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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. OMAR MAPALAO and REX

MAGUMNANG
G.R. No. 92415. May 14, 1991

FACTS:

An information was filed in the RTC of Baguio City charging Rex Magumnang,
Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar Hadji Edris, Gumanak Ompa and Omar Mapalao of the
crime of Highway Robbery with Homicide, which was allegedly committed on
September 20, 1987 at Km. 24 along Halsema Road, Caliking, Atok, Benguet.
Upon arraignment, accused Omar Mapalao, Gumanak Ompa, Rex Magumnang
and Aliman Bara-akal, assisted by their counsel, pleaded not guilty.
Accused Anwar Hadji Edris had not been arrested and remained at large. On
March 17, 1988, accused Aliman Bara-akal died in jail during the trial so the case was
dismissed as to him on April 4, 1988. Accused Rex Magumnang, after being
positively identified by witnesses Adolfo Quiambao, Jimmy Jetwani and Simeon
Calama during the trial, escaped from detention on September 25, 1988 when
brought for medical treatment to the Baguio General Hospital, so the trial  in
absentia continued as to him.
After the trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the trial court on January
12, 1990 convicting the accused of the offense charged ruling or finding accused
Omar Mapalao y Dianalan, Gumanak Ompa, and Rex Magumnang guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation, of the offense of Robbery with
Homicide in a Highway in violation of PD 532, as charged, and hereby sentences
each of them to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua.
Not satisfied therewith the accused Omar Mapalao and Rex
Magumnang(THROUGH COUNSEL) appealed the decision to this Court
contending that the trial court erred in failing to consider significant exculpatory
facts and circumstances and that the trial court erred in failing to apply the
constitutional mandate on the presumption of innocence and proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

TRIAL IN ABSENTIA (CITING Gimenez vs. Nazareno )

ISSUE 1:
Whether or not, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over the person of the
accused and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his
escape from the custody of the law.

RULING:
YES. SC held that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of
parties but continues until the case is terminated. Where the accused appears at the
arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by
the court over his person and this continues until the termination of the case,
notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law.
Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution aforecited a ‘trial in absentia’ may
be had when the following requisites are present; (1) that there has been an
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arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear
and his failure to do so is unjustified.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the
evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused
who escaped from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence
and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for
this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial  in
absentia. As it has been aptly explained:
‘x x x The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a provision as there were
quite a number of reported instances where the proceedings against a defendant had
to be stayed indefinitely because of his non-appearance. What the Constitution
guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his
guilt could be proved. With the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his
absence cannot justify a delay provided that he has been duly notified and his failure
to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied. That is the way it should
be, for both society and the offended party have a legitimate interest in seeing to it
that crime should not go unpunished.’
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not, the accused the right of the accused to be presumed innocent
will be violated (if tried in absentia) if a judgment is rendered as to him.

RULING:
NO. The contention that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will
be violated (if tried in absentia) if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable.
He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the
evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the
opportunity to be heard.
Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried  in absentia retains his rights
to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear
during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived these rights. This Court
has consistently held that the right of the accused to confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. In the same vein,
his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit
and protection, may be waived by him.
Section 1(c) of Rule 115 which clearly reflects the intention of the framers of our
Constitution, to wit:
‘x x x The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a
particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be
present during that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the
date of the trial and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be
present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained. x x x’
Also, SC held that an escapee who has been duly tried  in absentia waives his
right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who testified against him.
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___________________________________________________________________________
APPEAL
ISSUE 3:
Whether or not, an accused who escaped after arraignment and
subsequently tried in absentia, can still exercise his right to appeal.

RULING:
NO. An accused who escapes from confinement or jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country, loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the Court, he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from the court, including his right to appeal his conviction.
The appeal of appellant Rex Magumnang should be struck down. After
arraignment and during the trial, he escaped from confinement and had not been
apprehended since then. Accordingly, as to him the trial in absentia proceeded and
thereafter the judgment of conviction was promulgated. Nevertheless, through
counsel, he appealed to this Court. Under Section 8, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Court, may “upon motion of the appellee or on its own
motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.” In this
case, appellant Magumnang remained at large even as his appeal was pending.
Hence, by analogy his appeal must be dismissed. The reason for this rule is because
once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits
to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief
from the court. Thus when as in this case he escaped from confinement during the
trial on the merits and after his arraignment, and so the trial  in absentia proceeded
and the judgment against him was promulgated in accordance with Section 14(2)
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, nonetheless, as he remained at large, he should
not be afforded the right to appeal therefrom unless he voluntarily submits to the
jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested, within fifteen (15) days from the
notice of the judgment against him. While at large as above stated he cannot seek
relief from the Court as he is deemed to have waived the same and he has no
standing in court.

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APPEAL
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To this effect a modification is in order of the provision of the last sentence of

Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
“If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused’s failure to appear was without
justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the accused, who may
appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to him or his counsel.”
It should provide instead that if upon promulgation of the judgment, the accused
fails to appear without justifiable cause, despite due notice to him, his bondsmen or
counsel, he is thereby considered to have waived his right to appeal. However, if
within the fifteen (15) day period of appeal he voluntarily surrenders to the court or
is otherwise arrested, then he may avail of the right to appeal within said period of
appeal.
By the same token, an accused who, after the filing of an information, is at large and
has not been apprehended or otherwise has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court, cannot apply for bail or be granted any other relief by the courts until he
submits himself to its jurisdiction or is arrested.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the

defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

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Note.—Escape of accused from jail not bar to review of judgment of conviction.
Criminal Law; Robbery with Homicide; Penalties;  Death Penalty; Robbery attended by
homicide or murder is certainly a heinous offense; In order to minimize, if not entirely
prevent serious crimes against life, chastity, and of property resulting in the wanton taking
of human life, a law must now be enacted defining what are the heinous offenses punishable
with the death penalty.—As the Court observed at the opening paragraph of this
decision, robbery attended by homicide or murder is certainly a heinous offense,
more so when in this case it is committed in the highway. There is hardly any
justification for the court to share the leniency of the trial court by imposing only the
life imprisonment as penalty. The circumstances of the commission of the offense do
not justify at all or require any killing or injury to be inflicted on any of the victims.
The appellant and his confederates were all armed while the victims were not. They
were at their mercy. None of them attempted to fight back or to resist. They gave all
their valuables and personal belongings. All they were pleading for was that their
lives be spared. It fell on deaf ears. It was a senseless killing for no valid reason. The
appellant and his confederates deserve the supreme penalty of death and no less.
But as the Court said, this is not possible under the Constitution. Our peace and
order situation today is very volatile. We have experienced several attempted coups
and we are warned of other possible coups. Our peace and order problem is a
continuing one. The division in our society is obvious and gaping. Our country is
suffering from the economic depression caused not only by the recent calamities that
visited us which were compounded by the Gulf war. Thus, measures should be
undertaken in order to minimize if not entirely prevent serious crimes against life,
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chastity and of property resulting in the wanton taking of human life. Our hope is
for a lasting peace and order in our society. A law must now be enacted defining
what are the heinous offenses punishable with the death penalty. We should not
tarry too long.
Highway robbery with homicide is a heinous offense. It is condemnable enough
for a person to commit robbery by way of a holdup but if in the process human life is
taken, the criminal act is certainly detestable. No less than the death penalty
provided by law should be meted out if we are to contain the proliferation of this
odious offense. Unfortunately, unless Congress and Malacañang act accordingly to
consider by law this class of crimes as heinous offenses, the Courts must have to
comply with the constitutional injunction against the imposition of the supreme
penalty.