Salientes VS Abanilla
Salientes VS Abanilla
Salientes VS Abanilla
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
SO ORDERED.[4]
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied on March 19, 2004.
Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari anchored on the
following grounds:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing the respondent
judge gravely abused his discretion, amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction in issuing an order for the petitioner-mother
to first show cause why her own three-year old child in her
custody should not be discharged from a so-called restraint
despite no evidence at all of restraint and no evidence of
compelling reasons of maternal unfitness to deprive the petitioner-
mother of her minor son of tender years. The assailed orders,
resolutions and decisions of the lower court and the Court of
Appeals are clearly void;
Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213[7] of the Family
Code, which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They
maintain that herein respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling
reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.
Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the
proper remedy for private respondent was simply an action for custody, but
not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the
mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insist there
was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own mother. There was
no need for the mother to show cause and explain the custody of her very own
child.
Private respondent counters that petitioners argument based on Article 213
of the Family Code applies only to the second part of his petition regarding the
custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as
the father to see his son. He asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available
against any person who restrains the minors right to see his father and vice
versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had petitioners
really intended to bring the child before the court in accordance with the new rules
on custody of minors, they would have done so on the dates specified in
the January 23, 2003 and the February 24, 2003 orders of the trial court.
Private respondent maintains that, under the law, he and petitioner
Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over their son. He
alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country as
required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have
custody of their son and not the maternal grandparents.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the assailed January 23,
2003 Order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties
but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they
are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent
to the trial courts full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending
before it.
Under Rule 41, Section 1[8] of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is
not appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under
Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent
upon petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the order.
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is
withheld from a person entitled thereto.[9] Under Article 211[10] of the Family Code,
respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over
their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is
separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In
the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still
entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents cause
of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition.
[11]
Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the supreme
consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code[12] unequivocally provides that
in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration.[13]
Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to
any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and
explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line
with the directive in Section 9[14] of A.M. 03-04-04-SC[15] that within fifteen days
after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court
shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the
minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did.
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial
adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody
by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondents
petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own
child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his
child under seven years of age.
In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January 23,
2003 and February 24, 2003. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the
petition for certiorari against the said orders of the trial court.