This case discusses the one-year prescriptive period for filing an insurance claim based on a contract. The Supreme Court ruled that:
1) The insured's cause of action and right to file a claim commences from the time of the insurer's denial of the claim, either expressly or impliedly.
2) For the plaintiff Emilio Tan, the one-year period began on April 2, 1984 when he received the letter rejecting his fire loss claim, not when he later requested reconsideration.
3) Allowing the prescriptive period to be suspended by requesting reconsideration could create uncertainty, so the rejection that starts the period is the initial denial, not any subsequent reconsideration process.
This case discusses the one-year prescriptive period for filing an insurance claim based on a contract. The Supreme Court ruled that:
1) The insured's cause of action and right to file a claim commences from the time of the insurer's denial of the claim, either expressly or impliedly.
2) For the plaintiff Emilio Tan, the one-year period began on April 2, 1984 when he received the letter rejecting his fire loss claim, not when he later requested reconsideration.
3) Allowing the prescriptive period to be suspended by requesting reconsideration could create uncertainty, so the rejection that starts the period is the initial denial, not any subsequent reconsideration process.
This case discusses the one-year prescriptive period for filing an insurance claim based on a contract. The Supreme Court ruled that:
1) The insured's cause of action and right to file a claim commences from the time of the insurer's denial of the claim, either expressly or impliedly.
2) For the plaintiff Emilio Tan, the one-year period began on April 2, 1984 when he received the letter rejecting his fire loss claim, not when he later requested reconsideration.
3) Allowing the prescriptive period to be suspended by requesting reconsideration could create uncertainty, so the rejection that starts the period is the initial denial, not any subsequent reconsideration process.
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SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD. vs.
COURT OF First, it is a cardinal principle of insurance law that a
APPEALS and EMILIO TAN policy or contract of insurance is to be construed G.R. No. 89741 liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the March 13, 1991 insurer company. However, if such terms are clear and unambiguous, they must be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. Digested by: Kristoper Laguting As the terms of section 27 of the insurance policy are very clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity Topic: whatsoever, it must be taken and understood in its plain, ordinary meaning. This case discusses about the period within which a party may file a case base on a claim arising from an In this case, Tan admitted that he received a copy of insurance contract and when such right to file or the the letter of rejection on April 2, 1984. Thus, the 12- cause of action commences or accrues. month prescriptive period started to run from the said date of April 2, 1984, for such is the plain meaning and FACTS: intention of Section 27 of the insurance policy. Emilio Tan took a property insurance policy from Sun Section 27 of the insurance policy was stipulated Insurance over his interest in an electrical supply pursuant to Section 63 of the Insurance Code, which store. 4 days after the issuance of the policy, a fire states that: burned down the store. Sec. 63. A condition, stipulation or agreement On August 20, 1983, Tan filed his claim for fire loss in any policy of insurance, limiting the time for with insurer, but on February 29, 1984, the insurer commencing an action thereunder to a period wrote Tan denying his claim. of less than one year from the time when the On April 3, 1984, Tan wrote to the insurer, seeking cause of action accrues, is void. reconsideration of the denial of his claim. So the question is “When does the cause of On September 3, 1985, Tan's counsel wrote the action accrue?” Insurer inquiring about the status of his April 3, 1984 Eagle Star Insurance Co. vs. Chia Yu (96 Phil. 696 request for reconsideration. (1955]), where the Court held: The insurer answered the letter on October 11, 1985, The right of the insured to the payment of his advising Tan's counsel that the Insurer's denial of loss accrues from the happening of the loss. Tan's claim remained unchanged. Tan filed Civil Case However, the cause of action in an insurance against the insurer on November 20, 1985. (note contract does not accrue until the insured's that the case was filed more than 1 year from the time claim is finally rejected by the insurer. This is Tan receive a letter denying his claim on April 1984.) because before such final rejection there is no The insurer filed a motion to dismiss on the ground real necessity for bringing suit. that the action had already prescribed. ACCFA vs. Alpha Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. (24 As provided in the Insurance policy, section 27 states SCRA 151 [1968], holding that: that: Since "cause of action" requires as essential 27. Action or suit clause — If a claim be elements not only a legal right of the plaintiff made and rejected and an action or suit and a correlated obligation of the defendant in be not commenced either in the Insurance violation of the said legal right, the cause of Commission or in any court of competent action does not accrue until the party obligated jurisdiction within twelve (12) months (surety) refuses, expressly or impliedly, to from receipt of notice of such rejection, or comply with its duty (in this case to pay the in case of arbitration taking place as provided amount of the bond). herein, within twelve (12) months after due Based on the said pronouncements, the insured's notice of the award made by the arbitrator or cause of action or his right to file a claim commences arbitrators or umpire, then the claim shall from the time of the denial of his claim by the Insurer, for all purposes be deemed to have been either expressly or impliedly. abandoned and shall not thereafter be recoverable hereunder. The rejection referred to should be construed as the rejection in the first instance. Tan is contending that the one-year prescriptive period does not start to run until the petition for Otherwise, if the filing of a motion for reconsideration reconsideration had been resolved by the insurer. would suspend the running of the prescriptive period of twelve months, a whole new body of rules on the ISSUE: matter should be promulgated so as to avoid any Whether or not this case was filed beyond the one- conflict that may be brought by it. year prescriptive period. Also, the Court noted the rationale for the necessity of RULING: YES. bringing suits against the Insurer within one year from the rejection of the claim. In Ang v. Fulton Fire Insurance Co., the Court held that: The condition contained in an insurance policy that claims must be presented within one year after rejection is not merely a procedural requirement but an important matter essential to a prompt settlement of claims against insurance companies as it demands that insurance suits be brought by the insured while the evidence as to the origin and cause of destruction have not yet disappeared.
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