R.A. 6657 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
R.A. 6657 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
R.A. 6657 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
Submitted to:
Atty. Irvin Joseph M. Fabella
Submitted by:
A: All private and public agricultural lands 1. Landowners whose lands have been
including other lands of public domain. covered by Presidential Decree No. 27
(Section 4) shall be allowed to keep the areas
originally retained by them thereunder:
Specifically, these lands are the following: Provided further, that original homestead
grantees or their direct compulsory heirs
a. All alienable and disposable lands who still own the original homestead at the
of the public domain devoted to or time of the approval of this law shall retain
suitable for agriculture. No same areas as long as they continue to
reclassification of forest or mineral cultivate said homestead. (Section 6)
lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of Q: Are lands held by multinational
this Act until Congress, taking into corporations covered by the
account ecological, developmental Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
and equity considerations, shall Program?
have determined by law, the
specific limits of the public domain. A: Yes. Specifically, these are the
following:
b. All lands of the public domain in
excess of the specific limits as a. All lands of public domain leased,
determined by Congress in the held or possessed by multinational
preceding paragraph; corporations or associations; and
Q: What are the guidelines for In the event they cannot agree on the
landowners of agricultural lands who price of land, the procedure for
entered into a voluntary arrangement compulsory acquisition as provided in
Section 16 shall apply. The LBP shall
extend financing to the beneficiaries for
purposes of acquiring the land. (Section According to DAR Administrative Order
21) No. 2, the following are also disqualified:
Beneficiaries
c) Those who have waived their right
Q: Who are qualified as beneficiaries? to become an agrarian reform
beneficiary in exchange for
A: Section 22 provides that: compensation, provided that the
waiver has not been questioned in
The person must be a landless the proper government entity;
resident of the same barangay, or d) Those who have not paid an
if there is none, landless residents aggregate of three annual
of the same municipality. amortizations;
e) Those who have failed to exercise
Q: Who is a landless resident? the right of redemption/ repurchase
within two years resulting in the
A: A person who owns less than three foreclosure of mortgage by the
hectares of agricultural land. Land Bank of the Philippines of a
previously awarded land;
Q: What are the qualifications to be an f) Those who refused to pay three
agrarian reform beneficiary? annual amortizations for land
acquired through voluntary land
A: The basic qualification under Section transfer or direct payment scheme,
22 is the beneficiary’s willingness, resulting in the possession by the
aptitude, and ability to cultivate and make landowner;
the land as productive as possible. g) Those who have been dismissed
for cause;
In 2009, the Department of Agriculture h) Those who have obtained
(DAR) issued DAR Administrative Order substantially equivalent
No. 2 (2009), the following requisites must employment;
concur: i) Those who have retired or
voluntarily resigned from their
a) Filipino citizen; employment;
b) Resident of the barangay or j) Those who have misused the land
municipality where landholding is or diverted the financial support
located; service extended by the
c) At least 15 years old at the time of government;
the identification, screening and k) Those who have misinterpreted
selection; and material facts in their basic
d) Willing, able, and equipped with qualifications;
aptitude to cultivate and make the l) Those who have sold, disposed, or
land productive. abandoned the land awarded to
them by the government;
Q: Who are disqualified to become m) Those who have converted
beneficiaries? agricultural lands to non-
agricultural lands to non-
A: agricultural use without prior
a) Beneficiaries under Presidential approval of the Department of
Decree (PD) No. 27 who have Agrarian Reform;
culpably sold, disposed of, or n) Those who have been finally
abandoned their land. adjudged guilty of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer over the 8) Others directly working on the
property; and land.
o) Those who have violated agrarian
reform laws and regulations. If it is not economically feasible to divide
the excess land to numbers 4-6, the
Q: Can farm workers working in criteria shall be observed:
commercial farms be qualified as
beneficiaries? (a) willingness, aptitude and ability to
cultivate and make the land
A: Yes Provided that the farm worker is productive
already employed as of June 15, 1988 in (b) physical capacity; and
the landholding covered by the CARP. (c) length of service
Q: Can managerial farmers or those With the basic qualification set, priority
farmers holding supervisory positions must be given to farm workers who
be qualified as beneficiaries? continuously worked on the subject
landholding. Other farm workers will be
A: No.However, this is the general put to the wait list.
rule.The exception is when they were
already selected and qualified as Q: Are there limitations to distributing
beneficiaries even before they were the land?
promoted to a managerial or supervisory
position. A: Yes. A qualified owner may not own
more than 3 hectares of agricultural land.
Q: What is the order of priority in the
distribution to qualified beneficiaries? Collective Ownership
A: The following are the qualified Q: Do the beneficiaries have the option
beneficiaries on order of priority: to have a collective ownership?
Q: Can there be collective owners for A: Upon the certification of the Land Bank
idle, abandoned or underdeveloped of the Philippines that a necessary deposit
agricultural lands to be covered by of the full payment in cash or in kind was
CARP? made with due notice to the landowner
and the registration of the certificate of
A: Yes. However, it shall only be allowed land ownership award issued to the
if the beneficiaries opt for it and there is a beneficiaries, and to cancel the previous
clear development plan that requires titles pertaining thereto, it shall be the
collective farming or integrated farm ministerial duty of the Registry of Deeds to
operations. register the title in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Award to Beneficiaries
Q: What are the grounds for the
Q: When does the rights and cancellation of the Certificate of Land
responsibilities of the beneficiaries Ownership Award?
commence?
a) Abandonment of land;
A: From the receipt of a duly registered b) Neglect or misuse of land;
emancipation patent or certificate of land c) Failure to pay three annual
ownership award and their actual physical amortizations;
possession of the land awarded to them. d) Misuse or diversion of financial
and support services;
The award shall be completed not more e) Sale, transfer, or conveyance of
than 180 days from the date of registration the right to use the land; and
in the name of the Republic of the f) Illegal conversion of the land.
Philippines.
Q: What are the obligations of Agrarian
Q: When does the DAR issue the Reform beneficiaries?
Certificate of Land Ownership Award?
A:
A: Only upon full payment of amortization a) exercise due diligence in the use,
by the farmer-beneficiary. cultivation, and maintenance of the
land, including improvements
Q: What is the purpose of the thereon; and
Certificate of Land Ownership Award? b) pay the Land Bank thirty annual
amortizations with 6% interest per
annum.
1. The payments for the first three
The amortization will start one year from years after the award shall be at
the date of registration of the Certificate of reduced amounts as established
Land Ownership Award. If before by the PARC. Provided, that the
registration of the Certificate, there is first 5 annual payments may not be
actual occupancy of the land, the one-year more than 5% of the value of the
prescriptive period shall be counted from annual gross production as
the constructive occupation of the land by established by DAR.
the beneficiary.
b) After the 5th year of payment:
Q: What rights does qualified 2. After the 5th year of payment, the
beneficiaries under Section 22 have? Land Bank may reduce the interest
and/or the principal obligation to
A: Usufructuary rights as soon as the make it more affordable to the
DAR takes possession of the land. Such beneficiaries if:
right shall not be diminished even if there i) If due to failure of production,
is a pending awarding of the emancipation the scheduled annual
patent or the certificate of land ownership. payments exceed 10% of the
annual gross production; and
Payment by Beneficiaries ii) The failure to produce is not
due to the beneficiary’ fault.
Q: What is the cost of the awarded land
that is payable by the beneficiaries to Q: What happens if the beneficiary
the Land Bank? failed to pay his amortizations?
Q: Can the leases be made to a former A: Yes. The children or the spouse of the
landowner? transferor can repurchase the land within
two years from the date of the transfer.
A: Yes. However, the approval of the DAR
shall be obtained through the Provincial Standing Corps
Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee.
Q: What are the rights of the landowner
Q: In the event where the land has not over the standing crops unharvested at
been fully paid by the beneficiary may the DAR shall take possession of the
the rights of the land be transferred or land under Section 16?
conveyed to any heir of the beneficiary
or any other beneficiary? A: The landowner shall retain his rights
over the standing crops that were
A: Yes, provided that: unharvested and he shall be given a
a) There is a prior approval by the reasonable time to harvest the same.
DAR;
b) The land shall only be sold to any
heir of the beneficiary or to any -------------CORPORATE FARMS-------------
other beneficiary; and
c) The transferee as a condition of Q: What are corporate farms?
the transfer or sale, the heir or the
other qualified beneficiary shall A: Corporate farms are farms that are
cultivate the land himself/herself. owned or operated by corporations or
other business organizations
If there is no approval of the DAR and the
condition was not met, the land shall be Q: How to distribute corporate farms?
transferred to the Land Bank and a due
notice shall be made for the availability of A: There are two ways, directly or
the land. indirectly.
Q: What shall the Land Bank of the Generally, lands shall be distributed
Philippines do after the transfer has directly to the individual worker-
commenced in the preceding beneficiaries.
situation?
In case it is not economically feasible and
A: The Land Bank of the Philippines shall sound to divide the land, then it shall be
compensate the beneficiary in one lump owned collectively by the worker-
sum for the amounts he has already paid beneficiaries who shall form a workers’
plus the value of the improvements the cooperative or association which will deal
beneficiary made on the land. with the corporation or business
association.
Q: What does hereditary succession
mean in the CARP Law? Q: What are the transfer schemes
provided under Section 31 of RA No.
A: Hereditary succession means 6657?
succession by intestate succession or by
will to the compulsory heirs. A: Voluntary transfer and stock transfer.
Corporate landowners may voluntarily
transfer ownership over their agricultural A: At the national level, it is the
landholdings to the Republic of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council or
Philippines or to qualified beneficiaries, PARC, including an Executive Committee
subject to confirmation by the DAR. as well as a PARC Secretariat. (Secs. 41-
43)
Corporations owning agricultural lands
may give their qualified beneficiaries the At the provincial level, it is the Provincial
right to purchase such proportion of the Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee
capital stock of the corporation that the or PARCCOM. (Sec. 44).
agricultural land, usually devoted to
agricultural activities, bears in relation to At the barangay level, it is the Barangay
the company’s total assets. Agrarian Reform Committee or BARC.
(Sec. 46 & E.O. 229)
Q: Discuss the Product Sharing Plan
under RA No. 6657 Q: What is the concept or principle
behind the creation of PARCCOM and
A: Pending final land transfer, individuals BARC? Explain.
or entities owning or operating agricultural
lands who realize gross sales in excess of A: Deconcentration. According to an
Php 5 million are hereby mandated to established jurisprudence, there is
execute a product-sharing plan with their deconcentration “if it involves the transfer
farmworkers or farmworkers’ organization of functions or the delegation of authority
if any, whereby 3% of the gross sales are and responsibility from the national office
given to regular and other farmworkers. to the regional and local offices.”
(Disomangcop v. Sec. of DENR, G.R. No.
In the event that the individual or entity 149848)
realizes profit, an additional 10% of the
net profit after tax shall be distributed to Q: What is the manner of
said regular and other farmworkers. implementation of CARP?
A: Yes. The BARC may seek legal Whenever necessary, to direct the
assistance whenever necessary in the Philippine National Police, the Armed
exercise of its functions. (Sec. 48) Forces of the Philippines or any of their
component units, or other law
enforcement agencies to assist in the
----ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION--- enforcement and execution of their
decisions, orders, writs, and other
Q: What are the quasi-judicial powers processes. (Sec. 6, Rule II, 2009 DARAB
of the DAR? Rules of Procedure)
---------------JUDICIAL REVIEW---------------
planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their
own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
classification have been violated. Lastly, in the question of whether it was a valid exercise of
the power of eminent domain, as earlier observed, the requirement for public use has
already been settled for us by the Constitution itself. No less than the 1987 Charter calls for
agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their
owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. That public use, as pronounced
by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us. For the second requirement, A reading
of the Section 16(d) of the CARP law will readily show that it does not suffer from the
arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although
the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are
nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But
more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any
means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section
16(f) clearly provides: Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the
court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation. The determination
made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise,
the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the
exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. The Court hereby declares that the content
and manner of the just compensation provided for in Section 18 of the CARP Law is not
violative of the Constitution. It stated that it does not mind admitting that a certain degree of
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all the Court is not a
cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the
need for its enhancement. Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not
always required to be made fully in money, it finds further that the proportion of cash
payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the
basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It
is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the
small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger
balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial
instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other
modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not
unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or
assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even
before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well-
accepted principle of eminent domain. The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the
property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of
the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in
other democratic jurisdictions. Thus: Title to property which is the subject of condemnation
proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is
entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition
under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under the Local Improvement
Act, is filed.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
Abundo, Ella Marie C Constitutionality of Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
Case Digest ASLP vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein
petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only
upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under
P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under
the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Abundo, Ella Marie C Constitutionality of Section 31 of CARL
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
Case Digest Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council
revocation. Revocation and nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of the lands in the
hacienda were the call in the second petition, styled as Petisyon. The Petisyon was filed by
AMBALA. Subsequently, a Notice of Coverage was issued against HLI. Petitioners filed a
motion for consideration but was denied. Hence, this petition. A mediation panel was made,
but still it failed to settle the dispute. Hence, this case.
ISSUE(s): Whether or not a) Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional; b) PARC has
the jurisdiction of to recall or revoke HLI’s SDP; (c) such recall or revocatory action is valid.
RULING:
a) No. Aside from the failure of the respondents to meet sll the essential
requirements before the Court may pass upon the constitutionality of a law, it also
explained the wordings of the constitution regarding agrarian reform. It reiterated
the provison which h provides that The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of the farmers and regular farmworkers, who
are landless, to OWN directly or COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL or, in
the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this
end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State
shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. It held that the wording
of the provision is unequivocal––the farmers and regular farmworkers have a
right TO OWN DIRECTLY OR COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The
basic law allows two (2) modes of land distribution—direct and indirect
ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used
method by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective
ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of
agricultural land by individual farmers. The aforequoted Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY
authorizes collective ownership by farmers. No language can be found in the
1987 Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of
farmers from being the legal entity through which collective ownership can be
exercised. The word "collective" is defined as "indicating a number of persons or
things considered as constituting one group or aggregate,"while "collectively" is
defined as "in a collective sense or manner; in a mass or body." By using the
word "collectively," the Constitution allows for indirect ownership of land and not
just outright agricultural land transfer. This is in recognition of the fact that land
reform may become successful even if it is done through the medium of juridical
entities composed of farmers.
b) Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve
the plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC.
However, contrary to petitioner HLI’s posture, PARC also has the power to
revoke the SDP which it previously approved. It may be, as urged, that RA 6657
or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARC
with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority,
however, is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary
implication, a basic postulate that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of
it as that which is expressed.
Abundo, Ella Marie C Constitutionality of Section 31 of CARL
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
Case Digest Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council
c) In our review and analysis of par. 3 of the SDOA on the mechanics and timelines
of stock distribution. It found that it violates two (2) provisions of DAO 10. Par. 3
of the SDOA. Consequently, the Court affirmed the revocation of the SDP on
Hacienda Luisita subject of PARC Resolution Nos. 2005-32-01 and 2006-34-01.
However, it held that the Court cannot close its eyes to certain "operative facts"
that had occurred in the interim. Pertinently, the "operative fact" doctrine realizes
that, in declaring a law or executive action null and void, or, by extension, no
longer without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting unfairness must
be avoided. This is as it should realistically be, since rights might have accrued in
favor of natural or juridical persons and obligations justly incurred in the
meantime. The actual existence of a statute or executive act is, prior to such a
determination, an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored; the past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
FWBs’ economic status, their life of hardship, if that really be the case, can hardly
be attributed to HLI and its SDP and provide a valid ground for the plan’s
revocation.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. PARC Resolution
No. 2005-32-01 dated December 22, 2005 and Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3,
2006, placing the lands subject of HLI’s SDP under compulsory coverage on mandated land
acquisition scheme of the CARP, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
original 6,296 qualified FWBs shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI. DAR
shall immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the
effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the
FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their
signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.
Of the 6,296 FWBs, he or she who wishes to continue as an HLI stockholder is entitled to
18,804.32 HLI shares, and, in case the HLI shares already given to him or her is less than
18,804.32 shares, the HLI is ordered to issue or distribute additional shares to complete said
prescribed number of shares at no cost to the FWB within thirty (30) days from finality of this
Decision. Other FWBs who do not belong to the original 6,296 qualified beneficiaries are not
entitled to land distribution and shall remain as HLI shareholders. All salaries, benefits, 3%
production share and 3% share in the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted
land and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot and homelots already received by the 10,502 FWBs,
composed of 6,296 original FWBs and 4,206 non-qualified FWBs, shall be respected with no
obligation to refund or return them.
Within thirty (30) days after determining who from among the original FWBs will stay as
stockholders, DAR shall segregate from the HLI agricultural land with an area of 4,915.75
hectares subject of PARC’s SDP-approving Resolution No. 89-12-2 the following: (a) the
500-hectare lot subject of the August 14, l996 Conversion Order; (b) the 80.51-hectare lot
sold to, or acquired by, the government as part of the SCTEX complex; and (c) the
aggregate area of 6,886.5 square meters of individual lots that each FWB is entitled to under
the CARP had he or she not opted to stay in HLI as a stockholder. After the segregation
process, as indicated, is done, the remaining area shall be turned over to DAR for immediate
land distribution to the original qualified FWBs who opted not to remain as HLI stockholders.
The aforementioned area composed of 6,886.5-square meter lots allotted to the FWBs who
stayed with the corporation shall form part of the HLI assets.
Abundo, Ella Marie C Constitutionality of Section 31 of CARL
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
Case Digest Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council
HLI is directed to pay the 6,296 FWBs the consideration of PhP 500,000,000 received by it
from Luisita Realty, Inc. for the sale to the latter of 200 hectares out of the 500 hectares
covered by the August 14, 1996 Conversion Order, the consideration of PhP 750,000,000
received by its owned subsidiary, Centennary Holdings, Inc. for the sale of the remaining
300 hectares of the aforementioned 500-hectare lot to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation,
and the price of PhP 80,511,500 paid by the government through the Bases Conversion
Development Authority for the sale of the 80.51-hectare lot used for the construction of the
SCTEX road network. From the total amount of PhP 1,330,511,500 (PhP 500,000,000 +
PhP 750,000,000 + PhP 80,511,500 = PhP 1,330,511,500) shall be deducted the 3% of the
total gross sales from the production of the agricultural land and the 3% of the proceeds of
said transfers that were paid to the FWBs, the taxes and expenses relating to the transfer of
titles to the transferees, and the expenditures incurred by HLI and Centennary Holdings, Inc.
for legitimate corporate purposes. For this purpose, DAR is ordered to engage the services
of a reputable accounting firm approved by the parties to audit the books of HLI and
Centennary Holdings, Inc. to determine if the PhP 1,330,511,500 proceeds of the sale of the
three (3) aforementioned lots were used or spent for legitimate corporate purposes. Any
unspent or unused balance as determined by the audit shall be distributed to the 6,296
original FWBs.
HLI is entitled to just compensation for the agricultural land that will be transferred to DAR to
be reckoned from November 21, 1989 per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2. DAR and LBP are
ordered to determine the compensation due to HLI.
DAR shall submit a compliance report after six (6) months from finality of this judgment. It
shall also submit, after submission of the compliance report, quarterly reports on the
execution of this judgment to be submitted within the first 15 days at the end of each quarter,
until fully implemented.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the
Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.
RULING: No. The Court agreed with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of
the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant
to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be
invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus, The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare
and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build
a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for
the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things
necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live
with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after
the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this
vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45) In this regard, the Philippine Constitution
likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants
guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which provides: Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of
agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the
disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain under
lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small
settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands. Additionally, it is
worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or
Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to
lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading, Section
6. Retention Limits. ... ... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act
shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.'
RULING: No. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As
to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity
as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land." The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
"Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands"
and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands." Based on the foregoing, it
is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any
language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use.
They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod
Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a
low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned from the
fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing
with such development. The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision
may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands are
still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL. Indeed, lands not devoted to
agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The
Notice of Coverage of 22 November 1990 by virtue of which undeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision were placed under CARL coverage is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
ALCANTARA, Carl Matthew R.
CARP
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C R.A.
6657
Case Digest Roxas & Co. v. DAMBA-
NFSW
FACTS:
Prior to the effectivity of the CARL, on May 6, 1998, petitioner Roxas & Co. filed with
respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell one of its 3 haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas
pursuant to EO 229 while the other two were later placed under compulsory acquisition by
the DAR in accordance with CARL. Petitioner subsequently withdrew the voluntary offer to
sell of the hacienda as the Sanggunian allegedly approved the reclassification of the same
from agricultural to non-agricultural and applied with the DAR for conversion from agricultural
to other uses.
In 2003, the petitioner’s application for exemption were reopened and the DAR
subsequently granted the exemption of 6 lots. This exemption was challenged by respondent
DAMBA-NSFW but was denied by the DAR and the CA.
ISSUES:
● W/N PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu
tourism zone to non-agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.’s three haciendas from
CARP coverage
● W/N Nasugbu MSO No. 4, Series of 1982 exempted certain lots in one of petitioner’s
haciendas from CARP coverage
● W/N the partial and complete cancelations by the DAR of CLOA No. 6654 subject of
G.R. No. 179650 is valid
RULING:
The Court reversed the 2003 decision and 2005 resolution of the CA which declared
that PP 1520 reclassified the lands in the municipalities of Nasugbu, Batangas and
Maragondon and Ternate, Cavite to non-agricultural use as PP 1520 specified that only
certain areas which have potential tourism value are reclassified. Further, it is the DAR and
not the Court who can determine if a land is non-agricultural and exempt from the coverage
of the CARP.
The Court also denied petitioner’s application for CARP exemption due to
discrepancies in the location and identity of the parcels of lands being applied for as it was
shown that the lots in the application were not really the lots of the petitioner’s hacienda and
the petitioner’s actual lots were not included in the reclassified lands for tourism.
And the Court granted the respondent DAMBA-NSFW’s motion for reconsideration
and upheld the CLOA issued by DAR for the rest of the hacienda except for the 6 lots which
were validly cancelled. The Court also ordered the petitioner to give the disturbance
compensation to the tenants before the effectivity of the exemption.
ALCANTARA, Carl Matthew R.
CARP
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C R.A.
7881
Case Digest Milestone Farms v. Office of the
President
FACTS:
On January 8, 1960, Milestone farm was incorporated with the SEC. On June 10, 1960;
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) took effect. This includes the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. In December 4, 1990, court ruled that
agricultural land which includes livestock, poultry and swine raising are excluded from
Comprehensive Reform Program (CARP). Milestone farm applied for exemption/exclusion of
its property.
The department of Agrarian reform (DAR) issued an administrative order, on rules and
regulation to govern exclusion of agricultural land used for livestock, poultry and swine
raising from CARP (DAR A.O. No. 9). DAR’s Land Use Conversion and Exemption
Committee (LUCEC) conducted an ocular inspection on the property of the petitioner.
LUCEC recommends the exemption of petitioner followed by DAR’s order to exempt
petitioner from CARP.
Pinugay Farmers moved for reconsideration for the order issued but was denied. They filed
a letter of appeal to DAR Secretary. Petitioner filed a complaint against Pinugay Farmer
Repesenatative, Balajadia, before the MCTC which ruled in favor of the petitioner but later
reversed by the RTC. It was brought to the CA where it was held that the defendants therein
failed to timely file a motion for reconsideration, given the fact that their counsel of record
received its October 8, 1999 Decision; hence, the same became final and executory.
R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881 which states that private agricultural lands
devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising were excluded from the coverage of the
CARL. The DAR Secretary issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares
of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director, and declaring 75.0646 hectares
of the property to be covered by CARP. Later, the Office of the President rendered a
decision reinstating Order declared the entire 316.0422-hectare property exempt from the
coverage of CARP.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The petition was denied on the grounds that the subject land was not actually, directly, and
exclusively used for pasture. Specifically when the petitioner admitted that he leased his
ranch. His defenses regarding the said lease did not convince the Court of the exclusivity of
the pasture use of his lands. Further, the power to exempt/exclude a land from the coverage
of CARL is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court and is exclusively vested upon the DAR
Secretary.
BONGOLAN, Nicolo B. Jurisdiction of the DARAB
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
Case Digest CMU v. DARAB
FACTS:
CMU is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the State located in Musuan,
Bukidnon. In 1984, CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program
called Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program (KSSP) under which the land resources of the
University were leased to its faculty and the employees. Under this program, the faculty and
staff combined themselves to groups of five (5) members each, and the CMU provided
technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to
cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice projects. This arrangement was covered
by a contract which prohibited participants and their hired workers to establish houses or live
in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of loan. It also
expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the
faculty and/or employees. In short, this particular program was conceived as a multi-
disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program to utilize available land,
train people in modern agricultural technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff
opportunity within the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment
their salaries.
On July 1986, the project was discontinued due to losses incurred while carrying on the said
project. Some CMU personnel, as a result, were laid-off. However, sometime later, CMU
launched a self-help project called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to
develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide
socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the
income of the faculty and staff. Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was extended only to
workers and staff members who were still employed with the CMU and was not made
available to former workers or employees. But in the middle of 1987, CMU allowed the
previously laid off workers from the KSSP to participate in the CMU-IEP for a period of one
(1) calendar year. Said contracts expired on June 30, 1988 and while some were renewed,
others were not and were instead given notices to vacate.
All these led the Bukidnon Free Farmers and Agricultural Laborers Organization (BUFFALO)
to file a complaint against the CMU, before the DAR for Declaration of Status as Tenants,
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform (CARP). Before the DARAB, it held that
BUFFALO were not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. Further,
the DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous
portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified
beneficiaries. This was affirmed in the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
i. Whether members of BUFFALO are tenants and qualify as beneficiaries under the
CARP;
ii. Whether the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case for Declaration of
Status of Tenants and coverage of land under the CARP.
RULING:
I. No, members of BUFFALO are not tenants and do not qualify as beneficiaries under
the CARP.
BONGOLAN, Nicolo B. Jurisdiction of the DARAB
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
Case Digest CMU v. DARAB
The allegation of being a landless tenant requires proof and should not be accepted as
factually true. Despite BUFFALO’s claim that they are landless peasants, the facts show
otherwise considering that no proof whatsoever appears in the record to show that they are
landless peasants. After the expiration of their privilege to occupy and cultivate the land of
the CMU, their continued stay was unauthorized and their settlement on the CMU’s land was
without legal authority. A person entering upon lands of another, not claiming in good faith
the right to do so by virtue of any title of his own, or by virtue of some agreement with the
owner or with one whom he believes holds title to the land, is a squatter. Squatters cannot
enter the land of another surreptitiously or by stealth, and under the CARP, claim rights to
said property as landless peasants.
II. No, DARAB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case for Declaration of Status
of Tenants and coverage of land under the CARP.
As to the determination of when and what lands are found to be necessary for use by the
CMU, the school is in the best position to resolve and answer the question and pass upon
the problem of its needs in relation to its avowed objectives for which the land was given to it
by the State. Neither the DARAB nor the Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its
judgement or discretion on this matter, unless evidentiary facts are so manifest as to show
that the CMU has no real need for the land.
Under Sections 4 and 10 of R.A. No. 6657, or the CARP, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the
DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More
specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within
the coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are actually,
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among such purposes, school
sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot production
centers, etc. Consequently, the DARAB has not power to try, hear and adjudicate the case
pending before it involving a portion of the CMU’s titled school site, as the portion of the
CMU land reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and
found by the school to be necessary for its purposes.
Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the
rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial
body to order private property to be awarded to future beneficiaries. The order segregating
400 hectares of the CMU land was issued on a finding that the complainants are not entitled
as beneficiaries, and on an erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or
exempted under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP. Going beyond what was
asked by the complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed for, constitutes a grave
abuse of discretion because it implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgement
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
DISPOSITION:
Luz Farms v. The Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR
Secretary)
G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990. Paras, J.
FACTS
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business. It claims to be
adversely affected by the enforcement of Sections 3 (b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 and
of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A.
No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989.
ISSUE
Whether Sections 3 (b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 are unconstitutional.
RULING
Yes, Sections 3 (b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 are unconstitutional.
Under Article XIII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, the State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers,
to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State
shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning
of the word “agricultural.” Clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the government. In fact, it adopted the definition of
agricultural land as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as land devoted to any growth,
including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land. There
is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms’ argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of
R.A. No. 6657 directing “corporate farms” which include livestock and poultry raisers to
execute and implement production-sharing plans pending final redistribution of their
landholdings whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their
gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional
compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process.
DISPOSITION
The instant petition is hereby GRANTED, Sections 3 (b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657
insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well
as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby
DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction
issued is hereby MADE permanent.
LAGMAY, Kriztel Mara G.
Expropriation
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988
Case Digest Land Bank of the Philippines v.
CA
FACTS:
Josefine is the assignee of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land
located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, a portion of the said property
was placed under the land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27
and eventually in 1988, under Executive Order No. 228. The land was thereafter subdivided
and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the
LBP fixed the value of the land which was deposited afterwards in cash and bonds in favor
of Lubrica.
Nenita Suntay-Tanedo (Nenita) and Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio), for their part, inherited
from Federico Suntay a parcel of agricultural land located at Balansay, Marumbao,
Occidental Mindoro which consisted of two lots. The second lot was placed under the
coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only a portion was considered by LBP and was also valued.
Josefine, Nenita, and Emilio (now collectively referred to as petitioners) rejected the
valuation of their properties. This led the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) to conduct summary administrative proceedings for determination of just
compensation, which they did for the contested lands.
The LBP, which was not satisfied with said valuation by the PARAD, filed two separate
petitions for judicial determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court. The
petitioners, for their part, filed separate Motions to Deposit the Preliminary Valuation Under
Section 16 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and Ad Cautelam Answer praying that the
LBP deposit the preliminary compensation determined by the PARAD. The RTC ruled in
favor for the Petitioners. The LBP then moved for reconsideration, which was denied.
At the Court of Appeals (CA), it affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It justified that there was no
law which prohibits LBP to make a deposit pending the fixing of the final amount of just
compensation. It also noted that there was no reason for LBP to further delay the deposit
considering that the DAR already took possession of the properties and distributed the same
to farmer-beneficiaries as early as 1972. However, upon motion for reconsideration by the
LBP, the CA reversed itself and ruled in favor of the bank since the determination of just
compensation done was erroneously computed.
ISSUE:
Whether the determination of just compensation is based on the value of the expropriated
property at the time of payment.
RULING:
Yes, the determination of just compensation is based on the value of the expropriated
property at the time of payment.
Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall compensate the landowner in such
amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as may be
LAGMAY, Kriztel Mara G.
Expropriation
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988
Case Digest Land Bank of the Philippines v.
CA
finally determined by the court as the just compensation for the land. In determining just
compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and
the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to
the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.
Petitioners were deprived of their properties in 1972 but have yet to receive the just
compensation therefor. The parcels of land were already subdivided and distributed to the
farmer-beneficiaries thereby immediately depriving petitioners of their use. Under the
circumstances, it would be highly inequitable on the part of the petitioners to compute the
just compensation using the values at the time of the taking in 1972, and not at the time of
the payment, considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already
benefited from the land although ownership thereof have not yet been transferred in their
names. Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just compensation
which, under the law, is a prerequisite before the property can be taken away from its
owners. The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are
conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by
the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the
landowner.
Considering the failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of time, it
should be determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not PD. No. 227 or E.O. No.
228. This is important considering that just compensation should be the full and fair
equivalent value of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent
being real, substantial, full and ample.
DISPOSITION:
The petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated October 27, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals affirming (a) the March 31, 2003
Order of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to
deposit the just compensation provisionally determined by the PARAD; (b) the May 26, 2003
Resolution denying respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003
Order directing Teresita V. Tengo, respondent’s Land Compensation Department Manager
to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order, is REINSTATED.
The Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special
Agrarian Court is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in the trial of Agrarian Case Nos. R-
1339 and R-1340, and to compute the final valuation of the subject properties based on the
aforementioned formula.
LAGMAY, Kriztel Mara G.
Expropriation
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988
Case Digest Land Bank of the Philippines v.
CA
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
I. No, private respondents did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies when they
filed a petition for the determination of just compensation directly with the trial court.
In fact, they did write a letter to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary
submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference for the
purpose of fixing just compensation. However, it was unanswered prompting private
respondents to file a petition directly with the RTC. Further, there is nothing contradictory
between the DAR’s primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, the second refers to judicial
proceedings. In other words, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a
preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian
reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts.
After all, the resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian
reform is a judicial function.
II. No, the RTC did not err in declaring that P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 are mere
guidelines in the determination of just compensation.
Considering the passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, the just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded under the said law, and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No.
228. This is imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real,
LAGMAY, Kriztel Mara G.
Expropriation
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988
Case Digest Land Bank of the Philippines v.
CA
substantial full and ample. Since the RTC arrived at the just compensation due private
respondents for their property on circumstances such as the nature of the irrigated land, its
location along the highway, market value, assessor’s value and the volume and value of its
produce, the Supreme Court ruled that the RTC ruled correctly in determining the amount of
just compensation in accordance with R.A. 6657.
DISPOSITION:
FACTS:
In 1992, the TCTs of Pedro Yap were totally cancelled by the Register of Deeds of
Leyte and were transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the
request of the Department of Agrarian Reform, together with a certification from Land Bank,
that a sum of money has been earmarked for Pedro Yap for the parcels of land covered by
the two certificate of titles in the names of the listed beneficiaries.
The Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that they are the owners of a parcel of land in
Nueva Ecija, which is registered under the name of the late Emiliano Santiago. In 1990,
Land Bank required the beneficiaries to execute an Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking,
without notice to the heirs of Emiliano Santiago, to pay rentals to the former for the use of
their farm lots equivalent to at least 25% of the net harvest. The DAR also directed Land
Bank to pay the landowner. Land Bank, however, claimed that it was the DAR which
required the execution of Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking; and that Land Bank did not
collect any amount as rental.
DAR maintained that the administrative order that it issued is valid as it was an
exercise of it rule-making power. Land Bank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of
Deposits was in consonance with the three circulars issued by the Land Registration
Authority. On 20 October 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the
respondents.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts
deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final
valuation of their properties
RULING:
Yes.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Association of Small Landowners in
the Phil vs, Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the
expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the
traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash.
The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16 (e)
of RA 6657 and the determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable.
To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their
behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR’s
valuation is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain.
The Court find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation and
final compensation for purposes of exercising the landowners’ right to appropriate the same.
LAGMAY, Kriztel Mara G.
Expropriation
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988
Case Digest Land Bank of the Philippines v.
CA
The landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be
fairly and immediately compensated.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED
LAGMAY, Kriztel Mara G. Functions of the DAR
officials
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988
Case Digest Heirs of Tantoco v.
CA
FACTS:
Spouses Alejandro and Lourdes Joson are the registered owners of a parcel of land
in Bulacan. Reynaldo Mendoza and Agapito Laquindanum however claimed to be the actual
and lawful tillers of land. In 1987, Spouses Joson together with Pastor Mendoza, the father
of Reynaldo, entered into a leasehold contract whereby the lessee bound himself to pay 20
cavans of palay at 46 kilograms per cavan to the lessor per cropping. Later on, Spouses
Joson filed with the PARAD a complaint to recover possession and actual cultivation of the
land in question from Pastor. This complaint was based on the allegation that Pastor has
migrated to the United States and has lived there as a lawful permanent resident. Further,
they alleged that they did not give their consent for Reynaldo or Agapito to till the land.
Pastor Mendoza together with Reynaldo and Agapito denied all the allegations and
contended that Pastor Mendoza still possess all the qualifications required of an agricultural
tenant and that he did not and had no intention to abandon his right over such land.
PARAD’s decision was in favor of Pastor Mendoza, and recognized Reynaldo
Mendoza as the new tenant. The DARAB held that although the agricultural lessee, Pastor,
has abandoned the landholding, Spouses Joson are barred from recovering possession of
the land although they are owners, pursuant to the passage of RA No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
DARAB. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondents were the lawful tenants of Spouses Joson
RULING:
No.
Their tillage of the subject landholding was without the consent of Spouses Joson.
Nonetheless, armed with the knowledge that under the present law, even the actual
occupants or tillers may actually have the rights as “beneficiary” of the CARP, the DARAB
took the precautionary measure of preserving the status quo and defer to the DAR’s turf the
determination of the issue as to who should be the beneficiary of the landholding in question.
Spouses Joson cannot recover possession of the landholding, although they are the
owners and although Pastor Mendoza has indeed abandoned the landholding and although
Reynaldo and Agapito are not tenant-farmers on the subject lan but are mere farmworkers or
actual tillers thereon, in view of the passage of RA No. 6657 which grants to Reynaldo and
Agapito the protection of being secured in their farming activities in the landholding in
question. Reynaldo Mendoza and Agapito Laquindanum are bound to observe the status
quo on the subject land.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partlygranted and the Decision dated 27
January 2000 and the Resolution dated 05 July 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
LAGMAY, Kriztel Mara G. Functions of the DAR
officials
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988
Case Digest Heirs of Tantoco v.
CA
No. 47437 are hereby MODIFIED to conform to the findings and conclusions of the DARAB.
The Decision dated 21 July 1997 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
in DARAB Case No. 3414 is hereby REINSTATED. In the interest of justice, we certify this
case and its records to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for the immediate determination of
whether or not respondents are appropriate beneficiaries of the land in question and to make
a report thereon within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LAGMAY, Kriztel Mara G. Functions of the DAR
officials
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988
Case Digest Heirs of Tantoco v.
CA
FACTS:
Francisco, Marta, Zosimo, Margarita, and Pacita all surnamed Tantoco owned a
parcel of land in Cavite. 9.6455 hectares of such land was declared exempt from the
coverage of PD 27. Later on, petitioners donated 6.5218 hectares of such land to Caritas de
Manila. The DAR had been considering the land in question for compulsory acquisition
pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Francisco Tantoco Sr.wrote
to DAR declaring the productive nature and agricultural suitability of the land in dispute and
offering the same for acquisition under the Voluntary Offer to Sell scheme. The land as
offered at Php 500,000 per hectare, but they never heard a thing from DAR.
Finally, in 1993, petitioners received a notice from DAR valuing the land in question
for Php 4,826,742.35. The total land area was decreased. This offer was rejected by
petitioners and they also withdrew their voluntary offer to sell. Because of this refusal,
theDAR requested Land Bank to open a trust account in favor of petitioners. A certification
was then issued by the Land Bank Bonds Servicing Department. Php 1,834,162.10 was
placed with the Trust Department but no release of payment in cash or in bonds had been
effected.
The DAR later on issued a Certificate of Land Ownership Award over the subject
property to Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association of Cavite. The certificate of title in the
name of the petitioners was later on cancelled. Upon learning that their certificate of title was
cancelled, petitioners filed an action for the reinstatement of the title in their name.
The DAR Regional Adjudicator for region 4 rendered a decision in favor of the
department of agrarian reform. The DARAB also ruled in their favor. So was the Court of
Appeals, hence this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the DAR officials, in acquiring said property, performed their functions
properly and in accordance with the law
RULING:
No.
The property in question can be properly subjected to CARP. It was not re-classified
nor converted from agricultural t non-agricultural use with the approval of the HLURB prior to
the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. A perusal of the records reveal
that DAR officials or its employees failed to comply strictly with the guidelines and operating
procedures provided by law in acquiring the property subject to CARP.
There were certain inconsistencies in the manner of selection of the CARP
beneficiaries who are members of ARBA. The assailed Certificate of Land Ownership
Award, CLOA for brevity, that was finally generated failed to show that it is duly registered
with the appropriate government and non-government agencies. Moreover, 53 names were
listed when in fact only 43 duly applied as potential beneficiaries. Among the 53 names
listed, only 29 accomplished the required application forms and 30 signed the corresponding
LAGMAY, Kriztel Mara G. Functions of the DAR
officials
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988
Case Digest Heirs of Tantoco v.
CA
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision
dated December 15, 2000 and the Resolution dated May 25, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 54970 are SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to respondent
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for proper acquisition
proceedings in accordance with the applicable administrative procedure. No pronouncement
as to costs. SO ORDERED.
MEDINA, Mary Elizabeth B. SEC. 50 of
RA6657
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
Case Digest Sta. Rosa Realty Devt. Corp. vs.
Amante
FACTS:
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, SRRDC) was the
registered owner of two parcels of land, situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna.
According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable
water to the Canlubang community, and that ninety (90) light industries are now located in
the area. Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby
destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case with
the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, seeking an easement of a right of way to and from
Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of
private respondents. Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao,
Laguna separate complaints for forcible entry against respondents.
The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a notice of
coverage to petitioner and invited its officials or representatives to a conference, and it was
the consensus and recommendation of the assembly that the landholding of SRRDC be
placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioner then filed with the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office (MARO), Cabuyao, Laguna a "Protest and Objection" to the compulsory
acquisition of the property on the ground that the area was not appropriate for agricultural
purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that the
occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries.
However, the farmer beneficiaries together with the BARC chairman answered the protest
and objection stating that the slope of the land is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land
is suitable and economically viable for agricultural purposes, as evidenced by the
Certification of the Department of Agriculture, municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna.
While the injunction and ejectment cases were still in process, it appears that in August,
1989, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage to
SRRDC. Then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices
of acquisition to petitioner, stating that petitioner’s landholdings had been placed under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.On March 18, 1991, SRRDC submitted a petition
to the Board for the latter to resolve SRRDC’s petition for exemption from CARP coverage
before any administrative valuation of their landholding could be had by the Board. On
December 19, 1991, the DARAB promulgated a decision, affirming the dismissal of the
protest of SRRDC against the compulsory coverage of the property SRRDC had filed with
the CA a petition for review of the DARAB’s decision, and it was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of whether the SRRDC
properties are subject to CARP coverage.
RULING:
YES. The DAR’s jurisdiction under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 is two-fold. The first is
essentially executive and pertains to the enforcement and administration of the laws,
MEDINA, Mary Elizabeth B. SEC. 50 of
RA6657
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
Case Digest Sta. Rosa Realty Devt. Corp. vs.
Amante
carrying them into practical operation and enforcing their due observance, while the second
is judicial and involves
the determination of rights and obligations of the parties. This is based on the fact that the
the power to determine whether a property is subject to CARP coverage lies with the DAR
Secretary. Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
To be more specific, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following:
a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the
cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws;
Provided, however, that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the
CARP and other agrarian laws and regulations, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and
cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR. Hence, to resolve the issue as to the true nature of
the parcels of land involved in the case at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct a re-
evaluation of the issue.
MEDINA, Mary Elizabeth B. SEC. 50 of
RA6657
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
Case Digest Sta. Rosa Realty Devt. Corp. vs.
Amante
DISPOSITION:
The Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals and REMANDED the case to
the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of the parcels of land involved
to resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.
MEDINA, Mary Elizabeth B. Section 32 of P.D.
1529
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
Case Digest Estribillo vs.
DAR
Estribillo vs. DAR
G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patiño, are the surviving spouses of
deceased recipients of EPs over parcels of land also located in Agusan del Sur. The parcels
of land described above, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a forested
area which have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent Hacienda
Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together with other persons, occupied and tilled these areas
believing that the same were public lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other
occupants in their peaceful cultivation. n 1956, HMI acquired such forested area through
Sales Patent No. 2683. On 21 October 1972 PD 27 was issued mandating that tenanted rice
and corn lands be brought under OLT and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. HMI requested
that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the coverage of OLT. Receiving
compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the
landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law.
From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares
were issued to petitioners, among other persons. In December 1997, HMI filed with the
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region XIII, 17 petitions
seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under PD 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its
former landholdings. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that
the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. HMI also sought for
the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed 277.5008 hectares which had been
awarded to petitioners. HMI filed with RARAD petitions seeking the declaration of
erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No.27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former
landholdings. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area
was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. RARAD rendered a decision
declaring as void the TCTs and Eps awarded to petitioners because the land covered was
not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations
between HMI and petitioners.
ISSUE:
RULING:
DISPOSITION:
The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73902 were REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The following EPs and the corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or to their
successors-in-interest were thereby declared VALID and SUBSISTING:
MEDINA, Mary Elizabeth B. RA 3844
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
Case Digest Caballes vs.
DAR
Caballes vs. DAR
GR No. 78214, 5 December 1988, SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60) square meters
was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the latter being the petitioner, by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes
This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of about 500 square
meters, situated at Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. The remainder of said was subsequently sold to
the said spouses by Macario Alicaba and the other members of the Millenes family, thus
consolidating ownership over the entire property in favor of the petitioner.
Before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon
constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00
to the owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion
of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a fitfy-fifty basis.
From 1975-1977, Abajon planted corn and bananas on the landholding. In 1978, he stopped
planting corn but continued to plant bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid
the P2.00 rental for the lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to
Andrea Millenes. after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda Caballes,
told Abajon that the poultry they intended to build would be close to his house and
pursuaded him to transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the landholding.
Abajon offered to pay the new owners rental on the land occupied by his house, but his offer
was not accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying that
they needed the property. But Abajon refused to leave. The parties had a confrontation
before the Barangay Captain of Lawaan in Talisay, Cebu but failed to reach an agreement.
All the efforts exerted by the landowners to oust Abajon from the landholding were in vain as
the latter simply refused to budge.
ISSUE:
RULING:
NO. The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it
is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who
plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or
patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not
automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60,
or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or
commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has
been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production.
The Supreme Court The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship, which are:
3. There is consent;
MEDINA, Mary Elizabeth B. RA 3844
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
Case Digest Caballes vs.
DAR
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator
thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has
established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he
covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. The
Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances of this case indicate that the private
respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of
benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its
southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said portion. Thud, Abajon is not a tenant for it
only occupied a miniscule portion of the land which cannot be interpreted as economic-
family size farm under the definition of RA 3844.
DISPOSITION:
The Order of public respondents dated November 15, 1986 was SET ASIDE and Criminal
Case No. 4003, was thereby DISMISSED. A copy of this decision was sent to the Municipal
Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu for appropriate action. This Decision was IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY.
MONTEMAYOR, Jolina N. Difference between a tenant and a
laborer
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C R.A. No
6657
Case Digest Gelos vs. Court of
Appeals
FACTS:
Ernesto Alzona (Alzona), herein respondent and his parents entered into a written contract
with Rafael Gelos (Gelos), herein petitioner. The Alzonas employed Gelos as a laborer of
their farmland with a daily wage of P5.00. Upon acquiring of the full ownership by Alzona, he
wrote to Gelos informing him that his services will be terminated and demanding him to
vacate from the property. However, Gelos refused, continued working and went to the Court
of Agrarian Relations to fix the agricultural lease rental on the subject property. Gelos
transferred the case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform which he found favor. However,
Alzona filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Gelos before the Municipal Court of
Cabuyao. Alzona also filed before the Court of Agrarian Reforms for the declaration of non-
tenancy and damages against petitioner.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that Gelos is a tenant of the property. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and ruled that Gelos was not a tenant of the
land and ordered the petitioner to surrender the property to Alzona.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Gelos falls under the definition of tenant under Section 5(a) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 1199.
RULING:
No.
Under R.A. No. 1199, a tenant is defined as a person who or with the aid from his immediate
farm household cultivates a land that belongs or possesses by another, with the latter’s
consent, for the purpose of production. The produce is shared by the landholder and the
tenant under the share of tenancy system or the tenant is paying the landholder a price-
certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both. In order to determine whether the
relationship exists, the following requisites must be present:
Absent one of the requisites, the person is not considered as a tenant. In application to the
case at hand, the Court ruled that Gelos is a mere laborer. It is evidenced from their
agreement, “Kasunuduan ng Upahang Araw” which is a lease of services as determined by
the Court. The Kasunduan expressly states the intention of the parties that Gelos is not a
MONTEMAYOR, Jolina N. Difference between a tenant and a
laborer
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C R.A. No
6657
Case Digest Gelos vs. Court of
Appeals
farm tenant but only a hired laborer. It is also clear based on the said agreement, that Alzona
intends to cultivate the land himself and no intention was given to place the land under
tenancy.
The Court made a difference between a tenancy relationship and a relationship between a
farm employer-farm worker. The former deals with the landowner as the lessor while the
tenant as the lessee of the agricultural land and the tenant’s income is based on the
agricultural produce or harvest while the latter, the farm worker works for the farm employer
and the farm worker receives a salary even if the farm employer does not make a profit.
The wife of the petitioner contended that Gelos is only tricked to sign the agreement
because Gelos is an illiterate. However, the Court dismissed this contention because it was
proven by Atty. Santos Pampolina, being the one who declared under his oath as a witness
because he was also the attorney and officer of the court, that he was the one who
explained the document to Gelos. The lack of notarization was pointed out by Atty.
Pampolina which the Court deemed that the absence of notarization does not affect the
validity of the agreement.
The payment of the irrigation fees does not declare him as tenant because at the time he
paid the fees, he was deemed as the “tenant” because of the preliminary finding; therefore,
the Agrarian Reform Office fixed a provisional leasehold rental.
Furthermore, the petitioner contends that Section 38 of R.A. No. 3844 must apply, but the
Court does not agree because it was already ruled that there is not tenancy relationship and
that Alzona already rejected Gelos’ claim that there exists a tenancy relationship by filing a
complaint for unlawful detainer.
Lastly, the Court cannot just rule in favor of Gelos because he was considered an
underprivileged party. Justice Sempio-Dy observed that Gelos is not necessarily an
underprivileged party because he was just a lowly employee. As she described, Gelos is a
mere farmer without a house of his own. It must be remembered that social justice or any
justice shall be applied for the deserving as the Court stated.
MONTEMAYOR, Jolina N. Definition of Tenant under R.A. No.
1199
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C R.A. No
6657
Case Digest Gabriel vs.
Pangilinan
FACTS:
Trinidad Gabriel (Gabriel) filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance against
Eusebio Pangilinan (Pangilinan). Gabriel was the owner of a 169,507 square meters
fishpond at Sta. Ursula, Betis, Pampanga. Gabriel and Pangilinan entered into a contract of
lease on the said fishpond on a year to year basis. During the course of the lease, Gabriel
notified Pangilinan in 1957 her intent to terminate the contract, but Pangilinan requested that
the lease be extended to another year which Gabriel heeded. In 1958, Gabriel intended to
terminate the lease and surrender the possession of the fishpond to her on January 1, 1959,
but her demand was ignored. Pangilinan answered that the trial court has no jurisdiction at
the case at hand because there exists an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship.
According to Pangilinan, the lease originally existed from Gabriel’s father, Potenciano
Gabriel. The latter stated that Pangilinan can lease the property as long as he wanted but
subject to the condition that Pangilinan shall convert the major portion into a fishpond and
improve the part that is already a fishpond.
The trial court ruled in favor of Gabriel and deemed that the lease contract is not under the
Tenancy Law in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1199 but merely a civil lease. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court’s ruling.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the lease entered by the parties is under R.A. No. 1199.
RULING:
No.
Section 4, R.A. No. 1199 as amended by R.A. No. 2263 provides that the requisites to
determine where there exists a leasehold tenancy:
Scrutinizing each requisites, the fishpond is indeed an agricultural land because the law
states that a “land in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural land.” For the second
requisite, the Court recognized that the fishpond is huge and the question to determine
whether the appellant’s family has raised the roughly 17 hectares of fishpond is not raised as
an issue. The third requisite was the determinant for this case because the Court ruled that it
MONTEMAYOR, Jolina N. Definition of Tenant under R.A. No.
1199
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C R.A. No
6657
Case Digest Gabriel vs.
Pangilinan
was proven that the tenant himself or with the aid of his immediate family did not work on the
land. It was discovered that the tenancy agreement was already severed in 1956 because
Pangilinan became ill and incapacitated. After Pangilinan became ill and incapacitated, none
of his immediate family worked in the fishpond. The term immediate farm household includes
only members of the family and other persons, related or not, who are dependent on the
tenant for the support and usually helps the tenant to operate the farm. The law that governs
the leasehold tenancy expressly states that the tant and his immediate farm household is
required to work in the land based in Section 5 of R.A. No. 1199 which defined tenant;
Section 8 which limits the relationship of people involved in the leasehold tenancy; and
Section 4 which requires the tenant and his immediate farm household to work in the land.
In application to the case at hand, the lack of work by Pangilinan or his immediate farm
household as required by the law does not make him a tenant. Furthermore, the one who
hires other people for the purpose of cultivating the land is also considered to abandon the
land as tenant under the Sections 5 and 8 of R.A. No. 1199. It was ruled by the Court that
the lease entered by Gabriel and Pangilinan is merely a civil lease.
MONTEMAYOR, Jolina N. Authority of the DAR in Land
Reclassification
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C R.A. No
6657
Case Digest Ros vs.
DAR
FACTS:
Jose Luis Ros, Andoni, Xavier, Roberto, Enrique (all surnamed Aboitiz), Matthias
Mendezona, Cebu Industrial Park Developers, Inc. and FBM Aboitiz Marine, Inc. are owners/
developers of several parcels of land. The subject properties were reclassified as industrial
lands by Municipal Ordinance No. 101 by the Municipal Council of Balamban, Cebu. The
Provincial Board of Cebu adopted the Ordinance and passed resolution No. 836-95 and
Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8. The petitioners secured all necessary permits and
government certificates for the development of the reclassified lands. However, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) sent a letter to Mendezona informing him to cease
and desist from further developments of the land and that DAR disallowed the conversion of
lands to industrial use.
The petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) asserting that the Local
Government Code specifically, Section 20 authorizes the reclassification of agricultural lands
to non-agricultural. According to the petitioners, the authority of DAR to approve the
conversion of lands is limited only from June 13, 1995 where the Agrarian Reform Law was
enacted. The petition was denied. The same petition was also denied by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the exercise of authority of the DAR in the reclassification of agricultural
lands to non-agricultural is only limited from the date of effectivity of the Agrarian Reform
Law.
RULING:
Yes.
The contention of the petitioners that the authority of the DAR must be limited only from the
date of effectivity of RA No. 6657 is of their disadvantage because as the Court ruled, RA
No. 6657 took effect on June 15, 1988 while the Municipal Ordinance No. 101 was passed
on March 25, 1992 and the Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8 was passed on April 3, 1995.
From the dates, it can be inferred that the parcels of land in under the authority of the DAR.
The Court ruled that agricultural lands, although already reclassified must go through the
authority of DAR which is the process of conversion. The lands only exempted are lands
already reclassified before the effectivity of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657. Administrative
Order No. 6 Series of 1994 which followed the Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 44,
Series of 1990 states that lands already classified before the enactment of the land, no
longer need a conversion clearance.
As ruled in the case of Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, there is a difference between conversion
and reclassification. The former is changing the current use of an agricultural land while the
MONTEMAYOR, Jolina N. Authority of the DAR in Land
Reclassification
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C R.A. No
6657
Case Digest Ros vs.
DAR
latter refers to specifying agricultural lands to be utilized for non-agricultural uses, for
example residential, industrial, commercial that is embodied in the land use plan and subject
to the requirements and procedure for conversion. Before reclassification, the land must be
converted first.
The Court also dismissed the contention of the petitioners regarding the alleged power of the
local governments to reclassify agricultural lands because the authority of the DAW is
covered by RA No. 6657 and the Local Government Code itself stated that noting in the
section of the Code shall be deemed to repeal or modify any provisions in RA No. 6657.
Penera, Louise Cleindale L. Land Conversion
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
Case Digest CREBA v. Sec. Agrarian
Reform
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (Creba) vs. The Secretary of
Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 183409. June 18, 2010
FACTS: On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-02,
entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR
AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01- 99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith.
DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural
uses or to another agricultural use. On 2 August 2007, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
amended certain provisions 8 of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07,
particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities. To address the
unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 which, temporarily suspended the
processing and approval of all land use conversion applications.
Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation involved in land and housing
development, building and infrastructure construction, claims that there is an actual slow
down of housing projects, which aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal
squatting problems to the substantial prejudice of petitioner and the whole nation.
ISSUE: WON DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in violation of Section 65 of
Republic Act No. 6657?
RULING: No. The argument of the petitioner that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was
made in violation of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers even those non-
awarded lands and reclassified lands by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations
on or after 15 June 1988 is specious.
DAR's express power over land use conversion provided for under Section 65 of Republic
Act No. 6657 is limited to cases in which agricultural lands already awarded have, after five
years, ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality
has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes. To suggest, however, that these are the only instances
that the DAR can require conversion clearances would open a loophole in Republic Act No.
6657 which every landowner may use to evade compliance with the agrarian reform
program. It should logically follow from the said department's express duty and function to
execute and enforce the said statute that any reclassification of a private land as a
residential, commercial or industrial property, on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No.
6657 on 15 June 1988 should first be cleared by the DAR.
Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some
other use as approved by the DAR while reclassification is the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures
for land use conversion. In view thereof, a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does
not automatically allow a landowner to change its use. He must undergo the process of
conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.
Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR's conversion authority can only
be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988. The said date
served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands
that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance or authority. Thereafter,
Penera, Louise Cleindale L. Land Conversion
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
Case Digest CREBA v. Sec. Agrarian
Reform
FACTS:
The alleged farmer-beneficiaries strikers protested the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office
of the President (OP), which approved the conversion of a 144-hectare land from agricultural
to agro-industrial institutional area. This led the OP, through then Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called "Win-Win" Resolution on November 7,
1997, substantially modifying its earlier decision after it had already become final and
executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion only to the
extent of 44 hectares and ordered the remaining 100 hectares to be distributed to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries.
The petitioners now seek to annul and set aside the "Win Win" Resolution and to enjoin
respondent Secretary Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform from implementing the
said Resolution.
ISSUE: WON the final and executory Decision dated March 29, 1996 can still be
substantially modified by the “Win-Win” Resolution.
RULING:
No. When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the
decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has file a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so
modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more
authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution.
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the
Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted
to be filed in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the second paragraph of
Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that
the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of
March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-
opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already
become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that
accord finality to administrative determinations.
Therefore, the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of
March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is void. Such void resolution is "a lawless thing,
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight or ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head."
Penera, Louise Cleindale L. “Win-win”
resolution
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
Case Digest Fortich v. Corona
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution dated
November 7, 1997, issued by the Oce of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To Intervene filed by alleged
farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.
Penera, Louise Cleindale L. Computation of just
compensation
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
Case Digest Land Bank of the Phils. v. Heirs of
Cruz
FACTS:
Stateland Investment Corporation (SIC) bought a property as the highest bidder in a public
action. Upon inspection, SIC found that there stood a two-storey house occupied by the
Ramos family in the portion of the property. Consequently, SIC employed security guards
and fenced the lots to prevent squatters. Fearing that they would be evicted, Francisco
Ramos filed a complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Adjudication
Board for the maintenance of their peaceful possession of the landholding. The Provincial
Adjudicator, however, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Francisco then appealed to
the DAR Adjudication Board docketed as DARAB Case No. 4471. Meanwhile, SIC filed a
case for ejectment against Ramos with the MTC. In his defense, Ramos cites lack of
jurisdiction of the MTC since he has been a tenant on the landholding since 1974. SIC
argues that it had purchased the five parcels of land, including the two-storey concrete
house, and that despite oral and written demands Ramos refused to leave.On the other
hand, Francisco admitted that SIC was the owner of the house and the landholding, but
interposed as defense that he had been a tenant on the land since 1974, and that the house
was assigned to him by the ARC as his residence. SIC then filed a case for ejectment
against Francisco.
ISSUE:
RULING:
a. Yes, because the action in the MTC was one for unlawful detainer or Francisco's eviction
from the two-storey house and not from the landholding. In this case, the MTC anchored its
claim on its purchase of the five parcels of land and asserted that it had the right of
possession over such house as well. According to the Supreme Court, “when a tenancy is
merely averred as a special and affirmative defense to a complaint for unlawful detainer, the
MTC does not automatically lose its jurisdiction over the said action. The MTC is duty-bound
to conduct a preliminary conference and, if necessary, to receive evidence to determine if
such tenancy relationship had, in fact, been shown to be the real issue. The MTC may even
opt to conduct a hearing on the special and affirmative defense of the defendant, although
under the Rules on Summary Procedure, such a hearing is not a matter of right. If it is shown
during the hearing or conference that, indeed, tenancy is the issue, the MTC should dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction.”
b. An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating the tenurial arrangement, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworking association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing and seeking to arrange terms and conditions of such tenurial
arrangement. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired
under R.A. No. 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and
tenant, or lessor and lessee.
YUZON, Edson A. Definition of Agrarian Dispute /
Jurisdiction
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Agrarian Reform Law
Case Digest Ramos vs. Stateland Investment
Corporation
c. No, the issue of whether the Francisco was the owner of the portion of the house occupied
by him and his family or was merely allowed by the former owner of the land to reside
therein is an issue which may be resolved by the application of general civil laws. In this
case, the issues of whether the Francisco was a bona fide tenant or agricultural lessee and
whether he had a right to redeem the landholding under the CARL are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB on appeal. The res in the PARAD and the DARAB
were the five parcels of land; in contrast, the res subject of the action in the MTC was the
two-storey house occupied by Francisco and his family. The sole issue in the MTC was who
between Francisco and the SIC had the right to the material or physical possession of the
house. Unfortunately, the issue was neither raised nor resolved by the PARAD or the
DARAB on appeal.
DISPOSITION:
FACTS:
Nazaria Tope was a tenant of a 10,000 square meter lot with fruit bearing trees which was
owned by Rafael Magpily. Upon Nazaria’s request, her nephew, Herminigildo de Jesus, was
allowed to a construct a house covering a portion of the land and to occupy the same.
Unfortunately, their relationship went sour so Rafael decided to evict Herminigildo but the
latter refused. Hence, Rafael filed an ejectment suit against him. In his defense, Herminigildo
contended that he is a bonafide agricultural tenant of Rafael for 15 years. According to him,
his ascendants were the former tenants of the owner. When her aunt died, he cultivated the
land and had share in its produce. He cites lack of jurisdiction of the court because the the
matter involves tenancy dispute, the exclusive jurisdiction of which belongs to DARAB. The
MTC ruled in favor of Rafael stating that Herminigildo failed to establish a tenancy
relationship. The RTC affirmed. On appeal, the CA reversed. According to the CA, the case
involves an agrarian dispute since Rafael allowed Herminigildo to cultivate, harvest and
share in the produce of the land.
ISSUE:
RULING:
a. None. The Supreme Court held that Herminigildo failed to discharge the burden of proving
that he was an agricultural tenant of Magpily and that the instant case involves an agrarian
dispute cognizable by the DARAB. In this case, “the sworn statements merely attested to the
fact that Herminigildo became a worker in the coconut plantation of Rafael following the
death of her aunt who was the former tenant of the land. Nowhere in the said statements
was it mentioned why and how Herminigildo became an agricultural tenant nor the intent of
of the owner to institute him as his tenant nor of the landowner’s purpose to embark on
agricultural production. It does not prove that he is an agricultural tenant, but only a
caretaker of the land.”
b. The tenants are persons who, in themselves and with the aid available from within their
immediate farm households, cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with
the latter’s consent; for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable
in produce or money or both under the leasehold tenancy system.
c. Yes, because the case involves the gratuitous occupation of another’s property which
became unlawful by virtue of the owner’s withdrawal of consent or tolerance to such
occupation.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 7, 2005 Decision and the April 18,
2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69601,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE
YUZON, Edson A. Period of Appeal /OGCC as LBP’s
Counsel
Agrarian Law & Social Legislation / 2C Agrarian Reform Law
Case Digest LBP vs.
Martinez
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
a. No, because nothing in the LBP charter that expressly authorizes the said Legal
Department to appear in behalf of LBP in any court or quasi-judicial proceeding. It should be
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. According to the Supreme Court, “years of
wrong practice do not make a statutory right “
b. Yes, because under the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the decision shall not be appealable
to the Board but shall be brought directly to the RTC acting as SAC within 15 days from
receipt of the notice thereof. In this case, LBP’s petition was filed 26 days after its receipt of
the PARAD’s decision or way beyond the reglementary period.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83276 is AFFIRMED.