SPECIAL

NO. 131
From War to Peace: The Regional Stakes
in Afghanistan’s Future

Kabir Taneja
Editor

MARCH 2021
© 2021 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through
print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF.
INTRODUCTION
Kabir Taneja

U
nited States Secretary of State Antony
Blinken’s letter to Afghanistan
President Ashraf Ghani, leaked to
the press in March 2021, set forth plan for Afghanistan involves a wider role for
a spate of diplomatic statements as regional players such as India, Pakistan, Iran,
the Joe Biden administration sought to clarify their Russia and China, the US–Taliban agreement will
stance on ending the war in Afghanistan. At the time remain the pivot around which any bilateral or
of writing this report, multiple processes were being multilateral system can be constructed. This, by
undertaken with urgency to find a resolution to the default, means that while regional players could
conflict. The long-running Doha process—where help Washington, D.C. hedge some of its risks, the
much headway has been made since 2013 between February 2020 agreement will remain either the
the Afghan government and others, and the Taliban, deal-maker or deal-breaker in the negotiations.
seems to be dissipating. New forums in Russia and
Turkey are taking shape to take the conversations The US war in Afghanistan, now in its 20th
further, and more regional and international actors year, has become a virtual shrine for the follies
are getting involved. As these cogs attempt to work of American interventionism, the internal
in concert, the Biden administration is attempting complexities of Afghan politics, and regional
to embed the peace process in a wider regional wrangling over parochial interests in South Asia.
framework. This report looks into these regional From the beginning of the conflict in the aftermath
stakeholders and their geopolitical stakes. of 9/11 and the start of America’s ‘war on terror’
campaign, the Afghan war moved towards an ad-
The US–Taliban deal, signed in February 2020 hoc plan. The narratives that carried it forward—
under the administration of Donald Trump, is of defeating Al Qaeda, diminishing the Taliban,
today the bedrock of all negotiations around the and institutionalising democratic political systems
Afghan conflict. The agreement requires the US in Kabul—have met with limited successes. Even
to withdraw its military forces from the country
by 1 May 2021. While President Joe Biden’s new

Attribution: Kabir Taneja, Ed., “From War to Peace: The Regional Stakes in Afghanistan’s Future,” ORF Special Report No. 131,
March 2021, Observer Research Foundation.

2
within these limits, however, the progress made
is more than worthy of being protected: women’s
rights to education, democratic values, and elections.

Throughout the international negotiation As the May 1 deadline looms, this report trains
process with the Taliban, India has mostly been an the spotlight on some of the most critical regional
outlier, refusing to join the table and preferring and international actors that could help pave
to back the democratic process and government the way to a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. In
in Kabul. New Delhi’s support in Afghanistan has the first chapter, Ibraheem Bahiss analyses the
largely taken the form of institutions, from building nucleus of the issue—the Ghani government
dams and supporting education, to training in Kabul, and how it is poised to deal with the
members of the Afghan military and providing pressures of coming to a conclusion with the
them with equipment and training in policing and Taliban. In her piece, Kriti M Shah focuses on the
diplomacy. These have had their limitations, which Taliban itself, and its strong position that allows
are revealing themselves today as regional and it to play its cards the way it wants to. Kashish
international actors mould policies to cement their Parpiani follows with an essay on the superpower,
interests as a cloud of uncertainty hovers around the US, beleaguered in Afghanistan and looking
the future Afghan political architecture. Even as it for a plausible exit from the quagmire of a two-
is clear that the Taliban will have an influence on decade long war. In the fourth chapter, Sushant
Kabul’s power-sharing system in the time to come, Sareen looks at the position of perhaps the most
the relationship that different stakeholders will important foreign actor, Pakistan, and how the
develop with the group could determine their own Pakistani establishment is looking for an outright
view of regional and international security. While victory for its interests via the Taliban. Kalpit
one of the critical provisions of the US-Taliban deal A Mankikar, in his chapter, examines China’s
is for the latter to cut all ties with Al Qaeda and deny interests in Afghanistan from the view of regional
them refuge, most analysts agree that the chances of security and Beijing’s overall approach towards
this happening are slim. the Muslim world as it continues its crackdown on
the Uyghur Muslims in restive Xinjiang. In the
The sidelines of the Afghan negotiations could sixth piece, Nivedita Kapoor surveys an old player
determine other regional stories. The recently in the Afghan contemporary history—Russia, and
announced ceasefire between India and Pakistan is how it continues to play a role despite its limiting
being viewed from a US-led Afghan lens. The India- historical baggage. In the last chapter, I look into
Pakistan rivalry is also critical to peace in Afghanistan, one of the most underrated players in the Afghan
where both New Delhi and Islamabad preside over crisis, another neighbor—Iran, and how its
a game of critical strategic, tactical and political one- fractured relations with the US could exclusively
upmanship. While the Taliban has its historical, shape its Afghan policy.
ideological and political mooring in Pakistan where
most of the Shuras are based, New Delhi has backed The aim of this report is to offer a quick but
the democratic processes in Afghanistan. India has incisive analysis of regional views on Afghanistan.
publicly supported the government of President These explorations should help clarify the Indian
Ghani despite increasing hostility towards his perspective through the vantage points of some
presidency, both from within the Afghan polity and of the potential partners (or even foes) that New
certain quarters in Washington, D.C. Delhi will have to engage with for its own future
policies on Afghanistan and the region.

3
THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT:
CHASING PEACE
Ibraheem Bahiss

T
he intra-Afghan conference held in
Moscow in March heralded a new
approach to the Afghan conflict – one
that could threaten the very survival Capitalising on regional support for an interim
of Ashraf Ghani’s government. The arrangement, the Joe Biden administration
government’s current predicament is the accretion propped up the notion of an interim “participatory
of factors both outside and within its control. peace government”, according to a leaked draft
US proposal.4 This call for an interim government
The Doha accord, signed between the United was part of a broader strategy of the new US
States (US) and the Taliban in February 2020, has administration, as announced by Secretary of
put the Afghan government in a difficult position.1 State Antony Blinken in a letter to President Ghani
The agreement required sacrificing negotiation leaked to the press.5 The letter highlighted three
leverage in return for having the Taliban sit at the crucial steps aimed at accelerating a settlement
table. As the Doha agreement was not predicated on between the Afghan government and the Taliban.
the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, First, it asked the United Nations (UN) to
the government had little capacity to extract convene a summit of leaders from the US, Russia,
concessions from the insurgents. Considering that China, Pakistan, Iran and India to form a unified
he would not be able to gain a favourable deal under approach to the peace process. Second, it hinted
such circumstances, President Ghani took a gambit, at the creation of an interim government in the
and arguably, delayed the peace process by refusing form of a “written proposal aimed at accelerating
to release Taliban prisoners as per the agreement.2 discussion on a negotiated settlement and
This ultimately proved counterproductive. For ceasefire.” The letter also mentioned a senior-
one, it fuelled perceptions among donor states that level meeting in Turkey “in the coming weeks to
the current government was hindering the peace finalize a peace agreement.”
process. Top US officials, for example, continued to
stress that peace talks were the only path forward
to finding a resolution to the enduring conflict in
Afghanistan.3 Presumably, this also incensed regional
powers such as Iran, Russia and China, who view
the peace process as an opportunity to compel the
US to withdraw from their strategic underbelly.

4
 Two shortcomings of the current government
have contributed to its current predicament. The
The Afghan government has objected to the plan. first is its Machiavellian approach to domestic
For his part, the chairperson of the High Council power-brokering. Powerful warlords like Atta
for National Reconciliation, Abdullah Abdullah, has Noor and Marshal Dostum were quickly courted
expressed cautious support for the plan. Others, by the government and then just as easily
including former President Hamid Karzai and abandoned for short-term gains. Where the
some powerful Afghan politicians, such as Abdul government has negotiated political pacts, such as
Rashid Dostum and Atta Noor, have also tentatively the National Unity Government agreement, the
endorsed the plan. Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin agreement, and the 2020
political participation agreement, the government
Ghani has stated that he is willing to step down has consistently been followed by accusations of
from the presidency before the end of his term, violating the terms of these agreements.9 Today,
but only to a duly elected successor. This was a other than a close and loyal clique of President
significant shift from his previously stated position Ghani’s followers, the overwhelming majority of
of completely rejecting an interim government.6 Afghan political actors appear indifferent to the
Senior US officials, according to some reports, fate of this government.10 Given this climate of
however, continue to insist that the government distrust, there is little that Ghani can do to build a
must agree to step down even without the holding unified front to deflect the growing pressure.
of a new election.7
Perhaps the most fatal flaw of the Afghan
With an increasing chorus of states throwing government has been its failure to present an
their weight behind the formation of an interim alternative vision for a peace settlement that
government, the Afghan government looks could rally domestic and international support.
increasingly beleaguered. In a joint statement, the Displeased with the current mechanism,
‘Expanded Troika’—consisting of the US, Russia, the government has haphazardly sought to
China and Pakistan—endorsed the plan, albeit undermine the current talks without providing a
couching it in diplomatic language.8 Should the UN viable alternative. Indeed, the government’s calls
succeed in securing the support of the European for protecting the constitutional order ring hollow
Union (EU), as well as of Iran and India for an as it has itself circumvented the Constitution
interim government, the Afghan leadership will several times in political pacts with rivals. Its
have little room to manoeuvre diplomatically. promises of protecting women’s rights or other
“gains” are seen as mere lip service given that
the government has failed to build a broad-based
initiative for peace.

5
 Other than a loyal clique
of President Ghani’ s
followers, the majority of
Afghan political actors are
indifferent to the fate of
the government.

To be sure, however, even at this 11th hour, the

government can still take remedial steps. If it can
present a viable and realistic alternative to the
proposal for an interim government, the government bitter historical relations between President Ghani
could get some support from strong allies such as and his rivals, the government would need to offer
the EU and India. This would arrest the growing more substantial concessions than vague political
diplomatic momentum towards the formation of promises based on presidential decrees that can
an interim government. Given that many regional easily be revoked. It is time for the government to
countries including India, Iran and Russia do not defer to the non-ideal for its very survival.
want a Taliban-dominated government, there may
be room to present a plan that shares power with Its failure to take the initiative has created a
the Taliban but does not give them the level of void that other actors are stepping in to fill with
dominance that current proposals are suggesting. proposals for peace that address only their own
It can also introduce certain prerequisite principles concerns and do not grapple with the fundamental
for a future government with the aim of increasing issues that hobble Afghanistan. The government’s
regional buy-in, such as principles of non-alignment inertia in this area has made the government a
in regional disputes and actively combatting terror mere spectator, while other stakeholders are
groups. getting poised to decide the fate of the country.

Similarly, the government can embark on

foundational structural changes that will address the
demands of key actors and constituencies. Given the

6
THE TALIBAN PLAY THE
WAITING GAME
Kriti M. Shah

O
ver a year since the Taliban and
the United States (US) signed the
withdrawal agreement in Doha, the
Joe Biden administration’s proposed to the Taliban’s leverage is the political legitimacy
peace agreement gives Washington it has managed to gain as an international actor—
a renewed opportunity to leave Afghanistan, but one that the US remains committed to not only
not before attempting to finally settle matters of negotiating with, but now encouraging to be part
governance. The new agreement and the looming of an elected Afghan government.
US exit places the Taliban in the strongest position
they have ever been. The Taliban preens with this legitimacy before
the international community. For example, in
The Taliban have shown the Afghan people, June 2020, the group released a photograph
Washington and militant groups around the world purportedly showing Taliban negotiator
that they possess the military capability to resist a US Mullah Baradar Akhund in a call with then US
invasion and outlast a superpower. For nearly two Secretary of State Mike Pompeo—preempting
decades, they have fended off attempts by NATO any statement from the US regarding the nature
forces to annihilate their ranks; indeed, they have of the interaction.12 It demonstrated not only
made themselves an intrinsic part of any attempt to that the US and the Taliban were in contact at
find a long-term solution for peace in the country. the highest levels of government, but that the
Taliban knew the importance of displaying their
As of March 2021, the group controls 19 percent direct access to Washington. In an effort to sound
of all districts in Afghanistan, with at least 47 percent more like a political party, the militant group also
of them being contested:11 in more than 66 percent clarified false claims circulating in social media
of Afghanistan’s districts, the Taliban controls with the spokesperson for the Taliban, stating that
either the entire district or large areas of it, or else it would not join the jihad in Kashmir as it did not
all areas outside of the district centre. This gives interfere in the internal affairs of other nations.13
them significant leverage in negotiating with the While this does mean that the Taliban and New
government: they are aware that Kabul will be forced Delhi will turn into reluctant allies anytime soon,
to concede to certain demands if only to avoid the it does give credence to the view that the group
group from taking over more geographies. Adding

7
does not see India as their enemy. The Taliban has
also been an active participant in the talks hosted
by Moscow in November 2018 and March 2021,
with Russia’s mellow stance towards the group, as that the Taliban leadership and its lower-rung
an integral ‘military-political movement’, helping fighters will agree to share power under this deal,
strengthen ties between the two.14 as it stands, given that they have always voiced
their belief about the Kabul government being an
The evolving relationship between the Taliban “American puppet”.17
and Iran also demonstrates how the group has been
able to build its political credibility through the The group will likely refer back to the Doha
years. From almost going to war with the Taliban in agreement (or the ‘Agreement for Bringing
1998, to supporting the US invasion in 2001, today Peace to Afghanistan’) to make all their future
Tehran nurtures high-level contacts with the Taliban demands.18 The crux of the agreement is that the
aimed at stopping the growth of the Islamic State- US will withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan
Khorasan in the region. Similarly, China has made by 1 May 2021. This is how the Taliban have
deep inroads with the Taliban, fueled by concerns always defined “peace”— the absence of foreign
that a withdrawal of Western troops would lead to a military forces from the country. For the Taliban,
rise in violence, that in turn would threaten China’s the US has been the main driver of the conflict in
restive Xinjiang province.15 the country, not them; therefore, it is when the US
completes its promise and leaves, that the Taliban
Taliban derives its political legitimacy from the will declare themselves victorious, for having
knowledge that they are no longer seen only as an brought much awaited “peace” to the country.
insurgency movement. Indeed, nations in the region
are viewing them as either a threat to their own Resistant to change and stagnant in their moral
interests in Afghanistan, or as an alternative political underpinnings, the Taliban in all probability will
solution to the enduring civil war. squander the best chance they have ever had of
being in an internationally recognised position of
The current Biden peace plan does not appease power. The Taliban are not pressed for time and
the Kabul government nor the Taliban leadership. 16 will wait until they get what they want: a complete
While it gives a glimpse of the nature of a potential US withdrawal, a slow surrender of democracy,
Taliban power-sharing government, it is nowhere and a return to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
close to what the Taliban want. The group has that the group installed and commandeered in
always stated its rejection of the democratic ideals Afghanistan from 1996 until losing it to the US
of universal suffrage, free and fair elections, and invasion in 2001.
respect for minorities—all of which are prerequisites,
as outlined in the draft agreement. It seems unlikely

The Biden peace plan is nowhere

close to what the Taliban want.

8
BIDEN’S ‘DIPLOMATIC
HAIL MARY’
Kashish Parpiani

T
he May 1 deadline for the withdrawal
of US troops from Afghanistan is
fast approaching, and President Joe
Biden faces a challenge that stems Therefore, in what is being termed as “a
from his predecessor’s foreign policy diplomatic Hail Mary”,21 the Biden administration
of retrenchment. While analysts anticipated Donald is struggling to broker a power-sharing
Trump’s fait accompli on Iran or North Korea to arrangement between the two sides. In replicating
immediately preoccupy the Biden administration, the format of the 2001 Bonn conference, which
his plan to extricate the US from Afghanistan has established a provisional government in Kabul
assumed precedence. after the ouster of the Taliban, the US is seeking
“an interim power-sharing government, which
Biden is the fourth US President to commit to would buy time for more comprehensive peace
ending the war in Afghanistan, which is now in its talks thereafter.”22
20th year and has cost 2,400 American lives and
over US$ 2 trillion of the public coffers.19 However, This attempt to reassert control over the
Trump’s deal with the Taliban, which was signed in Afghan peace process, however, is hampered by
Doha in February 2020, poses a quandary as peace the Trump administration’s precedent of direct
talks between the Afghan government and the negotiations with the Taliban in 2018. This
Taliban have stalled.20 Without a buy-in from both, constituted a departure from the US’ traditional
a withdrawal of troops could lead to Afghanistan insistence on an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned”
drifting into a civil war and becoming a terror haven process.23 The consequent decline in US leverage
once again. over Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has been
apparent. In response to US Secretary of State
Antony Blinken’s push for Kabul to work towards
“a road map to a new, inclusive government”
with the Taliban, Ghani has categorically stated:
“The transfer of power through elections is a
nonnegotiable principle for us.”24 In mid-March

9
this year, to rekindle its relationship with Kabul and
underscore US credibility on jointly preventing a
downward security spiral, the Biden administration
even ordered airstrikes on Taliban fighters that were opposition to protracted military conflicts has
“actively attacking and manoeuvring on” Afghan emerged as an odd point of convergence between
troops.25 the progressive ‘new Left’ and the conservative
nationalist Right on the two extremes of the
Similarly, a year after the conclusion of US- American political spectrum. Thus, during the
Taliban talks that underscored Washington’s 2020 campaign, both Biden and Trump vowed to
commitment to withdraw its remaining 2,500 troops end US wars, albeit using slightly different catch-
from Afghanistan, Biden can hardly convey any US all phrases of “forever wars” and “endless wars”.30
resolve on holding the Taliban accountable if it does
not accept “the demand for a 90-day reduction in Beyond political sloganeering however, Biden’s
violence.”26 This has been apparent with the Taliban position is not absolutist, since he supports
expanding its on-ground initiative against Kabul, in narrowly defining the scope of operations to
clear violation of its commitments under the Doha continue a focus on counterterrorism.31 On
agreement. Reports suggest that the Taliban has Afghanistan, in particular, Biden has been an
encircled “cities in the country’s south, and even advocate for maintaining a residual force for
kept up attacks near Kabul during the unusually counterterrorism purposes since the Barack
mild Afghan winter, a time when fighting historically Obama administration’s 2009 Cabinet review.32
has subsided.”27 The already daunting task of selling this minimal
(yet status-quoist) proposition to an anti-war
Thus, Biden has been left with the task of brokering electorate now only stands compounded with the
an arrangement with diminished leverage over both pressures posed by Trump’s timeline.
Kabul and the Taliban. Any failure to oversee a
withdrawal would also defy Biden’s 2020 campaign
promise to end America’s “forever wars”.28 With
more than seven of every 10 Americans (76 percent)
supporting the return of troops from Afghanistan,29

10
 In the 2020 election
campaign, both Biden
and Trump vowed to end
US wars, albeit using memory of being alienated due to Trump’s
slightly different phrases ‘America First’ approach to extricate the US may
not be short-lived.35 Not to mention, recent reports
of‘forever wars’and of European leaders also being in the dark about
‘endless wars’ . Blinken’s proposed power-sharing arrangement.36

These challenges will therefore likely inform

the postponement of US troop withdrawal beyond
the May 1 deadline. After having already termed
Trump’s timeline as “tough”,37 Biden could make
a case for postponing it by citing the Taliban’s
violation of the Doha agreement. The challenge
Moreover, Biden, as Obama’s vice president, for the Biden administration would then be
witnessed firsthand the politically-expensive to keep its eye on the ball as it devises a more
turnaround that the president had to endure, when prudent withdrawal timeline, lest the impending
Obama had to recommit US forces to fight the Spring offensive by the Taliban38 entrap the US in
Islamic State less than three years after withdrawing another cycle of the “forever war”.
from Iraq.33 Such an eventuality repeating upon a
precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan, is certain
to figure in Biden’s calculations. A withdrawal could
also trigger the pullout of the roughly 7,000 NATO
and other coalition troops from Afghanistan.34 If
the US were to return to Afghanistan to stem the
resurgence of al-Qaeda, for instance, chances are
slim that the US can cobble another “coalition of
the willing” due to its diminished credibility. While
America’s European partners have fought alongside
it since the beginning of the Afghanistan war, their

11
WILL PAKISTAN HIT A
HOME RUN?
Sushant Sareen

T
he Biden administration’s announcement
in late January of a review of the
February 2020 peace deal with the
Taliban raised anxieties in Pakistan. at this stage from Pakistan is to get the Taliban to
Pakistani officials were not sure what agree to a skeletal US force remaining for some
the “review” meant, as in their view, there was little more months. If the Taliban remain undaunted,
room to amend the provisions of the deal. The however, it is unlikely that the US will decide to
Taliban were clear that they would not accept the stay on in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.
presence of US troops in Afghanistan after the May
deadline. With the review being called for by the US To be sure, Pakistan is trying to assuage
right on the cusp of what Pakistan was anticipating fears that the Taliban will succeed in capturing
as a victory, it cautioned the US against backtracking Kabul, or that Pakistan will support them in this
on the deal. mission. The assurances are not being believed,
however.41 For nearly two decades Pakistan has
Pakistan views the ultimatum given by Secretary defied the United States and has sustained and
of State Antony Blinken to Afghan President Ashraf provided a safe haven to the Taliban.42 Today the
Ghani as the US’ way to exit and push the Afghan militia that Pakistan has supported for a long 20
government to capitulate to the Taliban.39 Even as years, appears set to score a victory, and there is
there are proposals to push the peace process, it is no indication that Pakistan will prevent it from
unlikely that these will be acceptable to either the happening.
Taliban or Pakistan.40 The most that can be expected

12
 Pakistan will neither let go of the Taliban, nor
change its strategy on Afghanistan, of which the
Taliban are a lynchpin. Pakistan will not be averse to
an interim government—less because they see it as Over the years, Pakistan has developed a
paving the way for a longer-term political solution, significant leverage over the Taliban which it
and more as they feel that once the Taliban get a thinks will help it exercise a fair bit of control in
share in the power in Kabul, it will only be a matter the Islamic Emirate. They have even inserted their
of time before they capture the entire Afghan state. most favoured terror group, the Haqqani Network,
For Pakistan, there is no downside to their support in the top echelons of the Taliban. Already, they
for the Taliban. Over the years, the US has done have managed to convince the Taliban to provide
nothing more than urging Pakistan to “do more”. assurances on some connectivity and energy
There has been neither significant economic projects that will run through Afghanistan.46
sanctions nor coercive diplomacy to force Pakistan Pakistan anticipates that once things settle down,
to give up the Taliban option. There is no indication they will reap enormous economic, political and
that things will change in this regard. strategic benefits by becoming the regional hub
and the main trade and transit route to Central
Pakistani scholars and policymakers have been Asia.
assiduously arguing that the US will eventually
“outsource” Afghanistan to Pakistan—that the Pakistan had made similar calculations in
US will not only stay engaged with Pakistan, but the 1990s. At the time, however, their plans fell
will also give economic dividends.43 The theory through. It remains to be seen whether they will
has found resonance among certain circles in the hit a home-run this time around, or get run out.
US.44 The report of the Afghanistan Study Group,
which seems to have been the guiding document
for Blinken’s letter to Ghani, also recognises
Afghanistan’s continuing dependence on Western
assistance.45 The US feels that this factor can be
leveraged to exert a certain degree of influence on
future developments in Afghanistan. For their part, The militia that Pakistan
Pakistan believes that for the right price, they will be
able to deliver on some critical preconditions set by
has supported for 20
the US, particularly those on security and terrorism years appears set to score
issues.
a victory; there is no
indication that Pakistan
will prevent it from
happening.

13
CHINA’S LITMUS TEST OF
POWER AND INFLUENCE
Kalpit A Mankikar

T
he impending US withdrawal from
Afghanistan—the so-called “heart
of Asia”—presents China with an
opportunity to extend its influence in outfit. A Taliban delegation met China’s special
a country of such strategic importance. representative for Afghanistan, Deng Xijun,
Beijing’s approach to the American initiative to in September 2019 after the US called off talks
work out a compromise between the Afghanistan following a bomb explosion in Kabul near a
government and the Taliban forces will be calibrated security post where two NATO soldiers were
by factors including its own geopolitical ambitions. killed.49 China’s engagement with key power
Under the peace plan, US Secretary of State Antony centres in the country indicates its intention to
Blinken has proposed a conclave—comprising the play an important role in Afghanistan after the
US, Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran and India, and American withdrawal.
under the United Nations’ auspices—to deliberate
on a coordinated approach for peace in Afghanistan. Two opportunities stand out.
China’s envoy to Afghanistan, Wang Yu, has
assured that as their most trustworthy neighbour, Incentivising military cooperation: Over the last few
China looks forward to the realisation of “stability, years, China has been ramping up its military
reconstruction and development” in Afghanistan.47 presence in the region. Reports emerged in 2019
of a Chinese base in Tajikistan near the strategic
China has deepened relations with the Afghanistan Wakhan Corridor, which connects Afghanistan to
government led by President Ashraf Ghani, who China.50 Afghanistan has also revealed that China
has been seeking Chinese assistance in peace talks is helping it set up a unit for mountain combat.51
and in promoting economic development.48 At The eventuality of a US troop withdrawal from
the same time, ties between the Taliban and the the territory could deepen military cooperation
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have grown in between China and Afghanistan. Getting such a
the run-up to protracted negotiations between toehold in a strategic region that borders West
the Trump administration and the fundamentalist Asia and Central Asia, will help China with its
hard-power projection beyond its borders.

14
 China’ s engagement
with key power centres
in Afghanistan indicates
its intention to play an
important role in the
country after the US
withdrawal.
war is being fought on two fronts in the media and
via diplomatic channels, while its state media have
kept the issue of human rights violations alive.55
At the institutional level, the foreign affairs office
Changing narrative on Muslims: China’s human rights
of the Xinjiang provincial government has been
record has come under increasing scrutiny for its
spearheading the propaganda narrative. Heading
policy in Xinjiang. Former US Secretary of State
the office is Yao Jing,56 whose stints as an envoy
Mike Pompeo has accused China of carrying out a
to Afghanistan and Pakistan between 2015 and
genocide against the Muslim Uyghurs in the region.
2020 will be useful in promoting China’s side of
The US is not alone in its outrage, and there is an
the story.
emerging clamour for a boycott of the 2022 Beijing
Winter Olympics.52 China is certainly trying to shape
China’s moves in Afghanistan will be carefully
opinion in the Muslim world and attempting to
examined by the international community, and
create a narrative that it can champion causes dear
therefore they present both a challenge and an
to it. A case in point was China’s foreign ministry
opportunity. After all, one of the hallmarks of a great
spokesperson Lijian Zhao tweeting an image of an
power is that it is able to mediate in geopolitical
Australian combatant holding a blood-soaked knife
disputes of third countries. While China has been
to the throat of an Afghan child (@zlj517, November
able to establish a working relationship with both
30, 2020). This followed the release of the Brereton
power centres—the Afghanistan government and
report in 2020 on the killing of Afghan civilians by
the Taliban—its lack of experience in the process
Australian special forces soldiers.53
of conflict resolution is visible. Pursuing closer
military engagement with the Afghan armed forces
Since the killings occurred at a time when
will give China exposure in terms of hard-power
peacekeeping efforts by the US and other allies were
projection. At the same time, however, China
ongoing in the war-torn nation, the events helped
runs the risk of getting mired in a possible future
China underscore its accusation that the West was
conflict. This is therefore a test case for Chinese
waging wars on the peoples of Afghanistan and Iraq
peace-making in its backyard.
in the name of combating terrorism and promoting
human rights and freedom.54 China’s propaganda

15
THE RUSSIAN VIEW
Nivedita Kapoor

O
n March 18, Moscow hosted a
meeting of the extended troika on
Afghanistan (Russia, China, Pakistan,
the US), which was also attended to work62 with all Afghans, including the Taliban,
by representatives of the Afghan and both insist that the Taliban ensure that Afghan
government and the Taliban.a The joint statement territory will not be used as a base by any terror
that followed, urged the parties to the conflict to group for launching attacks on other countries.
work towards a negotiated peace settlement and
to reduce violence; it called upon the Taliban to Russia’s own security and geopolitical interests
refrain from pursuing a Spring offensive.57 Engaged make it an interested party in a stable Afghanistan
in parallel efforts58 to encourage a deal, the US and in putting an end to armed conflict in the
State Department has noted that Russia’s efforts region.63 Its concern is that in the event of
“complement all other international efforts” towards heightening instability, violence could spill over
the Afghan peace process. into Central Asia and cause destabilisation close
to Russia’s borders. The threat of extremist and
This is an argument that has been repeatedly radical ideology spreading to Central Asia64 and
advanced by analysts, who have said that talks led onwards to South Caucasus and broader Russia
by two countries are not “contradictory”59 and is another worry, especially when it comes to
that Moscow’s efforts can help make any US deal the Islamic State (ISIS). The continued flow
“sustainable and long-lasting.” Foreign Minister of illegally trafficked drugs into Russia is also a
Sergei Lavrov has on record expressed60 not only continuing problem. These factors make Moscow
support for the Doha talks but willingness to help invested in the ongoing talks regarding the future
continue the process. Moreover, as a permanent of Afghanistan, even as it maintains its position
member of the UN Security Council,61 Russia has against non-intervention through military means.
committed itself to the US-Taliban agreement of
2020. Moscow and Washington agree on the need

a The US was represented by its special envoy for Afghanistan Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad. Other attendees included members of
Afghanistan’s High Council for National Reconciliation, other prominent Afghan political figures, as well as representatives from Qatar
and Turkey.

16
 Russia’ s concern is that in
the event of heightened
instability in Afghanistan, The same aim has necessitated an engagement
with other stakeholders – China, Pakistan,
violence could spill over India, and Iran – as well as outreach to factions
and destabilise Russia’ s within Afghanistan, which has strained Russia’s
relations with the Ghani government. In the
borders. past decade, Moscow expanded its contacts
beyond traditional linkages with the Uzbeks
and Tajiks—characterised by close ties with the
Northern Alliance—to include Afghan Pashtuns.
Since Pashtuns make up about 42 percent of the
Afghan population and also dominate the Taliban
ranks, this move by Russia constituted a “more
Russia only began taking a more active approach diversified and national-level approach.”68
in Afghan affairs in the mid-2010s, driven by an
impending American drawdown and reports of the Russia also has good relations with the regional
emergence of ISIS in the country.65 In November players, and in this context has intensified its
2018 it hosted talks in Moscow, bringing together outreach to Pakistan in recent years. Islamabad’s
for the first time regional powers, an Afghan high- links with the Taliban and its leverage over them69
level peace council delegation, and the Taliban. The was one of the key factors in Russia increasing its
following year, Russia was the venue for an informal association with Pakistan. Given that Russia is only
intra-Afghan dialogue comprising representatives one of the many players in Afghanistan, it will
of the Taliban, a delegation of Afghan politicians need the cooperation of various interested parties,
and the Afghan diaspora – which was criticised by including the US, to “strike a balance”70 among
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani. The US special different domestic Afghan actors to preserve its
envoy for Afghanistan Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad, for interests and influence.
his part, saw the talks as a positive development.
This is not to say that Moscow wants to see an
These developments highlight Russia’s role as indefinite presence of US/NATO troops on the
an important interlocutor, and signal the Kremlin’s ground in Afghanistan. Such a prospect worries
willingness to engage with the Taliban.66 As the Russia about the expansion of US influence
Taliban have not been militarily defeated, it is in Central Asia.71 At the same time, however,
necessary to politically engage them for a stable Moscow remains aware of the perils associated
future for Afghanistan. At present, this translates to with a sudden, complete withdrawal that raises
discussions on a transitional government where the the prospect not only of Taliban gaining control
Taliban has a place alongside other Afghans—the of the country but also of creating widespread
aim is to deny the group a scenario where it seeks to instability.72 Russia is aware of the necessity of US
“seize all power.”67 efforts to keep the situation stable and ensure
that a deal is reached.73 This will also help Russia
preserve its security and geopolitical goals, while
simultaneously expanding influence in the region
through its own efforts and geopolitical design.74

17
IRAN: THE NEIGHBOUR
UNDER A CONTESTED
U.S. CLOUD
Kabir Taneja

I
n the various iterations of discussions
and diplomatic engagements around the
question of peace and stability in Afghanistan, government in Kabul. To put this in perspective,
little attention has been paid to Kabul’s while Tehran has good relations with the Afghan
immediate western neighbour, Iran. Tehran, government, to balance the same, the Taliban
in fact, has high stakes in Afghanistan’s future, and appointed a Shia Hazara, Mawlavi Mahdi, as a
its diplomacy towards the war-torn country, while shadow district chief.75
arguably less overt, will be critical.
Over the past four years, the “maximum
Tehran’s approach to Afghanistan is two-pronged: pressure” policy applied by the US on Iran under
one that is regional in nature, and a second that is President Donald Trump has forced Tehran to
in the context of Iran’s fractured relations with the view the Afghanistan crisis, and an impending US
US. With US Secretary of State Antony Blinken withdrawal, as a tactical opportunity to free up a
suggesting a UN-led regional system involving key theatre in its neighbourhood of US military
the US, Russia, China, Pakistan, India and Iran to influence.76 Today, Iran and the Taliban find
develop a future plan for Afghanistan, Tehran will themselves on common ground when it comes
play a greater role as a border-sharing neighbour. to US presence in Afghanistan. Married into this
Indeed, Iran may have a more pragmatic approach reality, Iran—which in 2001 supported the US
on the issue than Afghanistan’s neighbour on the intervention in Afghanistan in the aftermath of
other side, Pakistan—which would rather have an 9/11—is hedging its bets between the Taliban,
unstable Afghanistan than a stable one that is under and whichever negotiated political eventuality in
a heavy influence of India. Kabul may look like. Scholar Maysam Behravesh
identifies Iran’s tactic as an “unpopular policy of
Iran, the seat of Shia Islam, has historically been strategic hedging”, where the strategic gains and
at ideological odds with a powerful Sunni Taliban. losses are questionable.77 For their part, scholars
However, the US-led intervention in Afghanistan like Colin P. Clarke and Ariane M Tabatabai
that brought US military might closer to Iran’s argue that Iran is viewing this as an opportunity
borders, has driven the way Tehran ultimately has to exert influence in Afghanistan. They refer to
dealt with both the Taliban and the incumbent

18
Tehran’s construct of the Fatemiyoun Brigade, the
Iran-backed Shiite group in Afghanistan made up of
Shia Hazaras which fights on behalf of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) in Syria.78 Still other
analysts, such as scholar Kanishka Nawab, see the contradictory,” and it gives Tehran multiple
Fatemiyoun as Iran’s very own “good Taliban” in options of navigating the question of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan.79 Iran uses both hard and soft power to make sure
that its neighbourhood, as challenging as it could
Iran’s blinkered view on foreign policy almost become, is free of American intervention.81
exclusively revolving around the US is also
highlighted by the fact that Tehran has allegedly All these facets of Tehran’s approach make
given refuge to Al Qaeda hierarchy over the years. its long-term goals towards Afghanistan difficult
Iran has refuted these reports. Clamping down to ascertain. Much of Iran’s current take on the
on Al Qaeda and denying the group safe refuge Afghanistan crisis will ultimately circle around a
is a fundamental part of the deal signed in Doha quick withdrawal of US forces, expedited by Iran’s
between the US and the Taliban in February 2020. foreign policy endeavours across the larger Middle
While Al Qaeda has suffered significant losses in East region, including Iraq and Syria, where it has
leadership, presence and stature, it has found some made significant strides on the ground to use its
common ground with Iran, despite the ideological influence. While Tehran arguably may not become
and theological crevasses between the two. For one, a big player in the Kabul-Taliban-Washington
they are both motivated by the aim of undermining dynamic, it offers partnership to other regional
US presence in the region. To be sure, however, this players working towards peace in Afghanistan, or
has been historically designed by Iran in a careful at the very least, a ceasefire to the decades-long
manner, making its relationship with the Taliban as conflict.82
fractious as the one with the US.80

Iran’s approach to the Afghan question reveals

that while it is not averse to a multi-faceted political
settlement in Kabul—one that involves all parties,
including the Taliban—it will actively work to Both the Taliban and
subvert a constant US military presence. The Biden Iran are motivated by the
administration has brought in Iran into the fold for
discussions on Afghanistan, despite tensions, and in aim of undermining US
clear departure from the Trump administration’s
policy. Scholars Timor Sharan and Andrew Watkins
presence in the region.
have called Iran’s strategy towards Afghanistan,
“coldly pragmatic, multifaceted and often seemingly

19
Endnotes

1 “NSA Mohib insists on Afghan-only talks, no mediator”, TOLO News, October 6, 2020,
https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-166850

2 Abdul Qadir Sediqi “Afghan President Ghani rejects Taliban prisoner release under U.S deal”, Reuters, March 1, 2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-taliban-idUSKBN20O1BE

3 Kathy Gannon, “Pompeo cautions on Afghan talks”, The Associated Press, September 12, 2020,
https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2020/sep/12/pompeo-cautions-on-afghan-talks/

4 “Details of proposed draft for Afghan peace”, TOLO News, March 7, 2021, https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-170504

5 Colm Quinn, “Blinken Threatens May 1 Afghan Troop Withdrawal”, Foreign Policy, March 8, 2021,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/08/afghanistan-letter-blinken-ghani/

6 Anisa Shaheed “Ghani Rejects Prospect of Interim Govt”, TOLO News, January 7, 2021,
https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-169074

7 Nick Schifrin, “As America’s longest war rages on, is there hope for peace?”, PBS, March 18, 2021,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/as-americas-longest-war-wages-on-is-there-hope-for-peace

8 “Joint statement on extended “Troika” on peaceful settlement in Afghanistan”, March 18, 2021,
https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-extended-troika-on-peaceful-settlement-in-afghanistan/

9 “Abdullah opposes removal of Interior Minister”, TOLO News, March 20, 2021, https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-170831

10 Dexter Filkins, “Last exit from Afghanistan”, The New Yorker, March 1, 2021,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/03/08/last-exit-from-afghanistan

11 Bill Roggio and Alexandra Gutowski, “Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan”, Long War Journal,
https://www.longwarjournal.org/mapping-taliban-control-in-afghanistan

12 Abdul Qadir Sediqi, “US, Taliban, say Afghan peace effort discussed in video talks”, Al Jazeera, June 30, 2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban-usa-idUSKBN24112P

13 Shishir Gupta, “Kashmir is India’s internal matter, says Taliba; denies plan to target Delhi”, The Hindustan Times, May 19,
2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/kashmir-is-india-s-internal-matter-says-taliban-denies-plan-to-target-
delhi/story-sOgG3yPsMenP4nZDKRbygL.html

14 “On the Taliban, peace and the future of Afghanistan: a long interview with Kabulov”, Sputnik News, February 17, 2021,
https://tj.sputniknews.ru/politics/20210217/1032840987/intervyu-kabulov.html

15 Aryaman Bhatnagar, “The Emerging India-China Competition in Afghanistan”, World Politics Review, February 24, 2021,
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29446/afghanistan-could-become-a-flashpoint-in-india-china-relations

16 “Afghanistan Peace Agreement”, Tolo News, February 28, 2020, https://tolonews.com/pdf/pdf.pdf

17 “Taliban renew call for ‘Islamic system’ during historic talks with the Afghan government”, France24, September 19, 2020,
https://www.france24.com/en/20200912-warring-afghan-sides-meet-in-doha-for-us-backed-talks

18 “Joint Declaration Between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Bringing Peace to
Afghanistan”, U.S. Department of State, February 29, 2020,
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf

20
19 William Ruger, “Why President Biden Must Withdraw From Afghanistan”, The New York Times, February 26, 2021,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/26/opinion/biden-afghanistan-war.html

20 BBC report, “Afghan conflict: US and Taliban sign deal to end 18-year war”, BBC News, February 29, 2020,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51689443

21 WaPo Editorial, “Opinion: Biden has an admirable Hail Mary for Afghanistan. He also needs a Plan B”, The Washington
Post, March 11, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/biden-has-an-admirable-hail-mary-for-
afghanistan-he-also-needs-a-plan-b/2021/03/10/a9a1314e-80f9-11eb-81db-b02f0398f49a_story.html

22 Madiha Afzal and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Why staying in Afghanistan is the least bad choice for Biden”, Brookings, March
12, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/03/12/why-staying-in-afghanistan-is-the-least-bad-choice-
for-biden/
23 Mujib Mashal and Eric Schmitt, “White House Orders Direct Taliban Talks to Jump-Start Afghan Negotiations”, The New
York Times, July 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/15/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-direct-negotiations.html

24 Sune Engel Rasmussen and Ehsanullah Amiri, “Afghan Government Accepts U.S. Invitation to Peace Conference With
Taliban”, The Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-government-accepts-u-s-invitation-
to-peace-conference-with-taliban-11615650749

25 Phillip Walter Wellman, “US airstrikes target Taliban in Kandahar province”, Stars and Stripes, March 17, 2021,
https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/us-airstrikes-target-taliban-in-kandahar-province-1.666094

26 Madiha Afzal and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Why staying in Afghanistan is the least bad choice for Biden”

27 David S. Cloud and Stefanie Glinski, “Leaving Afghanistan under Trump deal could spur chaos, U.S. commanders say”,
Los Angeles Times, March 14, 2021, https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2021-03-14/us-troops-afghanistan-taliban-peace

28 Dan Lamothe, “Like Trump, Biden has promised to end the ‘forever wars.’ The landscape remains complicated.”, The
Washington Post, December 9, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/09/biden-wars-terrorism-iraq-
afhganistan-syria/

29 William Ruger, “Why Americans Want a President Who Ends Endless Wars”, National Interest, August 17, 2020,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/why-americans-want-president-who-ends-endless-wars-167041

30 Kashish Parpiani, “Will Biden oversee a bipartisan consensus on Trumpism?”, Observer Research Foundation, November 9,
2020, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/will-biden-oversee-a-bipartisan-consensus-on-trumpism/

31 Joe Biden, “Why America Must Lead Again”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again

32 Peter Baker, “How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan”, The New York Times, December 5, 2009,
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/world/asia/06reconstruct.html

33 Michael R. Crittenden, Jeffrey Sparshott and Felicia Schwartz, “Obama Authorizes Up to 1,500 More Troops to Deploy
to Iraq”, The Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-authorizes-up-to-1-500-more-
military-personnel-to-deploy-to-iraq-1415391118

34 Gerald F Seib, “Biden’s Opposition to ‘Forever Wars’ Being Tested in Afghanistan”, The Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2021,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bidens-opposition-to-forever-wars-being-tested-in-afghanistan-11614612130

35 Lolita C Baldor, “Expect US election to have consequences for troops overseas”, AP News, September 12, 2020,
https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-islamic-state-group-elections-joe-biden-campaigns-2b65dc0bdc41591760a340b2ac1
7f15b

21
36 Missy Ryan, Karen DeYoung and Susannah George, “With clock ticking before exit deadline, U.S. appears poised to
postpone troop withdrawal from Afghanistan”, The Washington Post, March 13, 2021,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/us-afghanistan-troop-withdrawal-postponed/2021/03/12/cf92d51c-8296-
11eb-bb5a-ad9a91faa4ef_story.html

37 quoted in Phillip Walter Wellman, “US airstrikes target Taliban in Kandahar province”

38 Sune Engel Rasmussen and Ehsanullah Amiri, “Afghan Government Accepts U.S. Invitation to Peace Conference With
Taliban”, The Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-government-accepts-u-s-invitation-
to-peace-conference-with-taliban-11615650749

39 US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s letter to the President of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani, TOLO News, March 7, 2021,
https://tolonews.com/pdf/02.pdf

40 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, David Zucchino and Lara Jakes, “US pushes UN-led peace conference in letter to Afghan leader”,
The New York Times, March 7, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/07/world/asia/afghanistan-blinken-troop-
withdrawal.html

41 Muhammad Anis, “Pakistan to continue to support Afghan peace process: DG ISPR”, The News, February 25, 2021,
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/795348-pakistan-won-t-support-taliban-dg-ispr

42 “US defense-secretary elect terms Pakistan ‘essential partner’”, The Express Tribune, January 20, 2021,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/2280681/us-defence-secretary-elect-terms-pakistan-essential-partner

43 “PM aide calls for building Pak-US ties around economic security”, Dawn, February 13, 2021,
https://www.dawn.com/news/1607075/pm-aide-calls-for-building-pak-us-ties-around-economic-security
44 Hammad Sarfraz, “Experts hope for a reset in US-Pakistan ties”, The Express Tribute, January 13, 2021,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/2279769/experts-hope-for-a-reset-in-us-pakistan-ties

45 “Afghanistan Study Group Final Report”, United States Institute of Peace, February 2021,
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/afghanistan_study_group_final_report_a_pathway_for_peace_in_afghanistan.
pdf

46 “Turkmenistan, Taliban hold talks”, Business Recorder, February 8, 2021,

https://epaper.brecorder.com/2021/02/08/1-page/868929-news.html

47 Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Wang Yu, “China Actively Upholds Multilateralism, Jointly Building a Community
with a Shared Future for Mankind with Afghanistan” (speech, Kabul, Afghanistan, February 24, 2021), Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1856328.shtml.

48 Ahmad Bilal Khalil, “The Afghan National Unity Government’s ‘China Card’ Approach to Pakistan: Part 2,” The Diplomat,
April 12, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/the-afghan-national-unity-governments-china-card-approach-to-
pakistan-part-2/.

49 “Afghan Taliban meet with Chinese officials after talks with US collapse,” Deutsche Welle, September 22, 2019,
https://www.dw.com/en/afghan-taliban-meet-with-chinese-officials-after-talks-with-us-collapse/a-50540037

50 Gerry Shih, “In Central Asia’s forbidding highlands, a quiet newcomer: Chinese troops,” Washington Post, February 19,
2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-central-asias-forbidding-highlands-a-quiet-newcomer-chinese-
troops/2019/02/18/78d4a8d0-1e62-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html.

22
51 “China says it is helping Afghanistan with defense, counterterrorism,” Reuters, August 30, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-afghanistan/china-says-it-is-helping-afghanistan-with-defense-counterterrorism-
idUSKCN1LF13H

52 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China,

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1847552.shtml

53 Parliament of Australia, The Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry, Karen Elphick,
Canberra: 2020, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/7528572/upload_binary/7528572.
pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22library/prspub/7528572%22

54 “Opinion: Australia, the perpetrator, should truly apologize for scathing crimes,” Xinhua, December 1, 2020,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-12/01/c_139555975.htm

55 CGTN, “Afghans welcome Chinese condemnation over atrocities of Australia,” YouTube video, 1.27 min, December 3,
2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xv9ZGOWqJHM.

56 “驻巴基斯坦原大使姚敬任新疆维吾尔自治区政府外办主任,” (Former ambassador to Pakistan Yao Jing appointed director of

the foreign affairs office of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Government), Guancha, January 20, 2021,
https://www.guancha.cn/politics/2021_01_20_578585.shtml

57 “Joint Statement of extended "Troika" on peaceful settlement in Afghanistan,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation, March 18, 2021,
https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4641844

58 Kirill Krivosheev, “Why Russia Is Hedging Its Bets in Afghanistan,” Carnegie Moscow Center, March 15, 2021,
https://carnegie.ru/commentary/84070

59 Ivan Safranchuk, “Russia's Policy in Afghanistan,” CSIS, February 6, 2019,

https://www.csis.org/events/russias-policy-afghanistan

60 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to media questions,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation, March 11, 2021,
https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/conflicts/-/asset_publisher/xIEMTQ3OvzcA/content/
id/4616426

61 “Security Council resolution endorses moves towards long-sought Afghanistan peace,” UN News, March 10, 2020,
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/03/1059161

62 “Joint Statement on the Signing of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement,” US Department of State, March 6, 2020,
https://2017-2021.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-signing-of-the-u-s-taliban-agreement/index.html

63 Ekaterina Stepanova, “Russia’s Afghan Policy in the Regional and Russia-West Contexts,” IFRI, May 2018,
https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/russieneireports/russias-afghan-policy-regional-and-russia-west

64 Dmitri Trenin and Alexei Malashenko, “Afghanistan: A View from Moscow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2010, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/trenin_afghan_final.pdf

65 Ekaterina Stepanova, “Russia and the Search for a Negotiated Solution in Afghanistan,” Europe-Asia Studies (October
2020):7.

66 Ibid.

67 “O Taliban, mire ibydyshemAfghanistana: bolshoe interview c Kabulovim” (On the Taliban, peace and the future of
Afghanistan: a long interview with Kabulov), Sputnik, February 17, 2021,
https://tj.sputniknews.ru/politics/20210217/1032840987/intervyu-kabulov.html

68 Stepanova, “Russia and the Search.”

23
69 Stepanova, “Russia's Afghan Policy.”

70 Krivosheev, “Why Russia Is Hedging Its Bets.”

71 Trenin and Malashenko, “Afghanistan.”

72 ArkadyDubnov, “Moscow Courts the Taliban,” Carnegie Moscow Center, September 13, 2018,
https://carnegie.ru/commentary/77244

73 Stepanova, “Russia’s Afghan Policy.”

74 David G. Lewis, “Return to Kabul? Russian Policy in Afghanistan,” George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies,
June 2020, https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/return-kabul-russian-policy-afghanistan-0

75 “Afghanistan’s Taliban appoints minority Shia Hazara official in ‘historic first’”, The New Arab, April 29, 2020,
https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/4/29/afghanistans-taliban-appoints-shia-hazara-official-in-historic-first

76 Ellis Mallet, “US policy of ‘maximum pressure’ has failed – why the West needs to re-engage Tehran”, The Conversation,
January 14, 2021, https://theconversation.com/iran-us-policy-of-maximum-pressure-has-failed-why-the-west-needs-to-re-
engage-tehran-153011

77 Maysam Behravesh, “What does Iran want in Afghanistan?”, Al Jazeera, February 4, 2019,
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/2/4/what-does-iran-want-in-afghanistan

78 Colin P. Clarke and Ariane M. Tabatabai, “What Iran wants in Afghanistan”, Foreign Affairs, July 8, 2020,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2020-07-08/what-iran-wants-afghanistan/

79 Kanishka Nawab, “Fatemiyoun: Iran’s ‘Good Taliban’”, TOLO News, February 7, 2021,
https://tolonews.com/opinion-169821

80 Bryce Loidolt, “Reconsidering Al Qaeda – Iranian cooperation”, War On The Rocks, February 17, 2021,
https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/reconsidering-al-qaeda-iranian-cooperation/

81 Timor Sharan and Andrew Watkins, “All Quiet on the Eastern Front? Iran’s Evolving Relationship with an Afghanistan in
Transition”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2021, Pg 2, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kabul/17342.pdf

82 Kabir Taneja, “Analysing Iranian Defence Minister’s visit to India”, Observer Research Foundation, February 8, 2021,
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/analysing-iranian-defence-minister-visit-to-india/

   

24
About the Authors

Ibraheem Bahiss is an independent analyst and consultant on issues related to Afghanistan.

Kalpit A Mankikar is a Fellow at ORF's Strategic Studies Programme.
Nivedita Kapoor is a Junior Fellow at ORF's Strategic Studies Programme.
Kashish Parpiani is a Fellow at ORF, Mumbai.
Sushant Sareen is a Senior Fellow at ORF.
Kriti M Shah is an Associate Fellow at ORF's Strategic Studies Programme. 
Kabir Taneja is a Fellow at ORF's Strategic Studies Programme.

Cover image:Getty Images/Tauseef Mustafa

Back cover image: Getty Images/Andriy Onufriyenko.
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