G.R. No.

112089       January 24, 2001

REMEDIOS A. DUPASQUIER, ENRIQUE M. ZALAMEA, JR., RAMON HENARES, RODRIGO

GATMAITAN, JR., JESUS CORDERO, BENJAMIN ELIZAGA AND EDUARDO TACOLOD,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR OF RIZAL, JUDGE JULIO R. LOGARTA of Branch 63, Regional Trial Court of
Makati, BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

X----------------------------------------X

G.R. No. 112737       January 24, 2001

HON. EDUARDO G. MONTENEGRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON. MAURO C.

CASTRO, in his capacity as PROVINCIAL Prosecutor for Rizal; HON. TEOFILO L. GUADIZ,
JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 147, Makati; HON. CANDIDO P.
VILLANUEVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 144, Makati, and HON. JULIO
R. LOGARTA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 53, Makati, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FORTUNATO M. DIZON, JR., respondents.

PARDO, J.:

These are two (2) consolidated cases assailing two (2) decisions 1 of the Court of Appeals involving
the prosecution of officials of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, for estafa.

In the first decision, the Court of Appeals 2 dismissed the petition of Remedios A. Dupasquier,
Enrique M. Zalamea, Jr., Ramon Henares, Rodrigo Gatmaitan, Jr., Jesus Cordero, Benjamin Elizaga
and Eduardo Tacolod, for the dismissal of the charges against them.  1âwphi1.nêt

In the second decision, the Court of Appeals 3 ordered petitioners Secretary of Justice, Provincial
Prosecutor for Rizal, and the trial courts to dismiss the charges against respondent Fortunato M.
Dizon, Jr.

In 1987, Carlota P. Valenzuela, deputy governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines and
receiver/liquidator of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, filed with the Department of Justice
a complaint for estafa against the following Banco Filipino officials in connection with irregular grants
of commercial loans to corporate subsidiaries of Banco Filipino, namely: Anthony C. Aguirre, Tomas
B. Aguirre, Teodoro C. Arcenas, Fortunato M. Dizon, Jr., Alberto C. Aguirre, Delfin M. Dimagiba,
Napoleon L. Buencamino, Enrique M. Zalamea, Jr., Eugenio A. Osias, Ramon Henares, Benjamin E.
Elizaga, Martin L. Calicutan, Eduardo V. Tacolod, Eduardo F. Quirino, Cynthia Subijano, Solita M.
Manalaysay, Hautila D. Jose, Remedios Dupasquier; Nancy L. Ty and Elena Pallasique. 4

After conducting preliminary investigation, Rizal 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Herminio T.
Ubana, Sr. issued two (2) resolutions 5 recommending the filing of information for estafa against the
above-named officials, except for Nancy L. Ty and Elena Pallasique. With the approval of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, on August 8, 1988, informations 6 were thus filed against said officials
with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 63.
From the resolutions of the prosecutor, some of the accused-officials moved for a reconsideration or
reinvestigation alleging serious irregularities during the preliminary investigation, to wit: (a) parties
not originally charged were found indictable in said resolutions and (b) of many who were not
included in the resolutions were charged in the informations filed in Cour.

On April 10, 1989, Rizal Provincial Prosecutor Mauro M. Castro issued a resolution 7 granting a
reinvestigation.

On March 21, 1991, a panel of investigators composed of 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Edwin Condaya,
3rd Assistant Prosecutor Domingo Allena and 4th Assistant Prosecutor Eduardo Bautista prepared a
memorandum8 for Provincial Prosecutor Mauro M. Castro recommending the dismissal of the
charges against the accused for lack of probable cause.

On July 11, 1991, respondent Provincial Prosecutor Castro issued a resolution 9 reversing the
investigating panel's recommendation and ordered the prosecution of petitioners 10 and respondent
Fortunato Dizon, Jr.11

On or about July 29, 1991, petitioners 12 filed a motion for reconsideration13 of the July 11, 1991
resolution of Provincial Prosecutor Castro. On the other hand, on July 24, 1991, respondent
Fortunato M. Dizon, Jr. with others filed with the Office of the Secretary of Justice a petition for
review .14

On October 2, 1991, Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello dismissed respondent Dizon's
petition for review.15 On March 25, 1992, Secretary of Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro denied
respondent Dizon's motion for reconsideration. 16

On May 18, 1992, respondent Dizon17 filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus18 to annul the resolution19 of Acting Secretary of Justice Eduardo G.
Montenegro, and to order the dismissal of all the criminal cases against him before the Makati
Regional Trial courts.

On May 28, 1992, Provincial Prosecutor Mauro M. Castro denied the motion for reconsideration of
the petitioners.20

On June 19, 1992, petitioners appealed to the Secretary of Justice from the resolution of respondent
Provincial Prosecutor Castro.21

On July 13, 1992, Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon dismissed the appeal of petitioners. 22 On
August 24, 1992, Undersecretary Ramon S. Esguerra denied the motion for reconsideration. 23

On September 8, 1992, petitioners24 filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus.25 They alleged that:

" 1. The respondents are acting with an uneven hand and, in fact, are acting oppressively
against Remedios Dupasquier when they allow her prosecution while excluding another
similarly situated.

"2. The respondent Secretary of Justice committed an act in grave abuse of his discretion
and in excess of his jurisdiction when he sustained the grave abuse of discretion of the
respondent Provincial Prosecutor in substituting his judgment in place of that of the panel
formed by him without first informing the petitioners of the result of the investigation.
 3. the respondents Secretary and Provincial Prosecutor acted in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to an excess of jurisdiction when they continued prosecution of the petitioners
despite lack of basis therefore and despite lack of damage on the part of Banco Filipino
Savings & Mortgage Bank."

On June 18, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision 26 dismissing the petition for lack of
merit. On July 5, 1993, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. 27

During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, 28 on September 03, 1993, the Court of
Appeals promulgated a decision29 setting aside the resolution30 of respondent Secretary of Justice
and ordering the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent Dizon.

Upon learning of the triumph of their co-accused respondent Dizon, Jr., 31 on September 14,
1993,32 petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a supplemental motion for reconsideration and an
urgent motion for the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 28867 and CA-G.R. SP No. 27922. On
October 1, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. 33

Hence, on November 9, 1993, they filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on
certiorari34 praying that the criminal cases against them be dismissed.

On January 10, 1994, the prosecution 35 interposed an appeal via certiorari to the Supreme Court
from the decision of the Court of Appeals. 36

On motion of petitioners,37 on August 22, 1994, the Court resolved to consolidate the two cases. 38

Petitioners39 raised several interrelated issues. However, the crucial issue raised is whether the court
may review findings of the prosecutor on the existence of probable cause sufficient to file the proper
information in court and substitute its judgment to that of the prosecutor in determining the
sufficiency of evidence to establish the guilt of petitioners for estafa.

We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor. 40 An
investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action where he is not convinced that
he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the averments. 41 Prosecuting officers have
equally the duty not to prosecute when after investigation or reinvestigation they are convinced that
the evidence adduced was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.42 Thus, the determination of
the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is vested with discretion in the
discharge of this function.43

Consequently, the fact that the investigating prosecutor exonerated some of the co-accused in the
preliminary investigation does not necessarily entitle petitioners to a similar exoneration where the
investigating prosecutor found probable cause to prosecute them for the crime charged.

The Court finds erroneous the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the investigating
prosecutor's recommendation for the prosecution of respondent Fortunato M. Dizon, Jr. Courts
should give credence, in the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, to the findings and
determination of probable cause by prosecutors in a preliminary investigation. 44 We have repeated
this dictum in People v. Cerbo,45 where we said that:

"In our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor has the quasi- judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court. Courts must respect the
 exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the accused is valid on its face,
and no manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice can be imputed to the public
prosecutor."

Finally, we note that the parties46 are ventilating before us the merits of their respective causes or
defenses. This is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence. The
presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature that may be passed upon
after a full-blown trial on the merits.47

WHEREFORE, the Court:

(1) In G. R. No.112089, DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.28867; and

(2) In G.R. No. 112737, GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27922.

Let the two cases be REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.