FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 207010. February 18, 2015.]

MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., A.P. MOLLER SINGAPORE PTE.

LIMITED, and JESUS AGBAYANI , petitioners, vs . TORIBIO C.
AVESTRUZ , * respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE , J : p

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated January 4,
2013 and the Resolution 3 dated April 16, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 125773 which reversed and set aside the Decision 4 dated April 26, 2012
and the Resolution 5 dated June 18, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. (M) 07-10704-11 [NLRC LAC No. (OFW-M)-01-000123-12]
dismissing the illegal dismissal complaint led by respondent Toribio C. Avestruz
(Avestruz) and awarding him nominal damages.
The Facts
On April 28, 2011, petitioner Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. (Maersk), on behalf of its
foreign principal, petitioner A.P. Moller Singapore Pte. Ltd. (A.P. Moller), hired Avestruz as
Chief Cook on board the vessel M/V Nedlloyd Drake for a period of six (6) months, with a
basic monthly salary of US$698.00. 6 Avestruz boarded the vessel on May 4, 2011. 7
On June 22, 2011, in the course of the weekly inspection of the vessel's galley,
Captain Charles C. Woodward (Captain Woodward) noticed that the cover of the garbage
bin in the kitchen near the washing area was oily. As part of Avestruz's job was to ensure
the cleanliness of the galley, Captain Woodward called Avestruz and asked him to stand
near the garbage bin where the former took the latter's right hand and swiped it on the oily
cover of the garbage bin, telling Avestruz to feel it. Shocked, Avestruz remarked, "Sir if you
are looking for [dirt], you can nd it[;] the ship is big. Tell us if you want to clean and we will
clean it." Captain Woodward replied by shoving Avestruz's chest, to which the latter
complained and said, "Don't touch me," causing an argument to ensue between them. 8
Later that afternoon, Captain Woodward summoned and required 9 Avestruz to
state in writing what transpired in the galley that morning. Avestruz complied and
submitted his written statement 10 on that same day. Captain Woodward likewise asked
Messman Jomilyn P. Kong (Kong) to submit his own written statement regarding the
incident, to which the latter immediately complied. 11 On the very same day, Captain
Woodward informed Avestruz that he would be dismissed from service and be
disembarked in India. On July 3, 2011, Avestruz was disembarked in Colombo, Sri Lanka
and arrived in the Philippines on July 4, 2011. 12
Subsequently, he led a complaint 13 for illegal dismissal, payment for the unexpired
portion of his contract, damages, and attorney's fees against Maersk, A.P. Moller, and
Jesus Agbayani (Agbayani), an o cer 14 of Maersk. 15 He alleged that no investigation or
hearing was conducted nor was he given the chance to defend himself before he was
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 dismissed, and that Captain Woodward failed to observe the provisions under Section 17
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment
Contract (POEA-SEC) on disciplinary procedures. Also, he averred that he was not given
any notice stating the ground for his dismissal. 16 Additionally, he claimed that the cost of
his airfare in the amount of US$606.15 was deducted from his wages. 17 Furthermore,
Avestruz prayed for the award of the following amounts: (a) US$5,372.00 representing his
basic wages, guaranteed overtime, and vacation leave; (b) on board allowance of
US$1,936.00; (c) ship maintenance bonus of US$292.00; (d) hardship allowance of
US$8,760.00; (e) P300,000.00 as moral damages, (f) P200,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and (g) attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award. 18
In their defense, 19 Maersk, A.P. Moller, and Agbayani (petitioners) claimed that
during his stint on the vessel, Avestruz failed to attend to his tasks, speci cally to maintain
the cleanliness of the galley, which prompted Captain Woodward to issue weekly
reminders. 20 Unfortunately, despite the reminders, Avestruz still failed to perform his
duties properly. 21 On June 22, 2011, when again asked to comply with the aforesaid duty,
Avestruz became angry and snapped, retorting that he did not have time to do all the tasks
required of him. As a result, Captain Woodward initiated disciplinary proceedings and
informed Avestruz during the hearing of the offenses he committed, i.e., his repeated
failure to follow directives pertaining to his duty to maintain the cleanliness of the galley,
as well as his act of insulting an o cer. 22 Thereafter, he was informed of his dismissal
from service due to insubordination. 23 Relative thereto, Captain Woodward sent two (2)
electronic mail messages 24 (e-mails) to Maersk explaining the decision to terminate
Avestruz's employment and requesting for Avestruz's replacement. Avestruz was
discharged from the vessel and arrived in the Philippines on July 4, 2011. 25
Petitioners maintained that Avestruz was dismissed for a just and valid cause and is,
therefore, not entitled to recover his salary for the unexpired portion of his contract. 26
They likewise claimed that they were justi ed in deducting his airfare from his salary, and
that the latter was not entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 27
Hence, they prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. 28
The LA Ruling
In a Decision 29 dated November 29, 2011, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed
Avestruz's complaint for lack of merit. The LA found that he failed to perform his duty of
maintaining cleanliness in the galley, and that he also repeatedly failed to obey the
directives of his superior, which was tantamount to insubordination. 30 In support of its
nding, the LA cited the Collective Bargaining Agreement 31 (CBA) between the parties
which considers the act of insulting a superior o cer by words or deed as an act of
insubordination. 32 acTDCI

Aggrieved, Avestruz appealed 33 to the NLRC.

The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision 34 dated April 26, 2012, the NLRC sustained the validity of Avestruz's
dismissal but found that petitioners failed to observe the procedures laid down in Section
17 of the POEA-SEC, 35 which states:
SECTION 17. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES. —

The Master shall comply with the following disciplinary procedures against an
erring seafarer:
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 A. The Master shall furnish the seafarer with a written notice containing the
following:
1. Grounds for the charges as listed in Section 33 of this Contract or
analogous act constituting the same.

2. Date, time and place for a formal investigation of the charges

against the seafarer concerned.

B. The Master or his authorized representative shall conduct the

investigation or hearing, giving the seafarer the opportunity to
explain or defend himself against the charges. These procedures
must be duly documented and entered into the ship's logbook.
C. If after the investigation or hearing, the Master is convinced that imposition of
a penalty is justi ed, the Master shall issue a written notice of penalty
and the reasons for it to the seafarer, with copies furnished to the
Philippine agent .

D. Dismissal for just cause may be effected by the Master without furnishing the
seafarer with a notice of dismissal if there is a clear and existing danger to
the safety of the crew or the vessel. The Master shall send a complete
report to the manning agency substantiated by witnesses, testimonies and
any other documents in support thereof. (Emphases supplied)

As the records are bereft of evidence showing compliance with the foregoing rules,
the NLRC held petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay Avestruz the amount of
P30,000.00 by way of nominal damages. 36
Avestruz moved for reconsideration 37 of the aforesaid Decision, which was denied
in the Resolution 38 dated June 18, 2012. Dissatis ed, he elevated the matter to the CA via
petition for certiorari. 39
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 40 dated January 4, 2013, the CA reversed and set aside the rulings of
the NLRC and instead, found Avestruz to have been illegally dismissed. Consequently, it
directed petitioners to pay him, jointly and severally, the full amount of his placement fee
and deductions made, with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, as well as his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract, and attorney's fees of ten percent (10%)
of the total award. All other money claims were denied for lack of merit. 41
In so ruling, the CA found that the conclusion of the NLRC, which a rmed that of the
LA, that Avestruz was lawfully dismissed, was not supported by substantial evidence, there
being no factual basis for the charge of insubordination which petitioners claimed was the
ground for Avestruz's dismissal. It found that petitioners, as employers, were unable to
discharge the burden of proof required of them to establish that Avestruz was guilty of
insubordination, which necessitates the occurrence of two (2) conditions as a just cause
for dismissal: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is,
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have
been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties
which he had been engaged to discharge. The CA found that, contrary to the rulings of the
labor tribunals, there was no evidence on record to bolster petitioners' claims that
Avestruz willfully failed to comply with his duties as Chief Cook and that he displayed a
perverse and wrongful attitude. 42
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 Moreover, it gave more credence to Avestruz's account of the incident in the galley
on June 22, 2011, being supported in part by the statement 43 of Kong, who witnessed the
incident. On the other hand, the e-mails sent by Captain Woodward to Maersk were
uncorroborated. On this score, the CA observed the absence of any logbook entries to
support petitioners' stance. 44
Similarly, the CA found that petitioners failed to accord procedural due process to
Avestruz, there being no compliance with the requirements of Section 17 of the POEA-SEC
as above-quoted, or the "two-notice rule." It held that the statement 45 Captain Woodward
issued to Avestruz neither contained the grounds for which he was being charged nor the
date, time, and place for the conduct of a formal investigation. Likewise, Captain
Woodward failed to give Avestruz any notice of penalty and the reasons for its imposition,
with copies thereof furnished to the Philippine Agent. 46
In arriving at the monetary awards given to Avestruz, the CA considered the
provisions of Section 7 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10022, 47 amending RA 8042, 48 which
grants upon the illegally dismissed overseas worker "the full reimbursement [of] his
placement fee and the deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract." However, with
respect to Avestruz's claims for overtime and leave pay, the same were denied for failure
to show entitlement thereto. All other monetary claims were likewise denied in the
absence of substantial evidence to prove the same. Finally, the CA awarded attorney's fees
of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award in accordance with Article 111 49 of the
Labor Code. 50 aHcACT

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, 51 which the CA denied in its Resolution 52

dated April 16, 2013, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred
when it reversed and set aside the ruling of the NLRC nding that Avestruz was legally
dismissed and accordingly, dismissing the complaint, albeit with payment of nominal
damages for violation of procedural due process.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
Generally, a re-examination of factual ndings cannot be done by the Court acting on
a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts but reviews only
questions of law. 53 Thus, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may
generally be put into issue. This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. 5 4 In this case,
considering that the factual ndings of the LA and the NLRC, on the one hand, and the CA,
on the other hand, are contradictory, the general rule that only legal issues may be raised in
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court does not apply, 55 and
the Court retains the authority to pass upon the evidence presented and draw conclusions
therefrom. 56
It is well-settled that the burden of proving that the termination of an employee was
for a just or authorized cause lies with the employer. If the employer fails to meet this
burden, the conclusion would be that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. 57
In order to discharge this burden, the employer must present substantial evidence, which
is de ned as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
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 adequate to justify a conclusion, 58 and not based on mere surmises or conjectures. 59
After a punctilious examination of the evidence on record, the Court nds that the
CA did not err in reversing and setting aside the factual conclusions of the labor tribunals
that Avestruz's dismissal was lawful. Instead, the Court nds that there was no just or valid
cause for his dismissal, hence, he was illegally dismissed.
Petitioners maintain that Avestruz was dismissed on the ground of insubordination,
consisting of his "repeated failure to obey his superior's order to maintain cleanliness in
the galley of the vessel" as well as his act of "insulting a superior o cer by words or
deeds." 60 In support of this contention, petitioners presented as evidence the e-mails sent
by Captain Woodward, both dated June 22, 2011, and time-stamped 10:07 a.m. and 11:40
a.m., respectively, which they claim chronicled the relevant circumstances that eventually
led to Avestruz's dismissal.
The Court, however, nds these e-mails to be uncorroborated and self-serving, and
therefore, do not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence as would su ciently
discharge the burden of proving that Avestruz was legally dismissed. On the contrary,
petitioners failed to prove that he committed acts of insubordination which would warrant
his dismissal.
Insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee, necessitates the
concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have
been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order
violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. 61
In this case, the contents of Captain Woodward's e-mails do not establish that
Avestruz's conduct had been willful, or characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude.
The Court concurs with the CA's observation that Avestruz's statement 62 regarding the
incident in the galley deserves more credence, being corroborated 63 by Kong, a messman
who witnessed the same.
Conversely, apart from Captain Woodward's e-mails, no other evidence was
presented by the petitioners to support their claims. While rules of evidence are not strictly
observed in proceedings before administrative bodies, 64 petitioners should have offered
additional proof to corroborate the statements 65 described therein. Thus, in Ranises v.
NLRC 66 which involved a seafarer who was repatriated to the Philippines for allegedly
committing illegal acts amounting to a breach of trust, as based on a telex dispatch by the
Master of the vessel, the Court impugned and eventually vetoed the credence given by the
NLRC upon the telex, to wit: cCEAHT

Unfortunately, the veracity of the allegations contained in the aforecited

telex was never proven by respondent employer. Neither was it shown that
respondent employer exerted any effort to even verify the truthfulness of Capt.
Sonoda's report and establish petitioner's culpability for his alleged illegal acts.
Worse, no other evidence was submitted to corroborate the charges against
petitioner. 67

Likewise, in Skippers United Paci c, Inc. v. NLRC , 68 the Court ruled that the lone
evidence offered by the employer to justify the seafarer's dismissal, i.e., the telexed Chief
Engineer's Report which contained the causes for said dismissal, did not su ce to
discharge the onus required of the employer to show that the termination of an employee's
service was valid. 69 The same doctrine was enunciated in Paci c Maritime Services, Inc. v.
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 Ranay, 70 where the Court held that the telefax transmission purportedly executed and
signed by a person on board the vessel is insufficient evidence to prove the commission of
the acts constituting the grounds for the dismissal of two seafarers, being uncorroborated
evidence. 71
As in this case, it was incumbent upon the petitioners to present other substantial
evidence to bolster their claim that Avestruz committed acts that constitute
insubordination as would warrant his dismissal. At the least, they could have offered in
evidence entries in the ship's o cial logbook showing the infractions or acts of
insubordination purportedly committed by Avestruz, the ship's logbook being the o cial
repository of the day-to-day transactions and occurrences on board the vessel. 72 Having
failed to do so, their position that Avestruz was lawfully dismissed cannot be sustained.
Similarly, the Court a rms the nding of the CA that Avestruz was not accorded
procedural due process, there being no compliance with the provisions of Section 17 of
the POEA-SEC as above-cited, which requires the "two-notice rule." As explained in
Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira: 73
An erring seaman is given a written notice of the charge against him and is
afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should sanctions be
imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be
furnished the erring seafarer. It is only in the exceptional case of clear and
existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices are
dispensed with; but just the same, a complete report should be sent to the
manning agency, supported by substantial evidence of the findings. 74

In this case, there is dearth of evidence to show that Avestruz had been given a
written notice of the charge against him, or that he was given the opportunity to explain or
defend himself. The statement 75 given by Captain Woodward requiring him to explain in
writing the events that transpired at the galley in the morning of June 22, 2011 hardly
quali es as a written notice of the charge against him, nor was it an opportunity for
Avestruz to explain or defend himself. While Captain Woodward claimed in his e-mail 76
that he conducted a "disciplinary hearing" informing Avestruz of his ine ciency, no
evidence was presented to support the same.
Neither was Avestruz given a written notice of penalty and the reasons for its
imposition. Instead, Captain Woodward verbally informed him that he was dismissed from
service and would be disembarked from the vessel. It bears stressing that only in the
exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the
required notices may be dispensed with, and, once again, records are bereft of evidence
showing that such was the situation when Avestruz was dismissed.
Finally, with respect to the monetary awards given to Avestruz, the Court nds the
same to be in consonance with Section 10 of RA 8042, as amended by RA 10022, which
reads:
Section 10. Money claims. — . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as de ned by law or contract, or any unauthorized deductions
from the migrant worker's salary, the worker shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee and the deductions made with interest at
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 twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less. 7 6
xxx xxx xxx

Similarly, the Court a rms the grant of attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the
total award. All other monetary awards are denied for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED . The Decision dated January 4, 2013 and the
Resolution dated April 16, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
125773 are hereby AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED . CAHaST

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin and Perez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
* Avertruz in some parts of the record.
1. Rollo, pp. 58-76.
2. Id. at 81-96. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with Associate Justices
Franchito N. Diamante and Melchor Quirino C. Sadang concurring.
3. Id. at 98-99. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with Associate Justices
Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela and Melchor Q.C. Sadang concurring.
4. Id. at 25-32. Penned by Commissioner Dolores M. Peralta-Beley with Commissioner Mercedes
R. Posada-Lacap concurring. Presiding Commissioner Leonardo L. Leonida was on
leave.
5. Id. at 34-35. Penned by Commissioner Dolores M. Peralta-Beley with Presiding Commissioner
Leonardo L. Leonida and Commissioner Mercedes R. Posada-Lacap concurring.

6. See Contract of Employment dated May 3, 2011; id. at 181.

7. Id. at 63.
8. See undated Statement Concerning the Event in the Gallery of Avestruz; id. at 184. See also
id. at 13, 26, and 82.
9. See undated Statement; id. at 183. See also id. at 82-83.
10. Id. at 184.
11. Id. at 83 and 185.

12. Id. at 83.

13. See Position Paper for the Complainant dated August 15, 2011; id. at 165-179.
14. Designated as Crewing Manager. See id. at 62 and 181.
15. Id. at 82.

16. See id. at 83.

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 17. See id. at 16.
18. Id. at 83.

19. See Position Paper dated September 5, 2011; id. at 191-206.

20. Id. at 194.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 195.
23. Id.

24. Dated June 22, 2011. Id. at 163-164.

25. Id. at 195-196.
26. Id. at 200-202.
27. Id. at 204-205.

28. Id. at 205.

29. Id. at 12-23. Penned by Labor Arbiter Enrique L. Flores, Jr.
30. Id. at 22.
31. Id. at 130-154.
32. Id. at 152.

33. See Memorandum of Appeal dated December 29, 2011; id. at 259-269.
34. Id. at 25-32.
35. See id. at 30-31.
36. Id. at 31.
37. See Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated May 12, 2012; id. at 563-571.

38. Id. at 34-35.

39. Dated July 21, 2012. Id. at 338-364.
40. Id. at 81-96.
41. Id. at 93-94.

42. See id. at 88-90.

43. Id. at 185.
44. Id. at 89-90.
45. Id. at 183.
46. Id. at 90-92.

47. "AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8042, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE MIGRANT
WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995, AS AMENDED, FURTHER
IMPROVING THE STANDARD OF PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE WELFARE OF
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 MIGRANT WORKERS, THEIR FAMILIES AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS IN DISTRESS, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (July 27, 2009).
48. Entitled "AN ACT TO INSTITUTE THE POLICIES OF OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT AND
ESTABLISH A HIGHER STANDARD OF PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE
WELFARE OF MIGRANT WORKERS, THEIR FAMILIES AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS IN
DISTRESS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (June 7, 1995).
49. Art. 111. Attorney's fees. —
1. In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorney's
fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.
2. It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial or administrative
proceedings for the recovery of wages, attorney's fees which exceed ten percent of the
amount of wages recovered.
50. Rollo, p. 93.
51. See Motion for Reconsideration dated January 23, 2013; id. at 573-579.

52. Id. at 98-99.

53. Jao v. BCC Products Sales, Inc., G.R. No. 163700, April 18, 2012, 670 SCRA 38, 44.
54. In New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 212-213 (2005), citing The Insular Life
Assurance Company, Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 86, the
Court recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: "(1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings
of facts are conflicting ; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion." (Emphasis supplied)
55. See Atty. Uy v. Bueno, 519 Phil. 601, 609 (2006).
56. See Mcmer Corporation, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 193421, June 4, 2014.
57. ALPS Transportation v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 186732, June 13, 2013, 698 SCRA 423, 432,
citing Nissan Motors Phils., Inc. v. Angelo, G.R. No. 164181, 14 September 2011, 657
SCRA 520, 532.
58. See Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. NLRC, 527 Phil. 248, 257 (2006).
59. See ALPS Transportation v. Rodriguez, supra note 57.
60. Rollo, p. 71.

61. Grandteq Industrial Steel Products, Inc. v. Estrella, G.R. No. 192416, March 23, 2011, 646
SCRA 391, 400.
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 62. Rollo, p. 184.
63. Id. at 185.
64. See PLDT Company, Inc. v. Tiamson, 511 Phil. 384, 398 (2005).
65. Rollo, pp. 184-185.

66. 330 Phil. 936 (1996).

67. Id. at 945.
68. Supra note 58.
69. See id. at 254-263; citations omitted.
70. 341 Phil. 716 (1997).

71. See id. at 722-723.

72. See Fil-Pride Shipping Co., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 97068, March 5, 1993, 219 SCRA 576, 581-
583.
73. 440 Phil. 906 (2002).
74. Id. at 919.
75. Rollo, p. 183.
76. Id. at 163.

76. The Court declared as unconstitutional the clause "or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA
8042, for being violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution (Serrano v.
Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil. 245, 306 [2009]).

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