IN THE FAMILY JUSTICE COURTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

[2020] SGHCF 18

Divorce (Transferred) No 3134 of 2019

Between

TOE
… Plaintiff

And

TOF
… Defendant

GROUNDS OF DECISION

[Family Law] — [Custody] — [Care and control]

[Family Law] — [Custody] — [Access]
[Family Law] — [Maintenance]
[Family Law] — [Matrimonial assets] — [Division]
 This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the
court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance
with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law
Reports.

TOE
v
TOF

[2020] SGHCF 18

High Court (Family Division) — Divorce (Transferred) No 3134 of 2019

Choo Han Teck J
15 September, 13 October 2020

26 October 2020.

Choo Han Teck J:

1 The plaintiff wife is a 53-year-old homemaker and the defendant

husband is a 54-year old former fund manager. The parties were married on
24 November 2000. They have, by consent, joint custody of their ten-year old
son. On 9 December 2019, interim judgment was granted on the basis that the
parties had been separated for four years since November 2012. The matters for
determination before me were care and control of and access to the child,
maintenance of the wife and the child, and the division of matrimonial assets. I
made my orders on 13 October 2020 and these are my grounds.

2 I shall address the issue of care and control of and the child first. Counsel
for the wife, Ms Siaw Susanah Roberta, sought sole care and control to the wife
with reasonable access to the husband. She argued that the husband had
persistently refused to work with the wife on matters concerning the child’s
welfare, and had deliberately obstructed the wife’s access to the child. Emphasis
TOE v TOF [2020] SGHCF 18

was placed on the fact that the husband had previously cancelled the child’s
Student Pass without the wife’s consent or an Order of Court, causing the child
to be unable to attend his school, [School X], for about six months. The husband,
who was unrepresented, sought shared care and control or, in the alternative,
sole care and control to him in the event that the wife refused to cooperate in
co-parenting.

3 The interim arrangement of shared care and control is not working well
as it is disruptive to the child and has created more conflicts between the parties.
Moreover, the child himself has stated that he does not like the current access
arrangement. The husband intends to return to the UK to care for his aged
mother. In contrast, the wife, a Korean, intends to continue residing in
Singapore, where she hopes to earn a living by opening a small business. The
child was born in Korea but came to Singapore when he was two months old,
and has attended [School X] ever since. He appears to have several close friends
in [School X] and is performing well. Given these circumstances, I am of the
view that the wife should be granted sole care and control of the child. I am
confident that the wife will be able to provide the child with a stable and
nurturing environment in his growing years. I also accept the wife’s evidence
that she would have less support from family and friends if she were to relocate
to the UK to be with the child.

4 I am aware that the child also enjoys a close relationship with his father.
I therefore think that it is appropriate to grant overnight access to the husband
from 2pm on Saturday to 2pm on Sunday, as well as one mid-week access from
6pm to 9pm on a day to be agreed between the parties. Access during the school
holidays shall be half to each parent. Given the circumstances of this case, and

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the fact that the child is ten years old, articulate and intelligent, with access to
email and his mobile phone adding to further contact with the father, this
arrangement achieves a fair balance between the child’s time with each of his
parents and also affords him sufficient time for his own commitments and
activities, including schoolwork and friends.

5 I next address the matters pertaining to maintenance. The interim

maintenance orders were that the husband pay S$5,000 a month and S$4,100 a
month to the wife and the child respectively. In addition, the husband was to
pay directly for the following:

(a) the child’s school fees and other school-related activities;

(b) the child’s enrichment classes and tuition where necessary;

(c) all of the child’s existing insurance policies; and

(d) the child’s medical and dental expenses.

6 Although the wife has a higher education qualification in hospitality and

worked as a cabin crew member for more than ten years, it is undisputed that
she has not been employed since the parties were married in 2000, and that she
depended on the husband for financial support throughout the marriage. It is
clear that the wife requires some financial assistance to help her as she has just
begun some temporary low-paying jobs but has not yet found a stable,
permanent one.

7 The husband was working as a fund manager with Tudor Capital Pte Ltd
from 2007 to 2011. After leaving Tudor Capital, the husband incorporated
Jagger Technologies Pte Ltd (“Jagger Singapore”), of which he is the sole

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shareholder, and continued to work as a fund manager under this company.

Based on the husband’s IRAS Notices of Assessment, the husband’s income
was approximately S$49,538 a month in 2011 but decreased to about $10,000 a
month from 2012 to 2015. The husband claims that he has not earned an income
since 2016 and is currently in debt. Yet, as noted by District Judge Edgar Foo
(“DJ Foo”) in TOE v TOF [2017] SGFC 45 at [61], despite this apparent drop
in income, the husband was nevertheless able to rent a property for S$20,000 a
month, pay S$2,500 a month for a car, pay for his son’s school fees amounting
to S$2,657 a month and hire a domestic helper. The husband also did not deny
the wife’s allegations that he had taken the child on numerous overseas trips to
the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Maldives in 2016 to 2017, and that he
had flown business class on these trips. Furthermore, the husband complained,
in the hearing before me, that he was effectively paying double maintenance
because he had (voluntarily) purchased numerous gifts for the child, such as
tennis and football equipment, on top of fulfilling his existing maintenance
obligations. In my view, the husband’s spending patterns are not consistent with
that of an individual who has no income, much less one who is in debt. Based
on the evidence before me, I am satisfied that the husband is fully capable of
supporting himself, the wife and the son. I therefore affirmed the interim
maintenance orders.

8 I turn finally to the division of matrimonial assets. As several of the

assets are foreign assets, I adopt the following exchange rates (which were
proposed by the wife and not disputed by the husband):

(a) 1 USD: 1.4 SGD

(b) 1 GBP: 1.76 SGD

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(c) 850 KRW: 1 SGD

9 The only disclosed assets consist of —

(a) a deposit paid by the wife for her mother’s rented apartment in
Korea;

(b) a Korean property owned by the wife; and

(c) the wife’s bank accounts.

All three assets belong to the wife. The husband claims to have no assets
whatsoever. This is disputed by the wife, who asserts that the husband has assets
amounting to S$39,474,303.30.

10 Parties in matrimonial proceedings are duty-bound to make full and

frank disclosure of their assets. And the failure to do so would leave the court
the only option of drawing an adverse inference against him or her. The effect
of the adverse inference is that the court can choose to give a value to what it
considers to be the undisclosed assets or to give a higher percentage of the
disclosed assets to the other party (see Yeo Chong Lin v Tay Ang Choo Nancy
and another appeal [2011] 2 SLR 1157 at [66]). As shall be seen below, these
principles are of fundamental importance in a case like the present, where the
husband has persistently refused to make full and frank disclosure of his assets.
It is obvious that from 2012 when the marriage broke down, the husband had
set about making his purse seem small and empty, and withheld all information
as to his income and assets. Moreover, the husband’s demeanour throughout the
proceedings gave me further reason to disbelieve whatever limited evidence he
put forward. He was glib and theatrical when it suited him in the course of
presenting his case, including a moment when he broke down in tears. But his

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hard and arrogant self emerged after I had read the orders to the parties, and I
had to caution him that he would be held in contempt should he continue as he
did. The wife, in contrast, was straightforward and forthright. In a marriage,
spouses have to be honest and forthright to each other, in a divorce, they have
to be honest and forthright to the court, especially in the difficult task of dividing
matrimonial assets and making orders for the welfare of the children of the
marriage.

11 I begin by determining the value of the disclosed assets, which the wife
estimates to be as follows:

(a) the value of the deposit for her mother’s rented apartment is
KRW280,000,000 (S$325,500);

(b) the net value of the Korean property (after deducting the tenant’s
deposit of approximately S$88,000) is S$17,000; and

(c) the value of the money in her bank accounts is S$47,888.

12 In his submissions and during the hearing before me, the husband
disputed the extent of the wife’s contributions to these assets but did not
seriously challenge her valuation of the same. I therefore add a sum of
S$390,388 (being the total value of the wife’s assets) to the parties’ matrimonial
pool.

13 Next, I deal with the husband’s alleged assets. According to the wife,
these consist of the following:

(a) an Audi motor car valued at S$140,000;

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(b) money in the bank accounts of Jagger Singapore, amounting to

at least S$1,050,000.00;

(c) money in the bank accounts of Jagger Technologies Cayman Ltd

(“Jagger Cayman”), amounting to at least S$2,236,404.18;

(d) sale proceeds from the sale of the parties’ matrimonial home,
“The Peak”, amounting to at least S$5,585,309;

(e) a property investment in Barama Bay, Phuket with a value of at

least S$6,082,585;

(f) a property in the UK with a value of at least S$968,000;

(g) a property investment in Bali with a value of at least

S$6,160,000;

(h) shares in Kings Keys Capital Partners (“KKCP”) with a value of

at least S$1,584,000;

(i) shares in Barclays PLC with a value of at least S$75,005.12; and

(j) cash amounting to at least S$5,200,000.

14 I briefly address each of the abovementioned assets in turn. In relation

to the Audi car, the husband informed the court, at the hearing for
FC/SUM 648/2020 (“SUM 648”) before District Judge Toh Wee San
(“DJ Toh”) on 28 May 2020, that he no longer owns the said Audi car, and that
he is presently renting another car. DJ Toh had accordingly ordered him to
provide documentary evidence of the net sale proceeds of the car and the rental
charges incurred for the new vehicle pursuant to s 63(1) of the Family Justice
Rules 2014 (S 813/2014) (“FJR”). These documents were never provided by the

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husband. The wife submits that in view of the husband’s omission, an adverse
inference ought to be drawn against him. I agree and do so accordingly.

15 In relation to Jagger Singapore, the wife had managed to obtain several

bank statements of Jagger Singapore’s Standard Chartered account before
leaving the matrimonial home in 2014. These statements show that a sum of
USD750,000 had been deposited into the bank account during the period from
2012 to 2013. In SUM 648, DJ Toh ordered, pursuant to s 63(1) of the FJR, that
the husband provide all Jagger Singapore bank statements from the date of
account opening to date, in an affidavit to be filed and served no later than
4 June 2020. Again, the husband did not comply with these directions. I
therefore draw an adverse inference against the husband in this regard.

16 The position in relation to Jagger Cayman is more complicated. The

husband admits that he is a director and manager of Jagger Cayman but denies
that he is a shareholder. Based on bank statements taken by the wife before she
left the matrimonial home, there were numerous transactions between Jagger
Cayman’s account and the parties’ joint accounts, as well as between Jagger
Cayman’s and Jagger Singapore’s bank accounts. The wife argues that this
demonstrates that the husband treats Jagger Cayman as his own company and
that he had used the monies in Jagger Cayman’s account “whenever and
however he wanted”. Furthermore, Jagger Cayman’s bank statements were sent
to the parties’ matrimonial home for many years. In the premises, I am inclined
to agree with the wife that the husband is more than a mere director and/or
manager of Jagger Cayman. I therefore draw an adverse inference against the
husband for refusing to disclose the true extent of his interest in the company.

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17 As for the matrimonial home, the wife says that the parties received
proceeds of S$5,585,309.63 from the sale of the apartment, which was initially
deposited into the parties’ joint account but subsequently transferred by the
husband to Jagger Cayman’s Standard Chartered account. The husband
claimed, during the hearing of MSS 1826/2015 before DJ Foo, that he had made
the transfer in order to pay off his debts to Jagger Cayman. I am unable to see
any basis for this bare assertion which, it seems to me, is no more than a
convenient afterthought on the husband’s part. I therefore draw an adverse
inference against the husband in respect of his failure to fully account for the
sale proceeds of the matrimonial home.

18 The wife also asserts that the husband has properties and/or property
investments in Phuket, Bali and the UK. In respect of the Phuket property, the
wife claims that the husband had previously informed her that he and a fellow
friend had set up a company to invest in a piece of land in Barama Bay, Phuket.
The wife produced records showing that the husband had transferred sums of
money to various parties in Thailand in or around 2012, including a payment of
USD163,463.33 with the details “Purchase Sor Kor 1 Baht 5,000,000 for
purchase of land in Thailand”. Also adduced by the wife was a letter from a
Thai law firm to the husband with the subject “Barama Bay — Invoice
No. 680015881”. The letter and the accompanying invoice were sent to the
parties’ matrimonial home. Based on the documentary evidence before me, I am
satisfied that the husband indeed made a property investment in Phuket, and that
he has failed to make full and frank disclosure of the same. I therefore draw an
adverse inference against him in this regard.

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19 The wife also alleges that the husband owns a property in Nottingham,
UK that is valued at GBP643,000–711,000. This house is registered in the
husband’s mother’s name, and the husband argues that the purchase price of the
property was paid for by his mother. In response, the wife argues that the
husband periodically sent large sums of money to his mother, which must have
been used to pay for the UK property. In my view, there is insufficient evidence
to suggest that the husband had a legal or beneficial interest in the UK property.
I therefore decline to draw an adverse inference against the husband in this
regard.

20 As for the property investment in Bali, the wife’s evidence is that she
and the husband gone to Bali together to choose a piece of land, and that the
husband had subsequently purchased this piece of land together with one Neil
Franks. In support of this contention, the wife adduced a bank statement
showing that a sum of $2,679,420 had been transferred from their joint account
to Neil Franks on 19 June 2008 with the reference “Pmt for Property
Investment”. When the husband was cross-examined on the Bali property
investment in MSS 1826/2015, he stated that he did not own the Bali property
but admitted that he had “invested into a vehicle” as a “scheme or mechanism…
to gain control over real estate”. The husband now avers that he does not and
has never made such an investment. In my view, the husband has not made full
and frank disclosure of the Bali property investment and I therefore draw an
adverse inference against him in this regard.

21 I now consider the shares which the husband allegedly owns in KKCP
and Barclays PLC. During the hearing for MSS 3796/2019 before District Judge
Kathryn Thong, the husband produced an Agreement of Sale and Purchase of

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Shares showing that he had agreed to sell 25 shares in KKCP for GBP750,000,
with the right to repurchase the shares at GBP900,000. He subsequently
admitted in oral evidence that these shares represented approximately 25% of
the total shares in the company. The wife says that in the absence of any
incontrovertible evidence by the husband that he only owns 25 shares in the
company, this court must assume that he is the sole shareholder of the company,
and that his shares are worth at least GBP4.5m. I disagree with the wife’s
submission. In my view, there is nothing to suggest that the husband owns or
owned any shares in KKCP beyond the 25 shares which he has already disposed
of. I will therefore not draw any adverse inference against him in this instance.

22 Where the Barclays PLC shares are concerned, the wife relies on a copy
of a Barclays Tax Voucher addressed to the defendant, showing that he had
35,588 shares in Barclays PLC as at 7 December 2012. The 35,588 shares are
presently valued at S$72,005.12. The husband claims to have sold the shares
but he has not furnished any evidence of the same. In the circumstances, I find
that the husband has failed to make full and frank disclosure of his Barclays
PLC shares and I draw an adverse inference against him in this regard.

23 I turn finally to the husband’s cash assets. In the husband’s Notice in

Response to Request for Interrogatories dated 30 January 2020, he refused to
give details of any bank account which he holds, whether in Thailand, the UK,
Hong Kong, Singapore or elsewhere. I agree with the wife that this is inherently
unbelievable. Based on the husband’s employment history, his financial status
during the marriage, and his current spending patterns, it is clear that the
husband must have cash assets that he is unwilling to disclose. I therefore draw
an adverse inference against him in this regard.

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24 Having established the pool of matrimonial assets, I now consider the

parties’ direct and indirect contributions to the marriage. The wife argues that
the direct contributions should be apportioned 97:3 in favour of the husband,
and that the indirect contributions should be apportioned 30:70 in favour of the
wife. This gives rise to an average ratio of about 36.5:63.5 in favour of the
husband. The husband does not object to the ratio of direct contributions but
asserts that the wife’s indirect contributions must be less than 70% since she
had the support of “domestic help, nannies, and family members living with [the
parties] to care for [the child]”. I accept that the wife had the assistance of
domestic helpers at certain points of the marriage, but I disagree that her indirect
contributions should be diminished on that basis. It is clear that before the
breakdown of the marriage, the husband was largely preoccupied with his career
and that the wife, as a homemaker, had devoted her full time and attention to
managing the parties’ properties and caring for the husband and the son. Having
considered all the circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the
percentages of direct and indirect contributions proposed by the wife are
appropriate.

25 Given the husband’s plans to relocate and the severe acrimony between
the parties, my view is that the best approach towards the division of
matrimonial assets in the present case would be for the husband to pay a lump
sum to the wife in full and final settlement of the division of matrimonial assets.
The question, then, is how to arrive at a just and equitable sum. My task in this
regard has been made more complicated by the husband’s persistent failure to
disclose the full extent of the assets within his possession. The difficulty with
finding a figure based on adverse inferences is that it is not a figure established
by proof, but in finding a fair sum on that basis the court should not give a

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discount that my result in unfairness to the ex-spouse. In this case, rounding the
wife’s contributions to the marriage with her claim for S$5m and the numerous
adverse inferences drawn against the husband, I am of the view that S$4m is a
reasonable figure. Between the competing claims of nil assets (husband’s case)
and almost S$40m (wife’s case), the little evidence that we have inclines
towards the latter, and is totally against the husband’s assertion that he has no
assets.

26 Only one minor issue remains: The wife wishes for the husband to return
her personal belongings, namely her jewellery and watches (consisting of two
Tiffany rings, two Tiffany necklaces, a 1.35 carat diamond ring, a pair of pearl
earrings, a pearl necklace, a Pandora bracelet, a Cartier watch, a Rolex watch
and other accessories, all of which are kept in the parties’ safe), paintings,
handbags and clothes. She also wishes to have half the furniture, kitchenware
(including a dinner set, plates and crockery that she had bought from Korea and
Japan), Christmas tree decorations and bedclothes. The husband did not object
to this request. Moreover, although some of these items may have been gifts
from the husband, the court has discretion to exclude de minimis inter-spousal
gifts from the pool of matrimonial assets (see Tan Hwee Lee v Tan Cheng Guan
and another appeal and another matter [2012] 4 SLR 785 at [48]–[49]).
Considering the size of the pool of matrimonial assets in the present case, I am
of the view that the value of the items requested by the wife is de minimis, and
I accordingly granted her request.

27 In summary, my orders were as follows:

(a) The parties shall have joint custody of the child.

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(b) The wife shall have sole care and control of the child. The
husband shall have overnight access to the child from 2pm on Saturday
to 2pm on Sunday, and one mid-week access from 6pm to 9pm, on a day
to be agreed between the parties. Access during school holidays shall be
half to each parent.

(c) The husband is to pay monthly maintenance of S$5,000 to the

wife and S$4,100 to the child. In addition, the husband is to pay directly
the following:

(i) the child’s school fees and school-related activities;

(ii) the child’s enrichment classes and tuition, where necessary;

(iii) the child’s existing insurance policies; and

(iv) the child’s medical and dental expenses.

(d) The husband is to pay the wife the sum of S$4m in full and final
settlement of the division of matrimonial assets.

(e) The husband is to return the wife her personal belongings,

namely her jewellery and watches (consisting of two Tiffany rings, two
Tiffany necklaces, a 1.35 carat diamond ring, a pair of pearl earrings, a
pearl necklace, a Pandora bracelet, a Cartier watch, a Rolex watch and
other accessories, all of which are kept in the parties’ safe), paintings,
handbags and clothes.

(f) The husband is to return the wife half the furniture, kitchenware
(including a dinner set, plates and crockery that she had bought from
Korea and Japan), Christmas tree decorations and bedclothes.

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(g) There shall be liberty to apply.

(h) There shall be no order as to costs.

- Sgd -
Choo Han Teck
Judge

Siaw Susanah Roberta (Siaw Kheng Boon & Co) for the plaintiff;
Defendant in-person.

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