Individuation:: Sheila Audrey Thoo
Individuation:: Sheila Audrey Thoo
Individuation:: Sheila Audrey Thoo
•
EXPERIENCE IN SEARCH OF THEORY
by
in the
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
at the
MARCH 1998
•
To my parents
ii
AMENDED ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the following people without whom
,..._.this work, both in practice and in theory, would not have taken shape.
Thank you to Prof David Fourie, my supervisor, for his grounding and wise
influence, for providing a context for me to clarify my thinking and to express fully
what I intended to in writing, and for moving mountains· in order to meet time
constraints.
Thank you to Sr Jennifer Alt for her insightful and freeing guidance.
Thank you to Mrs Maryna Haumann for her kind and generous assistance in
proficiently typing and retyping this during all hours and under much pressure.
Thank you to Mr James Kitching for his always kind, willing and prompt
assistance with research.
Thank you to Mrs Claudette Nothnagel for kindly and readily assisting when
urgent typing arrangements needed to be made and for typing the bibliography.
Acknowledgement to the Centre for Science Development for the scholarship for
part-time study.
•
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IV
SUMMARY
- that the socio-cultural context influences this experience directly by influencing the
process of self-expression via defining what is experienced as narcissistic, altruistic,
or individualistic behaviour, and indirectly by the theories which reflect its norms;
- that the relationship between experience, and theory and personal epistemologies
potentially initiate tensions, and facilitate their resolution;
---oOo---
v
CONTENTS
Page number
Declaration .........................• .............................. (i)
Dedication ....................................................... (ii)
Acknowledgements ................................................ (iii)
Summary ........................................................ (v)
CHAPTER 1 ....................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION ................................................... 1
CHAPTER 2 ....................................................... 7
SELF IN RELATION TO GROUP ....................................... 7
Introduction ...................................................... 7
The Notion of Culture in Western Theories on Individuation ................ 7
The Notion of Culture in Modern, Western Theories on Individuation ....... 8
The Notion of Culture in Postmodern, Western Theories on Individuation .. 12
A Discussion of Jung's Theory of Individuation ......................... 23
A Brief Definition of Jung's (1959) Construct of Individuation ............ 23
A Brief Discussion of the Terms "Ego", "Persona", "Self' ................ 24
A Broader Description of Jung's (1959) Theory of Individuation .......... 26
'Self as a Socio-Cultural Construct .................................. 28
Self-Construct in Collectivist Culture ............................... 29
Self-Construct in Eastern Culture ............................... 29
Self-Construct in African Culture ................................ 32
Self-Construct in Individualist Culture ............................ 34
Can Self-Expression be seen to Occur in a Way Other Than by Opposing Public
Opinion? ....................................................... 34
Self-Expression in Collectivist Cultures ............................. 36
Self-Expression in Individualist Cultures ............................ 38
Can a Relationship be seen to Exist Between the Socio-Cultural Context and the
Process of Self-Expression? . . . . . . . . ....... . . 38
Individuation in Collectivist Cultural Contexts .. 42
VI
A Description of Individuation in African Culture ......' ................ 42
A Description of Individuation in Indian Culture ....................... 43
A Description of Individuation in Japanese Culture .................... 44
Conclusion .....................• .............................. 45
CHAPTER 3 ...................................................... 46
SELF IN RELATION TO OTHER ...................................... 46
Introduction ..................................................... 46
Individuation in terms of Psychodynamic Theory ........................ 46
Individuation as Becoming Separate and Emotionally Autonomous ......... 46
Exploring the Concept of Emotional Autonomy in terms of Kohut's Theory .... 53
Interpreting Individuation in terms of Systemic Theory .................... 56
States of Individuality ........................................... 56
Communicational Patterns ....................................... 59
Concept of Differentiation in Systemic Terms ...................... 59
Differentiation of Self or the Capacity to be an Individual Within a Group 59
Dialectical Relationship between States of Individuality and Communicational
Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Influence of 'Self' on Interpersonal Distance ....................... 61
Regulating Interpersonal Distance .............................. 65
• Factors which Influence the Nature of Boundary .............. 66
• Factors which Influence the Definition of a Relationship ........ 67
• Factors which Influence the Extent to which Responses Express
Sameness /or Difference ......................... : ...... 68
• Factors Influencing the Extent to which the 'Emotionally Autonomous'
Person can Regulate His/Her Emotional Involvement in a
Relationship ........................................ ·.. 69 ·
Developing the Ability to Regulate Interpersonal Distance ............ 70
• What would such an Ability Entail? ........................ 70
• Constraining or Limiting Factors .......................... 70
Integrating the Separateness versus Togetherness Resolution ............. 71
Individuation as Lineal Progression or Recursive Process ................ 76
Conclusion ..................................................... 78
VII
CHAPTER 4 ...................................................... 79
SELF IN RELATION TO SELF ....................................... 79
Introduction .......................' .............................. 79
Finding Out Who One Is ........................................... 79
Being Who One Is ............................................... 80
Experience Of Being Who One Is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Experience and Postmodern Conceptualisations of Identity ............. 81
Experience and Postmodern Conceptualisations of Aloneness ........... 85
Emotionality and Being Oneself ................................... 86
Revealing Who One Is ............................................ 88
Being True to Who One Is ......................................... 89
Essential Authentic Self ......................................... 90
Singularity versus Multiplicity/Continuity versus Discontinuity ............ 91
Conclusion ..................................................... 92
CHAPTER 5 ...................................................... 94
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . ........................... 94
Conclusions Drawn from the Process of the Search ..................... 94
Facilitating Experience by Conceptualising it in Theory ................... 97
Freedom in Relation to Group .................................... 98
Freedom in Relation to Other ..................................... 98
Freedom in Relation to Self ...................................... 98
Recommendations ................................................ 99
viii
FIGURES Page
IX
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
•
This study was initiated by the a priori situation of difficulties in the experience of
individuating. In this situation, the experience of difficulties in individuating was
intimately tied up with Western, psychodynamic concepts of what individuation means,
namely: becoming the separate, self-contained, independent individual, and being
self-expressive (or self-assertive). Such concepts were also experienced as societal
prescriptions and thus as having normative value.
This a priori situation gave rise to three points of enquiry. The first point of enquiry
involved a question: would one experience difficulties in individuation if societal
prescriptions of what individuation entails was not that of becoming the separate,
self-contained, independent individual? This gave rise to a related question: what
could individuation be seen to entail in a collectivist culture? To address such a
question, a discussion of various writers' descriptions of individuation in collectivist
cultures would be required. It was thought that such an exploration would aid in
resolving difficulties in the experience of individuating by deconstructing
conceptualisations of individuation given normative value by Western discourse
practices. This focus of enquiry pointed to a presumed link between experience and
the socio-cultural context.
From the literature search, two points of enquiry related to the idea of apresumed
link between experience and the socio-cultural context arose.
Theorising about individuation has already been undertaken from a vast number of
sources reflecting a wide range of theoretical perspectives. To use Mazor and
Enright's (1988) and Rice, Cole, and Lapsley's ( 1990) categorisation, these theoretical
perspectives include: psychoanalytic (e.g., Blas, 1967; Josselson, 1980; Jung, 1959;
Mahler, 1972a), ego developmental (Erikson, 1950 in Rice et al., 1990), interpersonal
(e.g., Cooper, Grotevant, & Condon, 1983), systemic (e.g., Bowen, 1985; Gavazzi &
1
Sabatelli, 1990; Haley, 1980; Karpel, 1976; Sabatelli & Mazor, 1985; Stierlin, 1994),
and social cognitive (Mazor & Enright, 1988). In addition to these, there have also
been a couple of original theories (Kegan, 1982; Stern, 1985). Furthermore, feminist
writers have also theorised about individ~ation (e.g., Jordan, 1991; Miller, 1991;
Surrey, 1991 ). In addition to these modern theoretical perspectives, there have also
been postmodern theories. In traditional thought, the individuation construct
incorporates the ideas of lineal developmental process towards some static end-point,
namely: the 'self, person, or individual. In contrast, postmodern thought takes this
static endpoint and conceptualises the 'self construct not in terms of an entity - the
self-contained individual, but in terms of a process, the construction of self in the
socio-linguistic domain of relating, or the empty self in the everchanging world of
experience. Hence, theories of individuation in postmodern thought have been in terms
of the 'self construct (e.g., Gergen, 1991; Harre, 1991; Hermans, Kempen, & Van Loon,
1992; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 1991 ). Furthermore, there have also been attempts
at integrating two or more theories on individuation. For example, Karpel (1976)
undertook to combine psychodynamic and systemic perspectives and Mazor, Alfa, and
Gampel (1993) undertook to combine social cognitive and object-relations
perspectives. Mitchell's (1991) article also focuses on an integration. Furthermore,
Blustein and Noumair (1996, p. 437) put forward a particular approach when theorising
about individuation which they call an "embeddedness perspective". Blustein and
Noumair ( 1996, p. 437) urge the reader to take into account the relational and cultural
influences when theorising about any psychological construct, which in their case is the
"interpersonal experience" of "self or identity".
2
point of enquiry which arose from the literature was: can a relationship be seen to exist
between the notion of culture and a dynamic sub-construct of the individuation
construct? In other words, can a relationship be seen to exist between the
socio-cultural context and the process of self-expression?
Before outlining the second and third points of enquiry to arise from the a priori
situation of difficulties in individuating, an outline of what this situation entailed needs
to be given.
Examples of theories which address this tension between individuality and group
acceptance is Winnicott's theory about the "true" and "false" self (in Mitchell, 1991, p.
3
133). It may be interpreted that the 'true self symbolises the expression of individuality,
and the 'false self, conformity and compliance to group norms and group interest to
ensure group acceptance. Jung's (1959) theory also addresses this tension between
individuality and group acceptance. However, Jung's (1959) theory was chosen as a
basis for finding a way of resolving this tension because the individuality versus group
acceptance tension may be interpreted to be at the heart of his theory on individuation.
Please note, the term 'public opinion' is intended to mean, for example, conventions, role
expectations, not macro-societal discourse practices.
4
The first chapter will address two of the three points of enquiry which arose from the
a priori situation. These are: can self-expression be seen to occur in any way, other
than by opposing public opinion if public opinion goes contrary to one's wishes, goals,
pursuits?, and: what can individuation be seen to entail in a collectivist cultural
context? The first chapter will also address both the two points of enquiry which arose
from the literature search. These are: do Western theories on individuation take into
account the notion of culture, and if so, how? And, can a relationship be seen to exist
between the socio-cultural context and the process of self-expression? These
questions relate to, or address tensions in what can be called the self-group relational
dimension.
Both the second and the third chapters will address the remaining point of enquiry
which arose from the a priori situation. This involved attempting to find out whether the
resolution of experiential tensions would be facilitated by integrating these dialectics
in theory, simply conceptualising them, or by gaining theoretical understandings or
interpretations of what individuation can be said to entail. The second chapter will
address this point of enquiry in terms of experiential tensions in the self-other relational
dimension, and the third chapter, in terms of the self-self relational dimension.
The final chapter will contain an illustration and discussion of conclusions drawn from
the process of the search to facilitate individuation by conceptualising or integrating
experiential themes or dialectics in theory. In the final chapter a particular
conceptualisation of individuation in terms of the notion of freedom, and on the basis
of various theories will be discussed. This can be said to be a way of facilitating
individuation in practice by conceptualising it in theory.
(1) That the phrases, "it can be said" or "it can be seen", are used to indicate that the
idea or comment being expressed is not regarded as having objective reality but
linguistic reality, that is, it exists only as an idea or thought. Hence, the word is is used
in the phrases "what is meant" or "a comment is" to similarly reflect that it is the
comment or the idea that is regarded as real. These phrases are used to reflect a
5
postmodern stance in the author's thinking.
(2) That the phrases: "may be interpreted as", "may be regarded as", "may mean",
"may be described as", "may be concluded", "'may be drawn from", "may be explained"
reflect the author's usage of other writers' ideas.
(3) That in general, the language of paragraphs where writers are referred to by
various means, for example, "according to", "for'', or by stating the name of the writer,
in most cases, reflects the writing of that writer unless otherwise indicated. Hence,
some paragraphs may reflect an objectivist epistemology.
6
CHAPTER 2
In this section, how or if modern and postmodern theories on individuation take into
account the notion of culture will be addressed. In order to do so, a description of how
'self is conceptualised in modern and postmodern theories on individuation needs to
be given. The description of the 'self construct is thought to be necessary in order to
describe more fully the presumed role that 'culture' is theorised to play in theories on
individuation. The terms 'self-concept' and 'sense-of-self will be used to aid in
describing the notion of 'self.
'Self-concept' can be said to be narrowly defined as how one sees oneself, for·
example, as serious, hardworking. 'Self-concept' is a term from Rogers's theory of
personality (Pervin, 1970, p. 177) referring to an "organised and consistent pattern of
perceptions". However, here it will be used not in terms of its original definition, but as
a metaphor to emphasise the cognitive, verbally mediated processes involved in
'self-construction'. Sense-of-self is not a theoretical term per se but it can be seen as
an ordinary descriptive term to capture what Stern (1985) best describes as
7
non-self-reflexive, nonverbal awareness. Hence, an artificial distinction, namely: a
verbal, self-reflexive extraction from experience (self-concept) and nonverbal,
experiential awareness (sense-of-self) will be used. The term 'self-knowledge' can also
be seen to involve a verbal, self-reflective &tance. These three terms: self-concept,
sense-of-self, and self-knowledge will be used in the next discussion.
In this section three theoretical perspectives from a modern perspective will be used
to address the question of how, or if the notion of culture is used in their
conceptualisations of 'self. First the systemic perspective will be addressed, followed
by the psychodynamic and feminist perspectives.
Bowen's (1985) and Kerr's (1988) theorising will be used as an example of the
systemic conceptualisation of 'self. The 'self here can be said to be the ability to have
convictions, opinions, ideas independent of emotional pressure to be the same as the
group. It can also be said to be the ability to respond flexibly with communicational
responses involving closeness (e.g., agreeing, compromising}, or distance (e.g.,
disagreeing, uncompromising). This presupposes emotional neutrality or the ability to
reflect on one's emotional reactions and not automatically react so as to achieve
emotional equilibrium. Hence, the self in this conceptualisation can be said to involve
emotional, cognitive, and communicational capacities.
This paragraph will address what role the notion of culture is theorised to have on
this systemic conceptualisation of self. Bowen's (1985), and Kerr's (1988) theory can
be said to be acultural if culture is seen in terms of society's prescriptions of what the
self should be. Kerr (1988) does not theorise about how culture can be seen to affect
the development of these emotional, cognitive, and communicational capacities.
However, he does focus on the effect of the emotional-relational milieu of the family on
this development. However, this very milieu can be said to be a cultural artefact of or
as being influenced by the cultural context of, for example, collectivist or individualist
societies.
8
Kerr (1988) places a normative value on a relational milieu where there is flexibility
in styles of relating permitting various degrees of closeness and distance between its
members. However, this normative stance can be said to be an outcome of an
individualist (Western) culture from which this theory arises. The nonnormative value
(as considered from within a Western cultural context), namely, a restrictive
unidimensional style of relating where only one pattern of distance regulation is
maintained, for example, closeness, may be considered to be the norm in collective
cultures such as Japanese and Indian societies. Hence, culture can be theorised to
influence the development of self (or cognitive, emotional, and communicational
capacities) indirectly via its influence on the family relational milieu. If one focuses on
the communicational capacities of this self-conceptualisation, then culture can also be
said to reciprocally influence the patterns of communicating/relating indirectly via the
notion of 'boundary' formation. 'Boundary' may be considered as that which regulates
the type of communicational exchanges occuring in stereotypical relational dyads of,
for example, gender, age, and hierarchical dimensions. What regulates these
communicational exchanges can be said to be culturally defined expectations or
common knowledges of what is acceptable behaviour within these stereotypical
relational dyads. Hence, in collectivist cultures age differences may be a more
determining factor of the type of communicational exchanges occuring in a relational
dyad, as compared to, for example, a Western culture.
However, Kerr (1988) does not include the role of culture in his conceptualisation of
'self.
9
needs met (Haase, 1993) and taking responsibility for the convictions, beliefs, opinions,
and wants that one has. The 'self construct that one is theorised to become in
psychodynamic theory is the 'aware self, or the self that knows about, and accepts a
priori unconscious motivations, undesirable "r undeveloped tendencies (Jung, 1959).
The 'self construct in psychodynamic theory may also be interpreted as the agentic
'self or the 'self that initiates responses or actions and does not simply react to the
processes of the relational domain or conform to the dictates of the group.
This paragraph will address what role the notion of culture is theorised to have on
this psychodynamic conceptualisation of 'self. From the above description, the 'self
conceptualised in psychodynamic theory (Kohut, 1971, 1977) can be said to fall into
the category of 'sense-of-self outlined earlier. By this, what is meant is that
psychodynamic theory theorises largely in terms of nonverbal awarenesses and states.
Hence, the role of culture can be said not to feature in psychodynamic theory, as these
fundamental, preverbal awarenesses are regarded by psychodynamic theory as being
universal.
10
women, the primary experience of the 'self is relational, that is, the 'self is organised
and developed within the context of important relationships. This may mean that, for
example, such individualist notions of sense-of-self, self-esteem, and individuality are
embedded in the relationship. In other wordt;, this may mean that these notions arise
out of, and depend upon the interactions that occur between people. Miller ( 1991, p.
13) uses the term "being-in-relation" to describe the sense-of-self. It is an internal
representation of the 'self inseparable from dynamic interaction. At the heart of this
dynamic interaction is the attending to each other's mental states and emotions. Thus,
this sense of 'self is of someone who attends to, and responds to what is going on in
the relationship between two or more people. In feminist theory, self-esteem is
dependent on the felt ability to make and then to maintain affiliations and relationships
(Surrey, 1991 ). This idea of ''taking care of relationships" (Miller, 1991, p. 16) involves
good-enough understanding of the other in a sense of mutual concern for the
well-being of each other. For Josselson (1987), in feminist theory, nurturing
connectedness is in itself a form of self-expression, self-assertion and individuality.
Hence, it can be said that the self-construct in feminist theory is described in terms of
the notion of self-concept in that it involves reflecting on experiences in relating, and
forming mental representations of those.
This paragraph will address what role the notion of culture is theorised to have on
the feminist conceptualisation of self. Of relevance here, is the idea that culture
influences one's self-concept. Various authors have explored the nature of this
influence (Goldschmidt, 1995; Kashima, Kim, Gelfand, Yamaguchi, Choi, & Yuki, 1995;
Lo Verso, 1995). For example, Kashima et al. (1995) showed how culture influences
how one sees oneself along the dimensions of independent versus interdependent,
agentic versus communal and separate versus relational. Feminist theory proposes
that culture (as prescribing an agentic, autonomous, independent self), has a devaluing.
impact on one's personal self-concept of "self-in-relation" (Surrey, 1991, p. 152).
Feminist writers, for example, Miller (1976), Nelson ( 1996), Gilligan ( 1982), have
expressed some vocalisation in relation to this. This vocalisation can be seen to be an
influence of the individual on the culture via social discourse practices. This can be
said to illustrate Goldschmidt's (1995) comment that the influence of culture on how one
sees oneself is not simply a unidirectional process. Tang (1992) makes a comment
11
that in collectivist societies where the socio-cultural self-construct is an interdependent,
relational we-self, the individual's personal self-concept may be notably individualistic.
This may be interpreted as illustrating Goldschmidt's (1995) comment.
•
The Notion of Culture in Postmodern, Western Theories on Individuation
Postmodern thought [Cerullo (1992); Fogel (1993); Gergen (1984, 1985, 1991a,
1994); Gergen and Gergen (1988); Greenberg (1995); Harre (1983, 1991 ); Hermans,
Kempen, & Van Loon (1992); Hermans, Rijks & Kempen (1993); Miller, Potts, Fung,
Hoogstra, & Mintz (1990); O'Hara & Anderson (1991); Penn & Frankfurt (1994);
Rappaport (1993); Rosenbaum & Dyckman (1995); Sarup (1993); Singer (1995);
Varella, Thompson, & Rosch (1991 )] distinguishes between experience and reflection.
According to Varela et al. (1991 ), we experience a sense of self that is continuous,
stable, in a sense, the essence of our psychic survival. It is this sense of self that we
want to defend or enhance and is linked to the losses and pains we experience. Yet,
when self-reflecting on immediate experience, Varela et al. (1991 ), state that meditators
find a flux of transitory experiential states, for example, bodily sensations, perceptions,
feelings, impulses, thoughts.
12
who, for example, has a body or has feelings, or, because of the disunity of any
particular experiential category.
Varela et al. (1991) conclude then that although one can discern many components
of experience, for example, motivations, dispositions, volitions and awareness of
various forms, one cannot discern anything that may be identified as this fundamental,
continuous, coherent self. They conclude that this flux of experience cannot "be pinned
down" and thus it is "empty of a self' (p. 80). The self that we believe to exist as some
permanent, stable, continuous entity is an expression of an "habitual clinging" (p. 80)
to any one or combination of these aggregates of experience, and as such the self is
just another transitory component in the flux of experience. According to Wilber's
(1985) thinking, this transitory component in experience that we cling to as 'self is
simply a collection of memories that is felt to be separate from present experience,
hence existing as an observing I. According to Varela et al. (1991 ), following Buddhist
thought, the tendency to imbue this experience of self as, for example, permanent and
fundamental is thus illusionary.
Epstein (1992) provides further ideas on the 'empty self concept. Epstein's (1992,
p. 52) "egolessness" or "selflessness" is used instead of the term 'empty self. For
Epstein (1992), selflessness does not refer to regressive states (in traditional thought)
in which there are no constraints on primitive impulses and where unrestrained
expression occurs; nor does it refer to (in traditional thought) fusion or merger
experiences where a sense of separateness from one's surroundings (social or
physical) is lost. Instead the ego, or (in Epstein's understanding) the ongoing flux of
experiential states - feelings, thoughts, bodily sensations, is retained. Selflessness, for
Epstein (1992, p. 52), is the negation of "the actual internal experience of one's self'
as "inherently existing". This involves identifying and negating the ways in which we .
believe we inherently exist. For Epstein (1992), selflessness does not involve negating
something which actually exists but recognising its nonexistence in the way we
imagined it to be. This involves, for example, appreciating that thoughts exist without
a thinker, feelings without a feeler and so on (Epstein, 1992).
13
self through reified, linguistic categories derived from reflections on past experience,
but we come to know self in the immediacy of ongoing experience (Rosenbaum &
Dyckman, 1995). Thus, one's self is not, for example, our beliefs, feelings, etcetera,
but the potentialities inherent in dispositioflls or capacities to perceive, think, feel or
believe (Rosenbaum & Dyckman, 1995). According to the empty-self
conceptualisation, the very self one believes that one has grasped is constantly
changing, hence the idea of 'empty self. Thus it can be said that there is no a priori
conceptualisation of self. The idea of self-knowledge may thus be interpreted as simple
awareness of the ongoing flux of changing perceptions, thoughts, feelings. This
conceptualisation of self may be described by the term 'sense-of-self since a
nonverbal, non-self-reflective stance is proposed. Hence, the notion of culture as
social discourse is not seen to feature much because the intermediatory process of
verbal self-reflection through which culture may be seen to impact, is not incorporated
in the notion of sense-of-self.
14
In terms of postmodern thinking, Self-2 refers to various social selves that arise out
of various interactional experiences and are contextually contingent. According to
Harre (1991 ), Self-1 in postmodern thought is not an a priori given but is an emergent
property. Self-1 arises when we organise e.xperience.
A question to be posed is: What may be meant by organising experience and what
kind of relationship can be seen to exist between culture and organising experience or
culture and the 'components' of 'self?
Beebe and Lachmann (1988) attempt to answer the question of how the infant
organises experience. They say that this is done via patterns of interaction where
there is mutual influence between mother and infant. The infant organises experience
by learning that certain actions give rise to certain responses. Thus, the idea of
organising experience involves making sense, or forming some order out o~ one's
experiential world.
According to Beebe and Lachmann (1988), the infant forms mental images of
interactional patterns - hence the emphasis is on the relationship and the behaviours
that happen. When the infant forms a mental image of an interactional pattern, he/she
also forms a mental image of what response to expect from his/her mother when a
15
certain action is performed. In this way, the infant develops expectancies as well as
a sense of initiative (Beebe & Lachmann, 1988) thus bringing organisation to his/her
experience.
•
These interactional patterns are also theorised to organise the infant's experience
on an emotional level. According to Beebe and Lachmann (1988), the infant forms an
expectation of being matched and being able to match the caregiver. By matching,
Beebe and Lachmann (1988) refer to the timely copying of behavioural responses. By
copying the behavioural response, the corresponding psychophysiological experience
is also copied. Thus, the infant develops the expectancy that he/she can copy the
other's gestures and so participate in the other's experience. He/she also develops the
expectancy that the others can copy his/her gestures and so share in his/her
experience.
This paragraph will address how the notion of epistemology may be interpreted as
being involved in the organisation of experience. For Bateson (1991 ), the concept of
self may be described as the reciprocal relationship between how one perceives or
interprets the world and the interactional behaviour that follows. Bateson (1979, p.
147) calls this process "learning II". Bateson ( 1991, p. 206) placed much emphasis on
what he calls "unconscious presuppositions" ... or the how of using one's senses, or
one's epistemology. For Bateson ( 1991 ), it is these unconscious presuppositions that
undergird how one interprets the world and by reciprocal relation, how one interacts
with it.
16
between one's epistemology and the interactional behaviour that reciprocally follows.
The next question to be addressed is: how are ways of organising experience
theorised to be influenced by culture? Learning expectancies is theorised to be one
way of organising experience (Beebe & Lachmann, 1988). Learning expectancies
occurs via interactional patterns (Beebe & Lachmann, 1988). Thus, the above question
may be rephrased as: how is culture theorised to influence interactional patterns?
However, first an interpretation of what Fogel (1993) may mean by the term culture
needs to be given. According to Fogel (1993), culture defines the type of discourse
possible between individuals, for example, who talks to whom, and what is discussed.
Culture also defines the nature of the communicational exchange itself because culture
provides the tools for communication, for example, language, symbols, gestures. The
expansive variety of personal pronouns in the Japanese language, allowing for a
multitude of different social relations to be represented, may be seen as an illustration
of the idea that culture provides the tools for communication. The existence of
particular emotional states typical in some cultures and not others because of the
emotional state's symbolic representations in some language systems and not others,
for example "liget" (Wetherell & Maybin, 1996, p. 236), in llongot culture, may be seen
as another illustration. The system of naming infants in Balinese culture accorcjing to
group membership rather than individual identity (Gergen, 1991 b) may be seen as a
third illustration. Hence, it may be concluded that culture, according to the above
description, refers to norms and the symbolic communicational system.
The following paragraphs will address the question of how 'culture' is theorised to
influence interactional patterns.
17
Fogel (1993) proposes a tight interdependence between the concepts of self,
communication, and culture. According to Fogel (1993, p. 16), each is a facet of the
developing individual, "each facet defines the other and each facet creates the other" .
•
For Fogel (1993), self emerges out of coordinated communicational exchanges - the
communicational exchange itself occurring via the use of a cultural symbolic system.
For Fogel ( 1993, p. 146) 'self only exists in comparison and the basis for this
comparison are "co-regulated relationships". Fogel (1993) describes the phrase 'self
only exists in comparison' by discussing a preverbal communicational exchange
involving mother pulling infant from a laying to a sitting position. According to Fogel
(1993), the infant becomes aware of a physical sense-of-self when there is difference
in the muscular exertion between him/her and his/her mother. Because there is
difference, he/she becomes aware of those parts of the physical exertion under his
control and those that are not. Hence, he/she becomes aware of a physical sense of
self (Fogel, 1993). Hence, the sense of self emerges out of (by comparison), but is
also embedded in the relationship. And the process of 'emerging out of and 'being
imbedded in' happens via the use of cultural symbols. Hence, culture may be
interpreted to influence interactional patterns by providing the very means by which this
communication takes place, and it is through communication that one organises
experience or constructs 'self via the 'building up' of expectancies or epistemology.
The third way by which experiences may be interpreted to be organised and the 'self
constructed, is through the construction of a narrative (Gergen & Gergen, 1988;
Greenberg, 1995; Harre, 1991; Hermans, Kempen, & Van Loon, 1992; Hermans, Rijks,
& Kempen, 1993; Miller, Potts, Fung, Hoogstra, & Mintz, 1990; Singer, 1995).
18
"we make ourselves by telling stories about ourselves" (Greenberg, 1995, p. 271 ).
Telling stories about ourselves involves linking the events in our lives in some
meaningful way. In other words, it involves finding answers to questions such as 'why
did this happen in relation to that?' Culture, or societal norms, evaluative standards,
ideologies, prevailing practices, cultural myths, may be interpreted as influencing this
process on two levels.
First, culture is said to influence the choices we make and thus the actual events that
happen in our lives (Greenberg, 1995). Secondly, culture is said to influence how we
find reasons for what happens in our lives (Gergen & Gergen, 1988), or link events
together in such a way so as to give rise to self-concepts commonly understood as
personal qualities or traits. According to Gergen and Gergen (1988), we are not alone
in this drama since the events that happen in our lives happen in relation to other
people. Thus, it may be interpreted that our relationships with others also influence the
reasons we give to these events as well as how we link these in some meaningful way.
To address the statement that culture provides reasons for events that happen in our
lives (Gergen & Gergen, 1988), a definition of culture in social constructionist thought
needs to be given.
19
frameworks takes place.
The third postmodern conceptualisation of self, namely, the "satured self' (Gergen,
1991 b, p. 7) will be discussed subsequently. The "saturated self' concept refers to the
notion of "self as relatedness" (Gergen, 1991 b, p. 139). According to Gergen (1991 b)
the notion of self as a separate, authentic, single, and knowable essence gives way to
the notion of self as embodied in the many social roles one comes to assume. 1-:fence,.
"one's identity is continuously emergent, reformed and redirected as one moves
through the sea of everchanging relationships" (p. 139), one's identity is thus only
"permitted by the social rituals of which one is part" (p. 157). In other words, the self
one constructs or the impression one gives is defined as real by the social processes
which issue in, and determine the fate of this self-construction (Gergen, 1991 b).
20
The following will address the role of culture in this conceptualisation of self as
saturated. Gergen (1991 b) gives a broad description of the role of culture in the
shifting conceptualisations of self. He uses the term 'culture' to refer to, for example,
lifestyles, communicational networks, cultural.artefacts. Gergen (1991b) uses the terms
romantic, modern, and postmodern to refer to different cultural periods and gives a
broad description of how culture influences one's experience of oneself in daily living
and reciprocally how this experience is conceptualised in the social discourse practices
of that period. This is outlined as follows: Gergen (1991 b, p. 27) describes the
romantic cultural period as one in which love was placed "in the forefront of human
endeavours" and a belief in the "deep dynamics of personality" was held. In
conceptualising the self, emphasis was placed on the unseen, inner depths of the
person. It was held that the person embodied a kind of sacredness, which gave value
to the individual and to the relationships he/she, became involved in. Coupled to this
was a sense of the unknown, the mysterious, where intuition, mysticism, inspiration,
creativity, passion, depth, and purpose characterised the world of persons.
According to Gergen (1991 b), with the rise of the modern period came an emphasis
on empirical observation and functional utility. People were seen as self-contained,
autonomous, and knowable, having machine-like essences that could be fathomed
through techniques of rational inquiry.
Gergen (1991 b, p. 48) describes the postmodern period by the term "social
saturation" which he refers to as the chaotic and multitudinous bombardment of social
stimuli - communicational obligations, relational commitment, activities, interests
beckoning attention. Gergen (1991 b) describes this cultural influence as having two
effects on the experience of oneself in daily living. The first effect Gergen (1991 b, p.
69) calls "populating of the self' or the acquisition of different and multiple potentials.
for being. This involves the situation that while one may know and feel secure with a
sense of coherent identity or self-sameness, one may suddenly have the experience
of being someone different-contradicting this sense of coherence. The second effect
Gergen (1991 b, p. 72) calls "multiphrenia" or the process of getting drawn into, and
becoming invested in so many different directions and pursuits (all of which have equal
validity or reality).
21
Gergen (1991 b) describes in more detail the effects of "populating of the self' (p. 69)
and "multiphrenia" (p. 72) on one's experience in daily living as follows: First what is
involved is a playing of varied and sometimes contradictory social roles so as to meet
the varied demands of the many relationships one finds oneself involved in. As one
searches for appropriate forms of action, one's identity is likely to be questioned rather
than confirmed, thus giving rise to a heightened sense of "playing a role" or "managing
impressions" (p. 145), and an erosion of a sense of security that an essential, unified
self brings. In terms of the relational domain, actions seem less sincere and more
instrumental. Slowly it becomes increasingly difficult to recall to what core essence one
must remain true, and instead one simply acts to full potential in the moment at hand
(Gergen, 1991 b). This sense of superficiality gives way to an optimistic sense of
enormous possibility until the distinction between image or presentation and real, true
self diminishes in accord with the emergence of a culture of multiple, equally valid
realities.
According to Gergen ( 1991 b ), these processes of "populating of the self (p. 69) and
"multiphrenia" (p. 72) have the following effect on the social discourse practices of the
self, namely: that the single knowable, authentic self becomes deconstructed giving rise
to the construction of self as existing in social role.
22
These sub-constructs can be said to be 'static' because 'self can be said to be
variously conceptualised as, for example, emotional, cognitive and communicational
capacities, perceptions, awarenesses, expectancies, epistemologies, cognitions
(stories). It can be said that none of these theories use a dynamic sub-construct (e.g.
behaviour) of the individuation construct when theorising about the role of 'culture' in
theories on individuation. Hence, the following sections will attempt to address the
question: can a relationship be seen to exist between the socio-cultural context 2 and
the process of self-expression (or individualist behaviour)? The following sections will
also attempt to address the following: can self-expression be seen to occur in a way,
other than by opposing public opinion if public opinion goes contrary to one's wishes,
goals, pursuits?
One of the primary foci of this section is to address the question: can self-expression
be seen to occur in a way other than by opposing public opinion? This question was
arrived at in order to find a way of resolving the experiential tension between
individuality and group acceptance. A discussion of Jung's (1959) theory on
individuation was deemed necessary because the individuality versus group
acceptance tension may be interpreted to be at the heart of his theory on individuation.
It was thought that by exploring Jung's (1959) theory on individuation, a way of
resolving the individuality versus group acceptance tension would be found, as well as
gaining an understanding of what individuation can be said to entail according to Jung's
(1959) theory.
For Jung (1959, p.17 4) "individuation involves divest(ing) the self of the false
wrappings of the persona on the one hand, and of the suggestive power of primordial
2
In this discussion, the following terms will be used interchangeably: societal prescriptions, socio-
cultural context, cultural discourse practices, cultural dictates, societal norms, culture. Unless
otherwise defined, these terms will be used to refer to authoritatively defined, circumscribed shared
understandings, typical expectations or common knowledge. The socio-cultural self-construct will
be used interchangeably with Jacobi's (1976, p. 42) "collective ideal" to refer to a narrow subset of
cultural discourse practice, namely: what society prescribes to be the ideal 'self.
23
images on the other". Elsewhere, Jung (1959, p. 275) says "individuation (is used) to
denote the process by which a person becomes a psychological individual, that is, a
separate, indivisible unity or whole". Jung (1959, p. 273) defines "individuality" as
"embracing our innermost, last, incomparable uniqueness, (which) implies becoming
one's own self'.
Jung (1959) defines the ego as follows: "a complex of ideas which constitutes the
centre of my field of consciousness and appears to possess a high degree of continuity
and identity" (p. 425). Elsewhere, Jung (1959, p. 5) uses ego to describe "conscious
•
personality". According to Hopche (1989) by ego, Jung meant our self-concept - what
one would refer to by the expression: "Gee, I wasn't myself last night" (p. 77). The ego
can be understood to refer to individual needs, wants, wishes, opinions which would
be referred to by the terms: 'self-expression' or 'self-assertion'. This is in contrast to
narcissism or what is commonly regarded as selfish in layman's terms. Jung (1959)
calls narcissism individualism - the uncompromising and exaggerated fulfilment of
selfish desires and wishes. Jung (1959, p. 557) uses the term "ego-personality" to refer
to a sense of 1-ness. Thus, in this section, the term 'self will be used interchangeably
with 'ego', and will refer to ideas of individuality, 1-ness, or self-expression. This is in
contrast to Jung's (1959, p. 460) term: Self which will be explained subsequently.
Jung (1959, p. 464) defines the persona as the "mask" that is, "the ad hoc adopted
attitude" by which the individual adjusts his/her "social aims and aspirations" to the
;
"social conditions and requirements". Jung (1959, p. 465) says that "the persona is
exclusively concerned with the relation to objects". By this Jung may mean that the
"persona" is outwardly directed - a form of relating that comes from an adaptation .to the.
outside world rather than towards an adaptation to one's inner psychic life. Jacobi
(1976) talks about the persona as a necessary outcome of good upbringing or societal
adjustment.
In contrast to the term self, Jung (1959) used the term Self to refer to an archetype
of wholeness, meaning an inherent, primordial, universal tendency to bring into
24
consciousness certain instinctual patterns of behaviour which the individual formerly
found difficult to understand or control. These "inherent tendencies" (Jung, 1959, p.
228) "patterns of instinctual behaviour" or "universal images", Jung (1959, p. 44) called
"archetypes". Thus the Self archetype may be regarded as the overriding tendency to
bring other archetypes (tendencies), (which have an unknown yet controlling influence
on the individual) into awareness.
According to Jacobi (1965), Jung uses the concept of 'Self to refer to the motive goal
and means of achieving individuation. By motive, Jung (1959) uses 'Self to refer to a
universal, fundamental teleology. The goal is often referred to by Jung (1959) as a.
state of dialectical relation between one's self-concept (ego) and one's unconscious.
According to Jung (1959), the ego is the only aspect of the Self which we know,
therefore, the more we come to know about ourselves, the more individuated we
become. However, Jung (1959) postulates that the Self will never be completely
knowable, hence according to Jungian theory, it is the ongoing, dialectical relationship
between the known and the unknown of ourselves that is at the heart of the
25
individuation process.
Qualities that are unacknowledged are regarded as 'opposites' to that which we are
consciously aware of, therefore this state ofadynamic tension is also often referred to
as the union of opposites or the integration of the shadow. Thus 'Self as metaphor of
the means of individuation can be said to refer to this dynamic tension between the
known and unknown or the process of uniting the opposites.
Sometimes Jung (1959) uses 'Self as a statidstructural metaphor to refer to this goal
of uniting the opposites. According to Jung (1959, p. 460) "the Self designates the
whole range of psychic phenomena in man. It expresses the unity of the personality
as a whole". Elsewhere, Jung (1959, p. 236) says the Self is used as a metaphor for
an "unknowable essence" or "God within us". Jacobi (1965) refers to the Self as "the
unconscious substrate" {p. 49), "the structural element of the psyche" (p. 50), or "the
primal, unfathomable ground of the psyche" (p. 132).
Thus Jung's concept of individuation can be seen to comprise two major ideas:
26
individuation namely: "Divesting the Self of the false wrappings of the persona" (Jung,
1959, p. 174) and "Becoming one's own Self' (p. 173).
Divesting the Self of the false wrappings of the persona involves coming to
realise and move crway from the unquestioning fulfilment of public opinion, conventions,
role expectations, to avoid being "carried by society" (Jung, 1959, p. 240). It can be
said that this involves the development of those qualities not prescribed or lauded by
the group or society.
For Jung (1959, p. 173), becoming one's own Self, does not imply the unlimited or
most authentic expression or development of selfish needs or wishes, what Jung (1959)
calls individualism, but expanding consciousness or fulfilling the archetype of the Self.
Becoming one's own 'self can be seen to embrace two facets namely: becoming more
aware of unconscious tendencies and seeing in ourselves what we would rather not
see. Jung (1959), describes an analytical process by which one is proposed to become
more aware of unconscious tendencies, impulses, attitudes. This involves the process
by which symbols or images from, for example, dreams become personified or attain
rational meaning and so are integrated into consciousness when their meaning is
experienced on an emotional level. Seeing in ourselves what we would rather not see
involves a process called withdrawing projections. When projections are withdrawn,
interactions with the environment can occur in a less automatic way and with greater
solidarity to others.
27
preserve both poles of the individuality versus group acceptance tension. This will be
taken up further in the section: can self-expression be seen to occur in a way other than
by opposing public opinion?
There have been various motivations for theorists to think differently about the
traditional notion of self as universal, separate, singular entity. For example, on a
practical level, for Hsu (1985}, such a conceptualisation of self is irrelevant because
it reflects, in theory, the Western ideal of individuality but does not reflect how the
individual lives in a Western culture, far less any individual in any culture. In a similar
vein, numerous authors have suggested that an adequate understanding of the
individual requires that one understand him/her in his/her particular socio-cultural and
cosmological context (Murphy, 1981; Pari, Morgenthaler & Pari-Matthey, 1980; Sow,
1977, 1980; in Alt, 1988). From another angle Shweder and Bourne (1984) discuss a
number of anthropological studies of various cultures in which the person is not
considered an individual in his/her own right. A comment they make is that in some
cultures the individual has no intrinsic moral value apart from the social status and.
3
The term Western culture will be used interchangeably with the term 'individualist culture', and the
term 'collectivist culture' will be used interchangeably with the term Eastern (Japanese or Indian), or
African cultures. The term 'individualist culture' will be used to refer to a social grouping in which the
discourse practices prescribe autonomy, independence. agency. Ryan's (1991, p. 225) definition
of autonomy and independence will be used. For Ryan (1991, p. 225) ·autonomy represents a
subjective sense of endorsement, volition and self-direction in one's action. In contrast, the issue of
independence is most adequately defined as self-reliance - not depending on resources from
another·. Agency can be said to refer to the ability to be proactive, to take initiative. The term
'collectivist culture' will be used to refer to a social grouping in which the discourse practices prescribe
interdependence, connectivity, mutuality and reciprocity.
28
situation in which he finds himself. They contrast this with the western cultural context
in which the person's moral responsibility transcends his/her social context. They use
Geerty's (1975 in Shweder & Bourne, 1984, p. 167) quote to put forward an opinion.
Geerty asserts that "the Western conception Qf the person as a bounded, unique, more
or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness,
emotion, judgement and action organised into a distinctive whole and set contrastively
both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background is,
however, incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the
world's cultures". In a similar vein, for Markus and Kitayama (1991) various proverbial
anecdotes or ritual practices in collectivist and individualist cultures suggested to them
that people in these different cultures hold different ideas about the nature of self,
others and the interdependence between the two. They suggest that these varying
construals which they define broadly as the "independent" and "interdependent"
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 230) construals influence certain features such as
cognition, emotion and motivation. Hence, the idea of 'self as being a socio-cultural
construct rather than an acultural, separate and singular entity has been reflected in
the literature (Carrithers, Collins, & Lukes, 1985; De Craemer, 1983; Florsheim, 1990;
Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Marsella, De Vos, & Hsu, 1985; Shweder & Bourne, 1984).
What will follow will be a discussion of how the self is constructed in Collectivist
(Eastern and African) and Individualist cultures.
29
Another aspect of the "we-self' is the idea of "loose ego-boundaries" (Roland,
1988). In this situation the person's sense of self is in terms of a we-ness in that the
person always has another in mind when thinking of him/herself. The 'other' is
represented internally as being connected to Vie person in varying degrees of intimacy
or in varying degrees of subordination or superiority. The we-ness may also be
experienced as the "self enmeshed and allied with the extended family, jati (caste4 ) or
other groups as a whole" (Roland, 1988, p. 225). According to Roland ( 1988, p. 224 ),
"This conveys both the intense dependency and the reciprocity of adult mutuality." In
other words, the other person is often more related to one in terms of one's self and
needs and conversely, one's self is often closely related to fulfilling other's needs.
(Roland, 1988). Hence, according to Roland (1988), there is a heightened sensitivity
and mutual reciprocity around empathic awareness of, and responsitivity to the other's
moods or needs for closeness, affection, dependency or esteem.
Others are expected to sense and meet one's needs without one taking responsibility
for overtly expressing these and actively getting these met (Roland, 1988). Also, any
internal distress, for example, frustration, anger, hurt is dealt with by relying on the
other's responsitivity (which is subtly or indirectly provoked) to regain equanimity
(Roland, 1988).
This relying on the other's goodwill is what Doi (1963, p. 64) has labelled "ameuru".
Ameuru refers to the behaviour exhibited to get a particular need met. This need is
what Doi (1971) points out as being at the centre of the interdependency typical of
Japanese culture. Doi (1971, p. 7) calls this need "amae". Amae refers to_the need to
be loved in a nurturant protective sense. It refers to a desire for dependence. Doi
(1963, p. 75) says that "the amae mentality (may) be defined as the attempt to deny the
fact of separation that is such an inseparable part of human existence and to obli.terate.
the pain of separation".
According to Doi (1963) the individual has no sense of self other than amae, or the
desire to be affirmed, or to belong. Doi (1971, p.19) calls this state being "at the mercy
4
Caste refers to a religio-mythical delineation of a social group.
30
of amae" in that any threat of isolation or rejection
\
from the group is akin to a threat of
a loss of self. As a result, the individual is submersed completely in the group (Doi,
1971, p.134 ), in that any individual opinion, preference or intention that differs from the
group norm is unexpressed or moulded to fit accordingly.
According to Doi (1971), this is associated with a tendency to preserve the harmony
of the relationship at the expense of individualistic assertion or autonomy. Hence there
is heightened sensitivity to mutual regard, affirmation, approval, as well as vulnerability
to rejection and disapproval as manifested by concern for the evaluative impact of one's
behaviours.
Another description of the self in Eastern cultures includes the following: that
"self-definition resides in others" (Slate, 1992, p. 436). One sees oneself as, for
example, a family member, member of a corporate organisation - hence the importance
placed on belonging to a larger whole (De Vos, 1985). Thus there exists strong
identification with the reputation and honour of the family or corporate organisation
(Roland, 1988). Linked to this is a concomitant loyalty to upholding jati (caste)
customs, culture, and traditions (Roland, 1988) in which the prosperity of the
organisation as a whole is a source of self-regard rather than recognition for one's
individual contribution.
Related to this concept of identity is the notion of the self as being "realised in role
behaviour'' (De Vos, 1985, p. 158) which refers to a sense of pride or self-regard in
fulfilling one's occupational function (De Vos, 1985). Role behaviour also refers to
one's social role or position in the hierarchical network of interpersonal relationships.
"Self as realised in role behaviour manifests in the careful sensitivity to, and
observance of traditionally defined contextual norms involving reciprocal.
responsibilities and obligations and observance to the social etiquette of diverse
hierarchical relationships" (Roland, 1988, p. 8). Another example of 'self as being
realised in role behaviour is the strict adherence, in Hindu mysticism to one's 'dharma'
or correct conduct as expected from one's stage in the life cycle.
31
Self-Construct in African Cultures
According to Bastide (1973 in Alt, 1988) the 'self is seen to be composed of forces,
as well as being in dynamic connection wit~ forces of social and cosmic nature. The
term "open force field" (Frankel in Beattie, 1980, p. 316) gives a clear description of this
idea. Furthermore, 'force' is what makes communication possible. Hence the view
exists of a universe where self, other, and offspring are interrelated as a system of
dynamic forces.
(1) Vertically (or the phylogenetic dimension). This involves relationships to ancestral
beings. The type of interaction that this affords is one of idealised meaning-giving in
that the ancestor constitutes the foundation of the person's culture, being, law.
(2) Horizontally. This involves interactions with others of the larger community.
(3) Ontogenetically. This involves the relationships to his/her lineage and nuclear
family.
The boundaries between the individual, society, and belief system in African culture
are seen as diffuse (Alt, 1988). The various dimensions of interactions afford the
experiential reality of different aspects of 'self. These 'aspects' include being, identity
and individuality (Alt, 1988).
According to Alt (1988), the person experiences his/her being, or one could say,
essence via the phylogenetic dimension. This may be interpreted as: the individual's.
'essence' is experienced as spiritual through hereditary connections to his/her
ancestors.
According to Alt ( 1988), he/she experiences identity via the relationships with the
larger community. Here the concept of "micro-societies" (Sow, 1980, p. 159) is
relevant. These function like peer groups, which are relatively autonomous - having
32
their own traditions, and which are based on the principle·s of mutual education,
seniority and modelling. It is via these micro-societies that integration into society is
facilitated and hence role identity is assumed. In these micro-societies, people learn
how to maintain the structural/hierarchical 51ature of the bigger society by assuming
their age and task related positions. Thus identity here can be said to refer to the idea
of social role, with social role being intimately connected to a person's age class.
Various rituals herald and publicise a change in identity. An example is the initiation
rites ceremonies which highlight the movement from child to adult identity. According
to Sow (1980, p. 160), "the initiation process generally includes three major phases
separated in space and time: separation (death), reclusion (marginality), reintegration
(rebirth)". Sow (1980, p. 161) describes the initiation process as follows "its harshness,
along with the painful experience of personal loneliness during the initiation process,
revives and extends the crisis of weaning". The initiation process is thought to facilitate
the transition to adult social role status. Thus, it would involve a mastering of fear and
the development of competencies for dealing with life and problems in order to assume
the social responsibilities of the adult role.
According to Alt (1988), the experience of individuality occurs within the nuclear
family. To elaborate, because of the person's lineage, he/she is assigned a precise
place in relation to the family and to the group as a whole (Sow, 1980). His/her
individuality is born out in the following parameters: order of birth, sexual category,
possible resemblance to a living relative or forefather, status as related to age class,
to level of initiation, to caste at birth (Sow, 1980).
Of note here, is the practice of naming. The name given to the individual expresses
the power of certain ancestors and situations on him/her (Alt, 1988). The name confers.
on the individual his/her own essence or force without which he/she is vulnerable to the
negative external forces both cosmological and social. If the person has force, he/she
has agency and thus freedom to create him-/herself (Alt, 1988). He/she thus has an
avenue for expressing his/her individuality by living out what the name means to him
or her.
33
Thus, it can be said that the 'self is not contained within the intrapsychic world. The
'self is 'spread out' in the levels of interactions which exist along the three major
dimensions discussed (namely, with ancestral spirits, with community and with the
nuclear family). ..
Another feature of the African concept of 'self is the notion of identification with the
group's traditions, ideals and values as a source of self-esteem (Alt, 1988). Standards
are not internalised but are 'held' in the group. Moral authority, although always
present, remains outside the individual (Sow in Alt, 1988) and experienced threats of
persecution are largely in response to a break in cohesion and homogeneity of the
group rather than due to an individual transgression.
It can be said that Jung (1959) theorises from a Western culture. Hence, the form
of self-expression Jung (1959) describes can be said to reflect what occurs in a
Western culture. Thus, it was thought that an exploration of, what may be interpreted
as, self-expression in other cultures would aid in addressing the above question.
34
The question: can self-expression be seen to occur in a way' other than by opposing
public opinion arose primarily from the experiential tension involving individuality
versus group acceptance. This tension involved the experience of mutual exclusivity
of the opposite poles of the dialectic. This meant a difficulty in integrating the opposite
poles in such a way that neither pole would be lost. The only resolution which
presented itself involved the tension that by ensuring group acceptance, individuality
would be lost, and that by ensuring individuality, group acceptance would be lost. This
tension found expression in pushing aside 'wanting to' by complying with 'having to' in
order to prioritise group interest thus ensuring relational harmony and group
acceptance.
Doi's (1971) comment (to be discussed in the next paragraph) can be said to
illustrate the above discussed expression of this tension albeit in broader terms. He
discusses a group of people in relation to the macro-socio-cultural context in contrast
to discussing an individual's experience in relation to the group.
35
Self-Expression in Collectivist Cultures
Roland (1980) describes that in spite of the strict adherence to hierarchical group
norms and social etiquette, the person's m•noeuvrability in getting his/her needs or
wants met is a form of self-expression since this form of adaptability is unique to the
individual in his/her context. Markus and Kitayama (1991) suggest that self-assertion
while simultaneously preserving interpersonal harmony and cooperation is a more
developed form of self-expression. Roland (1988) discusses how the practice of using
another as an extension of oneself in order to express a particular desire occurs as well
as a form of manipulation of superiors to get a request fulfilled while overtly remaining
within the boundaries of one's hierarchical position.
Secondly, Roland (1980) discusses how, what can be called a superficial adherence
to social etiquette and role obligations, takes place while the person's true feelings or
intentions are conveyed in nonverbal or other subtle ways. This is especially so when
these feelings would threaten intergroup harmony or would spark conflict. Thus Roland
(1980) suggests the often dual/incongruent nature of communication in which what is
said is not always what is meant.
Roland ( 1980, 1988) marks the development of the spiritual, transcendent self as
a primary form of self-expression in Indian (Hindu) culture. According to Roland (1980,
1988) the individual develops the spiritual self by imbuing daily practices with special
meaning, thus allowing for inner transformations for the purpose of eventually
becoming "one with the godhead" (p. 289). Thus the exercise of one's _dharma (or
expected) behaviour is regarded as a spiritually significant form of self-expression.
As an example, De Vos ( 1993) says that complete devotion to a social rol~ may.
seem like a form of self-sacrifice in which the persona is subsumed in the social role
leaving no space for self-expression. However, as De Vos (1993) describes, the
person gains meaning by sacrificing him-/herself to a larger cause or by exercising a
moral duty for the sake of a highly valued ethic. In this way, self-expression takes the
form of the wish to uphold this ethic even at the expense of forsaking any other
self-fulfilment.
36
Roland (1988) describes another way in which individuality can be said to be
facilitated. This involves spiritual pursuits which allow for a degree of detachment from
familial emotional bonds. By detachment, Roland (1988) implies that the individual is
less dependent on the other for the fulfilme111t of ego needs and thus relates in a less
intensely inter-connected way. These practices in themselves allow for a greater
degree of personal choice, privacy, differentiation, and freedom of expression.
Now to return to the comment made earlier that in Japanese cultures self-expression
may possibly be discarded for the sake of group conformity (Doi, 1971 ).
From the previous discussion it can be said that some form of self-expression, be it
subtle, indirect or non-verbal is retained in collectivist cultures. This is in accord with
Roland's (1980, p. 82) emphasis that despite the collective ideal of the we-self there
is the development and maintenance of a "private self' which consists of the
individual's opinions and tendencies and which when revealed is done in a veiled way.
Doi (1985, p. 36, 37), writing later about "tatemae" (social conventions) and "honne"
(personal views), and motivations also implies a compromise between self-expression
and the collective ideal by his statement that "tatemae conceals and reveals honne".
In the Eastern cultures discussed above, it can be said that the overt and direct
expression of individual wants, opinions, pursuits is not strictly incorporated into the
collective ideal. In African cultures, the collective ideal, or that which society
prescribes, is the 'self that functions according to its age-class, level of initiation and
caste positions in accord with the ancestral influences. However, in African culture
self-expression can be said to be formally instituted and sanctioned by the social
structures and practices themselves, for example: in the lineage structure and naming
practice. Hence, the overt and direct expression of individuality can be said. to be.
incorporated into the African culture's collective ideal.
37
Self-Expression in Individualist Cultures
From his writing, Maslow (1971) seems to be urging for a curbing against complete
espousal of public opinion, or the adoption of role definitions. Maslow (1971) implies,
and Muller (1987) states that it is easy for the person in modern Western culture to live
through occupational status categories or other role definitions, for example, successful
yuppie. Maslow (1971) seems to be suggesting that the individual move away from
adopting role definitions towards self-actualisation.
A comment is that Maslow's (1971) notion of the self-actualising person does not
incorporate how the expression of dependency and belonging needs occur in a culture
prescribing autonomy and independency. Johnson (1985) suggests that any existence
of interdependent relationships is disguised in an inflated sense of individuality such
that these dependency needs are not given overt acknowledgement and expression.
From the above section it may be concluded that self-expression can be seen to
occur in a variety of other ways not just by opposing public opinion; even the opposite
38
of opposing public opinion, namely, preserving relational ·harmony or sacrificing
individual opinions, pursuits for group priorities may be regarded as a form of
self-expression in collectivist cultures. Various forms or modifications of self-assertive
(typical of self-expression in Western cultures, namely, expressing one's individualist
needs, wants, opinions, and following one's pursuits even if these oppose public
opinion) are also regarded as a form of self-expression in collectivist cultures (Roland,
1980).
However, it can be said that in Western culture, anything other than self-expression
in the typical (Western) sense of the term (self-assertive behaviour), is regarded as a
form of compliance. Furthermore, even though it was concluded that in Japanese
cultures, ways of self-expression occur that allow for the expression of individuality
while simultaneously preserving group acceptance, it was thought that the adoption of
such solutions would not be experienced as self-expression but either as conformity or
false self-expression in a Western culture.
Thus, it can be said that these conclusions point to a relationship between the
socio-cultural context and the process of self-expression or individualist behaviour.
The following section will be an attempt to address the question: can a relationship be
seen to exist between the socio-cultural context and the process of self-expression or
individualist behaviour?
The metaneeds proposed by Maslow (1971) can be said to be very much in line with
the Western construct of self (Johnson, 1985). Thus it may be concluded that the
description of self-expression extracted from Maslow's (1971) writing is very much
congruent with the collective ideal of Western society.
39
(in the form of role behaviour or traditional practices) of what self-expression entails.
Thus, it can be said that one may not conclude that in individualist cultures
self-expression is congruent with the collective ideal, but in collective cultures
self-expression varies from congruency to.oomplex interrelationships (Roland, 1980)
with the collective ideal.
It is on the basis of theorising about the relationship between self-expression and the
collective ideal that notions such as narcissism, altruism, and individuality arise.
These terms can be said to describe various forms of the self-group dialectic. In this
discussion, self-group refers to the individual and the collective ideal (or the 'self that
society prescribes). Hence narcissism, altruism and individuality are used as
descriptive terms for any relationship thought to exist between the individual and the
socio-cultural context. These terms will be used in the following discussion.
Tang (1992) calls the person's social role or form of self-expression within cultural
constraints a false self. Similarly Fromm ( 1941, p. 257) uses the term "bondage" to
imply being trapped into "sacrificing the integrity of one's individual self' for the sake
of security found in group conformity and group identity.
40
Fromm's (1941, p. 258) concept of self-realisation as the 0 active expression of his
emotional and intellectual potentialities" can be said to describe self-expression in
societies prescribing individuality. Fromm (1941, p. 265) elaborates on this concept
saying that it "is an end that can never•lte subordinated to purposes which are
supposed to have greater dignity''. According to Fromm (1941, pp. 267-268) "a genuine
ideal is not some veiled force superior to the individual but is the articulate expression
of utmost affirmation of the self'. Thus Fromm ( 1941 ) seems to be elevating
self-expression beyond any higher cause or spiritual reality. This could be regarded
as an extreme form of narcissism because 'self is raised not only above the 'other' or
group but also above any Transcendental Reality.
A comment to be made is that while Masterson (1985) can be said to use the concept
of self-expression of Western society, as highlighted by Maslow (1971) and Fromm
( 1941 ), as a basis to evaluate the form of self-expression in collective societies as
veiled narcissism, Masterson (1985) implies that the self-expression of Western society
is genuine, whereas when looked at from another perspective, it (self-expression in
Western society) may appear extremely narcissistic. Similarly, conformity in Japanese
culture may be regarded from one individualistic cultural perspective as "bondage"
(Fromm, 1941, p. 257) yet from another individualistic perspective as altruistic.
However, Tatara, (1982, p. 232) states "In Japan conformity does not necessarily mean
self-denial, but rather is considered as a way to achieve self-actualisation (as) a means
of preserving individuality" "The word 'conformity' does not carry the connotation of
loss-of-self as it does in English" (Murase & Johnson, 197 4 in Tatara, 1982, p. 232).
A comment is that not only is the ·self or collective ideal socio-culturally constructed,
but so too is the process of adaptation of the individual to society. In other words, the
way in which the individual expresses him-/herself in relation to the prevailing collective
ideal is itself socio-culturally constructed.
41
Hence, it may be concluded that a relationship between the socio-cultural context
and the process of self-expression or individualist behaviour can be seen to exist. This
relationship can be said to involve the following: that the socio-cultural context
influences the process of self-expression by {.fefining what is regarded as narcissistic,
altruistic or individualist behaviour. Hence, what is regarded by one culture as
conformative behaviour, may be experienced or regarded by an individual in another
culture as individualist behaviour.
In this section an attempt is made to address the question of what individuation can
be seen to entail in a collectivist culture. It was thought that a theory of individuation
as it occurs in a collectivist culture would aid in resolving difficulties in the experience
of individuation by deconstructing pre-existing conceptualisations of individuation given
normative value by Western discourse practices. Hence, this section discusses various
writers' descriptions of individuation as it is seen to occur in collectivist cultural
contexts.
Erny (1972) and Sow (1980) (in Alt, 1988) put forward three phases in the
development of the child in African cultures.
The first phase is called a "fusion relationship" (Alt, 1988, p. 253) in ·which there
exists close physical proximity between mother and infant as well as the undisturbed
gratification of needs. After a rather extended symbiosis, the infant is weaned and the
mother no longer eases all the tensions of the infant.
According to Alt ( 1988), this abrupt weaning marks the beginning of the second
phase. The abrupt weaning is regarded as a "violent crisis" (Alt, 1988, p. 254)
accompanied by an intense experience of abandonment. In this second phase, the
child begins socially to move away from the mother. However, there is always a mother
substitute to make the violent separation less traumatic. According to Alt (1988), the
42
effect that this has on later relating, is that while deep and sincere relationships can be
formed, the loss of these is easily overcome by the forming of other relationships. For
Alt (1988), this weaning crisis predisposes the individual to an intuitive recognition of
the vulnerability of human relationships. ••
The third phase marks the second major crisis according to Alt (1988). This
happens at about five to six years of age when the child is placed within its peer group.
Hence, Alt (1988) rem?rks that there is a style of communal upbringing where children
are brought up in groups with other children. Thus there is less of an individualised,
focused and consistent style of parenting. The child experiences many mother
substitutes rather than one single reliable mother. Furthermore, there is less of a
sharing of personalised, individualised meaning systems between mother and infant
and more of a sharing of what Alt (1988, p. 255) calls a "common unconscious ... a
shared universe of meanings and experience". This may be interpreted as dependence
on group acceptance and idealisation of traditional customs and beliefs as integral to
self-esteem. This may also be interpreted as involving a retaining of relational ties (as
the child is brought up communally), which fosters a sub-ordination of individualistic,
competitive strivings but at the same time offers a sense of assurance in group
belongingness.
However, around the age of three to five years, to early teens begins what Bassa (in
Roland, 1980, p. 79) calls "the cardinal crisis of Indian childhood". According to Roland
(1980), this refers to an imposition of strict demands for respect. obedience and
43
conformity to well-defined hierarchical role expectations ·and a strict curbing of
self-assertive responses, for example, aggressive or demanding behaviour. This gives
rise to anxiety over meeting familial expectations because the individual realises he/she
has to earn acceptance and approval in sharp contrast to immediate experiences of
assurance of well-being. He/she earns this approval by the adherence to the jati
(caste) customs and family traditions. Hence the development of the 'we-self strongly
connected to the role obligations and mutual need fulfilling functions. Thus the primary
disciplinary style is one of shaming because by shaming, the child is made aware of the
negative experience of disapproval or rejection, or the threat of that, and thus is
motivated to avoid it.
44
moving with the child (De Vos, 1993), can be said to foster this style of communication.
Lebra (in OeCraemer, 1983, p. 28) calls the relationship between mother and child
facilitating this, "skinship".
••
Thus, it may be interpreted that intrapsychic functions, for example, need expression
and fulfilment, self-regard or disregard becomes intrinsically interwoven with the
feedback from others.
Conclusion
45
CHAPTER 3
The focus of this chapter involves addressing the experiential tension in the self-in-
relation-to-other dimension. This tension encompasses difficulties in becoming the
separate, self-contained, independent individual according to psychodynamic theory.
Since this tension involves intrapsychic experience and the interpersonal relationship,
both psychodynamic and systemic theory were consulted to gain a conceptual
understanding of this tension in order to facilitate its resolution in practice.
Central themes of the experiential tension took on expression in the form of the
separateness versus togetherness dialectic, and individuation as lineal progression or
recursive process dialectic. It was thought that by integrating these dialectics in theory,
or by conceptualising them differently, a way of resolving them in practice would be
facilitated.
46
It is intended to find a common thread in these authors' writings which would afford
an interpretation of individuation.
The next phase is called the rapprochement phase (15 - 24 months). Mahler
( 1972b) placed emphasis on this phase since the preferred outcome of this phase was
hypothesised to be separation or the awareness by the infant of being alone and
largely helpless in a big world. In this phase it was hypothesised that the polarities of:
fusion versus separateness and fear-of-mother-loss versus object constancy are
negotiated. The dilemma inherent in the fusion versus separateness polarity in"volved
wanting to guard a newfound autonomy, yet not wanting to lose a sense of grandeur
and omnipotence characteristic of the previous phase. According to Mahoney ( 1991,
p. 223), in this phase "pronounced feelings of anxiety and vulnerability are negotiated
to the extent that child and mother remain attuned and responsive despite their
separateness". The last phase is called the consolidation phase (24 - 36 months)
Here the negotiation of fear-of-mother-loss versus object constancy is thought to be
47
completed. The desired outcome is that of object constancy which Pine (1994)
describes as the awareness that even though mother is not part of the self, she is
nonetheless potentially available even if not physically present. Hence, it may be
concluded that the desired outcomes of th~·process are separation (a sense of being
different from the mother), object constancy, and what Mahler, Pine and Bergman
(1994, p. 423) call uan awareness of a sense of being ... not a sense of who I am, but
that I amn. They see this as the first step in the development of identity.
Blas ( 1967) sees adolescent rebellion as one way of attempting this separation "from
internalised objects". Blas (1967) talks about the peer group as having the function of
testing out ways of developing one's individuality, but at the same time as potentially
having the regressive function of substitute "internalised objects" (p. 163), whereby the
48
individual depends on the group for the regulation of internal states and meeting needs.
Blas (1967) says that the inability to disengage from internalised objects is
experienced as a sense of alienation but that disengagement from internalised objects
is akin to the experience of loss and thus accompanied by the effect of a mourning
process. By loss of the "internal object", Blas (1967, p. 182) refers to the awareness
that the omnipotent parent is no longer available in the way that he/she used to be.
In adolescence, the central task is separating not from the real/physical mother as·
happens in infanthood, but separating from the parental introjects. Separating from the
parental introjects may be interpreted as involving the following: one regulates internal
states not on the basis of asking oneself, for example, "What would mom or dad say?"
or by recalling what behavioural response led to pride or approval as secondary to a
similar reaction from the parents. Josselson (1980) calls this process individuation
from introjected parental objects. The new ways one makes decisions or regulates
49
internal states she calls autonomous ego functions. Josselson (1980) points out that
'autonomous' does not necessarily mean opposite to parental norms and values but
that the making of decisions and regulation of internal states is not automatically
dictated by memories of past parental inv~l\lement. Josselson (1980, p. 196) makes
a significant comment in relation to this, namely: that the struggle for autonomy is "not
against the parents but against the adolescent's own wishes to deny his/her
alonenessn.
These ego functions are then consolidated into a new identity. Hence Josselson
(1980) saw the individuating process of adolescence as involving the interdependent
sequence of: individuation, autonomy, and identity formation. According to Josselson
( 1980, p. 191 ), the experience of individuation is ua feeling of selfhood and will" - that
one's choices are one's own and so too is the responsibility therefore.
Mahler (1972a) did not go into much depth in describing the individuation side of the
separation - individuation process of infanthood. Mahler, Pine, and Bergman's (1994)
comment was that there is an assumption of individual characteristics. According to
Bias's (1967) and Josselson's (1980) theorising, individuation takes on greater
expression in adolescence. According to Josselson (1980), the assumption of
individual characteristics occurs when ego functions are consolidated into a new
identity.
Josselson ( 1980) goes into some depth in discussing the processes of separating
from parental introjects of infancy/childhood and its implications for identity formation.
For example. Josselson ( 1980) states that due to the gradual separating from the
50
automatic adherence to "shoulds" and "oughts" simply to avoid internal dis-ease, an
increased vulnerability is experienced as self-esteem becomes dependent on the
teenager's current activities and types of relational feedback he/she receives in
response to these. Josselson (1980, p. 19i)atalks about "loss of an internal protective
function" when "introjects are deidealised" and "the ego striv(ing) to reconstitute the
superego-ego-ideal system with more realistic content and thus moum(ing) the loss of
narcissistic omnipotence, replacing it with self-esteem". Also, Josselson (1980) talks
about a threat to the continuity of the experience of a stable sense of self. Due to
gradual separating from automatic ways of doing things, making decisions, regulating
states of ease or dis-ease, there is a feeling of having moved past previous perceptions
of self without yet having established new perceptions to replace these.
Colarusso (1990) builds on Mahler's (1972a) and Bias's (1967) theorising to discuss
how the issues of fusion, separation, object loss get played out in the typical relational
patterns of adulthood (i.e. as spouse, parent, and child of aging parent). According to
Colarusso (1990), the more one is dependent on mental representations of parental
influence, or the more one is bound to internalised parental introjects, the greater is the
experienced threat of losing the supportive, emotional ties of the parent. Colarusso
( 1990) thus alludes to the presence of an ongoing tension in adulthood between
independence of self and loss of emotional ties.
51
Josselson (1980) - becoming separate (seeing oneself as different from the significant
other and the world, and independently regulating one's own emotional states) and
individuated (developing individual ideals, beliefs, goals, interests) is a necessary
condition for mature relating. The notion of.,mature relating• will be elaborated on by
using the writings of psychodynamic theorists (e.g., Haase, 1993) and existential
theorists (e.g., Yalom, 1980).
In short, mature relating involves relating to another in such a way that one can be
alone in the relationship. One does not need the other to fulfill an emotional function
by way of unconscious or unsaid expectations or obligatory binds. The emotional
function (be it self-affirmation, self-comforting), is fulfilled directly or indirectly by the
individual alone. In other words, one can self-validate or self-soothe oneself, or that
one takes responsibility for requiring this from the other and so consciously and overtly
takes on the needy, requesting position rather than expecting the other to magically
know and fulfill this need.
Another aspect of mature relating is that one responds to the other as completely
other and not as part of one's own experience. This involves not responding to the
other as if one would respond to one's own needs. In other words, it involves
recognising that the other is different from oneself and may not be needing what one
imagines the other to be needing based on knowledge of one's own needs. For
example, one may find it difficult to be loyal to oneself. In a relational situation one may
encourage or advise the other to be loyal to him-/herself when the other is fully able to
be, and is easily loyal to him-/herself. Responding to the other as completely other can
also be said to involve 'not doing for the other what one can't do for oneself. In other
words, it involves not engaging in false altruism. For example, one may have a
difficulty in accepting praise. Thus, by praising others one vicariously fulfills this need
in oneself.
Accepting one's 'selfish' needs (Haase, 1993) following Jung (1959) can be said to
be a necessary condition for mature relating. It is when one accepts what one deems
as one's undesirable qualities that prevents one from seeing the other as having these
qualities. This facilitates the stance of relating to the other as completely other and not
52
as part of one's own experience. Melanie Klein has coined the terms "projective
identificationn and "introjective identificationn (in Scharff & Scharff, 1991, pp. 73-74) to
describe the reciprocal steps of: placing undesirable qualities on the other and the
other unconsciously accepting these, thus atluwing for the first person to respond to the
other as part of his/her own experience.
Yalom (1980, p. 372) describes "mature relating" by the term "need-free relationship"
characterised by "need-less love". According to this description, one relates in a
selfless way, in the moment, with one's whole being and not with the considerations of
what the evaluative impact of the relating will have on oneself, or some real or imagined
other. Descriptive terms for this relationship include: freedom, fullness, mutuality, and
selfless giving. Yalom (1980, p. 373) states "mature caring flows out of one's richness,
not out of one's poverty - out of growth, not out of need. One does not love because
one needs the other to exist to be whole, to escape overwhelming loneliness ... Past
loving, then, is the source of strength, current loving is the result of strength".
Alt's (1988) discussion of Kohut's (1971, 1977) work will be used to address this. As
an introduction, Kohut's work on the development of the self can be seen as an in-
depth discussion on the development of emotional autonomy. By extension,
individuation in terms of Kohut's theory, may be reinterpreted as the development and
maintenance of emotional autonomy.
53
For Kohut (1977, p. xv), the self is the way a person experiences him-/herself as him-
/herself, "a permanent mental structure consisting of feelings, memories and·
behaviours that are subjectively experienced as continuous in time and as being 'me··.
The self is also a "felt center of independent initiativen and an "independent recipient
of impressions" - the center of the individual's psychological universe. An interesting
distinction is given by Ewing (1990) between the content and functions of the •selr
construct (Kohut, 1977, p. xv). According to Ewing (1990), Kohut (1977) defined 'self
both in terms of content (namely: self as memory) and function (namely: self as centre
of experience and initiative and main motivating agency).
54
validation, protection and acknowledgement is given: mirroring, idealising and twinship
transferences respectively. From the experience of being (1) approved of; (2)
protected; and (3) acknowledged, the individual develops: (1) a sense of self-worth or
vitality; (2) the ability to self-soothe; (3) values and ideals; and (4) certain talents and
skills (Alt, 1988). Thus it is through particular relational experiences that certain
psychological structures/functions get built up, or the development of the self takes
place.
The process by which this "transfer" and modification of relational experiences into
psychological structures takes place, is called by Kohut (1977, p. 49) "transmuting
internalisationsn. Kohut ( 1977, pp. 50-57) gives a very esoteric, intricate description
of how this takes place. Initially the self-object is experienced as an all-powerful person
who magically and perfectly takes away any slightest distress. With appropriate
disappointments, that is, humanly expected less than perfect administrations to the
infant's needs, the "archaic self-object" becomes "decathected" that is, is not idealised
and overvalued in an absolute, all-dependent fashion, so that only the functions of, for
example, validation become part of the psychological structure in the form of, for
example, self-worth.
A comment here is the importance of the emotional-relational milieu out of which the
development of the 'self arises in terms of Kohutian theory. According to Kohut ( 1984,
p. 238) "You need other people in order to become yourself'.
55
idealising transferences is regarded as essential even after the psychological
structures have been built up (Alt, 1988). The significance of this emotional-relational
imbeddedness is also brought home by Alt's (1988) comment that current, what Kohut
( 1977) calls self-self-object relating (relating whereby the other is experienced as
having emotional impact on one), reflects (in some degrees and in some
circumstances) previous self-self-object relating. In other words, current relating
according to Alt (1988) is, in some ways, emotionally-tinged by our early interactions
with our parents.
Development of the self in terms of systemic thinking involves the dual notion of how
one attains different states of individuality within a context of interpersonal relating.
Thus, the focus is on the individual as well as on the interactional/communicational
patterns which connect him/her to the others in his/her world. In line with this is how
the development of states of individuality is either impeded or enhanced by the different
interactional/communicational patterns between members of the system.
States of Individuality
Bowen's (1985, p. 472) concept of the "differentiation of self scale" assesses "the
basic level of self in a person" (p. 473). By "basic self', Bowen (1985, p. 473) refers to
the degree to which one has, for example, convictions, beliefs, opinions independent
of the relationship system in which one finds oneself, or in other words, independent
of the approval, recognition, support, or lack thereof from others. "Basic self' implies,
if necessary, the ability to withstand the emotional pressure of being different from the
group.
According to Bowen (1985), the more differentiated one's self is, the less likely is one
to make decisions and act on the basis of what feels right, thus letting feelings govern
one's behavioural responses in a more or less automatic fashion. By extension, the
more differentiated one's self is, the more one is capable of independent regulation of
internal states. This would be coupled with a greater ability to regain emotional
56
equanimity independently without having to act in such a way in order for others to fulfill
this function.
According to Kerr (1988), the greater the degree of self-differentiation, the more
energy the individual has for self-determined, goal-directed activity. In other words,
less emotional energy is bound up in the relational system. Kerr (1988, p. 69)
elaborates on the notion of "energy being bound up in a relational system" as follows:
"An individual's functioning becomes totally governed by what transpires between him
and the other person. He/she is so responsive to cues from the other and his internal
reactions so intense that he/she is a complete 'emotional prisoner' of the relationship.
These automatic emotional responses totally dictate his/her actions".
Bowen (1985, p. 495) refers to the differentiated self as the "responsible I" who
assumes responsibility for his/her own happiness, failures or successes and who
doesn't place demands on others with the attitudes of, for example, 'I deserve' or 'it is
my right'.
Kerr (1988, p. 101) has divided the scale of differentiation into four ranges of
functioning: people at the low end of the scale are described as "emotionally needy and
highly reactive to others". Much energy goes into reactiveness to having failed to get
love, or in trying to achieve comfort. People at this level cannot distinguish between
thought and feeling - their functioning is almost totally governed by their emotional
reactions to the environment. Responses range from automatic compliance to extreme
oppositional behaviour. Such individuals are likely to relate to others in such a way as
to mimic early familial dependent attachments.
Kerr (1988, p. 102) calls people in the next level "ideological chameleons". They ·
lack convictions of their own and thus are highly suggestible in order to gain
acceptance. They adopt viewpoints that best complement their emotional make-up.
According to Kerr ( 1988), people in the next level are still highly influenced by
feelings. They are sensitised to emotional disharmony, to the opinions of others, and
to creating a good impression. Their emotional equanimity is largely dependent on the
57
approval of others. According to Kerr (1988) such people are mostly in lifelong pursuit
of the ideal close relationship. Such people function with a "pseudo-self (p. 103).
'Pseudo-self refers to knowledge and beliefs that are acquired from others and which
are fused with the emotionality of the relationship system. Thus connection between
an individual or group is facilitated by automatically adopting the shared beliefs of the
group. In an intimate relationship there is "borrowing and trading of self (p. 104). This
means that both partners' pseudo-selves are enhanced by one gaining emotional well-
being by having his/her opinions or values automatically supported and the other also
gaining emotional well-being by supporting or sharing the opinions and values of the
other. Kerr (1988, p. 104) describes the pseudo-self as a "pretend" self in that people
pretend to be, for example, weaker or stronger than they really are - the pretence
occurring in emotional reactiveness to the relationship system. Such pretence may
also indude compromising an opinion because it is contrary to what the group feels or
believes.
People high up the scale have what Kerr (1988, p. 105) calls a "solid self' of firmly
held convictions and beliefs that can only be changed from "within self' and not from
persuasions from others. "Having a way of thinking that is consistent within itself and
reasonably consistent with available factual knowledge ... , is the principal element that
allows someone to be an individual while in emotional contact with a group" (p. 105).
These people are freer to have a choice between being governed by the intellectual or
feeling world. Hence they have more freedom to move back and forth between intimate
emotional closeness and goal-directed activity. Such people can extricate themselves
from highly emotional situations with logical reasoning when need arises. Kerr (1988)
describes such an individual as inner directed, sure of his/her beliefs but not dogmatic,
able to assume full responsibility for him-/herself, realistically aware of his/her
dependence on his/her fellow man and free to enjoy relationships. He/she does not ·
have a 'need' for others that may impair functioning, and others do not feel 'used'.
He/she is realistic in his/her assessment of self and others. Intense feelings are well
tolerated and so he/she does not act automatically to alleviate them.
58
Communicational Patterns
According to Kerr (1988, p. 95), family systems theory assumes the existence of
instinctually rooted life forces: individuality and togetherness. Individuality "propels the
developing child to grow to be an emotionally separate person, an individual with the
ability to think, feel and act for himself'. In contrast, the togetherness force "propels
child and family to remain emotionally connected and to operate in reaction to one
another ... to think, feel and act as one". Differentiation describes the process by which
individuality and togetherness are managed by a person and within a relationship
system.
59
cohesion and mutuality in such a way that not every action is in emotional reaction to
others or in response to the directives of others (Kerr, 1988).
According to Kerr (1988), an effort towards individuality does not insist that others
change and it is not contingent on anyone's cooperation. It is not yielded by, for
example, anger or hurt but involves a thoughtfully determined direction for oneself.
Kerr (1988) reiterates that such self-determination does not mean selfishly following
one's own directives but an increased capacity for choice to be guided by the interests
of the group or oneself.
60
Dialectical Relationship Between States of Individuality and Communicational
Patterns
•
In terms of systemic thinking, entities are not conceptualised in isolation - divorced
from their contextual connections. Thus the phrase: becoming an individual is
antithetical to the systemic conceptualisation of individuation as involving the
development of the individual within his/her relational context (Allison & Sabatelli, 1988;
Karpel, 1976; Stierlin, Wirsching, & Knauss, 1977).
For this section an intrapsychic conceptualisation is referred to by the term 'self and
psychoanalytic terminology will be used when referring to this term.
Karpel's (1976) paper will be used to outline four types of interpersonal distances.
Three of these four types will be used to discuss the influence of self on interpersonal
distance. The four modes of relationship put forward by Karpel (1976, p. 70) are:
"unrelatedness, pure fusion, ambivalent fusion and dialogue". For Karpel (1976, p. 70),
"the relational mode of unrelatedness corresponds to the schizoid position", in that
there is a rejection and denial of relationship. Laing's ( 1960) work will be used to
discuss the influence of 'self on this type of interpersonal distance, namely
unrelatedness. The relational mode of pure fusion will be discussed next, followed by
a discussion of the dialogue relational mode. Lastly the unrelatedness relational mode
will be discussed in terms of Laing's (1960) theory.
According to Karpel ( 1976, p. 70), involved in the style of relating called "pure fusion"
. .
is the process of one partner projecting onto the other unacceptable qualities of the self
and responding to the other in terms of these qualities and not as a separate person.
In other words, one responds to the other as part of one's own experience.
61
sameness or oneness. Cycles of guilt and blame may occur as each holds the fantasy
of absolute responsibility for the other in order to deny their separateness and the sole
responsibility for oneself that this brings. Hence loss of the relationship is akin to loss
of the self. •
According to Karpel (1976, p. 77) the central feature of "the relational mode,
dialogue" is that people relate not in accordance with an unsaid obligatory bind. This
bind compels each partner to respond in a way expected of him/her in order to fulfill the
demands of this bind. In contrast, in dialogic relating each partner is allowed the
freedom to respond in any way he/she chooses - ways that are not necessarily
predictable. Hence there is greater spontaneity, unpredictability, and freedom in the
patterns of interaction. According to Kerr (1988, p. 111) this reflects an individual with
a greater degree of "emotional neutrality" in that one is not dependent on the other in
a rigidly binding way to meet various needs for emotional equanimity. However, this
does not mean to say that each partner is fully self-sufficient in the meeting of his/her
particular needs. In this type of relationship there is also the mutual satisfaction of
needs.
According to Karpel (1976, p. 7), the difference between the "dialogue" and the
"fusion" relationships in terms of mutual need fulfilment is that in the "dialogue" mode,
the partner takes responsibility for being transiently 'needy' or vulnerable and thus risks
asking, and so too potential rejection. In the fusion mode there exists an unsaid
guarantee that the other is expected to know one's need and to automatically fulfill it,
without one taking responsibility for assuming the requesting position.
Karpel (1976) mentions that the central feature undergirding the dialogue
relationship that allows for mutual need fulfilment is trust. This means that any partner, ·
at any given time and for any duration can 'request' a need to be fulfilled. This
happens without there being any binding condition that he/she will have to do the same
for the other to compensate for 'taking' from the other.
Also, because each person does not respond to the other as part of his/her own
experience, difference is enhanced which permits greater flexibility for an individual to
62
assume various role positions in the relationship, for example, as caregiver, receiver,
initiator. In this way, growth and change in each individual is allowed for, and affirmed.
However, even such a 'desired' form of relating also involves imperfections of times of
symbiotic relatedness (Searles in Karpel, 1~76).
A central organising principle of Laing's (1960) theory is the idea of two states of
ontological being or how one experiences one's existence. One can experience one's
existence as "primary ontological security" or "primary ontological insecurity" (p. 40).
By primary ontological insecurity, Laing (1960) may mean that one lacks a sense of
particular self-validating certainties such as belief in the permanence, reliability and
substantiality of natural processes - of the world and oneself.
For Laing (1960, p. 40), in this existential position, one is preoccupied with
"preserving rather than gratifying" oneself. Thus from the ontological secured,
relatedness with others is potentially gratifying. From the ontological insecure position
relatedness (meaning the rejection thereof) is used in order to preserve the 'self.
According to Laing (1960, p. 55), this position involves a "failure to be oneself, a failure
to exist alone", but, paradoxically, one ends up being alone (or isolated) because other
people are rejected in order to "sustain a sense of one's own being" (p. 55).
Thus the theme: the influence of self on the relational mode of unrelatedness will be
addressed by discussing: how one preserves oneself by rejecting others.
63
The first area describes the experience of lacking a stable~ clear, or definite sense
of autonomy, identity - of being different from the other. Relating to another brings with
it the threat of engulfment and loss of oneself. Any hint of being known, loved or even
seen brings with it the terror of not being abte to exist without the other (Laing, 1960).
Thus, in order to guard against this terror and so preserve the self one distances
oneself from others, and from relatedness.
The second area describes the experience of feeling "insubstantial" of being "unable
to assume that the stuff he is made of is genuine, good, valuable" (Laing, 1960, p. 43).
The threat of relating is one of being "petrified or depersonalised, of being treated as
a robot or thing, of being ignored, disregarded or treated in an impersonal way" (Laing,
1960, p. 43). One may interpret this as a threat of being profoundly humiliated. In
order to guard against this threat one relates to others in a depersonalising way thus
not allowing the other to have an emotional impact on one. This gives rise to the effect
of rejection of others and of relatedness.
The third area describes the experience of not having a "sense of personal
consistency or cohesiveness" (Laing, 1960, p. 43). Laing (1960, p. 71) talks about the
"unembodied self' to describe a state of inner incohesiveness. The individual
experiences him-/herself as divided between a false-self system (mental) and that part
of him-/herself considered to be his real self or core which he/she attempts to preserve
(Laing, 1960). By operating with the false-self system he/she keeps his/her inner
feelings, intentions, views guarded. In this way, he/she can protect him-/herself from
the threat of being humiliated or the threat of nonexistence - of being engulfed (taken
over or controlled by the other). Thus he/she does not commit himself to his/her
actions as revealing anything of his/her inner life. Thus he/she never says what he/she
feels, thinks or wants. Hence all his/her interactions attain a kind of alien, mechanical-·
like quality devoid of any personal satisfaction or meaning. The price to be paid for this
kind of self-preservation is an increasing sense of emptiness, despair, futility as he/she
becomes forever prevented from attaining emotional reciprocity and enriching feedback
from the world. His/her awareness of this isolating entrapment leads him/her to
respond with disdain, indifference or contempt for that which he/she so desperately
longs for, that is, relationship. These attitudes further reject others from him/her.
64
Regulating Interpersonal Distance
Cooper, Grotevant and Condon (1983) have put forward a model of family
communication. They highlight four main categories of communicational responses:
separateness which involves the ability to disagree with or challenge another's view;
self-assertion which involves the ability to hold and clearly express a personal
viewpoint; mutuality which involves sensitivity to and respect for others viewpoints and
permeability which involves openness and responsiveness to the views of others.
Thus, according to this model, interpersonal distance may be described as the extent·
to which communicational responses express sameness (connectedness) or difference
(individuality). Thus, regulating interpersonal distance can be said to involve factors
which influence the extent to which communicational responses express
sameness or difference.
65
discussion. According to Kerr (1988) something has emotional significance if the
individual is affected on an emotional level by what another person thinks, feels, says,
and does, or by what is imagined to be what another person thinks, feels, says, and
does. ..
Another factor which can be said to influence the nature of boundary includes
societal or cultural norms which prescribe expected forms of relating in relationships
involving, for example, generational, gender, or occupational role differences.
However, the extent to which these affect the nature of a boundary in any microscopic
relational context can be said to depend on the individual's acceptance and adherence
to these norms. For example, some people may regard such norms as having
66
absolute, prescriptive power on what is acceptable behaviour in a given relationship,
while others may regard such norms with less intensity.
According to Ryder and Bartle ( 1991 ), •another factor influencing the nature of
boundary is the attribution of who is responsible for defining what is accepted in a given
relationship. Sometimes one individual may hold the belief that the other is not willing
for particular behaviours to occur. In this case, the responsibility for boundary
definition is held to be in the other's domain. Also, such a responsibility may be held
to be in the domain of some external party - be it family, tradition or societal norms.
Bateson, Jackson, Haley, and Weakland (1956) used the concept of logical typing
to show how communication is divided into different classes or levels. Bateson et al.
(1956) discuss the verbal and nonverbal levels of communication, in other words, what
is being said (content) and the way it is said (process). According to Bateson et al.
(1956) the verbal or content part of communication is regarded as the message. The
nonverbal or process part indicates what is meant by this message or classifies the
message. The message is classified in terms of what kind of a relationship it invites.
Thus at a nonverbal level the person may be saying, for example, 'parent me', thus
inviting parental responses from the other and defining the relationship as
complementary.
67
relationship, involves the ability to metacommunicate or communicate about
communication. This may be regarded as the ability to say, for example, 'When I talk
to you, I tend to invoke parental responses from you in a rather consistent fashion so
that I end up being the one to ask for assurance or support and you end up being the
one to give it. In this way, a complementary needy-supportive relationship occurs
between us'. The ability to metacommunicate also involves the ability to use
metacommunicative responses such as: 'is that what you meant?' (Bateson et al.,
1956).
68
expressing difference.
A comment from a traditional perspective is that some people may show a general
tendency to express mutuality and permeability. However, this perspective sees
individuation as an intrapsychic property or tendency which is not what is suggested
by systemic theory. According to Cooper et al. (1983), individuation is conceptualised
as a quality of a relationship where some relationships are seen to be more
individuated than others. Cooper et al. (1983) describe a relationship to be
individuated when there is a balance of individuality and connectedness in
communicational responses.
• Factors Influencing the Extent to which the 'Emotionally Autonomous' Person can be
seen to Regulate His/Her Emotional Involvement in a Relationship
It can be said that an interplay exists between the capacity to regulate one's
emotionality autonomously and the capacity to regulate one's emotional involvement
in a relationship. According to Kerr (1988) the greater one's capacity for autonomous
emotional regulation, the greater capacity one has to regulate one's emotional
involvement in a relationship. Thus, factors proposed to influence the one capacity can
be said to indirectly influence the other. According to Kerr (1988) one factor to
influence the capacity for autonomous emotional regulation, is the emotional m~lieu in
which the person is brought up. According to Kerr (1988), if a person grows up under
strong pressure to adjust to the anxiety and emotional reactivity of others, his/her life
becomes strongly governed by feeling processes. However, if he/she grows up with
the freedom not to have his/her thinking and emotional functioning contingent on
others, then his/her life will be less governed by feeling processes.
69
Developing the Ability to Regulate Interpersonal Distance
A question to be posed is: what can be said to hamper the ability to communicate
sophisticatedly or flexibly?
70
possibility for defining the relationship differently, as one, for example, where the
participants can now say what formerly was nonverbally agreed upon to remain unsaid.
This involves the possibility for difference, newness or change and with it, potential for
loss of familiarity or safety. Hence, one can.think of this as involving risk. When one
risks talking about how one responds in relation to the other, or about nonverbalised
expectations or assumptions of the other, one risks the possibility of the other
responding in a way that may be threatening to the person's investments in the
relationship. It can be said that the extent to which these factors: identity, self-worth,
purpose depend solely on relationships will strongly influence the ease with which one
can regulate interpersonal distance.
The experiential situation involved trying to attain the ability to be separate and
together, or independent and interdependent simultaneously. Thus, a point of enquiry
arose namely, to conceptualise the separateness-togetherness tension in such a way
that would aid its resolution in practice.
Early writings have conceptualised these ideas as fundamental, basic needs or life
forces (e.g., Bakan, 1966; Jung, 1959). Much theorising has been done on finding
ways to conceptualise the resolution of the inherent tension or conflict seen to exist
between them (Allison & Sabatelli, 1988; Field, 1994; Gavazzi & Sabatelli, 1990;
Josselson, 1988; Olthuis, 1983; Sabatelli & Mazor, 1985).
From Bowen's (1985) and Kerr's (1988) writings, it can be said that this distinction
between the need for togetherness and the need for separateness is largely contained
in the distinction between emotional reactivity and independent thinking. The t_ension
can be said to involve the ability to think independently (separateness) even when this
conflicts with the emotional threat of loss of group acceptance or approval (loss of
togetherness). It can be said that Bowen (1985) resolves this dialectic by implying that
greater separateness or ability to think independently allows for greater flexibility for
emotional togetherness or not. In order to become 'more separate' one must first risk
losing the acceptance of the group.
71
In Jungian theory this separateness may be interpreted as seeing the negative-
underdeveloped or undesirable in oneself and so not needing others to maintain a
desirable image of oneself. It can be said that the resolution here also involves a
choice - but if made in the 'growth' direction will promote a newfound resolution of the
separateness-togetherness tension. Using Jung's theorising, the togetherness one
gives up, namely, the cessation of seeing one's own negative qualities in others
promotes a newfound togetherness, namely, the cessation of relating to others as if
they were extensions of oneself. The newfound togetherness also includes the
awareness of solidarity.
72
hence unsafe option versus staying the same. However, it may be interpreted that
integration of the opposite poles (separateness and togetherness) only comes after
risking the unknown because only then can one choose between parental norms and
newfound norms.
This contrasts sharply with what can be said to be the manifestation of this tension
in collective societies. Here the tension can be said to take on the dimension of how
self-expression occurs in societies emphasising interdependency. This was dealt with
in the chapter on the self-group relational dimension. A comment here is that in
collectivist cultures, a strong emphasis is placed on the togetherness side of the
tension. In other words, in individualistic cultures there is a value placed on separation
whereas in collectivist cultures (e.g., Indian culture), the emphasis is on what can be
called integration into a group consciousness involving 'we-self identity and intuitive
mutual need obligatory and fulfilling relationships. Hence, the value is how to become
more 'together' as opposed to separate.
73
manifest minimally. It is almost as if the separateness-togetherness tension is resolved
by way of the cultural belief system and associated practices. In other words, the risk
of isolation or loss conceptualised as inherent in the separation side of the tension, as
described in psychodynamic terms, is confronted as a necessity by way of the weaning
and initiation rites practices. Hence, there is no clinging to togetherness in terms of
fused (in psychodynamic terms) relating as a way of protecting oneself from the threat
of isolation or loss, one has already encountered loss. As a result, there is no
emphasis on encountering separation, in its psychodynamically theorised
manifestations, in order to 'develop' or 'relate maturely'.
74
how one sees oneself, experiences oneself, and feels, depends upon the responses
of others. Hence, the notion of the 'separate self becomes deconstructed.
It can be concluded that the many varied ways in which this dialectic is
conceptualised almost dismisses the ontological validity of the experience~ tension but
does nothing to aid its resolution. It can also be concluded that psychodynamic theory
closely mirrors both the experiential situation and the way its resolution was sought.
It can be said that difficulties with the separateness-togetherness tension arose from
the experience that the psychodynamic constructs of the separate, self-contained,
independent individual held a normative value. It can also be said that the normative
value is not embodied in the theory per se, since the existence of other theoretical
perspectives on the separateness-togetherness dialectic, where separateness is not
valued, does not lesson the normative impact of the psychodynamic constructs. Thus,
75
it can be concluded that it is not the theory itself but the socio-cultural context whose
dictates that theory mirrors, which gives normative value to the theory's theoretical
constructs, hence influencing experience.
The experience of this dialectic involved the question of whether the evaluative
influence of being at lower versus higher stages of the psychodynamic lineal model
would be deconstructed if individuation was experienced as recursive process. Hence,
various interpretations of individuation as lineal progression or recursive process were
sought.
76
In systemic theory the process can be said to be the ongoing experience of
regulating interpersonal distance. There is no chronological progression here since
more sophisticated and flexible forms of relating may co-exist with less sophisticated
and flexible forms. Furthermore, some relationships may be characterised with one
particular way of regulating interpersonal distance while others may involve different
and varied ways of regulating interpersonal distance.
In existential theory this process of becoming can be said to involve the ongoing
negotiation between opposite poles of various dialectics be it, for example, risk-safety,
aloneness-togetherness, self-other, complexity-simplicity, stillness-movement,
acceptance-change, chaos-order.
Stem's (1985) model can be said to incorporate both ideas of lineal progression and
recursive process. Stem (1985) emphasises the nonchronological nature of his model,
in that he puts forward various senses-of-self as potentially co-existing in various
combinations. However, the emergence of these "senses-of-self' (Stern, 1985, p. 11)
are described as occurring in a chronological fashion. Hence, Stern (1985, p. 11) puts
forward a "core-'sense-of-self' to describe primitive affective and sensational
awarenesses, which describes the sense-of-self in the infant. The "subjective-sense-
of-selr (Stern, 1985, p. 11) arises next. This involves the awareness of one's feeling
intentional, attentional, and vitality effects as well as the awareness that these may be
potentially shared by a distinct other. However, the "verbal-sense-of-self' (Stern, 1985,
p. 11) only arises at a later chronological stage, hence this 'verbal-sense-of-self can
be said to follow developmentally the initial senses-of-self. Yet, once all th~se senses-
of-self have emerged, each may dominate one's experiential state, and thus way of
relating, in varying degrees. Thus, even though one may be generating and sharing
new and richer interpretations and experiences by communicating in language,_ which
the verbal sense-of-self makes possible, the nonverbal communication of affective
states, as occurs with the core-sense-of-self, may still occur but in a new way, since
one now has more possibilities for self-experience and relating.
77
interprets reality in terms of dynamic, interconnectivity such that one can only grasp
facets of an everchanging whole. Thus, there is no 'self as an isolated, entity and thus
no process of developing or becoming this 'self. 'Self is everchanging as it emerges
and re-emerges out of different relational domains by the social discourses and ritual
practices that issue in its construction and deconstruction.
It can be said that one can easily conceptualise individuation as lineal progression
or recursive process by simply swapping the theoretical perspective one uses, but that
these theoretical perspectives do nothing to change the evaluative experience of stage
comparisons. It can be concluded that the evaluative impact of the psychodynamic
lineal stage model arose because of the normative value afforded the theory by the
theory's reflecting Western culture's dictates.
Conclusion
Two overall conclusions can be drawn from the discussion in this chapter. The first
conclusion is that experience (speaking narrowly in terms of the idiosyncratic
experience of difficulties in individuating) influences how one interprets or makes sense
of theory. This is especially so with regard to the interpretation of individuation
involving the dialectical relationship between states of individuality and
communicational patterns. The second conclusion, is that the extent to which theory
impacts on experience depends upon that theory being 'endorsed' by the cultural
context. The theory can be said to be endorsed by the socio-cultural context by the
extent to which the theory reflects existing socio-cultural dictates.
78
CHAPTER4
The focus of this chapter involves addressing the experiential tension in the self-in-
relation-to-self relational dimension. This tension encompasses difficulties in the
experience of self-acceptance which involves four aspects, namely: finding out who one
is, being who one is, revealing who one is and being true to who one is. Theory was
consulted to gain a conceptual understanding of this tension in order to facilitate its
resolution in practice.
This involves the question of how does one find out who one is? Defining oneself
or arriving at one's identity was thought to be a verbal process alone, thus excluding
any other intuitive or nonverbal knowing. In other words, the question posed was: can
the answer to who one is be seen to be simply one's identity or can it be said that there
is more involved in coming to know oneself than simply a cognitive verbal process?
Theory was searched in order to address this question. Various writers (e.g., Alt,
1988 & Weigert, 1988) suggest a distinction between self-experience and one's
identity. According to Alt (1988) and Weigert (1988), one's identity involves some form
of linguistic modification of 'pure' experience into one's self-concept or how one sees
oneself, or one's identity or how one defines oneself. It may be interpreted that these
writers are implying that one can only come to know oneself, or rather symbolise or·
express that knowledge to oneself or others through a cognitive or linguistically
mediated process. These writings confirmed the idea of identity involving a cognitive
verbal process alone. However, this theoretically substantiated idea contradicted
experience which suggested a nonverbal, intuitive way of knowing who one is. This
experience involved the following. Sometimes a commitment to some area of life, be
79
it spiritually, materialism, a relationship, a vocation comes to be more than a pursuit or
activity but seems to be embued with passion or purpose as reflected by expressions
such as 'it's her life' or 'that's all that matters to him'. It was thought that in these
situations, the experience of who one is becomes embodied in these commitments.
Hence, the suggestion of a nonverbal, intuitive way of knowing who one is. However,
this nonverbal, intuitive way of knowing seemed to lack validity against the wealth of
theories endorsing the identity construct as involving knowing who one is via a
cognitive, verbal process.
Gladis and Blasi's (1993) theorising pointed out a way of conceptualising this
experience thus giving theoretical validity to it. Gladis and Blasi (1993) seem to be
saying that there is more involved in coming to know oneself than simply arriving at a
linguistically mediated self-concept. Gladis and Blasi (1993, p. 357) may be suggesting
that one also comes to know oneself through "the immediate experience of the self in
the very process of acting and being acted upon" which "comprises distinct facets or
ways of apprehending one's own subjectivity".
This process (initiated by the question: how does one find out who one is?)
suggested that the use of theoretical terms to conceptualise experience facilitates the
resolution of a tension in practice.
Writers such as Jung (1940) and Storr (1988) have written about the value of
80
vocation in giving meaning to an individual. This reflected the experiential situation of
one's self being closely tied up with one's vocational commitment. However, it was
thought that such 'life or death commitments', while being valuable in their potential for
creativity or purpose, prevent the full and free experience of 'living in the moment'. In
this case, one's 'essential essence' becomes too dependent on oneself alone. Thus,
a point of enquiry arose namely, how to retain one's purposeful commitment yet, at the
same time, not have one's 'essential essence' depend solely on it. Kierkegaard's
(1980) theory can be said to facilitate the resolution of this dialectic.
81
the experience of identity and aloneness and postmodern conceptualisations of these
notions. These postmodern conceptualisations were felt to be the new emerging socio-
cultural discourse practices. Hence, the possibility of a tension between experience
and these newly established norms. It was ~hought that the resolution of this tension
in practice (namely between experience and postmodern conceptualisations) would be
facilitated by attempting to gain an experiential appreciation of current (postmodern)
conceptualisations of identity and aloneness.
82
structure" of "constructs, hypotheses and expectations" (p. 172) by which the individual
interprets 'reality'. However, Berzonsky (1993) emphasises that these constructs,
assumptions or expectations are potentially modifiable depending on the type of
feedback obtained from the social world. •
It can be said that the social-constructionist perspectives put forward a social view
of identity in that there is no 'reality' separate from the relational domain. Hence the
ontological status of identity can be seen to exist only in social interaction and
discourse. This is in contrast to the constructivist perspective which accepts the
existence of a reality independent of the relational context but that there are multiple
interpretations thereof.
Whether identity exists as personal identity or social role, has been addressed by
theorists in the field (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Hollis, 1995; Lesser, 1996). For
example, for Lesser (1996), ontological status exists in the social role. Hollis (1995),
however, implies the existence of personal identity in spite of ontological status given
to various social roles.
Brewer and Gardner (1996) put forward a triple distinction of identity, dividing the
term 'personne' into "interpersonal" and "collective identities" (p. 83). The difference
between interpersonal and collective identities refers to the nature of connective ties.
which they propose exist between the individual and others. It is these 'ties' which for
Brewer and Gardner (1996) give ontological status to the interpersonal and collective
identities.
These ties are not simply affiliative, solidarity - affording connections to a self-
contained identity of goals, values, convictions, commitments. These ties are proposed
83
to be intrinsic or essential to such intrapsychic features as, following Brewer and
Gardner (1996, p. 84) "self-concept, the frame of reference for evaluations of self-worth
and the nature of social motivation".
•
According to Brewer and Gardner (1996), the interpersonal identity derives from
interpersonal relationships, and refers to one's social role. In this case self-worth is
derived from appropriate role behaviour, and social motivation is directed toward the
benefit of the other.
In contrast to these social identities, the personal identity in Brewer and Gardner's
(1996) article refers to the common understanding of identity in Western culture. In
other words, self-concept refers to one's individual traits, self-worth is derived from
comparing these in relation to others and social motives are derived from personal self-
interest (Brewer & Gardner, 1996) and not, as with social identities, for others well-
being in and of itself.
For Brewer and Gardner (1996), 'identity' exists as both personal identity and social
role. They describe this as "self-categorisations at different levels of inclusiveness"
(Brewer & Gardner, 1996, p. 91 ).
84
As an attempt to resolve the debate, Freeman (1995) and Robinson (1991) respond
that the postmodern conceptualisation is simply another way of naming the essentially
unnameable qualities of selfhood and moral agency .
•
This debate can be said to reflect in process the previous discussion on various
conceptualisations of the identity construct. It can be said that reading the vast array
of theoretical perspectives on the identity construct which give rise to various linguistic
realities, is akin to undergoing epistemological gymnastics whereby experience is
almost dismissed in the array of alternative perspectives each given equal ontological
validity. The understanding of each perspective having equal ontological validity
seems to diminish the unique experiential validity of any one perspective. Hence, an
attempt to gain an experiential appreciation of current conceptualisations of identity
was not facilitated. The implication of this will be discussed in the conclusion section.
The experience of aloneness as being a 'real' state can be said to reflect modern
conceptualisations (e.g., Winnicott, 1953, 1965). Modern thought (in accord with
psychodynamic theory) places much emphasis on the independent regulation of
emotional states - social interaction is seen to be important primarily in terms of the
early mother-child relationship which is seen to be a necessary and vital prerequisite
to eventual independent regulation of emotions (Winnicott, 1965).
85
deconstruction happens through communication (Gergen & Gergen, 1988; Gergen,
1991a).
Thus, it can be said that postmodern thoblght deconstructs the experiential state of
aloneness by stating that the individual is never alone. He/she is always part of a
shared symbolic system. Hence, it may be concluded that postmodern thought does
not conceptualise the experience of aloneness.
This section addresses the question: how to conceptualise the 'emotional structure'
of self. It was thought that such a conceptualisation would further an understanding of
oneself, hence aiding the ability for emotional regulation and the capacity to be.
The postmodern view emphasises that 'psychic structure' is 'built up' by learning
rules (or expectancies) of the relationship (Beebe & Lachmann, 1988) and a way of
construing events. 'Psychic structure' may also be interpreted as being 'built up' in
postmodern thought when the individual constructs a narrative of his/her life's
experiences (see for example, Harre, 1991 ). In terms of postmodern thought, it may
be interpreted that one develops, not so much an ego function, for example, how to.
self-soothe, but a cognition, that is, an expectancy, that an effect (like the altering of
an emotional state from panic to calm) can happen 'of I do something in relation to the
other'. Thus, it can be said that postmodern thought conceptualises not so much an
emotional structure, but a cognitive structure of self where emotions are subsumed in
cognitive expectations of mirroring or where emotions are constructed in dialogical
exchange.
86
A similar process may be interpreted to take place in Kerr's (1988) theorising in
terms of emotions being subordinated to cognition. It can be said that Kerr (1988)
conceptualises a cognitive structure of self that is nonetheless intimately tied up with
emotions in that 'self development involves, inter alia, the development of cognitive
control over emotional reactivity to ensure emotional equanimity.
It can be said that Kerr's (1988) entire theory of differentiation of self rests on the
premise that the more one can thoughtfully contemplate or reflect on one's emotional
responses, the less one's actions become automatically dictated by emotional
responses in reaction to another, and the more flexibility one has to choose to act, for
example, on the basis of thought versus feeling, or self versus group.
It can be said that Kohut's (1971, 1977) and Stern's (1985) theorising best described
the structural and functional dimensions of emotionality. It may be interpreted that
'emotional structure', in terms of Kohut's (1971, 1977) theory, is comprised of 'ego
functions' or capacities for regulating emotional states-capacities such as self-
comforting or self-affirming. Stern's (1985) conceptualisation of the functional
dimension of emotions may be interpreted as how one communicates by emotional
means. Stern (1985, p. 140) proposes a form of "affective communication" where there
is mutual communication of feelings, and acknowledgement that such a communication
has taken place, all without the use of words. Stern (1985, p. 140) uses the term "affect
attunement" for this.
It can be said that Stern (1985, p. 71) conceptualises the 'emotional structure' of self
by his concept "experiential integration" which captures the nonverbal, affective,
experiential dimensions of interaction. This "experiential integration" is symbolised by
the term "representations of interactions that have been generalised - RIG" (Stern, .
1985, p. 97). RIG's are memories which (in a preverbal fashion) store the affective and
sensational dimension common to a group of interactional sequences. These RIG's are
regarded as the 'building blocks' of the self, as are 'ego functions' in Kohut's (1971,
1977) theory.
It can be said that the conclusion that was drawn in the section on 'Finding out who
87
one is' can also be drawn here, namely that the use of theory to conceptualise
experience facilitates the potential resolution of a tension in practice (in this case, the
capacity to be).
•
Revealing Who One Is
How to reveal who one is, was initiated by the following experiential tension.
Difficulties in saying what one truly thought or felt gave rise to a tendency to hide one's
true intentions, opinions, feelings. It was thought that an understanding of what this
hiding entailed would aid in facilitating 'true' expression. It was thought that this
process of hiding was closely captured by the term alienation, since when one hides
one's true, for example, intentions, feelings from others, one identifies with that which
is revealed thus hiding oneself from oneself as well. 'Alienation' may then be used to
describe an estrangement (in different degrees and in different situations) from oneself
and from others. Various writer's theorising may be interpreted as giving various
conceptual understandings to the experience of hiding.
From a psychodynamic perspective is Haase's (1993, p. 30) phrase "the inner child
masquerading as adult". This describes one's alienation from various childhood
grievances or unmet needs. Haase (1993) describes that one alienates oneself from
these by denying them or trying to get these superficially met by various addictions.
A move towards authenticity involves taking responsibility for what Haase (1993, p. 32)
calls "healing the inner child" and thus not taking on a victim stance. Taking
responsibility involves accepting one's childish needs and taking· individual
responsibility for getting them met.
From a systemic perspective is Kerr's (1988, p. 103) notion of the "pseudo self',. This·
describes a more cognitive alienation, meaning one compromises, or changes one's
own, or directly adopts other opinions or ideas for the sake of group affiliation and
acceptance.
From Stern's ( 1985) theory is the notion of how language may be used to distort or
deny certain experiences when one fails to name them, or names them in another way.
88
One may use language to hide one's intent, message or motivation when these are not
communicated verbally. In this way, language may be used to shield one from
accountability to oneself or to others, which can be said to give rise to alienation and
inauthentic relating. •
According to Wilber (1985) we need not even experience vulnerability. For Wilber
(1985) vulnerability comes from the belief that we have a 'self that we need to protect.
The manifestation of the belief that we have a self that needs to be protected involves
the identification of any experiential state as being one's essential existence. Wilber
(1985) exhorts one to disidentify from any intrapsychic state as being one's whole
existence because this frees one from the gravity of impact which any loss, failure,
humiliation or hurt may have. In contrast, it can be said that modern, psychodynamic
theorists attest to the validity of the experience of vulnerability and the need to hide by
the many theories on self-protection, hence Freud's notion of defences, and Rogers's
notion of the true and false self. It can also be said that modern theorists theorise
about the experience of vulnerability in its various manifestations (e.g., Freud's
theorising about losses and Kohut's theorising about humiliations), as well as how to
facilitate 'true' self-expression (e.g., various works on 'healing the inner child', in
Abrams, 1990).
Thus it can be said that these various modern theories provided a way of integrating
the dialectic of experiencing vulnerability without needing to hide, thus potentially
facilitating its resolution in practice.
89
Being True to Who One Is
The expression of being true to who one is involved being true to a singular,
continuous spiritual essence. This conflicted sharply with postmodern notions of the
multiple, everchanging self. A point of enquiry which arose was how to reconcile
postmodern conceptualisations of multiplicity and discontinuity with the experience of
singularity and continuity. The reason was not so much to resolve difficulties related
to this experience of a spiritual essence of selfhood to which one remains true, but to
try and gain an experiential appreciation of what was felt to be the new emerging socio-
cultural norm, namely, the 'self of the postmodern world. A subtle realisation was the
immanence of a possible tension when firmly held convictions of the essential,
continuous self conflicted with the new socio-cultural norm of an everchanging multiple
self. Hence, the intent to attempt an integration.
An idea which was part of the initiation to attempt an integration between modern,
experiential notions of selfhood and postmodern conceptualisations of selfhood was
that postmodern conceptualisations of self do not give sufficient expression to what
can be called the fundamental notions of being a person. These can be said to refer
to the traditional intrapsychic features of, for example, motivations, intentions, drives,
emotions, consciousness, phenomenological experience, belief or will.
The following interpretation may be made from Ham~'s (1983) postmodern theorising
about how an inner sense of unity or being is derived from the domain of social
interchange. It may be interpreted that what is languaged about externally becomes
internal, private languaging of selfhood, giving rise to consciousness, agency, and
90
identity. These can be said to be the central features of modern conceptualisations of
selfhood.
In this section the attempt will be made to reconcile modern, experiential notions of
self as singular and continuous with postmodern conceptualisations of self as multiple
and discontinuous.
91
"internalised objects". This concept suggests that one relates lo people in the present
according to rigid patterns of how one has related to significant others (e.g., mom, dad)
in the past. This conclusion that postmodern conceptualisation of 'pseudo-multiplicity'
reflects modern conceptualisations of 'pseudo-multiplicity' sparked off the realisation
that the experience of self was not entirely unitary or singular as initially thought, but
that the intrapsychic experience of multiplicity does occur as indicated by such
statements as 'part of me' and 'in two minds'. Thus, it can be said that an integration
between experience and conceptualisations was found by the process of theory
informing and highlighting experience.
Conclusion
A first conclusion that can be drawn is that the resolution of an experiential tension
or dialectic can be said to be potentially facilitated by its conceptualisation or
integration in theory.
A second conclusion that can be drawn from the inability, most times, to reconcile
modern experiential notions with postmodern conceptualisations suggested a lack of
integration between the author's thinking (which was identified with a postmodern
epistemology) and experience (which was identified with modern theoretical
understandings). This suggests that potential difficulties in individuation may arise not
only because of a tension between experience and culturally 'endorsed' theory.
Potential difficulties in individuation may arise because of the intrapsychic tension
between idiosyncratic epistemologies, or ways of thinking, and experience.
92
A third conclusion that can be drawn is that theory informed and highlighted
experience in showing that the experience of singularity was not as uniform as initially
thought.
•
A fourth conclusion that can be drawn is that theory allows one to conceptualise
experience, this conceptualisation itself moulding subsequent experience, and that the
talk and texts of social life (to use Wetherell & Maybin's, 1996 terminology) convey
theory into the everyday world of living.
A fifth conclusion that can be drawn is the following. From the experientially based
comment that postmodern conceptualisations were heralding the new emerging socio-
cultural norms, the implicit assumption was of a tight link existing between theory and
socio-cultural norms. However, the conclusion from Chapter 3 suggests that only some
theories can be said to embody and reflect socio-cultural discourse practices, and it is
only these theories that can be said to have a notable influence on experience.
93
CHAPTER 5
Firstly, it can be concluded that the tension in relation to the normative value of these
concepts was not so much due to these concepts being instituted in theory but because
these concepts reflected socio-cultural discourse practices. Thus, it can be concluded
that the socio-cultural context influences the experience of difficulties in
individuating indirectly via the theories which reflect its norms.
Secondly, it can be concluded that the socio-cultural context influences the process
of self-expression by defining what is experienced or regarded as narcissistic, altruistic
or individualised behaviour. This can be seen as the direct influence of the socio-
cultural context on the experience of difficulties in individuating when idiosyncratic
ways of self-expression contrasts with societal prescriptions of what self-expression
'should' entail.
In relation to the a priori situation was the question of what individuation means in
a collectivist culture. It was thought that a theory of individuation as it occurs in a
collectivist culture would aid in resolving difficulties in the experience of individuation
by deconstructing pre-existing conceptualisations of individuation given normative
value by Western discourse practices. Thirdly, it can be said that when cross-cultural
theorists (e.g., Parin, et al., 1980; Roland, 1980, 1988) theorise about individuation as
it occurs in another cultural context, they start with an a priori Western (usually
94
psychodynamic) preconceptualisation of what individuation· is said to mean, then
describe how cultural practices (e.g., child-rearing practices) influence individuation as
conceptualised by Western theory's constructs. The literature is scarce with regards
formulating a culturally applicable 'a priori given' of what the experience of individuation
can be said to entail within a collectivist culture. Doi's (1963) 'amae' concept can be
seen as a move in this regard.
Fifthly, it can be concluded that potential difficulties in individuation may arise not
only because of a tension between experience and culturally 'endorsed' theory.
Potential difficulties may arise because of the intrapsychic tension between
idiosyncratic epistemologies and experience.
95
Figure 5.1: Individuation: Experience, theory and socio-cultural
context: an emerging connectedness
,,
SOCIO-
EXPERIENCE ~ THEORY 1
CULTURAL
CONTEXT
• I
~~~~~~' ~1~~~~~~1-~1~~~~~---'i
1 1
: ~
~-----------®----------~
?
CD shows the direct influence the socio-cultural context can be said to have on the
experience of self-expression by defining what is regarded as narcissistic, altruistic and ·
individualistic behaviour.
@ shows the indirect influence the socio-cultural context can be said to have on
experience by giving normative value to theoretically embodied notions of the
individuated person.
96
@ shows what can be said to be a close relationship between the individual's
experience, and theory, as well as his/her personal epistemologies. This relationship
can be said to give rise to tensions, as well as to the facilitation of potentially resolving
tensions. •
©and ®ask the question of how idiosyncratic experience can be seen to influence
socio-cultural norms. © suggests, after feminist writers, that this occurs via academic
discourse practices and@ asks how else can the individual's experience be seen to
influence socio-cultural norms?
The above conclusions were drawn from the process of the search to facilitate
individuation in practice by conceptualising or integrating themes or dialectics in theory.
97
Freedom in Relation to Group
Freedom here can be said to involve findi111g a way of expressing one's individuality
in relation to the socio-cultural dictates in such a way that one does not give up
individuality for the sake of false security found in having to safeguard group
acceptance. Freedom here can be said to involve the risk of loss which, if experienced,
·.may give rise to a new way of preserving both individuality and connectivity.
This can be said to involve, in accord with psychodynamic theory, the ability to
choose, to ad in relation to that choice, and to take responsibility for that choice. This
can be said to be in contrast to responding rigidly and automatically. The capacity for
emotional neutrality (Bowen, 1985) can be said to be intrinsic to the capacity for choice.
According to Bowen (1985), emotional neutrality involves the flexibility to respond
according to either one's thought or one's emotions, group or self interest, as well as
freedom from having one's actions completely dictated by emotional responses from
the other.
This can be said to involve, in accord with psychodynamic theory, the freedom from
unconscious motivations or tendencies which involves self-awareness or accepting
more than what we already know to be part of ourselves (Jung, 1959). This self-
awareness can be said to be linked with knowing what is essential to one, or in other
words, what one identifies with. Freedom in relation to this can be said to involve.
knowing the unconscious motivations, controlling influences, impediments or fears
linked to that which one identifies with. Hence, the implication is that there is greater
choice in relation to that which one identifies with and commits oneself to. But one may
also become overly controlled by, and dependent upon that which one identifies with.
Hence, freedom here can be said to involve a process of "disidentifying with all
particular objects, mental, emotional or physical, thereby transcending them" (Wilber,
98
1985, p. 130). According to Wilber (1985) this involves reaiising that one is not, for
example, one's wishes, feelings, possessions. In this way, disappointments, hurts,
humiliations, failures, losses are not of life or death significance. However, it can be
said that one can only "disidentify" (p. 1307, or in Kierkegaard's (1980, p. 30) theory
"rest in the transiency" of not holding onto any one pole of dialectic as a source of
certainty, hence security for one's existence if one has faith in a Higher Being. This
could be the same as saying that there is far more (a greater plan, of which we do not
know) to what we hold to be of life or death significance, and it is only by having faith
in a Higher Being that we can live.
Recommendations
This study focussed on the experience of a single individual within a Western cultural
context rather than on the reports of a member of people in various cultural contexts.
Hence, to further the idea of constructing a theory of individuation in a collectivist
cultural context, the following is recommended.
Reports from a number of people living in various collectivist cultural contexts could
be obtained. The intention of these reports would be to enquire about the individuals'
idiosyncratic conceptualisations of what the experience of individuation entails. An
idea of the social discourse practices of these contexts could be obtained from
literature or by asking individuals about traditional practices or societal norms which
they see as characteristics of their cultural context. In this way various views of societal
prescriptions of individuation could be obtained. Thus, one would obtain reports of
idiosyncratic experiences of individuation, as well as interpretations of socio-cultural
norms of individuation.
An attempt to construct another theory of individuation in this way could further the
deconstruction of the normative value which any one theory holds or conveys since the
emphasis would not be on the theory alone, but on the relationship between
experience and socio-cultural context in the creation of theory.
This could have implications for therapy in terms of highlighting an approach {after
99
Bateson's (1979) thinking) towards understanding an individual's idiosyncratic
experience. An alternative to comparing an individual's experience of difficulties in
individuating to normative criteria, held in any one theory, could be the following. One
could explore how socio-cultural discourse practices of what individuation should entail
relate to the individual's experience. This could involve exploring how these socio-
cultural discourse practices are mediated or become accepted as real or personally
applicable, either by the individual's personal epistemologies (how they make sense
of their world), or by the talk and texts of social life (Wetherell & Maybin, 1996), for
example, family, work, school milieus. In this way, one could appreciate a broader view
of an individual's experience.
100
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