The Blue Economy Handbook of the Indian
Ocean Region (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa Press, 2018).
2
Attri and Muller, The Blue Economy Handbook of the Indian Ocean Region
3
Gunter Pauli, the Belgian economist, conceived the idea of BE, positing
it as a counter-point to the Green economy, that promised the same benefits
as BE, but did not adhere to the tenets of sustainable development. Paoli
propounded sustainable systems as a way of utilizing the advantage of the
blue waters, but also ensuring regeneration and minimum wastage thorough
resource recycling. As a result of his groundbreaking work, Blue Economy
has come to be associated with radical resourcee efficiency. See Gunter Paoli,
“Blue Economy-10 Years, 100 Innovations, 100 Million Jobs”, Paradigm
Publications, New Mexico, 2010.
141
4
“Third IORA Ministerial Blue Economy Conference”, Indian Ocean Rim
Association, September 6, 2019, https://www.iora.int/en/events-media-news/
news-updates-folder/third-iora-ministerial-blue-economy-conference.
5
“Third IORA Ministerial Blue Economy Conference”, IORA
6
“Fourth BIMSTEC Summit Declaration”, (Kathmandu, Nepal: August 30-
31 2018), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2018, https://
mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/30335/Fourth_BIMSTEC_ Summit_
Declaration_August_3031_2018.
7
“BIMSTEC: The Road Ahead”, Research and Information Services, (New
Delhi, India: November 2016), http://ris.org.in/pdf/BIMSTEC%20Report.pdf.
8
The Sustainable Management of the Bay of Bengal (BoB) Large Marine
Ecosystem (LME) project, was implemented in the eight countries surrounding
the Bay of Bengal from 2009 to the end of 2017 to address transboundary
marine resources issues along the coast of this LME, including land-based
sources of marine pollution, artisanal fisheries versus commercial fisheries,
and habitat conservation and restoration; See
15
Singh, “A marine ecological crisis in South Asia”
16
“India among eight nations gets funds for marine conservation”, Business
Standard, 25 June 2018,
https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/india-among-eight-
nations-gets-funds-for-marine-conservation-118062501152_1.html.
17
“Fish meal and fish oil industries are wiping out India’s marine resources”,
Quartz India, 9 January 2020
https://qz.com/india/1780065/rampant-overfishing-threatens-to-wipe-out-
indias-marine-stock/.
18
Discussions with experts and environmental scientists on BE in the Bay of
Bengal.
19
Aparna Roy, “Blue Economy in the Indian Ocean: Governance perspectives
27
“Oceans and Sri Lanka’s future: Towards a blue economy”, Daily FT, 21
June 2017
http://www.ft.lk/article/620407/Oceans-and-Sri-Lanka-s-future--Towards-a-
blue-economy.
28
“Major Ports Register Positive Growth Of 4.77% During 2017-18”, Marine
Insight, 6 April 2018,
https://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/india-major-ports-register-
positive-growth-of-4-77-during-2017-18/.
29
“India to launch its Deep Ocean Mission by October, Times of India, August
1, 2019, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-to-launch-its-deep-
ocean-mission-by-october/articleshow/70414191.cms
30
The restructured Centrally Sponsored Scheme (CSS) on Blue Revolution:
Integrated Development and Management of Fisheries was approved in
December, 2015 with a total central budgetary outlay of Rs.3000 crore for
five years (i.e. till end 2019-20); also see Guidelines Centrally Sponsored
Scheme (CSS) on Blue Revolution: Integrated Development and Management
of Fisheries”, National Fisheries Development Board, Government of India,
August 2019.
144 31
“Ministry of ‘Blue Economy’ inevitable - MoS, External Affairs and
Parliamentary Affairs”, FICCI Press Release, 17 January 2020, http://www.
ficci.in/pressrelease-page.asp?nid=3602
32
Pankaj Sekhsaria, “Many shades of a blue economy: Sagarmala project”,
The Hindu, 7 September 2019
https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/many-shades-
of-a-blue-economy-sagarmala-project/article20104312.ece.
33
Dr Himanshu Damle, “Financial Analysis of the Blue Economy: Sagarmala’s
Case in Point”, Centre for Financial Accountability, October, 2017, https://
www.cenfa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/blue-economy-financial-
analysis.pdf.
Runa Sarkar
“T
he acute impact of climate change on Asia, and
on South Asia in particular, will play out across
a landscape shaped by the past – shaped by the
cumulative effects of social inequality, shaped by
the borders of the mid-twentieth century, shaped by the infrastructures
of water control. And it will be shaped by the legacy of ideas from the
past, including ideas about climate and the economy,” says author Sunil
Amrith.1 Institutions like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Amrith says, “are
focussed overwhelmingly on the development of infrastructure and
promotion of trade.” Although environmental protection is not absent
from their concerns, it is not a high priority. When policy documents
refer to climate, it is often as a metaphor, as in the often-expressed hope
of creating a “climate friendly to investment”.
Further, as the region progresses economically, the only way to meet its
rising energy demands will be by exploiting its potential for hydroelectric
power, despite the likely devastating environmental impacts, with
hundreds of dams already planned in the Himalayan region over the next
few years. Such initiatives will require cooperation from all countries to
minimise the environmental impact and maximise sharing the economic
benefits. Building a dam has far reaching impacts, from areas upstream of
the dam getting waterlogged or rendered infertile to those downstream
becoming drained of sediment and vulnerable to flooding. This is
concerning since several of the affected areas are biodiversity hotspots
that do not recognise manmade national boundaries.
a repository for proposal writing skills, leaving local entities free to work
on implementation activities with limited resources.
150
Adaptation and Possible Approaches
air purifiers in New Delhi), will result in the further exacerbation of the
existing social, political, economic and environmental stresses within
society by marginalising the have-nots. Hence, there is a need for planned
adaptation measures across nations.
Conclusion
Endnotes
1
Sunil Amrith, Unruly Waters: How Rains, Rivers, Coasts, and Seas have
Shaped Asia’s History. (New York: Basic Books, 2018), pp. 266 – 405.
2
J. J. McCarthy, O. F. Canziani, N. A. Leary, D. J. Dokken and K. S.
White (eds.), Climate Change: Impacts Adaptation and Vulnerability,
Contributions of Working Group II to the 3rd Assessment Report of the
IPCC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; New York, USA: 2001),
pp. 535-580
3
Jack D. Ives, Rajendra B. Shrestha, and Pradeep K. Mool, Formation
of glacial lakes in the Hindu KushHimalayas and GLOF (glacial lake
outburst flood) risk assessment, Kathmandu, ICIMOD, 2010, http://
www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/ICIMODGLOF.pdf
4
J.P Aryal, D.B Rahut, T.B Sapkota, Ritika Khurana and Arun Khatri-
Chhetri, “Climate change mitigation options among farmers in South
Asia”, Environment Development and Sustainability, Springer, 22
(2020): 3267–3289. 153
5
B. P Resurreccion, E. E Sajor, and E. Fajber, Climate adaptation
in Asia: Knowledge gaps and research issues in Southeast Asia,
Kathmandu, Institute for Social and Environmental Transition-
International, & Institute for Social & Environmental Transition-Nepal,
2008, https://2eac3a3b-5e23-43c7-b33c-f17ad8fd3011.filesusr.com/
ugd/558f8a_ce5ba3d8a18e462a98010494f08d930a.pdf
6
P. Sawhney, and M. Perkins (Eds.), Emerging Climate Change
Adaptation Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region, Bangkok, Institute
for Global Environment Studies - Asia Pacific Adaptation Network,
2015, http://asiapacificadapt.net/sites/default/files/resource/attach/
Emerging%20issues-APAN_0_0.pdf
T
he Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) region—home to
around 1.7 billion people, with a combined gross domestic
product of US$2.7 trillion—has seen an average economic
growth of 5.6 percent over 2014-2018 despite global financial upheavals.
The average annual population growth in the region is 0.91 percent (see
Table 1).
155
In the BIMSTEC region, losses from natural catastrophes are rising due to
economic growth in urban at-risk areas and due to growing urbanisation
in at-risk locations where elevation is one metre or less.a While it is still
possible to insure life and property against weather-related risks at such
locations, insurability could be jeopardised in high-exposure urban areas
due to the impacts of global warming and climate change.5
With about nine million people residing in extremely vulnerable low lying
areas in the Bay of Bengal littoral states,6 it is important to understand
past and projected changes in key climate variables such as warming, sea-
156
level rise and tropical cyclonic storms.
a
According to the Center for International Earth Science Information Network, a Low
Elevation Coastal Zone is a land area with elevation up to 20 meters.
by the end of the 21st century across warming scenarios, relative to the
average temperature during 1976-2005. In recent decades, sea surface
temperatures in the Indian Ocean have risen significantly, at a higher rate
than the global average. Sea surface temperature in the tropical Indian
Ocean rose by 1°C on average over the 1951-2015 period and is projected
to increase further during the 21st century under medium (RCP4.5) and
high (RCP8.5) emission scenarios. The rate of warming in the tropical
Indian Ocean is the fastest among tropical oceans and accounts for about
one quarter of the increase in global oceanic heat content over the last
two decades.
157
Rise in ocean surface temperature and heat content is closely linked to
the intensity of tropical cyclones, but long-term observations (1951-2018)
indicate a significant reduction (-0.26 per decade) in annual frequency
of tropical cyclones in the Bay of Bengal.8 However, over the 2000-2018
period, a significant rise (+0.86 per decade) in the frequency of very
severe cyclonic storms was observed during the post-monsoon season
(October-December). This implies that within the reduced number of
storms in the BIMSTEC region, a greater number are of the very severe
category. With continued global warming, the activity of very severe
cyclonic storms over the North Indian Ocean is projected to further
increase during the 21st century. About 80 percent of tropical cyclones
(on an annual scale) in the North Indian Ocean basin occur in the Bay of
Bengal and a major percentage of these evolve into severe cyclonic storms
or a higher category. On average, about five or six tropical cyclones are
generally observed in the Bay of Bengal every year, of which two or three
reach severe stages; between 1981 and 2018, 40 percent of the time, the
severe cyclonic storms in the Bay of Bengal transformed into very severe
cyclonic storms. There were 15 extreme category storms in the Bay of
Bengal region between 2000 and 2018. Most severe cyclonic storms in
the Bay of Bengal region attained very severe cyclonic storm or extremely
severe cyclonic storm status during these seasons.
159
In situ response measures to sea level rise take various forms and have
different approaches. The measures could be in the form of legislations
and regulations, hard infrastructure like dikes, sea walls and raised
160
houses, early warning systems or climate risk insurance, all of which aim
to reduce risk and build resilience for the continued habitability of coastal
areas. The approaches taken to deal with seal level rises can be grouped
as: (i) resist or protect, (ii) accommodate, and in certain cases (iii) build
seaward (advance) to protect the hinterland (see Figure 3).19 Usually, a
combination of approaches are implemented after a coastal disaster. In
extreme cases, the approach is to retreat (move people and assets out of
harm’s way), as seen in Sri Lanka after the Indian Ocean tsunami where
the government prohibited rebuilding in the coastal zone.20 The retreat
approach, however, is unfeasible for densely populated urban areas since
“there are no technological limits to protect the coast during the 21st
century even under high-end SLR [sea level rise] of 2 m.”21
161
Source: Adapted from IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing
Climate, 201922
162
Country/
Response Response
city/ Status Effectiveness Study
type measure
region
Prevents tidal
flooding, salinity
intrusion and
facilitates the
Dewan et
Hard Bangladesh Polders* Extant outflow of water.
al., 201524
Long-term
maintenance of
projects remains
challenging.
Can limit salinity
Engineered intrusion provided
Protect
Approach
Country/
Response Response
city/ Status Effectiveness Study
type measure
region
Flexibility in
structural solutions
Floating Trang,
Biophysical Vietnam Extant adapting to
houses 201627
environmental and
climate change.
Repeated individual
Houses
and city council
Semarang elevated with
intervention Buchori et
Biophysical City, the additional Extant
required. Beyond al., 201828
Indonesia height, 50-400
2030s, expensive
Accommodate
cm*
proposition.
An alternative
strategy to
mitigate the
Allowing impacts of flooding
Assessment
164 buildings to to individual
of
float when buildings and to Nilubon et
Biophysical Bangkok amphibious
water level simultaneously deal al., 201629
building
starts to with the challenges
technology
rise (>0.6m) of restoring and
preserving water
storage capacity in
cities.
Country/
Response Response
city/ Status Effectiveness Study
type measure
region
Elevation of
household Individual intervention;
Can Tho assets & extensive adaptation Garschagen,
Biophysical Extant
City, Vietnam fortification deficits and high rates 201530
of housing of flood affectedness.
structure
Improves nutritional
Floating security, household
Irfanullah
Biophysical Bangladesh vegetable Extant income, and land use
et al., 201131
gardens capacity of the very
poor and landless.
Short cycle varieties
would allow for
continued rice
cultivation but salinity
Thanh Phu Sal-tolerant
will eventually Renaud et
Biophysical district, paddy Developed
compromise rice al., 2016
Vietnam varieties* 165
production; salinity
Accommodate
Approach
Country/
Response Response
city/ Status Effectiveness Study
type measure
region
Included in
National Adaptation
Floating Programme of
Irfanullah et
Institutional Bangladesh vegetable Extant Action (NAPA) of
al., 201134
gardens* Bangladesh but no
pragmatic steps for
implementation.
Can effectively limit
salinity intrusion
Thanh Phu Regulating but the region will
Renaud et al.,
Institutional district, upstream Planned be dependent on
201635
Vietnam river flow* water management
decisions made
upstream.
Accommodate
Builds resilience
166 against hydro-
meteorological
coastal hazards.
Allows people to
remain in hazard-
prone areas but
provide advance
Early
warning for Leal Filho, et
Institutional Bangladesh Warning Extant
evacuation in the face al., 201836
System
of imminent danger.
However, the gap
between the logistics
and the monitoring
of weather data for
modelling and fitting
of climate systems
remains a constraint.
Country/
Response Response
city/ Status Effectiveness Study
type measure
region
Conclusion
Endnotes
1
The World Bank, “World Bank Open Data,” The World Bank, https://
data.worldbank.org/
2
R. Krishnan et al., Assessment of Climate Change over the Indian Region
(Singapore: Springer, 2020), https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%
2F978-981-15-4327-2
3
“Urban-Rural Population and Land Area Estimates Version 2,” Center
for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN)/
Columbia University, https://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/lecz-
urban-rural-population-land-area-estimates-v2
4
CIESIN, “Urban-Rural Population and Land Area Estimates Version 2”
5
Lucia Bevere and Michael Gloor, sigma 2/2020: Natural catastrophes
in times of economic accumulation and climate change, Swiss Re
Institute, 2020, https://www.swissre.com/institute/research/sigma-
research/sigma-2020-02.html
6
CIESIN, “Urban-Rural Population and Land Area Estimates Version 2” 169
7
Krishnan et al., Assessment of Climate Change over the Indian Region
8
Ramesh K. Vellore et al., “Extreme Storms,” in Assessment of Climate
Change over the Indian Region, ed. R. Krishnan et al. (Singapore: Springer,
2020), 155-173. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4327-2_10
9
W. Han, et al., “Patterns of Indian Ocean sea-level change in a warming
climate,” Nature Geoscience 3 (2010): 546-550, https://doi.org/10.1038/
ngeo901
10
T. Wahl, et al, “Understanding extreme sea levels for broad-scale coastal
impact and adaptation analysis,” Nature Communications 8 (2017): 1-12.
https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms16075
11
M.I. Vousdoukas, et al., “Global probabilistic projections of extreme
sea levels show intensification of coastal flood hazard,” Nature
Communications 9(1) (2018): 1-12.https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-
04692-w
12
S. Kay, et al., “Modelling the increased frequency of extreme sea levels
in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna delta due to sea level rise and other
effects of climate change,” Environmental Science: Processes & Impacts
17(7) (2015): 1311-1322. doi:10.1039/c4em00683f
13
F.E. Dunn, et al., “Projections of historical and 21st century fluvial
sediment delivery to the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, Mahanadi, and
Volta deltas,” Science of the Total Environment 642 (2018): 105-116.https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2018.06.006
14
B.K. Paul, “Why relatively fewer people died? The case of Bangladesh’s
Cyclone Sidr,” Natural Hazards 50 (2009): 289-304.https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11069-008-9340-5
15
Amartya Kumar Bhattacharya, “An Analysis of Land Subsidence in
Bangkok and Kolkata Due to Over-Extraction of Groundwater,” Electronic
Journal of Geotechnical Engineering 18 (Bund. I) (2013): 1683-1694. http://
www.ejge.com/2013/Ppr2013.163alr.pdf
16
D.M.E. Haque, Tanzim Hayat and Samanin Tasnim, “Time series
analysis of subsidence in Dhaka city, Bangladesh using INSAR,” Malaysian
Journal of Geosciences 3(1) (2019): 32-44. http://doi.org/10.26480/
mjg.01.2019.32.44
17
Teije van der Horst et al., “Monitoring land subsidence in Yangon,
Myanmar using Sentinel-1 persistent scatterer interferometry and
assessment of driving mechanisms,” Remote Sensing of Environment 217
170
(2018): 101-110.
18
N. Phien-wej, P.H. Giao and P. Nutalaya, “Land subsidence in Bangkok,
Thailand,” Engineering Geology 82 (2006): 187-201.
19
M. Oppenheimer, et al., “Sea Level Rise and Implications for Low
Lying Islands, Coasts and Communities” in IPCC Special Report on
the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, ed.H.-O. Pörtner,
et al., (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 321-445.
https://www.ipcc.ch/srocc/chapter/chapter-4-sea-level-rise-and-
implications-for-low-lying-islands-coasts-and-communities/
20
Miyuki Hino, C. Field and K. Mach, “Managed retreat as a response
to natural hazard risk,” Nature Climate Change 7 (2017): 364-370.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3252
21
Oppenheimer, et al., “Sea Level Rise and Implications for Low Lying
Islands, Coasts and Communities,” 388.
22
Oppenheimer, et al., “Sea Level Rise and Implications for Low Lying
Islands, Coasts and Communities,” 386.
23
M. Garschagen, “Risky change? Vietnam’s urban flood risk governance
34
Irfanullah et al., “Floating Gardening in Bangladesh: a means to rebuild
lives after devastating flood”
35
Renaud, et al., “Resilience and shifts in agro-ecosystems facing
increasing sea-level rise and salinity intrusion in Ben Tre Province,
Mekong Delta”
36
W. Leal Filho, et al., “Fostering coastal resilience to climate change
vulnerability in Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon and Uruguay: a cross-
country comparison,” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global
Change 23 (2018): 579-602. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-017-9750-
3
37
T. Srinivasa Kumar, P. Kumar and S Nayak, “Performance of the Indian
tsunami early warning system,” ISPRS Archives 28(8) (2010): 271-274.
38
J. Skees, J. Hartell and A. Goes, “Using Index-based Risk Transfer
Products to Facilitate Micro Lending in Peru and Vietnam,” American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 89(5) (2007): 1255-1261.
39
R. Mechler, J. Linnerooth-Bayer and D. Peppiatt, Disaster Insurance
for the Poor? A review of microinsurance for natural disaster risks in
developing countries (Geneva/Laxenburg: ProVention/International
172
Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) Study, 2006).
40
A.R. Siders, M. Hino and K.J. Mach, “The case for strategic and
managed climate retreat,” Science 365 (6455) (2019): 761-763.
41
A.A. Danda et al., “Strategic and Managed Retreat as Adaptation:
Addressing Climate Vulnerability in the Sundarbans” ORF Issue Brief
No. 387 (July 2020), https://www.orfonline.org/research/strategic-and-
managed-retreat-as-adaptation-addressing-climate-vulnerability-in-
the-sundarbans/
42
Hino et al., “Managed retreat as a response to natural hazard risk”
43
Oppenheimer, et al., “Sea Level Rise and Implications for Low Lying
Islands, Coasts and Communities”
44
Danda et al., “Strategic and Managed Retreat as Adaptation: Addressing
Climate Vulnerability in the Sundarbans”
K.M. Parivelan
B
IMSTEC states, home to 1.5 billion people or 21 percent of
the world population, are facing challenges from climate
change and natural disasters which cause massive damage
to property and loss of human lives.1 These countries
have geographical and socio-economic vulnerabilities, to begin with,
and in recent years, climate change has compounded the severity of
hydro-meteorological disasters. Various hazards like cyclones, floods,
droughts, storms and wildfires affect millions of people, underlining
the importance of disaster risk management through coordination and
cooperation among the BIMSTEC countries. Climate change (“attributed
directly or indirectly to human activity,”) and disasters (“a situation or
event that overwhelms local capacity…an unforeseen and often sudden
event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering”) are
cross-cutting issues that need to be addressed holistically, integrating the
Paris Climate Agreement and disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures.
Climatological hazards are caused by long-lived meso- to macro-scale
atmospheric processes, ranging from intra-seasonal to multi-decadal
climate variability. In 2019, 396 natural disasters were recorded globally,
with 11,755 deaths, 95 million people affected and US$103 billion in
economic losses. But the burden was not shared equally, with Asia
suffering the worst impact and accounting for 40 percent of disaster
events, 45 percent of deaths and 74 percent of the total affected.
Climate Change and Disaster Management
Bangladesh: Cyclones and floods pose the greatest risk to the country.
Sub-nationally, the northern and eastern regions of Bangladesh are
175
susceptible to earthquakes while the southeast is particularly vulnerable
to all five hazards—cyclones, droughts, earthquakes, floods and volcanos.
Nepal: Nepal’s fragile geology and steep topography have made it the 20th
topmost disaster-prone country in the world. It ranks fourth, eleventh and
thirtieth out of 200 countries on relative vulnerability to climate change,
earthquake and flood hazards, respectively.
176
Sri Lanka: Floods are the primary hazard affecting Sri Lanka, ranking
in high deciles when weighted by both mortality and GDP. Cyclones
affect the northern region of the country but have a moderate to minor
risk when weighted by mortality. Compared to the rest of the world, the
mortality weighted multi-hazard map highlights those hazards that pose
significant risks to the entire country and are especially severe in Sri
Lanka’s southwestern region.
Scope of Cooperation
In recent years, governments around the world have been updating and
strengthening their disaster management legislations. Some countries
still lack national disaster management laws, while others have not yet
expanded and organised their legal frameworks to effectively address the
full spectrum of disaster management. Experience shows that even the best-
prepared countries may need international support when major disasters
strike, such as the US received after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 or in the
aftermath of Japan’s Fukushima nuclear disaster
in 2011. Unfortunately, few governments have
adequate systems in place to facilitate and regulate outside relief.
After years of intensive research and consultations on problems and
best practice in the regulation of international disaster relief, the
IFRC spearheaded negotiations to develop a new set of international
guidelines to help governments strengthen their domestic laws and
ASEAN and SAARC are committed to the Paris Agreement and the
179
Sendai Declaration, and their member states also adhere to the IDL.
Despite its difficulties, ASEAN has a functional and comprehensive
structure of disaster management that is worthy of observation and
emulating. BIMSTEC is already considering adopting a model similar to
the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster
management. SAARC also conducts periodic training programmes to
develop disaster risk resilience and organises workshops to meet the
Sendai targets. BIMSTEC can emulate these efforts.
Conclusion
180
Endnotes
1
BIMSTEC, “Brief on BIMSTEC,” Ministry of External Affairs,
Government of India, 2014,
https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/BIMSTEC_Brief_
February_2014.pdf.
2
United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, New York, 1992, 3, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/
conveng.pdf.
3
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, “Natural
disasters 2019: Now is the time to not give up,” 2019, https://www.cred.
be/publications.
4
Adam Smith, “Peril Classification and Hazard Glossary- Data Publication
No.1,” Beijing, Integrated Research on Disaster Risk, March 2014,
181
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280938471_Integrated_
Research_on_Disaster_Risk_2014_Peril_Classification_and_Hazard_
Glossary/link/55ccfa7008aebd6b88e05bac/download.
5
“Natural disasters 2019: Now is the time to not give up”
6
Martin Parry, Osvaldo Canziani, Jean Palutikof, Paul van der Linden
and Clair Hanson (eds.), Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation
and Vulnerability, UK, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
Cambridge University Press, 695, https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/
uploads/2018/03/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf
7
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “Nationally
Determined Contributions,” 2015, https://unfccc.int/process-and-
meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement/nationally-
determined-contributions-ndcs.
8
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “Paris
Agreement,” Paris, United Nation, 2015, https://unfccc.int/files/essential_
background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf.
9
United Nations, 2009 UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk
20
Indian Navy, “Indian Naval Ship Sumitra visited Yangon”, 2017, https://
www.indiannavy.nic.in/node/17032
21
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, October 6, 2017,
https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29012/#:~:text=India%20
is%20hosting%20the%20First,13%20October%202017%20in%20
Delhi.&text=The%20main%20focus%20of%20the,disaster%20respons-
e%20among%20Member%20States.
22
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, February 12, 2020,
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1603015.
23
Dinakar Peri, “BIMSTEC to boost connectivity”, The Hindu, November
18, 2018, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/bimstec-to-boost-
connectivity/article25532597.ece
24
Government of India, National Disaster Management Plan (New Delhi:
National Disaster Management Authority, November 2019), https://
www.ndma.gov.in/images/policyplan/dmplan/ndmp-2019.pdf.
25
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, “Sendai Framework
for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030,” https://www.undrr.org/
publication/sendai-framework-disaster-risk-reduction-2015-2030
183
26
BIMSTEC Centres, “BIMSTEC Centre on Weather and Climate,”
August 6, 2018, https://bimstec.org/?page_id=1292.
27
“Foreign Aid to the U.S. During Hurricane Katrina,” Borgen
Magazine, November 5, 2013, https://www.borgenmagazine.com/
over-90-countries-offered-foreign-aid-to-the-u-s-during-hurricane-
katrina/#:~:text=Soon%20after%20the%20destruction%20of,to%20
be%20sold%20for%20cash).&text=A%20Swedish%20plane%20of%20
aid%20was%20not%20given%20clearance%20to%20land.
28
United Nations Office of Disaster Risk Reduction, UNISDR Annual
Report 2017, Geneva, https://www.preventionweb.net/files/58158_
unisdr2017annualreport.pdf.
29
ASEAN, ASEAN-UN Joint Strategic Plan of Action on Disaster
Management 2016-2020, 11, https://asean.org/storage/2017/12/ASEAN-
UN-JSPADM-2016-2020_final.pdf
30
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction and the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation, Towards Coherent Disaster Risk
Reduction Strategy Development, Implementation and Monitoring
among SAARC Member States, Workshop Agenda, 2019, https://www.
preventionweb.net/files/66872_CN%20_%20AGENDA-SAARC-
National-Coherence.pdf
31
“BIMSTEC to boost connectivity”
32
SAARC Disaster Management Centre, “Regional workshop and
capacity building programme for utilization of space based and
geospatial information for achieving the targets of the Sendai Framework
for Disaster Risk Reduction,” 2018, http://saarc-sdmc.org/regional-
workshop-and-capacity-building-programme-utilization-space-based-
and-geospatial-information
184
ANALYSING HUMAN
CAPITAL
Reimagining BIMSTEC’s
Health Futures
Oommen C. Kurian
E
stablished in 1997, BIMSTEC comprises of five nations
from South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Sri
Lanka) and two nations from Southeast Asia (Myanmar and
Thailand). It is often seen as a link between these two regions
and their respective regional institutions: the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN).1 Fourteen sectors of cooperation have been identified
by the member countries: trade, technology, energy, transport and
communication, tourism, fisheries, agriculture, public health, poverty
alleviation, counterterrorism, environment, culture, people-to-people
contact, and climate change.2
The world, and the BIMSTEC region, are now healthier and wealthier
than ever. In 1980, only 84 of every 100 children globally reached their
fifth birthday, compared to 94 of every 100 in 2018. In 1980, a child born in
a low-income country had a life expectancy of 52 years, which improved
187
to 65 years in 2018.6 Among the South Asian countries, life expectancy at
birth was only 54 until 1980, improving to 69 in 2018. The corresponding
improvement in life expectancy at birth within the East Asian Region was
75 in 2018, an increase of 10 years since 1980.7
Source: Author’s own, using data from Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of
Public Health 2019.12
The Global Human Capital Index (HCI) was initiated by the World Bank
and its partners to create a simple cross-country metric for generating
the political attention needed for catalytic worldwide action in social
sectors such as health and education.13 There are three health-related
components within the HCI. First, according to the World Bank, the
survival component reflects the fact that children born today must
survive until the process of human capital accumulation through formal
education can begin.14 Survival is measured using the under-five mortality
rate (See Graph 2). While almost all children survive from birth to school
age in first-world countries, preventable child deaths are still a major
challenge in South Asia.
189
Source: Author’s own, using data from The Human Capital Project. 15
Source: Author’s own, using data from The Human Capital Project.17
Source: Author’s own, using data from The Human Capital Project.19
Overall, the health outcomes in the BIMSTEC region remain low, owing
largely to bottlenecks within health systems. Moreover, the medical
innovation landscape in the region leaves much to be desired. The Global
Innovation Index 2019 focused on the future of global medical innovation
and scored countries across a composite index, which pooled indicators
across institutions, human capital and research, infrastructure, market
sophistication, business sophistication, knowledge and technology
outputs, and creative outputs. Only Thailand and India fared better than
the global average (See Graph 5); both Bhutan and Myanmar remain
absent from the global innovation landscape.20
191
Source: Author’s own, using data from Cornell University, INSEAD and
WIPO (2019).21
192
Source: Author’s own, using data from Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of
Public Health 2019.23
Recommendations
Conclusion
193
The 2017 paper observed26 that while there have been many in-depth
studies focusing on the comparative analysis of the health systems in
BRICS nations, offering valuable policy lessons, no such studies have
been undertaken for the BIMSTEC members. This gives India an
opportunity to conduct and support comparative health system studies
within the region, with stronger economies providing valuable lessons
for the future and the poorer members offering lessons for the present.
Additionally, platforms for cross-learning can be immensely beneficial
for culturally and socially similar neighbouring countries to learn from
each other’s successes and failures in health policy.
Endnotes
1
K. Yhome, “Twenty years of BIMSTEC: promoting regional
cooperation and integration in the Bay of Bengal region” : edited by
Prabir De, New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2018, pp. 292. ISBN 978-93-
87324-35-0 (ebook). 2019, 373-376.
2
Pratnashree Basu and Nilanjan Ghosh, “Breathing New Life into
BIMSTEC: Challenges and Imperatives,” ORF Occasional Paper No.
243, April 2020, Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.
org/research/health-policies-of-bimstec-states-the-scope-for-cross-
learning/
3
Soumya Bhowmick, “Reimagining BIMSTEC amidst the COVID-19
disaster”. ORF Expert Speak, 26 March 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/
expert-speak/reimagining-bimstec-amidst-the-covid-19-disaster-63736/
4
Oommen C. Kurian, “Health policies of BIMSTEC states: The scope
for cross-learning” ORF Issue Brief No. 211, November 2017, Observer
194 Research Foundation.
5
“BIMSTEC leaders pledge to collectively combat COVID-19
impact”, 6 June 2020, Bangladesh News, https://bdnews24.com/
neighbours/2020/06/06/ bimstec-leaders-pledge-to-collectively-
combat-covid-19-impact
6
World Bank Group. World Development Report 2019: The Changing
Nature of Work. World Bank, 2018.
7
World Bank Group. World Bank Data. https://data.worldbank.org/
8
World Bank Group. World development report 2019: The Changing
Nature of Work. World Bank, 2018.
9
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health 2019 Global Health
Security Index: building collective action and accountability. October,
2019. https://www.ghsindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2019-
Global-Health-Security-Index.pdf
10
https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-
country/
11
Dina Balabanova, Anne Mills, Lesong Conteh, Baktygul Akkazieva,
Hailom Banteyerga, Umakant Dash, Lucy Gilson et al. “Good Health
at Low Cost 25 years on: lessons for the future of health systems
strengthening.” The Lancet 381, no. 9883, 2013, 2118-2133.
12
Global Health Security Index: building collective action and
accountability. October, 2019, https://www.ghsindex.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/10/2019-Global-Health-Security-Index.pdf.
13
The Human Capital Project. World Bank Group. World development
report 2019: The changing nature of work. World Bank, 2018.
14
World Bank Group. The Human Capital Project 2019
15
World Bank Group. World development report 2019: The changing
nature of work. World Bank, 2018, accessed at https://www.worldbank.
org/en/publication/human-capital.
16
World Bank Group. World Development Report 2019
17
World Bank Group. World Development Report 2019
18
World Bank Group. World Development Report 2019
19
World Bank Group. World Development Report 2019
20
Cornell University, INSEAD, and WIPO (2019); The Global Innovation
195
Index 2019: Creating Healthy Lives—The Future of Medical Innovation,
Ithaca, Fontainebleau, and Geneva.
21
The Global Innovation Index 2019: Creating Healthy Lives—The
Future of Medical Innovation, Ithaca, Fontainebleau, and Geneva,
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2019.pdf
22
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health 2019 Global Health
Security Index: building collective action and accountability. October,
2019. https://www.ghsindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2019-
Global-Health-Security-Index.pdf
23
Global Health Security Index: Building Collective Action and
Accountability, October 2019. https://www.ghsindex.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/10/2019-Global-Health-Security-Index.pdf.
24
Oommen C. Kurian, “Health policies of BIMSTEC states: The scope
for cross-learning” ORF Issue Brief No. 211, November 2017, Observer
Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/research/health-
policies-of-bimstec-states-the-scope-for-cross-learning/
25
A Decade of Public Health Achievements in WHO’s South-East Asia
Region, WHO, http://apps.searo.who.int/PDS_DOCS/B5003.pdf.
26
Oommen C. Kurian, “Health policies of BIMSTEC states: The scope
for cross-learning” ORF Issue Brief No. 211, November 2017, Observer
Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/research/health-
policies-of-bimstec-states-the-scope-for-cross-learning/
196
Introduction
E
ducation and culture have historically provided essential
links of connectivity between India and the member states
of BIMSTEC. The Jataka tales, scriptures, inscriptions,
palm-leaf records and accounts of foreign travellers testify
to Takshashila, Nalanda and Vikramshila attracting scholars from the
region in ancient times.1
Bhutan
Bangladesh
Myanmar
Myanmar’s traditional education link with India has been through the
people of Indian origin who inhabit its two main cities, Yangon and
Mandalay. Yangon University has traditionally hosted leading Indian
scholars: Bengali novelist Sarat Chandra Chatterjee spent several years in
199
Myanmar. The Mekong Ganga Cooperation project included education
as an area of collaboration.9
Nepal
Sri Lanka
India and Sri Lanka have a history of cooperation in education. The
Government of India offers 50 training opportunities Scheme in diverse
fields under its Colombo Plan Technical Cooperation.16 The India–Sri
Lanka Cultural Exchange Programme offers 60 annual scholarships
to pursue undergraduate and postgraduate degree courses in India.
Moreover, the ICCR’s South Asian Regional Cooperation Scholarship
Scheme annually awards one fellowship and two scholarships at the
postgraduate level, in economics, education, environment, agriculture,
mass communication, language, literature, sociology, transport
engineering, applied economics, business administration, biochemistry,
Following the 2016 Sri Lanka visit of India’s External Affairs Minister
Sushma Swaraj, India agreed to establish a Civil and Mechanical
201
Engineering Complex and Skill Development Centre on the Kilinochchi
Campus of the University of Jaffna; set up English Language Laboratories
in all provinces of Sri Lanka; renovate 27 schools in Tamil-dominated
Northern Province; and construct the Rabindranath Tagore Memorial
Auditorium at the Ruhuna University and the Mahatma Gandhi
International Centre in Matale.18 Annual Indian education fairs in Sri
Lanka were also proposed.
Thailand
Conclusion
June 2017, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, too, underscored the cultural
binding force of the organisation as well as its geostrategic importance
for India:
Acknowledgement
This essay is based on the findings of the research project on “Look East
and Act East: Implication of Indian Foreign Policy” pursued at the Netaji
Institute for Asian Studies, Kolkata.
Endnotes
1
“About BIMSTEC,” BIMSTEC, https://bimstec.org/?page_id=189.
2
Ibid.
3
“Areas of Cooperation,” BIMSTEC, https://bimstec.org/?page_id=199.
4
Ibid.
5
The total population of the females is based on data compiled from,
Asma Akhter and Qumrun Naher Islam, Women and Men in Bangladesh:
Facts and Figures 2018 (Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2019),
http:// bbs.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/ bbs.portal.gov.bd/
page/b343a8b4_956b_45ca_872f_4cf9b2f1a6e0/Women%20and%20
men%20in%20Bangladesh-Facts%20and%20figures%202018.pdf
and, “Population, Female,” Data – The World Bank, https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.IN?end=2018&locations=
MM&start=1960&fbclid=IwAR1qQHZRjhFCAnUtTG5ovY-hXfiOF9_
mdbjsvEWNFafXMVDUJPvUte9Oxb8
204 6
“Global Gender Gap Report 2020” (Geneva: World Economic Forum,
2019), 8, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf
7
Ibid, 29.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid, 30.
10
Ibid, 9.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf.
15
Nawaz Farhin, “Women in Parliament: Only Impressive in Number,”
Dhaka Tribune, 8 March 2018, https://www.dhakatribune.com/
bangladesh/2018/03/08/women-parliament-impressive-number.
16
“Gender Equality,” UNFPA Bangladesh, https://bangladesh.unfpa.
org/en/topics/gender-equality-13.
17
Md Kyser Hamid, “How is Bangladesh faring in gender equality?,”
The Daily Star, 27 May 2019, https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/
perspective/news/how-bangladesh-faring-gender-equality-1749268
18
“UN Women Bangladesh,” UN Women: Asia and the Pacific, https://
asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/countries/bangladesh.
19
“Gender Equality,” UNFPA Bangladesh, op. cit.
20
Ibid.
21
Samara Mortada, “Bangladesh launches first National Action Plan
on women, peace and security as per UN resolutions,” UN Women: Asia
and the Pacific, 23 November 2019, https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/
news-and-events/stories/2020/01/bangladesh-launches-first-national-
action-plan-on-wps.
22
Kai Schultz and Suhashini Raj, “For Indian Women, the Coronavirus
Economy Is a Devastating Setback,” The New York Times, 15 July 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/world/asia/india-coronavirus-
women-economy.html.
23
“Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments (%) –
India,” The World Bank – Data, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SG.GEN.PARL.ZS?locations=IN. Also see, Nandita Bhatla, Sunayana
Walia, Tina Khanna, Ravi Verma, “Opportunities and Challenges of
Women’s Political Participation in India: A Synthesis of Research
205
Findings from Select Districts in India,” International Center for Research
on Women and UN Women, 2012, 7.
24
“Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women,” United Nations Treaty Collection, (New York:
United Nations General Assembly, 18 December 1979), https://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec.
25
Shamika Ravi and Nirupama Jayaraman, “Gender Issues in India:
An Amalgamation of Research,” Brookings India, 10 March 2020,
https://www.brookings.edu/research/gender-issues-in-india-an-
amalgamation-of-research/.
26
“UN Women India,” UN Women: Asia and the Pacific, 4 July 2020,
https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/countries/india.
27
Mollie Pepper, “Ethnic Minority Women, Diversity, and Informal
Participation in Peacebuilding in Myanmar,” Journal of Peacebuilding and
Development, Volume 13, no. 2, July 2018, 61, https://doi.org/10.1080/154
23166.2018.1472030.
28
Ibid, 66.
29
Ibid. Also see, “Gender Equality,” UNFPA Myanmar, https://myanmar.
unfpa.org/en/node/15284.
30
“Women and the Economy in Myanmar: An Assessment of DFAT’s
Private Sector Development Programs” (Australia: Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, January 2016), 5.
31
“About Myanmar,” UN Women: Asia and the Pacific, https://
asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/countries/myanmar/about-myanmar.
32
Myanmar has kept its reservation on Article 29, paragraph 1 of the
CEDAW. For all the declarations, see, “ASEAN Declaration on the Gender-
Responsive Implementation of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025
and Sustainable Development Goals” (Manila: ASEAN, 16 November
2017), https://asean.org/asean-declaration-on-the-gender-responsive-
implementation-of-the-asean-community-vision-2025-and-sustainable-
development-goals/; “Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
against Women in the ASEAN Region” (Jakarta: ASEAN, 12 October
2012), https://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-elimination-
of-violence-against-women-in-the-asean-region-4 and, “Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,” United
206
Nations Treaty Collection, op. cit.
33
Mollie Pepper, op. cit., 62. Also see, “Joint Submission to CEDAW on
Myanmar,” Human Rights Watch, 24 May 2018, https://www.hrw.org/
news/2018/05/24/joint-submission-cedaw-myanmar.
34
“Our Focus: Gender Equity and Equality,” UNDP Sri Lanka, https://
www.lk.undp.org/content/srilanka/en/home/gender-equality.html.
35
“Getting More Sri Lankan Women to Work: It Can Be Done,” The
World Bank, 22 November 2017, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
feature/2017/11/22/Getting-More-Sri-Lankan-Women-to-Work-It-Can-
Be-Done.
36
Vindhya Weeratunga, “Gender Inequality – Is It an Issue in Sri Lanka?”
The Asian Women’s Exchange and Research Forum (KFAW), http://www.
kfaw.or.jp/correspondents/docs/24-3_Sri_Lanka_E.pdf.
37
“Our Focus: Gender Equity and Equality,” UNDP Sri Lanka, op. cit.
38
Ibid.
39
“Sri Lanka commits to update national action plan, and sustain firm
commitment to gender equality and women’s empowerment (updated),”
UN Women: Asia and the Pacific, https://www.unwomen.org/en/get-
involved/step-it-up/commitments/sri-lanka.
40
Vitit Muntarbhorn, “Challenges to Gender Equality in Thailand,” The
Bangkok Post, 8 March 2018, https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/
opinion/1424306/challenges-to-gender-equality-in-thailand.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
“Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages
15+) (modelled ILO estimate),” The World Bank – Data, https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS.
44
“Thailand,” UN Women: Asia and the Pacific, https://asiapacific.
unwomen.org/en/countries/thailand.
45
Unlike Myanmar, Thailand has no reservation on CEDAW. For all
the declarations, see: “ASEAN Declaration on the Gender-Responsive
Implementation of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and Sustainable
Development Goals,” ASEAN, op. cit.; “Declaration on the Elimination
207
of Violence against Women in the ASEAN Region,” ASEAN, op. cit. and,
“Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women,” United Nations Treaty Collection, op. cit.
46
Maren Schindler, “Tackling gender-based violence,” Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung Thailand, 5 December 2017, https://www.fes-asia.org/news/
tackling-gender-based-violence/.
47
“Goal 5: Gender Equality,” UNDP Bhutan, https://www.bt.undp.
org/content/bhutan/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-5-
gender-equality.html.
48
Sonam Chuki and Mark Turner, “Women and politics in democratic
transitions: The case of Bhutan,” Contemporary South Asia, Volume 25,
no.2, May 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2017.1321615.
49
Ibid.
50
“Ending Gender Based Violence to achieve Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs),” UNDP Bhutan, 27 August 2019, https://www.bt.undp.org/
content/bhutan/en/home/stories/ending-gbv-to-end-sdgs.html.
51
Ibid.
52
“Sustainable Development and Happiness: Bhutan’s Voluntary
National Review Report on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development,” Royal Government of Bhutan and
United Nations High Level Political Forum, July 2018, 42-44, https://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/19369Bhutan_
NSDGR_Bhutan_2018.pdf. Also see, “Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,” United Nations Treaty
Collection, op. cit.
53
Ibid.
54
“16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence,” UNFPA Nepal,
25 November 2019, https://nepal.unfpa.org/en/events/16-days-activism-
against-gender-based-violence-2.
55
Ibid.
56
“UN Women Nepal,” UN Women: Asia and the Pacific, https://
asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/countries/nepal.
57
Rita Rai, “Gender Inequality in Nepal: At A Crossroads of Theory and
Practice,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
8 March 2019, https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/gender-equality-
208
nepal-crossroads-theory-and-practice.
58
Anweshaa Ghosh, Anjam Singh and Shraddha Chigateri, “A
Trapeze Act: Women Balancing Paid Work and Unpaid Care Work
in Nepal,” Technical Report, National Report for Women’s Economic
Empowerment Policy and Programming, October 2017, 2, DOI: 10.13140/
RG.2.2.15451.87843
Amena Mohsin
Introduction
I
n recent years, the world has seen a proliferation of regional
organisations, with pronounced territoriality and defined
regional markers, e.g. the Association of South-East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), African Union (AU), European Union (EU), and South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Amongst these,
BIMSTEC is an exception, since it moves beyond the traditional notion
of “region,” referring to itself as “a regional organisation comprising
seven member states lying in the littoral and adjacent areas of the Bay of
Bengal constituting a contiguous regional unity.”1
This chapter reviews the state of gender equality (or lack of it) in each
BIMSTEC member country. The World Economic Forum (WEF) has
proposed a “Gender Gap Index,” which illuminates how the member
states fare amongst global gender-based disparities. It broadly categorises
gender-based inequalities into four aspects: economic participation and
opportunity; educational attainment; health and survival; and political
empowerment.6 In the absence of an exclusive document on the gender
gap and equality attainments of the BIMSTEC member states, the WEF
Global Gender Gap Index provides a starting point for investigating
gender-related issues in the countries.
Bangladesh
India
212
India holds reservations against Article 29 (1) of the CEDAW, while in
reference to Articles 5 (a), 16 (1) and 16 (2), it has declared that states must
not interfere in the community issues.24 This stance must be examined
in the backdrop of numerous layers of structural hierarchies. Violence,
forced marriage and discrimination in healthcare access places India at
a rank of 150 amongst 153 countries in the WEF sub-index on “Health
and Survival.” Moreover, Indian women are also prone to SGBV as well as
suicides due to violence at almost double the rate as men.25 These issues
have prompted the United Nations (UN) Women India to prioritise six
areas: ending violence against women, promoting leadership, national
planning, economic empowerment, peace and security, and migration.26
Myanmar
213
Officially, the country has promised to uphold the norms proposed
by the international community, since it is a signatory of the ASEAN
Declaration on the Gender-Responsive Implementation of the ASEAN
Community Vision 2025 and the SDGs and of the ASEAN Declaration
on the Elimination of Violence against Women in the ASEAN Region, in
addition to its commitment to the CEDAW.32 However, it has been accused
of not incorporating women from ethnic minority groups. Moreover, in
2017, it had to report exceptionally to the Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women, for the country’s atrocities committed
against Rohingya women in Northern Rakhine.33
Sri Lanka
In Sri Lanka, 64 percent of the workforce (of 8.6 million people) are men.34
Only one every three Sri Lankan women take part in the country’s labour
force.35 The female unemployment rate in Sri Lanka (11 percent) remains
higher than that of their male counterparts (seven percent).36 Political
representation is another key concern, since women make up more than
50 percent overall population, but only 5.3 percent of the parliament.37
Thailand
Bhutan
Despite the bleak data, Bhutan is one of the few BIMSTEC members
that not only focus on attaining the SDGs with a specific focus on Gross
National Happiness (GNH) and carbon neutrality, but has also adopted
the CEDAW without any reservations against Article 10 of the country’s
Constitution.52 The country is also focused on the gendered aspects of
climate change, as rural agriculture becomes heavily dependent on
women during specific seasons.53
Nepal
215
In Nepal 22 percent of women aged 15–49 have experienced gender-
based violence since the age of 15, seven percent of whom have
experienced sexual violence.54 Around 66 percent of women do not seek
assistance against their experienced violence, fear of stigma being the
main deterrent.55
Conclusion
216
Acknowledgement
Endnotes
1
“About BIMSTEC,” BIMSTEC, https://bimstec.org/?page_id=189.
2
Ibid.
3
“Areas of Cooperation,” BIMSTEC, https://bimstec.org/?page_id=199.
4
Ibid.
5
The total population of the females is based on data compiled from,
Asma Akhter and Qumrun Naher Islam, Women and Men in Bangladesh:
Facts and Figures 2018 (Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2019),
http:// bbs.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/ bbs.portal.gov.bd/
page/b343a8b4_956b_45ca_872f_4cf9b2f1a6e0/Women%20and%20
men%20in%20Bangladesh-Facts%20and%20figures%202018.pdf
and, “Population, Female,” Data – The World Bank, https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.IN?end=2018&locations=
MM&start=1960&fbclid=IwAR1qQHZRjhFCAnUtTG5ovY-hXfiOF9_
mdbjsvEWNFafXMVDUJPvUte9Oxb8
6
“Global Gender Gap Report 2020” (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 217
2019), 8, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf
7
Ibid, 29.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid, 30.
10
Ibid, 9.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf.
15
Nawaz Farhin, “Women in Parliament: Only Impressive in Number,”
Dhaka Tribune, 8 March 2018, https://www.dhakatribune.com/
bangladesh/2018/03/08/women-parliament-impressive-number.
16
“Gender Equality,” UNFPA Bangladesh, https://bangladesh.unfpa.
org/en/topics/gender-equality-13.
17
Md Kyser Hamid, “How is Bangladesh faring in gender equality?,”
The Daily Star, 27 May 2019, https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/
perspective/news/how-bangladesh-faring-gender-equality-1749268
18
“UN Women Bangladesh,” UN Women: Asia and the Pacific, https://
asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/countries/bangladesh.
19
“Gender Equality,” UNFPA Bangladesh, op. cit.
20
Ibid.
21
Samara Mortada, “Bangladesh launches first National Action Plan
on women, peace and security as per UN resolutions,” UN Women: Asia
and the Pacific, 23 November 2019, https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/
news-and-events/stories/2020/01/bangladesh-launches-first-national-
action-plan-on-wps.
22
Kai Schultz and Suhashini Raj, “For Indian Women, the Coronavirus
Economy Is a Devastating Setback,” The New York Times, 15 July 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/world/asia/india-coronavirus-
women-economy.html.
23
“Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments (%) –
India,” The World Bank – Data, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SG.GEN.PARL.ZS?locations=IN. Also see, Nandita Bhatla, Sunayana
Walia, Tina Khanna, Ravi Verma, “Opportunities and Challenges of
Women’s Political Participation in India: A Synthesis of Research
218
Findings from Select Districts in India,” International Center for Research
on Women and UN Women, 2012, 7.
24
“Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women,” United Nations Treaty Collection, (New York:
United Nations General Assembly, 18 December 1979), https://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec.
25
Shamika Ravi and Nirupama Jayaraman, “Gender Issues in India:
An Amalgamation of Research,” Brookings India, 10 March 2020,
https://www.brookings.edu/research/gender-issues-in-india-an-
amalgamation-of-research/.
26
“UN Women India,” UN Women: Asia and the Pacific, 4 July 2020,
https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/countries/india.
27
Mollie Pepper, “Ethnic Minority Women, Diversity, and Informal
Participation in Peacebuilding in Myanmar,” Journal of Peacebuilding and
Development, Volume 13, no. 2, July 2018, 61, https://doi.org/10.1080/154
23166.2018.1472030.
28
Ibid, 66.
29
Ibid. Also see, “Gender Equality,” UNFPA Myanmar, https://myanmar.
unfpa.org/en/node/15284.
30
“Women and the Economy in Myanmar: An Assessment of DFAT’s
Private Sector Development Programs” (Australia: Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, January 2016), 5.
31
“About Myanmar,” UN Women: Asia and the Pacific, https://
asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/countries/myanmar/about-myanmar.
32
Myanmar has kept its reservation on Article 29, paragraph 1 of the
CEDAW. For all the declarations, see, “ASEAN Declaration on the Gender-
Responsive Implementation of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025
and Sustainable Development Goals” (Manila: ASEAN, 16 November
2017), https://asean.org/asean-declaration-on-the-gender-responsive-
implementation-of-the-asean-community-vision-2025-and-sustainable-
development-goals/; “Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
against Women in the ASEAN Region” (Jakarta: ASEAN, 12 October
2012), https://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-elimination-
of-violence-against-women-in-the-asean-region-4 and, “Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,” United
219
Nations Treaty Collection, op. cit.
33
Mollie Pepper, op. cit., 62. Also see, “Joint Submission to CEDAW on
Myanmar,” Human Rights Watch, 24 May 2018, https://www.hrw.org/
news/2018/05/24/joint-submission-cedaw-myanmar.
34
“Our Focus: Gender Equity and Equality,” UNDP Sri Lanka, https://
www.lk.undp.org/content/srilanka/en/home/gender-equality.html.
35
“Getting More Sri Lankan Women to Work: It Can Be Done,” The
World Bank, 22 November 2017, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
feature/2017/11/22/Getting-More-Sri-Lankan-Women-to-Work-It-Can-
Be-Done.
36
Vindhya Weeratunga, “Gender Inequality – Is It an Issue in Sri Lanka?”
The Asian Women’s Exchange and Research Forum (KFAW), http://www.
kfaw.or.jp/correspondents/docs/24-3_Sri_Lanka_E.pdf.
37
“Our Focus: Gender Equity and Equality,” UNDP Sri Lanka, op. cit.
38
Ibid.
39
“Sri Lanka commits to update national action plan, and sustain firm
commitment to gender equality and women’s empowerment (updated),”
UN Women: Asia and the Pacific, https://www.unwomen.org/en/get-
involved/step-it-up/commitments/sri-lanka.
40
Vitit Muntarbhorn, “Challenges to Gender Equality in Thailand,” The
Bangkok Post, 8 March 2018, https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/
opinion/1424306/challenges-to-gender-equality-in-thailand.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
“Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages
15+) (modelled ILO estimate),” The World Bank – Data, https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS.
44
“Thailand,” UN Women: Asia and the Pacific, https://asiapacific.
unwomen.org/en/countries/thailand.
45
Unlike Myanmar, Thailand has no reservation on CEDAW. For all
the declarations, see: “ASEAN Declaration on the Gender-Responsive
Implementation of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and Sustainable
Development Goals,” ASEAN, op. cit.; “Declaration on the Elimination
of Violence against Women in the ASEAN Region,” ASEAN, op. cit. and,
“Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women,” United Nations Treaty Collection, op. cit.
220 46
Maren Schindler, “Tackling gender-based violence,” Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung Thailand, 5 December 2017, https://www.fes-asia.org/news/
tackling-gender-based-violence/.
47
“Goal 5: Gender Equality,” UNDP Bhutan, https://www.bt.undp.
org/content/bhutan/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-5-
gender-equality.html.
48
Sonam Chuki and Mark Turner, “Women and politics in democratic
transitions: The case of Bhutan,” Contemporary South Asia, Volume 25,
no.2, May 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2017.1321615.
49
Ibid.
50
“Ending Gender Based Violence to achieve Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs),” UNDP Bhutan, 27 August 2019, https://www.bt.undp.org/
content/bhutan/en/home/stories/ending-gbv-to-end-sdgs.html.
51
Ibid.
52
“Sustainable Development and Happiness: Bhutan’s Voluntary
National Review Report on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development,” Royal Government of Bhutan and
United Nations High Level Political Forum, July 2018, 42-44, https://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/19369Bhutan_
NSDGR_Bhutan_2018.pdf. Also see, “Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,” United Nations Treaty
Collection, op. cit.
53
Ibid.
54
“16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence,” UNFPA Nepal,
25 November 2019, https://nepal.unfpa.org/en/events/16-days-activism-
against-gender-based-violence-2.
55
Ibid.
56
“UN Women Nepal,” UN Women: Asia and the Pacific, https://
asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/countries/nepal.
57
Rita Rai, “Gender Inequality in Nepal: At A Crossroads of Theory and
Practice,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
8 March 2019, https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/gender-equality-
nepal-crossroads-theory-and-practice.
58
Anweshaa Ghosh, Anjam Singh and Shraddha Chigateri, “A
Trapeze Act: Women Balancing Paid Work and Unpaid Care Work
in Nepal,” Technical Report, National Report for Women’s Economic
221
Empowerment Policy and Programming, October 2017, 2, DOI: 10.13140/
RG.2.2.15451.87843
Introduction
I
n the pre-COVID19 era, the increased incidence of trafficking
and undocumented migration of people, and of women and
children in particular, had become an urgent human rights
concern for the countries of BIMSTEC. The routes, methods and
activities of traffickers are organised, with greater penetration of crime
syndicates into trafficking both within and outside the Bay of Bengal
region. The alarming numbers of women and children being trafficked
for forced labour or slavery-like practices (including commercial sexual
exploitation) is a crucial concern for the Bay littorals. Since the statistics
available are limited and contested in nature, it is difficult to create an
exhaustive map of the current situation. Nonetheless, the available data
has managed to draw BIMSTEC’s attention to trafficking issues in the
region.
Considering the dearth of data on the Bay of Bengal region, the 2018
UNODC report can be used to understand the situation in South Asia
and East Asia-Pacific.1 According to the report, of the total trafficked
persons in South Asia,4 women account for 59 percent and men for 37
percent. Of all incidents, trafficking exclusively for sexual exploitation
(50 percent) and trafficking for forced labour (49 percent) are nearly
equal.5 In 2016, 67 percent of the total reported victims of trafficking
in East Asia and the Pacific were women. About 60 percent of these
detected victims were trafficked for sexual exploitation, and 38 percent
for forced labour. In Myanmar, most of the detected victims were
women. In Thailand, there was more trafficking of people for forced
labour than for sexual exploitation, and men accounted for the majority
of trafficked persons. Both these countries reported particularly high
Based on this preliminary data, the next section discusses the severity
of women trafficking in the India–Nepal–Bangladesh zone.
Once these women are trafficked from one country to another, they lose
their rights and become virtually stateless. Some start their journey as
migrant workers but end up in brothels, primarily because there are
no authorised safe channels for women migrant workers to guarantee
their employment and remuneration. In most cases, the migrations
225
occur without any legal or authorised documents. Unskilled female
workers, between the ages of nine and 25 years, constitute the most
vulnerable group in human trafficking.13 Radhika Coomaraswamy’s
report provides important indicators for the possible intersections
between trafficking and migration.14 The growth in migration and
trafficking flows has resulted from a combination of push, pull and
facilitating factors. Illiteracy, poverty, class clashes, natural calamities,
and political and ethnic unrest have all contributed to increasing the
vulnerabilities of marginalised groups and made them susceptible to
gross violations of human rights.15
• Bilateral Responses
At the bilateral level, the India–Bangladesh MoU in 2015 was a
significant move in the two countries’ efforts at preventing human
trafficking. The MoU has focused on three aspects: a) extension of the
definition of people subjected to trafficking; b) repatriation; and c) the
creation of a joint task force. India has been planning to sign similar
MoUs with other neighbouring countries such as Nepal and Myanmar.16
On 27 November 2019, the Union Cabinet of India approved an MoU
between India and Myanmar on bilateral cooperation for the Prevention
of Trafficking in Persons, encompassing rescue, recovery, repatriation
and reintegration of victims of trafficking.17 It was finally exchanged on
27 February 2020, during the state visit of the President of Myanmar.
In Thailand, multiple agencies, including the MSDHS, the Royal Thai
Police, the Immigration Bureau, the Office of the Attorney General, and
226
the Office of the Judiciary, have cooperated with the Myanmar Police
and other relevant agencies to provide assistance for and expedite
the repatriation of Myanmar victims through the reception centre in
Myawaddy, Myanmar.18
• SAARC’s Approach
The signing of the SAARC Convention on Trafficking in 2002 was a
landmark step towards recognising the importance of the issues relating
to cross-border trafficking and undocumented migration. However,
despite being touted as a milestone in coordinating interventions against
trafficking at the regional level, the convention has its limitations. For
one, it defines ‘trafficking’ within the limited scope of “prostitution.”
This definition does not address trafficking from a general perspective
and needs to be broadened.19
• BIMSTEC’s Role
Since its inception, BIMSTEC member states have advocated for
peaceful and progressive development in the region. Subsequently,
the leaders have identified the fight against “terrorism and organised
international crime” as one of the most important prerequisites for
sustainable growth and for maintaining peace in the region. In the
Eighth Ministerial Meeting held at Dhaka, Bangladesh, on 18–19
December 2005, Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC)
was added as one of the priority sectors of BIMSTEC, with India
as the lead. Accordingly, a joint working group (JWG) was formed
including four sub-groups, each with its own lead country: intelligence
sharing (Sri Lanka), financing of terrorism (Thailand), legal and law
enforcement issues (India), and prevention of trafficking in narcotics
and psychotropic substances (Myanmar).
Conclusion
BIMSTEC is still in its nascent stage and yet to finalise its rule of laws.
Therefore, no fruitful steps have yet been taken at the BIMSTEC level
for legal enforcement of laws and regulations to stop human trafficking.
In relation to the countries’ populations, the response level of criminal
justice appears to be limited. For instance, in 2016, countries in South
Asia reported lower conviction rates compared to those in more
populated regions; the situation is similar in BIMSTEC.
Acknowledgement
229
Endnotes
1
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organised Crime and the Protocols Thereto,
(Vienna: UNDOC, 2004). http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/
UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf
2
See GAATW, Collateral Damage: The Impact of Anti-Trafficking
Measures on Human Rights around the World, Global Alliance Against
Traffic in Women (Bangkok: GAATW, 2007); also see Pascale McLean,
“Incomplete Citizenship, Statelessness and Human Trafficking: A
Preliminary Analysis of the Current Situation in West Bengal, India”,
Policies and Practices, Issue No. 38, Calcutta Research Group, Kolkata,
2011,4.
3
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global report on Trafficking
in persons, op.cit,, p.8.The report is based on information collected from
142 countries, encompassing more than 94 per cent of the world’s
230
population. Since 2003, the year of entry into force of the UN protocol
till date UNODC has collected information on about 225,000 victims of
trafficking detected worldwide.
4
Based on information available from Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal and
Pakistan.
5
Based on information on the forms of exploitation for 641 victims of
trafficking detected in above mentioned four countries. Victims detected
were sometimes trafficked for ‘mixed forms of exploitation’, such as
victims exploited both sexually and in forced labour, or exploited in
begging as well as in criminal activity (often carrying out petty crimes).
UNODC report 2018, pp.66-67.
6
UNODC report 2018,,pp. 68-69.
7
Joffres, C., Mills, E., Joffres, M. et al. Sexual slavery without borders:
trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation in India. Int J Equity
Health 7, 22, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1186/1475-9276-7-22
8
Shantanu Guha Ray,” Bengal new epicentre of human trafficking”
Sunday Guardian,14 january2018, at https://www.sundayguardianlive.
com/news/12400-bengal-new-epicentre-human-traffickingL.
9
https://kathmandupost.com/national/2019/08/06/nearly-1-5-
million-nepali-at-risk-of-human-trafficking-while-35-000-trafficked-
last-year-nhrc-report
10
https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/50-women-from-nepal-
are-trafficked-to-india-every-day-1357737-2018-10-07
11
See US State Department report, Trafficking in Person, 2019, p. 129.
https://public-preview-server.prod.cstreetsandbox.com/reports/2019-
trafficking-in-persons-report-2/burma/
12
US State Department report 2019 .
13
National Network against Girl Trafficking repot, Women’s Rights: Its
Challenges and Sensitivity. (Kathmandu: NNAGT, 2002), p. 5.
14
Radhika Coomaraswamy, Report on Trafficking in Women, Women’s
Migration and Violence against Women, 29 February2000. UN Doc. E/
CN.4/2000/68 (The Special Rapporteur’s Report), http://www.unhchr.
ch.html/menu2/7/b/mwom.htm.
15
Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury. “Trafficking of Women and the Crisis of
Identity”, Peace Prints: South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, Vol. 4, No. 1,
2012, p. 8.
231
16
Md Owasim Uddin Bhuyan, Labour migration equals trafficking
in Bangladesh, (NewAge: Dhaka,2019), https://www.newagebd.net/
article/84369/labour-migration-equals-trafficking-in-bangladesh
17
“Cabinet approves MoU signed between India and Myanmar on
bilateral cooperation for Prevention of Trafficking in Persons”, https://
www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/cabinet-approves-mou-signed-
between-india-and-myanmar-on-bilateral-cooperation-for-prevention-
of-trafficking-in-persons/#:~:text=The%20Union%20Cabinet%20
chaired%20by,integration%20of%20victims%20of%20Trafficking.
18
Royal Thai Government Report, Anti-Human Trafficking Efforts
(Bangkok: Royal Thai Government, 2018), p. 29.
19
Basu Ray Chaudhury. “Trafficking of Women and the Crisis of
Identity”,p. 13.
20
National Assembly adopts BIMSTEC Convention”, 5 February 2020,
http://www.bbs.bt/news/?p=127884
21
See Md. Nasir Uddin, Maksuda Khatun Faizer Rahman and Kazi
Wazir Hyder. “BIMSTEC for Countering Terrorism and Transnational
Crime: An Insight from Bangladesh Perspectives “, International Affairs
and Global Strategy, Vol. 39, 2015.
Introduction
T
he COVID-19 pandemic will no doubt have far-reaching,
multifaceted impacts on the geopolitical and geoeconomic
landscape across the globe. As the pandemic recedes
with time and is brought under control once an effective
vaccine becomes available, the world must concentrate on economic
reconstruction. Most countries are likely to turn inwards to revive
national economies and concentrate on healthcare to keep the pandemic
at bay. The first step is to address the issues of inadequate healthcare
support and the public fear of the pandemic, since national economies
are dependent on the quality of human capital. The post-COVID-19
era is also likely to witness a churning of the international order, as
China’s expansionist role and hegemonic aspirations lead to strategic
realignments.
For the economic revival of nations, the imperatives are food security,
healthcare, re-skilling of the workforce, and generating employment.
This will require cooperation at the national, regional and international
levels. In the current international situation, however, it is uncertain
whether the big powers will cooperate in the fight against the pandemic.
With nations looking inwards and relying more on national resources
instead of global cooperation, PM Modi announced his government’s
mission, “Atmanirbhar Bharat,” along the same lines as “Make in India.”
The policy can be interpreted to have various elements: self-reliance, local
manufacturing, and reducing imports.2 At the same time, however, it runs
the risk of being viewed as reflective of India’s lack of trust in regional
cooperation; this can have a dampening effect on regional organisations
like BIMSTEC. To combat this notion, India has declared that it is not
retreating into protectionism or autarky and will actively seek foreign
investments and linkages with global value chains, which have become
the backbone of global manufacturing.
For the first time in 18 years, India has recorded a trade surplus in June
2020, which is symptomatic of a contracting economy and declining
demand. While discussing how reopening from lockdown can lead to
uncertain recovery of the economy, the Chief Economist of the IMF said,
“Over 75 percent of countries are now reopening at the same time as
the pandemic is intensifying in many emerging market and developing
economies. Several countries have started to recover. However, in the
absence of a medical solution, the strength of the recovery is highly
uncertain and the impact on sectors and countries uneven.”4
234
65 Thailand 0.60
Further, UNESCAP has highlighted that the first track amongst several
responses to COVID-19 must be the protection and building of human
capital, particularly for vulnerable groups. BIMSTEC must therefore
start planning programmes for human capital development in the sectors
selected for cooperation.
6. Fisheries: Thailand
7. Agriculture: Myanmar
8. Public Health: Thailand
9. Poverty Alleviation: Nepal
10. Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime: India
11. Environment and Disaster Management: India
12. People-to-People Contact: Thailand
13. Cultural Cooperation: Bhutan
14. Climate Change: Bangladesh8
In the context of the changing global order and the disruption caused
by COVID-19, China will seek to undermine regional organisations, as
it attempts to expand its hegemonic envelope and build a China-centric
Asian order. Several nations and organisations have now started to push
back. The World Health Assembly has voted unanimously to investigate
the origin of the COVID-19 virus and China’s role in the pandemic, much
to China’s chagrin. The recent Russia–India–China virtual meeting of
foreign ministers ended without the customary joint statement. The
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS are likely to be
the next casualties, since Brazil, India and Russia have been amongst the
countries worst hit by COVID-19.9 BIMSTEC must consider the challenge
posed by China and take steps to counterbalance its role in undermining
regional cooperation through bilateral incentives to member countries
such as Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand.
Post-COVID Roadmap
In light of the pandemic and the issues associated with it, BIMSTEC
238
must review whether or not to continue cooperation in all 14 sectors.
For now, the organisation could focus on sectors that contribute directly
to economic revival in member countries. During the 16th meeting of
BIMSTEC Ministers in August 2018, the foreign ministers of Bangladesh
and Thailand had underlined the importance of prioritising some sectors,
since progress across them has been uneven.
Endnotes
1
Kaustuv Chakrabarti, “India’s medical emergency during COVID19
through South South Cooperation,” Expert Speak, Observer Research
Foundation, 9 July 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/
indias-medical-diplomacy-during-covid19-through-south-south-
cooperation-69456/ .
2
V.S Seshadri, “Aatma Nirbhar Bharat Abhiyan and the Trade Factor.”
DPG Policy Brief, Volume V, Issue 25, (New Delhi: Delhi Policy Group, 30
June 2020), p. 2, https://www.delhipolicygroup.org/publication/policy-
briefs/aatma-nirbhar-bharat-abhiyan-and-the-trade-factor.html.
3
Rohan Venkataramakrishnan, “Modi government boasts of a trade
surplus – even though it is actually terrible news for the economy,” 18
July 2020, https://scroll.in/article/967800/modi-government-boasts-
of-a-trade-surplus-even-though-it-is-actually-terrible-news-for-the-
economy.
240 4
Gita Gopinath, “Reopening from the Great Lockdown: Uneven
and Uncertain Recovery,” International Monetary Fund,24 June
2020, https://blogs.imf.org/2020/06/24/reopening-from-the-great-
lockdown-uneven-and-uncertain-recovery/.
5
Syed Akbaruddin, “Pandemic accentuates challenges to global order.
New framework is needed, India must be rule-shaper,” The Indian
Express, 2 July 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/
columns/antonio-guterres-united-nations-coronavirus-pandemic-syed-
akbaruddin-6485727/.
6
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30498
7
“Socio-economic Response to Covid-19: ESCAP Framework,”
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (Bangkok: United
Nations, 20 May 2020), https://www.unescap.org/resources/socio-
economic-response-covid-19-escap-framework .
8
“BIMSTEC Priority Sectors,” Areas of Cooperation, (Bangkok,
Thailand: BIMSTEC, 2014-2020), https://bimstec.org/?page_id=199 .
9
Rahul Mishra and Raj kumar Sharma, “Taking
down BRICS,” The Indian Express, 30 June 2020,
h t t p s :// i n d i a n ex p re s s.c o m /a r t i c l e /o p i n i o n / t a k i n g- d ow n -
brics-6483623/.
10
“Report of the Sixteenth BIMSTEC Ministerial Meeting,”
Document No. BIMSTEC/MM/16/2008/05 (Kathmandu: BIMSTEC,
29 August 2008), 8-28, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gNzcfzLOq_
sSJvcriCA2p0k0SlMzMV7j/view .
11
https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1939416/7-secrets-
of-thai-covid-19-success
12
Pratnashree Basu and Nilanjan Ghosh, “Breathing New Life into
BIMSTEC: Challenges and Imperatives,” Occasional Paper No. 243,
(New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2020), https://www.
orfonline.org/research/breathing-new-life-into-bimstec-challenges-
and-imperatives-65229/
241
ENHANCING TRADE
Enhancing Trade in the
BIMSTEC Region
T
he Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) was established
in June 1997 through the Bangkok Declaration as a bridge
between South and Southeast Asia. Among the BIMSTEC’s
seven member states, Myanmar and Thailand are also members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), while Bangladesh,
Bhutan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka are also members of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). BIMSTEC was
established to create an enabling environment for rapid economic
development. The aim is to establish a foundation for common action
in trade, investment, technological exchange and other interrelated
sectors through a spirit of equality and partnership, thereby contributing
to peace, progress and prosperity in the region.1 Of the 14 areas of
cooperation, trade and investment promotion constitutes the core of
BIMSTEC cooperation.
domestic production (GDP). The average per capita GDP was US$2,191,
with Thailand, Sri Lanka and Bhutan above the average. The BIMSTEC
countries had an average of 6.6 percent GDP growth rate; among them,
Bangladesh had the highest growth (7.9 percent) and Bhutan had the
lowest growth (2.3 percent).3
In 2018, India had the highest trade share among all BIMSTEC members
(40.26 percent), while Bhutan had the lowest (2.11 percent). India also
had the highest trade share in BIMSTEC’s global trade (55.42 percent)
244
while Bhutan had the lowest (0.16 percent). At the same time, 85.71
percent of Bhutan’s trade was with the BIMSTEC region (the highest),
while only 4.30 percent of Thailand’s trade was intra-regional
(the lowest).6
In the same year, out of Bangladesh’s total trade with the other BIMSTEC
countries, 87 percent was with India and 10 percent with Thailand, with
the remaining 3 percent with the others. Of Bhutan’s total trade with the
BIMSTEC region, 81 percent was with India, 15 percent with Bangladesh
and the rest with the other member states. Of Myanmar’s total trade with
the BIMSTEC states, 77 percent was with Thailand, 21 percent with
India, and rest with the others. For Nepal, 97 percent of intra-regional
trade was with India. For Sri Lanka, 86 percent of BIMSTEC-wide
trade was with India, 10 percent with Thailand, and the remaining with
the other countries. Out of Thailand’s total trade with the BIMSTEC,
57 percent was with India, 34 percent with Myanmar, and the other
countries making up the remaining 9 percent. Similarly, of India’s total
intra-regional trade, 32 percent was with Thailand, 26 percent with
Bangladesh, 20 percent with Nepal, 16 percent with Sri Lanka, 4 percent
with Myanmar and 2 percent with Bhutan.8
India is the top trading partner for five other BIMSTEC member states
(Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand), while Thailand is
India and Myanmar’s top trading partner. At the same time, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka have few trade engagements
with each other.
The BIMSTEC Free Trade Area (FTA) framework agreement was signed
in February 2004, and included six constituent agreements—Agreement
on Trade in Goods, Agreement on Trade in Services, Agreement on
Investment, Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in
Customs Matters, Agreement on Rules of Origin and Operational
Certification Procedures, and Agreement on Trade Facilitation.11
BIMSTEC tariff reduction is divided into fast and normal tracks and two
categories, developing countries (India, Sri Lanka and Thailand) and
least developed countries (LDCs; Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar and
Nepal). It also recognises that LDCs in the region need to be accorded
special and differential treatment given their development needs. Some
products are listed in the negative list and will see no tariff reduction. The
trade negotiating committee (TNC) held its first meeting in September
2004 and has several working groups to assist in the negotiations,
including those on rules of origin, trade in services, investment, and
Trade Facilitation.12
247
The TNC has held 21 rounds of negotiations to finalise constituent
agreements under the BIMSTEC FTA but has been unable to conclude
any deal due to a lack of consensus on important issues. At the 21st
meeting in 2018, several core elements related to the Agreement on Trade
in Goods, its rules of origin and product specific rules were agreed upon.13
In 2017, the average tariff rate in intra-regional trade in South Asia was 6.8
percent, which was higher than in ASEAN (2.7 percent), Latin America
(1.1 percent), Sub-Saharan Africa (3.1 percent), transition economies
(0.4 percent), and West Asia and North Africa (1.9 percent).15 Non-tariff
barriers and issues such as a lack of connectivity and infrastructure,
high transaction costs, complex customs procedures and huge informal
cross-border trade are obstacles to smooth intra-regional trade. Various
domestic compulsions have also prolonged the trade negotiations. The
BIMSTEC tariff reduction list is wider than other agreements, and some
member states appear to be apprehensive of losing customs revenue and
significant harm to domestic industries if the FTA is implemented.16
Tariffs are no longer the major barrier to intra-regional trade, but the cost
and time to trade remain relatively high.17 Tariffs have reduced as a result
of global, regional and bilateral agreements, and no longer appear to be the
major barrier to trade in BIMSTEC. Instead, it is the non-tariff barriers
that are the main cause for dismal intra-regional trade in the region.18 The
FTA will grant all BIMSTEC member states greater market access since
it connects South Asia, one of the least economically integrated regions,
and Southeast Asia, one of the most integrated regions.
Conclusion
At the Fourth BIMSTEC Summit in 2018, the countries called for the
early conclusion of the FTA negotiations, and directed the BIMSTEC
Trade and Economic Ministerial Meeting and its subsidiary bodies,
including the TNC, to expedite the finalisation of the deal. The member
states must now match their words with action.
250
Endnotes
1
“Declaration on the Establishment of The Bangladesh-India-Sri
Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIST-EC),” Basic Documents
(Bangkok: BIMSTEC, 6 June 1997), 1-2, https://drive.google.com/file/
d/0B8Fv9wDGJqx2NkJTVzlZek5va0U/view.
2
Ellen L. Frost, “It’s Time to Deepen Integration around the Bay
of Bengal,” (New Delhi: Carnegie India, 31 May 2017), 1, https://
carnegieendowment.org/files/5.31.2017_Frost_Bay_of_Bengal_Web.pdf.
3
Calculated by the author based on “World Development Indicators,”
The World Bank, accessed 10 June 2020, https://databank.worldbank.
org/source/world-development-indicators.
4
Calculated by the author based on “Direction of Trade Statistics
(DOTS),” International Monetary Fund, accessed 12 June 2020, https://
data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B85.
5
World Trade Organization, World Trade Statistical Review 2019,
(Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2020), 55, https://www.wto.org/ 251
english/res_e/statis_e/wts2019_e/wts2019_e.pdf
6
Calculated by the author based on International Monetary Fund data
7
Calculated by the author based on International Monetary Fund data
8
Calculated by the author based on International Monetary Fund data
9
Calculated by the author based on International Monetary Fund data
10
“Regional Trade Agreements Database,” World Trade
Organization, last updated 17 August 2020, http://rtais.wto.org/UI/
PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx.
11
“Trade and Investment,” Areas of Cooperation, BIMSTEC, last
updated 13 May 2018, https://bimstec.org/?page_id=264.
12
“Report of the Twenty-First Meeting of the BIMSTEC Trade
Negotiating Committee,” Document no. BIMSTEC/TNC/21/2018/13
(Dhaka: BIMSTEC Secretariat, 19 November 2018).
13
Ibid.
14
“Trade and Investment,” Areas of Cooperation, BIMSTEC, op. cit.
15
“Key Statistics and Trends in Trade Policy 2018,” United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, 2019, 13, https://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/ditctab2019d1_en.pdf.
16
Jayshree Sengupta, “BIMSTEC-FTA: A New Hope for Enhanced
Regional Trade,” ORF Issue Brief, Issue No. 198, Observer Research
Foundation, September 2017, 4, https://www.orfonline.org/research/
bimstec-fta-new-hope-enhanced-regional-trade/.
17
A. Didar Singh, “Rationale for a BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement,”
DPG Regional Brief, Volume III, Issue 15, Delhi Policy Group, 27 August
2018, 4, https://www.delhipolicygroup.org/uploads_dpg/publication_
file/rationale-for-a-bimstec-free-trade-agreement-1112.pdf.
18
Prabir De and Suthiphand Chirathivat, “Strengthening BIMSTEC
Integration: The New Agenda,” in Twenty Years of BIMSTEC Promoting
Regional Cooperation and Integration in the Bay of Bengal Region, ed.
Prabir De (New Delhi: KW Publisher Pvt Ltd, 2018), 277.
19
“COVID-19 and South Asia: National Strategies and Sub-regional
Cooperation for Accelerating Inclusive, Sustainable and Resilient
Recovery,” COVID-19 Response and United Nations Economic and Social
252
Commission for Asia and Pacific, 25 June 2020, 23, https://www.unescap.
org/sites/default/files/South%20Asia%20Covid-19%20Paper_5.pdf.
Suthiphand Chirathivat
T
he Mediterranean Sea and the Bay of Bengal are among
the oldest waterways in the world, and are vital lanes for
trade, tradition and the exchange of ideas and civilisation.1
However, the Bay of Bengal is less known than the
Mediterranean, despite having modern states in its littoral periphery
such as India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand and Malaysia,
and Indonesia’s Sumatra.
Changing Landscape
India, the biggest economy in the grouping, is still trying to develop its
manufacturing sector and to link it to global and regional value chains,
with limited results. Without boosting its manufacturing sector, it will
be difficult for India to develop into a service- or tech-based economy.
Despite having a world-class garment manufacturing sector, Bangladesh
seems to be caught with red-tapeism and enacting reforms to attract
investment to diversify beyond apparels. And Sri Lanka, Nepal and
Bhutan, despite a concerted, whole-of-government push to boost trade
and investment levels, have not yet been able to create a suitable domestic
environment for manufacturers. Myanmar, which joined ASEAN in the
late 1990s, is still far behind other countries in the grouping in terms of
attracting manufacturing investment and creating value chains, despite
its geographical closeness to BIMSTEC countries. Only Thailand, the
second largest ASEAN economy, has successful embarked on a pathway
255
to long-lasting broad-based prosperity by building on a manufacturing
sector linked to global and regional value chains. However, the country is
yet to develop on the technological and digital ladder. Nonetheless, it still
has little linkages to the BIMSTEC region as far as its production base is
concerned. Thailand’s intra-regional trade within ASEAN is far greater
than its intra-regional trade within BIMSTEC. Interestingly, Thailand’s
trade with China alone is equivalent to ASEAN-India trade in 2019.5
This showcases the importance of intra-regional trade and production
linkages.
BIMSTEC must seize the moment and show tangible targets and results
through an increased focus on crucial areas of cooperation—trade
and investment, connectivity, energy, people-to-people exchanges,
counterterrorism and the Blue Economy—alongside the enhanced
institutional capacity of its secretariat. BIMSTEC must stamp out an
FTA, even if it is limited in scope. The Thailand-proposed “Connecting
the Connectivities” for ASEAN12 could also serve well for BIMSTEC,
much like the pending BIMSTEC Coastal Shipping Agreement, which
aims to connect BIMSTEC members through a network of ports running
in the Bay of Bengal, amid other attempts to connect the region.13
The region is also rich in maritime and territorial biodiversity. The whole
258
BIMSTEC area offers a great chance to produce and trade products and
services that cater to the wellness of the people. In addition, cross-border
e-commerce and digital transformation can be carefully exploited in
ways that are suitable, inclusive and sustainable for economies, people
and societies. BIMSTEC trade and development should be linked to
improving social justice and equality and environmental conditions in
whichever way the grouping decides to move forward to boost regional
cooperation and integration.
Endnotes
1
F. Braudel , La Méditerranée : L’ espace et histoire, (Champs
histoire :Flammarion, 1985); Sunil Amrith, Crossing the Bay of Bengal : The
Furies of Nature and the Fortune of Migrants, (Cambridge, Massachuetts:
Harvard University Press, 2003).
2
Amitav Acharya ,“Can Asia lead: Power ambitions and global
governance in the twenty-first century,” International Affairs, 87, 4, 2011,
851-869.
3
Remarks by K. Georgieva, IMF Managing Director, held at the IMF
Annual Meeting, October 2019.
4
Calculated by the author based on “World Development Indicators,”
The World Bank, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-
development-indicators
5
Thailand’s intra-ASEAN trade is more than 25% while that of
BIMSTEC is around 5%. And Thailand’s trade with China is more than
USD 90 billion in 2019. 259
6
See Yuki Fukuoka, “SUPPLY CHAIN TRANSFORMATION
UNDERWAY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA”, https://www.mitsui.com/mgssi/
en/report/detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2020/09/18/2008c_fukuoka_e.pdf
7
A. Didar Singh, “Rational for a BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement,”June
2018, https://www.delhipolicygroup.org/uploads_dpg/publication_file/
rationale-for-a-bimstec-free-trade-agreement-1112.pdf
8
Prabir De and Suthiphand Chirathivat (eds.), New Challenges to
ASEAN-India Economic Partnership, (New Delhi, India: KW Publisher,
2017).
9
R. Baldwin, The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the
New Globalization, (Harvard, USA: Harvard University Press, 2018).
10
UNCTAD, World Investment Report2020, (New York: United Nations,
2020), https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2020_
en.pdf.
11
P. De and S. Chirathivat (2018), “Strengthening BIMSTEC Integration:
The New Agenda”, in P. De (Edited), Twenty Years of BIMSTEC:
Promoting Regional Cooperation and Integration in the Bay of Bengal
Region, BIMSTEC Secretariat, Dhaka.
12
“ASEAN in 2019: Thailand’s Chairmanship,” Keynote Speech by
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, 21 November
2018 at a meeting on Asean Thailand 2019: Advancing pernership for
sustainability, http://newdelhi.thaiembassy.org/en/2018/11/asean-
2019-thailands-chairmanship/#:~:text=That%20is%20why%20
Thailand%20is,ASEAN%20Connectivity%2C%20or%20MPAC%20
2025.&text=It%20is%20impossible%20for%20any,ASEAN’s%20
challenges%20in%20one%20year
13
Nazia Hussain, “Can BIMSTEC Finally Become Relevant?,” The
Diplomat,2 November , 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/can-
bimstec-finally-become-relevant/
260
Nilanjan Ghosh
T
he last few years have seen a sudden spurt in mentions of
the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), an international
organisation of seven South and Southeast Asian nations (Sri
Lanka, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand) in
various policy discussions. This marks a clear departure from the nearly
two-decade-long slumber since the formation of the institution in 1997.
Prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, two major geopolitical
forces were seen as the enabling factor for the sudden rise in BIMSTEC’s
importance—first, a need for an alternate institutional mechanism due
to uncertainty in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
resulting from aggravation in India-Pakistan relations; and second,
the ascendance of China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).1
However, with COVID-19 and the consequent lockdowns crippling the
global economy, BIMSTEC, as a regional grouping, must be evaluated
from a different perspective in light of ways in which regionalism will
be looked at.
loom large across the region in the context of India’s souring relations
with the former; bigger member-nations’ lack of manouverability with
domestic policies for broader regional goals that become a stiff challenge
in a federal democracy like India; and combatting the threats of global
warming and climate change in the Bay.4 However, there is a fifth force
of threat that has emerged recently—the COVID-19 pandemic. The
pandemic is a new challenge to regionalism, with borders getting sealed
and economies getting insulated. Nevertheless, trade and investment
within the BIMSTEC bloc is a critical force in enabling regionalism and
regional development.
T_ij=X_ij/X_it ÷ X_wj/X_wt
where Tij is the trade intensity index, Xij and Xwj represent the values of
country i’s exports and of world exports to country j, and where Xit and
Xwt are country i’s total exports and total world exports, respectively. An
index of more (or less) than one indicates a bilateral trade flow that is
larger (or smaller) than expected, given the partner country’s importance
in world trade. In other words, while measuring the ratio of a country or
region’s trade share to the share of world trade with a partner, the trade
intensity index also indicates the potential for trade growth when the
ratio is less than unity.
This inference can be drawn even though the FTA will not be an unmixed
blessing and will have variable results with disproportionate benefits for
member countries. However, keeping with the axiom of monotonicity of
The BIMSTEC FTA is significant for India given that it has withdrawn
from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)
negotiations for many reasons. First is the presence of China, for which
the RCEP fits well in its market imperialistic designs. The recent souring
of ties between the two countries over the COVID-19 pandemic and
tensions at the border have triggered protectionist responses from India
through the creation of trade, investment and market barriers.
Third, most of the RCEP partners have a higher rank than India in terms
of the ease-of-doing-business index, except for Cambodia, Laos and the
Philippines. India has among the lowest manufacturing productivity
and transaction costs of doing business are still high due to compliance
costs of irrationalised GST and labour laws, both of which need further
reform.8 In that sense, the RCEP partners are in better positions than
India to attract investment.
However, these factors do not exist for BIMSTEC. There is enough reason
for India to take a leadership role in the context of creating a BIMSTEC
free trade area, where essentially even joint endeavours need to be taken
to create a better investment climate. What seems to be pulling India back
is the belief that there may not be much for it to gain from a BIMSTEC
FTA since it is already a major player in regional trade. India’s response,
therefore, has been a bit lukewarm and slow but not deterring.9
What are the implications of such results for BIMSTEC at a time when
the world economy is reeling under the impacts of the pandemic?
The short-run impacts on the global and regional economies will
be as negative as expected. The global economy is witnessing rising
Conclusion
Endnotes
1
Nilanjan Ghosh “Time for BIMSTEC to realise potential”, Mail Today,
February 17. 2020, https://epaper.mailtoday.in/c/49078245
2
Pratnashree Basu and Nilanjan Ghosh. “Breathing New Life into
BIMSTEC: Challenges and Imperatives”, Occasional Paper 243,
Observer Research Foundation, April 27, 2020, https://www.orfonline.
org/research/ breathing-new-life-into-bimstec-challenges-and-
imperatives-65229/
3
Basu and Ghosh. “Breathing New Life into BIMSTEC”
4
A. Anurag Danda, Nilanjan Ghosh, Jayanta Bandyopadhyay, and
Sugata Hazra ““Managed Retreat: Adaptation to Climate Change in
the Sundarbans ecoregion in the Bengal Delta”, Journal of Indian
Ocean Region, August 12, 2019, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/19480881.2019.1652974?af=R&journalCode=rior20
5
Janaka Wijayasiri, “Challenges to a BIMSTEC FTA-A Sri Lankan
Perspective” in BIMSTEC: The Road Ahead, Research and Information 269
System for Developing Countries, 2016, http://www.ris.org.in/sites/
default/files/BIMSTEC%20Report%20%283%29.pdf
6
Wijayasiri, “Challenges to a BIMSTEC FTA”
7
Nilanjan Ghosh. “Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership:
Issues and Concerns for India”, in World Trade and India: Multilateralism,
Progress and Policy Response, eds. Ajitava Raychaudhury, Prabir De and
Suranjan Gupta (New Delhi: Sage Publishers, 2020)
8
Ghosh “Time for BIMSTEC to realise potential”
9
“Implementation of Free Trade Agreement can help grow intra-
BIMSTEC trade: Official,” Economic Times, September 24, 2018,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/
implementation-of-free-trade-agreement-can-help-grow-intra-
bimstec-trade-official/articleshow/65932903.cms?from=mdr
10
Tan Khee Giap, Sasidaran Gopalan, Anuja Tandon, and Tan Kong
Yam. Annual Competitiveness and Growth Slowdown Analysis for Sub-
National Economies of India. (Singapore: Asia Competitiveness Institute,
National University of Singapore, 2016).
11
Nilanjan Ghosh, Soumya Bhowmick, and Roshan Saha “SDG Index
and Ease of Doing Business in India: A sub-national study”, Occasional
Paper 199, Observer Research Foundation, June 17, 2019, https://www.
orfonline.org/research/sdg-index-and-ease-of-doing-business-in-india-
a-sub-national-study-52066/
12
Estiaque Bari, “Value Chains in BIMSTEC Region: Current Status,
Possibilities and Challenges,” Policy Brief No. 10, Centre for Policy
Dialogue, May 2018, http://hdl.handle.net/11540/8888
13
Basu and Ghosh. “Breathing New Life into BIMSTEC”.
14
Samir Saran. “For BIMSTEC to work, fix BBIN first”, Observer
Research Foundation, August 30, 2018, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-
speak/43735-for-bimstec-to-work-fix-bbin-first/,
15
Amartya Sen, “A better society can emerge from the lockdowns,”
Financial Times, April 15, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/5b41ffc2-
270
7e5e-11ea-b0fb-13524ae1056b
THE INDO-PACIFIC
The Bay of Bengal in the
Emerging Indo-Pacific
C. Raja Mohan
Abstract
T
his essay looks beyond the institutional dimension of the
BIMSTEC forum, which was set up in the late 1990s and
is now the focus of renewed political attention, especially
in India. It analyses the growing strategic significance
of the Bay of Bengal region, the geographic focus of the BIMSTEC
initiative, within the new and increasingly contested geography of
the Indo-Pacific. Structured in three parts, this chapter examines the
historic evolution of the littoral, its historic location at the heart of the
Indo-Pacific, and the unfolding challenges to regionalism in the Bay of
Bengal.
Historic Evolution
Geographically, the Bay of Bengal is a placid sea, but for the seasonal
cyclones that disturb life in the littoral. It is almost a closed sea with just
three countries bordering its northern reaches—Burma, Bangladesh
and India. The northern waters of the Bay are also far from the main
sea lines of communication. The region has not seen any serious great
power rivalries or major conflicts in the recent past. However, it is
poised to become, once again, a zone of geopolitical rivalry. But first to
the past.
The Indo-Pacific
Throughout the ancient times, the Bay of Bengal was the natural
connector between the subcontinent and the abutting regions to the
east, right up to the southern coast of China. There was extensive
movement of people, goods and ideas across the Bay of Bengal, which
enriched the civilisations along this littoral, for instance, the spread
of Hinduism and Buddhism, followed later by Islam. The trading
communities along the subcontinent’s coast were instrumental in this
movement. With the rise of European capitalism and the revolution in
maritime capabilities, distant powers gained dominance in the littoral.
Intense competition amongst the European powers—France, Britain,
Russia, Austria, Hungary, Germany (then Prussia)—for the resources
and markets of the region eventually led to the colonisation of the Bay of
Bengal territories and beyond. The rivalries among the European great
powers ended after the Napoleonic Wars in the early 19th century with
the triumph of Great Britain. The Dutch and French rivals accepted the
British primacy, and the geopolitical accommodations made amongst
them endured until the middle of the 20th century. The rise of Japan
in the early 20th century as a great power and the growth of Asian
273
nationalism helped unravel the European imperial project in Asia. The
19th century, however, saw the political and administrative integration
of the subcontinent into a coherent territorial entity under the British
Raj. This, in turn, allowed the more purposeful political and strategic
direction of the subcontinent’s massive material and manpower
resources.
The primacy of the Raj in the littoral was threatened briefly during the
First World War, when the German cruiser Emden spread mayhem in
the waters of the Bay of Bengal. That brief interlude presaged the kind
of challenges that would eventually undo the Raj. During the Second
World War, a rising Japan ousted Britain from Malaya and Burma—
reaching the eastern land gates of the Raj, occupying the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands, and setting up a provisional Indian government
in Port Blair. The Raj needed all the resources of the Subcontinent and
assistance from afar to reverse the Japanese occupation of South-East
Asia and its ingress towards India. If the Indian Army swelled to more
than two million soldiers in the Second World War, nearly 800,000
troops had to be deployed to the so-called Burma-China-India (BCI)
theatre.
The Allied triumph in the Bay of Bengal at great cost and the enormous
sacrifices of the people of the Subcontinent faded from the memory
amidst the region’s shifting power alignment, the wave of decolonisation,
and major internal changes in some of the key littoral nations. The
massive battles in the BCI theatre are now called the “forgotten war.”
The Bay of Bengal did not return to its status as the British lake and
simply disappeared from the geopolitical and geoeconomic view in the
second half of the 20th century. It was only at the turn of the 21st century
that the Bay regained some strategic salience.
The decline in the importance of the Bay of Bengal was based largely on
three factors rooted in the internal politics of the littoral.
274
The situation began to change at the turn to the 21st century. India’s
economic reforms launched in the 1990s began to produce substantive
growth by the turn of the new millennium. Other countries in the region,
too, have embarked on upward trajectories, especially Bangladesh and
Sri Lanka, making South Asia the fastest-growing region in the 21st
century. The opening up of Burma across the littoral and its integration
into South-East Asian structures has provided the basis for overland
and maritime links in the Bay of Bengal.
China is not the only country dependent on the Malacca Straits for energy
and commerce. The other leading economies in the east, i.e. Korea and
Japan, are deeply dependent on the few channels connecting the Indian
and Pacific Oceans. Japan, which had historic links to Burma and has
invested in the modernisation of South-East Asian infrastructure, is
now keen on promoting subregional cooperation in the Bay of Bengal.
Meanwhile, India’s growing commercial engagement with East Asian
countries has raised Delhi’s stakes in the partnership with the region.
The oil-producing countries of the Gulf and the mineral-rich African
states, which had traditionally looked to the West, are now looking east
276
to India and China.
As the new spatial concept of the Indo-Pacific gains traction, the Bay
of Bengal is emerging as geographically central. Coupled with the new
outward orientation of the littoral and its rapid economic growth, the
region is overcoming its fragmentation in the second half of the 20th
century and finding ways to reconnect. Fortunately, the littoral has not
had the kind of intense territorial disputes that have roiled the waters
in the adjacent waters of the South China Sea. Moreover, Dhaka’s
initiative has addressed the maritime territorial disputes between India,
Bangladesh and Burma through international arbitration, fostering a
positive environment for building a regional community in the Bay of
Bengal. This opportune moment, however, appears to be slipping away
amidst the renewed rivalry among the major powers and the competing
visions of regionalism.
278
Gareth Price
I
n recent years, the Bay of Bengal, in the eastern Indian Ocean, has
become central to the emerging conception of the Indo-Pacific.
This has urged a discussion on further expanding BIMSTEC.
However, considering the disparities in size, threat perceptions,
and economic heft between the member states, the grouping must first
focus on more parochial, mutually beneficial “successes,” whether
geographically or into a more politically minded bloc.
The most successful military alliance in the recent past has been the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), its members brought
together by a shared belief in liberal democracy and, more importantly, a
clear and present threat to those values in the form of the Soviet Union.
BIMSTEC’s members share similar political systems; do they have a
shared threat? As recent clashes between Indian and Chinese troops in
the Himalayas demonstrated, the tension between India and China is
both real and current, and India shares with the US, and several countries
in the South China Sea, similar concerns about China’s intentions,
both immediately and in the long term. However, other members have
different approaches and several are willing to benefit from Chinese
investment. Since smaller countries have been long used to navigating
between great-power machinations, they view the seemingly inevitable
rise of China not as a threat but as either a challenge to be surmounted or
an opportunity to be taken.
The Indo-Pacific
Asia has many regional groupings, with most sharing common challenges.
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is
perhaps the most extreme example. While SAARC was established at a
time of relative goodwill between India and Pakistan, the two countries
had far from sorted their fundamental disagreements. Thus, this attempt
to recreate the European Union (EU) in South Asia was doomed from the
start. Consequently, since around 2016, SAARC has effectively been put
in abeyance.
The history of the EU, however, holds lessons for other organisations,
including BIMSTEC. Notably, the EU emerged from the European
Coal and Steel Community. Its visionary founders saw coal and steel
as areas where cooperation could prove its worth, in turn encouraging
countries to invest their time and effort in developing further areas
where cooperation could be mutually beneficial. The EU is exemplary of
how proving the worth of international cooperation is a necessary pre-
condition for strengthening political cooperation.
280
This reframes the challenge for BIMSTEC. If it is to evolve into a
geostrategic reality, what would be its equivalent to the EU’s coal and
steel? It is worth adding a caveat here. At both regional and global levels,
there are various challenges and opportunities. Even as the world is
becoming increasingly fragmented, dealing with global challenges is best
done at a global rather than regional level. The lack of a global response
to the COVID-19 crisis is an obvious case in point. At the regional
level, however, BIMSTEC must find a unique selling point with regard
to the issues it chooses to address. This need is intensified by the fact
that Myanmar and Thailand are members of ASEAN, which, while not
without its critics, certainly offers a stronger regional sense of purpose.
Thus, it is important to factor in the capacity constraints of the officials
of BIMSTEC member states to understand whether their time would be
best served by focusing on BIMSTEC, instead of other regional or global
organisations.
A few years ago, when power cuts due to load-shedding was a frequent
occurrence, the idea of a regional electricity grid would have seemed
fanciful. However, such a grid is now slowly emerging amongst the
BBIN countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal). Thus, mutual
benefit (e.g. through trade in goods or power) should serve to build
trust, and there are countless examples where it has done exactly that.
In this context, India is by far the largest country in BIMSTEC. This
is problematic, since smaller countries frequently do not see “mutual
benefit” in engagements with larger neighbours. They see it instead as
reliance and, therefore, vulnerability. The emergence of a (kind of ) BBIN
grid demonstrates how to gradually increase engagement and, with India
as both an upstream and downstream neighbour, build trust. Extending
energy connectivity across BIMSTEC would provide significant impetus
to the organisation’s trajectory.
A further caveat for BIMSTEC would be to note that there are regional
sensitivities between its member states. For instance, finding a solution
for the Rohingya crisis—perhaps by providing a friendly forum for
281
discussions between Bangladesh and Myanmar—would help the
grouping’s case immensely. However, it seems unlikely that Myanmar
would accede to such a proposal. Man-made disasters are frequently too
sensitive for regional organisations, certainly those intent on exercising
and demonstrating their “sovereignty.”
To some extent, BIMSTEC’s USP lies in its name: the Bay of Bengal
Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. The
Indian Ocean is one of the world’s least governed spaces. As an integral
part of that, could BIMSTEC members formulate a set of rules to govern
maritime activities in the Bay of Bengal and manage the challenges
emanating from its waters?
Even as BIMSTEC members compete over fishing, these nations are also
threatened by large trawlers from outside of the region, particularly from
China. In the future, if BIMSTEC morphs into a platform for geostrategic
discussion, forging a common position, or standard operating procedures,
283
for their fishers would be a good place to start. This would strengthen the
negotiating position of BIMSTEC nations in the event of a confrontation
with China on overfishing. Successfully “resolving” the issue of fishers’
rights in the Bay of Bengal could become a template for BIMSTEC, to be
up-scaled for the wider Indian Ocean Region.
284
Introduction
S
ince its inception, BIMSTEC has carefully nurtured the shared
past of the Bay of Bengal to consolidate its membership and
validate its rationale by imbibing a sense of community within
the organisation.1 According to the constructivist school of
thought, “regions” are constructed and reconstructed over time, based on
ideational factors such as shared history and identities.2 Indeed, the Bay
had once been a “nation unto itself,”3 a fluid world linked through cultural
and commercial ties and continuous migrations. This was one of the
foundational pillars of BIMSTEC, as seen in the Bangkok Declaration.4
In recent years, the need to enhance this sense of community has gained
additional impetus due to the strategic resurgence of the Bay of Bengal.
This is reflected in the title of the conference that BIMSTEC held in
2018 to mark its 20th year: “BIMSTEC at 20: Towards a Bay of Bengal
Community.”5
One of the crucial harbingers of this idea has been the BIMSTEC
Nations Military Field Training Exercise (MILEX) 2018, the first
BIMSTEC military exercise wherein soldiers from six Indo-Pacific
countries gathered at the AUNDH Military Station in Pune, India, to
take part in counterterrorism drills.11 By strengthening BIMSTEC’s
security aspect using interoperability and consensus-generation around
counterterrorism,12 this multilateral engagement is a welcome step
towards making the organisation’s presence felt in the Indo-Pacific.
The extended Bay littorals which are part of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), are equally interested in participating in this
domain both as part of this grouping (ASEAN’s “Outlook on the Indo-
Pacific” or “ASEAN Centrality”) and omnidirectionally.13 In fact, the
ASEAN charter supports probabilities of seeking to develop appropriate
cooperation with other regional and subregional groupings in the Asia-
Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions.14 Aiming to keep the SLOCs and the
important chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca free and open, the
countries are seeking increased engagements.15 For instance, the recent
287
development in the 2,300-km submarine optical fibre from Chennai
to Port Blair (2020) in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands promises
opportunities for ASEAN countries, especially the Rando Island in
Sumatra (Indonesia) and Thailand. Moreover, the ASEAN line of credit
may be used to fund this opportunity, which can culminate into a deeper
engagement between the two organisations in the wider Indo-Pacific
paradigm.16
A quarter of all goods trading in the world takes place through the Bay
of Bengal conduit, making BIMSTEC a vital organisation for enhanced
future trade collaborations.17 However, trade volumes remain low
amongst BIMSTEC nations, and the best capacities of each country
continue to be underutilised. For instance, Kolkata, Chittagong and
Yangon ports can handle limited container cargo due to inadequate
investments. These river ports require the ships to travel up the river,
often increasing the travel and turnaround time, and consequently, the
Unfortunately, many ports along the Bay’s coast are exposed to cyclones,
which damage infrastructure and hinder shipping.26 Indeed, natural
disasters in this region affect much more than ports, with a large section
of the 1.4 billion coastal population27 being vulnerable to great risks of
loss of life and property.
The Bay is prone to natural turbulence due to its triangular shape; low, flat
coastal terrain; shallow depth;28 and the presence of easterly waves.29 Of
the 36 most devastating cyclones recorded in history, 26 have happened
in this maritime space, earning it the reputation of being the “deadliest”
bay in the world.30 Furthermore, to the southeast of the Bay of Bengal
lies the seismically active Andaman–Sumatra Subduction Zone, which
triggers violent tsunamis.31 Therefore, one of the cardinal concerns of the
littorals is their vulnerability to natural disasters.
Endnotes
1
BIMSTEC, “Summit Declarations,” Dhaka, 2014-2020, https://
bimstec.org/?page_id=942.
2
Rakhahari Chatterji, “Rethinking Regionalism: The Idea of China-
South Asia Trans-Himalayan Regional Cooperation,” Occasional Paper
no. 228, Observer Research Foundation (December 2019): p. 3, https://
www.orfonline.org/research/rethinking-regionalism-the-idea-of-china-
south-asia-trans-himalayan-regional-cooperation-58893/.
3
Varun Nayar, “Reframing Migration: A Conversation With Historian
Sunil Amrith,” Pacific Standard, December 1, 2017, https://psmag.com/
social-justice/reframing-global-migration-with-sunil-amrith.
4
BIMSTEC, “Declaration on the Establishment of The
Bangladesh-India-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation
(BIST-EC),” Bangkok, June 6, 1997, https://drive.google.com/file/
d/0B8Fv9wDGJqx2NkJTVzlZek5va0U/view.
292 5
BIMSTEC Secretariat, “BIMSTEC at its 20: Towards a Bay of Bengal
Community,” Dhaka, April 1, 2018, https://bimstec.org/?event=bimstec-
at-its-20-towards-a-bay-of-bengal-community.
6
M. Shahidul Islam, “BIMSTEC at its 20: Towards a Bay of Bengal
Community,” (Secretary General’s speech at the opening ceremony of the
Conference, Dhaka, March 20, 2018), BIMSTEC Secretariat, p. 2, https://
drive.google.com/file/d/1RpRFffo8nhOJE6yXuk2hnqKVR2Cjfcp0/
view.
7
V.Suryanarayan, “Prospects for a Bay of Bengal Community,”
Seminar Magazine, No. 487, March 2000, https://www.india-seminar.
com/2000/487/487%20suryanarayan.htm#top.
8
The Andaman Sea and Strait of Malacca may be considered as notional
extensions of the Bay of Bengal. See, Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury,
Pratnashree Basu and Sohini Bose, Exploring India’s Maritime
Connectivity in the Extended Bay of Bengal (New Delhi: Observer
Research Foundation, November 2019), p.13, https://www.orfonline.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/11/ORF_Report_India-ExtendedBOB.pdf.
9
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “External Affairs
Minister’s conversation with Valdai Discussion Club Moscow on 27
August 2019,” October 19, 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-
Statements.htm?dtl/31957.
10
Obja Borah Hazarika, “BIMSTEC in India’s Act East Policy,” Kalinga
Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies (July 7, 2019), http://www.kiips.in/
research/bimstec-in-indias-act-east-policy/.
11
“With MILEX 2018 India Graduates To Leading Multilateral
Defence Exercises,” Security Risks Asia, 2018, https://security-risks.
com/2018/09/11/with-milex-2018-india-graduates-to-leading-
multilateral-defence-exercises/.
12
Mandeep Singh, “BIMSTEC nations conduct first military exercise,”
Indo-Pacific Defence Forum, October 18, 2018, https://ipdefenseforum.
com/2018/10/ bimstec-nations-conduct-first-military-exercise/.
13
ASEAN, “Final ASEAN Outlook in the Indo-Pacific,” 2019, p. 2, https://
asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_
FINAL_22062019.pdf.
14
Ibid.
293
15
Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, Pratnashree Basu and Sohini Bose, op.
cit., p. 61.
16
Deeksha Bharadwaj, “Andaman Optical fiber may pitch India as
alternative to China in ASEAN region,” Hindustan Times, August 11,
2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-inaugurates-
optical-fibre-project-to-provide-international-connectivity-to-asean-
nations/story-ANoK30ADYbfaP4xPZuDx7J.html.
17
Anchalee Kongrut, “Making BIMSTEC matter,” The Bangkok Post,
January 20, 2020, https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/1839464/
making-bimstec-matter.
18
SASEC, “BIMSTEC Working Group Discusses Coastal Shipping to
Strengthen Trade,” December 1, 2017, https://www.sasec.asia/index.php
?page=news&nid=804&url=bimstec-coastal-shipping.
19
BIMSTEC, “Transport and Communication,” Dhaka, July 17, 2019,
https://bimstec.org/?page_id=270.
20
Ministry of Shipping, Government of India, “Coastal shipping,” (New
Delhi: Sagarmala Port-led Prosperity, October 11, 2018), http://sagarmala.
gov.in/coastal-shipping.
21
Bency Mathew, “India eyes coastal links for regional trade push,” JOC
Maritime News, September 10, 2019, https://www.joc.com/maritime-
news/short-sea-shipping/india-eyes-coastal-links-regional-trade-
push_20190910.html.
22
“Maritime Expert calls for India-Indonesia Shipping Chamber,”
Hellenic Shipping News, April 14, 2019, https://www.hellenicshippingnews.
com/maritime-expert-calls-for-india-indonesia-shipping-chamber/.
23
Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Eyeing Southeast Asia, India builds port
in Indonesia,” The Economic Times, March 2019,https://economictimes.
indiatimes.com/news/defence/eyeing-southeast-asia-india-builds-port-
in-indonesia/articleshow/68490478.cms?from=mdr.
24
Vijay Sakhuja, “Short Sea Shipping in Bay of Bengal Takes Baby Steps,”
Maritime Matters, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, November
2017, http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5386.
25
Ibid.
26
Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury and Sohini Bose, “In the eye of
tempestuous Bay of Bengal: Measuring the disaster resilience of major
ports on India’s east coast,” Issue Brief no. 289, Observer Research
294
Foundation (April 2019): p. 6, https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/04/ORF_Issue_Brief_289_DisastersPorts.pdf.
27
Constantino Xavier and Darshana M. Baruah, “Connecting the
Bay of Bengal: The Problem,” Carnegie India (March 1, 2018), https://
carnegieindia.org/2018/03/01/connecting-bay-of-bengal-problem-
pub-75710.
28
Md. Mahbub Alam, Md. Arif Hossain and Sultana Shafee, “Short
Communication: Frequency of Bay of Bengal Cyclonic Storms and
Depressions crossing different coastal zones,” International Journal of
Climatology 23 (2003): p. 1119, https://rmets.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
pdf/10.1002/joc.927.
29
Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India, “Frequently Asked
Questions on Tropical Cyclones,” Regional Specialized Meteorological
Centre for Tropical Cyclones over North Indian Ocean, Indian
Meteorological Department, p. 12, http://www.rsmcnewdelhi.imd.gov.
in/images/pdf/cyclone-awareness/terminology/faq.pdf.
30
Deekshith Nevil Pinto, “Sorrow of the Bay: Cyclone Hotbed Bay of
Bengal Continues to Drive Storms Towards India, Bangladesh,” Times
Of India, May 20, 2020, https://weather.com/en-IN/india/news/
news/2020-05-20-cyclone-amphan-india-bangladesh-bay-of-bengal-
hotbed-cyclones.
31
Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, Pratnashree Basu and Sohini Bose, op.
cit. p. 41.
32
Ibid., p. 47.
33
Ibid., pp. 45-47.
34
Sohini Bose, “BIMSTEC and Disaster Management: Future Prospects
for Regional Cooperation,” Issue Brief no. 383, Observer Research
Foundation (July 2020): p. 11, https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/07/ORF_IssueBrief_383_BIMSTEC-Disasters.pdf.
35
Amitendu Palit, Rahul Choudhury and Silvia Tieri, “BIMSTEC:
Relevance and Challenges,” ISAS Insights, no. 519, Institute of South
Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, October 10, 2018, https://
www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ISAS-Insights-No.-
519-BIMSTEC-Relevance-and-Challenges.pdf.
295
36
Constantino Xavier, Toward a stronger BIMSTEC: Bridging the Bay of
Bengal, New Delhi, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018,
p.7, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep16974.6.
37
BIMSTEC, “Joint Statement of 2nd the BIMST-EC Ministerial
Meeting,” Dhaka, December 19, 1998, p.1, https://drive.google.com/file/
d/0B8Fv9wDGJqx2QlJvR2lOaUh1RGs/view.
38
Shakhawat Hussain, “BIMSTEC- Establishing effective mechanism
for information and intelligence Sharing (IIS),” (presentation at
International Conference on “BIMSTEC at its 20: Towards a Bay of
Bengal Community,” Dhaka, March 20, 2018), https://drive.google.com/
file/d/1AvJ8guGY06wuq3Hgykxrsu8-AXhnjc0J/view.
Christian Wagner
Introduction
R
egionalism has long been seen as an important strategy for
many countries in dealing with the challenges and prospects
of globalisation. While a replication of the European Union
(EU) in other parts of the world would not be possible be-
cause of its different political and legal foundations, the debate on “open/
new regionalism” has paved the way for new forms of regional collabora-
tion in Asia. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its
achievements have been regarded as one of the most successful examples
of this new approach towards regional cooperation.
However, the rise of China and the geopolitical ambitions that are con-
nected with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the growing geopolitical
compulsions between China and the United States, the rising trend of
nationalism and protectionism, and the recent challenges posed by the
COVID-19 pandemic have disrupted the conversation. This raises a
significant question: What role can BIMSTEC play in such a changing
geopolitical landscape? This essay discusses the recent developments in
regional cooperation in South Asia and outlines the prospects and chal-
lenges for BIMSTEC. Finally, it highlights some long-term perspectives.
The Indo-Pacific
Regional cooperation arrived fairly late in South Asia. The first summit
of the newly established South Asian Association for Regional Cooper-
ation (SAARC) was held only in 1985. However, the new organisation
could not overcome the structural challenges of the region. India’s dif-
ficult relationship with most of its neighbours and the lack of economic
complementarity hindered a positive development. Eventually, SAARC
became an example of an organisation that adopted “open-regionalism”
but had weak institutional structures. The organisation became known
notorious for producing “…reports, not results…” Intra-regional trade has
grown from two to three percent in the mid-1980s, to five to six percent
in recent times. The most visible sign of SAARC’s poor performance was
the low number of summits. Initially expected to be held annually, only
18 summits were held in 31 years.
At the same time, much of the literature of SAARC reflects a certain un-
derestimation of the new possibilities that such an institution could bring.
Despite its failings, SAARC also had some intended and unintended pos-
itive achievements. One of its most-important yet least-known achieve-
ments is the SAARC Development Fund (SDF), which supports common
projects when they are operating at least in three countries. The creation
of the South Asia University (SAU) has also been a positive achievement,
especially in times of growing nationalism. SAARC has paved the way for
new forms of civil society networks, e.g. between chambers of commerce,
parliamentarians, media and others. One of SAARC’s most important un-
intended achievements has been its function as a mechanism for confi-
dence-building measures. SAARC summits have been used regularly to
discuss contentious bilateral issues at the highest political level on the
side-lines of official meetings. Military confidence-building measures
between India and Pakistan in the 1990s had their origins in the infor-
mal discussion between their prime ministers at SAARC summits. While
bilateral issues were banned from the official agenda, SAARC’s function
as an informal platform gave the organisation an important political role.
298
The decline of SAARC after 2016 was accelerated by various factors. Af-
ter the Uri attack in September 2016, the Indian government started scal-
ing back relations with Pakistan, which continues to date. The Pulwama
attack, the Balakot airstrike, and the revision of the status of Jammu and
Kashmir into two Union Territories in 2019 marked this process of a slow
but steady decoupling between the two nations. Except for the opening
of the Kartarpur corridor in 2019, there has been no noteworthy initiative
between the two sides in recent years. Thus, India’s announcement in
June 2020 to halve its diplomatic missions in Pakistan was a consistent
development.
Perhaps the most important external driver that contributed to the de-
cline of SAARC was the massive Chinese investments in South Asia in the
context of the BRI. The bulk of the investments has been in the China–
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is the single-largest project
in the BRI. Additionally, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives
have also received sizable Chinese infrastructure investments. The neg-
ative implications—rising debts and greater Chinese influence—have re-
sulted in renegotiations in some cases. However, the continued invest-
ments will strengthen China’s economic relations with these countries,
fostering Beijing’s claim for membership in SAARC. This would not be
in India’s interests.
302
In the emerging subregional cooperation networks, India can use BIM-
STEC. The grouping has always been seen as a bridge to Southeast Asia
and ASEAN, but it may also serve an important function in strengthen-
ing other subregional networks such as the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,
Nepal (BBIN) grouping. Moreover, BIMSTEC is also part of the larger
Indo-Pacific theatre and can be a crucial link to the Indian Ocean Rim
Association (IORA). After strengthening the maritime linkages between
the different networks, “BIMSTEC Plus,” including countries such as
Malaysia and Singapore, seems to be a logical next step.3
China’s political and economic shadow already looms large over most
BIMSTEC members. To make the organisation a success, India must play
its cards right.
Endnotes
1
After the entry of Bhutan and Nepal the organisation was renamed
as Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation, thereby keeping its abbreviation BIMSTEC.
2
See Constantino Xavier, Bridging the Bay of Bengal. Toward a
Stronger BIMSTEC, New Delhi, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_325_
Xavier_Bay_of_Bengal_INLINE.pdf
3
Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, Pratnashree Basu and Sohini Bose,
Exploring India’s Maritime Connectivity in the Extended Bay of Bengal,
New Delhi, Observer Research Foundation, 2019, p. 76, https://
www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/ORF_Report_India-
ExtendedBOB.pdf
303
Bertil Lintner
T
he main challenge for journalists who intend to write about
the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is to explain what
kind of organisation it purports to be. Most of the public
in Asia and elsewhere have never heard of it and what it stands for.
But BIMSTEC nevertheless brings together seven countries in South
and Southeast Asia—Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri
Lanka and Thailand—with member states listed in alphabetical order to
emphasise equality. It has also a permanent secretariat based in Dhaka.
If BIMSTEC wants more attention from the media, it will also have to
undertake initiatives that journalists can report on, or, as Sri Lankan
writer Priyanjini Charitha Fernando pointed out at a recent conference,
“The media is not a PR agency, hence, it cannot serve as a tool for
promoting BIMSTEC if the organisation remains static.”1
Furthermore, some ASEAN countries like Laos and Vietnam are one-
party states, Cambodia is ruled by a strongman who has been in power
for decades, Brunei is an absolute monarchy, Malaysia and Singapore are
semi-democracies, and in Thailand and Myanmar, the military remains
a powerful institution behind an elected government. This makes the
Philippines and Indonesia the most ‘democratic’ countries in ASEAN.
This divergence of political systems and views makes it impossible for
ASEAN to agree on its most fundamental principle—consensus.
contradict each other. China, of course, is aware of this and deals with
ASEAN members bilaterally, in what could be described as a divide-and-
rule policy.
Only a few years ago, ‘citizen journalism’ was being hailed as a positive,
ground-breaking development within the media scene in Asia and
around the world. By the means of the Internet, the public was able to
collect, disseminate and analyse news, and challenge the dominance of
so-called ‘mainstream media’.
While good and admirable intentions may have been behind the concept,
the outcome has been that social media is awash with rumours, doctored
pictures and conspiracy theories that would never have appeared in
professionally-run newspapers and magazines, where editors, fact
checkers and lawyers scrutinise reports before they appear in print. But
because social media and blogs are free, traditional media is facing an
unprecedented crisis.
In Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, China has established its first military
base abroad, ostensibly to fight piracy in the region. But the facility is also
close to US bases in the region, including the facility on Diego Garcia
and those in Gulf countries. The Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean
and, in particular, the Bay of Bengal is also perceived as a threat to India’s
interests in the region. Thus, a new ‘Cold War’ is emerging in the Indian
Ocean whose origins and development have not been scrutinised so
far, nor have the long-term implications for China’s newly established
For obvious reasons, India, China’s main strategic rival in the region,
has placed the Indian Ocean high on its security agenda. In 2001, India
created a new Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) to protect its interests
in the region. The plan for its establishment was reportedly hatched in
1995 after a closed-door meeting in Washington between India’s Prime
Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao and the US President Bill Clinton. The plan
was finalised when Clinton visited India in 2000. As an Indian journalist
reported at the time, “FENC will have state-of-the-art naval electronic
warfare systems that can extend as far as Southeast Asia.”8
FENC is based on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the local
command of the three services of the Indian armed forces coordinates
activities in the Indian Ocean. This is India’s first such integrated
command and, speaking at a roundtable conference held on 12 April 2010
organised by the New Delhi-based think tank the National Maritime
310
Foundation, Chief Admiral Gary Roughead of the US Navy stated that
American leaders at the highest level have declared that the US and India
would be strategic partners for the 21st century: “I’m here to say that the
United States navy in particular is a committed friend to India for the
long term”.9 The aim of this cooperation has never been stated officially,
but is nevertheless clear—to counter the rise of China.
Naval cooperation between India and the US, and other countries that
share concerns about China’s forays into the Indian Ocean, is likely to
increase, especially since signals intelligence stations in the region have
It may be argued that those geostrategic concerns are not part of the
charter BIMSTEC is expected to adopt at the end of 2020. Stated
common interests of concern for BIMSTEC member countries include
illegal migration and armed piracy, freedom of navigation, controlling
transnational threats, harnessing and sharing the natural wealth of the Bay
of Bengal, promoting infrastructural, and people-to-people connectivity,
but this would also mean a common policy to deal with China’s presence
in the Indian Ocean. No regional bloc can avoid addressing this issue,
and BIMSTEC is in a better position than ASEAN to agree on a common
policy aimed at securing peace and stability in the Indian Ocean and the
Bay of Bengal. And that is something the professional media will most
certainly want to cover, to counter misinformation spread by hackers and
internet trolls.
311
Endnotes
1
Priyanjini Charitha Fernando delivered speech in Kolkata Colloquium,
an international conference on “Reimaging BIMSTEC”organised by
Observer Research Foundation in collaboration with DFID, UK and KAS,
New Delhi on November 28-29, 2019 in Kolkata, India.
2
Merriden Varrall, “Chinese Media; Chinese International
Broadcasting; CGTN; CCTV; Xi,” The Interpreter, the Lowy Institute,
January 16, 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/tags/
chinese-media-chinese-international-broadcasting-cgtn-cctv-xi.
3
Andre Wheeler, “Will Belt and Road be good for Myanmar?,”
Myanmar Times, August 3, 2018, https://www.mmtimes.com/news/will-
belt-and-road-be-good-myanmar.html
4
“Discussion held on China-Myanmar Development Cooperation”,
The Global New Light of Myanmar, July 9, 2019, http://www.briupdates.
com/regional/detail/90c782cbce544f15a5c1de27dccac6fe
312 5
UNCTAD, “Review of Maritime Transport 2018”, New York, United
Nations, 2018, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/
rmt2018_en.pdf
6
“How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?,” China Power,
the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2016,
https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/
7
Pan Qi “Opening to the Southwest: An Expert Opinion,” Beijing
Review, September 2, 1985.
8
Sudha Ramachandran, “India Bids to Rule the Waves: From the Bay
of Bengal to the Malacca Strait.” Asia Times Online, October 19, 2005,
http://www.asiatimes/atimes/Soutth_Asia/GJ19Df03.html
9
Balaji Chandramohan, “US Courts India in the Indian Ocean,” Asia
Times Online, May 6, 2010, http://www.asiartimes.com/atimes/South_
Asia/LE06Df02.html.
10
Saibal Dasgupta, “China Gets First-Ever Chance to Enter Indian
Ocean”, Times of India, August 2, 2011,http://www.burmanet.org/
news/2011/08/03/times-of-india-china-gets-first-ever-chance-to-
enter-indian-ocean-for-exploration-saibal-dasgupta/.
Haroon Habib
T
he Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) was a dream of regional
leaders who envisioned strengthened economic and physical
connectivity among the South Asian and Southeast Asian
nations through trade, investment, and tourism. BIMSTEC is a bridge
between South Asian and Southeast Asian countries, and as a platform
between the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for intra-
regional cooperation. The region is home to about 1.5 billion people, or
about 22 percent of the global population.
June 2020 marked 23 years of BIMSTEC, with leaders from the member
countries reaffirming their commitment to building cooperation and
increasing resilience under the inter-regional body.1 The current chair,
Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, has declared that the grouping
could play a more proactive role in boosting regional economy through
trade, exchange of technological advancement and the development of
human capital.2 Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina stressed the
importance of BIMSTEC as a platform for nations to “collectively address
the fallout and challenges stemming from the (Coronavirus) pandemic”.
Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi noted the importance of
BIMSTEC as a key platform for the achievement of peace, prosperity,
sustainability and cooperation. Suu Kyi also expressed hope that the
organisation will further leverage regional cooperation and respond to
The Media
Evaluating BIMSTEC
The media has identified some basic hurdles to the grouping’s growth.
These include having an expansive mandate,4 and failing to implement
the FTA.5
The media saw the grouping getting a boost when political leaders met at
the BRICS Summit in Goa in 2016.8 The media also had a positive view of
the first meeting of the BIMSTEC National Security Chiefs in New Delhi
in March 2017, which discussed various traditional and non-traditional
security issues, including the holding of joint disaster management
exercises.
In recent years, BIMSTEC has also started looking at the Bay as part of its
larger maritime strategic space. The reasons are clear—the Indo-Pacific,
a key transit route between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, is located
at the intersection of Indian and Chinese strategic interests and is deeply
impacting the other BIMSTEC nations. Moreover, the Bay of Bengal is
facing a multitude of non-traditional security threats. Therefore, it is
315
important to combat the transnational threats and ensure freedom of
navigation so that the BIMSTEC countries can harness and share their
natural wealth.
BIMSTEC is not an opportunity for any one country alone, but for the
entire Bay of Bengal region. If the sub-regional collaboration succeeds,
there will be a wider scope for direct connectivity with Southeast Asia
via India’s northeastern states and Myanmar. If the grouping emerges
stronger, India’s ‘Act East’ and Thailand’s ‘Look West’ policies will
complement each other, and the landlocked Nepal and Bhutan will also
have the opportunity to enhance their connectivity with the rest of the
region.
The media has always maintained that there is huge potential for
enhanced intra-regional trade and investment in the BIMSEC region.
Barring the Rohingya crisis between Myanmar and Bangladesh, the
BIMSTEC countries have not had any significant bilateral problem. If
such issues are resolved amicably, BIMSTEC will not be at risk of going
the SAARC way.
BIMSTEC has failed to live up to its potential over the last two decades.
India, the largest member of the grouping, has been criticised for not
providing a strong leadership to it, while Thailand and Myanmar are
viewed as having ignored BIMSTEC in favour of ASEAN. Additionally,
the formation of another sub-regional group, the Bangladesh-China-
India-Myanmar Forum, under Chinese initiative, has served as a counter
to BIMSTEC.
Endnotes
1
“FMs to take BIMSTEC forward further,” Bangladesh Post, 5 June,
2020, https://bangladeshpost.net/posts/fms-to-take-bimstec-forward-
further-34709.
2
“BIMSTEC leaders pledge to collectively combat COVID-19 impact,”
The Financial Express, 6 June 2020, https://thefinancialexpress.com.
bd/national/bimstec-leaders-pledge-to-collectively-combat-covid-19-
impact-1591437728.
3
Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury and Rohit Ranjan Rai, “Towards a
Deliberative BIMSTEC,” ORF Occasional Paper, No. 263, Observer
Research Foundation, New Delhi, India, 6 August 2020, https://www.
orfonline.org/research/towards-a-deliberative-bimstec/.
4
Abhijnan Rej, “SAARC Foreign Ministers Meet Virtually in a Sign That
the Grouping Is Not Dead,” The Diplomat, 25 September 2020, https://
thediplomat.com/2020/09/saarc-foreign-ministers-meet-virtually-in-a-
318 sign-that-the-grouping-is-not-dead-yet/#:~:text=Comprising%20of%20
Bangladesh%2C%20Bhutan%2C%20India%2C%20Myanmar%2C%20
Nepal%2C%20Sri,is%20the%20perennial%20question%20of%20
India%E2%80%99s%20extant%20capabilities.
5
Humayun Kabir Bhuiyan, “BIMSTEC still ineffective 22 years
after inception, despite Dhaka’s proactive role,” Dhaka Tribune, 26
June 2019, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/foreign-
affairs/2019/06/26/bimstec-still-ineffective-22-years-after-inception-
despite-dhaka-s-proactive-role.
6
BIMSTEC, “Fourth BIMSTEC Summit Declaration,” Kathmandu,
Nepal, 30-31 August 2018, https://bimstec.org/?page_id=942.
7
Suyash Desai, “India’s Focus Shift From SAARC To BIMSTEC Is
Strategic But Underused,” The Wire, 4 June 2019, https://thewire.in/
diplomacy/india-saarc-bimstec-trade-south-asia.
8
BRICS, “8th BRICS Summit,” India, 2016, http://www.brics2016.gov.in/
content/innerpage/8th-summit.php.
9
Modnath Dhakal, “BIMSTEC will deliver benefits to Nepal’s energy and
tourism sectors: Experts,” The Rising Nepal, 30 August 2020.
10
“BIMSTEC leaders pledge to collectively combat COVID-19
impact,” bdnews24.com, 6 June 2020, https://bdnews24.com/
neighbours/2020/06/06/ bimstec-leaders-pledge-to-collectively-
combat-covid-19-impact.
11
Pallab Bhattacharya, “BIMSTEC by Choice: The Road Ahead,” The
Daily Star, 10 June 2019, https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/global-
affairs/news/bimstec-choice-the-road-ahead-1754527.
319
Subir Bhaumik
T
he Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) has gained greater
importance in the post-COVID-19 world. Countries in
Asia have realised they will need to address the question of
China’s rise as Beijing sheds its pretensions of peaceful emergence and
flexes its military, political and economic muscle at the bilateral and
multilateral level to push ambitious connectivity projects like the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) or water down global opinion through perception
management and powerful backroom lobbying at the United Nations.
destruction will hold the sector back. Therefore, the potential of tourism
to generate people-to-people contact and cement the regional grouping
will be limited in the foreseeable future. The only other way to boost
people-to-people contact is the free flow of news between the member
countries going beyond political or conflict news since the media has a
much greater reach than tourism in impacting popular perceptions. b
323
Endnotes
1
Subir Bhaumik , “Look East through Northeast: Challenges and
Prospects for India”, ORF Occasional Paper 51, June 25, 2014, https://
www.orfonline.org/research/look-east-through-northeast-challenges-
and-prospects-for-india/
2
“China pumps millions into foreign media outlets to create a new world
order”, Wion News, June 12, 2020, https://www.wionews.com/world/
china-pumps-millions-into-foreign-media-outlets-to-create-a-new-
world-order-305238
3
Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin, “Inside China’s audacious global
propaganda campaign”, The Guardian, December 7, 2018, https://www.
theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-
dominance-propaganda-xi-jinping
4
Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury and Rohit Ranjan Rai, “Towards a
deliberative BIMSTEC”, ORF Occasional Paper 263, August 6, 2020,
324 https://www.orfonline.org/research/towards-a-deliberative-bimstec/
Tshering Dorji
T
he Bay of Bengal, the largest basin in the world, historically
holds great economic and ecological significance. Today, the
Bay of Bengal is home to a cluster of developing countries
that are grappling with poverty, economic susceptibility, the
adverse impact of climate change and a host of other social issues, and
together form the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). The region has the advantage
of demographic dividend, market forces, investment opportunities and
natural resources, but the BIMSTEC countries are yet to realise their full
potential. Reinforcing regional integration is the key to leverage collective
efforts—not just government-to-government but business-to-business
and people-to-people as well—towards this goal. The media can play a
vital role in influencing governments, the public and other institutions
by highlighting the outcome of a harmonious and prosperous BIMSTEC
region.
There are many challenges. The BIMSTEC region is not well integrated,
in terms of both physical and virtual connectivity. There is a dearth of
infrastructure and efficient logistics to facilitate the seamless movement
of people and goods within the region. These factors have manifested into
immigration, customs and standards compliance issues among different
countries. Security concerns and transit norms also hinder trade. These
problems have surfaced in almost all regional forums and progress to
address these challenges has been slow.
Finding Solutions to BIMSTEC Region’s Challenges: How the Media Can Help
The Media
Finding Solutions to BIMSTEC Region’s Challenges: How the Media Can Help
The Media
Finding Solutions to BIMSTEC Region’s Challenges: How the Media Can Help
The Media
Endnotes
1
“Bangladesh 2nd fastest growing economy in South Asia: WB,” The
Daily Star, October 13, 2019, https://www.thedailystar.net/business/
bangladesh-2nd-fastest-growing-economy-in-asia-1813156
2
Ministry of Economic Affair, Royal Government of Bhutan, “MoU on
use of inland waterways for transportation of bilateral trade and transit
cargoes between Royal Government of Bhutan and The government
of the people’s republic of Bangladesh,” https://www.moea.gov.bt/
wp-content/uploads/2017/07/MoU-on-Use-of-Inland-Waterways-for-
Transportation-of-Bilateral-T-Scanned.pdf
3
M B Subba, “Bangladesh to invest in Bhutan’s hydropower,” Kuensel,
May 18, 2016, https://kuenselonline.com/bangladesh-to-invest-in-
bhutans-hydropower/
4
Tshering Dorji, “Bhutan proposes to graduate from LDC in 2023,”
Kuensel, June 2, 2018, https://kuenselonline.com/bhutan-proposes-to-
329
graduate-from-ldc-in-2023/
5
M B Subba, “From aid to trade,” Kuensel, March 9, 2019, https://
kuenselonline.com/from-aid-to-trade/
Finding Solutions to BIMSTEC Region’s Challenges: How the Media Can Help
Resurrecting BIMSTEC
Through the Media
Chandani Jayatilleke
T
he Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) area, which has over 1.6
billion people and a combined gross domestic product of over
US$3 trillion,1 is one of the fastest growing regions in the world.
Information provided through the news media includes actual data (raw
data or analysis/interpretation) and human expressions, from expressions
of interest (political, cultural, business) to messaging between individuals
331
and groups in terms of aspirations, frustrations, appreciations and
hostilities. Such media functioning enables negotiations, planning and
decision-making. Therefore, the news media plays an important role in
policymaking, programme implementation, and assessments and impact
evaluation.
Sri Lanka in turn can benefit from BIMSTEC in ways it cannot from
SAARC, although the latter offers its own unique advantages. Sri Lanka’s
advantage is that all its neighbouring countries are SAARC members, and
so it can easily reach out to SAARC members for support, including in
security matters, both military and social (for instance, through disaster
mitigation assistance and emergency food support). Close neighbour
status enables necessary bilateral and intra-regional cooperation on
332
crucial matters such as climate and ecology management, and close
economic exchanges (trade, labour markets and investments). But
SAARC is politically hampered by rivalries between the countries due to
their close-neighbour proximity, including the regional conflict between
India and Pakistan and other cross-border issues (land, water sharing,
migration, disaster commonality, smuggling, transborder insurgency).
For Sri Lanka, BIMSTEC is thus very useful in off-setting some of the
disadvantages of SAARC, especially in areas of economic cooperation,
like investments, freight-forwarding, shipping, sea route security and
inter-ports collaboration, and capitalising on opportunities in the richer
ASEAN market.
Media’s role
The media can play a key role in introducing the BIMSTEC states to each
other’s citizens. Informing the people on the grouping and its activities
will help politically legitimise the BIMSTEC and its policies.
The media can also help specific interest groups within each country
in understanding the usefulness of BIMSTEC in areas like business
investments and trade, sociocultural aspects (tourism, pilgrimages, arts
and entertainment), professional cooperation (associations of lawyers
or doctors), and expert collaboration (especially in IT, sciences, mineral
resources exploitation and ecology management). Specialised media/
information groups can be set up to further link professional communities
in the BIMSTEC countries on specific projects.
The media should not wait for governments and political leaders to
promote such integration as this could take a long time, as it did with the
SAARC. Creating greater awareness on the benefits of BIMSTEC could in
turn lead to increased public interest and pressure in support of regional
integration efforts. It is important to remember that BIMSTEC is meant
to benefit the people of the region, who have many things in common but
have forgotten their shared history and geography.
It is time for the media fraternity in the region to foster closer ties to take
BIMSTEC cooperation forward. Journalists must not shy away from
BIMSTEC stories, even if they are of a political—and thus negative—
nature, and instead see it as an opportunity. There is scope for stories
on trade, travel and other sectors of BIMSTEC cooperation, as well as
on how the opening of big markets like India and Thailand could be
useful to the region’s businesses. The role of the media in BIMSTEC
can be strengthened by fostering a better understanding among media
professionals that the news media can be an opinion shaper as well as an
agenda setter.
335
Endnotes
1
M. Shahidul Islam, “Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi- Sectoral
Technical and Economic Cooperation” (speech, Kolkata, India,
November 28-29, 2019)
2
Islam, “Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi- Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation”
3
Islam, “Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi- Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation”
4
Chandani Jayatilleke, “Academics, policy makers to drive ‘Re-
imagining BIMSTEC’ concept,” Daily News, November 27, 2019, http://
www.dailynews.lk/2019/11/27/finance/203978/academics-policy-
makers-drive-%E2%80%98re-imagining-bimstec%E2%80%99-concept
5
Islam, “Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi- Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation”
6
Chandani Jayatilleke, “A Bay of Hope with BIMSTEC,”
Sunday Observer, December 15, 2019, http://www.sundayobserver.
336 lk/2019/12/15/business/bay-hope-bimstec
7
Islam, “Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi- Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation”
8
“BIMSTEC and Sri Lanka: A Potential Agenda for 2018-2020,”
Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute of International Relations and Strategic
Studies, April 4, 2018, https://lki.lk/publication/bimstec-and-sri-lanka-
a-potential-agenda-for-2018-2020/
9
“CNCI concerned about proposed ETCA with India,” Daily FT,
February 29, 2016, http://www.ft.lk/article/528113/cnci-concerned-
about-proposed-etca-with-india
10
PK Balachandran, “Indian Envoy Rebuts ‘Misconceptions And
Canards’ About Economic Pact,” New Indian Express, March 4, 2016,
https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2016/mar/04/Indian-
Envoy-Rebuts-Misconceptions-And-Canards-About-Economic-
Pact-899808.html
11
T. Ramakrishnan, “Industry divided over economic pact with
India,” The Hindu, February 27, 2016, https://www.thehindu.com/
news/international/industry-divided-over-economic-pact-with-india/
article8289687.ece
R
akhahari Chatterji, Ph.D. (Chicago) is Honorary
Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation,
Kolkata. He is a former Professor in Political Science and
Dean of the Faculty of Arts, University of Calcutta. Prof.
Chatterji was also Visiting Fellow, Political Science and Associate,
Committee on South Asian Studies, University of Chicago; Visiting
Fellow, Political Science at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor)
and University of Virginia (Charlottesville); and Emeritus Fellow, UGC.
He has authored and edited several books, in addition to contributing
numerous papers and review articles to books, journals, newspapers
and websites. He specialises in International Relations, Comparative
Politics, Indian Politics and South Asia. His recent publications include
“Para-Diplomacy: Concept and Context” (co-authored), India Quarterly
73, no. 4, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 2017; West Bengal
under the Left (co-edited), Routledge, 2019; “Rethinking Regionalism:
The Idea of China-South Asia Trans-Himalayan Regional Cooperation,”
ORF Occasional Paper, December 2019; and “Peace and Conflict Studies:
A Prolegomenon,” in Peace and Conflict Studies: Perspectives from Asia,
edited by Anindya Jyoti Majumdar and Shibasish Chatterjee (London:
Routledge, 2021).
338
T
he Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)
was established in 1997. Over the next 23 years,
its membership has expanded, declarations
have been made, and intentions expressed. Yet little has
changed on the ground, even as the world has gone through
changes, some of them perhaps irreversible—marked
by a huge push towards globalisation, a global financial
crisis, China’s departure from its “hide your strength,
bide your time” strategy to the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI)
and, most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic.