Wage-Led Growth: An Equitable Strategy For Economic Recovery
Wage-Led Growth: An Equitable Strategy For Economic Recovery
Wage-Led Growth: An Equitable Strategy For Economic Recovery
Edited by
Marc Lavoie
and
Engelbert Stockhammer
© International Labour Organization 2013
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Contents
Foreword ix
Preface xi
Introduction 1
Marc Lavoie and Engelbert Stockhammer
Index 187
v
List of Tables and Figures
Tables
vi
List of Tables and Figures vii
Figures
ix
x Foreword
so, it shows that the risk of wage moderation is real and that the debt-
led and export-led strategies pursued in many countries are related to
these economic problems. Finally, the book outlines a wide range of
policy implications, pointing to the need to “rebalance” functional
income distribution. This “rebalancing” act in favour of wages will be
an essential element of equitable and sustainable growth and requires
strong policy coordination at the global level.
The findings of this volume are reflected in the Global Wage Report
2012/13: Wages and Equitable Growth published by the International
Labour Office (ILO). As emphasized in the report, it is high time for the
global community to revisit its past policies and make coordinated
efforts and actions in search of balanced and equitable growth that ben-
efits all.
Sangheon Lee
Research and Policy Coordinator,
Conditions of Work and Equality Department,
International Labour Office
Preface
xi
Notes on Contributors
xii
Notes on Contributors xiii
The financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007 turned into the
worst economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The crisis
began in the financial sector, but has since spread throughout the econ-
omy. National income levels are well below trend and unemployment
rates are double their pre-crisis level. In many countries households and
governments remain burdened by high debt levels, which prolong sub-
dued demand. In the euro area the crisis morphed into a sovereign debt
crisis, laying bare the dysfunctional nature of the European economic
policy regime.
The crisis has led to an intensified debate over the role of the state.
The orthodox austerity policies claim to be aimed at reducing govern-
ment debt; but as they are unable to revitalize demand growth, they
often result in rising debt, as is illustrated by the recent UK experi-
ence. Austerity policy usually attempts to change not only the size,
but also the nature of government interventions by reducing welfare
expenditures (including pensions) and by privatizing public services.
The academic debate is mirrored by increasingly bitter political strug-
gles. Government intervention, almost by necessity, has distributional
effects. A strong welfare state usually strengthens labour and the poor
as they benefit most from welfare expenditures and public infrastruc-
ture. The question of how to engineer a recovery is thus closely tied
to the question of who pays for the crisis. The political confrontations
have gained in intensity as the effects of the crisis have been felt more
widely in the form of rising unemployment, wage cuts, and rising lev-
els of homelessness; they follow three decades of a rapid and histori-
cally unprecedented increase in inequality, in which the very top of
the income distribution, and, in particular, top earners in the financial
sector have gained at the expense of wage earners.
1
2 Wage-led Growth
Thus for these economists, the financial crisis occurred in the United
States because of a series of government interferences, such as the overly
low US short-term interest rates or the inducements for banks to pro-
vide loans to poorer communities, or, looking further, the crisis was
triggered by the Chinese government, who rigged exchange rates, thus
flooding long-term US bond markets. It is also argued by these econo-
mists that the stimulus packages put in place to respond to the crisis
only made matters worse and amplified the crisis.
The second point of view, which is best associated with the so-called
‘salt-water’ economists and New Keynesians, sees the financial crisis as
an extreme example of market failure and poor information. Financial
innovations, such as securitization, also called the new ‘originate and
distribute’ banking model, which replaced the former ‘originate and
hold’ model, turned out to have unwanted consequences as lenders
managed to get rid of bad loans by transforming them into securities.
These failures were due in part to inappropriate pay structures in the
banking and financial industry, while fraud or quasi-fraud was made
possible by the gradual relaxation of financial regulation and the lack
of appropriate supervision.
The third explanation, while it recognizes the validity of the micro-
economic elements highlighted by the second group of economists,
relies in addition on deeper structural causes tied to the evolution of
macroeconomic variables, most importantly income distribution. This
explanation is usually associated with non-mainstream economists.
The economists who rely on the third explanation emphasize the fact
that since the 1980s there has been a switch in economic policies,
which have moved from policies aiming to promote full employment to
policies targeting low inflation. They also emphasize the general trans-
formation of society towards the acceptance of neoliberal precepts, in
particular the increasing importance of finance and that of sharehold-
ers, a phenomenon which has been called financialization and which
is associated with a ‘downsize and distribute’ model, where firms make
profits by reducing the size of their workforce instead of increasing their
investment levels. Both of these changes have weakened the bargaining
power of labour, leading in most countries to a substantial decrease in
the share of wages in national income, as well as to a noticeable increase
in wage and income inequality, as described in Tables I.1 and I.2.
These phenomena have led to a change in the way accumulation pro-
ceeds. Whereas growth had previously been supported by wage-led con-
sumption, with wages rising broadly in line with labour productivity,
growth over the past two decades has been based either on household
4 Wage-led Growth
Table I.1 Labour income share as percentage of GDP at current factor costs or
wage share in GDP, in percentage, G20 countries, average values over the trade
cycle, early 1980s–2008
Notes: The labour income share is given by the compensation per employee divided by
GDP at factor costs per person employed. The beginning of a trade cycle is given by a local
minimum of annual real GDP growth in the respective country.
a
adjusted to fit in 3 cycle pattern, b wage share in GDP or in gross value added, c incomplete
trade cycle
Source: E. Hein and M. Mundt, ‘Financialisation and the requirements and potentials for
wage-led recovery – a review focussing on the G20’, Conditions of Work and Employment
Series No. 37, (Geneva: ILO), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---
protrav/---travail/documents/publication/wcms_191782.pdf.
Table I.2 The share of top 1 per cent earners’ income in total income, mid-
1970s to mid-2000s
Change,
Country Mid-1970s Mid-2000s percentage points
G20-countries
Argentinae 9.9 16.8 +6.9
d
Australia 5.0 9.7 +4.7
Canadad 8.2 12.8 +4.6
a,e
China 2.6 5.9 +3.3
Franced 8.2 8.7 +0.5
Germanye 10.4 12.1 +1.7
Indiab,e 7.0 9.5 +2.5
Indonesiac,e 7.2 9.1 +1.9
Italyd 7.0 9.2 +2.2
Japand 6.9 9.0 +2.1
United Kingdome 6.1 14.3 +8.2
United Statesd 7.9 18.0 +10.1
Notes: a First data point is from the mid-1980s; b second data point is from the end of the
1990s; c first data point is from the early 1980s.
Source: d 2012 OECD Employment Outlook, supporting material for chapter 3, Table 3.A2.1;
e
http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/#Database.
between the Right and the Left, with the upper economic class hav-
ing taken control of the reins of government and having succeeded in
achieving regulation capture, on top of having convinced voters that
trickle-down economics was a fact rather than simply a theory. This
has allowed the upper classes to pursue and achieve rent-seeking. For
Stiglitz the negative effects of rising inequality are mostly to be found
on the supply side. Thomas Palley (2012) argues that economists and
economic theory are very much to blame for the global financial cri-
sis, because of their focus on supply-side economics and the optimal
properties of unfettered markets, while ignoring the demand-generat-
ing process. What he calls ‘emergency Keynesianism’ – expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies in crisis periods – is unlikely to succeed,
because it ignores the underlying problem, that of the structural lack
of aggregate demand, caused by excessively low wages and overly large
income dispersion. However, he does not provide systematic evidence
for this claim. James Galbraith (2012) presents a novel measure of eco-
nomic inequality and argues that it reflects a concentration of wealth at
the very top of the distribution. It has been brought about by financial
rather than real forces. Interest rates, stock market booms and inter-
national payments, but not technology or education are responsible.
While Galbraith repeatedly stresses inequality as a cause of the crisis,
he is rather vague about the exact mechanisms and criticizes the Bush
administration and its drive for an ownership society for a deterioration
of lending standards.
All of these contributions share a focus on the experience of the United
States. Our approach differs, firstly, in systematically highlighting the link
between income distribution and demand formation, in particular the
effect of wage growth on consumption growth. This link is substantiated
empirically. Second, we take an internationally comparative approach,
highlighting that different countries have adopted different strategies
in dealing with the rise in equality. The US debt-led growth model is
only one variant among many. Other countries have pursued export-led
growth strategies. Both strategies do rely on rising imbalances (the former
on rising debt ratios, the latter on rising trade imbalances). A wage-led
growth strategy offers a sounder macroeconomic alternative.
the G20 sample, as well as the whole of the euro area, are in a domestic
demand-led regime. Of these, only Australia, Canada, Mexico, Argentina,
China, India and South Africa exhibit a profit-led total demand regime.
However, Onaran and Galanis demonstrate that if all countries were to
simultaneously decrease their wage share by one percentage point, only
Australia, China and South Africa would benefit from an expansion of
aggregate demand, while the world GDP would decrease by 0.36 percent-
age points. This shows clearly that the world economy is in a wage-led
demand regime. The authors also point out that it is possible to find a
scenario whereby all countries would benefit from an increase in their
wage share even if this increase is smaller for countries that are in a
profit-led total demand regime. They thus conclude that a global wage-
led recovery is one way out of the current recession.
The chapter by Servaas Storm and C.W.M. Naastepad investigates
the supply-side effects of higher wage growth, in particular the effect
of productivity growth. Whereas Stockhammer as well as Onaran and
Galanis focus on the wage share, Storm and Naastepad start their analy-
sis by considering the growth rate of wages. Storm and Naastepad rely
on the Dutch experience since the early 1980s as a case study of the
economic impact brought about by the interrelationship between the
growth rate of wages and the growth rate of productivity. They point
out that real wages have two effects on productivity growth: first, a
direct effect, which is usually positive, as higher real wages will induce
firms to introduce more productive methods of production so as to safe-
guard their profits; secondly, an indirect impact, which arises because
higher real wages will have an impact on aggregate demand, as pointed
out empirically in the previous chapter, and the change in the rate of
growth of aggregate demand will feed a change, of the same sign, in the
growth rate of productivity, with this last relationship being called the
Kaldor–Verdoorn effect. Storm and Naastepad explain that in the case
of the Netherlands there was an overly slow increase in real wages and
a fall in the wage share for over twenty years. Because the Netherlands
are in a wage-led demand regime, this led to a slowdown in the growth
rate of aggregate demand, which itself induced very slow productiv-
ity growth. It was this slow or nearly zero-productivity growth that
explained the Dutch employment miracle of the 1980s and 1990s, when
unemployment rates fell both in absolute and relative terms, because
the low growth rate of demand surpassed the even lower growth rate of
labour productivity, thus generating a fair growth rate of employment.
Based on consensual estimates of the Kaldor–Verdoorn effects and of
the relatively weak impact of wage growth on demand growth in the
10 Wage-led Growth
euro zone and in the United States, Storm and Naastepad deduce that
most countries that are in a wage-led demand regime are likely to be
in a profit-led employment regime. This means that faster increases in
real wages are likely to generate slower increases in employment. As a
result of their findings Storm and Naastepad conclude that whereas pro-
labour policies are favourable to productivity growth and to aggregate
demand (as shown in the previous chapter), they are likely to be unfa-
vourable to job creation. This implies that, to avoid this contradiction,
pro-labour policies, in most wage-led regimes, must be accompanied
by supportive fiscal and monetary policies. Some could infer from the
above that wage-restraining policies should be pursued; but such poli-
cies, although they are likely to reduce unemployment by creating low-
wage jobs, will keep aggregate demand and productivity stagnant. This
is an option that Storm and Naastepad reject, and which they encour-
age trade unions to reject as well, because it leads to stagnant living
standards and also removes the possibility of rising living standards
accompanied by a reduced number of working hours.
We have so far focused our attention on the distribution of functional
income, that is, the wage and profit shares in national income. However,
as we saw in Table I.2, personal income, including wage income, has also
been subjected to large changes over time. The income share of recipients
of the top decile and, most particularly, the top 1 per cent or even 0.1 per
cent has increased considerably in a large number of countries. Until now,
we have argued that the greater inequality in income distribution is likely
to have slowed down aggregate demand, as high-income earners have a
higher propensity to save than do low-income earners. And indeed, there
is a great deal of literature that argues that income inequality is inimical
to fast growth, in contrast to the past mainstream view that argued that
income inequality was a necessary side effect of growth and efficiency.
But can we draw any other consequence from this change in the distribu-
tion of personal income? This is the task that Simon Sturn and Till van
Treeck have assigned to themselves. To do so, they examine the case of
three quite different countries: the United States, China and Germany.
Van Treeck and Sturn first argue that the rising income inequality in
the United States has led to a change in the consumption and borrow-
ing behaviour of American households. After having increased working
hours, and having easy access to credit, for the purposes of both consump-
tion and housing, middle-income Americans have reacted to the growing
gap between their revenues and those of their better-to-do neighbours by
increasing the extent of their borrowing and thus reducing their saving
rates. This has led to structural changes – a debt-led consumption boom
Marc Lavoie and Engelbert Stockhammer 11
generated by such strategies are unsustainable in the long run. Hein and
Mundt thus recommend a wage-led recovery strategy embedded into
their Global Keynesian New Deal. The wage-led growth strategy requires
enhanced trade union bargaining power, a reduction of managerial over-
heads and the profit claims of financial wealth holders, and the downsiz-
ing of the profit-intensive financial sector. More generally, the New Deal
requires first, the re-regulation of the financial sector in order to prevent
future financial excesses and financial crises; second, the reorientation
of macroeconomic policies towards stimulating and stabilizing domestic
demand, in particular in the current account surplus countries; and third
the reconstruction of international macroeconomic policy co-ordination
and a new world financial order along the lines of Keynes’s international
clearing union, so as to discourage countries from adopting export-led
mercantilist policies based on low wages or low wage growth. The chapter
by Hein and Mundt thus concludes this book on wage-led growth strate-
gies with a broad vision of the economic policies that are needed for a
sustainable economic recovery.
Acknowledgements
References
Galbraith, J.K. 2012. Inequality and Instability: A Study of the World Economy Just
Before the Great Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press).
International Labour Office (ILO). 2012. Global Wage Report 2012–13: Wages and
Equitable Growth (Geneva: ILO).
Palley, T.I. 2012. From Financial Crisis to Stagnation: The Destruction of Shared
Prosperity and the Role of Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Rajan, R.G. 2010. Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World
Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Stiglitz, J.E. 2012. The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers
Our Future (New York: W.W. Norton).
1
Wage-led Growth: Concept,
Theories and Policies1
Marc Lavoie and Engelbert Stockhammer
1.1 Introduction
The subprime financial crisis that started in 2007 and which became
the global financial crisis challenges economists and policy-makers to
reconsider the theories and policies that had gradually been accepted as
conventional wisdom over the last thirty years. It is widely recognized
that the global financial crisis has called into question the efficiency
and stability of unregulated financial markets. This chapter argues that
it has also demonstrated the limitations and even falsehood of the claim
that wage moderation, accompanied by more flexible labour markets as
well as labour institutions and laws more favourable to employers, will
ultimately make for a more stable economy and a more productive and
dynamic economic system.
The introductory chapter has recalled that in a large number of coun-
tries the past decades have witnessed falling wage shares and a polari-
zation of personal income distribution. As will be argued in the next
chapter, we believe that these phenomena are, at most, only partially
associated with technical change and changes in the composition of
output, and that the essential cause of the long-run evolution of income
distribution and its rising dispersion is the change in economic poli-
cies and in the institutional and legal environment that has been more
favourable to capital and its high-end supervisory employees over the
last thirty years or so.
It is time to reconsider the validity of these pro-capital distributional
policies, and to examine the possibility of an alternative path, one
based on pro-labour distributional policies, accompanied by legisla-
tive changes and structural policies that will make a wage-led growth
regime more likely, that is, pursue what we call a wage-led growth strategy,
13
14 Wage-led Growth
which, in our view, will generate a much more stable growth regime for
the future. This issue is particularly important in view of the fact that
the financial crisis has plunged many economies in recession, thus fur-
ther weakening the ability of workers to resist attempts to lower wages
or real wages, and hence with the consequence, at the macroeconomic
level, of further reducing the wage share in national income.
The advocacy of a wage-led economic strategy has a long history. It
has been articulated in reformist visions within the labour movement
and in nineteenth-century economics the phenomenon was discussed
under the heading of ‘underconsumption’.2 Within the Marxist tra-
dition, underconsumption theories have been discussed as problems
in the realization of profit.3 These ideas received a further boost from
their endorsement by Keynes, when he proposed his theory of effective
demand, arguing that excessive saving rates, relative to deficient invest-
ment rates, were at the core of depressed economies. In the more recent
academic debate, post-Keynesian economists have done the most to
analytically clarify the relation between income distribution and effec-
tive demand.4 More recently, the policy-oriented concept of a wage-led
growth strategy was prominently used by UNCTAD (2010, 2011).
A standard objection to the consideration of the underconsumption
thesis, or the consideration of problems related to the lack of effective
demand, is that long-run growth – the trend rate of growth, also called
the potential growth or the natural rate of growth – is ultimately deter-
mined by supply-side factors, such as the growth rate of the labour force
and the growth rate of labour productivity. While adepts of the so-
called ‘endogenous growth theory’ will recognize that investment in
human capital or research and development may end up modifying the
potential growth rate, they usually set aside the idea that actual growth
rates could have an influence on potential growth rates. Yet, since the
advent of the global financial crisis, government agencies and central
banks in many industrialized countries have lowered their forecasts
of long-run real growth, thus demonstrating clearly that weak aggre-
gate demand does have an impact on potential growth. As Dray and
Thirlwall (2011, p. 466) recall, ‘it makes little economic sense to think
of growth as supply constrained if, within limits, demand can create its
own supply’. This explains why we shall focus on the income distribu-
tion determinants of aggregate demand, paying less attention to the
supply-side factors.
The main objective of the present chapter is to provide an accessi-
ble introduction to the topic of a wage-led growth strategy for policy-
makers. Another important objective is to present the overarching
Marc Lavoie and Engelbert Stockhammer 15
The relation between distribution and growth had been at the centre
of macroeconomic analysis in classical economics, but with the domi-
nance of neoclassical economics in the twentieth century, issues of dis-
tribution have been neglected, since income distribution was assumed
16 Wage-led Growth
Distributional policies
Expansionary Contractionary
Distributional policies
Pro-capital Pro-labour
Pro-capital Pro-labour
In this section, we wish to present the tools that will help us distinguish
between wage-led and profit-led economic regimes. Following conven-
tional practice among researchers in the field established since Boyer
(1988), we will distinguish between demand regimes and productiv-
ity regimes, although, as we shall see, the overall effects on aggregate
demand and productivity growth are interdependent. We first deal
with the demand side, emphasized by Keynesian economists.
AD = C + I + G + NX
to make the distinction between the domestic demand regime and the
total demand regime. Since it is difficult to treat government expendi-
tures as anything but exogenous, to assess the domestic demand regime
we only need to consider the impact of a change in income distribution
on consumption and investment.
Let us start with the effect of an (exogenous) increase in the wage
share (or in real wages at constant labour productivity) on private con-
sumption. If the propensities to consume out of profits and out of wages
are the same, then the change in real wages will have no impact whatso-
ever on consumption, which is the standard assumption in mainstream
models, where income distribution plays no role. However, if the pro-
pensity to consume out of wages is higher than the propensity to con-
sume out of profits, then a shift in income distribution towards wages
will induce an increase in consumption demand. This occurs because
the redistribution of income towards a higher wage share generates
an increase in consumption expenditures, since wage earners spend a
greater portion of their income than profit recipients. A decrease in
wage dispersion, providing a greater share of income to the lower quin-
tiles, would lead to a similar result. These effects are at the core of the
arguments of the underconsumptionist economists who highlight the
detrimental impact of rising or high profit shares, as can be found in
the modern and canonical Kaleckian models of Rowthorn (1981), Taylor
(1983) and Dutt (1987).
These consequences are well supported by empirical evidence, which
shows that the propensities to save out of profits are much higher than
those to save out of wages (in part because firms, by definition, save all
of their retained earnings) and which also shows that the propensities
to save of the richest quintiles are higher, as one would expect, than
those of the poorest quintiles.7 These effects reinforce each other since
wage earners generally are poorer than most profit recipients. Capital
gains on real estate and the stock market may reduce somewhat the
differential between the propensities to consume of wage earners and
profit recipients, and this differential will also be affected by the exist-
ing social security system.
The favourable effects of higher wage shares on consumption and
aggregate demand may, however, be overturned by the detrimental
effects of a higher wage share on private investment expenditures. Most
Kaleckian economists argue that expected profitability depends on past
realized profitability, and hence on sales, relying on the strength of the
accelerator effect, and thus believing that investment should not be neg-
atively affected by an increase in the wage share.8 By contrast, Marxists
Marc Lavoie and Engelbert Stockhammer 23
and several other economists tend to claim instead that expected profit-
ability depends on the share of profits in national income, that is, on
the profit margin of firms, or, more precisely, on the profit rate that
firms expect to achieve on their capital when capacity is utilized at its
normal rate (see Lavoie 1995, pp. 795–800). As higher real wages, all
else constant, imply lower profit margins and lower profitability at the
normal rate of capacity utilization, it implies a downward shift of the
investment function. These profitability effects have been formalized
by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), the article of which is famous for hav-
ing defined the dichotomy between wage-led and profit-led demand
regimes. Similar formalizations of the investment function were also
adopted by Kurz (1990), Taylor (1991) and Blecker (2002), as well as
by many authors wishing to assess the presence of these regimes in
empirical studies. This variant of the canonical Kaleckian model is often
referred to as the post-Kaleckian model of growth and distribution. It is
worth quoting Bhaduri and Marglin in full here:
Any increase in real wage rate, depressing profit margin and profit
share ..., must decrease savings and increase consumption to validate
the under-consumptionist thesis... Nevertheless, aggregate demand
(C + I) may still rise or fall depending on what impact that lower
profit margin/share has on investment. Since it is plausible to argue
that, other things being equal, a lower profit margin/share would
weaken the incentive to invest, the contradictory effects of any exog-
enous variation in the real wage on the level of aggregate demand
become apparent. A higher real wage increases consumption but
reduces investment, in so far as investment depends on the profit
margin. (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990, p. 378)
Table 1.5 summarizes the various factors that will determine whether
the structure of an economy is such that it is in a wage-led or a profit-
led demand regime. Of course, there are many more factors other than
income distribution that determine aggregate demand: monetary pol-
icy, fiscal policy, various shocks such as oil price shocks, the bursting
of stock market bubbles, changes in real exchange rates, changes in the
growth rate of foreign GDP, and so on. Indeed, for most year-to-year
changes, income distribution will only be a minor influence on the
determination of aggregate demand, with other developments playing a
more prominent role. However, if there are long-lasting deep changes in
income distribution as have occurred in the last quarter century, they
will end up having a substantial role.
24 Wage-led Growth
Demand regime
Profit-led Wage-led
Table 1.6 Effects of an increase in the wage share and domestic and total
demand regimes
Positive Negative
Productivity regime
Table 1.8 Total productivity effect of an increase in the wage share, when the
partial productivity regime is wage-led
Table 1.9 Summary of the results of Onaran and Galanis (2013): effects of a
national and global one percentage point increase in the profit share
A B C D (A+B+C) E G
Note: The global simulation excludes Germany, France and Italy since they are part of the
euro zone.
Source: Onaran and Galanis (2013, Table 2).
‘Effect of worldwide change in profit share on aggregate demand’: effect of a simultaneous
change in the profit share in all countries, including domestic multiplier effects and
international trade effects
that are individually profit led, the positive effect of the profit share on
demand relies on net exports. Effectively this means that some individ-
ual countries can successfully pursue ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies
via wage moderation, but this does not constitute a viable strategy for
32 Wage-led Growth
Notes
1. The paper was presented at a session of the Regulating for Decent Work
(RDW) conference, held at the ILO, Geneva, 6–8 July 2011. We wish to
thank participants for their remarks and questions – in particular, Pierre
Laliberté, Eckhard Hein and Simon Sturn.
2. See Bleaney (1976) for a historical account of underconsumptionist theories.
3. For example, Baran and Sweezy (1966).
4. Based on the analysis of Kalecki (1971), Steindl (1952) and Bhaduri (1986),
the benefits of a wage-led growth strategy has been resurrected and formal-
ized by several Kaleckian or post-Keynesian authors, starting with Rowthorn
(1981), Taylor (1983), Dutt (1987) and Lavoie (1995). Taylor (1988) showed
early on that when emerging countries had enough capacity to adjust, a
wage-led growth strategy made sense.
5. It has sometimes been argued that because several empirical studies of aggre-
gate production functions have yielded estimates of the output elasticities of
factors that were consistent with the predictions of marginal productivity the-
ory under conditions of perfect competition (because these elasticities equated
pretty closely the shares of wages and profits), it was possible to conclude that
markets behaved as if they were fully competitive. But it has since been shown
that this success was achieved because what the regressions of aggregate pro-
duction functions are really measuring are the wage and profit shares, not the
output elasticities, as the regressions are in fact estimating national accounting
identities. See Lavoie (2007) and Felipe and McCombie (2013) for a review of
this critical literature.
6. Although some researchers would argue instead that reliance on free mar-
ket mechanisms and more flexible labour markets have generated large
increases in world real income over the last three decades (Balcerowicz and
Fisher, 2006). But these authors forget to compare the last decades to the
evolution of the 1950s and 1960s. Harvey (2003) and Glyn (2006) offer
insightful discussions of neoliberalism in practice.
7. Both Marglin and Bhaduri (1990) and Bowles and Boyer (1995) found that
this differential in propensities to save out of profits and out of wages was
around 0.40 on average over several countries. This is in line with the esti-
mates of Onaran and Galanis (2013).
8. Kalecki’s equation, in its simplified version where wages are all consumed
and profits are all saved, says that realized profits are equal to the value
of investment expenditures. If investment depends on realized profits, the
equation would imply that higher real wages that induce higher investment
expenditures would always lead to higher profits, and hence taking profit-
ability into account would never allow us to modify our previous conclu-
sions. This has been called the paradox of costs by Rowthorn (1981): higher
wage costs reduce profits for a single firm, but with the accelerator they
increase overall profits if all firms face similar cost increases.
9. An increase in real wages may not have a negative effect on net exports if
it arises as a result of a spontaneous change in the pricing strategy of firms,
with producers and exporters deciding to reduce their profit margins.
10. Blecker refers to a mature economy, but it should be pointed out that Taylor
(1983) figured that less developed countries also operate with excess capac-
ity, and hence that the Kaleckian model also applies to emerging countries.
36 Wage-led Growth
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