SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 154087. October 25, 2005.]

MILAGROS ILAO-QUIANAY and SERGIO ILAO, as Joint Administrator

of the Intestate Estate of Simplicio Ilao, and AMBROSIA ILAO ,
petitioners, vs . RODOLFO MAPILE , respondent.

DECISION

TINGA , J : p

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assails the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV 50923 which sustained the trial court decision in declaring that the property
subject of this case rightfully belongs to respondent herein.
The following facts are condensed from the decisions of the Court of Appeals and
the trial court.
Subject of this case is a parcel of land situated in Sta. Cruz, Manila and covered by
Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 48529 (TCT No. 48529) in the name of the deceased
Simplicio Ilao (Ilao). In the course of the judicial settlement of Ilao's estate, his heirs found
out that the title of the subject property had an annotation of adverse claim led by a
certain Juanito Ibarra (Ibarra). Respondent herein, Atty. Rodolfo Mapile (respondent), led
a motion to exclude the property from the inventory on the ground that the same no longer
formed part of Ilao's estate having been disposed of during the latter's lifetime in favor of
Ibarra. Acting upon respondent's allegation, the heirs of Ilao, through petitioners herein,
promptly led on December 8, 1976 a civil case for Quieting of Title and Damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 105865 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 12, in Special Proceedings No. 93674,
denied respondent's motion and, in an order dated February 7, 1978, authorized the sale of
the subject property to Virgilio Sevilla subject to the outcome of Civil Case No. 105865.
Relevantly, it appears that in 1974, Ibarra led a petition for the issuance of a new
owner's duplicate copy of the title of the subject property, claiming that he was in
possession of said owner's duplicate but that he lost the same in a re that took place in
Bo. Sta. Ignacia, Camiling, Tarlac on April 26, 1974. The case was docketed as LRC Cad.
Rec. No. 271 of the RTC of Manila. This allegation was, however, uncovered by the trial
court to be false when, upon the court's subpoena, Ilao's heirs appeared and presented the
certificate of title Ibarra claimed to have been lost. SEcAIC

On October 3, 1983, respondent led Civil Case No. 83-20520 for Speci c
Performance and Declaration of Nullity of Contract, claiming that the subject property had
been sold by Ilao to Ibarra pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale (deed of sale) dated
February 7, 1972, and that Ibarra, in turn, sold the property to him.
Civil Case No. 105865 and Civil Case No. 83-20520 were consolidated. After trial,
the court rendered judgment in favor of respondent, nding that the deed of sale was
genuine and ordering, among others, that petitioners herein surrender the owner's
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 duplicate copy of TCT No. 48529 and all documents appurtenant thereto in their
possession. 3 The decision was primarily anchored on the trial court's nding that the
con icting testimonies of the handwriting experts 4 presented by both parties left it no
choice but to favor the notarized deed of sale and to rule that the same is genuine.
Petitioners led a motion for reconsideration, which respondent countered with an
omnibus motion to strike out the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma and to
seek the issuance of a writ of execution. The trial court denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, granted respondent's omnibus motion, and ordered the issuance of a writ
of execution. 5
The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, the order denying
the motion for reconsideration became the subject of a petition for certiorari also with the
appellate court. The petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 38421, was denied
because the trial court had already ordered the elevation of the records of the case to the
appellate court, and in view of respondent's manifestation that he would not move for
execution pending appeal.
The errors assigned on appeal dwell on the twin ndings that the deed of sale
between Ilao and Ibarra was genuine and that the subject property was validly transferred
to respondent. As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals a rmed the decision of the
trial court and denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners 6 herein argue that the appellate court erred in disregarding the
testimonies of the expert witnesses allegedly to the effect that Ilao's signature on the
deed of sale was forged. While the two experts initially disagreed in that whereas
petitioners' witness categorically declared that the signature on the deed of sale was a
forgery based on the specimen signatures, respondent's witness expressed doubts
whether the specimen signatures were themselves genuine, the latter allegedly agreed to
exclude the specimen signatures to which he expressed reservation and came up with the
same conclusion that the signature in the deed of sale was indeed forged.
Moreover, petitioners question the probative value given by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals to the notarized deed of sale. They stress that the trial court even went to
the extent of admitting in evidence the transcript of the testimony of the notary public who
purportedly notarized the document taken in LRC Cad. Rec. No. 271 in which petitioners
were not named parties, while the appellate court for its part sustained the lower court's
action.
They assail as hearsay the factual ndings of the trial court on the circumstances
surrounding the sale of the property to Ibarra which were based only on respondent's
narration, without Ibarra actually testifying thereon. These circumstances, i.e., that it was
Ibarra's father who paid for the property allegedly to induce Ibarra to marry a girl his father
had wanted for him; that instead of marrying the girl, Ibarra ed to Mindanao; and that he
later returned and was advised by a lawyer, who turned out to be an impostor, to le a
petition claiming that the certi cate of title had been destroyed by re, which petition was
the subject of LRC Cad. Rec. No. 271, were adopted by the appellate court as the factual
backdrop of the case.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals also allegedly erred in certain matters
crucial to the case, such as the fact that Ibarra neither took possession of the subject
property nor of the certi cate of title covering it; that Ibarra never paid the real estate
taxes on the property as the tax declarations have remained in the name of Ilao; and that
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 no capital gains tax, documentary stamps tax and other transfer taxes were ever paid
pursuant to the supposed deed of sale. These circumstances are allegedly known to
respondent who has never denied knowledge thereof. ESTCHa

Notably, these arguments are the very same ones raised before the Court of
Appeals albeit petitioners purposively rearranged the order in which they made their
assignment of errors in this petition.
Respondent 7 avers at the outset that the instant petition should be denied because
it raises questions of fact not proper in a petition for review.
On the objection to the admission in evidence of the testimony of the notary public
taken in another case and as regards the hearsay nature of his testimony on the
circumstances surrounding the sale of the property to Ibarra, respondent cites the
decision of the appellate court ruling that these testimonies may be admitted as
independently relevant evidence and as part of respondent's narration.
Respondent further claims that the disagreement of the expert witnesses on the
matter of whether the specimen signatures are themselves authentic is insurmountable
such that both testimonies should be disregarded as was done in this case.
Finally, he claims that he is a buyer in good faith because he bought the property
after procuring a certi ed true copy of the deed of sale from the clerk of court of the then
Court of First Instance of Manila and ascertaining from the transcript taken of the
testimony of the notary public who notarized the document that Ibarra's claim of
ownership is valid.
The question of whether Ilao's signature on the deed of sale is a forgery is a
question of fact which requires an appraisal and re-evaluation of the evidence presented
by the parties. As a rule, however, such a procedure is beyond the Court's dominion
because factual ndings of trial courts, especially when a rmed by the Court of Appeals,
as in this case, are binding on the Supreme Court. The review of such ndings is not a
function that this Court normally undertakes.
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review before this Court. However, this Rule is not absolute; it admits of
exceptions, such as: (1) when the ndings of a trial court are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower court's inference from its factual
ndings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the ndings of the appellate court go
beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or
fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; (5) when there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the ndings of fact are
conclusions without mention of the speci c evidence on which they are based, are
premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record. 8
Petitioners argue that the trial court and the appellate court failed to take into
account the fact that the handwriting expert presented by respondent as his witness, after
agreeing to exclude the specimen signatures which he doubted, nally agreed with the
nding of petitioners' own expert witness that Ilao's signature on the deed of sale was
forged. Allegedly, both courts misappreciated the evidence and consequently came up
with the erroneous conclusion affirming the validity of the deed of sale.

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 We nd, however, that petitioners' contention is not entirely accurate. The trial court
and the Court of Appeals did take into account the entirety of the testimonies of the
handwriting experts and reckoned that neither should be accorded probative value
because the expert witnesses have con icting opinions on the genuineness of the
signatures used as standards against which the alleged forged signature on the deed of
sale would be measured. The assailed Decision succinctly summarizes:
Both experts agree, as logic and commons sense demand, with one
absolute proposition. A conclusion that the specimen signatures and the
questioned signature were not signed by the same person is based on the
assumption that all the exemplars were written by one and the same person.
Otherwise, the conclusion does not deserve a scant consideration. ESTaHC

Constantino testi ed he was "sure" that all the standard signatures W-5, W-
11, W-13 and W-14, included were written by one and the same person.
Cruz, however, disagreed. He "doubted" that the signatures marked as W-5,
W-11, W-13 and W-14 by the same author of the rest of the exemplars. To him, the
specimen signatures consisted of two sets signed by two different persons.
Worse, he does not know which of the two sets of specimen signatures is the
authentic signature to serve as the standard. If on the exemplars alone, there is
already an unbridgeable divergence of opinion when there should be none, it is
safe to expect greater polarization, in fact, "confusion" to use Cruz's term, of
conclusions with respect to the questioned signature.

With this irreconcilable stand, it is a super uity to further discuss the

appellants' arguments on the claim of forgery. Constantino and Cruz, sincere in
their espousal of their respective opinion, disparaged, discredited and neutralized
each other completely that the "assistance" experts are supposed to extend to
courts is nowhere in sight. The appellants' stratagem to FIRST DISREGARD the
doubtful signatures and THEN ADD additional specimens in order for Cruz to
conclude that the questioned signature and the exemplars were not written by one
person amuses but does not relieve the confusion. Constantino remains "sure"
that the four signatures were signed by the author of all the exemplars. The
"doubtful" signatures cannot be removed without impeaching Constantino.
Neither could the latter be believed without making Cruz look ludicrous and
unskilled. Experts are presented to enlighted — not confuse — the courts and for
this reason, We do not fault the lower court for disregarding, in its exasperation,
their testimony on record, no doubt, relying on the leeway extended to all courts
that they "are not bound to submit their ndings necessarily to such testimony;
they are FREE to weigh them and they can give or REFUSE to give them any value
as proof . . ." (Salonga, Philippine Law on Evidence, p. 507, emphasis supplied). 9
Indeed, courts are not bound by expert testimonies. They may place whatever
weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The
relative weight and su ciency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the
trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon
the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his
opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testi es, and any other matters
which serve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of an expert should be considered by
the court in view of all the facts and circumstances of the case. The problem of the
evaluation of expert testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. 1 0

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 We nd that the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not commit an error in their
evaluation of the testimonies of the handwriting experts. In fact, we quite agree that the
conflicting testimonies should be completely disregarded.
The validity of the deed of sale should, therefore, be recognized, the only opposition
thereto being the alleged forgery of Ilao's signature which, as discussed above, was not
satisfactorily demonstrated. There is no doubt that the deed of sale was duly
acknowledged before a notary public. As a notarized document, it has in its favor the
presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. 1 1
In this connection, we have to say that petitioners' objection to the admission in
evidence of the testimony of the notary public who supposedly notarized the deed of sale
taken in another case in which petitioners were not parties is persuasive. Such testimony
does not qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule under Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding . — The
testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given at a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties
and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had
the opportunity to cross-examine him.

None of the circumstances for the admission of the testimony given at a former
proceeding obtains in this case. Not only were petitioners not parties to the former
proceeding and hence without opportunity to cross-examine the notary public, there was
also no proof that the notary public was already deceased or unable to testify. Hence, the
testimony should not have been accorded any probative weight.
The same cannot be said, however, of the testimony of respondent relevant to the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of sale between Ilao and Ibarra. It
should be noted that what was sought to be admitted in evidence, and what was actually
admitted in evidence, was the fact that the statements were made by Ibarra, not
necessarily that the matters stated were true. The utterances are in the nature of
independently relevant statements which may be admitted in evidence as such, but not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof. 1 2
It has been said that where, regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact
that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, and the statement may
be shown. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for
the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the
existence of such a fact. 1 3 On this basis, the statements attributed to Ibarra regarding the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of sale related to the court by
respondent are admissible if only to establish the fact that such statements were made
and the tenor thereof. EcTaSC

As regards petitioners' contention that at no time did Ibarra exercise ownership over
the subject property as neither the property nor the certi cate of title covering it were
delivered to Ibarra, these circumstances do not necessarily warrant a conclusion that the
property was not validly transferred to Ibarra.
It has been held that ownership of the thing sold is acquired only from the delivery
thereof, either actual or constructive. Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that when the
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 sale is made through a public instrument, as in this case, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed
the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. The execution of the public
instrument, even without actual delivery of the thing, transfers the ownership from the
vendor to the vendee, who may thereafter exercise the rights of an owner over the same. 1 4
In this case, a public instrument was executed through which constructive delivery
of the subject property was made transferring ownership thereof to Ibarra. As the new
owner, Ibarra acted perfectly within his rights when he sold the property to respondent.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 10-36.

2. Id. at 37-54; Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis and concurred in by
Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Perlita J. Tria Tirona.
3. RTC Records, pp. 81-101; The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the deed of sale executed in
favor of the Sevillas null and void and the Deed of Sale executed by Simplicio Ilao in
favor of Juanito Ibarra and the deed of Sale executed by Juanito Ibarra in favor of the
plaintiff to be valid and legally binding.
This court orders the defendants as follows:

1. To surrender the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 48529 and all other
documents appurtenant thereto;

2. To cause the peaceable and smooth turn over of the subject property to the
plaintiff;
3. To remit to the plaintiff all rentals of the premises at the rate of P6,500.00 per
month or P78,000.00 a year commencing from October 1976 up to the time the premises
are actually surrendered to the plaintiff.
Defendant Milagros Ilao-Quianay is hereby ordered to refund to the defendant heirs of
Virgilio Sevilla the sum of P225,000.00 representing the purchase price they paid to the
former for the property subject of this suit without interest.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
4. Petitioners presented Eleodoro Constantino, a fingerprint and handwriting expert from
the National Bureau of Investigation, while respondent presented, as rebuttal witness,
Francisco Cruz, Jr., Chief of the Questioned Documents Division of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Services.
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 5. RTC Records, pp. 160-164; Order dated May 29, 1995.

6. Rollo, pp. 245-272; Memorandum for the Petitioners dated March 17, 2003.
7. Id. at 212-244; Memorandum for the Respondent dated March 10, 2003.
8. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, G.R. No. 141856, February 11, 2005, 451
SCRA 63.
9. Rollo, pp. 45-46.
10. Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70263, May 14, 1990, 185 SCRA 352.
11. Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 146222, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 648.
12. Bon v. People, G.R. No. 152160, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 101.
13. D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 249.
14. Balatbat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109410, August 28, 1996, 261 SCRA 128.

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