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Bernardina P. Bartolome vs. SSS

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Bernardina P. Bartolome vs.

SSS

Case Title : BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and
SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., respondents.

Case Nature : PETITION for review of a decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission.

Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Adoption ; Succession ; Biological Parents ;

Syllabi:

1. Civil Law;  Adoption;  Succession;  Biological Parents;  It is apparent that the biological
parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of
adoption.-
—It is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of
their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS
covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on
legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and
those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that
certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which,
We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their
minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose
second chance at a better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by
death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not
being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that
Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental
authority over the adopted child.

2. Administrative Agencies;  Appeals;  Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies


are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their
jurisdiction.-
—Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great
respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said
administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction. However, in the extant case,
the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner — Cornelio’s death
certificate. Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on
October 26, 1987, or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4,
1985, which attained finality. As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly
proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.

3. Administrative Regulations; Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the


provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved
in favor of the basic law.-
—This Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation,
559 SCRA 160 (2008) that: As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined
to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in
harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will
always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied) Guided by this doctrine, We find
that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction
of and a substantial deviation from Article 167(j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase
“dependent parents” to refer to “legitimate parents.”

4. Dependent Parents;  Words and Phrases; Plainly, “dependent parents” are parents,


whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or
assistance.-
Bernardina P. Bartolome vs. SSS

—The term “parents” in the phrase “dependent parents” in the aforequoted Article 167(j)
of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited
to “legitimate parents” as what the ECC did. The phrase “dependent parents” should, therefore,
include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When
the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, “dependent parents” are parents,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or
assistance.

5. Constitutional Law;  Equal Protection of the Laws;  As jurisprudence elucidates, equal


protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.-
—As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.
In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially,
and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective. The concept of equal protection, however, does not require
the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the
equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass
the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. “Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.”

6. Legitimate Parents;  Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that “legitimate parents”
pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the Employees’
Compensation Program (ECP).-
—Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that “legitimate parents” pertain to those
who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. It was only in the
assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendo that the
ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the
deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental
authority, petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary. True, when Cornelio, in
1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was
severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s
death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption
decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age. John’s minority at the time of his
adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental
authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking
into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no
collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if
the adopter passed away?

Division: THIRD DIVISION


Docket Number: G.R. No. 192531
Counsel: Mary G. Miranda for respondent SSS.
Ponente: VELASCO, JR

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of the Employees’
Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased
covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome. No costs.

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