CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CASE DIGEST COMPILATION

(2017-2020)

Prepared by:
Janine Claire Andres
Eric Joe Bumagat
Miriam Catolos
Jeffrey Columna
Florieanne May Reyes
Pemar Taguinod
Chris Harry Ursua
JD-2

Rule 112
Preliminary Investigation

Labay vs Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. 235937-40

July 23,2018 J. Velasco Jr.

Doctrine:
The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a
criminal offense and be formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal
or technical right. It is a substantive right since the accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to

1
prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense, and the right to an opportunity
to avoid a painful process is a valuable right.

Facts:
Field Investigation Office I (FIO I)of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a complaint against petitioner
Labay for his participation in the alleged anomalous utilization of the PDAF of former Representative
Cagas. The complaint alleged that Rep. Cagas IV, in conspiracy with other public officials and private
individuals such as petitioner Labay, through the Technology Resource Center (TRC), sought the
release and transfer of his PDAF in the total amount of Php6,000,000.00 to Farmer-business
Development Corporation (FDC), which was led by its then president, petitioner Labay. However, upon
field verification conducted by the FIO I, it appears that the livelihood projects funded by Rep. Cagas
IV's PDAF were never implemented and were considered tobe "ghost projects." The Ombudsman
directed those charged to file their respective counter-affidavits, but copies of this Order could not
be served on Labay. It appears that the Ombudsman attempted to serve copies of the September 1,
2015Joint Order on petitioner Labay at his office at the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC)
and at his last known residence. However, the copies were returned unserved because he was no
longer employed in that office and he was unknown at the given residential address. As such, the
Ombudsman proceeded with the preliminary investigation without any counter-affidavit or
participation from Labay. Thereafter, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner and
his correspondents for conspiracy. Labay filed an Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and Deferment
of Filing of Information with Request for Copies of Complaint-Affidavit and Supporting Documents
dated November 16, 2016, praying, among others, that a reinvestigation be conducted on his behalf,
asserting that he was not afforded an opportunity to present his defense and to participate during
the preliminary investigation since he had neither been notified that a complaint had been filed
against him nor was furnished a copy of the same. However, the Ombudsman denied Labay's
Omnibus Motion, ruling that his right to due process had not been violated since he had the
opportunity to be heard when he filed the Omnibus Motion. Labay imputes grave abuse of discretion
to the Sandiganbayan’s order declaring the existence of probable cause and denying Labay’s Motion
For Reinvestigation and To Defer the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest for lack of merit.

Issue:
WON the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Labay’s Motion For Reinvestigation

Held:
Yes. There is no dispute that the Ombudsman was unable to serve copies of the complaint or of its
September 2015 Joint Order on petitioner Labay prior to or even during the preliminary investigation
of the case. The court also cannot subscribe to the Sandiganbayan's justification that petitioner was
afforded reasonable opportunity to address the charges against him since he was able to file a
motion for reinvestigation with the Ombudsman. By the mere fact that petitioner was not yet even
furnished a copy of the complaint affidavit at the time he received the Ombudsman's Resolution, it is
clear that he could not effectively and sufficiently address the allegations against him. Petitioner
Labay should not be blamed for being unable to raise any substantive defense in either the omnibus

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motions he filed with the Ombudsman since he had not even seen any of the allegations filed against
by the FIO. More importantly, he could not have been expected to seek appropriate evidence to
support his defense when he was not even given any access to the documents submitted by the FIO
in support of its complaint. The Sandiganbayan should have ordered the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for the conduct of a proper preliminary investigation with respect to petitioner Labay's
participation in the crimes charged. Instead, it chose to turn a blind eye towards the injustice
committed against petitioner.

Rule 113
Arrest
Lapi vs. People G.R. No. 210731
February 13, 2019 J. Leonen

Doctrines:
Warrantless Arrests: As with certain constitutional rights, the right to question the validity of a
warrantless arrest can be waived. This waiver, however, does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of the evidence seized during the illegal arrest.
The right to question the validity of an arrest may be waived if the accused, assisted by counsel, fails
to object to its validity before arraignment.

Facts:
In an information dated April 20, 2006, Simeon M. Lapi, Allen Sacare, and Kenneth Lim were charged
with violation of Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165. On arraignment, they pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. At pretrial, Sacare and Lim changed their pleas to guilty, and were
sentenced to rehabilitation for 6 months. Only Lapi was subjected to trial on the merits.
According to the prosecution, on April 17, 2006, operatives of the Bacolod City Anti-Illegal Drug
Special Operation Task Group conducted a stakeout operation. During the operation, PO2 Villeran
heard noises from one of the houses. He peeped through its window and saw Lapi, Sacare, and Lim
having a pot session. He entered the room and introduced himself as a police officer. Lapi, Sacare,
and Lim tried to escape, but were caught by PO2 Villeran’s team members, who were waiting by the
main door.
RTC found Lapi guilty and ruled that the warrantless arrest against him was legal since he was caught
in flagrante delicto.CA affirmed RTC decision

Issue:
WON the petitioner validly waived his right to question the legality of the warrantless arrest

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Held:
Yes. The Constitution guarantees against unreasonable warrantless searches and seizures. For a
warrantless arrest to be valid, the arrest must have been committed under the circumstances
mentioned in Rule 113 Section 5.
The Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for
the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he
enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. An accused may be estopped from
assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him
before his arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when
he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Petitioner admits that he failed to question the validity of his arrest before arraignment. He did not
move to quash the Information against him before entering his plea. He was assisted by counsel
when he entered his plea. Likewise, he was able to present his evidence. Hence, his right to question
the legality of his arrest is deemed waived.

People vs Compadro G.R. No. 213225

April 4, 2018 J. Martires

Doctrine:
The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, any evidence obtained from such warrantless search is inadmissible for any purpose in any

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proceeding. This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely: 1) Warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest; 2) Search of evidence in plain view; 3) Search of a moving vehicle; 4) Consented
warrantless search; 5) Customs search; 6) Stop and Frisk; and 7) Exigent and emergency
circumstances.
Facts: On 19 July 2011, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article 2 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Upon his arraignment, he pleaded not guilty.
According to the prosecution, a confidential informant sent a message to P/Insp. Orate, Deputy
Station Commander of Police Station 6 of Cagayan de Oro City, that n alleged courier of marijuana
together wih a female companion was sighted. The alleged courier had in his possession a backpack
containing marijuana and boarded a bus with a plate number of 2646. Thus, the policemen put up a
checkpoint and stopped the bus bearing the same plate number. Police officers boarded the bus
and saw a man matching the description given to them. They found a transparent cellophane
containing dried marijuana leaves in the bag of the man. Accused-appellant, however, denied
ownership of the bag and the marijuana. He maintains that a certain Freddie Nacorda requested him
to carry the bag to Cagayan de Oro.
Issues:
1.WON accused-appellant’s arrest was valid;
2. WON the seized items are admissible in evidence

Held:
1. No. The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, any evidence obtained from such warrantless search is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely: 1) Warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest; 2) Search of evidence in plain view; 3) Search of a moving vehicle; 4) Consented
warrantless search; 5) Customs search; 6) Stop and Frisk; and 7) Exigent and emergency
circumstances.
The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not sufficient to incite a genuine
reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on accused-appellant. An examination of the records
reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime.
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of
securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited
to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle
is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if
the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains [an] item, article or object
which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. The search in this case, however, could not be
classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target
and not a specific person.

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2. No. Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.34 This exclusionary rule instructs that
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other
words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence
for any purpose in any proceeding. Without the confiscated marijuana, no evidence is left to convict
accused-appellant.
 

Miguel vs People G.R. No. 227038

July 31, 2017 J. Perlas-Bernabe

Doctrines:
The acts of the Bantay Bayan or any barangay-based or other volunteer organizations in the nature of
watch groups relating to the preservation of peace and order in their respective areas have the color
of a state-related function. As such, they should be deemed as law enforcement authorities for the
purpose of applying the Bill of Rights under Article III of the 1987Constitution to them.

There must first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made and thatsuch process cannot be
reversed.

Facts: On May 2010, the petitioner was charged of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The
prosecution alleged that while a Bantay Bayan operative named Reynaldo Bahoyo was doing his
rounds, he received a report of a man showing off his private parts. He and fellow Bantay Bayan
operative Mark Anthony Velasquez went to the street and saw a visibly intoxicated person, which
they later identified as herein petitioner, urinating and displaying his private parts while standing in
front of a gate enclosing an empty lot. They approached petitioner and asked for an identification
card, but petitioner failed to produce one. Instead, petitioner emptied his pockets, revealing a pack of
cigarettes containing one stick of cigarette and two pieces of rolled paper containing dried marijuana
leaves. This prompted Bahoyo and Velasquez to seize the items, take petitioner to the police station,
and turn him in, as well as the seized items, over to SPO3 Rafael Castillo.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge, and stated that he was just urinating in front of his
workplace when he was frisked by the operatives and thereafter brought him to the barangay hall
where they showed him two sticks of marijuana joints allegedly recovered from him.

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RTC found accused guilty and CA affirmed the decision

Issue:
WON the search and arrest made on the petitioner is legal

Held:
No. Bantay Bayan operatives are not government agents like the PNP or the NBI in charge of law
enforcement, but are civilian volunteers who act as “force multipliers” to assist the law enforcement
agencies in maintaining peace and security. The Bill of Rights generally cannot be invoked against the
acts of private individuals, however, they may be applicable if such individuals act under the color of
a state-related function. In this case, the acts of the Bantay Bayan relating to the preservation of
peace and order in their respective areas have the color of a state-related function. As such, the Bill
of Rights may be applied to the Bantay Bayan operatives who arrested and subsequently searched
petitioner.

A lawful arrest may be made without a warrant, provided the parameters defined in Section 5, Rule
113 are complied with. In Section 5(a), or in flagrante delicto arrests, 2 elements must concur, namely:
(a.) The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime, (b.) Such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. Section 5(b) requires that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in
fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the accused had committed it. In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the
commission of an offense is essential.
The prosecution’s claim that petitioner was showing of his private parts was belied by the
testimonies. Moreover, if the arrest was made because of the alleged display of private parts, then
the proper charge should have been filed against him. However, records are bereft of any showing
that such charge was filed aside from the instant criminal charge for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. This strengthens the view that no prior lawful arrest was made which led to a valid search
incidental thereto. There must be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made, the process
cannot be reversed.

.
 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENANTE COMPRADO

G.R. No. 213225

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April 4, 2018

Doctrine:
 As regards search incidental to a lawful arrest, it is worth emphasizing that a lawful arrest
must precede the search of a person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed
 In Flagrante Delicto Arrests; For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto
to be valid, two (2) requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.

Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 where the accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution contends that a confidential informant informed the police officers through text
message that a courier of marijuana together with female companion was sighted in Cabangsalan,
Bukidnon where the alleged courier had in his possession a backpack containing marijuana and
would be travelling from Bukidnon to Cagayan De Oro City. Acting on the information, the police
officers traced the courier in a bus wherein they asked the courier to open the subject backpack and
saw a transparent cellophane containing dried marijuana leaves.
However, the accused-appellant contends otherwise stating that they were ordered to alight from the
bus for baggage inspection. The bag was opened and they saw a transparent cellophane containing
dried marijuana leaves.
The RTC found the appellant guilty of illegal possession of marijuana. Consequently, the CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC. The CA reasoned that the seized items are admissible in evidence because
the search and seizure of the illegal narcotics were made pursuant to a search of a moving vehicle. It
added that while it was admitted by the arresting police officers that no representatives from the
media and other personalities required by law were present during the operation and during the
taking of the inventory, noncompliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal and
would not render inadmissible accused-appellant’s arrest or the items seized from him because the
prosecution was able to show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been
preserved.

Issue:
Whether accused-appellant’s arrest was valid.

Ruling:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant

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or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, any evidence obtained from such warrantless search is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding .This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely: 1) Warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest; 2) Search of evidence in plain view; 3) Search of a moving vehicle; 4) Consented
warrantless search; 5) Customs search; 6) Stop and Frisk; and 7) Exigent and emergency
circumstances.
The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not sufficient to incite a genuine
reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on accused-appellant. An examination of the records
reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime.
As regards search incidental to a lawful arrest, it is worth emphasizing that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed. Thus, it becomes
imperative to determine whether accused-appellant’s warrantless arrest was valid. Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances wherein a peace officer or a private
person may lawfully arrest a person even without a warrant.
Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless
arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, the elements of an arrest effected in hot
pursuit under paragraph (b) of Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) are: first, an offense has just
been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Here, without the tip provided by the confidential informant, accused-appellant could not be said to
have executed any overt act in the presence or within the view of the arresting officers which would
indicate that he was committing the crime of illegal possession of marijuana. Neither did the
arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant had just
committed an offense. Again, without the tipped information, accused-appellant would just have
been any other bus passenger who was minding his own business and eager to reach his destination.
It must be remembered that warrantless arrests are mere exceptions to the constitutional right of a
person against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus, they must be strictly construed against the
government and its agents. While the campaign against proliferation of illegal drugs is indeed a
noble objective, the same must be conducted in a manner which does not trample upon well-
established constitutional rights. Truly, the end does not justify the means.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, acquitting the appellant.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CEASAR CONLU
G.R. No. 225213
October 3, 2018

Doctrine:
The prosecution’s failure to present the poseur-buyer proved fatal to its case.

Facts:
Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 where
the appellant pleaded not guilty.
Based on reports of rampant drug pushing in various areas in Silay City, Negros Occidental, the Chief
of Police of Silay City PNP ordered the conduct of surveillance and monitoring in order to confirm
such reports. To verify the report that appellant and his brother are known to be drug pushers, the
police conducted a test buy operation in their area through their asset, who was able to buy a small
sachet of a white crystalline substance which when tested was positive for shabu. With this
confirmation, the Chief of Police ordered a buy-bust operation by members of the Silay PNP and
their civilian agents. They coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) in Silay
City.
Police operatives followed and went to the location of the operation after fifteen (15) minutes. Police
officers Libo-on and Bernil were located approximately fifty (50) meters from where the asset and
appellant were supposed to conduct their transaction when the poseur-buyer then called up the
police operatives and told them to get ready. The police then moved toward the site, approximately
ten (10) meters from where their asset and appellant were about to meet.
The poseur-buyer at that moment approached appellant and gave the latter the marked money.
Appellant then put the marked money in the right front pocket of his cargo short pants, and then
pulled out a small sachet containing crystalline substance and gave it to the poseur-buyer. To notify
the operatives that the transaction was complete, the asset performed the prearranged signal by

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putting his right hand over his head. The operatives immediately rushed to the scene to arrest
appellant. The accused was then searched and sachets of shabu were recovered.
However, the accused stated differently from the above statement as there was no shabu recovered.
The RTC ruled that the valid arrest of the accused as the prosecution more than complied with the
requisites for a successful buy-bust operation for the said operation was not a random buy-bust
operation but a well-planned operation. CA affirmed the said decision stating that the non-
presentation of the poseur-buyer did not weaken the case.

Issue:
WON the conviction is valid.

Ruling:
We acquit for failure of the prosecution to prove the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond
reasonable doubt and failure of the prosecution to prove the unbroken chain of custody of the
dangerous drug.
The poseur-buyer, whose testimony would have clearly established that the illegal transaction
occurred, was not presented before the court. While the prosecution argues that the non-
presentation of the poseur-buyer was not fatal to its case because there were eyewitnesses, we deem
otherwise. The ten- or seven-meter distance between the police officers waiting for the prearranged
signal from the poseur-buyer and the appellant made it difficult for the supposed eyewitnesses to
see (and hear) what exactly was happening between appellant and the poseur-buyer.
In Sindac v. People, 19 the Court, in acquitting the accused, took into account the distance between
the police officers and the site of the alleged drug transaction. The Court invalidated the in flagrante
delicto arrest and warrantless search on the ground that no criminal overt act could be attributed to
the accused as to result in suspicion in the mind of the arresting officers, to wit: Considering that
PO3 Peñamora was at a considerable distance away from the alleged criminal transaction (five [5] to
ten [10] meters), not to mention the atomity of the object thereof (0.04-gram of white crystalline
substance contained in a plastic sachet), the Court finds it highly doubtful that said arresting officer
was able to reasonably ascertain that any criminal activity was afoot so as to prompt him to conduct
a lawful in flagrante delicto arrest and, thereupon, a warrantless search. These similar circumstances
were availing in the cases of Comerciante v. People and People v. Villareal where the Court likewise
invalidated the in flagrante delicto arrest and ensuing warrantless search. In this relation, it should
also be pointed out that no criminal overt act could be properly attributed to Sindac so as to rouse
any reasonable suspicion in the mind of either PO3 Peñamora or PO1 Asis that Sindac had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Sindac’s actuations of talking to and
later on, receiving an unidentified object from Canon, without more, should not be considered as
ongoing criminal activity that would render proper an in flagrante delicto arrest under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the appeal. We ACQUIT appellant Ceasar Conlu y Benetua for violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond

11
reasonable doubt and ORDER his immediate release from confinement at the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa City.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRSTDIVISION), MARIO L.

RELAMPAGOS, MARILOU D. BARE, ROSARIO S. NUÑEZ and LALAINE N. PAULE
G.R. Nos. 219824-25
February 12, 2019

Doctrine:
A judge is mandated to personally determine the existence of probable cause after his personal
evaluation of the prosecutor’s resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime charged.

Facts:
The National Bureau of Investigation, following the disclosure of Benhur Luy, filed a complaint against
then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula(Jaraula) and several other public officers, which
includedMario L. Relampagos (Relampagos) as then Undersecretaryfor Operations, Rosario S. Nuñez
(Nuñez), Lalaine N. Paule(Paule) and Marilou D. Bare (Bare) (collectively,Relampagos, et al.), assigned

12
to the Office of theUndersecretary for Operations, all of the Department ofBudget and Management
(DBM), for malversation of publicfunds, direct bribery, corruption of public officials and violation of
Section 3, paragraphs (b),(e), (g) and (j), and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019.
The Ombudsman resolved the complaints in a joint resolution finding probable cause to indict the
respondent for three counts of malversation of public funds having conspired with Jaruala and
Napoles to misappropriate public funds drawn from Jaruala’s PDAF.
Consequently, three Information for violation of Section3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 were filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Resolving the complaints, the Sandiganbayan deferred the determination of probable
cause on the two Information pending the presentation of the subject copy of SARO. After such
presentation, Sandiganbayan thus resolved to dismiss the two Information finding that there exist no
probable cause.

Issue:
WON there exist grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan, when it dismissed these
cases for lack of probable cause considering that the executive function of determining the existence
of probable cause for the filing of an information is vested solely in the prosecution.

Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan has the authority to determine whether or not to dismiss the case.
Petitioner essentially attacks the Sandiganbayan’s reversal of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable
cause, contending that the function of determining whether or not probable cause, exists is executive
in nature that is lodged within the competence of the Ombudsman. The executive determination of
probable cause is not to be confused with the judicial determination of probable cause. In a criminal
prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages: first, the executive level where probable
cause is determined by the prosecutor during the preliminary investigation and before the filing of
the criminal information; and second, the judicial level where probable cause is determined by the
judge before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

Thus, while it is true that the Ombudsman retains full discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, the latter gains full control as soon as the case
has been filed before it. This must necessarily be so considering that when an information is filed in
court, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case and the concomitant authority to determine
whether or not the case should be dismissed being the “best and sole judge” thereof. Consequently,
absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction and control over a case properly filed before it. As to the manner by which a court is
expected to determine the existence or nonexistence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused,
the same is spelled under the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

A judge is mandated to personally determine the existence of probable cause after his personal
evaluation of the prosecutor’s resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime charged.
Specifically, under Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court has three
options upon the filing of a criminal complaint or information: a)immediately dismiss the case if the

13
evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds
probable cause; or c) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice
in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause.

Thus, when the Sandiganbayan chose to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest over the other
criminal cases, ordered the prosecution to present the subject SARO which Relampagos, et al. denied
having signed and processed, and thereafter, upon examination of the subject SARO, dismissed the
criminal cases for lack of probable cause, the Sandiganbayan, in fact acted well-within its competence
and jurisdiction. There is therefore no reason to ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan for having reversed the Ombudsman’s earlier determination of probable cause.
That the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution only upon compliance with the requirement
that probable cause was personally determined by the court is evident from its examination of the
subject SARO and noting that it was signed by a person other than Relampagos, et al. This
examination, in turn, led the Sandiganbayan to conclude that Relampagos, et al. probably did not
participate in the preparation and issuance of said SARO. To emphasize, when the court judicially
determines probable cause, it is tasked to determine the probability of the guilt of the accused by
personally reviewing the prosecutor’s initial determination and seeing if it is supported by substantial
evidence. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan reached the conclusion that there was no probable cause for
Relampagos, et al. to commit the crimes charged insofar as the subject SARO was concerned, only
upon application of the basic precepts of criminal law to the facts, allegations and evidence on
record.
Therefore, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

KENNETH SANTOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 232950

14
August 13, 2018
Doctrine:
 A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private individual
under the circumstances set forth in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
 In Flagrante Delicto Arrests; In an in flagrante delicto arrest, the concurrence of two (2)
elements is necessary, to wit: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.

Facts:
This case stemmed from an Information6 dated September 13, 2012 charging petitioner with violation
of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
The prosecution contends that a team of police officers were conducting a routine patrol along Libis,
Talisay, Caloocan City. While on post, PO3 Pacis noticed petitioner, standing at a street corner and
removing something from his pocket. They discreetly approached the petitioner upon seeing that it
was plastic sachet to scrutinize what he was holding. At a distance of an arm’s length, PO3 Pacis saw
that petitioner was holding a plastic sachet containing marijuana. When PO3 Pacis and SPO1
Bombase introduced themselves as police officers, petitioner attempted to run. However, PO3 Pacis
was able to immediately grab petitioner’s hands and recover the plastic sachet from him. Thereafter,
SPO1 Bombase apprised petitioner of his rights, while PO3 Pacis conducted a search on the body of
petitioner. The search yielded another twelve (12) plastic sachets of marijuana from petitioner’s
pocket. PO3 Pacis marked the seized plastic sachets. Subsequently, petitioner and the confiscated
sachets were brought to the crime laboratory for examination. While petitioner tested negative10 for
drug use, the specimens found in the plastic sachets tested positive11 for marijuana, a dangerous
drug.
For his defense, petitioner claimed that on September 11, 2012, between 5:00 to 6:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, he was watching a basketball game at Orcania Street, Caloocan City when five (5) men
approached him and invited him to the police station. When he asked what his violation was, they
merely told him to go with them. He was first brought to the Diosdado Macapagal Medical Center
(now Caloocan City Medical Center) where he was examined and thereafter, to the police station
where he was frisked and the police recovered his cell phone and wallet. Subsequently, two (2)
persons, who introduced themselves as “Tanod” and “ExO,” arrived and claimed to be the victims of a
robberysnatching incident. However, they denied that petitioner was the perpetrator thereof. After
they left, the police asked petitioner for P10,000.00; otherwise, they would file a criminal case against
him. When petitioner replied that he had no money, they showed him an ice bag containing dried
marijuana leaves, which they threatened to use as evidence against him. The following day, he was
subjected to inquest proceedings.13
The RTC ruled that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt which consequently was affirmed
by the CA.

Issue:

15
WON the CA erred in affirming petitioner’s conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA
9165.

Ruling:
The appeal is partly meritorious.
A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private individual under the
circumstances set forth in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, viz.: Section 5. Arrest Without
Warrant; When Lawful. —A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Section 5(a) above cited speaks of an in flagrante delicto arrest, where the concurrence of two (2)
elements is necessary, to wit: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Nonconfluence of these
elements renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In this case, records show that
petitioner was actually committing a crime when he was arrested. A cursory examination of the
testimony given by PO3 Pacis before the RTC will show that at the time of his arrest, petitioner had in
his possession a plastic sachet containing marijuana.

Notwithstanding the validity of petitioner’s warrantless arrest, however, the Court is wont to acquit
him on the basis of the nonobservance of the stringent requirements under the IRR of RA 9165,
Section 21.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, petitioner Kenneth Santos y Italig is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged.

16
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GIO COSGAFA, JIMMY SARCEDA, and ALLAN VIVO
G.R. No. 218250
July 10, 2017

Doctrine:
The arrest of Allan and his co-accused resulted from a hot pursuit, immediately conducted by the
police officers in the area upon learning, through a report from Barangay Tanod Cabug-os, and
investigating about the incident that just occurred; It is, thus, readily apparent that the knife seized
from Allan is admissible in evidence, the same having been recovered from him incidental to a lawful
arrest, contrary to the defense’s argument.

Facts:
Accused-appellants Gio Cosgafa (Gio), Jimmy Sarceda (Jimmy), and Allan Vivo (Allan) were charged
with murder in an Information dated April 28, 2004. In the arraignment of the case, the accused-
appellants pleaded not guilty.

After the confrontation at the bar where Gio tried to box Rosbill but did not connect. Rosbill, Joseph,
and Panfilo then ran back to where they left the rest of the group and told them what happened. The
victim then confronted Gio but the accused-appellants took turns holding and stabbing the victim.
When the victim fell on the ground, the accused -appellants ran away. Seeing that the accused-
appellants had deadly weapons and they had none, the victim’s group failed to come to his rescue.
The victim was declared dead at the hospital.

The police then responded to the report of the Barangay Tanod regarding the incident nearby. Upon
inquiry around the area, they learned from Lapiz that accused-appellants were the ones responsible
for the crime. They immediately conducted a hot pursuit, which resulted to the accused appellants’
arrest. Gio and Jimmy admitted in open court that they stabbed the victim but interposed self-
defense. They, however, averred that Allan had no participation in killing the victim. Gio admitted that

17
he used the screwdriver/ice pick, while Jimmy admitted that he used the Batangas knife in stabbing
the victim.
The RTC found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, rejecting Gio and
Jimmy’s uncorroborated claim of self -defense, as well as their claim that Allan had no participation in
the perpetration of the crime. The CA sustained the conviction of the accused-appellants.
Issue:
WON the admissibility of the knife recovered from him despite its being a product of an invalid
search considering that the police officers had no personal knowledge that he was one of the
perpetrators of the crime when he was arrested without warrant.

Ruling:
We do not agree.
As can be gleaned from the factual backdrop of this case, the arrest of Allan and his co-accused
resulted from a hot pursuit, immediately conducted by the police officers in the area upon learning,
through a report from Barangay Tanod Cabug-os, and investigating about the incident that just
occurred. Thus, the arresting officers had personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons
to be pursued
and arrested are responsible for the crime that had just been committed. Indeed, the arresting
officers had probable cause to pursue the accused-appellants based on the information from
witnesses in the area that they gathered from their immediate investigation. This is in accord with
Section 5(b) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on valid warrantless arrest. It is,
thus, readily apparent that the knife seized from Allan is admissible in evidence, the same having
been recovered from him incidental to a lawful arrest, contrary to the defense’s argument. Deduced
from the foregoing, therefore, Allan’s participation in the killing of the victim cannot be doubted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. KUSAIN AMIN, a.k.a. “Cocoy,”

G.R. No. 215942
January 18, 2017

18
Doctrine:
The justification that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that the suspect is arrested
in flagrante delicto, that is, the suspect has just committed, or is in the act of committing, or is
attempting to commit the offense in the presence of the arresting police officer or private person.

Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 5,
paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 where the RTC found the accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
In so ruling, the RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution where the
prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the essential elements of the crime accused-
appellant having been “positively identified by the police officers who conducted the buy-bust
operation as the seller of the shabu presented in the case. Likewise, the prosecution established that
the “sale actually occurred and that one sachet of shabu was sold for the price of P100.00.”
Moreover, the RTC found that the identity of the dangerous drug was sufficiently proven because the
prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody, from the time it was sold by accused-
appellant to when it was presented in court.
Consequently, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. In convicting appellant of the crimes
charged, the CA disregarded his position that there was no valid buy-bust operation, because the
arresting team had not coordinated the matter with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
The appellate court maintained that neither R.A. 9165 nor its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) required PDEA’s participation in any buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is “just a form of
an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court [sic], which police
authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators x x x. A buy-bust operation is not
invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.”

Issue:
WON the RTC and the CA erred in finding the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses
sufficient to warrant appellant’s conviction for the crimes charged.

Ruling:
We reverse the appellate court.
The non-presentation of the poseur-buyer is fatal to the cause of the prosecution. In People vs
Andaya, “The justification that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that the suspect is
arrested in flagrante delicto, that is, the suspect has just committed, or is in the act of committing, or
is attempting to commit the offense in the presence of the arresting police officer or private person.
The arresting police officer or private person is favored in such instance with the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty. Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete.
In every
criminal prosecution, it is the State, and no other, that bears the burden of proving the illegal sale of
the dangerous drug beyond reasonable doubt. This responsibility imposed on the State accords with
the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, who has no duty to prove his innocence until

19
and unless the presumption of innocence in his favor has been overcome by sufficient and
competent evidence. “

While there is a “need to hide [the poseur-buyers] identities and preserve their invaluable service to
the police,” this consideration cannot be applied to this case, because, as in Andaya, the “poseur-
buyer and the confidential informant were one and the same. Without the poseur-buyer’s testimony,
the State did not credibly incriminate [the accused].”

Hence, the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer is fatal to the case.

Therefore, the decision of the CA and RTC is hereby reversed, acquitting the accused-appellant.

JOSELITO PERALTA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 221991
August 30, 2017

Doctrine:
Rule 113, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court: Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112. In warrantless arrests made pursuant to
Section 5(a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.

Facts:
The instant case arose from an Information7 dated November 20, 2008 charging Peralta of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition, defined and penalized under PD 1866, as amended. Police
officers responded to a call received by the desk officer-on-duty of a man firing a gun at the back of

20
PLDT Building in Pantal District, Dagupan City. Upon arrival, the officers saw two man, identified as
Peralta and his companion, Larry Calimlim, holding a gun who became uneasy upon seeing the
officers, thus, prompting the officers to swoop in. The two were arrested and later brought to the
precinct for a paraffin test after they were brought to the Region I Medical Center.
In his defense, Peralta denied the accusation against him and presented a different narration of facts.
According to him, he was riding a motorcycle with Calimlim when they were flagged down by the
police officers. While admitting that the latter recovered a knife from Calimlim, Peralta vigorously
denied having a firearm with him, much less illegally discharging the same. Further, Peralta averred
that upon arrival at the police station, he was forced to admit possession of the gun allegedly
recovered from him, and that they were subjected to a paraffin test but were not furnished with
copies of the results thereof.15 Finally, Peralta claimed that he and Calimlim were merely framed up,
after his brother who operated a “hataw” machine went bankrupt and stopped giving “payola” to the
police officials. Finding that the prosecution established existence of the elements of the crime
charged, the RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. On
appeal, the CA affirmed RTC’s decision in toto.

Issue:
WON the CA correctly upheld Peralta’s conviction for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.

Ruling:
The petition is without merit.
The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused’s lack of license or
permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the
corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that: (a) the firearm exists; and (b) the
accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or
carry the same. In this case, the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of
the aforesaid elements. Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the
trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case.
In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Peralta questioned the legality of the
warrantless arrest and subsequent search made on him. However, such contention is untenable.
Section 2, Article III36 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause,
absent which, such search and seizure becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3(2),
Article III37 of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches
and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words,
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. One of the
recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before
a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. A lawful arrest may be affected with or

21
without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure should — as a general rule — be complied with: Section 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully
effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was
the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has
escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely:
(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5(b), Rule 113
requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed
and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed
it.
In this case, records show that upon the police officers’ arrival at Pantal District, Dagupan City, they
saw Peralta carrying a pistol, in plain view of everyone. This prompted the police officers to confront
Peralta regarding the pistol, and when the latter was unable to produce a license for such pistol
and/or a permit to carry the same, the former proceeded to arrest him and seize the pistol from him.
Clearly, the police officer conducted a valid in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest on Peralta, thus,
making the consequent search incidental thereto valid as well. At this point, it is well to emphasize
that the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum punished by special law and, in
order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had
no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such
possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent. In People v. PO2 Abriol, the court
ruled that the carrying of firearms and ammunition without the requisite authorization — a clear
violation of PD 1866, as amended — is enough basis for the conduct of a valid in flagrante delicto
warrantless arrest. Given these, Peralta can no longer question the validity of his arrest and the
admissibility of the items seized from him on account of the search incidental to such arrest.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

22
Aparente VS People
G.R. No. 205695
September 27, 2017

DOCTRINE
• Where a warrantless search preceded a warrantless arrest but was substantially
contemporaneous with it, what must be resolved is whether or not the police had probable cause for
the arrest when the search was made.
• Probable cause may be in the form of overt acts which show that a crime had been, was
being, or was about to be committed. Thus, a warrantless arrest that precedes a warrantless search
may be valid, as long as these two (2) acts were substantially contemporaneous, and there was
probable cause.

FACTS
P01 Dela Cruz, while patrolling On or about the 13th day of February 2006, in the Municipality of
Binangonan, Province of Rizal, Philippines, the accused, not being lawfully authorized by law to
possess any dangerous drug, caught, then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
possess and have in his custody and control 0.01 gram of white crystalline substance contained in

23
one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet, which was found positive to the test for
Methylamphetamine (sic) hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of the
above cited law.
After which, the Police Officer brought the petitioner to the Binangonan Police Station where a police
investigator marked the confiscated sachet with the petitioner’s initials.

ISSUE
WON the circumstances of petitioner’s warrantless arrest violated his constitutional rights.

RULING
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures is inviolable.
In People v. Cogaed, 27 this Court explained that while this rule generally requires a warrant to be
issued in order for a search or seizure to be deemed reasonable, there are situations where a search
is reasonable even without a warrant.
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. In the Rules of
Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant 1.
Further, it is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence
holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable
cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.

In this case, the arrest and the search were substantially contemporaneous. Thus, what must be
evaluated is whether or not the arresting officers had probable cause for petitioner’s arrest when they
made the search.

Thus, that the search preceded the arrest does not render invalid the search and arrest of petitioner

24
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,”; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs
search; 6. Stop and frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ELSIE JUGUILON y EBRADA
G.R. No. 229828
June 26, 2019

DOCTRINE
Seized items are admissible in evidence if preceded by a valid warrantless arrest.

FACTS
A buy-bust operation was initiated on or about the 20th day of February 2007, at about 1:00 in the
afternoon, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, that the appellant, with deliberate intent, without being
authorized by law, did then and there sell, deliver or give away to a poseur buyer Two (2) heat sealed
transparent plastic packs of white crystalline substance, known as SHABU, containing
Methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Thereafter, the appellant straightly denies the
charges against her as she was only framed-up.

ISSUE
WON the seized items are inadmissible in evidence even without a warrant.

RULING
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court recognizes in flagrante delicto as a valid warrantless arrest. Based on
the pieces of evidence and testimonies correctly identified by the lower court, the accused was clearly
arrested in flagrante delicto as she was the committing a crime in violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act in the presence of the buy-bust team. As a result, the seized items were admissible in evidence as
the search, being incidental to a lawful arrest, needed no warrant for its validity.

It has also been ruled that "the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed
by the courts with disfavor for it can just easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense
ploy in most prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

G.R. No. 238659

( Franklin Vaporoso and Joelren Tulilik vs. People of the Philippines)

Doctrine:

25
Failure to question the legality of an arrest is deemed have waived any objections involving the same.
However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over his
person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver
of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

Facts:
• Allegedly at around 7:00 in the evening, PO2 Torculas noticed 2 men aboard a motorcycle
with the back rider holding a lady bag which appeared to have been taken from a vehicle parked on
the side of the road.
• After PO2 Torculas shouted at petitioners to halt, the owner of the vehicle approached him
and told him that petitioners broke the window of her vehicle and took her belongings.
• During the chase of these 2 men, PO2 Torculas call for back-up.
• After successfully recovering the bag and belongings of Ms. Dombase from the petitioners,
the police officers conducted an initial cursory body search on the latter, and thereafter, brought
them to the Panabo Police Station.
• Thereat, the police officers conducted another "more thorough" search on petitioners, which
yielded (5) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from Vaporoso and four (4) plastic
sachets with similar white crystalline substance from Tulilik.

Issue:
1. Was the arrest valid?
2. Whether or not the two (2) searches made fall within the purview of a valid search incidental to
their lawful arrest.

Ruling:
1. Yes, the arrest is valid. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the
general parameters for effecting lawful warrantless arrests.
There are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected and these are:
(a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto;
(b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and
(c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In this case, paragraph (b) will apply.
Since the PO2 Torculas have personal knowledge that a crime had just committed by these 2 men
and he needs to immediately arrest them.
On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would
necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within
a very limited period of time. Hence, the arrest is valid.

26
2. Under Section 13 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure it provides that “A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been
used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.”

The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is to protect the
arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. Furthermore, such
warrantless search cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. Hence, the first search
made on petitioner is considered as a search incidental to a lawful arrest as it was done
contemporaneous to their arrest and at the place of apprehension. On the other hand, the same
cannot be said of the second search which yielded the drugs subject of this case, considering that a
substantial amount of time had already elapsed from the time of the arrest to the time of the second
search, not to mention the fact that the second search was conducted at a venue other than the
place of actual arrest.

G.R. No. 233659

(People of the Philippines vs. John Sanota, Deo Dayto and Rolando Espineli)

Doctrine:
"No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will
suffice. All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.”

Facts:
• On March 31, 2011, Santiago Abion, Jr. allegedly overheard the three (3) appellants planning
planning to raid a house in Hacienda 8.
• Abion also heard that anyone who blocks their path will be killed.
• Later on the same day, Abion was invited by Espinelli to attend a birthday party.
• Instead of going to Don Jose, Santa Rosa, Laguna, the motorcycle headed towards Hacienda
8, and after five (5) minutes of travelling, appellant Espineli parked the motorcycle beside the road
and in front of the house of Don Alfonso Quiros.
• After a few seconds, appellants Sanota and Dayto arrived and the two asked Abion where
appellant Espineli was.
• Abion told them that appellant Espinelli went inside the house of Quiros and, thereafter,
appellants Sanota and Dayto went inside the same house.
• After five (5) minutes, Abion heard a gunshot and saw appellant Dayto come out of the
window of the house of Quiros with a gun on his right hand and a "black thing" on his left.

27
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC although there was no direct
evidence to establish appellants’ commission of the crime and only circumstantial evidence was
present in this case.

Ruling:
Under Section 4 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Evidence it provides three (3) requisites that
should be established to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.

In this case, the prosecution’s witnesses established the existence of circumstances that support a
clear conclusion that the 3 accused conspired to commit robbery, which they carried out the plan
and, as a result of such concerted resolve; complainant's only son was shot and killed.
Abion's testimony was sufficient to establish the guilt of all 3 accused, as it was not shown that he
had ill-motive which impelled him to testify against them.
Moreover, the prosecution presented documentary evidence and testimonies connecting the accused
to the commission of other crimes of Robbery with Homicide perpetrated with the same modus
operandi. Hence, the CA didn’t commit an error in affirming the conviction of the 3 accused.

G.R. No. 234196

28
(Jonathan Mendoza vs. People of the Philippines)

Doctrine:
The factual findings by the trial court when affirmed by the CA, are accorded respect by the Court
and not disturbed on appeal.
However, jurisprudence provided exceptions to the said rule. Thus, the Court may pass upon
questions of fact: where there is an “ostensible incongruence” in the findings of the said courts or in
criminal cases where the testimony upon which the conviction is based is “riddled with patent
inconsistencies and improbabilities on material points.”

Facts:
• On August 31, 2006, during a checkpoint, PO1 Pagcaliwagan, PO1 Torres and PO1 Calalo
flagged down a motorcycle as it had no license plate and 3 occupants were not wearing a helmet
and one of them is Jonathan Mendoza who was then driving the motorcycle.
• As PO1 Pagcaliwagan was approaching, he allegedly saw the petitioner take a firearm and
covered it with a bag.
• The item was confiscated and brought to the police station and turned over to PO1 Bermejo
and marked by PO1 Pagcaliwagan.
• The petitioner was charged for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions.

Issue:
Was there a valid search and seizure pursuant to a lawful arrest?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court concludes that the warrantless arrest of the petitioner is invalid, which thus
renders the search conducted thereafter illegal. In order for an arrest to be justified under paragraph
(a), the following elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other
hand, in order for paragraph (b) to operate, at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant
had committed it.
In this case, the Court sees that there was no overt act, much more, an offense that was committed
that would justify the arrest of the petitioner without warrant. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to
establish the essential elements of the offense charged. Hence the, search and seizure conducted by
the police officers is invalid.

29
GR No. 234686
(People of the Philippines vs. Michael Frias)

Doctrine:
Entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid “warrantless
arrest,” in the with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court.

Facts:
• On July 9, 2009, PDEA received a report from a confidential informant that Michael Frias and
his live-in partner Marichu Suson were allegedly selling shabu at Purok Mahigugmaon, Brgy. 22,
Bacolod City.
• After the PDEA’s surveillance and confirmation, they performed a buy-bust operation.
• During the buy-bust operation, they recovered a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance and buy-bust money and subsequently arrest both Michael Frias and Marichu Suson.
• The items were marked and inventoried at the place of arrest and in the presence of media
representatives Larry Trinidad and Raquel Gariando and barangay officials Delilah Ta-asan, Rafael
Valencia, and Charlie Chavez.

Issue:

30
1. Did the Court of Appeals err when it affirmed appellant's conviction for violations of Section 5
(illegal sale of dangerous drugs) and Section 11 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs), both of Art.
II of RA 9165?
2. Was the warrantless arrest and incidental search valid?

Ruling:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of the appellant. Under Section 21
paragraph 1 of RA 9165, physical inventory and taking of photographs of the items should be done
in the presence of the accused, representative of the media, representative of the DOJ and any
elected public officials wherein their signatures are required. Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. In this case, since there was no
representative from the DOJ and the prosecution did not explain it further, then the integrity of the
items in the physical inventory were inadmissible in evidence. Hence, the decision of the CA and RTC
should be reversed.

2. In this case, the appellant was arrested during an entrapment operation where he was caught
inflagrante delicto selling and in possession of shabu. In People v. Rivera, the Court reiterated the rule
that an arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is
considered a valid "warrantless arrest," in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Revised Rules of Court. Hence, appellant's warrantless arrest as well as the incidental search effected
by the PDEA agents on his person validly conformed with Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure.

31
 RULE 126
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

G.R. No. 221991. August 30, 2017.*

JOSELITO PERALTA y ZARENO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Doctrine:
Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.

Facts:
A team of police officers responded to a telephone call received by their desk officer-on-duty that
there was a man firing a gun at the back of the PLDT Building in Pantal District, Dagupan City. Upon
arrival thereat, the police officers saw two (2) men walking, later identified as Peralta and his
companion, Calimlim, holding a gun and a knife respectively. Upon seeing the police officers, the
men became uneasy, which prompted the police officers to swoop in. Upon apprehension, they
recovered a caliber .45 pistol with Serial Number 4517488 containing a magazine with five (5) live
ammunitions from Peralta and a knife from Calimlim. The men were then brought to the Region I
Medical Center, and later, to the community precinct for paraffin and gun powder residue test.
Meanwhile, the pistol and the magazine with live ammunitions were endorsed to the duty
investigator.

While admitting that the police recovered a knife from Calimlim, Peralta vigorously denied having a
firearm with him, much less illegally discharging the same. Peralta questioned the legality of the
warrantless arrest and subsequent search made on him. According to him, there was no reason for
the police officers to arrest him without a warrant and consequently, conduct a search incidental
thereto. As such, the firearm and ammunitions purportedly recovered from him are rendered
inadmissible in evidence against him.
Issue:
1. Whether or not there is a valid Search and Seizure?
2. Whether or not appellant is guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.

Held:
1. Yes. Section 2, Article III 36 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause,
absent which, such search and seizure becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3(2),

32
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words,
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.

One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be effected is a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made —the process cannot be reversed.

2. Yes. The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused’s lack of license
or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish
the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that: (a) the firearm exists; and (b) the
accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or
carry the same.

In this case, the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the aforesaid
elements, considering that: (a) the police officers positively identified Peralta as the one holding a .45
caliber pistol with Serial Number 4517488 with magazine and live ammunitions, which was seized
from him and later on, marked, identified, offered, and properly admitted as evidence at the trial; and
(b) the Certification dated August 10, 2011 issued by the Firearms and Explosives Office of the
Philippine National Police which declared that Peralta “is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of
any kind and calibre, specifically Caliber .45 Pistol, make (unknown) with Serial Number 4517488 per
verification from the records of this office as of this date.

G.R. No. 237116. November 12, 2018.*

DAMACEN GABRIEL CUNANAN a.k.a “RYAN,”petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Doctrine:
 Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is crucial to the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and its existence largely depends on the finding of the judge conducting the
examination.
 The ‘probable cause’ for a valid search warrant has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched
Facts:
On May 22, 2012, at around6:30 in the morning, several members of the Laoag City Police Station led
by Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Rovimanuel Balolong (SPO4 Balolong) conducted a search on the

33
residence of petitioner at Barangay 14, Fonacier St.,Laoag City. The search was by virtue of Search
Warrant issued by the RTC for an alleged violation of RA 9165, which directed the police officers to
make a search of petitioner’s bedroom and vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero with plate number RDM 429,
and to seize and confiscate an “undetermined volume of shabu.”

SPO4 Balolong introduced himself and his companions to an unidentified female, who was standing
by the gate inside the premises, and announced their purpose. SPO4 Balolong and SPO1 Santos
knocked on petitioner’s bedroom at the ground floor. When petitioner himself opened the door,
SPO1 Santos read and explained to him the contents of the search warrant. During the height of
activity in the living room, Gwendolyn Cunanan (Gwendolyn), petitioner’s mother, surreptitiously
slipped into petitioner’s bedroom and came out holding something wrapped in a piece of white
cloth, which she claimed SPO4 Balolong threw under the bed of her son. SPO4 Balolong took the
bundle from Gwendolyn and extracted therefrom ten (10) pieces of small plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance. The items were photographed and thereafter, SPO4 Balolong marked the
same with his initials and handed them over toSPO1 Santos.

Thereafter, PO1 Ventura and PO3 Saclayan searched petitioner’s Mitsubishi Pajero, which was parked
at the garage. Under the floor matting on the passenger side of the vehicle directly below the glove
compartment, PO3Saclayan found a white carton box containing two (2) pieces of cut aluminum foil,
four (4) empty plastic sachets, and one (1) big heat-sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance suspected to be shabu.

Petitioner disavowed the charges and claimed that the confiscated items were planted evidence.

Issue:
1. Whether or not there is a probable cause in the issuance of a search warrant
2. Whether or not there is a valid implementation of the search warrant

Held:
1. Yes. In this case, the judge issued the search warrant not merely on the basis of SPO4 Balolong’s
testimony but further, based on the first hand information proffered by the confidential asset who
testified that after the surveillance conducted by the police officers, he personally bought shabu from
petitioner in the course of a “test buy” arranged with SPO4 Balolong.

2. Yes, SPO4 Balolong testified that they knocked on the bedroom door, which petitioner himself
opened, and proceeded to announce their identities and purpose of serving the search warrant.
Further, petitioner’s claim that the police officers failed to read the search warrant or inform him of
its contents is belied by the testimony of Chairman Ayson.

Likewise, the mere fact that the police officers were carrying firearms did not negate or had no actual
bearing on the validity of the implementation of the search warrant, the same being neither a
requirement nor a prohibition under the law. As regards petitioner’s insistence that the police officers

34
pointed their firearms at him and his household, which constituted show of force, the Court finds the
records devoid of evidence to prove the same except for the claims of the defense witnesses. The
Court accords more probative weight and credence to the testimonies of the police officers who
caught petitioner inflagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs and paraphernalia during the
conduct of a valid search, in the absence of evidence that they have been inspired by an improper or
ill motive, as in this case.

G.R. No. 234196. November 21, 2018. *

JONATHAN MENDOZA y ESGUERRA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Doctrine:
Warrantless Searches and Seizures; In order for an arrest to be justified under paragraph (a), Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, the following elements must be present: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer. On the other hand, in order for paragraph (b) to operate, at the time of the
arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.

Facts:
On August 31, 2006, at about 11:45 p.m., during a checkpoint, PO1 Pagcaliwagan, PO1 Torres, and
PO1 Calalo flagged down a motorcycle as it had no license plate and its three occupants were not
wearing a helmet. As they were approaching the motorcycle, PO1Pagcaliwagan saw the petitioner
take a firearm and cover it with a bag. The former then alerted his co-police officers, took the firearm
and arrested the petitioner who denied ownership of the gun, but at the same time claimed the same
was licensed. Confiscated from the petitioner were one (1) gray Ranger caliber .45 pistol with Serial
No. CO2009, one (1) stainless magazine with four (4) pieces of live ammunition, one (1) black
magazine, five (5) live ammunition, and three (3) pieces of empty shells for caliber .45. The items were
brought to the police station and turned over to PO1Charlie Bermejo and marked by PO1
Pagcaliwagan

The petitioner denied any criminal liability and by way of defense claimed that the firearm,
magazines, and live ammunition were the product of an illegal search and thus were illegally
obtained in his possession

Issue:
1.) Whether or not police officers have the legal authority to search the body of the driver and/or his
motorcycle because he violated traffic rules and regulations?
2.) Whether or not the police officers in this case had validly conducted a search incident to a lawful
arrest as governed by Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

35
Held:
1.) No, The petitioner and his companions were flagged down during a checkpoint after the police
officers noticed that the motorcycle which they were riding bore no license plate and the riders are
not wearing any helmet. The commission of a traffic violation does not justify the arrest of the
petitioner. Under Section 29 of R.A. No. 4136 or The Land Transportation Code, such violation merely
warrant the confiscation of the offender’s driver’s license.

2.) No, The theory of the prosecution, which was found credible by both the RTC and the CA, was
that the warrantless arrest and search was justified under Section 5(a) and (b), Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court which provides:
Sec. 5.
Arrest without warrant; when lawful .— A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it.
Xxxx
In order for an arrest to be justified under paragraph(a), the following elements must be present: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, in order for paragraph (b) to operate, at
the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.

Even siding with the version offered by the prosecution, the Court sees no such overt act, much
more, an offense that was committed that would justify the arrest of the petitioner without warrant.

G.R. No. 239957. February 18, 2019. *

JESUS TRINIDAD y BERSAMIN, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Doctrine:
 To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3(2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
 One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected
is a search incidental to a lawful arrest.

Facts:

36
At around 8:30 in the evening of November 14, 2014, members from the Philippine National Police
(PNP)-Pasig Police Station conducted a buy-bust operation, with PO1 Sanoy as the poseur-buyer and
PO1 Nidoy as the backup arresting officer, to apprehend a certain “Jessie” who, purportedly, was
involved in illegal drug activities. After the alleged sale had been consummated, PO1 Nidoy arrested
Trinidad, frisked him, and recovered from the latter a 0.38 caliber revolver loaded with six (6) live
ammunitions tucked at his back, as well as a 0.22 caliber rifle loaded with seven (7) live ammunitions
and two (2) magazines (subject firearms and ammunition) which were found beside the gate of his
house. When asked if he has any documentation for the same, Trinidad claimed that they were
merely pawned to him.

Issues:
Whether or not there exist a valid search during the buy bust operation

Ruling:
No, The subject firearms and ammunition are also inadmissible in evidence for being recovered from
the same unreasonable search and seizure as in the drugs cases.

Here, an examination of the ruling in the drugs cases (which Trinidad offered as evidence and the
RTC admitted as part of his testimony) confirms that the drugs cases and this case are so interwoven
and interdependent of each other since, as mentioned, the drugs, as well as the subject firearms and
ammunition, were illegally seized in a singular instance, i.e , the buy-bust operation. Hence, the Court
may take judicial notice of the circumstances attendant to the buy-bust operation as found by the
court which resolved the drugs cases. To recall, in the drugs cases, the finding of unreasonableness of
search and seizure of the drugs was mainly based on the failure of PO1 Sanoy’s testimony to
establish the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation against Trinidad as said testimony was found to be
highly doubtful and incredible. This circumstance similarly obtains here as in fact, the testimonies of
both PO1 Nidoy and PO1 Sanoyin this case essentially just mirror on all material points the latter’s
implausible narration in the drugs cases. In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the
subject firearms and ammunition are also inadmissible in evidence for being recovered from the same
unreasonable search and seizure as in the drugs cases. Since the confiscated firearms and
ammunition are the very
corpus delicti of the crime charged in this case, Trinidad’s acquittal is in order.

37
G.R. No. 213225. April 4, 2018.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENANTE COMPRADO y BRONOLA, accused-
appellant.

Doctrine:
 The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be carried out with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, any evidence obtained from such warrantless search is inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding
Facts:
That on July 15, 2011, at more or less eleven o’clock in the evening, along the national highway,
Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above named accused, without being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drugs, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have in his possession, control and custody 3,200
grams of dried fruiting tops of suspected marijuana, which substance, after qualitative examination
conducted by the Regional Crime Laboratory, Office No. 10, Cagayan de Oro City, tested positive for
marijuana, a dangerous drug, with the said accused, knowing the substance to be a dangerous drug.

Upon his arraignment on 8 August 2011, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Issue:
1. Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence

Ruling:
1. No, Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule instructs that evidence
obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words,
evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.

38
The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not sufficient to incite a genuine
reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on accused-appellant. An examination of the records
reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime. In the case at bar, accused-appellant was just a passenger carrying his bag.
There is nothing suspicious much less criminal in said act. Moreover, such circumstance, by itself,
could not have led the arresting officers to believe that accused-appellant was in possession of
marijuana.

The search in this case, however, could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In this
particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a specific person. Further, in search of a
moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to
note that the information relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus
was carrying marijuana such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of
the person matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or contents of the
said bus.

G.R. No. 229380. June 6, 2018.*

LENIZA REYES y CAPISTRANO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Doctrine:
 In order to deem as valid a consensual search, it is required that the police authorities
expressly ask, and in no uncertain terms, obtain the consent of the accused to be searched
and the consent thereof established by clear and positive proof.

39
  In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a),Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indication that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section
5(b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact
just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the accused had committed it.

Facts:
At around eight (8) o’clock in the evening of November 6, 2012, a group of police officers from
Cardona, Rizal, including PO1 Monteras, was patrolling the diversion road of Barangay Looc, Cardona,
Rizal when two (2) teenagers approached and informed them that a woman with long hair and a
dragon tattoo on her left arm had just bought shabu in Barangay Mambog. After a few minutes, a
woman, later identified to be Reyes, who matched the said description and smelled like liquor passed
by the police officers. The latter asked if she bought shabu and ordered her to bring it out. Reyes
answered, “Di ba bawal kayong magkapkap ng babae?” and at that point, turned her back, pulled
something out from her breast area and held a small plastic sachet on her right hand. PO1 Monteras
immediately confiscated the sachet and brought it to the police station where he marked it with
“LRC-1.” Thereat, he prepared the necessary documents, conducted the inventory and photography
before Barangay Captain Manolito Angeles.

Issue:
1. Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence

Ruling:
1. No, the Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. PO1 Monteras himself admitted that
Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously or doing anything wrong, except that she smelled
of liquor. As no other overt act could be properly attributed to Reyes as to rouse suspicion in the
mind of PO1 Monteras that she had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis. As case law demonstrates, the act of walking while
reeking of liquor
per se cannot be considered a criminal act.

In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from Reyes
on account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree. And since the shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Reyes must
necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.

40
VERIDIANO vs PEOPLE
G.R. NO: 200370
June 7, 2017

FACTS:
Through an information from a concerned citizen that the accused Mario Veridiano was in
possession of a Marijuana, the police officers of Nagcarlan, Laguna conducted a check point, the
police officers personally know Veridiano when they found him to be on board a jeepney from San
Pablo, Laguna; the passengers including the accused where asked to disembark and was instructed to
raise their t-shirts in search for concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets.
Police officers recovered from Veridiano a tea bag containing to be what appeared as Marijuana.
Veridiano contends that there was no Marijuana found in his possession. However, he was still
bought to the police station where he was informed of the charges against him. He further contends
that the marijuana was inadmissible in evidence for being the “fruit of a poisonous tree” and that his
arrest was illegal. He argues that the tea bag containing marijuana leaves was seized in violation of
his right against unreasonable search and seizure. He was merely seated inside the jeepney at the
time of his apprehension. He did not act in any manner that would give the police officers reasonable
ground to believe that he had just committed or that he was committing a crime.
Prosecution on the other hand contends that the legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the Court over the person of the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was valid warrantless search against petitioner.

HELD:

41
 No. There was no valid warrantless search in this case. The Supreme Court held that the
petitioner’s warrantless arrest was unlawful. A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there
must first be a lawful arrest before a search is made. "the process cannot be reversed."78 For there to
be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant. The invalidity of an arrest leads
to several consequences among which is any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus
rendering the evidence acquired as constitutionally inadmissible. A hearsay tip by itself does not
justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise
to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and
frisk" searches. While probable cause is not required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on
the basis of a suspicion or hunch. The petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be
considered as consent to the warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures may be surrendered through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver
was executed with clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the extensive search conducted by the
police officers exceeded the allowable limits of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to
believe that the accused violated any law except for the tip they received. They did not observe any
peculiar activity from the accused that may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover,
the search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.
Hence, the marijuana found in a tea bag is rendered inadmissible. Veridiano is acquitted.

JORGE DABON, a.k.a. GEORGE DEBONE vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 20877

42
January 22, 2018

FACTS:
Law enforcement agents applied for a search warrant after the surveillance and test-buy operations
conducted by the operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP)-Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Bohol, which confirmed that Dabon was engaged in illegal drug activity.
On July 26, 2003, at about 5:30 a.m a group of policemen of the Bohol Criminal Investigation and
Detection Team proceeded to an apartment unit at Boal District, Tagbilaran City where the residence
of Dabon is situated. Upon reaching the two-storey apartment at about 7:30 am, the CIDG operatives
requested Brgy. Kagawad Angalot, Councilor Angalot, SK Chairman Angalot, media representative
Responte, DOJ representative Castro to witness the search. After P/Insp. Mallari handed the copy of
the search warrant to Dabon, the CIDG operatives searched the kitchen where PO2 Datoy 12 and PO2
Enterina found, in the presence of Brgy. Kagawad Angalot, drug paraphernalia. The police officers
then frisked Dumaluan and recovered from his pocket, a coin purse, a lighter, a metal clip, three
empty decks of suspected shabu, two pieces of blade and crumpled tin foil. The chemical
examination and confirmatory test conducted by P/Insp. Tan on the seized items yielded positive
results for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride. Two Information were filed against
Dabon for violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
For his defense, Dabon argued that he was surprised when he was. awakened by alleged members of
the CIDG, who entered his room, pointing guns at him and telling them that they will conduct a raid.
Dabon and Dumaluan claimed that they were not allowed to witness the search conducted by the
CIDG. Instead, they were ordered to stay and sit in the living room while other members of the
household were locked inside the room of their house helper.
Dabon questioned the admissibility of seized items as neither he nor any member of his family was
present when the search was conducted.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the evidence obtained against Debone is admissible

HELD:
No. The evidence obtained is admissible for being violative of Dabon’s right stated under
Article III Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The State and its agents cannot conduct searches and
seizures without the requisite warrant. Otherwise, the constitutional right is violated. Section 8 Rule
126 of Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “the search should be witnessed by two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality only in the absence of either
the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family” During the search, the hierarchy
among the witnesses as explicitly provided under the law was not complied with. For one, the lawful
occupants of the premises were not absent when the police authorities implemented the search
warrant. Still, two-witness rule was not complied with as only one witness, Brgy. Kagawad Angalot,
was present when the search was conducted. Failure to comply with the safeguards provided by law
in implementing the search warrant makes the search unreasonable. Thus, any evidence obtained in
violation of this constitutional mandate is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose.40 We

43
emphasize that the exclusionary rule ensures that the fundamental rights to one's person, houses,
papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld. The Supreme Court reversed and
set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and Acquitted George Debone.

MERLINA DIAZ vs PEOPLE

G.R. No. 213875
July 15, 2020

FACTS:
On April 27, 2012, on the basis of the application filed by and examination under oath of applicant
PO2 Avila RTC Judge Agripino Morga, Presiding Judge of San Pablo City, Branch 32, issued Search
Warrant against Merly Diaz/Merly Palayok for alleged violation of RA 9165 with a sufficient reason to
believe that she has in her possession and control an undetermined amount of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu which she is keeping and concealing in her house at Gitna,
Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna. Pursuant to the search warrant, members of the San Pedro Police
Station searched the house of petitioner. Approximately nine grams of shabu were then found in and
seized from the premises. Petitioner was immediately arrested and detained by the members of the
searching team for her alleged violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165. On May 22, 2012,
petitioner filed before the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna, Branch 32, a Motion to Quash Search
Warrant No. 97 on the ground that the same was in the nature of a general warrant which failed to
describe with particularity the place to be searched.
Particularly, petitioner averred in her motion that: (a) house number 972 did not appear in her home
address as stated in the search warrant; and (b) the search warrant failed to distinguish petitioner's
unit, which was the place intended to be searched, from the other units or rooms representing the
four other households inside the house located in Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna. RTC and CA
denied her petition ruling that the search warrant did not partake of the nature of a general warrant
as it sufficiently described with particularity the place to be searched stated therein. CA further

44
explained that the police officers who served the warrant and conducted the search of petitioner's
residence were able to identify the building where she actually resided notwithstanding the fact that
the search warrant did not specifically indicate house number 972.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant issued was valid and does not constitute a general
character.

HELD:
Yes, the search warrant is valid. The requirements of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution and in Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules Court, one of which is the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized in order for it to
be valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which is proscribed by both jurisprudence
and the 1987 Constitution. It is to be noted that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if
the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable effort the place intended, and
distinguish it from other places in the community. Hence, a designation that points out the place to
be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. A "place" may refer to a single building or
structure, or a house or residence, like in the present case. The search warrant in the instant case
clearly complied with the foregoing standard since it particularly described the place to be searched,
which is petitioner's "house at Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna." The subject search warrant
sufficiently described the place to be searched with clear indication that the same was intended to
authorize a search of the entire house of petitioner, albeit confined to the area of her house, to the
exclusion of the other two structures or buildings similarly located along the street of Gitna. Simply
put, the constitutional requirement of definiteness has been met. Hence, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed.

45
SIMEON LAPI y MAHIPUS, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 210731
February 13, 2019

FACTS:
In an Information dated April 20, 2006, Lapi, Allen Sacare (Sacare), and Kenneth Lim (Lim) were
charged with violation of Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165. On arraignment, Lapi, Sacare,
and Lim pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At pre-trial, Sacare and Lim changed their pleas to
guilty, and were sentenced to rehabilitation for six (6) months at a government-recognized center.
Only Lapi was subjected to trial on the merits. In his defense, Lapi alleged that on April 17, 2006, he
was in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City to deliver a mahjong set to a certain Antonio Kadunggo.
On his way home, two (2) persons approached him and searched his pocket. They took his money,
handcuffed him, and boarded him on a tricycle with four (4) other persons whom he did not know.
RTC ruled against Lapi explaining that the warrantless arrest against him was legal since he was
caught in flagrante delicto. The Court of Appeals further affirms that the warrantless arrest was valid
since the arresting officers had reasonable ground to believe that [Lapi was] under the influence of
dangerous drugs. Thus, he was justified and even obligated by law to subject him to drug screening
laboratory examination. Petitioner asserts that while he failed to question the validity of his arrest
before entering his plea, his warrantless arrest was illegal from the start. Hence, any evidence
obtained cannot be used against him. He argues that P02 Villeran committed "a malevolent intrusion
of privacy" when he peeped through the window He contends that this intrusion into his privacy
"cannot be equated in plain view[;] therefore[,] petitioner cannot be considered caught inflagrante
delicto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest against petitioner Simeon M. Lapi was valid and the evidence
obtained against him is admissible.

HELD:
Petition is denied A citizen's right to be secure against any unreasonable searches and
seizures is sacrosanct. No less than the Constitution guarantees that the State cannot intrude into the
citizen's persons, house, papers, and effects without a warrant issued by a judge finding probable
cause. The Constitution guarantees against "unreasonable" warrantless searches and seizures. This
presupposes that the State may do so as long as they are reasonable. As with certain constitutional
rights, the right to question the validity of a warrantless arrest can be waived. This waiver, however,
does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during the illegal arrest.
Petitioner does not deny that his drug test yielded positive for illegal drugs. What he questions is the
alleged illegality of his arrest. In this case the accused has already waived the right to question the
validity of his arrest. No items were seized from him during his arrest as he was not charged with
possession or sale of illegal drugs. Thus, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in

46
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violation of Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No.
9165. The Court of Appeals decision is affirmed

People vs Maderazo G.R. No. 235348

December 10, 2018 J. Peralta

Doctrine:
When in issuing the search warrant, the issuing judge failed to comply with the requirements set by
the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the resulting search warrants must be struck down as it was
issued with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to in excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Facts: Two separate applications for search warrants against Maderazo, Alea, Mabansag and Alcantara
are filed after Police Superintendent Tolentino was informed by barangay officials, Roco and Rivera,
that they were keeping an undetermined quantity of dangerous drugs, drug paraphernalia, and
firearms of unknown caliber and ammunitions.
On March 2015, after the preliminary investigation of witnesses Roco and Rivera, under oath,
Executive Judge Leynes issued the search warrants. By virtue of the search warrants, police officers
recovered heat-sealed transparent plastic sachetswhich were suspected to be containing shabu,
various drug paraphernalia, a .38 caliber revolver, live ammunitions, mobile phones, computer laptop,
cash, among others, from the premises. Maderazo, Alea, and Mabansag were, subsequently,charged
with illegal possession of dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia, and illegal possession of firearm
respectively.

47
On July 2015, Maderazo filed the Motion to Quash, arguing the search warrants were issued without
probable cause. He claimed that Tolentino did not have personal knowledge of Maderazo’s supposed
possession of illegal drugs and an unlicensed firearm, because the police officer merely relied on
Roco and Rivera’s statements. CA nullified and set aside the search warrants.

Issue:
WON there is compliance with the requirements for the issuance of search warrant

Held:
No.The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the
home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against
such usurpations when attempted. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 126 provide for the requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant. A search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in
connection with a specific offense alleged in an application based on the personal knowledge of the
applicant and his witnesses. This the substantive requirement for the issuance of a search warrants.
Procedurally, the determination of probable cause is a personal task of the judge before whom the
application for search warrant is filed, as he has to examine the applicant and his or her witnesses in
the form of “searching questions and answers” in writing and under oath.
The Court agrees with the CA in ruling that the trial judge failed to conduct the probing and
exhaustive inquiry as mandated by the Constitution. The interrogation conducted by the trial judge
appeared to be merely routinary, considering that same questions were thrown on both witnesses
Roco and Lozano. The trial judge failed to propound questions as to how the applicants came to
know of the existence of the items, where they found it, or what they have seen and observed inside
the premises. There was no probing, exhaustive, and extensive questions. Consequently, because the
trial judge failed to conduct exhaustive probing and searching questions, the findings of the existence
of probable cause become dubious. Consequently, Tolentino’s application and his witnesses’
testimonies, are inadequate proof to establish that there exists probable cause to issue the assailed
search warrants.
 

48
People vs Acosta G.R. No. 238865
January 28, 2019 J. Perlas-Bernabe

Doctrine:
The “plain view” doctrine cannot apply if the officers are actually “searching” for evidence against the
accused

Facts:
Acosta was accused of the crime of Illegal Planting and Cultivation of Marijuana Plant, defined and
penalized under Section 16, Article II of RA 9165. The prosecution alleged that at around seven (7)
o’clock in the morning of September 10, 2015, Salucana went to the Gingoog City Police Station to
report a mauling incident where Acosta purportedly hit him with a piece of wood. He also reported
that Acosta was illegally planting marijuana. Salucana’s foregoing reports prompted the police officers
to proceed to Acosta’s home. The policemen went to his house and seized the marijuana plants
without obtaining first a valid search warrant. The RTC of Gingoog City found the accused-appellant
Acosta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation Sec. 16, Art. II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165,
otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.” The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling.
Issue:
WON there is a violation of Sec. 3(2), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution

Held:
Yes. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried
out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause,
absent which, such search and seizure become “unreasonable” within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3
(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches
and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words,
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. One of the
recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is when the “plain
view” doctrine is applicable. Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a
position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be
introduced in evidence. The ‘plain view’ doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the
law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is

49
inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of
a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make
an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. Verily, it could not
be gainsaid that the discovery was inadvertent when the police officers already knew that there could
be marijuana plants in the area. Armed with such knowledge, they would naturally be more
circumspect in their observations. In effect, they proceeded to Acosta's abode, not only to arrest him
for the mauling incident, but also to verify Salucana's report that Acosta was illegally planting
marijuana. Thus, the second requisite for the "plain view" doctrine is absent. Considering that the
"plain view" doctrine is inapplicable to the present case, the seized marijuana plants are inadmissible
in evidence against Acosta for being fruits of the poisonous tree.

Dimal vs People GR No. 216922

April 18, 2018 J. Peralta

Doctrine:
A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and
identify with reasonable effort the place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the
community.
Having no direct relation to the said crime, the 1,600 sacks of palay cannot be a proper subject of a
search warrant because they do not fall under the personal properties stated under Section 3 of Rule
126, to wit: (a) subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the
offense; or (c) those used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense, can be the
proper subject of a search warrant.

50
Facts: On September 2010, Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio were reported missing by
Edison Pua after they were scheduled to visit the compound of Jaylord Dimal in Isabela, to negotiate
for the sale of palay. Edison was escorted by two policemen to Dimal's compound, where they
allegedly stayed and observed the premises in the absence of Dimal until September 7, 2010. On
even date at around 5:30 a.m., Edison and the two policemen supposedly searched without a warrant
Dimal's compound, but found no evidence linking him to the disappearances. On October 8, 2010,
P/Insp. Malixi, a commissioned officer of the Philippine National Police assigned with the Police Anti-
Crime and Emergency Response in Camp Crame Quezon City, filed an Application for the Issuance of
a Search Warrant[4] before the RTC Hagan, Isabela, Branch 17, in connection with the kidnapping and
multiple murder of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma. After the hearing of the application on October 8,
2010, Judge Bonifacio T. Ong of the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 17, issued a Search Warrant.
Included in the warrant was the command to seize and take possession of the following properties:
blood-stained clothes of Rosemarie Pua, Lucio Pua, and Gemma Eugenio, either to take the 1,600
sacks of palay or just to photograph the same, and the 9mm caliber pistol, and to bring the said
articles to the custody of the Provincial Director of Isabela at the Provincial Police Office of Isabela
under custodia legis, to be dealt with according to law. There are articles seized, however, which are
not included in the search warrant.

Issues:
1.WON the search warrant was validly issued
2. WON the items seized are admissible in evidence

Held:
1. Yes. Records clearly show that Judge Ong personally examined under oath applicant P/lnsp. Malixi
and his witnesses, whose collective testimonies would prompt a reasonably discreet person to believe
that the crime of kidnapping with murder was committed at the Felix Gumpal Compound on
September 6, 2010, and that specific personal properties sought in connection with the crime could
be found in the said place sought to be searched. The search warrant issued by Judge Ong identified
with particularity the place to be searched, namely; (1) the house of Jaylord Dimal and (2) the palay
warehouse in the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela. This is
evident from the Search Warrant issued by the judge. A description of a place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable effort the place
intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community.
The CA committed no reversible error in upholding the denial of the Omnibus Motion to quash
because all the Constitutional and procedural requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are still
present, namely: (1) probable cause; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally
known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to
be seized.
2. No. Despite the fact that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 10-11 is valid, most items listed in the
Return on the Search Warrant are inadmissible in evidence. Since only 2 items were particularly

51
described on the face of the search warrant, the Court declares that only two articles under the
Return on the Search Warrant are admissible in evidence. Having no direct relation to the said crime,
the 1,600 sacks of palay that were supposedly sold by the victims to Dimal and found in his
warehouse, cannot be a proper subject of a search warrant because they do not fall under the
personal properties stated under Section 3 of Rule 126, to wit: (a) subject of the offense; (b) stolen or
embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or (c) those used or intended to be used as
the means of committing an offense, can be the proper subject of a search warrant.
 

People vs Juguilon G.R. No. 229828

June 26, 2019 J. Del Castillo
Doctrine:
The arrest of appellant, albeit without warrant, was effected under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. The seized items were admissible in evidence
as the search, being an incident to a lawful arrest, needed no warrant for its validity.
Facts: PDEA received an information that appellant was engaged in the illegal drug trade in Barangay
Carreta, Cebu City. A three-day surveillance confirmed the veracity of the report. Appellant's errand
boy (the informant) volunteered to help the PDEA. A buy-bust operation was conducted against the
appellant and two plastic packs of shabu was recovered. PO2 Cansancio told appellant that she had
committed a crime and advised her of her constitutional rights. After the arrest, the operatives
proceeded to the PDEA Office with appellant, along with her daughter. Appellant denied the
allegations and raised the defense of set up. On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. RTC found appellant guilty for the violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
Appellant questions the legality of the arrest and search conducted.

Issue:
WON there was a valid search and warrantless arrest .

Held:
Yes. Under the circumstances portrayed by the prosecution's evidence, the arrest of appellant, albeit
without warrant, was effected under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court or the arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto. Appellant was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as she was then
committing a crime, a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in the presence of the buy-bust team.
Consequently, the seized items were admissible in evidence as the search, being an incident to a
lawful arrest, needed no warrant for its validity.

52
 RULE 114
BAIL
G.R. No. 224162. November 7, 2017. *
JANET LIM NAPOLES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), respondent.

Doctrine:
While bail may generally be granted as a matter of right prior to the conviction of the accused, those
charged with a capital offense is granted bail only when the evidence of guilt is not strong; The trial
court may also deny the application for bail when the accused is a flight risk, notwithstanding the
prosecution’s evidence on the guilt of the accused.

Facts:
In 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman received: (1) a Complaint from its Field Investigation Office;
and (2) a recommendation from the NBI; charging Janet Lim Napoles, former Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile,
his Chief of Staff, Atty. Jessica Lucila Reyes and several other individuals with the crime of Plunder
under RA 7080 and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) for allegedly
misappropriating former Sen. Enrile’s PDAF through fictitious NGO’s. The Ombudsman Special Panel
of Investigators found probable cause and thereafter Information against them were filed before the
Sandiganbayan.

In 2014, Napoles filed a Petition for Bail arguing that the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Sandiganbayan conducted bail hearings. The
prosecution presented several witnesses but Napoles did not present any nor any other evidence.

The Sandiganbayan thereafter denied the Petition for Bail of Napoles as well as her Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:
1. Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for Bail?

Ruling:
1. No. As a rule, bail may be granted as a matter of right prior to conviction. Except (1) when it
involves a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong; or (2) when the accused is a flight risk.
In such cases, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion.
How should a trial court exercise such discretion? The following are the duties of the trial court in
applications for bail:
(1) notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application or require him to submit his
recommendation, whether the application for bail is a matter of right or discretion; (2) where bail is a
matter of discretion, conduct a hearing on the application regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence, to enable the court to exercise its sound discretion; (3)

53
decide whether the evidence of guilt is strong; (4) if so, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond; otherwise, petition should be denied.
In this case, Napoles was charged with Plunder which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. She
cannot, thus, be admitted to bail when the evidence of her guilt is strong. The burden of proof to
show such is on the prosecution. The prosecution can discharge its burden by proving that the
evidence shows evident proof of guilt or a great presumption of guilt, which the Court defined in
People v. Cabral as follows:
“Proof evident” or “Evident proof’ in this connection has been held to mean clear, strong evidence
which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been
committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished
capitally if the law is administered. “Presumption great” exists when the circumstances testified to are
such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an
unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion. Even though
there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the
presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused.
No grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan scheduled hearings to allow the parties to submit their respective pieces of
evidence. The prosecution submitted numerous testimonial and documentary evidence. Napoles, on
the other hand, opted not to submit any evidence on her behalf and relied instead on the supposed
weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. The evidence of the prosecution was summarized
accordingly, effectively complying with the due process requirements. It even extensively discussed
the available evidence in relation to the elements of Plunder, which the prosecution intended to
prove point by point for purposes of demonstrating Napoles’ great presumption of guilt.
G.R. No. 224974. July 3, 2017.*
MARVIN CRUZ and FRANCISCO CRUZ, in his capacity as Bondsman, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Doctrine:
Bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled in three (3) instances: (1) the acquittal of the accused,
(2) the dismissal of the case, or (3) the execution of the judgment of conviction

Facts:
In an Information dated September 19, 2013, Cruz, along with seven (7) others, was charged with
Robbery in an Uninhabited Place and by a Band for unlawfully taking four (4) sacks filled with scraps
of bronze metal and a copper pipe worth P72,000.00 collectively. Cruz posted bail through a cash
bond in the amount of P12,000.00. The private complainant in the criminal case subsequently filed an
Affidavit of Desistance stating that he was no longer interested in pursuing his complaint against
Cruz. Cruz, through his bondsman Francisco, filed a Motion to Release Cash Bond

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court’s denial of their Motion to Release Cash Bond amounted
to grave abuse of discretion.

54
Ruling:
Yes, Bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled in three (3) instances: (1) the acquittal of the
accused, (2) the dismissal of the case, or (3) the execution of the judgment of conviction. The Rules of
Court do not limit the cancellation of bail only upon the acquittal of the accused.

The automatic cancellation of bail, however, does not always result in the immediate release of the
bail bond to the accused. A cash bond, unlike a corporate surety or a property bond, may be applied
to fines and other costs determined by the court. The excess shall be returned to the accused or to
the person who deposited the money on the accused’s behalf

G.R. No. 220913. February 4, 2019.*

ALLEN C. PADUA and EMELITA F. PIMENTEL, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
FAMILYCHOICE GRAINS PROCESSING CENTER, INC., and GOLDEN SEASON GRAINS CENTER,
INC., respondents.

Doctrine:
 From the moment an accused is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the
officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of
Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt
is strong.
 Where bail is a matter of right, it is ministerial on the part of the trial judge to fix bail when
no bail is recommended.

Facts:
Juanito A. Tio (Tio), in his capacity as representative of Family Choice Grains Processing Center of
Cabatuan, Isabela filed a complaint for estafa against Allen Padua (Padua), Emelita Pimentel (Pimentel)
and Dante Frialde (Frialde), as officials of Nviro Filipino Corporation (Nviro).

The public prosecutor found all the elements of the crime to be present, thus, the filing of four (4)
separate Informations against the three accused for estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Consequently, a Warrant of Arrest dated August 6, 2010 was issued by the RTC, in said criminal cases.

Four years after, or on July 21, 2014, Padua and Pimentel filed an Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad
Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail) wherein they alleged that their co-accused
Frialde had died. They also alleged that it was only recently that they were able to find a lawyer who
explained to them that they are entitled to bail under the law and under existing jurisprudence.

55
Padua and Pimentel asserted that the Informations only charged them with estafa under paragraph
2(a), Article 315 of the RPC. They claimed that the Informations failed to allege that the crimes
charged against them had been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1689, hence, the penalty for
estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the RPC shall be in the range of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Padua and Pimentel averred that the imposable penalty cannot exceed twenty (20) years
of imprisonment which is the maximum of reclusion temporal, therefore, the charges in the
Informations are bailable, and that they are entitled to bail for their provisional liberty.

The trial court denied Padua and Pimentel’s omnibus motion, the pertinent portion of which reads:

Records show, however, that the accused continue to be at large, thus, the Court has no jurisdiction
over their persons as they have not surrendered nor have been arrested, as such, the accused have
no legal standing in Court and they are not entitled to seek relief from the Court.

Padua and Pimentel filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration. However, the RTC denied the same.

Padua and Pimentel filed a Petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when the court a quo denied their Omnibus
Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam and Motion for Reconsideration.

In its assailed Decision, the CA denied the petition for certiorari, and affirmed the ruling of the court
a quo, to wit:

A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of
his liberty. (T)he purpose of bail is to secure one’s release, and it would be incongruous to grant bail
to one who is free. Here, despite the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest on 06 August 2010, the same
remained unserved as petitioners appear to have gone into hiding without surrendering and
submitting themselves to the custody of the law.

Hence, Padua and Pimentel filed a petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45) before the
Supreme Court (this Court).

Padua and Pimentel maintain that being charged with estafa which is an offense punishable by
reclusion temporal, they should be granted bail as a matter of right. They also asserted that they
already submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court when they filed their Omnibus Motion
Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail) and, thus, there is no need
to make personal appearance.

Respondents, however, asserted that while Padua and Pimentel were indeed charged with estafa
under par. 2(a), Art. 315 of the RPC which is bailable, bail cannot still be granted to them who are at

56
large. They claimed that under the law, accused must be in the custody of the law regardless of
whether bail is a matter of right or discretion.

Issues:
1. Whether Padua and Pimentel are entitled to bail.
2. Whether the right to bail, whether as a matter of right or discretion, is subject to the limitation that
the person applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived
of his liberty.

Ruling:
1. The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, to
wit:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.

The general rule, therefore, is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall
be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Thus, from the moment an
accused is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he retains his
right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

With the amendment of Article 315 of the RPC, in view of the recent enactment of R.A. 10951 (An Act
Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on Which a Penalty is Based, and the
Fines Imposed under the Revised Penal Code, August 29, 2017), the imposable penalty now for estafa
is as follows:

SEC. 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, Presidential Decree No.
1689, and Presidential Decree No. 818, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
“1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000) but

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does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos (P4,400,000), and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional Two million pesos (P2,000,000): but the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
“2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the
fraud is over One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million
four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000).
“3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, if such amount is over Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not exceed One million two
hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000).
“4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed Forty
thousand pesos (P40.000) x x x.”

Here, applying paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 10951 – in one of the four
criminal cases filed against Padua and Pimentel, the amount allegedly defrauded by them amounted
to P2,600,000 which exceeded two million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000) but not more
than P4,400,000.00, the imposable penalty will be prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period. In the other three criminal cases, where the amounts allegedly
defrauded all exceeded P4,400,000.00, the imposable penalty shall be in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00). However, the law also provides that
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

Clearly, in the instant case, Padua and Pimentel are entitled to bail as a matter of right as they have
not been charged with a capital offense. Estafa, under Art. 315 of the RPC as amended by R.A. 10951,
which Padua and Pimentel have been charged with, has an imposable penalty of reclusion temporal
in its maximum period, which is still bailable.

2. In Miranda, et al. v. Tuliao [520 Phil. 907 (2006)], the Court pronounced that “custody of the law is
required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes
a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.”

Indeed, a person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has
no right to invoke the processes of that court.However, applying also the same pronouncement in
Tuliao, the Court also held therein that, “in adjudication of other reliefs sought by accused, it requires
neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the person.”

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Thus, except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief.

In the instant case, there is no dispute that Padua and Pimentel were at large when they filed, their
Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam wherein they asked the court to quash the warrant of
arrest and fix the amount of the bail bond for their provisional release pending trial. However, albeit,
at large, it must be clarified that Padua and Pimentel’s Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam
(to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail) is not an application for bail. This is where the instant
case begs to differ because what Padua and Pimentel filed was an Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad
Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail). They were neither applying for bail, nor were
they posting bail.

The subject Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail)
is distinct and separate from an application for bail where custody of law is required. A motion to
quash is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the
submission of the person of the accused that it is the very issue. Its prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court which is also as an exception to the rule that filing
pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission
of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, in filing the subject Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest
and to Fix Bail), Padua and Pimentel are questioning the court’s jurisdiction with precaution and
praying that the court fix the amount of bail because they believed that their right to bail is a matter
of right, by operation of law. They are not applying for bail, therefore, custody of the law, or personal
appearance is not required. To emphasize, custody of the law is required before the court can act
upon the application for bail but it is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
accused, as in the instant omnibus motion to quash warrant of arrest and to fix bail.

Furthermore, while there is a need to elucidate that insofar as the requirement that accused must be
in the custody of the law for purposes of entitlement to bail, We must also distinguish, because bail
is either a matter of right or of discretion.

The constitutional mandate is that all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.However, bail may be a matter of
right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is “not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment” before conviction. However, if the accused is
charged with an offense and the penalty of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment
— “regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution” — and when evidence of one’s guilt is not
strong, then the accused’s prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial court [People v.
Escobar, G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017].

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Clearly, bail is a constitutional demandable right which only ceases to be so recognized when the
evidence of guilt of the person charged with a crime that carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
life imprisonment, or death is found to be strong. Stated differently, bail is a matter of right when the
offense charged is not punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or death.

When the grant of bail is discretionary, the grant or denial of an application for bail is dependent on
whether the evidence of guilt is strong which the lower court should determine in a hearing called for
the purpose. The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter
of judicial discretion. Judicial discretion in granting bail may indeed be exercised only after the
evidence of guilt is submitted to the court during the bail hearing [People v. Presiding Judge of the
RTC of Muntinlupa City, 475 Phil. 234, 244 (2004)]. It is precisely for this reason why an accused must
be in the custody of the law during an application for bail because where bail is a matter of
discretion, judicial discretion may only be exercised during bail hearing. However, where bail is not a
matter of discretion, as in fact it is a matter of right, no exercise of discretion is needed because the
accused’s right to bail is a matter of right, by operation of law. An accused must be granted bail if it
is a matter of right.

Thus, an accused who is charged with an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, as in this case, they must be admitted to bail as they are entitled to it as a matter of
right. Here, considering that estafa is a bailable offense, Padua and Pimentel no longer need to apply
for bail as they are entitled to bail, by operation of law. Where bail is a matter of right, it is ministerial
on the part of the trial judge to fix bail when no bail is recommended. To do otherwise, We will
effectively render nugatory the provisions of the law giving distinction where bail is a matter of right,
or of discretion.

Where bail is a matter of right, prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from such right, bail
must be allowed irrespective of such circumstance. The existence of a high degree of probability that
the accused will abscond confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase the bond to
such an amount as would reasonably tend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is
wanted, such amount to be subject, of course, to the constitutional provision that “excessive bail shall
not be required” [San Miguel v. Judge Maceda, 549 Phil. 12, 19 (2007)]. The recourse of the judge is
to fix a higher amount of bail and not to deny the fixing of bail.

To reiterate, when bail is a matter of right, the fixing of bail is ministerial on the part of the trial
judge even without the appearance of the accused. They must be admitted to bail as they are
entitled to it as a matter of right. However, it must be further clarified that after the amount of bail
has been fixed, Padua and Pimentel, when posting the required bail, must be in the custody of the
law. They must make their personal appearance in the posting of bail. It must be emphasized that
bail, whether a matter of right or of discretion, cannot be posted before custody of the accused has
been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender, or personal
appearance. This is so because if We allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the
law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude

60
being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. Furthermore, the
continued absence of the accused can be taken against him since flight is indicative of guilt.

G.R. No. 206958. November 8, 2017.*

PERSONAL COLLECTION DIRECT SELLING, INC., petitioner, vs. TERESITA L. CARANDANG,
respondent.
Doctrine:
Since cancellation of bail is automatic upon the dismissal of the case, no notice or hearing is even
necessary, as the cancellation takes place when any of the three (3) enumerated instances takes place

Facts:
Personal Collection filed a Complaint-Affidavit for estafa with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of
confidence against Carandang before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The Assistant
City Prosecutor then filed an Information against Carandang before the Regional Trial Court. Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordered that an arrest warrant be issued against
Carandang after finding that there was prima facie evidence to support the case. Carandang filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation. She alleged that she did not appear during the preliminary investigation
because she did not receive any subpoena from the Office of the City Prosecutor.

Personal Collection filed its Opposition [To: Motion for Reinvestigation Dated July 1, 2009].Carandang
filed a Manifestation and Motion to Admit Reply (To Opposition to the Motion for Reinvestigation
Dated July 1, 2009). The Regional Trial Court granted Carandang's Motion for Reinvestigation in its
Order dated August 14, 2009. The Regional Trial Court granted Carandang's Motion for
Reinvestigation.

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Carandang filed her Counter-Affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor. Personal Collection,
through its representative Marilou S. Palarca, filed its Reply-Affidavit.
Carandang's arguments:
1. Her failure to completely liquidate the cash advances was due to the sudden termination of her
employment by Personal Collection.
2. She did not receive any demand letter or any offer from Personal Collection to settle the case

Personal Collection's arguments:

1. Carandang admitted to receiving the cash advances and failing to liquidate the proceeds.
2. Also, it had demanded Carandang to return the cash advances or liquidate their proceeds

3. It claimed that prior demand was unnecessary since she admitted that she had received these cash
advances.

The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending that the complaint be dismissed.
Thus, a Motion to Withdraw Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court, which granted the
same. Personal Collection Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC. The RTC then released
the cash bond posted for Carandang's bail, upon her motion. Personal Collection filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Its argument: That the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it issued the Orders granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and the Motion to Release
Bond. The CA dismissed the same for lack of merit.

Issues:
1. W/N Personal Collection was deprived of due process when it was allegedly not given notice or
opportunity to be heard on Carandang's Motion to Release Cash Bond

Ruling:
No. Petitioner's right to due process was not violated when it was not given notice or an opportunity
to be heard on the Motion to Release Cash Bond. No notice or hearing was necessary, since the bail
was automatically cancelled upon the dismissal of the case due to the withdrawal of the information.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case,
or the execution of the judgment of conviction. (Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court)

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G.R. No. 214300. July 26, 2017.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MANUELESCOBAR, respondent.
Doctrine:
 Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been arrested and
detained but “whose guilt has not yet been proven” in court beyond reasonable doubt
 The accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is “not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment” before conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). However,
if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment— “regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution” — and when
evidence of one’s guilt is not strong, then the accused’s prayer for bail is subject to the
discretion of the trial court

Facts:
On June 18, 2001 at 7:40 a.m., Mary Grace, her bodyguard Valentin B. Torres (Torres), and her driver
Dionisio F. Burca (Burca) were passing by the front of Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines,
Diliman, Quezon City when a vehicle blocked their way. Clad in police uniform, four (4) armed men
forced Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres inside the vehicle.
Alleged group leader Rolando Villaver (Villaver) and some of the suspects then travelled and detained
Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres in an undisclosed location in Batangas. Afterwards, the group headed
to Club Solvento, a resort in Calamba, Laguna owned by Escobar, who personally served them food.
Some of the accused stayed in Club Solvento to rest or sleep while the others, namely, Villaver, Cesar
Olimpiada, a certain Cholo, and Biboy Lugnasin, left to negotiate the price for the victims' release.
Cheng paid the ransom of P15,000,000.00.
Cancio Cubillas (Cubillas), the group's driver, confessed to have received a total of P1,250,000.00 for
the kidnapping operation. At 10:30 p.m. on the same day, Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres were finally
released. They were freed somewhere in Alaminos, Laguna, more than 12 hours since they were
abducted.
Cubillas became a state witness. On June 3, 2002, he executed an extrajudicial confession and
implicated respondent Escobar as an adviser for Villaver. On February 17, 2004, an Amended
Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court charging Escobar as a co-conspirator in the
kidnapping for ransom.
On June 3, 2008, Escobar filed the First Bail Petition before the Regional Trial Court. In the Order
dated October 6, 2008, the Regional Trial Court denied Escobar's First Bail Petition. Escobar appealed
before the Court of Appeals. On March 8, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the First
Bail Petition.
Pending the proceedings on Escobar's case, the police arrested one (1) of the co-accused Fajardo
brothers, Rolando Fajardo (Rolando), who applied for bail before the Regional Trial Court. In an Order
dated September 13, 2011, the Regional Trial Court denied Rolando's petition for bail. However, in an
Order dated October 14, 2011, the Regional Trial Court reversed its previous order and granted
Rolando's bail application. Escobar saw Rolando's release on bail as a new "development which
warrant[ed] a different view" on his own bail application.

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Thus, on January 27, 2012, Escobar filed another petition for bail (Second Bail Petition) before the
Regional Trial Court. He noted that Cubillas could not explain how either Rolando or Escobar advised
Villaver and that both Rolando and Escobar were absent before, during, and after the kidnapping.
Hence, if Rolando's petition for bail was granted based on the unreliability of Cubillas' testimony,
Escobar reasoned that the trial court should likewise grant him provisional release.

Prosecution Contends
On November 6, 2014, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Petition for
Review via Rule 45 before this Court. In its Petition, the prosecution does not pray for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order of the Court of Appeals Decision; rather, in assailing the grant of
Escobar's Second Bail Petition, the prosecution avers that the doctrine of res judicata must be
respected.
Respondent Contends
On October 19, 2015, Escobar filed his Comment, arguing that res judicata did not apply here, that
there was no strong evidence of his guilt, and that the Court of Appeals could rectify errors of
judgment in the greater interest of justice.

Issues:
Whether or not a second petition for bail is barred by res judicata.

Ruling:
NO. Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been arrested and
detained but "whose guilt has not yet been proven" in court beyond reasonable doubt. The right to
bail is cognate to the fundamental right to be presumed innocent.
Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail if the offense
charged is "not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" before conviction by
the Regional Trial Court. However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment—"regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution"—and when evidence of one's guilt is not strong, then the accused's prayer for bail is
subject to the discretion of the trial court.

In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death, reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Escobar's bail is, thus, a matter of judicial discretion, provided that the evidence of his guilt is not
strong.

Escobar's Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not recognized in
criminal proceedings. Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the dispute
between the parties or their successors-in-interest. Trinidad v. Marcelo declares that res judicata, as
found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law and "has no bearing on
criminal proceedings." Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied
in criminal cases, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under

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Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no
bearing on criminal proceedings.

An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in nature, does not
give rise to res judicata. As in Trinidad, even if we are to expand the argument of the prosecution in
this case to contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or double jeopardy, the same will still not apply.
Double jeopardy requires that the accused has been convicted or acquitted or that the case against
him or her has been dismissed or terminated without his express consent. Here, while there was an
initial ruling on Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has not been convicted, acquitted, or has had his
case dismissed or terminated.

Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil cases, Escobar's Second Bail
Petition cannot be barred as there is no final judgment on the merits.

Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following elements: The judgment sought to bar the new
action must be final; The decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter; The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action.
In deciding on a matter before it, a court issues either a final judgment or an interlocutory order. A
final judgment "leaves nothing else to be done" because the period to appeal has expired or the
highest tribunal has already ruled on the case. In contrast, an order is considered interlocutory if,
between the beginning and the termination of a case, the court decides on a point or matter that is
not yet a final judgment on the entire controversy.

An interlocutory order "settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an
action"; in other words, something else still needs to be done in the primary case—the rendition of
the final judgment. Res judicata applies only when there is a final judgment on the merits of a case; it
cannot be availed of in an interlocutory order even if this order is not appealed.

Here, the prosecution itself has acknowledged that "the first order denying bail is an interlocutory
order." The merits of the case for kidnapping must still be threshed out in a full-blown proceeding.
Being an interlocutory order, the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision denying Escobar's First Bail
Petition did not have the effect of res judicata. The kidnapping case itself has not attained finality.
Since res judicata has not attached to the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision, the Regional Trial
Court should have taken cognizance of Escobar's Second Bail Petition and weighed the strength of
the evidence of guilt against him.

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