EVIDENCE

CASE DIGESTS

GROUP 1

MAGADAN, Alvan A.
LAGUTAO, Phebe May N.
RODRIGUEZ, Joy Mariel S.
TUAZON, Keziah Eden L.
UY, Son Gabriel J.
WU, Jessica M.

Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal

Bukidnon State University, College of Law

February 20, 2021

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Click on the case title to be

directed to the case digest.
A. General principles
1. Concept of evidence
• Baguio Country Club Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-55624,
November 19, 1982
• Bustos v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948, 81 PHIL 640-658
• Aldeguer v. Hoskyn, G.R. No. 1164, September 17, 1903, 2 PHIL 500-503
• People v. Moner y Adam, G.R. No. 202206, March 5, 2018

a. Question of law and fact

▪ Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 83 (1998)
G.R. 124043
▪ Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 90 (1998) GR 127997
▪ Cruz v. People, 303 SCRA 533 (1999) GR121422

2. Scope of the Rules on Evidence

• Ferrer v. Carganillo, G.R. No. 170956, May 12, 2010, 634 PHIL 557-593

3. Classification of Evidence
a. Direct and circumstantial
• People v. Caparas Jr. y Temporas, G.R. Nos. 121811-12, May 14, 1998, 352 PHIL
686

b. Corroborating and cumulative

• Guinea v. Vda. de Ramonal, G.R. No. L-38659, February 20, 1975, 159 PHIL 426

c. Positive and negative

• People v. Araneta, G.R. No. 137604, July 3, 2000, 390 PHIL 306-317

d. Primary and secondary

• H. D. Kneedler v. Paterno, G.R. No. L-1349, December 29, 1949, 85 PHIL 183-192

e. Conclusive and prima facie

• Cometa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124062 (Resolution), December 29, 1999

f. Documentary, object, and testimonial

4. Proof versus evidence

5. Factum probans versus factum probandum

• Grace Park International vs. Eastwest, G.R. No. 210606. July 27, 2016
• Tantuico Jr. v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991
• Far East Marble (Phils.) Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94093, August 10, 1993
• Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994
• Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of Batangas, 201 Phil. 311, July 30, 1982 GR L-38544
• Paranaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, February 26, 1997 GR 111538
• De Gala v. De Gala, 42 Phil. 771

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Baguio Country Club Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission,

G.R. No. L-55624, November 19, 1982

FACTS:

Baguio Country Club Corporation filed with the Ministry of Labor office an
application for clearance to terminate the services of respondent Jimmy Sajonas for
willful breach of trust, telling lies in an investigation, taking money paid by customers,
threatening a fellow employee, committing dishonesty against guests and committing
four violations of the club rules and regulations which would constitute valid grounds for
dismissal. Sajonas then filed his opposition alleging that his dismissal was without justifiable
grounds to support it and that it would contravene his constitutional right to security of
tenure.

After an investigation, the Regional Director suspended Sajonas and indorsed the
case for compulsory arbitration to Labor Arbiter Benigno Ayson. The labor arbiter however
reversed the decision for insufficiency of evidence and ordered the reinstatement of
Sajonas. On appeal, the NLRC also affirmed the decision of Labor Arbiter.

Petitioner then filed a petition contending that it was denied due process as its
evidence was not considered by both the labor arbiter and the NLRC. The petitioner
states that as a result of this ignoring of its evidence, the decisions of the public
respondents are contrary to the facts and the applicable law.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the petitioner was denied of due process as its evidence was not
considered.

HELD/RULING:

Yes. The petitioner was denied of due process. The respondent Commission which
affirmed the order to reinstate Mr. Sajonas was based only on the evidence available to
the labor arbiter when he decided the case in which it had not sufficiently shown a just
cause for the complainant's dismissal.

The respondent Commission committed grave abuse of discretion when it

affirmed the irregular and one-sided procedure adopted by the labor arbiter in arriving
at his finding of insufficiency of evidence and when it decided to uphold a decision not
only contrary to the facts but obviously unfair and unjust. The irregular procedure of labor
arbiter is that it allowed a last minute position paper of respondent Sajonas to be filed
and without requiring a copy to be served upon the Baguio Country Club and without
affording the latter an opportunity to refute or rebut the contents of the paper, forthwith
decided the case.

Thus, the instant petition is a timely reminder to labor arbiters and all who wield
quasi-judicial power to ever bear in mind that evidence is the means, sanctioned by rules,
of ascertaining in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, the truth respecting a matter of
fact. The object of evidence is to establish the truth by the use of perceptive and
reasoning faculties. The statutory grant of power to use summary procedures should
heighten a concern for due process, for judicial perspective in administrative decision
making, and for maintaining the visions which led to the creation of the administrative
office.

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DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS v. ANTONIO G. LUCERO

G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948 81 PHIL 640-658

FACTS:

Dominador Bustos, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying
that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol,
the court of origin, in order that the petitioner herein might cross-examine the
complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of
which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The accused, assisted by counsel,
appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace
informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which
he entered the plea of not guilty. Then his counsel moved that the complainant present
her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in
the manner and form provided by law. The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected,
invoking section 11 of rule 108, which provides
“Evidence - which is the "the mode and manner of proving the
competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish
the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings"

The objection was still sustained denying the motion for reconsideration of the accused
herein. The motion was denied, and for that reason the present special civil action of
mandamus was instituted.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court infringes the
constitutional right of the accused to confront and be confronted by the witness against
him.

HELD/RULING:

No. While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine
witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains
unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him both
at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. It is fundamentally a procedural law.
The Supreme Court that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the
justice of the peace on the matter. Said section defines the bounds of the defendant's
right in the preliminary investigation.

The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against

him does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary
examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses. (32 C.J.S., 456.)

The decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the
majority and denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge
holding the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to
testify anew.

The present petition was dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

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MANUEL ALDEGUER, ET AL. vs. HENRY HOSKYN

G.R. No. 1164, September 17, 1903, 2 PHIL 500-503
FACTS:
Doña Petrona Inarda bought the land in question in 1855 from Don Pablo Garcia.
Doña Petrona lived on the land until her death, in 1876, when Don Miguel Aldeguer, their
grandfather, was appointed guardian of Doña Petrona's four children, the present
plaintiffs. In 1884 Don Manuel sold the land to one Martinez, who sold it to the defendant,
Henry Hoskyn, in 1887. In the deed to Martinez, Don Manuel stated that he acquired the
property by purchase from Don Pablo Garcia twenty-four years before. The court finds
that this declaration was the only evidence in the case that Don Manuel had any title to
the land.

The appellant defendant below assigns as error that the court found from parol
evidence alone the existence of the contract of sale between Don Pablo and Doña
Petrona. It is true the court says that no documentary evidence was received on this
point, but it is also stated that the existence of a written contract was proved, as also its
record in the registry of property, its attachment to a complaint filed in court by the
plaintiffs in 1892, its subsequent destruction with other papers in the case, and the
contents thereof.

The appellant has moved for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. This evidence is to the effect that one Bonifacio Garcia was never the owner
of the land in question and never sold it to the mother of the plaintiffs.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the judgment is supported by the findings of fact stated in the
decision.

HELD/RULING:

After such preliminary proof had been made, parol evidence of the contents of
the document was properly received. Such a ruling does not infringe section 795, par. 6,
of the Civil Code, which provides "that nothing in this act contained shall be so construed
as to divest or injuriously affect any property right that has already become vested under
existing law," even if under article 1221 or other provisions of the Civil Code, after the
destruction of the instrument, such parol evidence of its contents could not have been
given. The general rule is that there is no vested right of property in rules of evidence.

The recital in the document of sale by Don Manuel to Martinez proves nothing
against the plaintiffs, either according to the former law (Civil Code, art. 1218) or
according to the new Code (secs. 277 et seq.), and the claim of the appellant to the
contrary cannot be sustained.

The appellant claimed that he has acquired title by prescription, but the defense
of the statute of limitations was not done. The appellant has moved for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, such that one Bonifacio Garcia was never the
owner of the land in question and never sold it to the mother of the plaintiffs. The motion
was denied on the ground that such evidence is not "of such a character as to probably
change the result." The court finds that the mother of the plaintiffs bought the land from
Don Pablo Garcia. Evidence that Bonifacio did not own it would be immaterial.

The Court finds that the introduced evidence showed that the purchase was
made from Don Pablo. We must presume that this was done without objection on the
part of the defendant, for no exceptions relating to the matter appear in the record. If
such objections had been made, the court had power to allow the plaintiffs to amend
their complaint by striking out the name of Bonifacio and inserting that of Pablo.

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People vs. Teng Moner y Adam,

G.R. No. 202206, March 5, 2018
FACTS:
Teng Moner was convicted by the trial court of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
(3.91 grams). To establish his guilt, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses namely:
P02 Joachim Panopio, P03 Junnifer Tuldanes, and PO3 Edwin Lirio. The prosecution's
evidence tends to establish the facts of the preparation, coordination and buy-bust
operation, arrest of Monera and taking into custody of the dangerous drugs. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Moner elevated the case before the Supreme Court and argued among others
that the arresting officers failed to comply with the statutorily mandated procedure for
the handling and custody of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from him. Moner
asserts that he should be acquitted of the criminal charges levelled against him
specifically because of the following serious lapses in procedure committed by the
apprehending officers: (a) the physical inventory was not conducted at the place where
the seizure was made; (b) the seized item was not photographed at the place of seizure;
and (c) there was no physical inventory and photograph of the seized item in the
presence of the accused, or his representative or counsel, with an elected public official
and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. He also
maintained that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof, failed to present
in court the informant who pointed him as supplier of shabu and that the operation was
conducted without proper coordination with PDEA. He also pointed out that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent, incredible, and unworthy of
belief.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21of Republic
Act No. 9165 will render the illegal drugs seized or confiscated in a buy-bust operation
inadmissible as evidence.

HELD/RULING:
No. The chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure. It is
therefore the Court who has the last say regarding the appreciation of evidence. Under
Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to
the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.

The court ruled that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
that were pointed out by Moner consist merely of minor variances that do not deviate
from the main narrative which is the fact that Moner sold illegal drugs to a poseur-buyer.
It has been held, time and again, that minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the
declarations of witnesses do not destroy the witnesses’ credibility but even enhance their
truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. It bears stressing, too,
that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by
the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not
conclusive effect. People vs. Moner, 857 SCRA 242, G.R. No. 202206 March 5, 2018

The court have consistently ruled that noncompliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 will not necessarily render the illegal drugs seized or
confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible. Strict compliance with the letter of
Section 21 is not required if there is a clear showing that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized illegal drugs have been preserved, i.e., the illegal drugs being offered
in court as evidence is, without a specter of doubt, the very same item recovered in the
buy-bust operation.

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Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,

298 SCRA 83 (1998) G.R. 124043
FACTS:
Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts
various programs and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young
people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable objectives.

In 1980, private respondent earned, among others, an income of P676,829.80 from

leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen
operators, and P44,259.00 from parking fees collected from non-members. On July 2,
1984, the commissioner of internal revenue (CIR) issued an assessment to private
respondent, in the total amount of P415,615.01 including surcharge and interest, for
deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and
professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. Private respondent formally
protested the assessment and, as a supplement to its basic protest, filed a letter dated
October 8, 1985. In reply, the CIR denied the claims of YMCA.

YMCA filed a petition for review at the Court of Tax Appeals and in due course, the
CTA issued a ruling in favor of the YMCA considering their findings that YMCA was not
engaged in the business of operating or contracting a parking lot and therefore there is
no legal basis for the imposition of a deficiency fixed tax and a contractor's tax in the
amounts of P353.15 and P3,129.73, respectively.

When the CIR elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), the CA initially
decided in favor of the CIR but upon finding merit in the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by the YMCA, the CA reversed itself stating that the Court cannot depart from the CTA's
findings of fact, as they are supported by evidence beyond what is considered as
substantial.

The internal revenue commissioner's own Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
Respondent Court. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not, in its decision, the Court of Appeals departed from the findings of
facts of the Court of Tax Appeals when being supported by substantial evidence should
have been final and conclusive?

HELD/RULING:
Indeed, it is a basic rule in taxation that the factual findings of the CTA, when
supported by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that
the said court committed gross error in the appreciation of facts. In the present case, this
Court finds that the February 16, 1994 Decision of the CA did not deviate from this rule.
The latter merely applied the law to the facts as found by the CTA and ruled on the issue
raised by the CIR: "Whether or not the collection or earnings of rental income from the
lease of certain premises and income earned from parking fees shall fall under the last
paragraph of Section 27 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended."

Clearly, the CA did not alter any fact or evidence. It merely resolved the
aforementioned issue, as indeed it was expected to. That it did so in a manner different
from that of the CTA did not necessarily imply a reversal of factual findings.

The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is clear-cut. It has
been held that "[t]here is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts." In the present
case, the CA did not doubt, much less change, the facts narrated by the CTA. It merely
applied the law to the facts. That its interpretation or conclusion is different from that of
the CTA is not irregular or abnormal.

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Villanueva v. Court of Appeals

294 SCRA 90 (1998) GR 127997

FACTS:

In a civil action for sum of money with damages filed by private respondent
Almario Go Manuel against petitioner Felix Villanueva and his wife Melchora which
involved a check dated June 30, 1991 in the amount of P167,600.00 issued by petitioner
in favor of private respondent. The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 rendered
a decision in favor of private respondent, directing the petitioner to pay the private
respondent P167,600.00, the dismissal of the case with respect to his co-defendant
Melchora Villanueva, and finally with costs against the husband. Both parties appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner prayed for the reversal of the trial court's
decision and contended that his principal obligation was only P23,420.00, while private
respondent sought interest of ten percent (10%) of the principal obligation; twenty-five
percent (25%) as attorney's fees, as well as moral and exemplary damages. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the trial court
subject to the modification that petitioner was directed to additionally pay private
respondent attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of ten (10%) percent of
P167,600.00, and the entire obligation to earn interest at six (6%) percent per annum from
the filing of the complaint.

ISSUE/S:

W/N the Court of Appeals erred in its decision based on the presented evidence?

HELD/RULING:

Time and again it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases
brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of
law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed
conclusive. As such, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings.

After a review of the case at bar, we consider petitioner to have failed to raise
issues which would constitute sufficient ground to warrant the reversal of the findings of
the trial and appellate courts.

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Cruz v. People
303 SCRA 533 (1999) GR No. 121422
FACTS:

On June 19, 1990, police officers arrested petitioner without warrant for illegal
possession of a .38 caliber revolver with six (6) rounds of ammunition while waiting outside
the Manila Pavilion Hotel along U.N. Ave., Manila.

The trial court proceeded to try the case. After the prosecution presented and
formally offered its evidence, the trial court issued an order dated January 18, 1993,
admitting in evidence the gun and ammunition seized from the accused, over his
objections. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner, on motion and upon
leave of court, filed a demurrer to evidence. On December 20, 1993, the trial court
denied the demurrer, and ordered the accused to present his evidence. Instead, the
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in an order
dated July 8, 1994.

On October 27, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
to annul the three (3) orders, namely: the order admitting the prosecution's formal offer
of evidence; the order denying his demurrer to evidence; and the order denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, for being issued capriciously, arbitrarily and
whimsically, in utter disregard of controlling law and jurisprudence, and with grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On November 7, 1994, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and
ordered the trial court to temporarily refrain from further proceeding with the trial of
Criminal Case No. 90-85059.

On August 8, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision 9 denying the petition for
lack of merit. The Court of Appeals ruled that the assailed orders were interlocutory in
nature and not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioner should wait until the trial court has
decided the case on its merits and if aggrieved, appeal from his conviction. The Court of
Appeals held that the trial court's order admitting the allegedly inadmissible evidence
involved questions of facts, which are not reviewable in petitions for certiorari. There
being no error on jurisdiction, whatever error in judgment committed by the trial court
cannot be corrected by certiorari.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's order
admitting in evidence the gun and ammunition, which are allegedly inadmissible for
being the fruits of an illegal warrantless arrest and search?

HELD/RULING:

Regarding the denial of the demurrer to evidence, we have likewise ruled that the
question of whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to convince
the court that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt rests entirely within the
sound discretion of the trial court. The error, if any, in the denial of the demurrer to
evidence may be corrected only by appeal. The appellate court will not review in such
special civil action the prosecution's evidence and decide in advance that such
evidence has or has not established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The orderly procedure prescribed by the Revised Rules of Court is for the accused to
present his evidence, after which the trial court, on its own assessment of the evidence
submitted, will then properly render its judgment of acquittal or conviction. If judgment is
rendered adversely against the accused, he may appeal the judgment and raise the
same defenses and objections for review by the appellate court.

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FELISA R. FERRER v. DOMINGO CARGANILLO, SERGIO CARGANILLO, SOLEDAD

AGUSTIN and MARCELINA SOLIS
G.R. No. 170956 May 12, 2010 634 PHIL 557-593

FACTS:

Among the four cases in the herein petition is DARAB Case No. 7862, “Felisa R.
Ferrer v. Domingo Carganillo and Sergio Carganillo” for Ejectment and Damages.
Petitioner alleged that she is the owner of a 6,000-square meters lot under Tax Declaration
No. 42-06462, situated at Brgy. Legaspi, Tayug, Pangasinan and tenanted by respondent
Domingo Carganillo who subleased the subject landholding to his brother, respondent
Sergio Carganillo for ₱ 15,000.00.

The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) dismissed her complaint for
lack of evidence and merit. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which rendered its Decision affirming the
finding of the PARAD. On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), Decision was rendered
affirming the DARAB Decision.

Petitioner argues that the CA erred in not finding that Domingo subleased or
mortgaged his landholding rights to Sergio which warrants their ejectment from the
subject landholding. She asserts that as evidenced by the Katulagan, Sergio has been
cultivating the land for more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint. The DARAB
held that the Katulagan is inadmissible in evidence because it was not formally offered
before the PARAD. On appeal, however, the CA considered the Katulagan, but found
the same to be a mere promissory note tending to prove indebtedness and not as an
evidence of mortgage.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the DARAB erred in disregarding the Katulagan as evidence.

HELD/RULING:

Yes. The Rules of Court, particularly the Revised Rules on Evidence, are specifically
applicable to judicial proceedings. The rules of evidence shall be the same in all trials
and hearing except as otherwise provided by law or these rules (Sec. 2, Rule 128).

In quasi-judicial proceedings, the said rule shall not apply except “by analogy or
in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient”. The DARAB Rules
of Procedure explicitly provides that the Agrarian Reform Adjudicators are not bound by
technical rules of procedure and evidence in the Rules of Court nor shall the latter apply
even in a suppletory manner. Thus, the DARAB erred in holding the Katulagan as
inadmissible since it was not formally offered and admitted. The fundamental rule found
in Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court does not find any application in this agrarian
case.

Respondents Domingo and Sergio Carganillo were dispossessed from the subject
landholding.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

RAMON CAPARAS JR. y Temporas a.k.a “Jun Pusa” and
JOSE SANTOS y Jordan a.k.a. Jun Balbon a.k.a “Jun Narcom”
G.R. Nos. 121811-12, May 14, 1998, 352 PHIL 686

FACTS:
Accused-appellants Ramon Caparas, Jr. y Temporas and Jose Santos y Jordan
were charged before the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region, Branch 25 of
Cabanatuan City with the crime of rape with homicide accusing them of raping and
killing a 13-year old girl named Maricris Fernandez. Both were convicted and sentenced
with death penalty. In its decision, the trial court heavily relied on the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution and considered this sufficient to establish the
culpability of the accused-appellants. Finding the judgment unacceptable, accused-
appellants filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not circumstantial evidence was duly established?

2. Whether or not the prosecutor’s reliance on circumstantial evidence was

sufficient to establish the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD/RULING:

Circumstantial evidence is evidence which indirectly proves a fact in issue, where

the fact finder must draw an inference or reason from the evidence established (People
vs. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191 [1995]), much like a tapestry forming a pattern from its
interwoven strands (People vs. Cabrera, 241 SCRA 28 [1995]). To suffice for conviction, (1)
there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt (Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules on
Evidence). Or simply put, the circumstances proven must form an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the perpetrator of the crime (People vs. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167 [1996]). In the
case at bar, the circumstantial evidence provided by the testimony of two witnesses is
contradicted, or at least not supported, by the physical evidence on hand. Firstly, it was
established by expert testimony that the hair strands found in the victim's hand belong
neither to Caparas nor Santos. Secondly, the human blood extracted from the victim's
fingernails, although matched the blood type of Santos, does not indicate with certainty
that Santos killed the victim because such type is the second most common type of
blood types. Thirdly, several circumstances considered by the trial court are irrelevant as
to the guilt, or innocence of the accused-appellants. Also, some circumstances
considered by the trial court are really irrelevant as to the guilt, or innocence, for that
matter, of accused-appellants.

Alibi is a weak defense. But then, so also is the prosecution's evidence in this case.
With what is on record, especially the findings of the NBI's forensic chemist, reasonable
doubt exists warranting the dismissal of the charges against Caparas and Santos. Indeed,
it is when evidence is purely circumstantial that the prosecution is much more obligated
to rely on the strength of its own case and not on the weakness of the defense, and that
conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty (People vs. Payawal, 247 SCRA
424 [1995]).

The Supreme Court finds the appeal meritorious. Thus, the Court believes that
reasonable doubt exists warranting the dismissal of the charge against accused-
appellants. In view thereof, the challenged decision is reversed and set aside and both
accused-appellants are acquitted of the crime charged.

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BEATRIZ MERCADO GUINEA, CARIDAD MERCADO VDA. DE GALLEGO,

ESTRELLA MERCADO IRENEO, SUSANA G. VDA. DE MERCADO,
VENUS MERCADO ABELLA, NILDA MERCADO ARUBAN,
ASILA MERCADO CURVERA, SILVESTRE MERCADO, JR.,
GODOFREDO MERCADO, ABUNDIA MERCADO,
GERTRUDES MERCADO TORRES, MANOLO TAMESIN,
ROMEO TAMESIN and BETTY EDMILAO VDA. DE MERCADO; and
REMEDIOS, EMMA, MILA, JULIO, EMMANUEL, and ANGELO,
all surnamed MERCADO, represented herein by their Mother
BETTY EDMILAO VDA. DE MERCADO, as Guardian-ad-litem, v.
MATILDE S. VDA. DE RAMONAL and JUDGE BERNARDO TEVES
of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental
G.R. No. L-38659 February 20, 1975 159 PHIL 426

FACTS:

During the trial of their case before respondent Judge, petitioners presented their
eighth witness allegedly to prove the same point already testified to by their previous
seven witnesses. Upon objection of private respondent, respondent Judge disallowed his
testimony. Subsequently, in the scheduled continuation of the trial, respondent Judge
terminated petitioners' evidence after their counsel had failed to arrive on time and
ordered private respondent to present her evidence. Denied reconsideration, petitioners
filed the present action for certiorari to annul this later order as well as the previous order
of respondent Judge.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing the eight witness
to testify on the issue of possession and in terminating the presentation of evidence.

HELD/RULING:

No. Where the testimony of the eight witness for the plaintiffs be on the same point
already testified to by their preceding seven witnesses, such testimony would be merely
cumulative and not corroborative. A testimony which would be merely cumulative may
be rejected by the trial court. The trial court is invested with the prerogative of stopping
"further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full
that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally
persuasive." (Sec. 6, Rule 133, Rules of Court).

Special civil action for certiorari dismissed with costs against petitioners.

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People v. Araneta
G.R. No. 137604, July 3, 2000, 390 PHIL 306-317

FACTS:

The accused was convicted of the crime of murder. That on or about 21st day of
December, 1995, in the municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila, Philippines, the accused
armed with a gum, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, did and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot Leo Latoja, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon the victim gunshot wounds which caused his immediate death.
Accused anchors his defense on mistaken identity and denial and alibi.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or Not the defense of mistaken identity should prosper.

HELD/RULING:

The appellant’s claim that witness was mistaken in naming him as “Gilbert Araneta”
and not “Robert Araneta” does not destroy her credibility and is not sufficient to
exculpate him. For even assuming that the accused real name is Robert, it is sufficient
that she was positive as to his physical identity as a participant in the shooting of her son
from her personal knowledge for purposes of identifying him in the present case. Given
the positive identification made by the lone prosecution witness, the appellant’s
uncorroborated defense of denial and alibi must fail. However, treachery and evident
premeditation were not established, therefore, the crime committed can only be
homicide, not murder. Abuse of superiority was however established. Considering that
the victim when assaulted was unarmed, he was therefore no match to his 3 adversaries
who were all armed with handguns. Our jurisprudence is exemplified by the holding that
where 3 armed persons attacked the defenseless victim but there was no proof as to how
the attack commence and treachery was not proved, the fact that there were 3 armed
assailants would constitute abuse of superior strength.

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H. D. Kneedler v. Paterno
G.R. No. L-1349, December 29, 1949, 85 PHIL 183-192

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Kneedler
Realty Co. sold to Simon Paterno a parcel of land situated in the municipality of Pasay
(now Rizal City). Paterno made an initial payment of P30,000 and agreed to pay the
balance of P81,000 in eleven monthly installments of P7,000 each and a twelfth
installment of P4,000, with interest at 9 per cent (9%) per annum. To guarantee the
payment of the said balance of P81,000 plus interest, attorney's fees, and cost of
collection, Paterno mortgaged the same property to the Kneedler Realty Co., and the
mortgage was duly annotated on the new transfer certificate of title No. 44470 issued in
his name by virtue of the deed of sale. The last mentioned transfer certificate of title was
subsequently lost. This action was commenced to foreclose said mortgage. On June 26,
1946, the defendant Simon Paterno wrote to the plaintiff H. D. Kneedler, in his capacity
as liquidator of the Kneedler Realty Co. with reference to their conversation of the 22nd
instant and the suit Kneedler instituted against Paterno, Vicente Madrigal, and the
Registers of Deeds of Manila and Rizal in Civil Case No. 7729 where he beg to confirm the
arrangement they have entered into in settlement of that suit. Acknowledging his
indebtedness to Kneedler in the amount of P81,000, together with interest at the rate of
5 per cent (5%) per annum from exclusive of the time of the Japanese occupation. He
will pay P5,000 upon accepting the letter and the dismissal of that suit. The balance, will
be paid P20,000.00 within 90 days; 20,000.00 within 180 days; 20,000.00 within 270 days;
and the balance—within 360 days with interest at 5 per cent (5%) per annum on unpaid
balances. The letter was alleged to be guaranteed by Don Vicente Madrigal upon
sending by Kneedler a copy of the motion to dismiss the case, whereupon Paterno will
send Mr. Vicente Madrigal's guaranty. Because Paterno refused to sign a mortgage to
guarantee the new schedule of payments as contained in the foregoing letter, the
plaintiff did not move to dismiss this case. The defendants Paterno and Madrigal filed their
answer, wherein they admitted the purchase by Paterno of the property in question and
the execution by him of a mortgage thereon to guarantee the payment of P81,000 plus
interest, attorney's fees, and cost of collection, as alleged in the complaint; but averred
as a special defense that during the Japanese occupation Simon Paterno paid to the
Japanese Enemy Property Custodian as liquidator of the Kneedler Realty Co., the entire
amount, in Japanese currency, due and owing under the mortgage. After due trial, it
was held that such payment was null and void and that therefore the obligation in favor
of the plaintiff had not been extinguished. The plaintiff insists in his brief that in the
absence of documentary proof plaintiff-appellee cannot accept the allegation of
payment.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not proof of payment may be established in the absence of

documentary proof to relieve the appellant from his obligation?

HELD/RULING:

Failure on part of Paterno to produce the primary or best evidence to establish

that the debt had been already paid is the receipt itself cancelling the mortgage, made
him accountable that the mortgage still subsists. Otherwise, he should have a secondary
evidence proving that the mortgage had been cancelled and paid other than the oral
testimony that does not corroborating as in the present case. Under Sec. 3., Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court Original document must be produced as a general rule. Under the
following circumstances, when: (a) The original of the document is one the contents of
which are the subject of inquiry; (b) When a document is in two or more copies executed
at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded

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as originals; (c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being
copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise
equally regarded as originals. The payment was alleged to have been made by checks
on the Yokohama Specie Bank. The present action was commenced on May 24, 1946,
and the trial was not held until October 25, 1946. Defendant then had sufficient
opportunity to produce the best evidence available had he exercised due diligence. If
the intervening period of five months between the filing of the complaint and the date
of the trial were not sufficient, said defendant could and should have asked the trial court
for the postponement of the trial to enable him to locate the necessary documentary
evidence in support of his defense. There was no cancellation of mortgage issued to the
defendant-mortgagor. It is strange that in paying off a mortgage for such a big amount
of the defendant Paterno contented himself with a mere receipt in Japanese characters
instead of securing a cancellation of the mortgage as other debtors of enemy nationals
who made payments to the Japanese did, thus it appears from defendant's own
testimony and that of his witnesses -that the Japanese Military Administration did not
cancel or release the mortgage in question. The judgment is affirmed, with costs against
the appellant.

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Cometa v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124062 (Resolution), December 29, 1999
FACTS:
SIHI and Cometa filed a criminal case against Guevara for falsification of Public
Documents which was docketed in the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Makati, entitled
State Investment House, Inc. vs. Reynaldo S. Guevara. The basis of the aforesaid case
filed by the defendants against Guevara is a supposed Affidavit of Undertaking which
had allegedly been submitted by the plaintiffs with the (HLURB) in connection with its
application of a License to Sell its townhouse units. According to the plaintiffs, the
Affidavit of Undertaking is a forgery because Cometa’s signature was forged. Office of
the Makati Provincial Fiscal dismissed the case filed by the defendants against Guevara.
Department of Justice reversed the dismissal of the case by the Makati Provincial Fiscal
and ordered the filing of the corresponding information in court. Consequently, a criminal
information was filed against Guevara in RTC. The prosecution represented by a private
prosecutor hired by the plaintiffs, presented its evidence against Guevara. The principal
evidence submitted by the prosecution consists of the sworn testimony of Cometa to the
effect that Guevara had submitted the forged document. After the prosecution had
rested its case, Guevara filed a Motion to Dismiss on a Demurrer to the Evidence,
contending that all the evidence submitted by the prosecution do not suffice to show
that he had committed the crime for which he has been accused. RTC granted the
motion to dismiss and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case for falsification of public
documents against him. Petitioners move for a reconsideration of the decision in this case.
They contend (1) that the complaint and its annexes show that petitioners acted with
probable cause and without malice in charging private respondent Reynaldo Guevarra
with falsification of public documents, and (2) that the non-inclusion in the civil case for
malicious prosecution of the government prosecutors who directed the filing in court of
the criminal case shows the existence of probable cause and the absence of malice.
Contending that the prosecution of private respondent Guevarra for falsification was
grounded on probable cause. On the other hand, private respondents argued that the
absence of probable cause is sufficiently alleged in their complaint that petitioners
criminal action against private respondent Guevarra had no basis in fact and in law as
well as by virtue of the trial courts dismissal of the criminal case for falsification of public
documents on private respondent Guevarras demurrer to the evidence.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of malicious prosecution?

HELD/RULING:
No. A complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause of action if it alleges the
following: (1) that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that at least the
prosecution was instituted at his instance; (2) that the prosecution finally terminated in
the acquittal of the plaintiff; (3) that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without
probable cause; and (4) that the prosecutor was actuated by malice. The first two
requisites are sufficiently alleged in the complaint. We may also take as sufficiently
pleaded the fourth requisite, i.e., malice. As stated in the original decision in this case, a
general averment of malice is sufficient in view of Rule 8, 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, the allegation in par. 18 that petitioners filed the criminal case for the
purpose of harassing and pressuring Guevarra, in his capacity as chairman of Guevent
Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC), to give in to their illicit and malicious desire
to appropriate the remaining unsold properties of the corporation, may be considered
sufficient. The question, however, is whether the third requisite, i.e., that the prosecutor
acted without probable cause, has been sufficiently alleged. To be sure, lack of probable
cause is an element separate and distinct from that of malice. It follows, therefore, that
one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he
acted with probable cause. The court found the complaint failed to state a cause of
action.

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Grace Park International vs. Eastwest

G.R. No. 210606. July 27, 2016

FACTS:

Grace Park International Corporation and Woodlink Realty Corporation

(petitioners) entered into a Mortgage Trust Indenture (MTI) with EBC, Allied, Security
(respondents), and Banco De Oro Unibank (BDO), with EBC acting as trustee, in the
aggregate amounts of ₱162,314,499.00 and US$797,176.47. BDO was the majority creditor
with 58.04% ownership of the credit, with EBC, Allied, and Security having 18.33%, 12.58%,
and 11.05% ownership, respectively. As collaterals, petitioners mortgaged 8 parcels of
land, as well as the improvements. Under the MTI, EBC, as trustee, cannot commence
foreclosure proceedings on any or all parts of the collaterals without the written
instructions from the majority creditors. During the pendency of the MTI, BDO's majority
share in the MTI was effectively paid for by Sherwyn Yao, Jeremy Jerome Sy, and Leveric
Ng (Sherwyn, et al.). EBC refused to honor the subrogation, causing Sherwyn, et al. to file
an action for subrogation and injunction, before the RTC-Makati. On the other hand, an
Amended Complaint for Injunction and Annulment of Foreclosure Sale was filed by
petitioners against respondents before the RTC-Malolos. In the respondents’ Answer and
Motion to Dismiss, they contended that the complaint before the RTC-Malolos should be
dismissed on the grounds of forum shopping and litis pendentia. They claimed that the
action for subrogation pending before the RTC-Makati basically involved the same
parties, reliefs, and causes of action with the action pending before the RTC-Malolos.
RTC-Malolos dismissed the case on the ground of forum shopping. CA likewise upheld the
dismissal, hence the petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not there is forum shopping in the instant cases.

HELD/RULING:

None. There is forum shopping when the following elements are present, namely:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amounts to res judicata in the action under consideration. In the instant case it cannot
be said that there is an identity of parties between the case pending before RTC-Makati
and that pending before RTC-Malolos because the plaintiffs in the former, herein Sherwyn,
et al (subrogated as creditors under the MTI)., represent substantially different interests
from the plaintiffs in the latter, herein petitioners (debtors to the MTI). The causes of action
in both cases are likewise substantially different in that in RTC-Makati, the cause of action
arose from EBC's alleged unjust refusal to subrogate Sherwyn, et al; while in RTC-Malolos,
the cause of action stemmed from EBC's purported breach of the MTI. At the most, a
judgment in the case pending in RTC Makati may only constitute the factum probans (or
evidentiary facts) by which the factum probandum (or the ultimate fact) sought to be
proven by petitioners in the case pending before RTC-Malolos, i.e., EBC’s non-
compliance with the foreclosure provisions of the MTI, could be established.

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Tantuico Jr. v. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991
FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, and assisted by the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil case against
Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. Petitioner Francisco S.
Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant in the case. After his motion for production and
inspection of documents was denied by respondent court, petitioner filed a Motion for a
Bill of Particulars, alleging that he is sued for acts allegedly committed by him as (a) a
public officer-Chairman of the Commission on Audit, (b) as a private individual, and (c)
in both capacities, in a complaint couched in too general terms and shorn of particulars
that would inform him of the factual and legal basis thereof, and that to enable him to
understand and know with certainty the particular acts allegedly committed by him and
which he is now charged with culpability, it is necessary that plaintiff furnish him the
particulars sought therein. The Solicitor General, for and in behalf of respondents,
opposed the motion. After the petitioner had filed his reply thereto, the respondent
Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution denying the petitioner's motion for a bill of
particulars on the ground that the particulars sought by petitioner are evidentiary in
nature and that evidentiary facts or matters are not essential in the pleading of the cause
of action, nor to details or probative value or particulars of evidence by which these
material evidences are to be established.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of

discretion in issuing the disputed resolutions.

HELD/RULING:

Yes. Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either directly form
the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or
omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or
particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established. It refers
to principal, determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entire
cause of action rests. While the term "evidentiary fact" has been defined as those facts
which are necessary for determination of the ultimate facts; they are the premises upon
which conclusions of ultimate facts are based. Where the complaint states ultimate facts
that constitute the essential elements of a cause of action. In the case at bar, the
allegations of the complaint in relation to which the petitioner pleads for a bill of
particulars are mere conclusions of law unsupported by factual premises. Nowhere in the
complaint is there any allegation as to what petitioner's duties were, with respect to the
alleged withdrawals and disbursements or how petitioner facilitated the alleged
withdrawals, disbursements, or conversion of public funds and properties, nor an
allegation from where the withdrawals and disbursements came from, except for a
general allegation that they came from the national treasury. Hence, without the
particulars prayed for in petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the
petitioner cannot intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial. Furthermore,
the particulars prayed for are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars
are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order
that the defendant may be informed of the claims made against him to the end that he
may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.

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Far East Marble (Phils.) Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 94093, August 10, 1993
FACTS:

The Bank of the Philippines Islands (BPI) filed a complaint for foreclosure of chattel
mortgage with replevin against petitioner Far East Marble (Phils.), Inc. (Far East), Ramon
A. Tabuena and Luis R. Tabuena, Jr. with Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region. Far East received from BPI several loans evidenced by promissory notes
executed by Far East and credit facilities in the form of Trust Receipts. The said promissory
notes and trust receipts have long matured but despite repeated requests and demands
for payment, Far East has failed and refused to pay. Far East also executed, in favor of
BPI, a Chattel Mortgage. Far East filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim
admitting the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes, alleging further
that said notes became due and demandable. On the basis of the maturity dates of the
notes, Far East raised the affirmative defenses of prescription and lack of cause of action
as it denied the allegation of the complaint that BPI had made previous repeated
requests and demands for payment. BPI maintained, the ten-years prescriptive period to
enforce its written contract had not only been interrupted, but was renewed. BPI then
filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that since Far East had admitted the
genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes and the deed of chattel
mortgage, there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, thus entitling BPI to a
favorable judgment as a matter of law in regard to its causes of action and on its right to
foreclose the chattel mortgage.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the complaint sufficiently established a cause of action.

HELD/RULING:

Yes. Complaint is a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the

plaintiff's cause or causes of action. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts
which either form the basis of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the
wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, while evidentiary facts are those which tend
to prove or establish said ultimate facts. Basically, a cause of action consists of three
elements, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the
defendant; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
These elements are manifest in BPI's complaint, particularly when it was therein alleged
that: (1) for valuable consideration, BPI granted several loans, evidenced by promissory
notes, and extended credit facilities in the form of trust receipts to Far East (photocopies
of said notes and receipts were duly attached to the Complaint); (2) said promissory
notes and trust receipts had matured; and (3) despite repeated requests and demands
for payment thereof, Far East had failed and refused to pay. Clearly then, the general
allegation of BPI that "despite repeated requests and demands for payment, Far East has
failed to pay" is sufficient to establish BPI's cause of action. Besides, prescription is not a
cause of action; it is a defense which, having been raised, should, as correctly ruled by
the Court of Appeals (DBP vs. Ozarraga, 15 SCRA 48 [1965]), be supported by competent
evidence. But even as Far East raised the defense of prescription, BPI countered to the
effect that the prescriptive period was interrupted and renewed by written extrajudicial
demands for payment and acknowledgment by Far East of the debt. In the case at bar,
the circumstances of BPI extending loans and credits to Far East and the failure of the
latter to pay and discharge the same upon maturity are the only ultimate facts which
have to be pleaded, although the facts necessary to make the mortgage valid
enforceable must be proven during the trial.

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Salita v. Magtolis
G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994
FACTS:

Petitioner and Private Respondent Espinosa were married on 1986 and separated
2 years after. Espinosa sued for annulment on the ground of Salita’s psychological
Incapacity. The RTC of Quezon City granted for Salita’s motion for a Bill of Particulars.
Espinosa specified in the Bill of Particulars the incapacity of Salita in being “unable to
understand and accept the demands by his profession’ whose intervention caused
Espinosa to lose his Job as a Doctor of Medicine. RTC and the Appellate Court found that
the Bill of Particulars adequate and issued an order upholding its sufficiency. Salita was
not contented and filed for certiorari regarding the insufficiency of the Bill of Particulars
arguing that the assertion (in the Bill of Particulars) is a statement of legal conclusion
made by petitioner's counsel and not an averment of 'ultimate facts,' as required by the
Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion may properly be inferred.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Bill of Particulars which specified the facts on the psychological
incapacity of the petitioner sufficient?

HELD/RULING:

The Court sustains finding of CA that Espinosas’ Bill of Particulars is Sufficient and to
ask for more is asking for evidentiary matters (Factum Probans). RTC to resume on the
annulment proceedings.

Note:

Rule 12, Section 6. Bill a part of pleading. — A bill of particulars becomes part of
the pleading for which it is intended. Evidence Submitted with the Filing of
Complaint and Answer

(Rules 7 and 11) Parties to a case are now required to attach to their opening
pleading (i.e., the complaint for the plaintiff or the answer for the defendant)
copies of all the pieces of evidence supporting their claims and defenses. They
must also indicate the names of intended witnesses and the summaries of their
testimonies.

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Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of Batangas

201 Phil. 311, July 30, 1982 GR L-38544
FACTS:

Petitioner, Balitaan, filed for Estafa against Rita De Los Reyes. Balitaan was the
owner of a dress shop in which the accused, De Los Reyes was an employee of. The dress
shop mended and made dresses for a business establishment in Makati. De Los Reyes
collected a sum of 127.58 pesos for the payment of the dresses made by Balitaan and to
deliver the amount to the latter. Despite repeated demands, De Los Reyes, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply, and convert the sum to her own use
and benefit to the damage and prejudice of Balitaan. In a testimony during a direct
examination of Balitaan, in the MTC, the counsel for the accused moved to strike out the
petitioner’s testimonies but the trial court denied the motion. The CFI nullified the MTC
decision and ordered the testimonies to be stricken out. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the testimonial evidence corresponded with the allegations in the
Information which did not state the three checks.
2. Whether or not the mode or form of Estafa in the information is correct?

HELD/RULING:

The Court reversed and set aside the decision of the respondent Court and held
that the existence of the three checks need not be alleged in the Information. They are
evidentiary matters which is not required therein.

It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be

alleged in the complaint or information. It is true that estafa under paragraph 1(b) is
essentially a different offense from estafa under paragraph 2(a). To sustain a conviction
for estafa under paragraph 2(a), on the other hand, deceit or false representation to
defraud and the damage caused thereby must be proved. This does not mean, however,
that presentation of proof of deceit in a prosecution for estafa under paragraph 1(b) is
not allowed. Abuse of confidence and deceit may co- exist. The presence of deceit
would not change the whole theory of the prosecution that estafa with abuse of
confidence was committed. Besides, in estafa by means of deceit, it is essential that the
false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive
which induces the complainant to part with the thing. MTC properly denied, CA decision
reversed and set aside.

(Rules 7 and 11) Parties to a case are now required to attach to their opening pleading (i.e., the
complaint for the plaintiff or the answer for the defendant) copies of all the pieces of evidence
supporting their claims and defenses. They must also indicate the names of intended witnesses
and the summaries of their testimonies.

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Paranaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

February 26, 1997 GR No. 111538
FACTS:

Private Respondent, Santos owned parcels of land and leased it to

Parañaque Kings. However Santos sold the property to private Respondent,
Raymundo even with the contract of lease to petitioner stating, First Option.
Petitioner filed for Breach of Contract. Trial court dismissed the complaint for lack
of a valid cause of action. Appellate court sustained respondent’s motion to
dismiss on the allegations that Santos had offered the subject property for sale to
the petitioner prior to Raymundo.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the complaint stated a valid cause of action?

HELD/RULING:

We do not agree with respondents' contention that the issue involved is

purely factual. The complaint sufficiently alleges an actional contractual breach
on the part of the respondents, under Part 9. The principal legal question, as
stated earlier, is whether the complaint filed by herein petitioner in the lower court
states a valid cause of action. Since such question assumes the facts alleged in
the complaint as true, it follows that the determination thereof is one of law, and
not of facts. A careful examination of the complaint reveals that it sufficiently
alleges an actionable contractual breach on the part of private respondents.
Under paragraph 9 of the contract petitioner, was granted the "first option or
priority" to purchase the leased properties in case Santos decided to sell. But on
September 21, 1988, Santos sold said properties to Respondent Raymundo
without first offering these to petitioner. conclusion that the complaint states a
valid cause of action for breach of the right of first refusal and that the trial court
should thus not have dismissed the complaint, we find no more need to pass upon
the question of whether the complaint states a cause of action for damages or
whether the complaint is barred by estoppel or laches. As these matters require
presentation and/or determination of facts, they can be best resolved after trial
on the merits. Trial court and Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint
and hereby reversed and set aside.

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De Gala v. De Gala
42 Phil. 771
FACTS:

This case is to compel the defendant pedro De Gala to recognize the plaintiff as
his natural son. Complaint alleged that the plaintiff had been in uninterrupted possession
of the status of a natural child of defendant which latter denied. the defendant objected
on admitting an evidence from a stenographic notes from another case. upon the
ground that it was "impertinent." The lower court sustained the objection. The lower court
sustained the objection. RTC Dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint and absolved defendant
from all liability. Plaintiff appealed but defendant died, hence the substitution by the
spouse and only legitimate son as defendants.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Exhibit C (stenographic notes) was admissible as evidence.

HELD/RULING:

While it is true that such admission of the defendant's only legitimate son
would not, of itself, be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a compulsory recognition
by the defendant as his natural child, yet it should have been admitted in
evidence as a factum probans, which would help to establish the factum
probandum — the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child. For
that purpose Exhibit C was perhaps admissible. In the present case there are no
indications that the defendant Pedro de Gala did not intend to recognize the
plaintiff as his natural son. On the contrary, it clearly appears that he had always
treated the plaintiff as a son; and his only legitimate son, Generoso, had also
treated the plaintiff as a brother. We are fully persuaded that the facts proven in
the present case clearly establish the uninterrupted possession by the plaintiff of
the status of a natural son of the defendant Pedro de Gala. the judgment of the
lower court is hereby revoked, with the costs of this instance against the
appellees, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that a judgment be entered,
requiring the appellees, Josefa Alabastro and Generoso de Gala, to recognize
and acknowledge the appellant, Sinforoso de Gala, as the natural son of the
deceased Pedro de Gala.

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