FIRST DIVISION Jambrich also formally adopted respondent’s two

sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-MAN,4 and per Decision of

[G.R. No. 159310. February 24, 2009] the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City dated May
5, 1988.5
CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner, vs.
ANTONIETTA O. ESCALLAR, Respondent. However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By
then, respondent found a new boyfriend while
DECISION Jambrich began to live with another woman in
Danao City. Jambrich supported respondent’s sons
PUNO, C.J.: for only two months after the break up.

What are the rights of an alien (and his successor- Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo
in-interest) who acquired real properties in the sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the
country as against his former Filipina girlfriend in real estate business. He also built and repaired
whose sole name the properties were registered speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich
under the Torrens system? purchased an engine and some accessories for his
boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted
The facts are as follows: to the latter for about ₱150,000.00. To pay for his
debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-
Macro properties to petitioner for ₱250,000, as
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the
evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute
Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by his
Sale/Assignment."6 On July 26, 1991, when
employer, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian
petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment,
company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984,
he discovered that titles to the three lots have been
he transferred to Cebu and worked at the Naga II
transferred in the name of respondent, and that the
Project of the National Power Corporation. There, he
subject property has already been mortgaged.
met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a
separated mother of two boys who was working as a
waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint
respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In against respondent for recovery of real property
dire need of additional income to support her before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City.
children, respondent agreed. The tutorials were held Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated
in Antonietta’s residence at a squatters’ area in November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and the
Gorordo Avenue. Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987
over the properties which identified both Jambrich
and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to
agreement of the parties since respondent did not
live together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes,
pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was
Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to their own
not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who
house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision,
paid for the properties using his exclusive funds; that
Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell
Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the
dated November 18, 19851 and March 10,
properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute
19862 covering the properties, Jambrich and
ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute
respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed
Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which
of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 19873 was
Jambrich executed in his favor.
likewise issued in their favor. However, when the
Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for
registration before the Register of Deeds, In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that
registration was refused on the ground that she did not pay a single centavo of the purchase
Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire price. On the contrary, she claimed that she "solely
alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, and exclusively used her own personal funds to
Jambrich’s name was erased from the document. defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject
But it could be noted that his signature remained on lots in question," and that Jambrich, being an alien,
the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondent’s was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the
signature as buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of Philippines.
page 4 which is the last page. Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 over the At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing
properties were issued in respondent’s name alone. her alleged financial capacity to buy the disputed
property with money from a supposed copra under litigation or could contribute any amount for
business. Petitioner, in turn, presented Jambrich as their acquisition which according to her is worth
his witness and documentary evidence showing the more than ₱700,000.00 when while she was
substantial salaries which Jambrich received while working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning
still employed by the Austrian company, Simmering- ₱1,000.00 a month as salary and tips of more or
Graz Panker A.G. less ₱2,000.00 she could not even provide [for] the
daily needs of her family so much so that it is safe to
In its decision, the court a quo found— conclude that she was really in financial distress
when she met and accepted the offer of Jambrich to
Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of come and live with him because that was a big
the purchase and acquisition of [the] properties financial opportunity for her and her children who
under litigation that Wilhelm Jambrich was still were already abandoned by her husband.9
working and earning much. This fact of Jambrich
earning much is not only supported by documentary The only probable and possible reason why her
evidence but also by the admission made by the name appeared and was included in [the contracts
defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So that, Jambrich’s to sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10,
financial capacity to acquire and purchase the 1986 and finally, the deed of absolute sale dated
properties . . . is not disputed.7 November 16, 1987] as buyer is because as
observed by the Court, she being a scheming and
xxx exploitive woman, she has taken advantage of the
goodness of Jambrich who at that time was still
On the other hand, evidence . . . clearly show that bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good
before defendant met Jambrich sometime in the attitude shown by her to him since he could still very
latter part of 1984, she was only working as a well provide for everything she needs, he being
waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of earning (sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as
₱1,000.00 a month and was . . . renting and living observed by this Court, the acquisition of these
only in . . . [a] room at . . . [a] squatter area at properties under litigation was at the time when their
Gorordo Ave., Cebu City; that Jambrich took pity of relationship was still going smoothly and
her and the situation of her children that he offered harmoniously.10 [Emphasis supplied.]
her a better life which she readily accepted. In fact,
this miserable financial situation of hers and her two The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
children . . . are all stated and reflected in the Child
Study Report dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs. "G" and WHEREFORE, Decision is hereby rendered in favor
"G-1") which facts she supplied to the Social Worker of the plaintiff and against the defendant Antoniet[t]a
who prepared the same when she was personally Opalla by:
interviewed by her in connection with the adoption of
her two children by Wilhelm Jambrich. So that, if 1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple
such facts were not true because these are now over the residential house of strong
denied by her . . . and if it was also true that during materials and three parcels of land
this time she was already earning as much as designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which are
₱8,000.00 to ₱9,000.00 as profit per month from her covered by TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and
copra business, it would be highly unbelievable and 24792 issued by the Register of Deeds of
impossible for her to be living only in such a Mandaue City;
miserable condition since it is the observation of this
Court that she is not only an extravagant but also an 2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790,
expensive person and not thrifty as she wanted to 24791 and 24792 issued in the name of
impress this Court in order to have a big saving as defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar by the
clearly shown by her actuation when she was Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
already cohabiting and living with Jambrich that
according to her . . . the allowance given . . . by him 3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue
in the amount of $500.00 a month is not enough to City to cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and
maintain the education and maintenance of her 24792 in the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a
children.8 Descallar and to issue new ones in the
name of plaintiff Camilo F. Borromeo;
This being the case, it is highly improbable and
impossible that she could acquire the properties
 4) Declaring the contracts now marked as JAMBRICH HAS NO TITLE TO THE
Exhibits "I," "K" and "L" as avoided insofar PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND MAY NOT
as they appear to convey rights and THEREFORE TRANSFER AND ASSIGN
interests over the properties in question to ANY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN FAVOR
the defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar; OF PETITIONER.

5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱25,000.00 SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE
and litigation expenses in the amount of WELL-REASONED DECISION OF THE
₱10,000.00; and, TRIAL COURT AND IN IMPOSING DOUBLE
COSTS AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER
6) To pay the costs.11 (THEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE).14

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a First, who purchased the subject properties?
Decision dated April 10, 2002,12 the appellate court
reversed the decision of the trial court. In ruling for The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the
the respondent, the Court of Appeals held: trial court, who between respondent and Jambrich
possesses the financial capacity to acquire the
We disagree with the lower court’s conclusion. The properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of
circumstances involved in the case cited by the the properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was
lower court and similar cases decided on by the gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.,
Supreme Court which upheld the validity of the title an Austrian company. He was earning an estimated
of the subsequent Filipino purchasers are absent in monthly salary of ₱50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was
the case at bar. It should be noted that in said assigned to Syria for almost one year where his
cases, the title to the subject property has been monthly salary was approximately ₱90,000.00.
issued in the name of the alien transferee (Godinez
et al., vs. Fong Pak Luen et al., 120 SCRA 223 On the other hand, respondent was employed as a
citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary of
Phils. 461; United Church Board for World Ministries not more than ₱1,000.00. In 1986, when the parcels
vs. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446, citing the case of of land were acquired, she was unemployed, as
Sarsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA admitted by her during the pre-trial conference. Her
547; Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78). In the allegations of income from a copra business were
case at bar, the title of the subject property is not in unsubstantiated. The supposed copra business was
the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant- actually the business of her mother and their family,
appellant. Thus, Jambrich could not have with ten siblings. She has no license to sell copra,
transferred a property he has no title thereto.13 and had not filed any income tax return. All the
motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire,
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. and the last one left standing was already scrap.
Further, the Child Study Report15 submitted by the
Hence, this petition for review. Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) in the adoption proceedings of
Petitioner assigns the following errors: respondent’s two sons by Jambrich disclosed that:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS Antonietta tried all types of job to support the
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING children until she was accepted as a waitress at St.
RESPONDENT’S JUDICIAL ADMISSION Moritz Restaurant in 1984. At first she had no
AND OTHER OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE problem with money because most of the customers
ESTABLISHING JAMBRICH’S of St. Moritz are (sic) foreigners and they gave good
PARTICIPATION, INTEREST AND tips but towards the end of 1984 there were no more
OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES IN foreigners coming because of the situation in the
QUESTION AS FOUND BY THE Philippines at that time. Her financial problem
HONORABLE TRIAL COURT. started then. She was even renting a small room in
a squatters area in Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. It was
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS during her time of great financial distress that she
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT met Wilhelm Jambrich who later offered her a
decent place for herself and her children.16
The DSWD Home Study Report17 further disclosed properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of
that: Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.

[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of
when he saw Antonietta Descallar, one of the facts. The findings of fact of the trial court are
waitresses of the said Restaurants. He made friends accorded great weight and respect, if not finality by
with the girl and asked her to tutor him in [the] this Court, subject to a number of exceptions. In the
English language. Antonietta accepted the offer instant case, we find no reason to disturb the factual
because she was in need of additional income to findings of the trial court. Even the appellate court
support [her] 2 young children who were abandoned did not controvert the factual findings of the trial
by their father. Their session was agreed to be court. They differed only in their conclusions of law.
scheduled every afternoon at the residence of
Antonietta in the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue, Further, the fact that the disputed properties were
Cebu City. The Austrian was observing the situation acquired during the couple’s cohabitation also does
of the family particularly the children who were not help respondent. The rule that co-ownership
malnourished. After a few months sessions, Mr. applies to a man and a woman living exclusively
Jambrich offered to transfer the family into a decent with each other as husband and wife without the
place. He told Antonietta that the place is not good benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to
for the children. Antonietta who was miserable and marry each other, does not apply. 19 In the instant
financially distressed at that time accepted the offer case, respondent was still legally married to another
for the sake of the children.18 when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an
adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists
Further, the following additional pieces of evidence between the parties. It is necessary for each of the
point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the
purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct acquisition of property in order to be able to lay
the house thereon: claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-
ownership and equal contribution do not apply.20
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed
under oath, during her re-direct examination Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of
and during the proceedings for the adoption the properties in the name of respondent alone.
of her minor children, that Jambrich was the Having found that the true buyer of the disputed
owner of the properties in question, but that house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich,
his name was deleted in the Deed of what now is the effect of registration of the
Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. properties in the name of respondent?
Nonetheless, his signature remained in the
deed of sale, where he signed as buyer. It is settled that registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership.21 It is only a means of
(2) The money used to pay the subject confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the
parcels of land in installments was in world at large.22 Certificates of title are not a source
postdated checks issued by Jambrich. of right. The mere possession of a title does not
Respondent has never opened any account make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the
with any bank. Receipts of the installment mere fact that respondent has the titles of the
payments were also in the name of Jambrich disputed properties in her name does not
and respondent. necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her
the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title
with Jambrich and her two children for ten implies that the title is quiet,23 and that it is perfect,
months, where she was completely under absolute and indefeasible.24 However, there are
the support of Jambrich. well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the
transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and acquire the subject properties for a valuable
Testament, where he, as owner, bequeathed consideration.25 This is the situation in the instant
the subject properties to respondent. case. Respondent did not contribute a single
centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his no income of her own at that time, nor did she have
rights, interests and participation over the subject
any savings. She and her two sons were then fully likewise ordered respondent to pay petitioner
supported by Jambrich. ₱25,000 as attorney’s fees and ₱10,000 as litigation
expenses, as well as the costs of suit.
Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from
acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section We affirm the Regional Trial Court.
7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,26 which is
basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of The rationale behind the Court’s ruling in United
the 1935 Constitution,27 and Section 14, Article XIV Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in
of the 1973 Constitution.28 The capacity to acquire subsequent cases,32 is this – since the ban on aliens
private land is dependent on the capacity "to acquire is intended to preserve the nation’s land for future
or hold lands of the public domain." Private land may generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by
be transferred only to individuals or entities making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens
"qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or
domain." Only Filipino citizens or corporations at those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens.
least 60% of the capital of which is owned by As the property in dispute is already in the hands of
Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be
public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the no more public policy to be protected. The objective
fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in
from acquiring or holding title to private lands, Filipino hands has been achieved.
except only by way of legal succession or if the
acquisition was made by a former natural-born IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The
citizen.29 Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV
No. 42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land dated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET
from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is
declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich REINSTATED.
conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a
Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World SO ORDERED.
Ministries v. Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the
consistent ruling in a number of cases31 that if land REYNATO S. PUNO
is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently Chief Justice
becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino,
the flaw in the original transaction is considered
cured and the title of the transferee is rendered
valid. Applying United Church Board for World
Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner,
viz.:

[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic)

Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation
[were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the
Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner,
yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff
who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw
in the original transaction and the title of the
transferee is valid.

The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor

of petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the
TCTs in the name of respondent. It declared
petitioner as owner in fee simple of the residential
house of strong materials and three parcels of land
designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and ordered the
Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to issue new
certificates of title in his name. The trial court
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES
MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE
VEGA, respondents.

Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for

private respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875
PUBLIC LAND ACT; CONFIRMATION OF [1982]) deserves scant consideration. There, it was
IMPERFECT TITLE; REQUIREMENTS; held that before the issuance of the certificate of
POSSESSION IS TACKED TO THAT OF title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the
APPLICANTS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST; true owner of the land since it still pertains to the
CASE AT BAR. — It must be noted that with respect State. Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v.
to possession and occupation of the alienable and Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in
disposable lands of the public domain, the law the 1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate
employs the terms "by themselves," "the applicant Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in
himself or through his predecessor-in-interest." Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606
Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant [1991]) where the Court, through then Associate
has been in possession of the subject property for Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
only a day so long as the period and/or legal "(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and
requirements for confirmation of title has been undisputed possession of alienable public land for
complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
said period is tacked to his possession. In the case whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious other sanction, ceases to be public land and
possession of the disputed land not only since June becomes private property. . . . "Nothing can more
12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of
not deny this except that respondent spouses, in its considering possession of public land which is of the
perception, were in possession of the land sought to character and duration prescribed by the statute as
be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the the equivalent of an express grant from the State
required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b])
parcels of land were acquired by private that the possessor(s) '. . . shall be conclusively
respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, presumed to have performed all the conditions
who, in turn, have been in open and continued essential to a Government grant and shall be
possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents entitled to a certificate of title . . . .' No proof being
stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in- admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption,
interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little
rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be more than a formality, at the most limited to
deemed as an imperfect title. As could be gleaned ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the
from the evidence adduced, private respondents required character and length of time; and
were able to establish the nature of possession of registration thereunder would not confer title, but
their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered simply recognize a title already vested. The
to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid proceedings would not originally convert the land
taxes on the subject land and introduced from public to private land, but only confirm such a
improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A conversion already affected by operation of law from
certified true copy of the affidavit executed by the moment the required period of possession
Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also became complete. As was so well put in Cariño, '. . .
formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of (There are indications that registration was expected
land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of
her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The
only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
from the Bureau of Lands was presented in confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.'"
Forest Development, to prove that the questioned (Emphasis supplied)
lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone
of the government and that no forestry interest was 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; OPEN, CONTINUOUS AND
affected (CA G.R. No. 28953, Records, p. 33). EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION FOR AT LEAST 30
YEARS OF ALIENABLE PUBLIC LAND IPSO JURE
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE THAT BEFORE CONVERTS THE SAME TO PRIVATE PROPERTY.
ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE, THE — Subsequent cases have hewed to the above
OCCUPANT IS NOT IN THE JURIDICAL SENSE pronouncement such that open, continuous and
THE TRUE OWNER OF THE LAND, ALREADY exclusive possession for at least 30 years of
ABANDONED. — At this juncture, petitioner's alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to
private property (Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 since time immemorial or possession in such a
SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 manner that the property has been segregated from
[1990]). This means that occupation and cultivation public domain; such that at the time of their
for more than 30 years by an applicant and his application, as American citizens, they have
predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land. In
so as to segregate the land from the mass of public the case at bar, private respondents were
land (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time
41 [1993]). of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue
thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — The Public the process, the possession in the concept of owner
Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that and the prescribed period of time held by their
(a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act.
possession, in the concept above stated, must be In addition, private respondents have constructed a
either since time immemorial or for the period house of strong materials on the contested property,
prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands now occupied by respondent Lapiña's mother.
v Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions
set by law are complied with, the possessor of the 7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION;
land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY;
a government grant, without the necessity of a NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN WHO HAS
certificate of title being issued (National Power LOST HIS CITIZENSHIP MAY BE A TRANSFEREE
Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases OF PRIVATE LANDS. — But what should not be
to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. the Constitution itself allows private respondents to
register the contested parcels of land in their favor.
5. ID.; ID.; TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution
REGISTRATION; NOT A MEANS FOR contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
ACQUISITION OF TITLE TO PRIVATE LAND. — In "Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
other words, the Torrens system was not private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
established as a means for the acquisition of title to except to individuals, corporations, or associations
private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not domain." "Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of
confer ownership. Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship
6. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC LAND ACT; BUYCO may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
RULING (216 SCRA 78 [1992]) NOT APPLICABLE limitations provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)
TO CASE AT BAR. — In the main, petitioner seeks Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above
to defeat respondents' application for registration of quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the
title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, then 1973 Constitution which reads: "Sec. 15.
the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this
supports petitioner's thesis. We disagree. In Buyco, Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
the applicants therein were likewise foreign has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of
nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens at private land, for use by him as his residence, as the
the time of their supposed acquisition of the Batasang Pambansa may provide." Pursuant
property. But this is where the similarity ends. The thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into
applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract of law, the relevant provision of which provides: "Sec.
land under the provisions of the Land Registration 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the
the Public Land Act. The land registration court legal capacity to enter into a contract under
decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land
by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of up to a maximum area of one thousand square
Lands brought the matter before us on review and meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in
we reversed. Clearly, the applicants in Buyco were the case of rural land, to be used by him as his
denied registration of title not merely because they residence. In the case of married couples, one of
were American citizens at the time of their them may avail of the privilege herein granted;
application therefor. Respondents therein failed to Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the
prove possession of their predecessor-in-interest total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum
herein fixed. "In the case the transferee already Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which requires the
owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, submission of the relevant sworn statement by the
he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an applicant. The Court is of the view that the
additional urban or rural lands for residential requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the
purposes which, when added to those already instant case since said requirements are primarily
owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas directed to the register of deeds before whom
herein authorized." From the adoption of the 1987 compliance therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in
Constitution up to the present, no other law has the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the
been passed by the legislature on the same subject. requirements must likewise be submitted before the
Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands land registration court prior to the approval of an
in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost application for registration of title. An application for
his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185. registration of title before a land registration court
should not be confused with the issuance of a
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Even if certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only
private respondents were already Canadian citizens when the judgment of the land registration court
at the time they applied for registration of the approving the application for registration has
properties in question, said properties as discussed become final that a decree of registration is issued.
above were already private lands; consequently, And that is the time when the requirements of Sec.
there could be no legal impediment for the 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be
registration thereof by respondents in view of what complied with by the applicants. This decree of
the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought registration is the one that is submitted to the office
to be registered no longer form part of the public of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate
domain. They are already private in character since of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance
private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have of the decree of registration, the register of deeds
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession has no participation in the approval of the
and occupation thereof under claim of ownership application for registration of title as the decree of
prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law registration is yet to be issued.
provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a FELICIANO, J., concurring:
transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of
1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case or CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION;
rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY;
185). It is undisputed that private respondents, as NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN WHO HAS LOST HIS
vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens CITIZENSHIP MAY BE TRANSFEREE OF
of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or PRIVATE LAND; TRANSFER MUST BE MADE
acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not AFTER LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP; CASE AT BAR. —
significant whether private respondents are no This separate statement is concerned only with the
longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or last two (2) paragraphs, just before the dispositive
registered the parcels of land in question. What is portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should
important is that private respondents were formerly be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as 16 March 1982, does not purport to cover the set of
transferees of a private land, they could apply for facts before the Court in this case: i.e., the
registration in accordance with the mandate of respondent spouses became transferees (on 17
Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering June 1978) of the land here involved while they
that private respondents were able to prove the were natural-born Philippine citizens who happened
requisite period and character of possession of their sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens
predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can
application for registration of title must perforce be determine, addresses itself only to a situation of
approved. persons who were already foreign nationals at the
time they became transferees of private land in the
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 6 Philippines, but who were previously natural-born
OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 185 PRIMARILY Philippine citizens. It is difficult, therefore, to see
DIRECTED TO THE REGISTER OF DEEDS THAN how B.P. Blg. 185 can become applicable to the
TO APPLICANT. — The dissenting opinion, present situation even at the subsequent time when
however, states that the requirements in BP 185, the respondent spouses would come before the
must also be complied with by private respondents. Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185, especially Section
6 thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a requirements in B.P. 185 have been read into the
specific limitation on the quantity of land (not more Act and should also be applied. Strict compliance is
than 1,000 square meters) which may be acquired necessary because of the special privilege granted
thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be to former Filipinos who have become foreigners by
exceeded both by the land of which such foreign their own choice. If we can be so strict with our
national becomes transferee and by such land taken citizens, I see no reason why we should be less so
together with other land previously acquired by such with those who have renounced our country.
foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P.
Blg. 185) B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to DECISION
subsequent purchases of land by the respondent
spouses, that is, purchases made after they were BIDIN, J.:
naturalized as Canadian nationals.
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title
CRUZ, J., dissenting: over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; who has complied with the requirements for
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN WHO HAS registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
LOST HIS CITIZENSHIP MAY BE TRANSFEREE
OF PRIVATE LAND; LIMITATIONS PROVIDED The Republic would have us rule on the negative
FOR IN BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 185; ABSENCE and asks this Court to nullify the decision of the
OF EVIDENCE IN CASE AT BAR OF appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the
COMPLIANCE THEREWITH. — With all due court a quo in granting the application of respondent
respect, I have to dissent. There is no question that spouses for registration over the lots in question.
the property is private land and thus subject to
registration by qualified persons. It was really On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots
needless to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a
inapplicable here. We can agree that the ruling case total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City,
is Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the
which is not challenged in this petition. But I think time of the purchase, respondent spouses where
the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the then natural-born Filipino citizens.
respondent spouses were natural-born Filipinos at
the time they acquired the land does not settle the On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an
question posed. The important point is that the application for registration of title of the two (2)
respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of
Philippines but naturalized Canadians. It does not San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however,
follow that because they were citizens of the they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted
Philippines when they acquired the land, they can to embrace Canadian citizenship through
register it in their names now even if they are no naturalization.
longer Filipinos. Section 7 of Article XII of the
Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the
that the respondent spouses were qualified to
parties have presented their respective evidence,
acquire the land in question when it was transferred
the court a quo rendered a decision confirming
to them. Section 8 of the same article is not
private respondents' title to the lots in question, the
applicable either because it speaks of a transfer of
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
private land to a former natural-born citizen of the
Philippines after he became a foreigner. Even if it be
assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not WHEREFORE, in view of the
appear that the private respondents have observed foregoing, this Court hereby approves
"the limitations provided by law." The ponencia finds the said application and confirms the
that all the requisites for the registration of the land title and possession of herein
in the private respondents' name have been applicants over Lots 347 and 348,
complied with. I do not believe so for there is no Ap-04-003755 in the names of
showing that B.P. 185 has also been enforced. The spouses Mario B. Lapiña and Flor de
view has been expressed that we should confine Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens
ourselves to the requirements for registration under by birth but now Canadian citizens by
the Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that the naturalization and residing at 14 A.
Mabini Street, San Pablo City and/or
 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not
Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada. merit petitioner's approval, hence this present
recourse, which was belatedly filed.
Once this Decision becomes final, let
the corresponding decree of Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied
registration be issued. In the outright for having been filed out of time had it not
certificate of title to be issued, there been for the constitutional issue presented therein.
shall be annotated an easement of .
265 meters road right-of-way. At the outset, petitioner submits that private
respondents have not acquired proprietary rights
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25) over the subject properties before they acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the registration thereof in their favor. It maintains
the trial court based on the following ratiocination: that even privately owned unregistered lands are
presumed to be public lands under the principle that
In the present case, it is undisputed lands of whatever classification belong to the State
that both applicants were still Filipino under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the
citizens when they bought the land in issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not
controversy from its former owner. in the jurisdical sense the true owner of the land
For this reason, the prohibition since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner further
against the acquisition of private argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the
lands by aliens could not apply. In land to the applicant for confirmation of title would
justice and equity, they are the the land become privately owned land, for in the
rightful owners of the subject realty same proceeding, the court may declare it public
considering also that they had paid land, depending on the evidence.
for it quite a large sum of money.
Their purpose in initiating the instant As found by the trial court:
action is merely to confirm their title
over the land, for, as has been The evidence thus presented
passed upon, they had been the established that applicants, by
owners of the same since 1978. It themselves and their predecessors-
ought to be pointed out that in-interest, had been in open, public,
registration is not a mode of acquiring peaceful, continuous, exclusive and
ownership. The Torrens System was notorious possession and occupation
not established as a means for the of the two adjacent parcels of land
acquisition of title to private land. It is applied for registration of title under a
intended merely to confirm and bona-fide claim of ownership long
register the title which one may before June 12, 1945. Such being the
already have (Municipality of case, it is conclusively presumed that
Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. all the conditions essential to the
No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With confirmation of their title over the two
particular reference to the main issue adjacent parcels of land are sought to
at bar, the High Court has ruled that be registered have been complied
title and ownership over lands within with thereby entitling them to the
the meaning and for the purposes of issuance of the corresponding
the constitutional prohibition dates certificate of title pursuant to the
back to the time of their purchase, not provisions of Presidential Decree No.
later. The fact that the applicants- 1529, otherwise known as the
appellees are not Filipino citizens Property Registration Decree. (Rollo,
now cannot be taken against them for p. 26)
they were not disqualified from
acquiring the land in question Respondent court echoed the court a quo's
(Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. observation, thus:
L-29442, November 11, 1987).
(Rollo, pp. 27-28) The land sought to be registered has
been declared to be within the
 alienable and disposable zone void in respondents' possession.
established by the Bureau of Forest They fall short of the required
Development (Exhibit "P"). The possession since June 12, 1945 or
investigation conducted by the prior thereto. And, even if they
Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources needed only to prove thirty (30) years
District (IV-2) reveals that the possession prior to the filing of their
disputed realty had been occupied by application (on February 5, 1987),
the applicants "whose house of they would still be short of the
strong materials stands thereon"; that required possession if the starting
it had been declared for taxation point is 1979 when, according to the
purposes in the name of applicants- Court of Appeals, the land was
spouses since 1979; that they declared for taxation purposes in their
acquired the same by means of a name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
public instrument entitled "Kasulatan
ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly executed The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following
by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus
on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a
"J"); and that applicants and their parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the
predecessors in interest had been in transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in
possession of the land for more than open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof
30 years prior to the filing of the for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however,
application for registration. But what what the law provides.
is of great significance in the instant
case is the circumstance that at the As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public
time the applicants purchased the Land Act (CA 141) reads:
subject lot in 1978, both of them were
Filipino citizens such that when they Sec. 48. The following-described
filed their application for registration citizens of the Philippines, occupying
in 1987, ownership over the land in lands of the public domain or claiming
dispute had already passed to them. interest therein, but whose titles have
(Rollo, p., 27) not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
concept of possession and argues: of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their
17. The Court of Appeals found that claims and the issuance of a
the land was declared for taxation certificate of title therefor under the
purposes in the name of respondent Land Registration Act, to wit:
spouses only since 1979. However,
tax declarations or reality tax xxx xxx xxx
payments of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. (b) Those who by themselves or
(citing cases) through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous,
18. Then again, the appellate court exclusive, and notorious possession
found that "applicants (respondents) and occupation of agricultural lands
and their predecessors-in-interest of the public domain, under a bona
had been in possession of the land fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
for more than 30 years prior to the for at least thirty years immediately
filing of the application for preceding the filing of the application
registration." This is not, however, the for confirmation of title except when
same as saying that respondents prevented by wars or force majeure.
have been in possession "since June These shall be conclusively
12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending presumed to have performed all the
Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141; sec. also conditions essential to a Government
Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a grant and shall be entitled to a
 certificate of title under the provisions the 1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate
of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied) Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in
Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606
As amended by PD 1073: [1991]) where the Court, through then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section
48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, (The weight of authority is) that open,
of the Public Land Act are hereby exclusive and undisputed possession
amended in the sense that these of alienable public land for the period
provisions shall apply only to prescribed by law creates the legal
alienable and disposable lands of the fiction whereby the land, upon
public domain which have been in completion of the requisite
open, continuous, exclusive and period ipso jure and without the need
notorious possession and occupation of judicial or other sanction, ceases to
by the applicant himself or thru his be public land and becomes private
predecessor-in-interest, under property. . . .
a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945. Herico in particular, appears to be
squarely affirmative:
It must be noted that with respect to possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of . . . Secondly, under
the public domain, the law employs the terms "by the provisions of
themselves", "the applicant himself or through his Republic Act
predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not No. 1942, which the
whether the vendee/applicant has been in respondent Court held
possession of the subject property for only a day so to be inapplicable to
long as the period and/or legal requirements for the petitioner's case,
confirmation of title has been complied with by his with the latter's proven
predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to occupation and
his possession. In the case at bar, respondents' cultivation for more
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, than 30 years since
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of 1914, by himself and
the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but by his predecessors-
even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this in-interest, title over
except that respondent spouses, in its perception, the land has vested on
were in possession of the land sought to be petitioner so as to
registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the segregate the land
required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed from the mass of
parcels of land were acquired by private public land.
respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, Thereafter, it is no
who, in turn, have been in open and continued longer disposable
possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents under the Public Land
stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in- Act as by free
interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal patent . . .
rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be
deemed as an imperfect title. x x x           x x x          x x x

At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. As interpreted in

Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant several cases, when
consideration. There, it was held that before the the conditions as
issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not specified in the
in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since foregoing provision are
it still pertains to the State. complied with, the
possessor is deemed
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. to have acquired, by
Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in operation of law, a
 right to a grant, a actually gained would be lost. The
government grant, effect of the proof, wherever made,
without the necessity was not to confer title, but simply to
of a certificate of title establish it, as already conferred by
being issued. The the decree, if not by earlier law.
land, therefore, ceases (Emphasis supplied)
to be of the public
domain and beyond Subsequent cases have hewed to the above
the authority of the pronouncement such that open, continuous and
Director of Lands to exclusive possession for at least 30 years of
dispose of. The alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to
application for private property (Director of Lands v. IAC, 214
confirmation is mere SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602
formality, the lack of [1990]). This means that occupation and cultivation
which does not affect for more than 30 years by an applicant and his
the legal sufficiency of predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant
the title as would be so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
evidenced by the and (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA
patent and the Torrens 41 [1993]).
title to be issued upon
the strength of said The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must
patent. prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and
(b) his possession, in the concept above stated,
Nothing can more clearly must be either since time immemorial or for the
demonstrate the logical inevitability of period prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of
considering possession of public land Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the
which is of the character and duration conditions set by law are complied with, the
prescribed by the statute as the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires
equivalent of an express grant from a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
the State than the dictum of the necessity of a certificate of title being issued
statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the (National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such,
possessor(s) ". . . shall be the land ceases to be a part of the public domain
conclusively presumed to have and goes beyond the authority of the Director of
performed all the conditions essential Lands to dispose of.
to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title ..." No In other words, the Torrens system was not
proof being admissible to overcome a established as a means for the acquisition of title to
conclusive presumption, confirmation private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149
proceedings would, in truth be little SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not
more than a formality, at the most confer ownership. As could be gleaned from the
limited to ascertaining whether the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to
possession claims is of the required establish the nature of possession of their
character and length of time; and predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to
registration thereunder would not prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid
confer title, but simply recognize a taxes on the subject land and introduced
title already vested. The proceedings improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A
would not originally convert the land certified true copy of the affidavit executed by
from public to private land, but only Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also
confirm such a conversion already formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of
affected by operation of law from the land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from
moment the required period of her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her
possession became complete. As only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report
was so well put in Cariño, ". . .(There from the Bureau of Lands was presented in
are indications that registration was evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of
expected from all, but none sufficient Forest Development, to prove that the questioned
to show that, for want of it, ownership lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone
of the government and that no forestry interest was upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh
affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33). Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890
[1946]):
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents'
application for registration of title on the ground of . . . All lands that were
foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director not acquired from the
of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's Government, either by
thesis. purchase or by grant,
belong to the public
We disagree. domain. An exception
to the rule would be
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise any land that should
foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino have been in the
citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of possession of an
the property. But this is where the similarity ends. occupant and of his
The applicants in Buyco sought to register a large predecessors in
tract of land under the provisions of the Land interest since time
Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the immemorial, for such
provisions of the Public Land Act. The land possession would
registration court decided in favor of the applicants justify the presumption
and was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. that the land had
The Director of Lands brought the matter before us never been part of the
on review and we reversed. public domain or that if
had been a private
This Court, speaking through Justice property even before
Davide, Jr., stated: the Spanish conquest
(Cariño v. Insular
As could be gleaned from the Government, 41 Phil
evidence adduced, the private 935 [1909]; 212 U.S.
respondents do not rely on fee simple 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594)
ownership based on a Spanish grant The applicant does not
or possessory information title under come under the
Section 19 of the Land Registration exception, for the
Act; the private respondents did not earliest possession of
present any proof that they or their the lot by his first
predecessors-in-interest derived title predecessor in interest
from an old Spanish grant such as (a) began in 1880.
the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the
"concession especial" or especial . . . alienable public
grant; (c) the "composicion con el land held by a
estado" title or adjustment title; (d) possessor, personally
the "titulo de compra" or title by or through his
purchase; and (e) the "informacion predecessors-in-
posesoria" or possessory information interest, openly,
title, which could become a "titulo continuously and
gratuito" or a gratuitous title (Director exclusively for the
of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 prescribed statutory
[1968]). The primary basis of their period (30 years under
claim is possession, by themselves the Public Land Act,
and their predecessors-in- as amended) is
interest, since time immemorial. converted to private
property by the mere
If indeed private respondents and lapse or completion of
their predecessors have been in said period, ipso jure.
possession since time immemorial, (Director of Lands v.
the rulings of both courts could be
 Intermediate Appellate the land for more than eighty (80)
Court, supra) years, . . .

It is obvious from the foregoing rule xxx xxx xxx

that the applicant must prove that (a)
the land is alienable public land and To this Court's mind, private
(b) his possession, in the concept respondents failed to prove that (their
above stated, must be either since predecessor-in-interest) had
time immemorial, as ruled in both possessed the property allegedly
Cariño and Susi, or for the period covered by Tax Declaration No.
prescribed in the Public Land Act. As 15853 and made the subject of both
to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez his last will and testament and the
Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 project of partition of his estate
SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule among his heirs — in such manner
enunciated by the Court of Appeals, as to remove the same from the
per then Associate Justice Hugo R. public domain under the Cariño and
Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the
for registration under Section 48 of predecessor-in-interest) died on 31
the Public Land Act must secure a May 1937, he transmitted no right
certification from the Government that whatsoever, with respect to the said
the lands which he claims to have property, to his heirs. This being the
possessed as owner for more than case, his possession cannot be
thirty (30) years are alienable and tacked to that of the private
disposable. It is the burden of the respondents for the latter's benefit
applicant to prove its positive pursuant to Section 48(b) of the
averments. Public Land Act, the alternative
ground relied upon in their application
In the instant case, private ...
respondents offered no evidence at
all to prove that the property subject xxx xxx xxx
of the application is an alienable and
disposable land. On the contrary, the Considering that the private
entire property . . . was pasture land respondents became American
(and therefore inalienable under the citizens before such filing, it goes
then 1973 Constitution). without saying that they had acquired
no vested right, consisting of an
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence imperfect title, over the property
miserably failed to establish their before they lost their Philippine
imperfect title to the property in citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
question. Their allegation of
possession since time immemorial, . . Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied
., is patently baseless. . . . When registration of title not merely because they were
referring to possession, specifically American citizens at the time of their application
"immemorial possession," it means therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove
possession of which no man living possession of their predecessor-in-interest since
has seen the beginning, and the time immemorial or possession in such a manner
existence of which he has learned that the property has been segregated from public
from his elders (Susi v. Razon, domain; such that at the time of their application, as
supra). Such possession was never American citizens, they have acquired no vested
present in the case of private rights over the parcel of land.
respondents. . . .
In the case at bar, private respondents were
. . ., there does not even exist a undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time
reasonable basis for the finding that of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue
the private respondents and their thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in
predecessors-in-interest possessed the process, the possession in the concept of owner
and the prescribed period of time held by their residence. In the case of married
predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. couples, one of them may avail of the
In addition, private respondents have constructed a privilege herein granted; Provided,
house of strong materials on the contested property, That if both shall avail of the same,
now occupied by respondent Lapiñas mother. the total area acquired shall not
exceed the maximum herein fixed.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of
this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows In case the transferee already owns
private respondents to register the contested parcels urban or rural lands for residential
of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII purposes, he shall still be entitled to
of the Constitution contain the following pertinent be a transferee of an additional urban
provisions, to wit: or rural lands for residential purposes
which, when added to those already
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary owned by him, shall not exceed the
succession, no private lands shall be maximum areas herein authorized.
transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the
associations qualified to acquire or present, no other law has been passed by the
hold lands of the public domain. legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs
the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine
provisions of Section 7 of this citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Even if private respondents were already Canadian
Philippine citizenship may be a citizens at the time they applied for registration of
transferee of private lands, subject to the properties in question, said properties as
limitations provided by law. discussed above were already private lands;
(Emphasis supplied) consequently, there could be no legal impediment
for the registration thereof by respondents in view of
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land
quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the sought to be registered no longer form part of the
then 1973 Constitution which reads: public domain. They are already private in character
since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the have been in open, continuous and exclusive
provisions of Section 14 of this possession and occupation thereof under claim of
Article, a natural-born citizen of the ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The
Philippines who has lost his law provides that a natural-born citizen of the
citizenship may be a transferee of Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship
private land, for use by him as his may be a transferee of a private land up to a
residence, as the Batasang maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1)
Pambansa may provide. hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as
his residence (BP 185).
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was
passed into law, the relevant provision of which It is undisputed that private respondents, as
provides: vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens
of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not
Philippines who has lost his significant whether private respondents are no
Philippine citizenship and who has longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or
the legal capacity to enter into a registered the parcels of land in question. What is
contract under Philippine laws may important is that private respondents were formerly
be a transferee of a private land up to natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as
a maximum area of one thousand transferees of a private land, they could apply for
square meters, in the case of urban registration in accordance with the mandate of
land, or one hectare in the case of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering
rural land, to be used by him as his that private respondents were able to prove the
requisite period and character of possession of their application for registration of title as the decree of
predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their registration is yet to be issued.
application for registration of title must perforce be
approved. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the
requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with SO ORDERED.
by private respondents. Specifically, it refers to
Section 6, which provides: Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
Sec. 6. In addition to the Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and
requirements provided for in other Mendoza, JJ.,concur. 
laws for the registration of titles to
lands, no private land shall be Separate Opinions
transferred under this Act, unless the CRUZ, J., dissenting:
transferee shall submit to the register
of deeds of the province or city where With all due respect, I have to dissent.
the property is located a sworn
statement showing the date and The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:
place of his birth; the names and
addresses of his parents, of his
Can a foreign national apply for
spouse and children, if any; the area,
registration of title over a parcel of
the location and the mode of
land which he acquired by purchase
acquisition of his landholdings in the
while still a citizen of the Philippines,
Philippines, if any; his intention to
from a vendor who has complied with
reside permanently in the Philippines;
the requirements for registration
the date he lost his Philippine
under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
citizenship and the country of which
he is presently a citizen; and such
other information as may be required There is no question that the property is private land
under Section 8 of this Act. and thus subject to registration by qualified persons.
It was really needless to elaborate on Buyco, which
is clearly inapplicable here. We can agree that the
The Court is of the view that the requirements in
ruling case is Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case
Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this
since said requirements are primarily directed to the
petition.
register of deeds before whom compliance therewith
is to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it
stated, much less implied, that the requirements But I think the ponencia misses the point. The
must likewise be submitted before the land finding that the respondent spouses were natural-
registration court prior to the approval of an born Filpinos at the time they acquired the land does
application for registration of title. An application for not settle the question posed.
registration of title before a land registration court
should not be confused with the issuance of a The important point is that the respondent spouses
certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only are no longer citizens of the Philippines but
when the judgment of the land registration court naturalized Canadians. It does not follow that
approving the application for registration has because they were citizens of the Philippines when
become final that a decree of registration is issued. they acquired the land, they can register it in their
And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. names now even if they are no longer Filipinos.
6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be
complied with by the applicants. This decree of Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is
registration is the one that is submitted to the office irrelevant because it is not disputed that the
of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate respondent spouses were qualified to acquire the
of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance land in question when it was transferred to them.
of the decree of registration, the register of deeds
has no participation in the approval of the Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either
because it speaks of a transfer of private land to a
former natural-born citizen of the of persons who were already foreign nationals at
Philippines after he became a foreigner. the time they became transferees of private land in
the Philippines, but who were previously natural-
Thus it states: born Philippine citizens. It is difficult, therefore, to
see how B.P. Blg. 185 can become applicable to the
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the present situation even at the subsequent time when
provisions of Section 7 of this Article, the respondent spouses would come before the
a natural-born citizen of the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185, especially Section
Philippines who has lost his 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a
Philippine citizenship may be a specific limitation on the quantity of land (not more
transferee of private lands, subject to than 1,000 square meters) which may be acquired
limitations provided by law. thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be
exceeded both by the land of which such foreign
Even if it be assumed that the provision is national becomes transferee and by such land taken
applicable, it does not appear that the private together with other land previously acquired by such
respondents have observed "the limitations provided foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P.
by law." Blg. 185)

The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply
registration of the land in the private respondents' to subsequent purchases of land by the respondent
name have been complied with. I do not believe so spouses, that is, purchases made after they were
for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also been naturalized as Canadian nationals.
enforced.
Separate Opinions
The view has been expressed that we should CRUZ, J., dissenting:
confine ourselves to the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act. I respectfully With all due respect, I have to dissent.
submit that the requirements in B.P. 185 have been
read into the Act and should also be applied. The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:

Strict compliance is necessary because of the Can a foreign national apply for
special privilege granted to former Filipinos who registration of title over a parcel of
have become foreigners by their own choice. If we land which he acquired by purchase
can be so strict with our own citizens, I see no while still a citizen of the Philippines,
reason why we should be less so with those who from a vendor who has complied with
have renounced our country. the requirements for registration
under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
Feliciano, J.: concurring
There is no question that the property is private land
I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion and thus subject to registration by qualified persons.
written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the result reached It was really needless to elaborate on Buyco, which
therein. is clearly inapplicable here. We can agree that the
ruling case is Director of Lands v. Intermediate
This separate statement is concerned only with the Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this
last two (2) paragraphs, just before the dispositive petition.
portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should
be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on But I think the ponencia misses the point. The
16 March 1982, does not purport to cover the set of finding that the respondent spouses were natural-
facts before the Court in this case: i.e., born Filpinos at the time they acquired the land does
the respondent spouses became transferees (on 17 not settle the question posed.
June 1978) of the land here involved while they
were natural-born Philippine citizens who happened The important point is that the respondent spouses
sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens are no longer citizens of the Philippines but
of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can naturalized Canadians. It does not follow that
determine, addresses itself only to a situation because they were citizens of the Philippines when
they acquired the land, they can register it in their portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should
names now even if they are no longer Filipinos. be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on
16 March 1982, does not purport to cover the set of
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is facts before the Court in this case: i.e.,
irrelevant because it is not disputed that the the respondent spouses became transferees (on 17
respondent spouses were qualified to acquire the June 1978) of the land here involved while they
land in question when it was transferred to them. were natural-born Philippine citizens who happened
sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can
because it speaks of a transfer of private land to a determine, addresses itself only to a situation
former natural-born citizen of the of persons who were already foreign nationals at
Philippines after he became a foreigner. the time they became transferees of private land in
the Philippines, but who were previously natural-
Thus it states: born Philippine citizens. It is difficult, therefore, to
see how B.P. Blg. 185 can become applicable to the
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the present situation even at the subsequent time when
provisions of Section 7 of this Article, the respondent spouses would come before the
a natural-born citizen of the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185, especially Section
Philippines who has lost his 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a
Philippine citizenship may be a specific limitation on the quantity of land (not more
transferee of private lands, subject to than 1,000 square meters) which may be acquired
limitations provided by law. thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be
exceeded both by the land of which such foreign
national becomes transferee and by such land taken
Even if it be assumed that the provision is
together with other land previously acquired by such
applicable, it does not appear that the private
foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P.
respondents have observed "the limitations provided
Blg. 185)
by law."
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the
to subsequent purchases of land by the respondent
registration of the land in the private respondents'
spouses, that is, purchases made after they were
name have been complied with. I do not believe so
naturalized as Canadian nationals.
for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also been
enforced.

The view has been expressed that we should

confine ourselves to the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act. I respectfully
submit that the requirements in B.P. 185 have been
read into the Act and should also be applied.

Strict compliance is necessary because of the

special privilege granted to former Filipinos who
have become foreigners by their own choice. If we
can be so strict with our own citizens, I see no
reason why we should be less so with those who
have renounced our country.

Feliciano, J.: concurring

I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion

written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the result reached
therein.

This separate statement is concerned only with the

last two (2) paragraphs, just before the dispositive