Armadas Da Índia
Armadas Da Índia
Armadas Da Índia
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goods – gold, ivory, coral, pearls, acquired during the year at several points along the Swahili
Coast – ready to be picked up by the armadas for sale in India.
Factories
Of course, an armada could not just sail into an Indian city and expect to find enough supplies at
hand in the city's spice markets to load up five or ten large ships at once. Should it even try, it
would likely provoke an instant scarcity and quickly drive up the prices of spices astronomically.
Instead, the Portuguese relied on the ancient 'factory' system. That is, in every major market, the
Portuguese erected a warehouse ('factory', feitoria) and left behind a purchasing agent
('factor', feitor). The factor and his assistants would remain in the city and buy spices from the
markets slowly over the course of the year, and deposit them into the warehouse. When the next
armada arrived, it would simply load up the accumulated spices from the warehouse and set sail
out at once.
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City of Calicut, India, c. 1572 (from Georg Braun and Frans Hogenberg's atlas Civitates orbis terrarum)
FIRST PIC. BELOW Antwerp
The first Portuguese factory in Asia was set up in Calicut (Calecute, Kozhikode), the principal
spice entrepot on the Malabar Coast of India in September 1500, but it was overrun in a riot a
couple of months later. Consequently, the first lasting factory was set up in the nearby smaller
city of Cochin (Cochim, Kochi) in late 1500. This was followed up by factories
in Cannanore (Canonor, Kannur) (1502) and Quilon (Coulão, Kollam) (1503).
Although some Portuguese factories were defended by palisades that eventually evolved into
Portuguese forts garrisoned by Portuguese troops (e.g. Fort Manuel was erected around the
Cochin factory in 1503, Fort Sant' Angelo around the Cannanore factory in 1505), not all did.
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The two concepts are distinct. Factories were commercial outposts, not political, administrative
or military. The factor was formally an employee of the Casa da Índia (the trading house), not an
officer of the Estado da Índia (the colonial government).
Age of Antwerp
While Lisbon was the offloading point of the India armada, it was not the endpoint of the
Portuguese spice trade. There remained the matter of distribution of the spices in Europe.
Until the Portuguese breakthrough into the Indian Ocean, the supply of eastern spices to
European consumers had been largely in the hands of Republic of Venice. Arab and Gujarati
merchants ferried spices from Indian ports like Calicut, across the Arabian Sea and into the Red
Sea ports like Jeddah. From there, they would be carried overland to ports in the
eastern Mediterranean, such as Alexandria, where they would be picked by Venetian merchants
and then sold on European markets.
The Portuguese India armadas challenged this old spice route, for a brief period disrupted it, but
they did not eliminate it. Despite Portuguese efforts to secure monopolies at the source, enough
spices still slipped through the old Venetian-Arab route and forced competition on the sale end in
Europe.
Realizing that the Mediterranean was saturated with spices supplied by Venetian merchants, the
Portuguese decided to avoid head-to-head competition that might cut into their profits there, and
focused on selling their spices in northern Europe, a market the Venetians had barely touched.
To this end, the Casa da Índia set up a factory (feitoria de Flandres) in the Brabantine town
of Antwerp in 1508. The factory had two purposes: firstly, to serve as a distribution center of the
Portuguese spices to the rest of northern Europe; secondly, to acquire the silver bullion needed
by the Portuguese India armadas to buy spices in Asia.
It is in the silver trade that Portugal and Venice competed directly. Both needed large volumes of
European silver to buy spices in Asia, yet the only significant silver source was in Central
Europe, dominated by major German trading families like the Welsers, the Hochstetters and
the Fuggers of Augsburg. To get their hands on this silver, the Portuguese and Venetians offered
gold, not only from their revenues of spice sales, but also from overseas sources: the Portuguese
had access to gold from the Akan fields on the Gold Coast of west Africa, while the Venetians
had access to the gold mines of the Sudan (which was freighted up the Nile to Alexandria). Via
river routes, the German silver merchants directed silver bullion supplies up to the Portuguese
factory in Antwerp, from where ships would carry them to Lisbon, to be loaded onto the India
armadas.
The intercontinental streams of spices, gold and silver flowing in and out of the Portuguese
factory transformed Antwerp overnight from a sleepy town into arguably the leading commercial
and financial center of Europe in the 16th century, a position it would enjoy until its sack by
mutinous Spanish soldiers in 1576.
Recent research has shown that, after 1505, most of the trade that moved between Lisbon and
Antwerp sidestepped the Portuguese royal "factory of Flanders". Most of the European leg of the
trade was directly contracted between the Casa da Índia in Lisbon and private foreign
consortiums (usually Italian and German) in Antwerp and freighted largely by Dutch, Hanseatic
and Breton ships. As a result, the bulk of the profits of the Portuguese spice trade accrued not to
the Portuguese crown, but to the private consortiums (Smith calculates that, in 1517–1519, as
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much as half the price difference for spices between Indian and European markets was pocketed
by private European merchants on this leg; by 1585, the share reaped by the Portuguese crown
had fallen to a mere 15%)
Due to a series of costly losses in the 1550s, the Casa da Índia fell into severe financial straits
and was basically bankrupt by 1560. In 1570, King Sebastian of Portugal issued a decree
revoking the royal monopoly, and opening up trade with India to any private Portuguese
merchant. As few took up the offer, the free trade decree was replaced in 1578 by a new system
of annual monopolies, whereby the Casa sold the rights of the India trade to a private merchant
consortium, guaranteeing them a monopoly for one year. The annual monopoly system was
abandoned in 1597, and the royal monopoly resumed. But by that time, everything had changed.
For an entire century, the Portuguese had managed to monopolize the India run. The spice trade
itself was not monopolized – through the 16th century, the Republic of Venice had kept up its
competition through its overland Levantine routes – but the sea route by the Cape remained
exclusively Portuguese. Despite occasional leaks (e.g. the Cantino planisphere of 1502), details
of the Portuguese Carreira da Índia had been largely kept secret, or at least was not exploited by
competitors. But this changed in the 1590s.
The capture of the Portuguese ship São Filipe by the English privateer Sir Francis Drake in 1587,
with its rutter and detailed maps, prompted the first English attempt to sail to the East Indies, a
private three-ship fleet organized by London merchants, and led by Sir James Lancaster. It was a
disaster – most of the ships and crews were lost, and Lancaster had to resort to piracy to fill his
hold – but it opened the way.
In the Netherlands, the preacher and cartographer Petrus Plancius had long been urging his
countrymen to set out on their own route, rather than relying on the Portuguese hauls. The Dutch
effort received an injection from the information provided by Cornelis de Houtman, a Dutch spy
dispatched to Lisbon in 1592 to scout the spice trade, and Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, a Dutch
sailor who had served on many Portuguese India armadas from the 1580s. With this information
in hand, the Dutch finally made their move in 1595, when a group of Amsterdam merchants
formed the Compagnie van Verre and sent out their first expedition, under de Houtman, to the
East Indies, aiming for the market port of Bantam. That same year, Linschoten published a little
tract in Amsterdam entitled Reysgheschrift vande navigatien der Portugaloysers in
Orienten (Travel Account of the Voyages of the Portuguese in the Orient), a rutter giving the
details of the sailing directions of the Portuguese India Run. It was republished in 1596, as part
of a larger book, the Itinerario, where Linschoten gave the details of the trade and the condition
of Portuguese defenses in Asia. It was an explosive sensation. It was immediately translated into
English, German, Latin and soon French.
1597 was the bellwether year – the year of Houtman's successful return, and the spread of
Linschoten's tracts. A slate of new Dutch companies (voorcompagnie) to trade with the East
Indies were immediately erected by various competing merchant consortiums in Amsterdam,
Rotterdam, Middelburg and elsewhere – often with the help of exiled Antwerp merchants
('Brabantsche'), who had long been involved on the distribution end of the Portuguese spice
trade, but expelled due to the Dutch-Spanish conflict. At least fifteen separate Dutch expeditions
to the East Indies, each involving enormous numbers of men, ships, and amounts of treasure,
were sent out by the voorcompanies in 1598–1601. From this enthusiastic anarchic beginning,
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the Dutch trade got organized in 1601, when the Dutch government forced the voorcompagnie to
fold under a single monopoly company, the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC).
Fearful of being left behind, the English had founded their own East India Company (EIC) in
1600, and managed to organize a small English expedition to Bantam in 1601, but enthusiasm
was weaker and the EIC had problems competing with the better-organized and better-financed
Dutch.
The vigorous Dutch VOC and English EIC encroachments on the Portuguese empire and trade in
Asia, prompted the monarchy (then in Iberian Union with Spain) to experiment with different
arrangements. In 1624, Philip III of Portugal granted a monopoly charter to a
Portuguese Companhia do commércio da Índia, a private joint-stock company organized on the
same lines as the Dutch and English companies. The Companhia was to take over all the
responsibilities of the Casa da Índia, including the annual India armada.[43] It proved to be a
fiasco. The Anglo-Dutch breach of the Portuguese East Indies trade was irreparable by this time,
squeezing profit margins and rendering the Companhia unprofitable. It was liquidated in 1633,
and what remained of the dwindling Portuguese India trade was brought back under the
royal Casa da Índia.
Livro de Lisuarte de Abreu ("Book of Lisuarte de Abreu")
What seems like the first chronology of the Portuguese India armadas can be found in the
magnificently illustrated codex known as the Livro de Lisuarte de Abreu ("Book of Lisuarte de
Abreu", named after the man who ordered the compilation). It covers the period from Vasco da
Gama's first trip (1497–99) to the end of 1563. It is conserved at the Pierpont Morgan
Library in New York City (ms. 525).
Another codex of the same nature is the Memória das Armadas que de Portugal passaram à
Índia ("Memory of the Armadas that from Portugal passed to India") or Livro das Armadas, held
by the Academia das Ciências in Lisbon. It covers the period from 1497 to 1567 (although
missing the armada of 1517).
The first Portuguese chronicler to attempt a systematic chronology of the India Armadas seems
to have been Diogo do Couto, in his appendix to João de Barros's Décadas da Ásia ("Decades of
Asia"), entitled " "De todas as Armadas que os Reys de Portugal mandáram à Índia, até que El-
Rey D. Filippe succedeo nestes Reynos", de 1497 a 1581" (Dec X, Pt.1, Bk. 1, c.16).
Other codices include "Relação das Náos e Armadas da India com os Sucessos dellas que se
puderam Saber, para Noticia e Instrucção dos Curiozos, e Amantes da Historia da India"
("Relation of the Ships and Armadas of India") (Codex Add. 20902 of the British Library),
covering the period from 1497 to 1653. It was compiled on the order of D. António de Ataíde,
who was himself responsible for a good part of its extensive marginal annotations. Other
annotations were added by later unidentified writers.
One of the more exhaustive chronologies, at least up to 1640, was compiled by Manuel de Faria
e Sousa in his Ásia Portugueza (part III, end of volume), published posthumously in 1675. Faria
e Sousa includes not only the India Armadas, but all the Portuguese fleets from 1412, including
those dispatched to Africa under Prince Henry the Navigator.
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There are several chronicles of Portuguese India written by contemporaries and historians, which
provide substantive descriptions of the various armadas. João de Barros's Décadas da
Ásia and Damião de Góis's royal chronicles (Crónica do Felicíssimo Rei D. Manuel, 1566–67
and Crónica do Principe D. João, 1567) were official chronicles. As a result, while
comprehensive, they have the drawbacks of being carefully censored and
consciously propagandistic. Both Barros and Gois constructed their accounts primarily from
archives in Lisbon although Barros's vast work was far more comprehensive and more
conscientiously faithful to accuracy (Góis's was an unabashed hagiography, whereas Barros
frequently updated his account on the discovery of any new scrap of information). Barros's work
was supplemented later by several additional volumes written by Diogo do Couto, who had spent
most of his career in India.
Of the unofficial accounts, Jerónimo Osório's De rebus Emmanuelis, is essentially
a Latin restatement of the earlier chronicles, hoping for a wider European audience, and provides
little that we don't already know. Fernão Lopes de Castanheda's História do descobrimento e
conquista da Índia pelos portugueses ("History of the Discovery and Conquest of the East Indies
by the Portuguese", 1554–59), although unofficial, is generally regarded as 'respectable' and
reliable. Unlike Barros, Góis or Osório, Castanheda actually visited the East, spending ten years
in India, and supplemented the archival material with independent interviews he conducted there
and back in Coimbra.
Distinct from all the others is Gaspar Correia's Lendas da Índia ("Legends of India", written c.
1556, manuscript found and published only in 1885). This is almost entirely original material, his
facts and names are often at variance with the official chronicles. Correia spent nearly his entire
life in India, and drew primarily from materials available there. His style of writing is also much
more entertaining, intense and replete with 'gossipy' details. Although not regarded as reliable,
Correia's account supplies a lot of information that the others miss or prefer to remain silent on.
Besides these comprehensive chronicles, there are many accounts of particular armadas – on-
board diaries, accounts, memoirs and letters written by their passengers.
There is quite some conflict between the various sources over the exact composition of the
various India Armadas, particularly in the names of the captains of the vessels. Attempts have
been made to reconcile the differences between the sources (e.g. Quintella's Annaes da Marinha
Portugueza), although these inevitably involve some degree of conjecture, dispute and revision.
1497
1st India Armada (Vasco da Gama)
7
– opened relations with Malindi
– Opened sea route to India (Calicut)
– one ship scuttled on return journey
1500
2nd India Armada (Pedro Álvares Cabral)
(1st Brazil Armada )
8
Arrived Portugal: September 1502. of Braganza
------------------------- 4.(Fernão Vinet) – owned
Notes: by Marchionni consortium
– two crown ships (1 & 2), two private ships (3 & 5. supply ship (?)
4)
– Discovered islands of Ascension, Saint
Helena and Juan de Nova
– Defeated Calicut fleet off Cannanore (December
31, 1501)
Departed: Feb (Sq. 1 & 2) Apr (Sq. 3), 1502 Fleet: 20 ships in three squadrons
Arrived in India: September 1502 (10+5+5), 800–1,800 men
------------------------- Multiple configurations given in different
Left India: December 1502 sources. One possible arrangement:
Arrived Portugal: September 1503.
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------------------------- Squad 1 (Vasco da Gama)
Notes: 10 ships (4 large naus + 4 navetas (nta) + 2
-d'Atougiua (11) dies, Aguiar transfers from 6 to caravels (cv))
11, 1. São Jerónimo (Vasco da Gama)
– Pero de Mendoça takes 6, but runs it aground near 2. Lionarda (D. Luís Coutinho)
Sofala 3. São Miguel (Gil Matoso)
– Est. factory in Mozambique island (Gonçalo 4. Batecabello (Gil Fernandes de Sousa)
Baixo) 5. São Rafael (Diogo Fernandes Correia,
– new caravel, Pomposa, built at Moz., given nta)
to João Serrão as patrol 6. Santa Elena (Pedro Afonso de Aguiar,
– Gama extorts tribute from Kilwa nta)
– Aguiar (on 11) secures treaty in Sofala 7. Bretoa? (Francisco Mareco/Francisco da
– three squads meet at Malindi, August 1502, cross Cunha, nta)
together. 8. Vera Cruz? (Rui da Cunha/Rui de
– Gama reduces Onor and Batecala to tribute Castanheda, nta)
– Est. alliance and factory at Cannanore 9. Fradeza (João Lopes Perestrello, cv)
– New factor at Cochin (Diogo Fernandes Correia) 10. Salta na Palha? (Antão Vaz do Campo,
– old Cochin factor Gonçalo Gil Barbosa cv)
transferred to Cannanore
– Gama bombards Calicut again. Squad 2 (Vicente Sodré)
Indian coastal patrol established, 200 men, 6–7 5 ships (2 naus + 3 cvs)
ships, under V. de Sodré. Composition: 11. Leitoa Nova? (Vicente Sodré/[[Brás
i. Vicente de Sodré (on 5) Sodré/Fernan d'Atouguia?)
ii. Braz Sodré (on 8) 12. São Paulo (Pêro Álvaro de Ataíde)
iii. P. A. d'Ataide (on 12?) 13. Santa Marta (João/Fernão Rodrigues
iv. Antão Vaz (on 10) Bardaças, cv)
v. F. Rodrigues Bardaças (on 13) 14. Estrella (António Fernandes Roxo, cv)
vi. A. Fernandes Roxo (on 14) 15. Garrida? (Pêro Rafael?, cv)
vii. Pêro Rafael (on 15)?
- Both Vicente and Braz Sodré are lost at Kuria Squad 3 (Estêvão da Gama)
Muria (Oman) in March, 1503. (5 ships (unknown comp.))
– Pêro Álvaro d'Ataide made new patrol captain. 16. (Estevão da Gama)
17. Julia (Lopo Mendes de Vasconcellos)
18. (Thomaz de Carmona/Cremona) –
Italian
19. (Lopo Dias)
20. Rui Mendes de Brito (João da
Bonagracia) – Italian
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Other 1502 events
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censorship of all private map and globe production, with outright
prohibition of any depiction of coast beyond West Africa.
1502 On return of the 2nd Brazil expedition, King Manuel I of
Portugal grants a consortium headed by Fernão de Loronha (or
Noronha), a New Christian merchant of Lisbon, a three-year
charter for the exclusive commercial exploitation of the 'lands of
Santa Cruz' (Brazil). He will drum up a profitable business
in brazilwood and novelty pets (monkeys, parrots). It is estimated
that Loronha will collect some 20,000 quintals of brazilwood
between 1503 and 1506, representing a 400–500% profit rate on
the 4,000 ducats the charter cost him.
1503
5th India Armada (Afonso de Albuquerque)
Departed: Mar (Sq. 1 & 2) Apr (Sq. 3), 1503 Fleet: 9 ships in three squadrons (3+3+3)
Arrived in India: Sq. 2 & Pacheco in Aug 1503; Multiple configurations given in different
Albuquerque in October 1503 sources. One possible arrangement:
Fernandes in May 1504, Saldanha and Ravasco in
September 1504 Squad 1 (Afonso de Albuquerque)
------------------------- 1. Sant' Iago (Afonso de Albuquerque)
Left India: February 1504 (Sq 1 & 2) 2. Espirito Santo (Duarte Pacheco Pereira)
Arrived Portugal: Sq. 1 arrive July 1504, Sq. 2 lost – 350t nau
at sea 3. São Cristóvão/Catharina Dias (Fernão
------------------------- Martins de Almada) – lost at Cape
Notes for Sq. 1 & Sq. 2
– two ships lost at Cape (3 & 6). Squad 2 (Francisco de Albuquerque)
– Sq. 2 makes junction with coastal patrol 4. (Francisco de Albuquerque) – lost on
at Anjediva, return
– Sq. 2 rescue Cochin from attack by Calicut. 5. Faial (Nicolau Coelho) – lost on return
– Erection of Fort Manuel of Cochin (Duarte 6. (Pedro Vaz da Veiga) – lost at Cape
Pacheco Pereira, 150 men, 2 caravels)
– Est. factory in Quilon (António de Sá) Squad 3 (António de Saldanha)
– Sq. 2 (F. Albuquerque and N. Coelho) lost on 7. (António de Saldanha).
return journey 8.(Rui Lourenço Ravasco)
Notes for Sq. 3 : 9. (Diogo Fernandes Pereira)
– hopelessly lost and split, lose monsoon to India,
cross only in 1504. In meantime:
– Saldanha (7) discovers Table Bay, extracts tribute
from Zanzibar
– Ravasco (8) extracts tribute
from Barawa and Mombassa
– Fernandes (9) roams up to Gulf of Aden,
discovers Socotra island.
– Fernandes (9) crosses to India, arrives in middle
of Battle of Cochin (May 1504)
– Saldanha and Ravasco picked up by Albergaria
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fleet (6th Armada) in September 1504.
13
– finds and incorporates ships of Saldanha and 3. (Leonel Coutinho).
Ravasco (3rd Sq of 5th Armada) at Angediva 4. (Tristão da Silva)
(September 4); 5. (Lopo Mendes de Vasconcellos/Lopo
– Bombards Calicut for 48 hours, Martins) – lost at Cape
razes Cranganore 6. (Lopo de Abreu da Ilha)
– Destroys Arab merchant fleet near Calicut. 7. (Pedro Afonso de Aguiar)
– Barreto stays in command of coastal patrol. 8. (Filipe de Castro)
– Mendonça ship (2) lost in channel on return 9. (Vasco da Silveira/Silva)
(rescue mission mounted in late 1505) 10. (Manuel Telles Barreto)
11. (Afonso Lopes da Costa, nta)
12. (Vasco de Carvalho, nta)
13. (Pêro Dinis de Setúbal/Dias, nta) –
omitted in some lists. See note below.
Note: In some lists, Pêro Dinis (or Dias) de Setúbal is substituted with two small ships, one
under Simão de Alcáçova, another under Cristóvão de Távora, bringing the total to fourteen. To
get thirteen again, they assume Albergaria doesn't have his own ship, but is aboard Pêro de
Mendonça's ship on outbound journey.
Other 1504 events
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