THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 152663. November 18, 2005.]

EDGARDO D. DOLAR , petitioner, vs . BARANGAY LUBLUB (now P.D.

Monfort North) of the Municipality of Dumangas, herein
represented by its Punong Barangay, PEPITO DUA, PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, DUMANGAS WATER
DISTRICT, 4th ILOILO MOBILE GROUP, ILOILO PROVINCIAL POLICE,
ILOILO REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 68 , respondents.

Norberto J. Procesion for petitioner.

Cartagena Sombiro Erebaren & Gallego for respondent Brgy. Lublub.
Rausa-Chan Mabasa & Associates for PLDT.
Rameses M. Padilla for Dumangas-Barotac Nuevo Water District.

SYLLABUS

1.CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; DONATION; RESCISSION; WHEN JUDICIAL

DECLARATION IS REQUIRED EVEN IF THE CONTRACT OF DONATION EXPRESSLY
PROVIDES FOR AUTOMATIC RESCISSION AND/OR REVERSION IN CASE OF BREACH OF
CONDITION THEREIN AND THE DONEE VIOLATES OR FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE
CONDITION; RATIONALE. — If the corresponding contract of donation expressly provides
for automatic rescission and/or reversion in case of breach of the condition therein, and
the donee violates or fails to comply with the condition, the donated property reverts back
automatically to the donor. Such provision, De Luna teaches, is in the nature of an
agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract in case of breach, without need
of going to court and that upon the happening of the resolutory condition or non-
compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked
without need of a judicial declaration to that effect. Where, however, the donee denies, as
here, the rescission or challenges the propriety thereof, then only the nal award of the
court can, to borrow from University of the Philippines vs. de los Angeles, "conclusively
settle whether the resolution is proper or not." Or, in the language of Catholic Archbishop
of Manila: The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic
revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial
declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement
providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine
whether or not the rescission was proper. When a deed of donation, . . . expressly provides
for automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and
the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since
Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such
stipulations, . . . not contrary to law, . . . public order or public policy, we are of the opinion
that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of
the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the
determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained,
the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself
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 the revocatory act.
2.ID.; ACTION TO QUIET TITLE; EXCEPTION TO THE IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY OF
ACTION IS WHERE THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE LAND;
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Lest it be overlooked, the rule on the imprescriptibility of
actions to quiet title admits of exceptions. The trial court correctly mentioned one,
referring to a situation where the plaintiff in an action to quiet title is not in actual
possession of the land. In the case at bench, petitioner is not in possession of the
property. For sure, he is even asking in his complaint in Civil Case No. 98-033 for recovery
of possession of the donated property. Given the above disquisition, petitioner can hardly
fault the trial court for its holding that petitioner's action to revoke is time-barred. As may
be recalled, respondent barangay had, under the terms of the deed of donation, ve (5)
years from the execution of the conveying deed in September 1981, or up September
1986, within which to introduce and complete the contemplated development of the
donated area. Following Article 764 of the Civil Code, petitioner had four (4) years from
September 1986, or up to September 1990, within which to seek the revocation of the
subject donation on the ground of breach of contract. The Court can grant that the
prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous donations, as here, are governed by
the general rules on prescription, which, in context, is Article 1144 of the Civil Code
providing that actions upon a written contract shall be brought within ten (10) years from
accrual of the right of action. Ten years from September 1986 — the date when petitioner's
right to revoke accrued — would be September 1996. Here, however, what partakes as
petitioner's suit to revoke was led only in May 1998. In all, petitioner's right of action to
revoke or cancel the donation had indeed prescribed, regardless of whether the applicable
legal provision is Article 764 or the favorable Article 1144 of the Civil Code. It should be
stated in this regard, however, that respondent barangay had disputed the existence of the
grounds upon which petitioner anchored his right to revoke, claiming it had already
complied with the construction and development conditions of the donation. From the
records, it would appear that respondent barangay's boast of compliance is not an empty
one. As we see it, the establishment on the donated area of telephone service, a water
service, a police mobile force, and a courtroom, all for the bene ts of the barangay
residents, substantially satis es the terms and conditions of the subject donation. The
concrete paving of roads and the construction of government o ces, sports complex for
public enjoyment and like infrastructures which, per respondent barangay's estimate, cost
not less than P25 Million, add persuasive dimension to the conclusion just made.
Petitioner's long silence vis-Ã -vis the kind of development structures that Barangay Lublub
had decided to put up or allowed to be established on the subject area cannot but be
taken as an indicia of his satisfaction with respondent barangay's choice of public service
projects. The prolonged silence was broken only after the provincial and municipal
governments advertised, then sold the property in a public auction to satisfy questionable
tax liabilities.
3.ID.; CONTRACTS; DONATION; REGISTRATION OF THE DEED WITH THE REGISTRY
OF DEEDS IS NOT NEEDED FOR THE VALIDITY AND EFFICACY OF THE DONATION. —
Petitioner's contention that the donation was invalid because it was not registered in the
Registry of Property deserves no merit. For, as between the parties to the donation and
their assigns, the registration of the deed of donation with the Registry of Deeds is not
needed for its validity and e cacy. In Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court
emphatically dismissed the notion that registration was necessary to make the donation a
binding commitment insofar as the donor and the donee were concerned.

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 DECISION

GARCIA , J : p

Via this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Edgardo D. Dolar seeks the annulment and setting aside of the Orders dated
January 3, 2002 1 and March 5, 2002 2 of the Regional Trial Court at Iloilo City, Branch 38, in
its consolidated Civil Cases No. 98-033 and 00-140 .
The facts:
Petitioner and Sera n Jaranilla were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of
4.6 hectares, identi ed as Lot No. 1, Pcs-06-000744 (Lot No. 1, for brevity), situated in
Brgy. Lublub, Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo. Said property forms part of Lots No. 4181
and 4183 of the Dumangas Cadastre.
On September 16, 1981, petitioner and Jaranilla donated Lot No. 1 to respondent
Barangay Lublub, subject to the following conditions:
A.)That the area donated shall be for the purpose of con[s]tructing building
and/or establishing public plaza, sports complex, public market, health centers
and the like for the use of the Barangay of Lublub . . . which area shall be
hereinafter be known as DON VENANCIO DOLAR PLAZA and shall be so
designated in a proper landmark;

B.)That the construction and development of the area above-described

shall be initiated and completed within ve (5) years from the execution of this
Deed of Donation and should the same be not made or completed then this Deed
of Donation shall have no force and effect whatsoever and the ownership of the
above-described property will revert back to the DONORS including all or any
unfinished improvement the DONEE might have placed or constructed.

C.)That . . . should the use of the area be converted to uses other than
herein stipulated, then this DEED OF DONATION shall be deemed revoked and the
ownership shall revert back to the DONORS . . . (Underscoring added) 3

Then barangay captain Jose Militar accepted the donation in behalf of Brgy. Lublub.
Following the execution of the deed of donation, Brgy. Lublub immediately took
possession of the donated property, which soon became the site of several government
o ce buildings and recreational facilities. For what in hindsight is a typical case of
complacency on the part of a government unit, respondent barangay did not have the
donation registered under its name. On April 12, 1989, or almost eight (8) years from
contract execution, petitioner was issued Transfer Certi cate of Title (TCT) No. T-129837
4 by the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo covering the donated area. IaAHCE

Sometime in June 1989, petitioner executed another deed 5 donating to Brgy.

Lublub, represented by its incumbent barangay captain, the very same area he and Sera n
Jaranilla had earlier donated to the same donee. The second deed of donation contained
exactly the same conditions expressly set forth in the first.
Barangay Lublub's peaceful possession of the donated area remained undisturbed
until mother Lots No. 4181 and 4183 were included in the published list of tax delinquent
properties for disposition. At the auction sale that followed, petitioner emerged as the
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 highest bidder and was, accordingly, awarded the property.
On May 6, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Iloilo City, petitioner led against
Brgy. Lublub a complaint for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession With Damages
involving the 4.6-hectare area he had earlier donated. Basically, petitioner claimed that the
donation in question had ceased to be effective, the donee barangay having failed to
comply with the conditions of the donation. Impleaded as co-defendants of Brgy. Lublub
were entities each occupying a portion of the donated property, such as the Philippine
Long Distance Company (PLDT), the Dumangas Water District, Branch 86 of RTC-Iloilo and
the Iloilo Provincial Police. Docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 98-033 , the
complaint alleged, inter alia, as follows:
10.That . . . defendant [barangay] failed to build or establish within the
period therein stipulated, a public plaza, sports complex . . . and like structures for
the use of Barangay Lublub and neither had it designated in a proper landmark
that the area donated is known as the 'Don Venancio Dolar Plaza'

11.That . . . defendant barangay allowed the use of the area donated to be

converted to uses other than those provided in the donation documents when it
allowed entities like defendants PLDT, Dumangas Water District, PNP Mobile
Force, and Branch 68 of the RTC of Iloilo, to construct buildings and occupy
portions of the lot in question . . .;
12.That because of the failure of defendant barangay to declare the lot in
question in its name for taxation purposes, the same was sold at public auction
for non-payment of real property taxes . . . .
13.That in the light of the terms and conditions in the Deeds of Donation
and actuations of the defendant barangay in relation to the property donated; the
donation . . . has automatically lost its force and effect whatsoever and the
ownership of the property has reverted to the plaintiff or the donation has been
deemed automatically revoked . . .;

14.That the act of defendant barangay in allowing the construction of

buildings by public and private entities on the donated property and holding
o ces therein has cast a doubt or cloud on the title of the plaintiff over the
property in litigation . . . .
15.That the plaintiff, as exclusive, absolute, and registered owner of the
property in question is entitled to the possession of the same. 6

In its Answer With Counterclaim, 7 Brgy. Lublub, after traversing the material
allegations of the complaint, alleged the following as affirmative defenses:
3.2.The said donation was made and accepted on the same public
instrument duly notarized by notary public Nicolas P. Sonalan . . .
3.3.The acceptance of donation was made by then Barangay Captain of
Barangay Lublub Jose Militar with authority from the barangay council;
3.4.After the said deed of donation was executed in compliance with the
conditions set forth in the deed of donation and within ve (5) years from its
execution thereof several structures/buildings were constructed thereon for the
use and benefit of Brgy. Lublub, Dumangas, Iloilo. . . . ;

3.5.Later on . . . (PLDT) was invited to construct an o ce building on

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 subject property for the bene t and use of the residents of Barangay Lublub,
Dumangas, Iloilo;
3.6.Likewise for the use and bene t of the barangay residents an o ce
building of Dumangas Water District was constructed . . .;
3.7.Likewise . . . a PNP Mobile Force was put up on the said place and a
PNP office, in line with this, was constructed . . .;
3.8.Likewise because of the desire of the barangay residents to make the
subject property a plaza and a center place for their needs, Branch 68 of the RTC
of Iloilo was established thereon. All these for the use and bene t of Barangay
Lublub, now P.D. Monfort North, . . . .

And, as grounds for its motion to dismiss embodied in the same answer, Brgy. Lublub
raised the matter of lack of cause of action or prescription of the cause of action, if any,
thus:
4.3Plaintiff proceeded with his complaint . . . without rst seeking the revocation
of the deed of donation in a proper court . . . as provided for under Article
764 of the New Civil Code;

4.4What plaintiff did was to unilaterally revoke the deed of donation . . . and
proceeded with the ling of this case with the assumption that the deed of
donation was already validly revoked. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx

4.6It must be noted that the deed of donation was executed in September 16,
1981. Even if the donee . . . failed to comply with the conditions of the deed
within 5 years or until 1986, plaintiff should have sought revocation of the
donation within 4 years from 1986 or until 1990 only. . . . ;
4.7The deed of donation having been executed in 1981 yet, the donee . . . took
possession of the same in concept of an owner, with just title, adverse,
open, peaceful and continuously up to the present. Hence, even if the
donation is void or conditions were not complied with, the property is now
owned by the donee, . . . as it can be considered that it has been acquired
by prescription.

On top of its Answer with Counterclaim, Brgy. Lublub, this time renamed and known
as Brgy. P.D. Monfort North, led with the same branch of the court a complaint for
Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance/Issuance of Title, Declaration of Nullity of Notice of
Delinquency in the Payment of Real Property Tax . 8 Named as defendants were petitioner
and his wife, certain municipal o cials of Dumangas and the Provincial Treasurer and
Register of Deeds of Iloilo. In its complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-140 , the
plaintiff barangay averred having conducted an investigation which led to the discovery
that the spouses Dolar, colluding with some local o cials, engineered the whole levy
process which culminated in the auction sale of what is now a very valuable donated
property.
To Brgy. Lublub's complaint, petitioner interposed a Motion to Dismiss 9 on grounds
of forum shopping and litis pendentia, obviously on account of the pendency of Civil Case
No. 98-033.
Eventually, the two (2) cases, Civil Cases No. 98-033 and 00-140, wherein the
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 respective principal defendants have each interposed a motion to dismiss, were
consolidated.
In the herein assailed Order dated January 3, 2002 , 1 0 the trial court, on the
nding that petitioner's action was already barred by extinctive prescription under Article
7 6 4 , 1 1 in relation to Articles 733 1 2 and 1144 (1) 1 3 of the Civil Code, granted the
Barangay's motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 98-033 and denied petitioner's similar
motion in Civil Case No. 00-140, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court resolved, as it hereby

resolves, the pending incidents in these two cases, to wit:
1.Defendant Barangay Lublub's built-in Motion to
Dismiss/Affirmative Defenses raised in its Answer in Civil Case No. 98-033,
being impressed with merit, is granted; consequently, said Civil Case No.
98-033 . . . is hereby ordered dismissed;
2.Defendants-spouses Edgardo D. Dolar's and Corazon Yap's
Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 00-140, being without merit, the same
is herby denied.
With this disposition, this Court shall proceed hearing Civil Case No. 00-140
entitled Barangay P.D. Monfort North, Dumangas Iloilo, etc. vs. Municipality of
Dumangas, Iloilo, et al.
SO ORDERED.

Explains the trial court in its impugned Order of January 3, 2002:

Stress should be made that the Deed of Donation executed by Edgardo D.
Dolar (plaintiff in Civil Case No. 98-033) in favor of Barangay Lublub . . . clearly
imposes the following conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the foregoing conditions, . . . should the barangay donee fails
(sic) to comply therewith, the donor had the right to bring action to revoke the
donation (Art. 764, supra) within a period of ten (10) years after the 5-year period
of non-compliance with the conditions in the deed of donation (Art. 733, supra, in
relation to Art. 1144(1), supra). Since the deed of donation was executed on
September 16, 1981, the 5-year period lapsed in 1986; consequently, the action to
revoke should have been brought not later than 1996, however, it appears that
Civil Case No. 98-033 was filed by plaintiff Dolar on May 6, 1998. cCSDTI

Obviously, since the petitory portion of his complaint in Civil Case No. 98-
033 seeks for quieting of his title over the subject property and seeks judgment
declaring him to be the absolute owner thereof, plaintiff Dolar also seeks the
revocation of the subject deed of donation. . . .
. . . . Accordingly, in the light of the foregoing jurisprudence, the action to
revoke donation was to have been led within ten (10) years from the time the
action accrued, i.e., from the time of the non-compliance of the conditions . . . .

In yet another Order dated March 5, 2002 , 14 same court denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
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 Therefrom, petitioner directly comes to the Court on pure questions of law,
submitting issues which may be formulated in the following wise:
1.Whether or not his action is one for revocation of donation instead of for
quieting of title; whether or not the action for quieting has prescribed.
2.Whether or not the deed of donation in question is (a) valid for defective
acceptance and/or (b) no longer effective by reason of the automatic
reversion clause therein.
3.Whether or not respondent barangay had acquired the property in question by
acquisitive prescription.

The petition lacks merit.

It bears stressing that petitioner, at the outset, predicated his action to quiet title on
the ground of ineffectiveness of the donation, albeit he would later add the matter of its
invalidity. Indeed, the make or break issue to be resolved and to which all others must yield
turns on the validity and/or continued e cacy of the subject donation. Valid and effective,
the donation virtually forecloses any claim which petitioner may have over the donated
property against the donee and other occupants thereof, and his action to quiet title is
virtually doomed to fail. Invalid and ineffective, however, the arena is left open for petitioner
to recover ownership and possession of the donated property and have the cloud on his
title thereto, if any there be, removed.
According to petitioner, the subject donation is, by force of Article 745 1 5 of the Civil
Code, void, the accepting barangay captain being without su cient authority for the
purpose. On this point, petitioner cites Section 88 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 1 6 — the
law then in force — and Sections 91 and 389 the Local Government Code of 1991 1 7 . In
gist, these provisions empower the punong barangay to enter into contracts for the
barangay upon authorization of the Sangguniang Barangay, or, in the alternative, the
Sanggunian may authorize the barangay head to enter into contracts for the barangay.
Excepting, however, respondent barangay alleged that then barangay captain Jose
Militar accepted the donation "in the same Deed of Donation per authority granted by the
barangay council." 1 8
The question then of whether Militar was clothed with authority to accept the
donation for respondent barangay stands as disputed. Since the present recourse is
interposed on pure questions of law, we need not resolve the factual issue regarding
Militar's authority, or lack of it, to accept the donation in behalf of respondent barangay. It
should be pointed out, nevertheless, that petitioner is hardly the proper party to challenge
the validity of the donation — which is presumed to be valid — on the ground he presently
invokes. The honor to question Militar's ultra vires act, if this be the case, belongs to the
Sanggunian of Barangay P.D. Monfort North. And more to the point, even assuming ex
gratia argumenti petitioner's legal standing to raise such a question, the final answer would
still lean towards the validity of the donation. For, from the allegations of all the parties, it
would appear that, through the years, the Sanggunian of Lublub as well as all the
succeeding Sangunians of P.D. Monfort North neither repudiated the acceptance of the
donation by Militar nor acted in a manner re ective of their opposition to the donation. On
the contrary, the respondent barangay has been enjoying the material and public-service
bene ts arising from the infrastructures projects put up on the subject property. In a very
real sense, therefore, the Sangguniang Barangay and the good people of P.D. Monfort
North, by availing themselves of such bene ts for more than two decades now, effectively
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 ratified Militar's acceptance of the donation.
This brings us to the question of the e caciousness of the donation. Petitioner
asserts that the 1981 and 1989 deeds of donation, pursuant to the uniform automatic
rescission/reversion clauses therein, ceased to be effective upon respondent's failure to
meet the conditions for which it was charged to ful ll. To petitioner, the automatic
rescission/reversion clause works, in appropriate instances, to revoke the donation and
revert the ownership of the donated property to the donor without the need of judicial
intervention. In support of this argument, petitioner cites De Luna vs. Abrigo 1 9 wherein this
Court put to rest any lingering doubt as to the validity of a stipulation providing for the
automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance by the
donee of the conditions or charges incumbent upon him.
Cited likewise is the subsequent complementary holding in Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila vs. Court of Appeals 2 0 , thus:
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the
revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-
compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in the
case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for
automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the condition
therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary.

De Luna and Archbishop of Manila are, to be sure, apropos. However, petitioner's

argument to support his thesis on the automatic rescission of the donation in question
and the consequent reversion of the property to the donor is an incomplete presentation
of the Court's pronouncements on the point.
We shall explain.
If the corresponding contract of donation expressly provides for automatic
rescission and/or reversion in case of breach of the condition therein, and the donee
violates or fails to comply with the condition, the donated property reverts back
automatically to the donor. Such provision, De Luna teaches, is in the nature of an
agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract in case of breach, without need
of going to court and that upon the happening of the resolutory condition or non-
compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked
without need of a judicial declaration to that effect. Where, however, the donee denies, as
here, the rescission or challenges the propriety thereof, then only the nal award of the
court can, to borrow from University of the Philippines vs. de los Angeles, 2 1 "conclusively
settle whether the resolution is proper or not." Or, in the language of Catholic Archbishop
of Manila: 2 2
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic
revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a
judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of
an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in
order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
When a deed of donation, . . . expressly provides for automatic revocation
and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules
on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article
1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such
stipulations, . . . not contrary to law, . . . public order or public policy, we are of the
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 opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for
automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that
purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission
sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely
declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
ISCaTE

In the case at bench, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent barangay denied or

challenged the purported revocation of the donation. In fact, the denial or challenge is
embodied in respondent barangay's complaint in Civil Case No. 00-140 and in its Answer
cum motion to dismiss in Civil Case 98-033, which similarly prayed for, among other
things, the cancellation of petitioner's title on the subject property.
The foregoing discussion veritably disposes of the second formulated issue.
Now back to the rst issue. It is petitioner's posture that his action in Civil Case No.
98-033 is one for quieting of title under Article 476 2 3 of the Civil Code, not, as erroneously
regarded by the trial court, an action to revoke donation under Article 764 of the Code
which, insofar as pertinent, reads as follows:
Article 764.The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor,
when the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which the former
imposed upon the latter.

xxx xxx xxx

This action shall prescribe after four years from the noncompliance with
the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised
against the donee's heirs. (Underscoring added)

Petitioner's posture does not persuade.

As aptly observed by the trial court, the petitory portion of petitioner's complaint in
Civil Case No. 98-033 seeks for a judgment declaring him the absolute owner of the
donated property, a plea which necessarily includes the revocation of the deed of donation
in question. Verily, a declaration of petitioner' absolute ownership appears legally possible
only when the deed of donation is contextually declared peremptorily revoked.
Owing to the prescriptive component of Article 764 of the Civil Code, petitioner's
dread of the invocation and application of said provision is at once apparent as it is
understandable. For, an action to revoke thereunder prescribes after four (4) years from
non-compliance by the donee with any of the conditions set forth in the deed of donation.
A little less than seventeen (17) years separate September 16, 1981, when the Deed of
Donation was executed, from May 6, 1998, when petitioner led his complaint in Civil Case
No. 98-033. Seventeen (17) years is, in turn, too far removed, as shall be illustrated shortly,
from the 4-year prescriptive period referred to in Article 764 or even from the 10-year
period under Article 1144. 2 4
It cannot be overemphasized that respondent barangay traces its claim of
ownership over the disputed property to a valid contract of donation which is yet to be
effectively revoked. Such rightful claim does not constitute a cloud on the supposed title
of petitioner over the same property removable by an action to quiet title. Withal, the
remedy afforded in Article 476 of the Civil Code is unavailing until the donation shall have
first been revoked in due course under Article 764 or Article 1144 of the Code.

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 Lest it be overlooked, the rule on the imprescriptibility of actions to quiet title
admits of exceptions. The trial court correctly mentioned one, referring to a situation
where the plaintiff in an action to quiet title is not in actual possession of the land. 2 5 In the
case at bench, petitioner is not in possession of the property. For sure, he is even asking in
his complaint in Civil Case No. 98-033 for recovery of possession of the donated property.
Given the above disquisition, petitioner can hardly fault the trial court for its holding
that petitioner's action to revoke is time-barred. As may be recalled, respondent barangay
had, under the terms of the deed of donation, ve (5) years from the execution of the
conveying deed in September 1981, or up September 1986, within which to introduce and
complete the contemplated development of the donated area. Following Article 764 of the
Civil Code, petitioner had four (4) years from September 1986, or up to September 1990,
within which to seek the revocation of the subject donation on the ground of breach of
contract.
The Court can grant that the prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous
donations, as here, are governed by the general rules on prescription, 2 6 which, in context, is
Article 1144 of the Civil Code providing that actions upon a written contract shall be
brought within ten (10) years from accrual of the right of action. Ten years from
September 1986 — the date when petitioner's right to revoke accrued — would be
September 1996. Here, however, what partakes as petitioner's suit to revoke was led only
in May 1998.
In all, petitioner's right of action to revoke or cancel the donation had indeed
prescribed, regardless of whether the applicable legal provision is Article 764 or the
favorable Article 1144 of the Civil Code. It should be stated in this regard, however, that
respondent barangay had disputed the existence of the grounds upon which petitioner
anchored his right to revoke, claiming it had already complied with the construction and
development conditions of the donation. From the records, it would appear that
respondent barangay's boast of compliance is not an empty one. As we see it, the
establishment on the donated area of telephone service, a water service, a police mobile
force, and a courtroom, all for the bene ts of the barangay residents, substantially
satis es the terms and conditions of the subject donation. The concrete paving of roads
and the construction of government o ces, sports complex for public enjoyment and like
infrastructures which, per respondent barangay's estimate, cost not less than P25 Million,
2 7 add persuasive dimension to the conclusion just made.

Petitioner's long silence vis-à-vis the kind of development structures that Barangay
Lublub had decided to put up or allowed to be established on the subject area cannot but
be taken as an indicia of his satisfaction with respondent barangay's choice of public
service projects. The prolonged silence was broken only after the provincial and municipal
governments advertised, then sold the property in a public auction to satisfy questionable
tax liabilities.
Much is made by petitioner about his execution of the 1989 deed of donation, which,
to him, should be utilized as a point of reference in determining the prescriptive period 2 8
defined under either Article 764 or 1144 of the Civil Code. He states:
. . . It has not been explained up to this juncture why the Deed of Donation
of June 1989 . . . is not being mentioned or considered when it is alleged in the
complaint. As will be noted in the Deed of Donation dated 1981 the property was
jointly owned by plaintiff Dolar and Jarantilla, with separate title; in Annex "B", the
Donation of 1989 only plaintiff Dolar signed the same as the only registered
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 owne[r] of the lot donated; . . . . As previously adverted to, the prescriptive period
for violation or contravention of the terms and conditions of Annex "B" should be
reckoned from 1994 and therefore this action filed in 1998 is within the period. ETDHSa

With the view we take of the case, the execution of the 1989 deed of donation is
really of little moment in terms of furthering petitioner's cause. For, at that time, the
property subject of this recourse was no longer his to donate, having earlier relinquished
his ownership thereon. Nemo dat qui non habet — No one can give what he has not. 2 9
Stated a bit differently, respondent barangay's right over the donated area proceeds from
the 1981 donation. The legal effects, therefore, of its action or inaction respecting the
donated property should be assayed on the basis of the 1981 donation.
The last issue raised pivots on whether or not respondent barangay can acquire the
subject property by acquisitive prescription, the petitioner's thesis being that prescription
does not run against registered land. 3 0
Petitioner's point is theoretically correct and may perhaps tip the balance in his
favor, but for the fact that the respondent barangay anchors its title and right over the
donated lot, rst and foremost, by virtue of the deed of donation. Admittedly, standing
alone, adverse, continuous and long possession of a piece of real property cannot defeat
the title of a registered owner. But, then, this postulate presupposes a Torrens Title
lawfully acquired and issued. As may be recalled, however, respondent barangay instituted
Civil Case No. 00-140, supra, for Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance/Issuance of Title
precisely because of the dubious manner by which petitioner allegedly acquired his TCT
No. T-129837 over a lot he admits donating.
Parenthetically, petitioner's contention that the donation was invalid because it was
not registered in the Registry of Property deserves no merit. For, as between the parties to
the donation and their assigns, the registration of the deed of donation with the Registry of
Deeds is not needed for its validity and e cacy. In Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 3 1 the Court emphatically dismissed the notion that registration was necessary to
make the donation a binding commitment insofar as the donor and the donee were
concerned.
As a nal consideration, let it be made clear that this opinion merely resolves the
question of the correctness of the dismissal by the trial court of Civil Case No. 98-033
on the basis of facts attendant thereto in the light of applicable laws and jurisprudence. It
is not meant to prejudge the outcome of Civil Case No. 00-140 which, while related to
Civil Case No. 98-033, tenders different issues, foremost of which is the validity of a
Torrens title issued over a piece of land to one who had previously donated the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., is on official leave.

Footnotes
1.Penned by Judge Roger B. Patricio; Rollo, pp. 25-30.
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 2.Rollo, pp. 73-74.
3.Rollo, pp. 183-185.

4.Rollo, p. 226.

5.Rollo, pp. 85-87.

6.Rollo, pp. 75-81.

7.Rollo, pp. 88-95.

8.Rollo, pp. 198-209.

9.Rollo, pp. 227-234.

10.See Note # 1, supra.

11.Art. 764. The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor when the donee fails to
comply with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter. . . .

This action shall prescribe after four years from the non-compliance with the condition. . . .
12.Art. 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts . . . .

13.Art. 1144 (1) provides that an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten (10)
years from the time the right of action accrues.
14.See Note #2, supra.

15.Article 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or through an authorized
person with a special power for the purpose, or with a general and su cient power;
otherwise, the donation hall be void.
16.Local Government Code of 1983.

17.Rep. Act No. 7160.

18.Complaint of Barangay PD Monfort North, p. 3; Rollo, p. 200.

19.181 SCRA 150 [1990].

20.198 SCRA 300 [1991].

21.35 SCRA 102 [1970]

22.See Note # 20, supra.

23.Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title. . . .

24.Art. 1144 provides that an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues.
25.Mamadsual vs. Moson, 190 SCRA 82 [1990].

26.De Luna vs. Abrigo, 181 SCRA 150 [1990] citing cases.
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 27.Rollo, p. 366.
28.Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp. 416-417.

29.Garcia vs. CA, 130 SCRA 435 [1984].

30.Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 16; Rollo, p. 417.

31.176 SCRA 340 [1989].

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