COVID-19 Call

A N A D H O C W H O T E C H N I C A L C O N S U LTAT I O N
Managing the COVID-19 infodemic

CALL FOR ACTION
A N A D H O C W H O T E C H N I C A L C O N S U LTAT I O N
Managing the COVID-19 infodemic

CALL FOR ACTION
An ad hoc WHO technical consultation managing the COVID-19 infodemic: call for action, 7-8 April 2020
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Contents
Acknowledgements iv
Note to the reader v
List of acronyms & abbreviations vi
Executive summary vii
Introduction 1
Background 1
Problem statement 1
Meeting proceedings 3
Summary of presentations 5
What is the new phenomenon? A roundtable of perspectives 5
How can the infodemic be managed, described and measured? 15
Policy implications 25
A framework for managing infodemics 27
1. Identifying evidence 27
2. Translating knowledge & science 27
3. Amplifying action 28
4. Quantifying impact 28
5. Coordination & governance 28
Conclusion 28
Annexes 30
Annex 1: Framework for managing infodemics in health emergencies 31
Action area 1:

Strengthening the scanning, review and verification of evidence and information 31
Action area 2:

Strengthening the interpretation and explanation what is known, fact-checking of
statements and addressing misinformation 33
Action area 3:

Strengthening the amplification of messages and actions from trusted actors
through to individuals and communities that need the information 35
Action area 4:

Strengthening the analysis of infodemic, including information flows, monitoring
of acceptance of public health interventions, and factors affecting infodemic and
behaviour at individual and population levels 38
Action area 5:

Strengthening systems for infodemic management in health emergencies 39
Annex 2: Programme 40
Annex 3: List of speakers & organizing team 42
AN AD HOC WHO TECHNICAL CONSULTATION | Managing the COVID-19 infodemic
Acknowledgements
The World Health Organization (WHO) Department of Infectious Hazard Preparedness produced this
report of the 7-8 April Global Consultation on Managing the COVID-19 infodemic. The global consultation
was led by Tim Nguyen and Tina Purnat under the direction of the WHO COVID-19 Infodemic Management
Pillar lead, Sylvie Briand, Director of the Department of Global Infectious Hazard Preparedness, with
significant inputs from strategic partners.
WHO acknowledges the work and contributions of experts from all over the world who participated
as expert panelists in the global consultation: Alexandre Alaphilippe, EU disinformation lab, Belgium |
Leticia Bode, Georgetown University, USA | Julii Brainard, Norwich Medical School UEA, UK | Ian Brooks,
Center for Public Health Analytics, School of Information Sciences, University of Illinois, USA | Neville
Calleja, Ministry of Health, Malta | Yana Dlugy, AFP Digital Verification, France | Manlio De Domenico,
Complex Multilayer Networks Lab, FBK | Fondazione Bruno Kessler, Italy | Ève Dubé, Institut national de
santé publique du Québec, Canada | Gunther Eysenbach, JMIR Publications, Canada – Anatoliy Gruzd,
Ryerson University, Canada | Philip Mai, Ryerson University, Canada | Athas Nikolakakos, Facebook, USA |
Kisoo Park, Korea University College of Medicine, South Korea | Rebecca Petras, H2H Network, USA/France
| Praveen Raja, Facebook, USA | Pier Luigi Sacco, IULM University, Italy | Philipp Schmid, University of
Erfurt, Germany | Tavpritesh Sethi, Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology Delhi, India | Viroj
Tangcharoensathien, Ministry of Public Health, Thailand | Jay J. Van Bavel, New York University, USA |
Tim Zecchin, Media Measurement, UK
WHO staff members and consultants who contributed to the process of organizing the meeting, drafting
the report and the infodemic management framework were: Tim Nguyen | Tina Purnat | Ioana Ghiga
| Alexandra Hill | Olga Fradkina | Daniel Hougendobler | Myrna Marti | Felipe Mejia Medina | Judith
Van Andel | Marcelo D’Agostino | Sebastian Garcia Saiso | Mark Landry | Arash Rashidian | Hisham
Mohamed Abdallah Abdelhalim | Clayton Hamilton | Sylvie Briand
This meeting was further supported by colleagues of the WHO Information Network for Epidemics
(EPI-WIN): Zerthun Alemu Belay | Viviane Bianco | Andre Buell | Candida Connor | Melinda Frost
| Sarah Hess | Judith Van Holten | Vicky Houssiere | Ivan Ivanov | Rosamund Lewis | Shi Han Liu |
Andrew Ramsay | Romana Rauf | Aicha Taybi
Consultation illustrations by Sam Bradd. Rapporteur services provided to the consultation by Mark Nunn.
iv
Note to the reader

This report condenses discussions according to the subjects addressed, rather than
attempting to provide a chronological summary. The summaries of the discussions
and group work address the themes emerging from wide-ranging discussions
among all speakers, and do not necessarily imply consensus.
Summaries of presentations and of points made in discussion are presented as the
opinions expressed; no judgement is implied as to their veracity or otherwise.
v
Acronyms & abbreviations

AFRO WHO Regional Office for Africa
AG Advisory Group
AMRO WHO Regional Office for the Americas
BARDA Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority
EMRO WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean
EQAP External Quality Assessment Project
EURO WHO Regional Office for Europe
GAP Global Action Plan for Influenza Vaccines
GBT Global Benchmarking Tool
GISRS Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System
HHS USA Department of Health and Human Services
HIC high-income countries
IFPMA International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations
ILI influenza-like illness
JRF WHO–UNICEF Joint Reporting Form
LAIV live attenuated influenza vaccine
LMIC low- and middle-income countries
NIC national influenza centre
NRA national regulatory authority
PIP Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (Framework)
RT-PCR reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction
SAGE Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization
SARI severe acute respiratory infection
SEARO WHO Regional Office for South-East Asia
SMTA2s standard material transfer agreements
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
USA United States of America
VLP virus-like particle
WPRO WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific
vi
Executive summary
An ‘infodemic’ is an overabundance of information—some accurate and some not—
that occurs during an epidemic. It spreads between humans in a similar manner to an
epidemic, via digital and physical information systems. It makes it hard for people to
find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they need it. During epidemics,
more so than in normal time, people need accurate information to adapt their
behaviour to protect themselves and their families and communities against infection.
The infodemic is propagated by the fundamentally interconnected way in information

is disseminated and consumed through social media platforms and other channels,
and, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is exacerbated by the global scale
of the emergency. Infodemics can impact citizens in every country, and addressing
them is a new and centrally important challenge in responding to disease outbreaks.
At the same time, though, the current, COVID-19 infodemic is an opportunity to find
and adapt new preparedness and response tools.
“We’re not just On 7 and 8 April, the WHO Information Network for Epidemics (EPI-WIN) held a global
fighting an online consultation on managing the COVID-19 infodemic. The aim of this consultation
was to crowdsource ideas for managing the infodemic from an interdisciplinary group
epidemic; of experts and the 1 300 participants who joined the webinar. Alongside the inputs of
the speakers, almost 600 ideas were submitted through an online interactive forum
we’re fighting while the consultation was taking place. Together, all these will form the basis for a
COVID-19 infodemic framework to guide the actions that governments and public
an infodemic.” health institutions can take.
The infodemic can be seen as having four major thematic areas in which people look for
WHO Director-General Tedros trustworthy information, and where misinformation and rumours are placed: the cause
Adhanom Ghebreyesus at the and origin of the disease; its symptoms and transmission patterns; available treatments,
Munich Security conference, 15 prophylactics and cures; and the effectiveness and impacts of interventions by health
February 2020
authorities or other institutions. These four areas require the addition of a fifth: the
coordination and governance of the generation, verification and dissemination of
trustworthy information.
The framework for response will also be built around four principles.
Firstly, interventions and messages must be based in science and evidence.
Within this topic there are two main overarching challenges: the need to manage
the creation and dissemination of trusted information so that it is not excessive,
overwhelming or confusing; and the need to counter misinformation.
Second, this knowledge should be translated into actionable behaviour change

messages, presented in ways that are accessible to all parts of all societies. Cultural
and contextual sensitivity in the messages used, and translation into local languages,
are necessary.
Thirdly, governments should reach out to key communities to understand their

concerns and information needs, the better to tailor advice and messages that can
help these communities address the audiences they represent. Through this process,
communities—of all kinds, whether neighbourhood, religious, professional or other
communities—amplify the right public health messages in ways that are user-friendly
and which can lead to the right changes in behaviour.
vii
Fourthly, strategic partnerships should be formed with Emergencies (see Annex 1), produced in response to the
social media and technology platforms and stakeholders, perspectives that emerged from this consultation, and which
along with other relevant stakeholders such as those in will be reviewed and refined as the COVID-19 pandemic
academia and civil society. continues and when it ends. This framework provides guidance
in five key areas of action that emerged from the consultation:
WHO’s immediate response to managing the COVID-10 (1) strengthening evidence and information; (2) simplifying
infodemic is and has been to provide timely and accurate and explaining what is known, fact-checking, and addressing
technical guidance, scientific briefs and situation reports, misinformation; (3) amplifying messages and reaching the
communicating the evidence-based knowns and unknowns communities and individuals who most need the information;
through frequent press conferences, educational videos and (4) quantifying and analysing the infodemic, including
trainings, ‘Myth Busters,’ and the WHO presence on social information flows, monitoring the acceptance of public health
media platforms. WHO is tailoring guidance to the needs of— interventions, and assessing factors affecting behaviour at
among others—governments, faith-based organizations, individual and population levels; and (5) strengthening
the food and agricultural sectors, organizers of large events, systems for infodemic management in health emergencies.
employers and unions, and health professionals. The
organization is also engaging major social media platforms to Managing the COVID-19 pandemic and related infodemic
provide access to accurate health guidance, while at the same requires swift, regular, coordinated action from multiple
time working to understand the sentiment of the discussions sectors of society and government. The timely translation
taking place on these platforms. of evidence into knowledge that people can use, adapted to
their local cultures, languages and contexts, will continue to
WHO is building on all of this work through this report and be crucial to fighting misinformation and saving lives as the
the draft Framework for Managing Infodemics in Health pandemic evolves.
viii
Introduction:
WHO ad-hoc technical consultation on managing the
COVID-19 infodemic
Background
The 2020 pandemic of Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) has been accompanied by a
massive ‘infodemic.’ An infodemic, simply put, is an overabundance of information,
good and bad. Together, it forms a virtual tsunami of data and advice that makes it
hard for people in all walks of life to find clear messages, trustworthy sources and
reliable guidance when they need them. Some of it is merely confusing, but some of
the misinformation can be actively harmful to life. Addressing infodemics like this is a
new, but centrally important, challenge in responding to all disease outbreaks.
For the most In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the infodemic is exacerbated by the global
effective scale of the emergency, and propagated by the fundamentally interconnected way
in which information is disseminated and consumed through social media platforms
national and other channels. The infodemic impacts citizens in every country.
responses, In response to the pressing demand for timely, trustworthy information about
COVID-19 and subsequent epi- and pandemics, the World Health Organization (WHO)
private and established the Information Network for Epidemics (EPI-WIN) to serve as a network
uniting technical and social media teams within WHO. EPI-WIN disseminates and
public actors amplifies evidence-based information about COVID-19, and tracks and responds to
misinformation, myths and rumours.
have to pull On 7 and 8 April 2020, EPI-WIN held an online technical consultation on managing
together for the the COVID-19 infodemic, with the aim of gathering information, evidence, ideas
and comments from a wide range of technical experts and other stakeholders. The
greater good. objective of this exercise was to gather inputs to feed into a draft infodemic response
framework (See Annex 1), with the secondary aim of catalysing a new community of
practice on infodemic management, and beginning to define its work.
Problem statement
A number of overarching themes and needs emerged from both the presentations
and the online engagement.
There is need for (a) international coordination of the response to the infodemic,
even—perhaps particularly—around such basic issues as the consistent use of
terminology; and (b) coordinated and integrated methods to manage the flow of
information for maximum positive impact. To fill these gaps, both an overview and
a detailed understanding of the distribution and sharing of information are crucial,
clarifying where it comes from; how it propagates; who clicks and shares it; and how
we can expect it to evolve in the coming weeks and months.
To earn and keep that essential trust, public health agencies and other authorities
need to be open—often—about the fact that this is a new virus, and therefore
recommendations and advice will change with more data.
For people act on information as best they can, health education and health literacy
are crucial, to help them absorb, analyse, understand and act on the information
they receive, question misinformation, and evaluate correctly which sources to trust.
1
Just as an effective public health response to an epidemic is A great deal of the necessary work has already been done.
based on a strong health system, resilience to misinformation Strong, tested intellectual frameworks already exist for (a)
depends on strong digital and health literacy. To facilitate conceptualizing and mapping the nature of infodemics and/
this, authorities could run information campaigns on how to or online misinformation, and (b) responding to them. New
practice digital hygiene in the same way that they promote approaches are constantly being developed and refined. There
personal hygiene. It is already clear that one lasting lesson from already exist many resources, tools, hubs, portals, frameworks,
COVID-19 will be the fact that health education before a crisis networks, initiatives etc. for action and analysis. Many of
is hugely valuable. these were outlined during the meeting, including rebuttal
strategies for misinformation, an infodemic risk index that that
For the most effective national responses, private and public measures exposure to unreliable sources of information, and a
actors have to pull together for the greater good. The key glossary of social interventions. Some of these initiatives have
to an effective response to an infodemic is multidisciplinary already amassed large amounts of data and long track records,
cooperation. The range and effectiveness of possible response and have been monitoring and refining their methods since
measures increases in relation to the degree of cooperation long before the COVID-19 pandemic.
between all these actors, across the whole of society—
including but not limited to private sector communication One problem, if it can be described as such, is an
and telecoms companies, state communication bodies, overabundance of options: WHO must now choose the
search engines, civil society, academia, frontline health most appropriate tools for the COVID-19 context and bring
workers, and others, all the way down to the grassroots level them to scale. This consultation may have been one of the
of neighbourhood mutual support groups. first opportunities for many of the people attending to hear
about the expertise and activities of others, and to frame
Widespread cultural change around online comportment the entirety of this activity within the problems of pandemic
may also be necessary. For example, the dynamics of management and public health. The desired outcome is to
misinformation might be far less dangerous to life if it were bring these tools together and reorient existing knowledge
more socially acceptable for online actors to retract and delete and expertise towards countering and managing infectious
inaccurate posts they might have shared. disease, providing crucially necessary multidisciplinary
expertise and coordination, and bringing important, trusted
Local context is absolutely crucial. Good information has to information to local level.
be adapted in response to culture, language and literacy, and
any other relevant influences on how information is received
and used. This adaptation must extend to marginalised and
vulnerable communities and languages.
2
Meeting proceedings
The consultation was held online via the Zoom platform, and Attendance at the
was open to all. The event brought together a multidisciplinary
group from a range of different backgrounds, including consultation dwarfed the
but not limited to academia (including social scientists,
epidemiologists, clinicians and communication experts); numbers for a conventional,
representatives of technology, web and social media platforms
and companies; staff from ministries of health and institutes physical meeting.
of public health; attendees from organisations that act as
‘amplifiers’ of information, including the World Economic
Forum (WEF), the International Air Transport Association (IATA),
a number of faith-based organizations and the World Council
of Nurses; journalists and media professionals, including health
and science reporters and representatives of major media
outlets; and civil society, including fact-checking organizations.
The agenda for the meeting1 can be found in Annex 2 and a
list of speakers in Annex 3. Full proceeding of and outcome of
1 375 attendees Day 1
1 169 attendees
meeting is described in journal article2 .
Attendance at the consultation dwarfed the numbers for a Day 2

conventional, physical meeting:
• Othen day
• 6forum
one alone, 1 375 people attended from all around
world; on Day 2, there were 1 169.
85 of those people were active on the interactive Slido

1 326 votes cast in response to 6 polls
594
held at www.sli.do (out of a total of 782 logged in).
ideas
This forum allowed those listening to the presentations contributed
to interact with the discussions, casting votes in polls and
contributing ideas and comments. 1 326 votes were cast on
Slido in response to six different polls, and 594 ideas and
comments were contributed. Regions represented
• -ASub
ttendees represented every continent bar Antarctica:
2% 3% 10%
Saharan Africa 11%
- North Africa & Eastern Mediterrannean 3%
- South East Asia 10%
- Western Pacific 2%
- Europe & Central Asia 42% Western Pacific North Africa & Eastern South East Asia
- The Americas: 33% Mediterrannean
• Attendees
backgrounds:
came from a wide range of professional
- Academia/research 26%
- Public health/government 8%
- Health care sector 7%
11% 33% 42%
- NGOs 22%
- Civil society 2% Sub Saharan The Americas Europe &
- International organizations/UN 14% Africa Central Asia
- Private sector 10%
- Students 8%
- Other 3%.
In addition to the online interaction, which generated a large

1
quantity of data, responses and comments for later analysis, Agenda and other meeting documents are available at https://www.who.int/
teams/risk-communication/who-ad-hoc-online-consultation-on-managing-the-
the meeting was illustrated in real time by Sam Bradd3 , who
covid-19-infodemic
provided unique, engaging perspectives on the discussions. 2
Tangcharoensathien V, Calleja N, Nguyen T, Purnat T, D’Agostino M, Garcia-
Saiso S, Landry M, Rashidian A, Hamilton C, AbdAllah A, Ghiga I, Hill A,
Hougendobler D, van Andel J, Nunn M, Brooks I, Sacco PL, De Domenico M,
Mai P, Gruzd A, Alaphilippe A, Briand S. Framework for Managing the COVID-19
Infodemic: Methods and Results of an Online, Crowdsourced WHO Technical
Consultation. J Med Internet Res 2020;22(6):e19659. DOI: 10.2196/19659
3
See more of Mr Bradd’s work at www.drawingchange.com
3
Professional backgrounds of attendees
Other Civil society

Health care sector
3% 2% Academia /
Students 7% research
8%
26%
Public health /
government
8%
10%
Private sector
22%
14% NGOs
International organizations /
UN
Attendees came from a

wide range of professional
backgrounds...
4
Summary of presentations
01 WHAT IS THE NEW PHENOMENON? A ROUNDTABLE

OF PERSPECTIVES
Presenters: Tim Nguyen, WHO; Viroj Tangcharoensathien, Thailand Ministry
of Public Health; Yana Dlugy, Agence France-Presse (AFP) Digital Verification,
France; Ève Dubé, Institut National de Santé Publique du Quebec, Canada;
Athas Nikolakakos and Praveen Raja, Facebook; Gunther Eysenbach, JMIR
Publications, Canada; Pier Luigi Sacco, IULM University of Languages and
Communication, Italy; Alexandre Alaphilippe, EU Disinformation Lab, Belgium
In the meeting’s first session, seven speakers presented different perspectives on the
infodemic.
WHO’s role
The key principle of WHO’s response to the infodemic is that individuals and
communities can better protect themselves if (a) they have timely access to, and
understanding of, the collected knowledge and wisdom of trusted sources; and (b)
they are engaged as part of the solution. WHO has a special position that allows—and
obliges—it to receive and communicate information directly from countries, from the
field, from hospitals and elsewhere; put together the big picture of what is happening
on the ground; and bring it to the attention of appropriate scientific networks. It has
to present information in ways that are actionable, and, where necessary, in ways that
target specific vulnerable groups. It also acts as a convener, gathering other trusted
sectors and pillars of society—such as faith based organizations (FBOs), the private
sector, governments and others—to share and adapt information. Finally, its position
of overview allows WHO to work to understand and quantify the infodemic, identifying
issues as early as possible and responding fast, with correct information.
To meet these needs and obligations, EPI-WIN has devised the basis for a five-part
framework for an infodemic management strategy, as outlined earlier: (1) identifying
evidence and gathering the necessary knowledge and wisdom; (2) simplifying
knowledge for different audiences; (3) amplifying action; (4) quantifying the impact of
the infodemic; and (4) assisting the coordination and governance of all these activities.
5
6
In Quebec, which at the time of the meeting had more COVID-19

The policy perspective cases than any Canadian province, a number of responses to
the infodemic are working well. Collaboration between public
The policy implications of the infodemic were explored by Viroj health scientists and government are informing action, and
Tangcharoensathien of the Thailand Ministry of Public Health, authorities are prioritising clear, transparent communication,
and by Ève Dubé of the Institut National de Santé Publique du which in turn has resulted in positive press coverage without
Québec (Quebec National Institute of Public Health). politicization. Phone lines have been set up to deal with
issues like medical health; and there are email channels
Dr Tangcharoensathien outlined Thailand’s evidence and through which members of the public can pose questions to
information demands after 2.5 months of intensive work on government. Statistics on social distancing behaviours to date
COVID. The Ministry of Public Health serves a wide range of show good adherence to advice.
audiences and by necessity operates a demand-driven strategy
to providing information about COVID-19. Three main groups Of course, there are challenges. There has been “an
need information: the public, policy makers at various levels, unprecedented increase in fake news,” and the people in
and frontline health care workers. fact-checking and debunking roles are overwhelmed. It is
impossible to address pieces of disinformation one by one,
The general public needs information on the nature of the virus and is now necessary to triage the fake news that could have
and how it works, and the correct social interventions, some of the most negative impact on health. Mis- and disinformation
which needs to be made specific to local contexts. The WHO can have non-health effects (such as changes in fuel prices and
Myth Busters4 information has been particularly useful in this key shortages), but there is also dangerous wrong information
regard, and should be expanded. Policy makers require daily around treatments, diagnostics and prevention approaches.
epidemiological updates—for regions and cities, nationally, The emergence of a number of conspiracy theories does
and for other countries—and evidence on the effectiveness not help. Managing these challenges is difficult: in the era
of different interventions, as well as information on the of 24/7 news, even well intended communications can
balance between the pandemic’s economic impacts and generate ambiguity and confusion regarding recommended
morbidity and mortality. They also need advice and evidence approaches. Canada is a federal country, so measures differ by
on the management of disinformation and—of course—the province, and there is confusion round specific questions such
allocation of health systems resources (including personal as whether or not to wear masks. An increase in anxiety and
protective equipment/PPE, beds and surge capacity, workforce psychological distress has been noticed across the population
and lab capacity, medicines, etc.) for different epidemiological after only three weeks of social distancing, and the distancing
scenarios. Meanwhile, frontline workers require evidence- is likely to last much longer. Mental health issues will be a
based guidelines on effective public health interventions and challenge, raising questions around how to quarantine, and
clinical management of patients. how to communicate to people not using traditional or known
sources of information and/or people who consume media
from other countries. Another common issue is the difficulty
of communicating uncertainties and changing guidelines—for
example, when the time comes, managing the transition out
4 of full social distancing.
See https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/
advice-for-public/myth-busters
7
8
Fact-checking: the media perspective

Some insight into the media perspective was provided by Yana Many rumours propagate in local or closed spaces such as
Dlugy of the AFP Digital Verification Service, which has had a Telegram, Nextdoor and WhatsApp, such as one widely-shared
team looking at misinformation since 2017. AFP’s worldwide recommendation of dangerously high doses of choloroquine
network includes 76 journalists in 32 countries, performing for those infected. While some of these memes and ideas are
fact-checks in 12 languages on a dedicated verification hub. wrong but harmless, some are potentially deadly and lead
This work reveals a number of things about the infodemic. to dangerous incidents such people in the United Kingdom
There is a huge public thirst for verified information, and destroying 5G towers, Americans drinking bleach, and Iranians
traffic to AFP fact-checking has exploded. To the date of the dying after drinking bootleg alcohol.
consultation in early April, 2020 had already seen more traffic
to AFP fact-checking than all of 2019. In response, AFP has stepped up collaborative projects to share
information and increase the impact of its work. These include
Trends particular to COVID-19 include the fact that much a Trusted News Initiative in collaboration with tech companies
wrong advice is not shared maliciously, but can still be like Facebook, Google, Twitter—a crucial workstream, given
threatening to life and health (for example, the idea that the that these platforms are key to how the misinformation is
virus can be cured with herbal eyedrops, or that disposable spread. AFP is also working with fact checkers worldwide on
masks can safely be steamed and reused; dangerous recipes a COVID facts alliance, led by the International Fact-Checking
for home made hand sanitizer recipes; numbers for unreliable Network (IFCN) 5 . Given the massive public demand for
information hotlines, and so on). Alongside this, ‘imposter trustworthy information, there is a pressing need to increase
content’ generated by those pretending to be authorities and cross-sectoral partnerships and include health in this work, so
trusted sources has been effective in propagating rumours and that correct expert advice is incorporated into these initiatives
misinformation, much of which has been contrary to official as quickly and thoroughly as possible.
advice. The same disinformation is being recycled in different
regions, as are many of the same photographs (for example,
a photograph that originated with an art project in Germany
commemorating the Holocaust was originally shared with
the claim that it showed victims of COVID-19 in China; some
5
time later, it reappeared purporting to show victims in Italy). See https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/know-more
9
Social media platforms: the Facebook

example
Praveen Raja and Athas Nikolakakos, respectively Head of clicked through. Outside these pop-ups, Facebook has linked
Health and Partnerships and Head of Integrity at Facebook WHO and others with celebrities and influencers to connect
and leads of Facebook’s response to health misinformation, with people; has given WHO and others (including global fact-
outlined how Facebook is attempting to responding to the checking partners) free advertisement credits to help their
infodemic. Facebook is a tool for people to share information, information campaigns; and has helped launch a service on
and in crisis situations it offers a number of ways to help them WhatsApp allowing users to sign up for daily alerts, tips for
receive critical messages. Governments and other authorities disease prevention, and other public health information that
can use it to get the word out through their own channels and they can pass on to others. In the USA, local governments and
accounts, interact with the public, host Q&A sessions, and so emergency response organizations are being helped to link
on; and individual doctors, researchers and other authoritative more easily with communities, and to produce localized alerts.
sources can share first-hand accounts. The company’s goal
in the COVID-19 context is to support global public health For the second part of the strategy, Facebook has been
work and keep people safe through a twofold strategy of removing false claims, as flagged by leading global health
(1) connecting people to accurate information from credible organizations, that could lead to physical harm—e.g. by
sources; and (2) stopping the spread of misinformation and making false claims about cures, treatments, the availability
other harmful content. of essential services, or the location or severity of the
outbreak. Guidance is regularly updated in consultation with
For the first part of this strategy, Facebook has launched its WHO and other trusted authorities. For a second category
coronavirus information centre, which can be found at the of false claim that does not threaten physical harm, such as
top of each user’s news feed. This contains real time updates, conspiracy theories around how the outbreak, Facebook
verified information and tips, and links to useful articles and works with a global network of over 60 fact-checking partners
videos. There are further measures to ensure that people in 50 languages to debunk misinformation. In addition, the
receive this information through other pathways as well— organization is blocking advertisements that try to exploit the
for example, every search on the Facebook platform for pandemic—e.g. by selling false cures—and any commerce
coronavirus or every joining of a coronavirus-related group listings for medical masks, sanitisers, disinfectant wipes and
results in a pop-up linking to WHO information; and on COVID-19 test kits.
Instagram, tapping on a COVID hashtag produces a pop-up
link to WHO or other verified information. Over one billion
people have received these links, and 100 million of them have
10
On WhatsApp, limits have been imposed on the capacity to Infodemic preparedness requires new infodemiology tools.
send chain messages or perform mass forwarding of messages, Some ideas for these that could be done quickly include WHO-
and accounts doing mass messaging have been banned. backed infodemiology hackathons and the establishment of
Support has been provided to independent newsrooms and new WHO Collaborating Centres for infodemiology and related
fact checkers promoting correct information and fighting fake work.
news: USD 25 million in funding has been given to local news
organizations, and USD 75 million worth of marketing has The antidote to misinformation is openness: transparency
been donated to help publishers around world as advertising leads to trust. To gain that trust, open science is key: “open
revenue declines. A further USD 2 million in grants has gone data, open peer review, open source and open access.”
to increase the capacity of fact checkers.
More can be done, perhaps particularly through bringing

tech companies together with health organizations and
ministries. Possibilities for further work include generating
content “that resonates with diverse populations and [which]
meets them where they are,” enabling those people to “be
their own best advocates on social media,” and reach the
organizations they care about with the best information—
impactful, locally relevant, in native languages. Another
possibility was to encourage and/or develop better ways of
sharing information about potentially false information trends,
building an evidence base to enable quicker learning about
new trends in misinformation around the world in order to
improve processes to find and act on it. Finally, it might be
possible to support WHO and others with existing initiatives,
such as Myth Busters.
Infodemiology and publishers

Gunther Eysenbach of JMIR Publications provided an
overview of infodemiology from the joint perspectives of
both scientist and publisher. The concept of infodemiology
started with the study of the determinants and distribution of
health information. How digital information affects people’s
behaviour is a problem as old as the internet—which generates
huge amounts of data with which to study it. Evidence and
metrics for information and communication patterns online,
and how they relate to health attitudes and status, can be fed
to public health professionals and policy makers, helping them
refine messaging, thereby influencing attitudes and health
status, which can be measured again to create a virtuous cycle.
An e-collection of recent infodemiology papers on this topic
is available online from JMIR6 .
For the publisher, the challenge under fast-evolving pandemic

circumstances is to review and publish as fast as possible, and
to meet the challenge of balancing speed against rigour, new
peer review models are needed. A great deal has happened
in the last few years in terms of acceptance of pre-prints,
which is one route to faster publication: rather than waiting
for peer review, this can now be done routinely, with the opt-
in of authors. Papers can be indexed in PubMed on the day of
acceptance, even before editing and typesetting. New peer
review models can also be trialled to accelerate this process,
such as virtual pre-print journal clubs that replace and/or
supplement the formal peer review process.
6
Link: https://www.jmir.org/themes/69
11
12
The socio-behavioural
dimension of infodemiology higher infodemic risk. The level of infodemic risk increases
Pier Luigi Sacco of the IULM University of Milan, Italy, pointed with the level of cognitive manipulation that is implied,
out that in the absence of reliable therapeutic strategies, the where ‘cognitive manipulation’ implies not only exposure
behavioural dimension is the key variable to mitigate the to unreliable information, but also a misleading cognitive
effects of a pandemic. Information is centrally important: frame with which to interpret it. Conspiracy theories and
misleading public perceptions or the legitimization of junk science are considered the most manipulative forms of
wrong ideas about the pandemic and its effects can have content; intentionally designed fake news and hoaxes are the
serious negative consequences. This requires an integrated next most serious form.
perspective that integrates medical and socio-behavioural
dimensions much more tightly than at present—and which Based on results to date, different countries present different
includes evaluation of the behavioural effects of public levels of infodemic risk, without any clear relationship to level
communication. Computational social science approaches of socioeconomic development. Public health interventions
offer a way to define and quantify the socio-behavioural are therefore strongly sensitive to socioeconomic factors,
dimensions of the infodemic, monitoring both the emotional which should be taken into account when designing any
and the cognitive domains. interventions. For example, lockdown and social distancing
clearly affect people differently depending on economic safety
The IULM team addresses the emotional dimension mainly (sources of income, available savings, etc.), quality of residential
through the VAD spectrum (valence, arousal and dominance), space, and family relations and level of social capital. A number
which describes emotional components such as how much of related potential issues around public health interventions
we like/dislike situations, how much they affect us, and how have been identified. For example, widespread perceptions
much we feel in control; and the OCEAN7 spectrum, which of socioeconomic inequality within a society could induce
describes societal ‘personality’ as defined by openness to less advantaged populations not to comply with public
new ideas and possibilities, consideration of others, sense of health measures if they are perceived as an additional toll; or
responsibility and organization, sociability and enthusiasm, prescription of mandatory masks might provide a false sense
anxiety, stress, and shifts in mood. Digital content is monitored of security, inducing people to go out more often.
as a bridging ‘mass psychology’ dimension where cognitive
and emotional elements mix—a complex social phenomenon, There are a number of wider policy implications. Evidence-
in which interaction of individual perceptions, feelings and based approaches on the effectiveness of the behavioural
thoughts causes the emergence of collective cognitions and dimension of public health measures are needed, along
emotions that in turn feed back onto the individual level. with protocols similar to those for standard public health
Finally, the cognitive dimension is tracked by defining and interventions. Designing public health interventions and
measuring infodemic risk associated to fake news with the related communications requires a data-driven approach
highest potential of dysfunctional cognitive restructuring. that clearly characterizes audiences’ emotional and cognitive
contexts, and which takes into account the relevant major
On the basis of these metrics the team has devised an index of socioeconomic parameters and cultural factors. Computational
infodemic risk that measures exposure to unreliable sources social sciences offer us new tools that are complementary to
of information, with more unreliable sources conferring laboratory experiments to develop new protocols and test
their effectiveness.
7
OCEAN stands for openness to experience, conscientiousness, extroversion,
agreeableness and neuroticism, or the ‘Big 5.’
13
Tackling misinformation viewers in three weeks. There is also huge concern about
impersonation of health authorities—for example, fake Twitter
Alexandre Alaphilippe provided an overview of the EU accounts purporting to be official sources advocating the use
Disinformation Lab’s work to understand and address COVID- of chloroquine, or people impersonating doctors to create an
related misinformation in EU member states. The Lab analyses audience and talk to huge audiences.
the spread of information using work of fact checkers like AFP
to understand how false narratives repeat themselves and why Because the disease is fast while science is relatively slow, there
(for example, because some networks are monetizing fake is an information asymmetry that needs addressing. It is hard
news). Comparisons are made with global trends observed to satisfy understandable demands for information in a crisis
by partners and the main actors in the disinformation field, with the answer that “we don’t know right now:” strategies
and other platforms’ responses to the crisis are monitored. are needed for this, and to get people to understand the
A COVID-19 resource hub has been created at https://www. dangers of wrong information so that they are cautious about
disinfo.eu/coronavirus. what they see and share online. Social media platforms are
responding in their own ways with a range of actions, including
The lab has created an overview of how disinformation has surfacing and prioritizing good content, close cooperation
evolved throughout the crisis, along with examples of the with fact-checkers and authorities to remove disinformation,
different manifestations of misinformation, and the main and provision of free advertising to authorities. They are
tactics for spreading disinformation. The types of mis- and also using automated content moderation, though this can
disinformation campaigns that have been seen “are new to sometimes lead to moderation mistakes and/or false positives.
Western Europe, and Europe hasn’t been prepared for it.”
There are many information channels active in spreading After this crisis, the big question will be how we can limit the
bad information, and while foreign influences are driving spread of this infodemic and those that come in the future.
some of this deliberate misinformation, it is not know who is Science moves as fast as it can, but it has limits to how fast it
behind them all. The ‘globalization of the fake’ nonetheless can be accelerated—testing vaccines cannot be rushed, for
continues apace, with fake news continuously being adapted example. Complementary methods will be needed to slow
to local languages and contexts. Novel digital economies the spread of disinformation, which requires information and
allow opportunities to gather large numbers of viewers oversight on how it is distributed and shared, the main clusters,
very quickly —for example, one French channel spreading how many are reached, and how much fake information is
conspiracy theories around COVID-19 has gathered a million online.
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02 HOW CAN THE INFODEMIC BE MANAGED, DESCRIBED

AND MEASURED?
Presenters: Kisoo Park, Korea University College of Medicine, South Korea; Julii
Brainard, Norwich Medical School, University of East Anglia, UK; Leticia Bode,
Georgetown University, USA; Rebecca Petras, H2H Network, USA/France; Philip
Mai and Anatoliy Gruzd, Ryerson University, Canada; Philipp Schmid, University
of Erfurt, Germany; Jay J. Van Bavel, New York University, USA; Tim Zecchin,
Media Measurement, UK; Manlio De Domenico, Complex Multilayer Networks Lab,
Fondazione Bruno Kessler (FBK), Italy; Marcelo D’Agostino, Pan American Health
Organization (PAHO), and Ian Brooks, University of Illinois, USA; Tavpritesh Sethi,
Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology Delhi, India
In the next parts of the consultation, speakers discussed different possibilities for quantifying
the infodemic.
The infodemic spreads easily, and can be conceived as an emerging infectious disease,
because there are currently no specific treatments or vaccines—and, as such, it can be
conceived from the perspective of the R0 (basic reproduction rate), which is determined
mostly by (1) the probability of transmission per contact; (2) the average number of contacts
per time unit; and (3) the duration of infectiousness. In parallel, then, the R0 of the infodemic
could be affected by (1) audiences’ vulnerabilities, related to their levels of health literacy
and/or socioeconomic and other vulnerability; (2) disseminators’ traffic volumes (e.g.
through websites and social media); (3) the plausibility of the misinformation; and (4) the
speed and effectiveness of health authorities’ responses with scientific evidence. Viruses
travel along networks—transport networks, social networks—and require epidemiology
to follow them; information does the same, and requires infodemiology: but it is crucial to
understand that these two processes are entangled, and cannot be studied in isolation from
one another. Infodemics are intertwined with other phenomena, and a systemic perspective
is needed deal with them.
15
The infodemic thrives on information that sounds plausible and

easy to understand, and which usually contains a little portion
of fact that makes it easier to believe. In this hyperconnected
world, it spreads and amplifies much faster than the real virus,
The infodemic thrives on
and moves faster than responders: disinformation can pop
up any time, anywhere, but it takes a while for defenders to
information that sounds
gather and respond with scientific evidence, especially in more
vulnerable and less well-served populations. As ever, society’s
plausible and easy to
least advantaged suffer the most risk: the danger is far more
acute to those with a lack of health and/or digital literacy, those
understand, and which
in places with reduced access to good, locally comprehensible
information, and/or those who are psychologically vulnerable
usually contains a little
in crisis situations.
portion of fact that makes
It is possible to model a number of key factors in the
infodemic, such as how misinformation might influence
it easier to believe.
disease outbreaks. For example, one such effort—presented
by Julii Brainard of Norwich Medical School in the University of
East Anglia, UK—produced outcomes that included not only in Brazilian favelas were enforcing lockdown in contradiction
more conventional results (resulting R0, peak prevalence, case of the President’s advice, on the basis that safeguarding the
fatality rate, duration of outbreak, etc.) but also other harms health and stability of their networks and markets was a more
directly related to the effect of information, such as misuse of favourable outcome for the illegal drugs business. COVID-19
medication and other harmful health behaviours, hoarding is bad for profits.
of drugs ineffective in the outbreak but needed for other
purposes, undermining important institutions, and gains in A team at Georgetown University has conducted six years
social capital for unaccountable and/or disreputable groups. of research in how to correct health misinformation on
social media in relation to Zika, which provides some insight
It is necessary also to look at the mechanisms and motives into managing the COVID-19 infodemic. Correction of bad
that make spreading—or not spreading—misinformation messages on social media platforms can be effective. Expert
productive and attractive. Many if these are financial— for organizations were shown to be the most effective correctors,
example, as already mentioned, monetising the spread of fake and could perform this function with little or no reputational
news. This can work in unexpected ways: one striking example, cost. Social media platforms themselves can also correct,
cited in a Financial Times article, described how drug gangs as can other users, but in the latter case interventions from
16
multiple users are needed to achieve the same effects, and exacerbated by the fact that COVID-19 is a moving target,
corrections should include links to expert organizations. Social with the needs for intervention moving and proliferating
media can therefore be an effective conduit for correction of quickly around the world. Messaging must change as needs
bad information if expert health organizations do the work and the science shift, and knowing local contexts is crucial.
directly; provide the public with clear, easily digestible, easily Not all guidelines (for example, on social distancing) work in
shareable information; and partner effectively with the social all places; the degree of different governments’ commitments
media. to factual information varies greatly; many people speak local
rather than national languages; literacy is low in many areas;
Member organizations of the H2H network—a collection of and adaptation is necessary. To counter these problems, local
agencies supporting humanitarians working during crises— media need more resources: fake news is hard to avoid, and
have been supporting the fight against COVID-19 in South journalists need help. Toolkits with validated information need
East Asia with a number of infodemic-related interventions. to be readily available, with content in multiple languages. To
These include providing key actors with a library of up-to-date meet these needs, integration and collaboration are crucial:
scientific evidence; providing multilingual media content to risk communication efforts must support each other, with new
address misinformation; and data-driven translation support to and more effective ways of sharing. In the short term, all of this
combat misinformation. An overview of all this work provides work must adapt to new realities, developing guidelines on
a number of key lessons. There is already an ‘Infodemic on top remote risk communications, reducing face-to-face contact
of the infodemic:’ the explosion of information and effort in while trying to ensure safeguarding, and providing remote
the humanitarian sector has added to an already formidable support in information management.
tsunami of information, and while new efforts to counter
the situation are laudable they multiply quickly, making Another helpful resource is the COVID-19 misinformation
duplication and ‘noise’ severely problematic. This issue is dashboard set up by the Canadian Institutes of Health
17
18
This can be supplemented by public service announcements

about the infodemic, educating on ‘digital hygiene’—in a
similar fashion to how they are taught to develop routines
and practices for personal hygiene. Finally, cultural shifts are
required, and should be encouraged by any means possible,
Research 8 , which tracks and visualizes coronavirus claims to make it socially acceptable for people to retract and delete
debunked by trusted, professional fact checkers around the inaccurate posts that they might have shared.
world. Establishing and running this resource has provided
a number of important lessons. To instill confidence in an While inaccurate messages of science denialism cause
increasingly uncertain information landscape, people’s damage, they can be mitigated. One technique for doing this
expectations need to be set by reiterating—constantly— is the use of rebuttal approaches, which have been shown
that this is a new virus, and that recommendations should to be effective even in vulnerable groups. WHO’s response
be expected to change with more data. To do this effectively, guidelines for vaccine deniers proposes such an approach:
better coordination is needed between different national while there is potentially an infinite number of messages a
agencies, down to the basic level of agreeing common terms science denier can share, making it hard to prepare for any
of reference. To account for regional differences, information potential debate, the task is made easier if a framework is
must clearly state its intended audience. For dissemination applied that reduces this to a manageable number. Science
purposes, social media influencers should be recruited and deniers tend to take positions along the same five lines: playing
given accurate content that they can ‘remix’ in accordance with down the disease threat; questioning the safety of the vaccine;
their own creativity and personal branding. suggesting alternatives to the vaccine; questioning trust in
health institutes; and questioning the effectiveness of the
Health authorities should work with domain registrars to act vaccine. A content rebuttal framework allows preparation for
against fraudulent COVID-19 websites, which are important those five topics with five key messages of response. Another,
vectors for misinformation. All automated registration of complementary approach is that of technique rebuttal, a
domains containing words related to the pandemic should more generic approach because techniques are shared across
be halted. Further work with mainstream media organizations domains—whether the science and evidence being denied
is required to implement ‘old article’ features to reduce the is that of vaccines, climate heating, the Holocaust, COVID-19
number of old stories re-circulated as new. Metadata can be or something else. The techniques used are selectivity;
used to limit the spread of outdated information that could be impossible expectation; conspiracy theories; false logic;
weaponized by misinformed/bad actors. misrepresentation; and referral to fake experts. Applying the
rebuttal approach to denialism messages along these lines
also allows the use of a rebuttal matrix. Technique and topic
8
w ww.covid19misinfo.org
19
rebuttal have been shown to be effective, even in vulnerable late January 2020, shows that 42% of the messages were
groups, with no need for further complex strategies and no generated by non-humans—i.e. bots or software-controlled
evidence of backfire. This evidence suggests that techniques activities. Fact-checking showed that of over 35 million linked
developed in responding to science and vaccine deniers may sources outside Twitter that these messages contained, 29%
be key to dealing with COVID-19 misinformation. were unreliable or biased. Such data and the accompanying
metadata allows geolocation, bot detection, psycholinguistic
Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 analysis to quantify emotional content, fact-checking, analysis
pandemic response is a recent paper, co-authored by 41 experts, of the information cascades generated by sharing content,
that examines the last century of insight into COVID-relevant and overall risk analysis—all of which can be used to create
topics9 to reveal a number of core lessons. People tend not an infodemic risk index that allows for spatiotemporal analysis,
to appreciate the risks they run, and often unconsciously act showing at which rate users are exposed to unreliable facts,
as continuing dangers to themselves and others. Broadly and therefore maps of infodemic risk distribution. This can be
speaking, it goes against human nature for us to keep ourselves explored at https://covid19obs.fbk.eu/
in rigid isolation as a means of protecting others when our
images of pro-sociality often involve the opposite: reaching Another example of how artificial intelligence (AI) and machine
out to people. But the COVID-19 pandemic is fundamentally learning can be applied to the struggle to get the right
framed around a collective response, and only if everybody information to the right people in the right format at the right
plays their role—washing hands, cancelling events, distancing, time come from India. WASHKaro, initially a water, sanitation
not travelling, sharing resources—does it work. To avoid and hygiene (WASH) intervention, was designed to address this
disincentivizing people as it gets harder, alternative ways are problem by matching WHO guidelines to users’ interests, and
required to maintain social connection while enabling that was repositioned to include COVID-19 information when the
effort. This paper has a number of pragmatic recommendations pandemic struck. The app uses provides users with bite-sized
to this end, including the need for authorities to build a shared pieces of information authenticated using machine learning
sense of identity by addressing the public in collective terms and natural language processing to match sources of verified
and urging people to act for the common good; the need to and authentic information, such as WHO reports, against
identify sources (such as community leaders) who are credible daily news. It delivers narrated content in Hindi and English
to different audiences and share public health messages using state-of-the-art text-to-speech engines. Finally, the
through them; using ‘ingroup models’ (such as community information is validated and improved by ongoing learning,
members) who are well connected and well-liked to role model as users feed back on its relevance to them. With the pivot
norms; and the need to prepare people for misinformation and to COVID-19, the development team decided to provide a
ensure they have accurate information and counterarguments. full information suite to users, including capacity for contact
To help slow infections, it may be helpful to make people tracing; a symptom tracker and access to WHO chatbots;
aware that they benefit from others’ access to preventative access to WHO Myth Busters; and the ability to communicate
measures; and instead of the phrase ‘social distancing,’ it with other phones running the app and tell users to maintain
would be preferable to use ‘physical distancing,’ signalling that physical distancing.
connection is possible even when people are physically apart.
Analysis of COVID-19 information on social media in the
A number of key issues need to be taken into account when Americas suggests that the top influencers all heads of state,
analysing web and social media for COVID-19 communication. not technical organizations. Another insight was to do with the
Identifying those who originate and share misinformation hashtags used by ministries of health: roughly half of ministries
is in fact of limited value: it is often done retrospectively, of health in the Americas are using Twitter, and the hashtags
and is only truly useful when seeking to share information most identifiable as coming from them are not the same as
with specific communities of interest, or when identifying those hashtags most used elsewhere. This raises questions
networks. It is also often difficult and resource intensive. It is about whether ministries should pivot to use the hashtags
arguably more important to educate citizens so that they can most commonly used by others, and/or also come up with a
identify misinformation—but as misinformation becomes series of hashtags identifiable with the ministries. It would be
more nuanced, this becomes more difficult, and it is a risk beneficial to coordinate the regional and international use of
to be seen to be stifling debate. In this situation, focusing hashtags and ensure constant reference to portals containing
on sharing correct information via trusted sources becomes real evidence. When communicating, ministries need to
more important. It is crucial to identify the citizens who are understand that not all information is suitable for every
asking questions. Doing so also identifies a valuable set of comment, and to know what information to use, from what
data, because the questions they most want answered are a source, and for what purpose. Active two-way participation
significant information demand opportunity, and meeting that with audiences is essential for this purpose—and not only
demand helps win the long-term battle. If trusted sources do for social media more broadly, but also for interaction and
not fill information voids, misinformation often will. communication in specific conversations. WHO is currently
developing a factsheet to help countries through these
Machine-assisted, crowd-based solutions are required for the processes.
task, because the scale of an infodemic is such that humans
alone can no longer do it. For example, analysis by a team
at IULM University of infodemic data on over 230 million
messages in public discussions on Twitter, collected since
9
The paper can be read at psyarxiv.com/y38m9
20
21
22
23
24
03 POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A panel discussion between Neville Calleja, Ministry for Health, Malta; Viroj
Tangcharoensathien, Ministry of Public Health, Thailand; and Sylvie Briand,
WHO
The consultation revealed five implications for policymakers to consider.
Firstly, interventions and messages must be based on science and evidence. Within
this topic there are two main overarching challenges: the need to manage the creation
and dissemination of trusted information so that it is not excessive, overwhelming or
confusing; and the need to counter misinformation.
Scientific findings must be collated, reviewed, appraised and assessed for relevance
to help form recommendations and policies that have an impact on the health of
individuals and populations. Scientific and public health institutions are central
in this process. COVID-19 has resulted in an explosion of evidence generation
and synthesis activities (an ‘infodemic on top of the infodemic’), which should be
internationally coordinated to avoid duplication. In parallel, work is required to slow
down and streamline the flow of information of all kinds, guided by a constantly
updated set of guidelines to counter misinformation, a unified strategy for producing
and disseminating trusted information, and a measured approach to correcting
misinformation. Medical journal editors could also help manage the infodemic
problem by—for example—producing plain language summaries for each COVID-19
related article for journalists and the public.
25
Second, knowledge should be translated into actionable

behaviour change messages, presented in ways that are
accessible to all parts of all societies. Cultural and contextual
sensitivity in the platforms and messages used, and translation
into local languages, are necessary. Coordinated work and
partnering with a variety of stakeholders, including civil
society, is required to ensure the availability of information
targeted at vulnerable and/or hard-to-reach communities
via non-digital routes. An on-the-ground network of global
field workers could help reach out to highly vulnerable
people to ensure they can access available relief materials and
information: many citizens around the world still do not have
access to pandemic information on the internet.
Thirdly, governments should reach out to key communities to

understand their concerns and information needs, the better
to tailor advice and messages that can help these communities
address the audiences they represent. Through this process,
communities—of all kinds, whether neighbourhood, religious,
professional or other communities—amplify the right public
health messages in ways that are user-friendly and which can
lead to the right changes in behaviour. Active engagement
calls and dialogue could be established for private sector
employers, telecoms companies, the food and agriculture
sector, faith-based organizations, health care and medical
professional associations, and the media. Community Health
Workers—the first line of health care in many low-resource
settings—could be mobilized with the correct information,
graphics and narratives to share within communities.
Fourthly, strategic partnerships should be formed across

all sectors, including the social media and technology
sectors, academia, and civil society. These are amplifiers and
observatories of information. Through strategic partnerships
with health authorities, these platforms can place and
prioritize relevant information and advice, ensuring citizens
see it, as well as help measure and describe the infodemic, and
track trends and the impact of messages and interventions.
There is a wealth of information on these platforms that can
improve understanding of the sentiments of populations and
guide the effectiveness of public health measures.
Fifthly, health authorities should ensure that the actions

described above are informed by sound information that
helps them understand the circulating narratives and changes
in trends of information, questions and misinformation in
communities. Analysis of online narratives and TV, radio
and news media, paired with appropriate fact-checking
resources, can be systematically applied. Mixed-methods
research approaches can also be put in place to monitor and
understand public knowledge, risk perceptions, behaviours
and trust in specific pockets of communities to generate
rapid snapshots to inform policy-makers. Examples of such
research methods include socio-behavioural research and
sentiment and media analysis through big data analysis of
digital information from online conversations, TV, radio and
news media, and community dipstick surveys.
Sixth, following experiences to date in responding to the

COVID-19 infodemic and the lessons from other disease
outbreaks, infodemic management approaches should be
further developed to support preparedness and response and
inform risk mitigation, and enhanced through data science
and socio-behavioural and other research.
26
A framework for managing

infodemics
The online brainstorming process of this consultation, along with the input from the
speakers and the plenary Q&A sessions summarised above, resulted in the online
collection and categorisation of 596 ideas. From this, five action areas emerged:
identifying evidence; simplifying knowledge; amplifying action; quantifying impact;
and coordination and governance.
01 IDENTIFYING EVIDENCE
Infodemic management is not just an operational practice, but also one that should be
based on science and evidence. Within this challenge there are two main overarching
challenges: the need to manage the creation and dissemination of trusted information
so that it is not excessive, overwhelming or confusing; and the need to counter
misinformation.
Scientific findings must be collated, reviewed, appraised and assessed for relevance
to help form recommendations and policies that have an impact on the health of
individuals and populations.
Meanwhile, mis- and disinformation needs to be identified and authenticated,

an exercise that requires international collaboration. While this type of work is the
normative function of WHO, countries can and should contribute, analysing social
media content and submitting their results. Fake news has drivers, and they need to
be understood in order for us to be able to counteract them.
Governments and public health institutions are trusted correctors of misinformation,

and need to keep doing it.
02 TRANSLATING KNOWLEDGE & SCIENCE

If health authorities can communicate respectfully, delivering decisive messages
rapidly in clear layman’s language and ensuring that what they are saying cannot be
twisted or misrepresented, they can establish and maintain themselves as trusted
authorities. To do this, good information has to be translated into actionable behaviour
change messages, presented in ways that are accessible to all parts of all societies.
Cultural and contextual sensitivity in the messages used, and translation into local
languages, are necessary. Coordinated work is required to ensure the availability of
information targeted at vulnerable and/or hard-to-reach communities. This adaptation
must extend to marginalised and vulnerable communities and languages.
27
relation to the degree of cooperation between all these actors,

03 AMPLIFYING ACTION across the whole of society. For this to be achieved improved
coordination is required between stakeholders including but
Amplification takes place mainly—though not exclusively— not limited to WHO, its Member States, scientific and public
at country level, and is carried out with the goal of building health institutions, private sector communication and telecoms
trust and spreading the right information to the right people companies, state communication bodies, search engines, civil
at the right time. Countries should optimise the use of social society, academia, frontline health workers, and others, all the
platforms through trusted and authentic agencies, using all way down to the grassroots level of neighbourhood mutual
necessary media, including but not limited to text, video and support groups.
infographics. There is a need for repeated, correct messaging
delivered in culturally friendly formats, along with the timely
correction of misinformation and the application where CONCLUSION
necessary of rebuttals and ‘Myth Busters.’ Governments and
other relevant actors should reach out to key communities to WHO is grateful to those who contributed at very short notice
understand their concerns and information needs, the better and under great pressure to this consultation, and is already
to tailor advice and messages that can help these communities learning from the results. The draft framework for managing
address the audiences they represent. Through this process, infodemics in health emergencies (see Annex 1) was prepared
communities—of all kinds, whether neighbourhood, religious, in the week following the consultation, and will be reviewed
professional or other communities—can amplify the right and adjusted as the pandemic and infodemic continue, and
public health messages in way that is user-friendly and which once they are over.
can lead to the right changes in behaviour. Active engagement
calls and dialogue should be established for private sector Managing infodemics is a complex and cross-disciplinary area
employers, telecoms companies, the food and agriculture of action that requires the participation of a range of different
sector, faith-based organizations, health care and medical actors and sectors. WHO, through headquarters and in
professional associations, and the media. Community Health collaboration with regional and country office teams, will work
Workers—the first line of health care in many low-resource with different stakeholders to advance the ideas discussed in
settings—should be mobilized with the correct information, the meeting, with a particular focus on those that are rapidly
graphics and narratives to share within communities. implementable at country level. Support will be given to
Strategic partnerships are also required with social media and social science research and other behavioural interventions to
technology platforms and stakeholders, as well as academia increase understanding; the integrated analysis of the results;
and civil society—all of which are amplifiers and observatories and the consequent development—where necessary—of
of information. Through strategic partnerships with health further tools to understand and measure digital information
authorities, these platforms can place and prioritise relevant flows and their effects. This will be done in collaboration
information and advice, ensuring it is seen by citizens. with partners, different expert teams within WHO, and other
important actors such as UNICEF, the International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the relevant
04 QUANTIFYING IMPACT country stakeholders.
The partnerships described above are key to gathering, When working on a pandemic such as this, many rules go
organizing and analysing data that can help measure and out the window. Time is at a premium; locked-down, captive
describe the infodemic, and track trends and the impact of populations are engaging more digitally, and more often, with
messages and interventions. There is a wealth of information the world; certain rules and standards are tightened compared
on digital platforms that can improve understanding of the to normal, while others are relaxed. A range of new challenges
sentiments of the population and guide the effectiveness of emerges, and the resultant infodemic makes choosing what
public health measures. The infodemic needs to be understood guidance to follow difficult. Meanwhile, paradoxically,
to be managed, and this challenge presents great potential for governments that need advice are getting less than they might
cross-sectoral and international scientific collaboration. expect—or want—from many of the organizations that usually
provide it, because those organizations are under such great
pressure and the situation is evolving at high speed. Quality
05 COORDINATION & GOVERNANCE assurance takes time, and even when it is done, it is not always
possible to identify the ‘right’ information with certainty. Many
COVID-19 has resulted in an explosion of evidence generation situations are not black and white. Without sufficient evidence,
and synthesis activities, which should be internationally science does not always show one clear path forward.
coordinated to avoid duplication. In parallel, work is required
to slow down and streamline the flow of information of all Taking these and other uncertainties and difficulties into
kinds, guided by a constantly updated set of guidelines on fake account, a framework is required to minimise the effect
news and a unified strategy for producing and disseminating of obstacles and maximise the collective strengths of
trusted information, and a measured approach to correcting stakeholders the world over in order to quantify and minimise
misinformation. the negative effects of the infodemic. With thanks to all who
contributed to this consultation, Annex 1 of this document
Managing epidemics—and infodemics—in an emergency presents a first draft of just such a framework.
requires a whole-of-society approach. For the most effective
responses, private and public actors have to pull together,
prioritizing multidisciplinary cooperation. The range and
effectiveness of possible response measures increases in
28
29
Annexes
ANNEX 1:
Framework for managing
infodemics in health emergencies
Interim draft for use during the COVID-19 response
This infodemic framework is proposed in the context of the COVID-19 response, and will be
reviewed, and adjusted if necessary, after the pandemic. It is hoped that each WHO Member State
and relevant actor of society will, within their mandate, apply localized infodemic management
approaches adapted to national and other contexts and ongoing practices.
ACTION AREA 1
STRENGTHENING THE SCANNING, REVIEW AND VERIFICATION OF
EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION
Evidence generation & synthesis
01 Develop and support international efforts to coordinate production and dissemination of
evidence syntheses, and reduce duplication of effort
02 Develop tools for rapid appraisal of evidence and synthesis of knowledge, and to disseminate
the information they produce
03 Develop critical appraisal tools and criteria for reporting and assessing ‘grey’/non-academic
evidence and community grassroots responses to overcoming COVID-19.
31
Evidence synthesis and knowledge translation

04 Establish national rapid evidence synthesis teams containing knowledge translation specialists
tasked with integrating knowledge translation into emergency health responses
05 Consider establishing mechanisms within WHO to build sustainable capacity for rapid evidence
synthesis and knowledge translation, through mechanisms such as the WHO EPI-WIN network
and platforms such as the WHO Academy and Open WHO
06 Promote and support systematic reviews of evidence about public health and infodemic
management interventions in health emergencies, to identify gaps and opportunities in research.
Develop this draft framework further with a set of recommended infodemic management
interventions
07 Strengthen and support community platforms that make available rapid knowledge synthesis
and evidence maps; references for localization of guidelines in Member States; analysis of
uptake of WHO guidelines; and guidelines for communicating and disseminating evidence from
systematic reviews.
Publication and dissemination of scientific evidence

08 Collaborate with scientific journals to define a set of principles for managing, reporting and
critically appraising new evidence in order to promote public clarity of scientific findings (such
as plain language summaries for journal articles and/or virtual journal clubs)
09 Support and reinforce the Open Science values and practices of open data, open peer review,
open source and open access, as well as standards for reporting evidence that enable rapid
synthesis and evaluation of the evidence in systematic reviews
10 Clearly communicate the stages of the scientific peer review process, and the advantages and
limitations of using pre-published articles that are rapidly shared
11 Develop tools for ranking the provenance, timeliness and credibility of scientific sources to aid
citizens, media, health authorities and other scientists, so that the overview of these sources
provides a kind of ‘evidence barometer.’
32
ACTION AREA 2
STRENGTHENING THE INTERPRETATION AND EXPLANATION OF
WHAT IS KNOWN, FACT-CHECKING STATEMENTS, AND ADDRESSING
MISINFORMATION
Risk communication and infodemic management
12 Consider establishing or strengthening national mechanisms in Member States for risk
communication that involve multidisciplinary teams of experts from national institutes of public
health, journalists, the fact-checking and misinformation-fighting community, monitoring and
analytical experts and other relevant actors in a coordinated effort to disseminate verified
information and respond to misinformation
13 Tailor messages to targeted audiences based on available evidence, and debunk the most
harmful myths (e.g. through the WHO EPI-WIN network); and develop approaches, standards and
tools that address the changing of messages and guidance as knowledge about the pathogen
and the disease increases
14 Coordinate efforts to produce reliable, multilingual content in response to claims and questions
about preventive measures and treatments, and base the work on research about what questions
are circulating in communities
15 Foster dialogue and communication between public health organizations and local journalists
to strengthen visibility and trust across professional sectors and raise the capacity of local media
to use verified information
16 Consider strengthening journalists’ training on health and scientific topics; using Q&As with
respected media trainers and health experts for training of journalists; and incorporating
retractions of unconfirmed or unfounded statements into standard reporting practice
17 Define and promote a research agenda on risk communication in the digital age to develop
scalable interventions that can address the receptivity of individuals and the sharing of
misinformation online.
33
Development of trusted sources, fact-checking, and response to

misinformation
18 Develop tools and guidance to promote risk communication, disseminate trusted information
and respond to misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic and other health emergencies.
These could include (but should not be limited to):
• Gengagement
uidelines and tools on use of digital tools and analytics for risk communication and community
in health emergencies
• Checklists and guidance on how to promote trusted content and respond to misinformation
• Papproaching
rotocols to decide which stories need to be debunked because they are gaining traction and
a strategic tipping point
• Resources for citizens to promote digital health and media literacy

19 Support the development of networks of trusted information sources and networks for
standards-based, multilingual fact-checking activities and misinformation response
20 Develop tools and standards for assessing the integrity/accountability of fact-checking initiatives,
including a common glossary and terminology for describing the infodemic and its elements that
will help facilitate communication, exchange of information and management of the infodemic
across all levels of society
21 Build capacity for promoting trusted content and fact-checking, monitoring, verifying, reporting
and responding to misinformation, by developing a dedicated network of WHO Collaborating
Centres and providing courses on training platforms such as Open WHO
22 Support collaborative development of integrated resources on communication in public health

emergencies, including but not limited to:
• Aanglobal resource centre and dashboards for fact-checking and misinformation that provide
integrated overview of information and related activities
• Iasnfodemic dashboards for emergencies, but also for more slow-burning systematic issues such
vaccine mistrust and misinformation, incorporating behavioural and other multidisciplinary
analyses of past experiences
23 Support the propagation of updated information through innovation in information networks

and the facilitation of collaborative, distributed fact-checking activities.
34
Social media, web and other communication channels

24 Engage social media companies and other locally dominant channels of information
dissemination in promoting access to trusted health information and reducing the impact of
misinformation
25 Ensure that social media platforms act to support and innovate in disseminating trusted health
information, and respond to the propagation of misinformation on their platforms. Actions to
this effect could include:
• Idisinformation/misinformation
mproving the alignment of platforms’ terms of use to local information laws in order to address
• Iofmplementing mechanisms for user-reported misinformation alerts, to facilitate faster review

misinformation
26 Work with domain registration companies to review any new domain registrations related to
COVID-19
27 Ensure that organizations with established and functioning websites do not register new domains
for the pandemic, because this makes it difficult to gain traction in search algorithms. Instead,
organizations should dedicate pages or sections on their already existing websites to COVID-19
28 Innovate to provide web readers with a ‘likelihood of fakeness’ assessment of information based
on machine learning and integrated repositories of misinformation and trusted content.
ACTION AREA 3
STRENGTHENING THE AMPLIFICATION OF MESSAGES AND ACTIONS FROM
TRUSTED ACTORS TO INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES THAT NEED THE
INFORMATION
Coordination of information dissemination
29 Coordinate the dissemination of information to reduce the proliferation of sources
30 Build intersecting platforms to share concrete communications practices and resources by sector
(e.g. for governments, journalists, health care professionals, the technology sector, community
leaders, law enforcement, students, and others), fostering self-learning and the exchange of
information.
Localization of messages and community engagement

31 Foster networks and communities for localization, context adaptation, and translation of
communication material, and link up with content production and dissemination networks
• Icivil
nvolve, and share leadership with, knowledge producers, journalists, librarians, policymakers,
society and local leaders
• Wcentres,
here these networks do not exist, engage, and share leadership with, local health care
community health workers and/or civil society, with the aim of cascading information
down to individual level
32 Devise and implement approaches that incentivize society to engage with WHO-recommended
content. Methods for doing this might include memes, games, cartoons, quizzes, surveys, polls,
competitions, participation in podcasts, scientific entertainment programmes and other events.
These should be executed using a coordinated approach across social media, mobile, web, email,
radio, TV, and other channels down to word of mouth, and should include the use of influencers
or other trusted mediums.
35
36
Use of communication channels

33 Ensure the strategic use of all relevant communication channels to disseminate information,
including social media, news, radio and/or community and other leaders. Include community
mechanisms for health provision, psychosocial support, education, provision of water, sanitation
and hygiene (WASH), and vaccine safety communication/promotion of immunization demand
34 Produce tools and guidance on how to engage social media platforms, and use hashtags and
other practices to disseminate health information as effectively as possible
35 Collaborate with private sector communications platforms (social media, communication

boards/online forums, messaging apps, etc.) to disseminate health information and engage
audiences through methods including Q&As, interactive sessions and the use of bots for content
dissemination
36 Ensure that social media platforms develop policies that institutionalize their support for efforts
to share information from WHO, UN agencies, national authorities and other trusted sources
37 In low-resource settings with low internet penetration, consider using text messaging and
Interactive Voice Response (IVR) to disseminate messages and collect feedback from the
population.
Health, digital health and media literacy

38 Implement programmes to boost critical thinking skills and health, media and digital health
literacy among the population, building capacity to discern what information is reliable
Work in partnership with the education sector, health literacy experts and others to develop
39 curricula, guidance, tools and evidence to promote digital health and health and media literacy
across the population throughout the life course, as well as specifically among health care
workers and vulnerable populations.
37
ACTION AREA 4
STRENGTHENING THE ANALYSIS OF INFODEMICS, INCLUDING ANALYSIS OF
INFORMATION FLOWS, MONITORING THE ACCEPTANCE OF PUBLIC HEALTH
INTERVENTIONS, AND ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING INFODEMICS
AND BEHAVIOURS AT INDIVIDUAL AND POPULATION LEVELS
Develop monitoring of the infodemic
40 Monitor, analyse and evaluate the implementation of infodemic management interventions
41 Promote and develop new data sources, methods and approaches for analysis of infodemic
management interventions
42 Develop a running research agenda for monitoring, analysis and evaluation of infodemic
components and interactions, and infodemic management interventions
43 Develop and introduce monitoring of key indicators for questions, opinions and attitudes to
inform infodemic interventions, including information from vulnerable and at-risk groups;
and develop new indicators for monitoring infodemic management from the points of view of
policymakers, the general public, health care workers, individuals, and particular communities
44 Develop a multidisciplinary research agenda and develop methods, data sources and mixed-
methods analysis protocols for measuring different aspects of the infodemic, including in the
areas of:
• Ibeing
nformation flows in digital and traditional media, including analysis of narratives, questions
asked, sentiment, web search activity and information dissemination networks
• Amisinformation,
nalysis of information flows focusing on the reliability of information versus types of
and exchanges of trusted information and misinformation
• Tsources,
rust and credibility measurement, including people’s attitudes towards information, its
and what system it comes from; how these lead to trust or mistrust; and prediction
of the likelihood of action
• Amisinformation
udiences’ interactions with information, including their vulnerability to misinformation,
exposure, and self efficacy (a person’s belief in having ability to change own
behavior, beliefs, motivation, to counter misinformation, and take up knowledge that leads
to healthy behaviour and recognize misinformation/low quality info) as related to their health
literacy, beliefs, knowledge, and behaviour
• Analysis to inform the implementation and revision of infodemic management interventions

• Analysis of circulating information and beliefs, and trust dynamics at community level
• Modelling of infodemic risk at societal level.
Develop research on health information dissemination and uptake

Develop infodemic research priorities to identify enablers of, and barriers to, the availability of
trustworthy health information, including how to improve production and dissemination of
45 evidence-based information for the public, patients, and health professionals, and measures to
increase health literacy and the ability to find and interpret such information.
38
ACTION AREA 5
STRENGTHENING SYSTEMS FOR INFODEMIC MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH
EMERGENCIES
46 Consider establishing national coordination mechanisms or task forces in Member States to
coordinate all aspects of infodemic management in support of risk communications, response to
misinformation, community engagement and measuring the impact of infodemic interventions.
47 Following the experience of the response to the COVID-19 infodemic, and the lessons of other
disease outbreaks, refine this draft infodemic management framework to support preparedness
and response in the future and inform risk mitigation, enhancing it through data science, socio-
behavioural and other research. This could include, but need not be limited to:
• Bcommunity
uilding capacity, shared open tools, and collaborations across sectors in global, national, and
responses
• Phuman
roduction of a value statement declaring access to correct health information as a basic
right and promoting dissemination of accurate health information (including up-to-
date information that has been localized for specific communities), and fact-checking and
monitoring of misinformation
• Dinterventions
eveloping guidelines on ethical considerations for analysis and design of infodemic
48 Build a network of WHO Collaborating Centres for all aspects of infodemic management,
and pursue collaborations with other UN agencies that are doing infodemic monitoring and
management work in the field, to conceive and deliver capacity building programmes online
and in Member States
49 Promote open source tools and standards that ensure reusable analysis and interoperable
exchange of infodemic data, AI training datasets and models
50 Use innovative methods, such as hackathons, innovation challenges and online brainstorms,
to collect further ideas and innovations and crowdsource problem-solving in infodemic
management.
39
ANNEX 2:
Programme
Day 1
Tuesday, 7 April 2020, 14:00–17:00 Geneva time. Plenary (3 hours)
Time Session
14:00 – 14:10 Introduction
Welcome by Dr Sylvie Briand, Director, Infectious Hazard Preparedness, WHO;
Lead of infodemic management pillar for COVID-19 response
14:10 – 15:30 Session 1: Managing infodemics – what is the new phenomenon?

Moderator: Tim Nguyen, Rapporteur: Mark Nunn
• Multi-faceted discussion of the COVID-19 infodemic
• Challenges, impact, and approaches to infodemic management
1. Towards a WHO framework for infodemic management – Tim Nguyen, WHO
2. A FP fact-checking service (media perspective) – Yana Dlugy, AFP Digital Verification, France
3. Challenges and current experience in informing infodemic management
(country/state government pespective) – Ève Dubé, Institut national de santé publique du
Québec, Canada
4. Private sector perspective – (TBC)
5. T itle TBC (publisher perspective) - Gunther Eysenbach, JMIR Publications, Canada
6. I nfodemiology: the socio-behavioral dimension
(science perspective) – Pier Luigi Sacco, IULM University, Italy
7. E uropean Disinfo Lab resources for tackling misinformation about COVID-19
(civil society perspective) – Alexandre Alaphilippe, EU disinformation lab, Belgium
15:30 – 15:40 Break
15:40 – 16:50 Session 2: Infodemiology – how can the infodemic be managed, described and measured?
Moderator: Marcelo D’Agostino, Rapporteur: Mark Nunn
METHODS, TOOLS AND EVIDENCE FROM THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND FROM COVID-19 PANDEMIC
• fact-checking and relevance analysis, misinformation dynamics
• characterizing social and societal dynamics of infodemic during outbreak
• science of digital and social information flows and analysis in outbreaks
• softudy of interaction and engagement with COVID-19-related media, web and social media items; analysis
advertising online
RISK COMMUNICATION, MISINFORMATION AND FACT-CHECKING
1. Lessons from 2015 MERS-Cov and COVID-19 for infodemic management – Kisoo Park, Korea University
College of Medicine, South Korea
2. Misinformation making a disease outbreak worse: outcomes compared for influenza, monkeypox, and
norovirus – Julii Brainard, Norwich Medical School UEA, UK
3. Correction of Global Health Misinformation on Social Media (Zika experience) – Leticia Bode, Georgetown
University, USA
4. Supporting the fight against COVID-19 infodemic in SE Asia – Rebecca Petras, H2H Network, USA/France
5. Canadian misinformation and fact-checking portal – Philip Mai and Anatoliy Gruzd, Ryerson University,
Canada
continued on next page
40
Day 1, continued
Tuesday, 7 April 2020, 14:00–17:00 Geneva time. Plenary (3 hours)
Time Session
16:50 – 17:50 Invitation for collective contribution of ideas towards a framework for infodemic management at
global, national and local levels
• FAmplify
ocus brainstorm ideas on the four areas of infodemic management (Identify evidence; Simplify knowledge;
action; Quantify impact).
• Use Sli.do #infodemic to submit ideas into each of four ‘rooms’
• Suggestions will be summarized and recapped for session 4 next day
FOUR AREAS OF BRAINSTORM (SEE SLI.DO ROOMS):
• Identify evidence: Scan, review and verify evidence and information
• Simplify knowledge: Interpret and explain what is known
• Amplify action: Reach out and listen to the concerns of sectors and provide advice for action
• Qinterventions
uantify impact: Describe the infodemic, measure change and impact of infodemic management
Day 2
Tuesday, Wednesday, 8 April 2020, 14:00 – 17:00 Geneva time. Plenary (3 hours)
Time Session
14:00 – 14:10 Recap from Day 1
Tina Purnat
14:10 – 15:20 Session 3: How can the infodemic be managed, described and measured? (continued from
previous day)
Moderator: Tina Purnat, Rapporteur: Mark Nunn
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE
ow behavioral science data helps mitigate the COVID-19 crisis – Philipp Schmid, University of
1. H
Erfurt, Germany
2. Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response – Jay J. Van Bavel,
New York University, USA
WEB/SOCIAL ANALYTICS AND AI TO PRODUCE ACTIONABLE INSIGHTS AND ANALYSIS
3. Web/Social media listening and analytics for COVID-19 communication – Tim Zecchin, Media
Measurement, UK
4. Infodemiology: tools for detecting and assessing infodemics – Manlio De Domenico, Complex
Multilayer Networks Lab, FBK – Fondazione Bruno Kessler, Italy
5. Title TBC – Marcelo D’Agostino, PAHO, and Ian Brooks, University of Illinois, USA
6. Assessing the similarity between daily news headlines and WHO recommendations – Tavpritesh
Sethi, Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology Delhi, India
15:20 – 15:30 Break
15:30 – 16:50 Session 4: A framework for managing infodemics

(working across whole of society for evidence-informed policy)
Moderator: Tim Nguyen, Rapporteur: Mark Nunn
• RQuantify
eport back on four areas of brainstorm: Identify evidence; Simplify knowledge; Amplify action;
impact
Brainstorm of suggestions for an infodemic response framework at global, regional and country level
6:50 – 17:00 Conclusions and next steps

Dr Sylvie Briand
41
ANNEX 2:
List of speakers & organizing team
Alexandre Alaphilippe Eve Dubé Pier Luigi Sacco
Executive Director, EU DisinfoLab Researcher, Scientific Group on Professor of Cultural Economics, IULM
aa@disinfo.eu Immunization, Québec National University, Senior Advisor/Head of
Institute of Public Health OECD Venice Office on Culture and Local
Leticia Bode eve.dube@inspq.qc.ca Development
Associate Professor, Communication, pierluigi_sacco@fas.harvard.edu
Culture & Technology Programme, Gunther Eysenbach pierluigi.sacco@iulm.it
Department of Government Founder, CEO, Publisher
Georgetown University JMIR Publications Philipp Schmid
lb871@georgetown.edu geysenba@gmail.com Behavioural Scientist,
Media and Communication Science
Julii Brainard Anatoliy Gruzd – Psychology and Infectious Diseases
Senior Research Associate, Director of Research, Lab, Center of Empirical Research in
Modelling Public Health Threats, Social Media Lab, Ted Rogers School Economics and Behavioral Sciences
Health Protection Unit, Norwich of Management, Ryerson University University of Erfurt
Medical School gruzd@ryerson.ca philipp.schmid@uni-erfurt.de
University of East Anglia
j.brainard@uea.ac.uk Philipp Mai Tavpritesh Sethi
Director of Business and Assistant Professor,
Ian Brooks Communications, Computational Biology,
Director, Center for Public Health Social Media Lab, Ted Rogers School Indraprastha Institute of Information
Analytics, School of Information of Management, Ryerson University Technology
Sciences philip.mai@ryerson.ca tavpriteshsethi@iiitd.ac.in
University of Illinois
ianb@illinois.edu Athas Nikolakakos Viroj Tangcharoensathien
Head of health integrity, Secretary General,
Neville Calleja Facebook International Health Policy Programme,
Director, Directorate for Health athasn@fb.com Ministry of Public Health, Thailand
Information & Research, viroj@ihpp.thaigov.net
Ministry for Health, Malta Kisoo Park
neville.calleja@gov.mt Institute for Occupational & Jay Van Bavel
Environmental Health, Associate Professor,
Manlio De Domenico Korea University College of Medicine Social Psychology, Cognition &
Head of Unit, Complex Multilayer blesspark@naver.com Perception, Neural Science
Networks (CoMuNe) Research, Center Director, Social Perception and Evaluation
for Information & Communication Rebecca Petras Lab
Technology Programme and humanitarian New York University
Bruno Kessler Foundation adviser, H2H Network jay.vanbavel@nyu.edu
manlio.dedomenico@gmail.com rebecca@h2hworks.org
mdedomenico@fbk.eu Tim Zecchin
Praveen Raja Managing Director,
Yana Dlugy Head of health and partnerships, Media Measurement
Project Leader, AFP Digital Facebook tim.zecchin@mediameasurement.com
Verification and FactCheck, Digital praveenraja@fb.com
Media Outreach – Head of AFP blogs,
Agence France Presse
yana.dlugy@afp.com
42
World Health Organization

HEADQUARTERS
Sylvie Briand* Alexandra Hill
Director, Global Infectious Technical Officer, High Impact Events Romana Rauf*
Hazards Preparedness, Emergency Preparedness, Global Infectious Consultant, Global Infectious
Preparedness Hazards Preparedness, Hazards Preparedness,
briands@who.int Emergency Preparedness Emergency Preparedness
hilla@who.int raufr@who.int
Viviane Bianco*
Consultant, High Impact Events Daniel Hougendobler* Aicha Taybi*
Preparedness, Global Infectious Project Officer, Consultant, High Impact Events
Hazards Preparedness, Emergency Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Preparedness, Global Infectious
Preparedness hougendoblerd@who.int Hazard Preparedness,
biancov@who.int Emergency Preparedness
Vicky Houssiere* taybia@who.int
Andre Buell* Consultant
Office Assistant, High Impact Events Preparedness Judith Van Andel
High Impact Events Preparedness, Global Infectious Hazards Consultant, Digital Health
Global Infectious Hazard Preparedness, Emergency Technologies, Digital Health and
Preparedness, Emergency Preparedness Innovation, Science Division
Preparedness houssierev@who.int jvan@who.int
buella@who.int
Rosamund Lewis* Judith Van Holten*
Candida Connor* Medical Officer, Consultant, Office of the Director,
Consultant, Emerging Diseases and Zoonoses, Global HIV, Hepatitis and STIs
Global Infectious Hazards Global Infectious Hazards Programmes, Communicable
Preparedness, Emergency Preparedness, Emergency and Noncommunicable Diseases
Preparedness Preparedness vanholtenj@who.int
connorc@who.int lewisr@who.int
Melinda Frost* Shi Han (Sharon) Liu* PAN-AMERICAN HEALTH

Technical Officer, Consultant, ORGANIZATION/ WHO REGIONAL
High Impact Events Preparedness, Monitoring Nutritional Status and OFFICE FOR THE AMERICAS
Global Infectious Hazards Food Safety Events, Nutrition and
Preparedness, Emergency Food Safety, Healthier Populations
Preparedness shliu@who.int Marcelo D’Agostino
mfrost@who.int Senior Advisor, Information Systems
Tim Nguyen* for Health, Evidence and Intelligence
Ioana Ghiga Unit Head, High Impact Events for Action in Health
Technical Officer, Preparedness, Global Infectious dagostim@paho.org
High Impact Events Preparedness, Hazards Preparedness,
Global Infectious Hazards Emergency Preparedness Sebastian Garcia Saiso
Preparedness, Emergency nguyent@who.int Director of Evidence and Intelligence
Preparedness for Action in Health
ghigai@who.int Tina Purnat* garciasseb@paho.org
Technical Officer,
Sarah Hess* Digital Health Technologies,
* WHO EPI–WIN team
Technical Officer, Digital Health and Innovation,
High Impact Events Preparedness, Science Division
Global Infectious Hazards purnatt@who.int
Preparedness, Emergency Illustrator
Preparedness Andrew Ramsay* Sam Bradd
hesss@who.int Scientist, Implementation Research, sam@drawingchange.com
High Impact Events Preparedness,
Global Infectious Hazards Rapporteur
Preparedness, Emergency Mark Nunn
Preparedness mark.nunn@gmail.com
ramsaya@who.int
43
World Health Organization
20 Avenue Appia
CH 1211, Geneva 27
Switzerland
epi-win@who.int
www.who.int/epi-win

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A N A D H O C W H O T E C H N I C A L C O N S U LTAT I O N

Managing the COVID-19 infodemic

Managing the COVID-19 infodemic

ISBN 978-92-4-001031-4 (electronic version)

© World Health Organization 2020

Cataloguing-in-Publication (CIP) data. CIP data are available at http://apps.who.int/iris.

Report design & layout by Vivian Lee.

Note to the reader

Acronyms & abbreviations

The infodemic is propagated by the fundamentally interconnected way in information

Second, this knowledge should be translated into actionable behaviour change

Thirdly, governments should reach out to key communities to understand their

Attendance at the consultation dwarfed the numbers for a Day 2

85 of those people were active on the interactive Slido

In addition to the online interaction, which generated a large

Professional backgrounds of attendees

Other Civil society

Attendees came from a

01 WHAT IS THE NEW PHENOMENON? A ROUNDTABLE

In Quebec, which at the time of the meeting had more COVID-19

Fact-checking: the media perspective

Social media platforms: the Facebook

More can be done, perhaps particularly through bringing

Infodemiology and publishers

For the publisher, the challenge under fast-evolving pandemic

02 HOW CAN THE INFODEMIC BE MANAGED, DESCRIBED

The infodemic thrives on information that sounds plausible and

This can be supplemented by public service announcements

Second, knowledge should be translated into actionable

Thirdly, governments should reach out to key communities to

Fourthly, strategic partnerships should be formed across

Fifthly, health authorities should ensure that the actions

Sixth, following experiences to date in responding to the

A framework for managing

Meanwhile, mis- and disinformation needs to be identified and authenticated,

Governments and public health institutions are trusted correctors of misinformation,

02 TRANSLATING KNOWLEDGE & SCIENCE

relation to the degree of cooperation between all these actors,

Evidence synthesis and knowledge translation

Publication and dissemination of scientific evidence

Development of trusted sources, fact-checking, and response to

• Resources for citizens to promote digital health and media literacy

22 Support collaborative development of integrated resources on communication in public health

23 Support the propagation of updated information through innovation in information networks

Social media, web and other communication channels

• Iofmplementing mechanisms for user-reported misinformation alerts, to facilitate faster review

Localization of messages and community engagement

Use of communication channels

35 Collaborate with private sector communications platforms (social media, communication

Health, digital health and media literacy

• Analysis to inform the implementation and revision of infodemic management interventions

Develop research on health information dissemination and uptake

14:10 – 15:30 Session 1: Managing infodemics – what is the new phenomenon?

15:30 – 15:40 Break

continued on next page

15:20 – 15:30 Break

15:30 – 16:50 Session 4: A framework for managing infodemics

6:50 – 17:00 Conclusions and next steps

World Health Organization

Melinda Frost* Shi Han (Sharon) Liu* PAN-AMERICAN HEALTH

• Resources for citizens to promote digital health and media literacy

• Iofmplementing mechanisms for user-reported misinformation alerts, to facilitate faster review

• Analysis to inform the implementation and revision of infodemic management interventions