1 Torts and Damages | Atty.

Marianne Beltran-Angeles

G.R. No. L-10563 March 2, 1916 When the accused engineer first saw the deceased, he was walking near
the track, in the same direction as that in which the train was running.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, The train, a heavy freight train, had just rounded a curve, and the man in
vs. front was about 175 meters ahead of the engine. The engineer immediately
ANTONIO BONIFACIO, defendant-appellant. blew his whistle twice, and noticing, a few moments afterwards, that the
man in front did not respond to the warning by stepping aside from the
William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant. track, he tried to slow down the engine, but did not succeed in stopping in
Acting Attorney-General Zaragoza for appellee. time to avoid running down the pedestrian. He did not attempt to stop his
engine when he first saw the man walking along the side of the track; but
he claims that he did all in his power to slow down a few moments
CARSON, J.:
afterwards, that is to say after he had blown his whistle without apparently
attracting the attention of the pedestrian, who, about that time, turned
The appellant in this case was charged in the court below with homicidio and attempted to cross the track.
por imprudencia temeraria (homicide committed with reckless negligence),
and was convicted of homicidio committed with simple negligence and
The only evidence as to the rate of speed at which the train was running at
sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor and to pay the costs
the time of the accident was the testimony of the accused himself, who said
of the proceedings.
that his indicator showed that he was travelling at the rate of 35 kilometers
an hour, the maximum speed permitted under the railroad regulations for
The information charges the commission of the offense as follows: freight trains on that road.

On or about the 31st day of October of the present year, 1913, in There was a heavy decline in the track from the turn at the curve to a point
the barrio of Santa Rita of the municipality of Batangas, Batangas, some distance beyond the place where the accident took place, and the
the accused, being an engineer and while conducting the freight undisputed evidence discloses that a heavy freight train running at the
train which was going to the municipality of Bauan, at about 10 rate of 35 miles an hour could not be brought to a stop on that decline in
o'clock in the morning of the said day saw that Eligio Castillo, a much less than one hundred and fifty meters.
deaf-mute, was traveling along the railroad track, and as the said
Castillo did not get off of the said track in spite of the whistle or
We think that the meter statement of facts, as disclosed by the undisputed
warnings given by the accused, the accused did maliciously and
evidence of record, sufficiently and conclusive demonstrates that the death
criminally cause the said train to run over the said Castillo,
of the deaf-mute was the result of a regrettable accident, which was
thereby killing him instantly; an act committed with violation of
unavoidable so far as this accused was concerned.
law.

It has been suggested that, had the accused applied his brakes when he
On the 31st of October, 1913, Eligio Castillo, a deaf-mute, was run down
first saw the man walking near the track, after his engine rounded the
and killed, while attempting to cross the railroad track in the barrio of
curve, he might have stopped the train in time to have avoided the
Santa Rita, Batangas, by an engine on which the accused was employed as
accident, as it is admitted that the distance from the curve to the point
engineer. The deaf-mute stepped out on the track from an adjoining field
where the accident occurred was about 175 meters.
shortly before the accident, walked along one side of the track for some
little distance and was killed as he attempted, for some unknown reason,
to cross over to the other side. But there is no obligation on an engine driver to stop, or even to slow down
his engine, when he sees an adult pedestrian standing or walking on or

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near the track, unless there is something in the appearance or conduct of attributed wholly to the reckless negligence of the deaf-mute, in walking
the person on foot which would cause a prudent man to anticipate the on the track without taking the necessary precautions to avoid danger from
possibility that such person could not, or would not avoid the possibility of a train approaching him from behind.
danger by stepping aside. Ordinarily, all that may properly be required of
an engine driver under such circumstances is that he give warning of his The trial judge, although he was satisfied that the accused was not guilty
approach, by blowing his whistle or ringing his bell until he is assured that of reckless negligence, held that he was guilty of homicide through simple
the attention of the pedestrian has been attracted to the oncoming train. negligence, accompanied by a breach of speed regulations, and imposed the
penalty prescribed for that offense in article 568 of the Penal Code.
Of course it is the duty of an engine driver to adopt every measure in his
power to avoid the infliction of injury upon any person who may happen to The only evidence as to the speed at which the train was running at the
be on the track in front of his engine, and to slow down, or stop altogether time of the accident was the testimony of the accused himself, who said
if that be necessary, should he have reason to believe that only by doing so that before the accident occurred his indicator showed that he was running
can an accident be averted. at the rate of 35 kilometers an hour, the maximum speed authorized under
the railroad regulations. From this statement of the accused, taken
But an engine driver may fairly assume that all persons walking or together with the evidence disclosing that the train was running on a down
standing on or near the railroad track, except children of tender years, are grade at the time when the accident occurred, the trial judge inferred that
aware of the danger to which they are exposed; and that they will take the train must have been running at more than 35 miles an hour at that
reasonable precautions to avoid accident, by looking and listening for the moment, that is to say at a speed in excess of that allowed under the
approach of trains, and stepping out of the way of danger when their railroad regulations.
attention is directed to an oncoming train.
We are of opinion, however, that the evidence does not sustain a finding,
Any other rule would render it impracticable to operate railroads so as to beyond a reasonable doubt, that the train was running at more than 35
secure the expeditious transportation of passengers and freight which the miles an hour at the time when the accident occurred. We think that the
public interest demands. If engine drivers were required to slow down or statement of the accused engineer that the indicator or his engine showed
stop their trains every time they see a pedestrian on or near the track of that he was running at 35 miles an hour before the accident referred to the
the railroad it might well become impossible for them to maintain a time immediately preceding the accident. Even if it were true, as the trial
reasonable rate of speed. As a result the general traveling public would be judge inferred from his evidence, that the accused looked at the indicator
exposed to great inconvenience and delay which may be, and is readily several seconds before the accident, and before the train entered on the
avoided by requiring all persons approaching a railroad track, to take down-grade some 175 yards from the place at which it occurred, it does not
reasonable precautions against danger from trains running at high speed. necessarily follow that the speed of travel was increased thereafter beyond
the limit prescribed by regulations. That would depend to some extent on
There was nothing in the appearance or conduct of the victim of the the steam pressure maintained on the engine, and perhaps upon other
accident in the cast at bar which would have warned the accused engine factors not developed in the record.
driver that the man walking along the side of the tract was a deaf-mute,
and that despite the blowing of the whistle and the noise of the engine he Mere conjecture, and inferences unsupported by satisfactory evidence, are
was unconscious of his danger. It was not until the pedestrian attempted not sufficient to establish a material finding of fact upon which a finding of
to cross the track, just in front of the train, that the accused had any reason guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, can be sustained.
to believe that his warning signals had not been heard, and by that time it
was too late to avoid the accident. Under all the circumstances, we are
satisfied that the accused was without fault; and that the accident must be
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3 Torts and Damages | Atty. Marianne Beltran-Angeles

Moreover, even if it were true that the train was running at a speed slightly conviction thereunder cannot be maintained, unless there was culpable
in excess of the limit prescribed by regulations, just before the accident negligence in the violation of a duly prescribed regulation; and unless,
took place, that fact would not justify or require the imposition of the further, the latter was the proximate and immediate cause of the injury
penalty prescribed in article 568 of the Criminal Code, it affirmatively inflicted:
appearing that the slight excess of speed had no possible causal relation to
the accident. Question No. 17. — A pharmacist left his store forgetting and
leaving behind the keys to the case where the most powerful drugs
Granting it to be true, as found by the trial judge, that the train had gained were kept. During his absence his clerk filled a prescription which
some small addition in speed beyond the authorized rate of travel, as a he believed was duly made out by a physician but which, in fact,
result of the fact that it was running on down grade for about one hundred was signed by an unauthorized person. The prescription called for
meters before the accident occurred, it affirmatively appears from the certain substances which were afterwards employed to procure an
statement of facts set forth above, that, under all the circumstances, the abortion. These substances, according to a medical report, were of
accident must have taken place whether the speed had been slightly under a poisonous and extremely powerful nature such as should be most
rather than slightly over the limit prescribed by regulation, and that it was carefully safeguarded and only expended after ratification of the
due wholly to the negligent conduct of the deceased. The provisions of prescription in accordance with article 20 of the ordinance relating
article 568 of the Criminal Code under which the accused was convicted to the practice of pharmacy. Under these circumstances would it be
are as follows: proper to consider the pharmacist as guilty of the offense of
simple imprudence with violation of the regulation of the said
xxx xxx xxx faculty? The Supreme Court has decided this question in the
negative on the ground that the fact of the pharmacist having
Any person who, while violating any regulation, shall, by any act forgotten and left behind, during the short time he was out
of imprudence or negligence not amounting to reckless walking, the key of the closet in which in conformity with the
imprudence, commit an offense, shall suffer the penalty of arresto pharmacy ordinances, he kept the most powerful and active drugs,
mayor in its medium and maximum degrees. properly considered, does not constitute the culpable
negligence referred to in article 581 of the Penal Code, nor was it
the proximate and immediate cause of the said prescription being
This does not mean that in every case in which one accidentally injures or
filled in his store without being properly ratified by the physician
kills another he is criminally liable therefor, if at the moment he happens
who signed it, as required by the said ordinances. The Court held,
to be guilty of a violation of some petty regulation (reglamento). The injury
therefore, that the trial court committed an error of law in holding
or death must have resulted from some "imprudence or negligence"
the appellant liable. (Decision of December 23, 19881; Official
(imprudencia o negligencia) on his part. True it need only be slight
Gazette of April 14, 1882.)
negligence, if accompanied by a violation of the regulations, but the
relation of cause and effect must exist between the negligence or
imprudence of the accused and the injury inflicted. If it appears that the See also the recent decision of the Tribunal Supremo de España dated July
injury in no wise resulted from the violation of the regulations, or the 11, 1906, wherein the doctrine is reaffirmed in a case involving the alleged
negligent conduct of the accused, he incurs no criminal liability under the negligence of certain railroad employees in handling railroad cars.
provisions of this article.
Doubtless a presumption of negligence will frequently arise from the very
Viada, in his commentaries on this article of the Penal Code (vol. 3, p. 685), fact that an accident occurred at the time when the accused was violating
sets out the following question and answer which clearly discloses that a a regulation; especially if the regulation has for its object the avoidance of
such an accident. But this presumption may, of course, be rebutted in
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4 Torts and Damages | Atty. Marianne Beltran-Angeles

criminal as well as in civil cases by competent evidence. In the Federal

Where a ship at the time of collision is in actual violation of a

The evidence of record in the case at bar clearly and satisfactorily discloses
that even if the train was running at a speed slightly in excess of the
maximum speed prescribed in the regulations, that fact had no causal
relation to the accident and in no wise contributed to it.

The judgment convicting and sentencing the appellant in this case should
be reversed, and the accused acquitted of the offense with which he is
charged in the information, and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of
both instances de officio. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The writer is of the opinion that the defendant should be sentenced for the
crime of reckless negligence to eight months of prision correccional, the
accessories, indemnity and costs with subsidiary imprisonment.

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