Review and Reaction, Shaye J. D. Cohen
Review and Reaction, Shaye J. D. Cohen
Review and Reaction, Shaye J. D. Cohen
A. Chronology.
This was a concise review of the political history of the period. Cohen is describing
some of the framework he is working in and explaining his choice of terms. There
were two items of interest here, new to me: 1) Herod the Great built pagan temples as
well as the Jewish one (p.16) and 2) Jews in Egypt, Cyprus, and Cyrenaica revolted in
115-117, resulting in the decimation of Egyptian Jewry (p.17).
Cohen defends his choice of a historical framework that has no theological (i.e.
Christian or rabbinic) bias.
This was the most interesting part of the chapter - a comparison of pre-exilic and
second temple people and religion. Judaism became less tribal, more individualistic,
less political, more religious in its self-definition. Private piety became more
important, eschatological notions developed, angel and demonology developed, and
scribes (students of the book) became religious authorities in an age aware that it was
postclassical.
Cohen examines three spheres of life and the degree to which gentile ideas influenced
Jews. In the political sphere, the general response was Jewish submission, based on
the teaching of Jeremiah. This carried over into early Christian approaches to civil
authority (Rom. 13). Cohen briefly recounts the four major exceptions to Jewish
submission.
Cohen explains why he does not like the term Hellenism (it is too vague, because it
can refer either to complete apostacy or to non-Palestinian Judaism; it also involved
syncretism of many Oriential ideas as well as Greek ideas). Most Jews adapted at least
some Greek customs; the question was not whether but how much. A line between
normative Judaism and Hellenistic Judaism would be arbitrary. Cohen does not
suggest a better term. Perhaps Greek-speaking would be descriptive for some, perhaps
less-orthodox, syncretistic, or gentile-influenced for others.
I thought it interesting that Cohen classified the apostle Paul as ``not law-observant''
(p.36). Yet Paul describes himself as a Pharisee. It seems that ``law'' is even more
vague than Hellenistic, but Cohen doesn't define his term.
Cohen documents the influence of Greek language, even within rabbinic circles, but I
think he assumes too much when he says that the Qumran scrolls demonstrate that
Hebrew was the predominate literary language of the time (p.40). I think it erroneous
to assume that Qumran Jews were typical.
Religion is discussed under the subhead ``philosophy and way of life'' much as an
atheistic social scientist might classify it. That is a bit annoying, but I remember that I
am reading history, not an exhortation to faith. He contrasts the OT anthropomorphic
God with the philosophers' abstract god, but did not explain the result of the conflict
between these two concepts. I suppose he will in chapter 3.
Gentiles had both animosity and attraction to Judaism. Anti-Judaism wasn't anti-
Semitism, Cohen argues at length, but he is giving semantic distinctions more
emphasis than I think they are worth. The fact that the term anti-Semitism was coined
in the 19th century doesn't mean the same attitudes did not exist earlier. The fact that
quasi-Christian arguments are now used in anti-Semitism does not make the basic
attitude or result different in antiquity. It is OK to explain the contributing factors to
ancient anti-Judaism, but it seems irrevelant (for the purpose of this book) to argue
about differences with modern anti-Semitism. Cohen has failed to convince me of the
distinction, and his concern with semantics makes me question the validity of some of
his other points. Whenever an author argues at length about something that isn't
essential for his book, he seems to be grinding an ax. I think that anti-Judaism is a
better term, for both modern and ancient animosities, simply because it identifies
which Semitic group is the target of animosity.
Once again Cohen takes issue with terms. ``The pervasive influence of Christianity on
our thinking makes us equate `religion' with theology or `faith.' This equation is true,
perhaps, for Christianity, but is false...for the Judaism of antiquity'' (p.60). If the
equation is false, he simply needs to say so; he does not need to reject the term.
Indeed, he could have easily avoided the term by talking about ``Jewish religious
practices and beliefs.'' Instead, he argues, and his opponent is Christianity. However,
his point is valid: ancient religions were more concerned with practice than with
belief.
B. Practices
His historical look at prayer matches what I already knew. What was especially
interesting is the way prayer supplemented and eventually replaced sacrifices, making
participation in the religion accessible to more people. Diasporan meeting-places were
proseuchai, places of prayer, not synag_gai, places of meeting. I always thought that
the synagogue was a diasporan invention! He promises to discuss this in greater detail
later.
The description of communal prayers was interesting with some parallels to Christian
prayers, specifically the use of first person plural, as we also see in the Lord's Prayer.
It was also interesting that he treated Scripture study as a part of prayer. Since study
was ``the basis of all rabbinic piety'' (p.72), it seems to deserve more prominence.
The purpose of rituals was to keep the people aware of God, so more rituals were
developed. Priestly rituals were modified to become rituals required for the public.
Some people became more mindful of the rituals than of God. [This seems to be a
``yoke'' or legalism Jesus and Paul objected to; we can be mindful of God without
requiring all those rituals, especially through the Holy Spirit. A chief problem of the
requirements is that, by focusing on practice rather than belief, they encourage self-
righteousness. They also led to ostracism of those who do not have the same practices;
Jesus objected to these religious barriers.] The purpose of the rituals, one of Cohen's
major points, was to ``democratize religion'' (pp. 74ff.). [Christianity continued this
trend -- a point that Cohen does not make. Christianity made religion meaningful to
the masses, made piety attainable even by the Gentiles.]
Cohen compares the decree of Acts 15 with a formula of the Bar Kokhba period
(p.77) and concludes that they are ``strikingly similar'' if we omit one thing and
reinterpret another. The comparison is interesting but not convincing.
C. Beliefs
His discussion of theology was not particularly illuminating. The Jews affirmed the
truth of conflicting doctrines. One God but multitudinous spirit powers, a far-off God
that is accessible, a just God who allows evil, who decrees all but allows free will.
Some of these tensions continue today in Christianity, too.
Cohen further explains the development of apocalyptic ideas: personal and national
eschatology, angels, and demons. He traces some of this back to Ezekiel's
proclamation that each person is rewarded according to his own works. Since it wasn't
always true in this life, there had to be another. Since the nation suffered unfairly in
this age, there had to be another.
I am not comfortable with Cohen's explanation of the origin of the doctrine, but I
recognize the importance of the topic. The more I learn about apocalyptic ideas, the
more I see their importance in the New Testament. Cohen's suggestions for further
reading (p.241) may be helpful.
D. Conclusion
His discussion of ethics [good works, he called it somewhere in this chapter] seemed
quite inadequate. He (seemingly to defend himself against Christian accusations) said
that ethics (love for neighbor) was as important as ritual (love for God), but he didn't
describe what Jewish ethics entailed. For a religion that is based more on practice than
belief, this seems to be a serious discrepancy. I suppose other books have lengthier
discussions of this topic.
There were fewer points of interest in this chapter, though the basic framework of
society is an important building-block for what Cohen may cover in later chapters.
The high priests had great power and influence due to the fact that Jewish monism
caused all Jews to look to the central temple. High priests (the term includes their
families) were so much more powerful than ordinary priests that class tensions were
strong.
The Sanhedrin was an ad hoc committee controlled by the high priest; I had thought it
was a more powerful, independent body.
C. Private Organizations
This is Cohen's longest chapter - a documentation of the diversity within Judaism. The
way he describes it, the first centuries were the time of greatest diversity. He does not
directly make this observation, but it seems that this diversity is what allowed the
development of Christianity. The religious and social chaos of the day enabled
Christianity's variant ideas to flourish long enough to become stabilized well enough
to survive expulsion from Judaism.
I like his working definition of a sect entailing social separation and claim for
exclusive truth (p.125). However, problems remain in applying the definition: Did the
Pharisees, in separating themselves from the common people, separate ``from a larger
religious body''? Did the majority of Jews form a religious body, or is ``Jew'' primarily
an ethnic term rather than a religious one?
It might also be questioned whether Christianity was ever a sect of Judaism. Jesus and
his followers claimed exclusive truth, but they didn't separate themselves. They were
what Cohen calls an ``elite.'' It seems that separation came at the initiation of Judaism,
not the Christians.
``The targets of sectarian polemics were primarily three: law, temple, and scripture''
(p.128). Temple, however, is listed on the next page as an area of law. Cohen's main
point is that the debates centered on practice, not theology. Cohen emphasizes the
important role that the influential but corrupt temple played in sectarianism: ``Sects
disappeared after 70 C.E., because the destruction of the temple removed one of the
chief focal points of sectarianism'' (p.132). This seems overstated. Another possible
explanation is that sects disappeared after 70 because the Essenes and Sadducees were
wiped out by the Romans and Pharisaism became the default norm.
It was interesting that the canon was not in dispute; there was no canon and seemingly
no desire for one. Canonization, I suspect, came due to Christianity and the
destruction of Judaism's center in Jerusalem.
Cohen says that the interpretation of scripture was a focus of debate, but he does not
prove his point. To be sure, sects tried to interpret the scriptures to support their other
points, but Cohen gives no evidence that the debate centered on scripture method
rather than result.
Cohen's claim for a Trito-Isaiah sect is even less convincing. He acts at one point as if
this were a suggestion; later he seems to assume it as fact. After concentrating on
Isaiah 65, he suddenly marshals evidence from three other chapters. It is simply not
convincing that the prophet's criticism of the people and his praise of God's
``servants'' is evidence of a sect.
This section was interesting, good reference material, but I had reaction to only a few
portions.
He says that the Essenes' literary ``attacks on the temple and on the legal practices of
their co-religionists mask the real source of alienation, which is never mentioned
explicitly'' (p.154). But I would ask, couldn't their religious differences be the real
source of alienation? Isn't religion important enough to some people that they would
have a sense of outrage at the corrupt practices of the high priests?
The Sadducees and Boethusians seem to be similar. Could the terms be synonymous?
I thought it interesting that the Sadducee priests were in effect forced to do things the
Pharisaic way. ``Why did the disputes between the Pharisees and the Sadducees create
social barriers while those between the houses [of Shammai and Hillel] did not?... I
prefer to admit ignorance'' (p.158). I admire his willingness to admit ignorance, but it
certainly underscores how tentative we must hold his conclusions about what defines
and motivates a sect. There's a lot we don't know.
D. Summary
It was interesting that not all priests and aristocrats were Sadducee; some were
Pharisee or nonsectarian.
Cohen says that the Pharisees did not have ``exclusivistic ideology, strict
organization, and group-centered eschatology which characterize sects'' (p.162). This
list bears little resemblance to his definition on p.125; I do not understand why he has
changed.
I appreciated the distinction between Sicarii and Zealots; I already suspected that
brigands were nonreligious highway robbers.
Christians he tends to classify as a sect based on their claim to essential truth, but he
does not address their social fellowship, part of his definition of sect. But as he
remarked, small groups of ``Christian Jews'' persisted for centuries. Here again ``Jew''
is clearly an ethnic term. Christianity ceased to be a Jewish sect when the majority of
the Church was gentile and did not observe Jewish practices.
A. Introduction
In the Hellenistic period, he says, the books were closed, even though their texts
remained fluid (p.174). I am not sure what the difference is. There seems to be several
concepts involved in canonization: selection of categories to be included (Law,
Prophets, Writings), selection of books to be included, selection of authoritative text. I
am not sure which step Cohen is dealing with at various points. In Jesus' day, for
example, the categories were fixed, most of the books were, but major textual variants
existed.
Cohen describes the process of canonization, as first the Torah was treated as
authoritative, then the Prophets, then the Writings. The books to be included in the
latter two categories seems to have fluid for a while. The evidence seems to be weak,
since ``some Jews...preferred not to define a canon at all'' (p. 187).
A particularly interesting quote: ``In Jeremiah's time Torah, counsel, and the word of
God were sought from living people [Jer. 18:18]; in Ben Sira's time they were sought
through the study of books'' (p.187). Judaism was becoming a religion of books in a
postclassical age.
Why some books and not others? ``These Jews [of the LXX] obviously did not
believe that a book had to be divinely inspired (or eternally valid) in order to be
included in the Bible'' (p.190). He offers no evidence. He notes that esoteric texts were
not canonized (since canonization requires recognition of authority by the
community), but in the end he concludes that we do not know why some books were
canonized and others were not.
``When the original [text] was still susceptible to change...the custodians of the sacred
originals would be wary of capricious modifications'' (p.193). This sentence seems
self-contradictory. When the text was changeable, was it considered sacred? Did it
have custodians? This idea seems to contradict the documentary theories that Cohen
seems to accept. Didn't he say that the text remained fluid?
Cohen says that classical prophecy ``evolved'' into apocalypse (p.196). He lists
various differences between them, but does not demonstrate that one evolved into the
other. Rather, one replaced the other. His comment about pseudepigraphy was helpful
- authors did not attempt to deceive the readers, but to ``highlight the correspondence
between the beginning and the end of time'' (p. 199).
``The canonization of the Tanak meant the creation of a scripturally oriented society''
(p.201). But perhaps it was the other way around. Didn't he say that the people,
realizing they were in a post-classical age, looked to the past writings for authoritative
guidance? Because they looked to written material, they needed a community-
accepted corpus of authoritative writings.
The history of darash was interesting - moving from seeking God to seeking the
Torah. The motives for interpretation seem sacrilegious - ``to remove laws and ideas
they found objectionable'' (p.207) - but logical: ``A living culture cannot live in
accordance with the dictates of an immovable text'' (p.206).
Since Judaism was a book religion, translations and paraphrases were important. In
one example of paraphrase, he noted that Pseudo-Philo and Artapanus added stories to
their paraphrases of the Torah. I don't call long additions a legitimate paraphrase, and
the practice seems contrary to what Cohen said earlier, that having a fixed text would
divert such things into other genres. Perhaps the problem is that Jewish sects and
individuals had such diverse approaches to canonization that we cannot speak of them
as a monolith, as Cohen seems to try to do.
Cohen defends his decision to treat the rabbinic period as a whole, rather than
breaking it into the tannaic (Mishnah) and the amoraic (Talmud) periods. He alludes
to greater diversity that he has space to deal with. He notes that he treats Palestinian
Judaism only; that makes me wonder whether other regions had significant
differences, and whether those differences affect the conclusions he presents in this
book. I suspect that source material is scanty for other regions.
It was interesting that rabbinic thought was so cut off from the world that some rabbis
hadn't even heard of Plato or Aristotle. And yet some rabbis were favorably disposed
toward gentiles, acknowledging the possibility of their salvation via the Noahide laws.
So these rabbis saw Judaism as only one sect of a more universal religion - a sect
focusing on social separation rather than exclusive truth. It would be interesting to
find out what these rabbis thought of Jews who kept the Noahide laws but not the
rabbinic regulations; it seems that there was enough doctrinal flexibility to accept
them, too. The relevance of Noahide laws, or the concept thereof, to Acts 15 is also
interesting, though I suspect we don't have enough information to make any firm
connection. Judaism's interest in Noahide laws may have been prompted by
Christianity's success with gentiles, or it may have pre-dated Christianity with the
religious category of God-fearer.
1) Rabbinic Religion
Cohen speculates about why Jewish literature was so unconcerned about the
destruction of the temple. Part of this was that various sects were ambivalent about the
temple; they had seen the combination of corruption and power. Because of their
ambivalence, they had already made religion relevant away from the temple.
Were the rabbis, like the Pharisees, a sect? They said that unbelieving Jews would
have no reward in the afterlife, but there was no social penalty in this age. But I
wonder: Didn't they expel anyone from the synagogue?
``The rabbis triumphed over the indifference of the masses by gradually gaining
control of the schools and synagogues...not earlier that the seventh century'' (p.221).
How they did this was not clear. Cohen describes the rise and fall of the patriarchate,
but indicates that the office had little to do with the rabbis eventual triumph. ``The
rabbinic estate came to include the poor'' (p.222), but what he means isn't clear to me.
Does he mean that rabbis were poor, rather than ``well-to-do landowners'' of previous
eras? Or does he simply mean that rabbis became advocates of the poor? He doesn't
offer evidence for either view.
His conclusion seems more solid when he says, ``It took much longer for the rabbis to
establish control over synagogues'' (p.223). The inscriptions give evidence. This
conclusion has relevance to the authority of the Jamnia conference.
As a speculation, I note that during the time of Christ, sects were divided over the
legitimacy of the temple and of the civil state. Jesus likewise showed ambivalence
toward traditional religious authorities. By proclaiming a kingdom, Jesus implied that
the existing government was illegitimate and that the leaders were not divinely
sanctioned. By predicting the destruction of the temple, he implied it was illegitimate.
This is perhaps another reason the religious authorities reacted strongly against him.
Cohen argues that the benediction against heretics was actually a curse against
sectarianism. That isn't convincing. ``The rabbis had no desire to exclude anyone''
(p.227). Not all synagogues expelled Christians, he says. Ah, but some did. This does
not fit well in his picture of completely ecumenical rabbis. True, rabbis tolerated great
diversity of thought, even recording opposing arguments without selecting a winner.
True, the council of Jamnia did not have authority throughout Judaism and could not
effect a complete separation. But the existence of a benediction against heretics
testifies to some concept of self-definition, of drawing lines and ostracizing others -
sectarian activities.
The council of Jamnia did not have the authority to dictate a canon. That makes sense.
But they did give a stamp of approval to certain books, an approval that was
influential among those people who were involved in copying and preserving
Scripture. Canonization, the recognition of authority, is a process, but even a process
can have significant steps along the way. Cohen does not address this.
Overall comments: The chief value of this book to me was its emphasis on Jewish
diversity. This diversity provided a religious environment in which Christianity could
grow. The new religion had legitimacy as one of many sects. As Christianity
continued to grow, especially among Gentiles, it was no longer considered a sect, but
a religion on its own.
The chief weakness was its failure to explain the dynamics of sectarianism.
No convincing explanation was given of why groups separated into sects or why
Judaism became nonsectarian in the rabbinic period. A similar weakness in the book
is its occassional failure to clarify whether it was using Jew as an ethnic term or as a
religious term.