Cruz v.

Centron 442 SCRA 53 (2004)

FACTS:

Atty. Centron assisted a certain Gloria Logdat and Conchita de la Cruz in consummating the sale of a parcel of land
(OCT No. 2186) in the name of one Joaquina Jabat. Such assistance consisted in preparing and notarizing the
documents of sale.

The said sale is illegal because the property covered by the sale is still the subject of reconstitution and Extra-
Judicial Settlement among the heirs. As a result of the illegal sale, Logdat and de la Cruz are charged with estafa
through falsification of public documents. Atty. Centron took advantage of her being a lawyer to solicit the trust
and confidence of the buyers of the subject parcel of land.

Atty. Centron is involved in the disappearance of OCT No. 2186, and she refuses to surrender the title which is in
the possession of one of her relatives.

Hence this case of disbarment was filed by Logdat and De la Cruz against Atty. Centron

In her Comment, Atty. Centron denied any involvement in the preparation of the documents and in the
consummation of the sale of the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 2186. She claims that her only participation in
the said sale is that she was the one who notarized the deed of sale on because she was requested by the parties to
notarize the same.

The Office of the Court Administrator held that Atty. Centron violated the provisions of Section 242 of the Revised
Administrative Code as well as Section G, Chapter VIII of the Manual for Clerks of Court when she notarized a deed
of conveyance, a document which is not connected with the exercise of her official functions and duties as Ex-
Officio Notary Public. Accordingly, she be fined in the amount of P2,000.00 and sternly warned.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Centron should be held liable.

RULING: Yes. In the present case, we find that complainant failed to present clear and preponderant evidence to
show that respondent had direct and instrumental participation in the preparation of documents and the
subsequent sale of the subject parcel of land covered by OCT No. 2186. Aside from the deed of sale covering the
subject parcel of land which was notarized by respondent, no competent evidence was shown that would directly
link her to the said sale.

While it may be logical to assume that Atty. Centron was the one who prepared the deed of sale since she was the
one who notarized it, we cannot give evidentiary weight to such a supposition in the absence of any evidence to
support it. Moreover, complainants allegation that Atty. Centron influenced the buyers is contradicted by the
sworn affidavit of Adelfa Manes, one of the buyers of the land. Manes attested to the fact that respondent did not
convince nor influence them in buying the subject property. Likewise, we find no competent evidence to prove that
Atty. Centron is responsible for the alleged loss of the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 2186.
Nonetheless, we find that respondent is guilty of violating Section 41 (as amended by Section 2 of R. A. No. 6733)
and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code, in relation to Sections G, M and N Chapter VIII of the Manual
for Clerks of Court.

Under these provisions, Clerks of Court are notaries public ex officio, and may thus notarize documents or
administer oaths but only when the matter is related to the exercise of their official functions. In the present case,
it is not within Atty. Centron competence, as it is not part of her official function and duty, to notarize the subject
deed of sale. Respondent is guilty of abuse of authority.

In the present case, it appearing that this is respondents first offense of this nature and that she has only notarized
one document, we find the OCAs recommended penalty of a fine of P2,000.00 commensurate to the offense
committed.

A.M. No. P-02-1644             November 11, 2004

ARNEL S. CRUZ, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LUNINGNING Y. CENTRON, Acting Clerk of Court, RTC-OCC, Calapan City, respondent.

Complainant alleges: Atty. Centron assisted a certain Gloria Logdat and Conchita de la Cruz in consummating
the sale of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2186, in the name of one Joaquina
Jabat. Respondent’s assistance consisted in preparing and notarizing the documents of sale. The said sale is
illegal because the property covered by the sale is still the subject of "reconstitution and Extra-Judicial
Settlement among the heirs." As a result of the illegal sale, Logdat and de la Cruz are charged with estafa
through falsification of public documents. Respondent took advantage of her being a lawyer to solicit the trust
and confidence of the buyers of the subject parcel of land. Respondent is involved in the disappearance of
OCT No. 2186, and she refuses to surrender the title which is in the possession of one of her
relatives. Complainant prays that respondent be disbarred and removed from office.
2 

respondent filed her Comment, denying involvement in the preparation of the documents and in the
consummation of the sale of the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 2186. Respondent claims that her only
participation in the said sale is that she was the one who notarized the deed of sale on account that she was
requested by the parties to notarize the same because they cannot afford the notarial fee being charged by the
notary public they earlier approached. Respondent also denies any involvement in the alleged loss of the
owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 2186. She claims that Conchita Acyatan de la Cruz and Gloria Acyatan
Salamat-Logdat gave the said certificate of title to their lawyer, Atty. Apolonia A. Comia-Soguilon. 3

the OCA submitted a report finding the complaint to be without basis. However, the OCA observed that
respondent violated the provisions of Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code as well as Section G,
Chapter VIII of the Manual for Clerks of Court when she notarized a deed of conveyance, a document which is
not connected with the exercise of her official functions and duties as Ex-Officio Notary Public. Accordingly, the
OCA recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P2,000.00 and sternly warned that a repetition of
the same or similar act(s) in the future will be dealt with more severely.

In a resolution, we resolved to require the parties to manifest within ten days from notice if they are willing to
submit the matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. In compliance therewith, complainant filed a
manifestation dated March 28, 2003, indicating his desire to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings filed. Respondent failed to file the required manifestation within the period allowed by the Court.
In a Resolution, we required respondent to show cause why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for her failure to file the required manifestation.

In a Compliance, respondent explained that her failure to timely file her manifestation was brought about by her
heavy volume of work and enormous responsibility as Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan
City. She manifested her desire to submit the instant case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly
preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. 4

In the present case, we find that complainant failed to present clear and preponderant evidence to show that
respondent had direct and instrumental participation in the preparation of documents and the subsequent sale
of the subject parcel of land covered by OCT No. 2186. Aside from the deed of sale covering the subject parcel
of land which was notarized by respondent, no competent evidence was shown that would directly link her to
the said sale. While it may be logical to assume that respondent was the one who prepared the deed of sale
since she was the one who notarized it, we cannot give evidentiary weight to such a supposition in the absence
of any evidence to support it. Moreover, complainant’s allegation that respondent influenced the buyers of the
subject parcel of land is contradicted by the sworn affidavit of Adelfa Manes, who is one of the buyers of the
disputed piece of land. Manes attested to the fact that respondent did not convince nor influence them in
buying the subject property. Likewise, we find no competent evidence to prove that respondent is responsible
for the alleged loss of the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 2186.

Nonetheless, we find that respondent is guilty of violating Section 41 (as amended by Section 2 of R. A. No.
6733) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code, in relation to Sections G, M and N, Chapter VIII of
5  6  7  8  9 

the Manual for Clerks of Court.

Under these provisions, Clerks of Court are notaries public ex officio, and may thus notarize documents or
administer oaths but only when the matter is related to the exercise of their official functions. As we held in
Astorga vs. Solas, clerks of court should not, in their ex-officio capacity, take part in the execution of private
10 

documents bearing no relation at all to their official functions. In the present case, it is not within respondent’s
11 

competence, as it is not part of her official function and duty, to notarize the subject deed of sale. Respondent
is guilty of abuse of authority.

In Astorga, we imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on a clerk of court who was found guilty of notarizing various
12 

documents and administering oaths on matters which are alien to his official duties. In the present case, it
appearing that this is respondent’s first offense of this nature and that she has only notarized one document,
we find the OCA’s recommended penalty of a fine of P2,000.00 commensurate to the offense committed.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Luningning Y. Centron, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental
Mindoro, is found guilty of abuse of authority and is hereby ORDERED to pay a FINE of P2,000.00. She is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 129416 : November 25, 2004]

ZENAIDA B. TIGNO, IMELDA B. TIGNO and ARMI B. TIGNO, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ESTAFINO AQUINO

and FLORENTINA AQUINO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:
The controversy in the present petition hinges on the admissibility of a single document, a deed of sale involving
interest over real property, notarized by a person of questionable capacity. The assailed ruling of the Court of
Appeals, which overturned the findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court, relied primarily on the presumption of
regularity attaching to notarized documents with respect to its due execution. We conclude instead that the
document has not been duly notarized and accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals.

The facts are as follow:

On 11 January 1980, respondent spouses Estafino and Florentina Aquino (the Aquinos) filed a complaint for
enforcement of contract and damages against Isidro Bustria (Bustria).1 The complaint sought to enforce an
alleged sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of a one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) square meter fishpond
located in Dasci, Pangasinan. The property was not registered either under the Land Registration Act or under
the Spanish Mortgage Law, though registrable under Act No. 3344.2 The conveyance was covered by a Deed of
Sale dated 2 September 1978.

Eventually, Bustria and the Aquinos entered into a compromise agreement, whereby Bustria agreed to recognize
the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos in turn agreed to grant to Bustria the right to repurchase the same
property after the lapse of seven (7) years.

Upon submission, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch VII, approved and incorporated the
compromise agreement in a Decision which it rendered on 7 September 1981.

Bustria died in October of 1986.3 On 1 December 1989, petitioner Zenaida B. Tigno (Tigno), in substitution of her
deceased father Isidro Bustria,4 attempted to repurchase the property by filing a Motion for Consignation. She
deposited the amount of Two Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the trial court, now Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55 at Alaminos, Pangasinan. On 18 December 1989, the Aquinos filed an opposition,
arguing that the right to repurchase was not yet demandable and that Tigno had failed to make a tender of
payment. In an Order dated 10 October 1999, the RTC denied the Motion for Consignation.5

In June of 1991, Tigno filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution, which was likewise opposed by the Aquinos, and
denied by the RTC. Then, on 6 September 1991, Tigno filed an action for Revival of Judgment,6 seeking the
revival of the decision in Civil Case No. A-1257, so that it could be executed accordingly.7 The Aquinos filed an
answer, wherein they alleged that Bustria had sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a deed of sale
dated 17 October 1985.8

Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus De Francia (De Francia), the instrumental
witness to the deed of sale, and former Judge Franklin Cariño (Judge Cariño), who notarized the same. These
two witnesses testified as to the occasion of the execution and signing of the deed of sale by Bustria. Thereafter,
in their Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, the Aquinos offered for admission as their Exhibit No. "8," the
deed of sale (Deed of Sale)9 purportedly executed by Bustria. The admission of the Deed of Sale was objected to
by Tigno on the ground that it was a false and fraudulent document which had not been acknowledged by Bustria
as his own; and that its existence was suspicious, considering that it had been previously unknown, and not even
presented by the Aquinos when they opposed Tigno's previous Motion for Consignation.10

In an Order dated 6 April 1994, the RTC refused to admit the Deed of Sale in evidence.11 A Motion for
Reconsideration praying for the admission of said exhibit was denied in an Order dated 27 April 1994.12

Then, on 18 August 1994, a Decision was rendered by the RTC in favor of Tigno. The RTC therein expressed
doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, characterizing the testimonies of De Francia and Cariño as
conflicting.13 The RTC likewise observed that nowhere in the alleged deed of sale was there any statement that it
was acknowledged by Bustria;14 that it was suspicious that Bustria was not assisted or represented by his counsel
in connection with the preparation and execution of the deed of sale15 or that Aquino had raised the matter of the
deed of sale in his previous Opposition to the Motion for Consignation.16 The RTC then stressed that the previous
Motion for Execution lodged by Tigno had to be denied since more than five (5) years had elapsed from the date
the judgment in Civil Case No. A-1257 had become final and executory; but the judgment could be revived by
action such as the instant complaint. Accordingly, the RTC ordered the revival of the judgment dated 7
September 1981 in Civil Case No. A-1257.17

The Aquinos interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.18 In the meantime, the RTC allowed the execution
pending appeal of its Decision.19 On 23 December 1996, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division promulgated a
Decision20 reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision. The appellate court ratiocinated that there were no
material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Cariño and De Francia that would taint the
document with doubtful authenticity; that the absence of the acknowledgment and substitution instead of a jurat
did not render the instrument invalid; and that the non-assistance or representation of Bustria by counsel did not
render the document null and ineffective.21 It was noted that a notarized document carried in its favor the
presumption of regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must be clear, convincing and more
than merely preponderant evidence to contradict the same. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC
erred in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale, and that the document extinguished the right of Bustria's heirs to
repurchase the property.

After the Court of Appeals denied Tigno's Motion for Reconsideration,22 the present petition was filed before this
Court. Tigno imputes grave abuse of discretion and misappreciation of facts to the Court of Appeals when it
admitted the Deed of Sale. He also argues that the appellate court should have declared the Deed of Sale as a
false, fraudulent and unreliable document not supported by any consideration at all.

The general thrusts of the arguments posed by Tigno are factually based. As such, they could normally lead to
the dismissal of this Petition for Review. However, while this Court is not ordinarily a trier of facts,23 factual
review may be warranted in instances when the findings of the trial court and the intermediate appellate court
are contrary to each other.24 Moreover, petitioner raises a substantial argument regarding the capacity of the
notary public, Judge Cariño, to notarize the document. The Court of Appeals was unfortunately silent on that
matter, but this Court will take it up with definitiveness.

The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.

MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October 1985 at Alaminos, Pangasinan both parties

known to me to be the same parties who executed the foregoing instrument.

FRANKLIN CARIÑO
Ex-Officio Notary Public
Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan

There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the document is certified by way of a jurat instead
of an acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct creature from an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of
one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed; while a jurat is that part of an affidavit where the officer certifies that the same was sworn before
him.25 Under Section 127 of the Land Registration Act,26 which has been replicated in Section 112 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529,27 the Deed of Sale should have been acknowledged before a notary public.28

But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one which is determinative of this petition. This
pertains to the authority of Judge Franklin Cariño to notarize the Deed of Sale.

It is undisputed that Franklin Cariño at the time of the notarization of the Deed of Sale, was a sitting judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Alaminos.29 Petitioners point out, citing Tabao v. Asis,30 that municipal judges may
not undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts, and other acts of
conveyance which bear no relation to the performance of their functions as judges.31 In response, respondents
claim that the prohibition imposed on municipal court judges from notarizing documents took effect only in
December of 1989, or four years after the Deed of Sale was notarized by Cariño.32

Respondent's contention is erroneous. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
judges are empowered to perform the functions of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No.
296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative
Code.33 However, as far back as 1980 in Borre v. Moya,34 the Court explicitly declared that municipal court judges
such as Cariño may notarize only documents connected with the exercise of their official duties.35 The Deed of
Sale was not connected with any official duties of Judge Cariño, and there was no reason for him to notarize it.
Our observations as to the errant judge in Borre are pertinent in this case, considering that Judge Cariño
identified himself in the Deed of Sale as "Ex-Officio Notary Public, Judge, MTC:"

[A notary ex officio] should not compete with private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal

conveyancing business.

In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge should notarize documents involving private transactions
and sign the document in this wise: "GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, Notary Public Ex-Officio, City Judge" (p. 16, Rollo,
Annex D of Complaint). In doing so, he obliterated the distinction between a regular notary and a notary ex
officio.36

There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as Supreme Court Circular No. I-90
permits notaries public ex officio to perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public provided
that certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such
municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only when there are no lawyers or notaries public that the exception
applies.37 The facts of this case do not warrant a relaxed attitude towards Judge Cariño's improper notarial
activity. There was no such certification in the Deed of Sale. Even if one was produced, we would be hard put to
accept the veracity of its contents, considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city,38 was even then not an
isolated backwater town and had its fair share of practicing lawyers.

There may be sufficient ground to call to task Judge Cariño, who ceased being a judge in 1986, for his improper
notarial activity. Perhaps though, formal sanction may no longer be appropriate considering Judge Cariño's
advanced age, assuming he is still alive.39 However, this Decision should again serve as an affirmation of the rule
prohibiting municipal judges from notarizing documents not connected with the exercise of their official duties,
subject to the exceptions laid down in Circular No. 1-90.

Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not having been notarized at all. The validity of
a notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public does not
have the capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document should be treated as
unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith
relying on the proferred authority of the notary public or the person pretending to be one. Still, to admit
otherwise would render merely officious the elaborate process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may
receive a notarial commission. Without such a rule, the notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary
public will have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged in pretense.

The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private document converts
such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity.40 Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a
substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or
authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices
generally.41

On the other hand, what then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it was not notarized? True enough, from a civil
law perspective, the absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily invalidate the transaction
evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits or
extinguishes real rights over immovable property should be in a public document, yet it is also an accepted rule
that the failure to observe the proper form does not render the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly
held that the form required in Article 1358 is not essential to the validity or enforceability of the transaction, but
required merely for convenience.42 We have even affirmed that a sale of real property though not consigned in a
public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding among the parties, for the time-honored
rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces legal effects between the parties.43

Still, the Court has to reckon with the implications of the lack of valid notarization of the Deed of Sale from the
perspective of the law on evidence. After all, the case rests on the admissibility of the Deed of Sale.

Clearly, the presumption of regularity relied upon by the Court of Appeals no longer holds true since the Deed of
Sale is not a notarized document. Its proper probative value is governed by the Rules of Court. Section 19, Rule
132 states:

Section 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public

or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,

and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and cralawlibrary

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the enumeration of public documents; hence,
it must be considered a private document. The nullity of the alleged or attempted notarization performed by
Judge Cariño is sufficient to exclude the document in question from the class of public documents. Even
assuming that the Deed of Sale was validly notarized, it would still be classified as a private document, since it
was not properly acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat.

Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the requirement of proof under Section 20, Rule
132, which states:

Section 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which is claimed to be.

The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence as authentic by the Aquinos, who likewise insist that its enforceability
militates against Tigno's claim. Correspondingly, the burden falls upon the Aquinos to prove its authenticity and
due execution. The Court of Appeals clearly erred in not appreciating the Deed of Sale as a private document and
in applying the presumption of regularity that attaches only to duly notarized documents, as distinguished from
private documents.

Did the RTC err then in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale? We hold that it did not. Section 20, Rule 132 provides
ample discretion on the trier of fact before it may choose to receive the private document in evidence. The RTC
wisely refused to admit the Deed of Sale, taking great lengths as it did to explain its doubts as to its veracity.
The RTC was not convinced of the proffered proof by the Aquinos, and the exercise of its sound discretion as the
primary trier of fact warrants due respect.
The most telling observation of the RTC relates to the fact that for the very first time respondents alleged the
existence of the Deed of Sale when they filed their answer to petitioner's current action to revive
judgment.44 Prior to the initiation of the present action, Tigno had tried to operationalize and implement the
Compromise Agreement through two judicial means: consignation and execution of judgment. The Aquinos duly
opposed these prior attempts of the petitioner to exercise the right to repurchase, but they did not raise then the
claim that such right to repurchase was already extinguished by the Deed of Sale. Tigno attempted to exercise
the right to repurchase only a few years after the execution of the Deed of Sale to which respondents themselves
were signatories. Thus, it is incredulous that the Aquinos did not invoke the Deed of Sale when they opposed in
court petitioner's successive attempts at consignation and execution of judgment. The Deed of Sale, if in
existence and valid, would have already precluded Tigno's causes of action for either consignation or execution of
judgment. The only believable conclusion, as drawn by the RTC, was that the Deed of Sale had yet to be created
when petitioner moved in 1990 for consignation and execution of judgment an existential anomaly if we were to
agree with the respondents that such document had been signed and notarized back in 1985.

The dubiousness in origin of the Deed of Sale is not alleviated by the other observations of the RTC. It also
pointed to certain incredible aspects in the Aquinos' tale of events. It noted that no receipts were ever presented
by the respondents to evidence actual payment of consideration by them to Bustria, despite the allegation of the
respondents that the amount was covered by seven (7) receipts.45 The Aquinos claimed that Bustria kept all the
receipts, an assertion which the RTC found as unbelievable, citing ordinary human nature to ask for receipts for
significant amounts given and to keep the same.46 In itself, the absence of receipts, or any proof of consideration,
would not be conclusive since consideration is always presumed. However, given the totality of the circumstances
surrounding this case, the absence of such proof further militates against the claims of the Aquinos.

We can appreciate in a similar vein the observation of the Court of Appeals that Bustria did not bother to seek his
lawyer's assistance as regards the execution of the Deed of Sale, considering that the subject property had
previously been fiercely litigated. Although the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the document would
not be rendered null or ineffective due to the lack of assistance of counsel, the implausibility of the scenario
strikes as odd and therefore reinforces the version found by the RTC as credible.

The Court likewise has its own observations on the record that affirm the doubts raised by the Court of Appeals.
Isidro Bustria, who would die in 1986, was already ninety-three (93) years old when he allegedly signed the
Deed of Sale in 1985. Still, the Aquinos asserted before the RTC that Bustria traveled unaccompanied from his
home in Dasol, Pangasinan, passing through two towns to Alaminos, to execute the Deed of Sale. Without
discrediting the accomplishments of nonagenarians capable of great physical feats, it should be acknowledged as
a matter of general assumption that persons of Bustria's age are typically sedentary and rarely so foolhardy as to
insist on traveling significant distances alone.

Also of note is the fact that there are glaring differences as to the alleged signature of Bustria on the Deed of
Sale and as it otherwise appears on the judicial record. Bustria's signature in the 1981 Compromise Agreement is
noticeably shaky which is not surprising, considering that it was subscribed when Bustria was eighty-nine (89)
years old. However, Bustria's signature on the Deed of Sale, which if genuine was affixed when he was already
ninety-three (93) years old, is remarkably steady in its strokes. There are also other evident differences between
Bustria's signature on the Deed of Sale and on other documents on the record.

Admittedly, these doubts cast above arise in chief from an appreciation of circumstantial evidence. These have to
be weighed against the findings of the Court of Appeals that the fact that Bustria signed the Deed of Sale was
established by the respective testimonies of witnesses De Francia and Judge Cariño. In its own appreciation of
these testimonies, the RTC alluded to notable inconsistencies in their testimonies. As a final measure of analysis,
the Court shall now examine whether the appellate court was in error in reversing the conclusion of the RTC on
these testimonies.

The inconsistencies cited by the RTC were that De Francia testified that Judge Cariño himself prepared and
typed the Deed of Sale in his office, where the document was signed,47 while Judge Cariño testified that he did
not type the Deed of Sale since it was already prepared when the parties arrived at his office for the signing.48 On
this point, the Court of Appeals stated with utter nonchalance that a perusal of the record revealed no material or
substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Judge Cariño and De Francia.

Strangely, the appellate court made no comment as to the inconsistency pointed out by the RTC as to who
prepared the Deed of Sale. If the only point of consideration was the due execution of the Deed of Sale, then the
Court of Appeals should have properly come out with its finding. Other variances aside, there are no
contradictions in the testimonies of Judge Cariño and De Francia on the question of whether or not Bustria
signed the Deed of Sale.

However, as earlier established, the Deed of Sale is a private document. Thus, not only the due execution of the
document must be proven but also its authenticity. This factor was not duly considered by the Court of Appeals.
The testimonies of Judge Cariño and De Francia now become material not only to establish due execution, but
also the authenticity of the Deed of Sale. And on this point, the inconsistencies pointed out by the RTC become
crucial.

The matter of authenticity of the Deed of Sale being disputed, the identity of the progenitor of this all-important
document is a material evidentiary point. It is disconcerting that the very two witnesses of the respondent
offered to prove the Deed of Sale, flatly contradict each other on the basis of their own personal and sensory
knowledge. Worse, the purported author of the Deed of Sale disavowed having drafted the document,
notwithstanding the contrary testimony grounded on personal knowledge by the documentary witness.

Establishing the identity of the person who wrote the Deed of Sale would not ordinarily be necessary to establish
the validity of the transaction it covers. However, since it is the authenticity of the document itself that is
disputed, then the opposing testimonies on that point by the material witnesses properly raises questions about
the due execution of the document itself. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Judge Cariño and De Francia
are irreconcilable. It is not possible to affirm the testimony of either without denigrating the competence and
credibility of the other as a witness. If Judge Cariño was truthful in testifying that he did not write the Deed of
Sale, then doubt can be cast as to the reliability of the notarial witness De Francia. It takes a leap of imagination,
a high level of gumption, and perverse deliberation for one to erroneously assert, under oath and with
particularities, that a person drafted a particular document in his presence.

However, if we were to instead believe De Francia, then the integrity of the notary public, Judge Cariño, would
be obviously compromised. Assuming that Judge Cariño had indeed authored the Deed of Sale, it would indeed
be odd that he would not remember having written the document himself yet sufficiently recall notarizing the
same. If his testimony as to authorship of the document is deemed as dubious, then there is all the reason to
make a similar assumption as to his testimony on the notarization of the Deed of Sale.

These inconsistencies are not of consequence because there is need to indubitably establish the author of the
Deed of Sale. They are important because they cast doubt on the credibility of those witnesses of the Aquinos,
presented as they were to attest to the due execution and authenticity of the Deed of Sale. The Court of Appeals
was clearly in error in peremptorily disregarding this observation of the RTC.

As a result, we are less willing than the Court of Appeals to impute conclusive value to the testimonies of de
Francia and Judge Cariño. The totality of the picture leads us to agree with the trial court that the Deed of Sale
is ineluctably dubious in origin and in execution. The Court deems as correct the refusal of the RTC to admit the
Deed of Sale, since its due execution and authenticity have not been proven. The evidence pointing to the non-
existence of such a transaction is so clear and convincing that it is sufficient even to rebut the typical
presumption of regularity arising from the due execution of notarial documents. However, for the reasons stated
earlier, the Deed of Sale is ineluctably an unnotarized document. And the lower court had more than sufficient
basis to conclude that it is a spurious document.

Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been successfully assailed, Tigno's right to repurchase was not
extinguished at the time of the filing of the Petition for revival of judgment, as correctly concluded by the RTC.
The Court of Appeals being in error when it concluded otherwise, the reinstatement of the RTC Decision is
warranted.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 23 December 1996 and Resolution dated 9
June 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49879 is REVERSED, and the Decision dated 18 August
1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil Case No. A-1918 is REINSTATED.
Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Fuentes v. Buno 560 SCRA 22 (2008)

FACTS:

1. Geronimo Fuentes filed a complaint wherein he alleged that he is one of the nine heirs of Bernardo
Fuentes, their father, who owned an agricultural land located at San Jose, Talibon, Bohol.

2. He also alleged that respondent judge prepared and notarized an "Extra-Judicial Partition with
Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale" of the said agricultural land, executed by complainant’s mother Eulalia
Credo Vda. de Fuentes, widow of Bernardo Fuentes, and Alejandro Fuentes, on his own behalf and on behalf of
his brothers and sisters, including Geronimo Fuentes, as heirs/vendors and one Ma. Indira A. Auxtero, as vendee.

3. In the aforesaid document, the aforementioned agricultural land was sold, transferred and conveyed by the
heirs/vendors to the vendee despite the fact that in his Special Power of Attorney (SPA), he merely appointed his
brother, Alejandro Fuentes to mortgage said agricultural land but not to partition, much more to sell the same.

4. According to complainant Geronimo Fuentes respondent judge notarized said document as ex-officio Notary
Public, thereby abusing his discretion and authority as well as committing graft and corruption.

5. In defense, respondent judge contended that he could not be charged of graft and corruption, since in a
municipality where a notary public is unavailable, a municipal judge is allowed to notarize documents or deeds as
ex-officio notary public.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge has authority to notarize the documents

RULING: No. While Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended, and Section 242 of the Revised
Administrative Code authorize MTC and MCTC judges to perform the functions of notaries public ex officio, the
Court laid down the scope of said authority.

SC Circular No. 1-90 prohibits judges from undertaking the preparation and acknowledgment of private
documents, contracts and other deeds of conveyances which have no direct relation to the discharge of their
official functions. In this case, respondent judge admitted that he prepared both the document itself, entitled
"Extra-judicial Partition with Simultaneous Absolute Deed of Sale" and the acknowledgment of the said
document, which had no relation at all to the performance of his function as a judge. These acts of respondent
judge are clearly proscribed by the aforesaid Circular.

While it may be true that no notary public was available or residing within respondent judge’s territorial
jurisdiction, as shown by the certifications issued by the RTC Clerk of Court and the Municipal Mayor of Talibon,
Bohol, SC Circular No. 1-90 specifically requires that a certification attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary
public in the said municipality or circuit be made in the notarized document. Here, no such certification was made
in the Extra-Judicial Partition with Simultaneous Deed of Sale. Respondent judge also failed to indicate in his
answer as to whether or not any notarial fee was charged for that transaction, and if so, whether the same was
turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Talibon, Bohol. Clearly, then, respondent judge, who was the sitting
judge of the MCTC, Talibon-Getafe, Bohol, failed to comply with the aforesaid conditions prescribed by SC
Circular No. 1-90, even if he could have acted as notary public ex-officio in the absence of any lawyer or notary
public in the municipality or circuit to which he was assigned.

[A.C. No. 5645. July 2, 2002

ROSALINDA BERNARDO VDA DE ROSALES, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIO G. RAMOS, respondent.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This complaint for disbarment was filed in behalf of complainant Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de Rosales by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos for violation of Act No. 2711 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, Title IV, Ch. 11, otherwise know as the Notarial Law, particularly Secs.
245 and 246 thereof.

In September 1990 Manuel A. Bernardo, brother of complainant Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de Rosales, borrowed
from Rosalinda the Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. 194464 covering Lot No. 1-B-4-H in her name. The lot
measures 112 square meters and is located at the back of Manuel's house on Fabie Street, Paco, Metro Manila.
On 25 November 1990 Rosalinda sold this lot to one Alfredo P. Castro. When she asked her brother Manuel to
return her title he refused.

On 22 October 1990 Rosalinda executed an Affidavit of Loss of her title and presented the affidavit to the
Register of Deeds of Manila.

On 3 September 1991 the Register of Deeds informed Rosalinda that her title to the property was already
transferred to Manuel by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale she purportedly executed in favor of Manuel on 5
September 1990. The document was notarized by respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos on 1 October 1990 and
entered in his Notarial Register as Doc. No. 388, Page No. 718, Book No. 10, Series of 1990. Rosalinda however
denied having signed any deed of sale over her property in favor of Manuel.

On 3 September 1991 Rosalinda filed with the NBI a complaint for falsification of public document against her
brother Manuel. The NBI invited respondent Atty. Ramos for questioning. The complaint alleged among others
that on 12 September 1991 Atty. Mario G. Ramos executed an affidavit before the NBI admitting that when
Manuel presented the purported Deed of Absolute Sale to him for notarization, he (Atty. Ramos) found some
defects in the document and that complainant Rosalinda was not around. The NBI Questioned Documents
Division also compared Rosalinda's signature appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale with samples of her genuine
signature, and found that the signature in the purported Deed of Absolute Sale and her genuine signatures were
not written by one and the same person.

On 5 October 1992 the NBI transmitted its findings to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the
recommendation that Manuel and Atty. Ramos be prosecuted for Falsification of Public Document under Art. 172
in relation to Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code, and that Atty. Ramos be additionally charged with violation of
the Notarial Law.

The NBI also transmitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
photocopies of the NBI investigation report and its annexes, and a verified complaint[1 for disbarment signed by
Rosalinda. The CBD received the records on 5 October 1992. On the same date, the CBD through Commissioner
Victor C. Fernandez directed respondent to submit an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from
notice.

Respondent admitted in his Answer[2 that he had affixed his signature on the purported Deed of Absolute Sale
but failed to enter the document in his Notarial Registry Book. He also admitted executing before the NBI on 12
September 1991 an affidavit regarding the matter. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the complaint since
according to him he only inadvertently signed the purported Deed of Absolute Sale and/or that his signature was
procured through mistake, fraud, undue influence or excusable negligence, claiming that he simply relied on the
assurances of Manuel that the document would not be used for purposes other than a loan between brother and
sister, and that he affixed his signature thereon with utmost good faith and without intending to obtain personal
gain or to cause damage or injury to another.

The CBD set the case for hearing on 3 March 2000, 28 April 2000, 16 June 2000 and 5 October 2000.
Complainant never appeared. The records show that the notices sent to her address at 1497 Fabie Street, Paco,
Manila, were returned unclaimed.[3

On 26 January 2002 the IBP Board of Governors approved the report and recommendation of the CBD through
Commissioner Fernandez that the case against respondent be dismissed in view of complainant's failure to
prosecute and for lack of evidence on record to substantiate the complaint.[4 The Investigating Commissioner
found that the notices sent to complainant were returned unclaimed with the annotation "moved out," and that
she did not leave any forwarding address, and neither did she come to the CBD to inquire about the status of her
case. From these actuations, he concluded that complainant had lost interest in the further prosecution of this
case,[5 and so recommended its dismissal.

We cannot wholly agree with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It is clear
from the pleadings before us that respondent violated the Notarial Law in failing to register in his notarial book
the deed of absolute sale he notarized, which fact respondent readily admitted.
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. It requires him to keep a notarial
register where he shall record all his official acts as notary,[6 and specifies what information with regard to the
notarized document should be entered therein.[7 Failure to perform this duty results in the revocation of his
commission as notary public.[8

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notaries public.[9 Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.[10 A notarial document is
by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must
be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.[11

For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties.[12 Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined.[13 Hence a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same
are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth
of what are stated therein.[14 The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free
act and deed.[15

The notary public is further enjoined to record in his notarial registry the necessary information regarding the
document or instrument notarized and retain a copy of the document presented to him for acknowledgment and
certification especially when it is a contract.[16 The notarial registry is a record of the notary public's official acts.
Acknowledged documents and instruments recorded in it are considered public documents. If the document or
instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt is engendered that
the document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it is not a public document and cannot bolster any
claim made based on this document. Considering the evidentiary value given to notarized documents, the failure
of the notary public to record the document in his notarial registry is tantamount to falsely making it appear that
the document was notarized when in fact it was not.

We take note of respondent's admission in his Answer that he had affixed his signature in the purported Deed of
Absolute Sale but he did not enter it in his notarial registry. This is clearly in violation of the Notarial Law for
which he must be disciplined.

Respondent alleges that he merely signed the Deed of Absolute Sale inadvertently and that his signature was
procured through mistake, fraud, undue influence or excusable negligence as he relied on the assurances of
Manuel A. Bernardo, a kababayan from Pampanga, that the document would not be used for any illegal purpose.

We cannot honor, much less give credit to this allegation. That respondent notarized the document out of
sympathy for his kababayan is not a legitimate excuse. It is appalling that respondent did away with the basics of
notarial procedure in order to accommodate the alleged need of a friend and client. In doing so, he displayed a
decided lack of respect for the solemnity of an oath in a notarial document. He also exhibited his clear ignorance
of the importance of the office of a notary public. Not only did he violate the Notarial Law, he also did so without
thinking of the possible damage that might result from its non-observance.
The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies to the due
execution and delivery of the document under his hand and seal he gives the document the force of evidence.
Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the
solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be
given without further proof of their execution and delivery.[17 Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or
consent to the doing of any.[18 Failing in this, he must accept the consequences of his unwarranted actions.

From his admissions we find that Atty. Mario G. Ramos failed to exercise the due diligence required of him in the
performance of the duties of notary public. We do not agree however that his negligence should merit
disbarment, which is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. Disbarment should never be imposed unless
it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the bar.
Removal from the bar should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe - reprimand, temporary
suspension or fine - would accomplish the end desired.[19 Under the circumstances, imposing sanctions decreed
under the Notarial Law and suspension from the practice of law would suffice.

WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law, the commission of respondent Atty.
Mario G. Ramos as Notary Public, if still existing, is REVOKED and thereafter Atty. Ramos should be
DISQUALIFIED from reappointment to the office of Notary Public.

Respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
effective immediately. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court his receipt of this Decision to enable it to determine
when his suspension shall have taken effect.

The Clerk of Court of this Court is DIRECTED to immediately circularize this Decision for the proper guidance of
all concerned.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6294             November 17, 2004

ATTY. MINIANO B. DELA CRUZ, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALEJANDRO P. ZABALA, respondent.

RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:

In his Letter-Complaint for Disbarment filed before the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, complainant Atty. Miniano B. Dela Cruz charged respondent, Atty. Alejandro P. Zabala, for
violating his oath as a notary public.

Complainant alleged that respondent notarized with unknown witnesses, a fake deed of sale allegedly
executed by two dead people, in gross violation of his oath as a Commissioned Notary Public in Quezon City. 1

Complainant averred that he was retained by a certain Demetrio C. Marero last December 21, 1996, to finance
and undertake the filing of a Petition for the Issuance of a Second Duplicate Original of the Owner's copy of
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4153, in the names of Sps. Pedro Sumulong and Cirila Tapales before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72. The court issued an Order approving the said petition on
March 10, 1997. 2

On May 20, 1997, complainant purchased the said property from Marero and had the title transferred to him
and his wife. OCT No. 4153 was then cancelled and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
330000. 3

The next day, complainant requested a certain Mrs. Adoracion Losloso and Mr. Nestor Aguirre to register the
title in the former's name at the Assessor's Office of Antipolo City. However, they were unable to do so because
the property was already registered in the name of Antipolo Properties, Inc., under TCT No. N-107359. 4

On May 27, 1997, respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale over the land covered by OCT No. 4153,
executed by Cirila Tapales and Pedro Sumulong in favor of the complainant and his wife. 5

On December 9, 1997, Mr. Marero filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of Title of the land, subject of the Deed
of Sale which was notarized by respondent, with damages against the complainant and his wife. The Deed of
Sale was the same document Marero used when he filed a complaint for Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Document docketed as I.S. No. 98-16357 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office and in a disbarment case
docketed as Adm. Case No. 4963 against complainant. 6

Purportedly, to clear his name, complainant filed this complaint for disbarment against respondent. According
to complainant, respondent notarized an irregular document where one of the parties to the transaction was
already dead, grossly violating his oath as a notary public.7

The IBP then required the respondent to file his answer to the said allegations.

Respondent, in his Answer alleged that as a notary, he did not have to go beyond the documents presented to
him for notarization. In notarial law, he explains, the minimum requirements to notarize a document are the
presence of the parties and their presentation of their community tax certificate. As long as these requirements
are met, the documents may be notarized. Furthermore, he adds, when he notarized the Deed of Sale, he had
no way of knowing whether the persons who appeared before him were the real owners of the land or were
merely poseurs. 8

Thereafter, the parties were ordered to appear before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline on July 31, 2001
and August 21, 2001, and required to submit their position papers.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, in its Report dated September 29, 2003, recommended that
respondent be reprimanded for violating Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The allegations
9 
with respect to the prayer for disbarment were recommended for dismissal for insufficiency of evidence. The
Commissioner held that complainant failed to establish by convincing proof that respondent had to be disbarred
because of his notarial negligence. The alleged failures of respondent did not indicate a clear intent to engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, according to the Commission's Report.

Noteworthy, however, respondent did not deny that he notarized the cited Deed of Sale under the
circumstances alleged by complainant. It appears that there was negligence on respondent's part which, in our
view, is quite serious. Thus, we cannot conclude that he did not violate the Notarial Law, and our rules
10 

regarding Notarial Practice. Nor could we agree that, as recommended by the IBP, he should only be
11 

reprimanded. At least his commission as Notary Public should be revoked and for two years he should be
disqualified from being commissioned as such.

The IBP noted that on its face, the Deed of Sale was not executed by the purported vendee and that only
Pedro Sumulong appeared and executed the deed even though the property was co-owned by Pedro
Sumulong and Cirila Tapales. In addition, a copy of the title was not attached to the said Deed of Sale when it
was presented for notarization. The aforementioned circumstances should have alerted respondent. Given the
ease with which community tax certificates are obtained these days, respondent should have been more
vigilant in ascertaining the identity of the persons who appeared before him.

We have empathically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of
authenticity thereof. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason,
a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties;
otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. 12

Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides,

...

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of
the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is
done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who
executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made
under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
[Emphasis ours.]

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are
stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein are facts they
have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representative's names should
appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same. 13

The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. By 14 

affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document
into a public document. In doing so, respondent, in effect, proclaimed to the world that (1) all the parties therein
personally appeared before him; (2) they are all personally known to him; (3) they were the same persons who
executed the instruments; (4) he inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (5) they
acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and freely executed the same. As a lawyer
15 

commissioned to be a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge his sacred duties with faithful
observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat. Simply put,
16 

such responsibility is incumbent upon him, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his
professional indiscretion. His act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without
ascertaining the identities of the persons executing the same constitutes gross negligence in the performance
of duty as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Atty. Alejandro P. Zabala GUILTY of gross negligence in his
conduct as a notary public. His notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED and he is
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is DIRECTED to
report the date of his receipt of this Resolution to the Court within five (5) days from such receipt. Further, he is
ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be subject to disciplinary action as a member of the Bar.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let this Resolution be also made of record in the personal files
of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Lee v. Tambago
544 SCRA 393

FACTS:

Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with violation of
Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be
spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and
two other witnesses. In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his
wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee,
half-siblings of complainant.

The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30,
1965.Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificateof the testator noted in the
acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.Furthermore, the signature of the testator
was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donationwhich supposedly contained his
purported signature. Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will
and in the deed of donation were “in any way entirely and diametrically opposed from one
another in all angle[s].”

Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported
witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and
merely copied from their respective voters’ affidavits.

Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives
division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture
and the Arts (NCCA).

ISSUE:

Was the will spurious?

HELD:

Yes, thus Tambago violated the Notarial Law and the ethics of legal profession.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object
of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud,
to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.

A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The will in question was
attested by only two witnesses. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. This
is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. The Civil Code
likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an
extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same
is his or her own free act and deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose:
(1) to safeguard the testator’s wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is
administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.

A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the
conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay
and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testator’s old residence certificate
in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent
invalidated the will.

As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe
the formalities of a will and those of notarization. These formalities are mandatory and cannot be
disregarded.

Dela Cruz v. Dimaano 565 SCRA 1 (2008)

FACTS:

In their complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Dimaano, complainants alleged that on July 16, 2004,
respondent notarized a document denominated as Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with Waiver of Rights
purportedly executed by them and their sister, Zenaida V.L. Navarro.
According to complainants, respondent had made untruthful statements in the acknowledgment portion of the
notarized document when he made it appear, among other things, that complainants "personally came and
appeared before him" and that they affixed their signatures on the document in his presence.

In the process, complainants added, respondent effectively enabled their sister, Navarro, to assume full ownership
of their deceased parents' property in and sell the same to the Department of Public Works and Highways.

The respondent however argued that "he notarized the document in good faith relying on the representation and
assurance of Zenaida Navarro that the signatures and the community tax certificates appearing in the document
were true and correct." Navarro would not, according to respondent, lie to him having known, and being neighbors
of, each other for 30 years.

ISSUES:

Whether or not respondent should be penalized for committing violations of his duties as a notary public.

What is the effect of a Notarized Document as a Public Instrument

RULING:

Yes, lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices,
such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.

It must be remembered that notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private
document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
authenticity and due execution. A notarized document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face and it is for this
reason that notaries public must observe the basic requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public on notarized documents will be eroded.

March 19, 2018

G.R. No. 200383

NORMA M. DIAMPOC, Petitioner
vs.
JESSIE BUENAVENTURA and THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOH THE CITY OF TAGUIG, Respondents
 DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari  seeks to set aside the February 21, 2011 Decision  and May 6, 2011
1 2

Resolution  of the Court of .Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R, CV No. 92453 which denied herein petitioner's appeal and
3

affirmed the December 20, 2007 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 268 (RTC) in Civil
4

Case No. 70076.

Factual Antecedents

In July, 2004, petitioner Norma M. Diampoc and her husband Wilbur L. Diampoc (the Diampocs) filed a
Complaint  for annulment of deed of sale and recovery of duplicate original copy of title, with damages, against
5

respondent Jessie Buenaventura (Buenaventura) and the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. The case
was docketed before the RTC as Civil Case No. 70076.

The Diampocs alleged in their Complaint that they owned a 174- square meter parcel of land (subject property)
in Signal Village, Taguig City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25044 (TCT 25044); that
Buenaventura became their friend; that Buenaventura asked to borrow the owner's copy of TCT 25044 to be
used as security for a ₱1 million loan she wished to secure; that they acceded, on the condition that
Buenaventura should not sell the subject property; that Buenaventura promised to give them ₱300,000.00 out
of the ₱1 million loan proceeds; that on July 2, 2000, Buenaventura cause them to sign a folded document
without giving them the opportunity to read its contents; that Buenaventura filed to give them a copy of the
document which they signed; that they discovered later on that Buenaventura became the owner of a one· half
portion (87 square meters) of the subject property by virtue of a supposed deed of sale in her favor; that they
immediately proceeded to the notary public who notarized the said purported deed of sales and discovered that
the said 87-square meter portion was purportedly sold to Buenaventura for ₱200,000.00;
that barangay conciliation proceedings were commenced, but proved futile; that the purported deed of sale is
spurious; and that the deed was secured through fraud and deceit, and thus null and void. The Diampocs thus
prayed that the purported deed of sale be annulled and the annotation thereof on TCT 25044 be canceled; that
the owner's duplicate copy of TCT 25044 be returned to them; and that attorney's fees and costs of suit be
awarded to them.

In her Answer, Buenaventura claimed that the Diampocs have no cause of action; that the case is a rehash of
an estafa case they previously filed against her but which was dismissed; and that the case is dismissible for
lack of merit and due to procedural lapses. 6

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After trial, the RTC rendered its December 20, 2007 Decision, pronouncing as follows:

Counsel for the plaintiffs presented two witnesses, namely: Norma Diampoc and Wilbur Diampoc, Stripped off
of its non-essentials, their testimonies are summarized as follows:

1. MRS. NORMA DIAMPOC - The witness is one of the plaintiffs. She testifies that they are the owners of the
property x x x covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25044 x x x; that sometime in May 2000, defendant
borrowed the original owner's duplicate copy of said title from the plaintiffs to be used as collateral of her loan
from a bank as she needed additional capital for her store x x x; that they have agreed that after getting the
proceeds of the loan of Php1,000,000.00, defendant will give Php300,000.00 to plaintiff to be used for the
repair of plaintiffs' second floor x x x; it was further agreed by the parties that defendant will pay the entire
amount of the loan and the Php300,000.00 shall represent payment for the use of plaintiffs' title x x x; that in
the morning of July 3, 2000, while plaintiff Norma Diampoc was in the store of a certain Marissa Ibes,
defendant Jessie Buenaventura arrived and force her to sign a document without giving her a chance to read
the same x xx; that in the morning of November 19, 2002, Eng[r]. Perciliano Aguinaldo went to the plaintiffs'
house and conducted a survey of the subject property; that plaintiffs asked said engineer why he was
conducting a Survey and the engineer replied that it was the instruction of defendant Buenaventura as the said
property has already been sold x x x;. that Engineer Aguinaldo showed plaintiff a document denominated as
"Deed of Sale" x x x; that when plaintiffs signed the Deed of Sale, the word "Vendor" was not yet written x x x;
that plaintiffs did not appear before the notary public who notarized the document and never received the
amount of Php200,000.00 as statod in the document x x x; that when they confronted the lawyer who notarized
the document, plaintiffs were advised to file a complaint before the Office of the Barangay x x x; that the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of the said Barangay issued a certificate to file action as the parties failed to settle the
case amicably x x x; that plaintiffs sent a letter of protest to Eng[r]. Aguinaldo x x x; that in connection with the
filing of the instant complaint, the witness executed a sw0rn statement x x x.

2. MR. WILBUR DIAMPOC -, x x x He was presented to corroborate the testimony of his wife-co-plaintiff, Mrs.
Norma Diampoc.

On May 19, 2005, defendant through counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that he be allowed to
participate in the trial. The Court in its Order dated August 22, 2005 gave defendant last opportunity to present
evidence in her behalf and allowed her to cross-examine the plaintiffs' witnesses.

On cross-examination, the witnesses confirmed that they signed the subject deed of sale but did not read the
contents of the document they signed; that they never appeared before the Notary Public to acknowledge the
Deed of Sale; that they did not file a case against the Notary Public; that they did not receive any consideration
for the alleged sale; that they filed a complaint against defendant only after they discovered that what they have
signed was a Deed of Sale: that they did not read the document before they affixed their signatures because
they trusted the defendant x x x.

Counsel for the defendant on the other hand presented the defendant herself as his lone witness. Jessie
Buenaventura testified that spouses Diampoc sold to her a portion of their land consisting of 87 square meters
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale marked in evidence x x x; that the said deed of sale was signed and
acknowledged before a Notary Public, Atty. Pastor Mendoza on July 6, 2000 x x x; that spouses Diampoc filed
a case against her for Estafa, Grave Threat, Coercion and Falsification before the Prosecutor's Office of Rizal x
x x; that said cases were dismissed x x x; that because of the filing of the instant case, defendant spent
litigation expenses x x x. On cross-examination, defendant further testified that [she] personally gave the
amount of Php200,000.00 to plaintiff Norma Diampoc before they went to the Notary Public x x x.

After evaluating the evidence on hand, the Court finds that plaintiffs fall short of the required evidence to
substantiate their allegations that subject Deed of Sale x x x is illegal and spurious. "The Deed of Sale being a
publicdocument, it is prima facie evidence of the facts state therein’ (Domingo versus Domingo, 455 SCRA
555). Under the rule, the terms of a contract are rendered conclusive upon the parties and evidence aliunde is
not admissible to vary or contradict a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a document. (Rosario
Textile Mills Corp. versus Home Bankers Savings, 462 SCRA 88).

The pertinent provision of the New Civil Code reads:

‘Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should
be complied with in good faith'

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the above-captioned case is hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 7

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Respondents filed an appeal before the CA, which denied the same, ruling as follows:
In beseeching the annulment of the notarized deed of sale, appellants impress upon Us that they were
deceived by Jessie (now ‘appellee’) into believing that they were signing papers for the intended bank loan.
They failed to read the contents of the document fr.lr it 'was folded’, and Jessie was in a hurry.

These specious arguments are devoid adjudicial mooring.

As aptly declared by the court a quo, notarized documents, like the deed in question, enjoy the presumption of
regularity which can be overturned only by clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence.
Miserably, appellants failed to discharge this burden.

Appellants are not illiterate, hut educated persons who understood the meaning of the word ‘vendor’ printed
[ vividly] under their names. They could easily read such word before they could affix their signatures. We are
simply appalled by appellant Wilbur's pathetic explanation that it was ‘dark’ at the time he signed the deed so
that he failed to read the word 'vendor'.

Yet, even if they avouch to be illiterate, which they most certainly are not being high school graduates
themselves, the enunciations in Bernardo v. Court of Appeals come to mind -

‘[G]ranting, without conceding, that private respondent and his wife were both illiterate, this still does not save
the day for them. As stressed in Tan Tua Sia v. Yu Biao Sontua, 56 Phil. 711, cited in Mata v. Court of Appeals
- .... The rule that one who signs a contract is presumed to know its contents have been applied even to
contracts of illiterate persons on the ground that if such persons are unable to read, they are negligent
if they fail to have the contract read to them. If a person cannot read the instrument, it is as much his duty to
procure some reliable persons to read and explain it to him, before he signs it, x x x and his failure to obtain a
reading and explanation of it is such gross negligence as will estop him from avoiding it on the ground that he
was ignorant of its contents. ‘x x x

Verily, the fact that appellants used only one community tax certificate cannot emasculate the evidentiary
weight of the notarized deed. The notary public may have been lax in his duty of requiring two community tax
certificates from the appellants, but this will not adversely affect the validity of the notarized deed.

Invariably, appellants cannot now be allowed to disavow the contractual effects of the notarized deed. It is true
that parol evidence may be admitted to challenge the contents of such agreement 'where a mistake or
imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of
the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings.’ However, such evidence must be clear and convincing and of
such sufficient credibility as to overturn the written agreement. The flimsy protestations of the parties are not
substantiated by compelling evidence which would Warrant a reversal of the impugned judgment.

As borne out by the notarized deed, a perfected contract of sale was forged between the parties.  Appellants
1âwphi1

received in full the payment of ₱200,000.00, having sold to appellee a portion of their lot. If the terms of the
deed were not in consonance with their expectations, they should have objected to it and insisted on the
provisions they wanted. Courts are not authorized to extricate parties from the necessary consequences of
their acts, and the fact that the contractual stipulations may turn out to be financially disadvantageous will not
relieve parties thereto of their obligations.

With this discourse, appellants' recourse falls through. The claim for payment of damages necessarily fails.

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 20 December 2007 of the Regional Trial

Court, Pasig City, Branch 268, in Civil Case No. 70076, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis in the original)

8
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,  which was denied via the May 6, 2011 Resolution. Hence, the
9

instant Petition.

In a January 25, 2016 Resolution,  this Court resolved to dispense with the filing of respondent Buenaventura's
10

comment, and petitioner manifested  her willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
11

pleadings on record.

Issues

Petitioner claims that -

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY
OF NOTARIZED DOCUMENTS AND UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE NOTARIZED DEED OF SALE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THERE. WERE IRREGULARITIES JN THE
EXECUTION AND NOTARIZATlON OF THE DEED OF SALE.

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS A VALID CONTRACT OF SALE. 12

Petitioner’s Arguments

Seeking reversal of the assailed CA dispositions, nullification of the subject deed of sale, cancellation of Entry
No. 5381 on the back of TCT 25044, 'the return of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT 25044, and payment of
attorney's fees and costs of suit, petitioner argues that while a notarized document enjoys the presumption of
regularity, this does not apply to the subject deed of sale as it was not signed before the notary public, and was
notarized in the absence of petitioner and her husband; that Buenaventura failed to present as her witness the
notary public who notarized the deed of sale; that Buenaventura herself failed to show that she was present at
the notarization; that there was only one· Community Tax Certificate used for both petitioner and her husband;
that with the irregularities pointed out, the prima facie; presumption of regularity no longer applies to the subject
deed of sale; that she and her husband never intended to sell the subject property; that while she and her
husband were not illiterate, still what matters is that Buenaventura deceived them into signing the subject
document without reading it through assurances that what they were signing was an authorization for the
purpose of obtaining a bank loan; that she and her husband had no reason to distn1st Buenaventura as the
purported Joan was previously agreed upon; that Buenaventura failed to prove that she paid the purported
consideration of ₱200,000,00 for the supposed sale, as she did not present any receipt therefor; and that in
view of these facts, the deed of sale should be annulled and voided.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

Petitioner's arguments center on the claim that the deed of sale suffers from defects relative to its notarization,
which thus render the deed ineffective, if not null and void. Petitioner claims that the deed was not signed by
the parties before the notary public; that it was notarized in her and her husband's absence; that there was only
one Community Tax Certificate used for both petitioner and her husband; and that Buenaventura failed to
present the notary public as her witness.

It must be remembered, however, that "the absence of notarization of the deed of sale would not invalidate the
transaction evidenced therein"; it merely "reduces the evidentiary value of a document to that of a private
document, which requires proof of its due execution and authenticity to be admissible as evidence."  "A 13

defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument.
Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity
of such document is preponderance of evidence." 14
x x x Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights
over immovable property should be in a public document, yet the failure to observe the proper form does not
render the transaction invalid. The necessity of a public document for said contracts is only for convenience; it
is not essential for validity or enforceability. Even a sale of real property, though not contained in a public
instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding, for even a verbal contract of sale or real estate;
produces legal effects between the parties. Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a
document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard originally attached to a duly-notarized document is
dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence. 15

x x x Nevertheless, the defective notarization of the deed does not affect the validity of the sale of the house.
Although Article 1358 of the Civil Code states that the sale of real property must appear in a public instrument,
the formalities required by this article is not essential for the validity of the contract but is simply for its greater
efficacy or convenience, or to bind third persons, and is merely a coercive means granted to the contracting
parties to enab1e them to reciprocally compel the observance of the prescribed form. Consequently, the private
conveyance of the house is valid between the parties. 16

Thus, following the above pronouncements, the remaining judicial task, therefore, is to detennin9 if the deed of
sale executed by and between the parties should be upheld. The RTC and the CA are t.manimoi1s in declaring
that the deed should be sustained on account of petitioner's failure to discredit it with her evidence. The CA
farther found that petitioner and her husband received in full the consideration of ₱200,000.00 for the sale. As
far as the lower courts are concen1ed, the three requirements of cause, object, and consideration concurred.
This Court is left with no option but to respect the lower courts' findings, for its jurisdiction in a petition for
review on certiorari is limited to reviewing only errors of law since it is not a trier of facts. This is especially so in
view of the identical conclusions affirmed at by them.

Indeed, petitioner and her husband conceded that there was such a deed of sale, but only that they were
induced to sign it without being given the opportunity to read its contents -believing that the document they
were signing was a mere authorization to obtain a bank loan. According to petitioner, the document was
"folded" when she affixed her signature thereon; on the other hand, her husband added that at the time he
signed the same, it was "dark". These circumstances, however, did not prevent them from discovering the true
nature of the document; being high school graduates and thus literate, they were not completely precluded
from reading the contents thereof, as they should have done if they were prudent enough, Petitioner's excuses
are therefore flimsy and specious.

Petitioner and her husband's admission that they failed to exercise prudence can only be fatal to their cause.
They are not unlettered people possessed with a modicum of intelligence; they are educated property owners
capable of securing themselves and their property from unwarranted intrusion when required. They knew the
wherewithal of property ownership. Their failure to thus observe the care and circumspect expected of them
precludes the courts from lending a helping hand, and so they must bear the consequences flowing from their
own negligence.

The rule that one who signs a contract is presumed to know its contents has been applied even to contracts of
illiterate persons on the ground that if such persons are unable to read, they are negligent if they fail to have
the contract read to them. If a person cannot read the instrument, it is as much his duty to procure some
reliable persons to read and explain it to him, before he signs it, as it would be to read it before he signed it if
he were able to do so and his failure to obtain a reading and explanation of it is such gross negligence as will
estop him from avoiding it on the ground that he was ignorant of its contents. 17

It is also a well-settled principle that "the law will not relieve parties from the effects of an unwise, foolish or
disastrous agreement they entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what they
were doing. Courts have no power to relieve them from obligations they voluntarily assumed, simply because
their contracts turn out to be disastrous deals or unwise investments. Neither the law nor the courts will
extricate them from an unwise or undesirable contract which they entered into with all the required formalities
and with full knowledge of its consequences." 18
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENlED. The February 21, 2011 Decision and May 6, 2011 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92453 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5482               February 10, 2015

JIMMY ANUDON and JUANITA ANUDON, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the document be present. Otherwise,
their participation with respect to the document cannot be acknowledged. Notarization of a document in the
absence of the parties is a breach of duty.

Complainants Jimmy Anudon (Jimmy) and Juanita Anudon (Juanita) are brother- and sister-in-
law.  Complainants and Jimmy’s brothers and sister co-own a 4,446-square-meter parcel of land located in
1

Sison, Pangasinan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 69244.  Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra
2

(Atty. Cefra) is a distant relative of Jimmy and Juanita. He was admitted to the bar in 1996. He practices law
and provides services as notary public in the Municipality of Sison, Pangasinan. 3

On August 12, 1998, Atty. Cefra notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale  over a land covered by TCT No. 69244.
4

The names of Johnny Anudon (Johnny), Alfonso Anudon (Alfonso), Benita Anudon-Esguerra (Benita), and
complainants Jimmy and Juanita appeared as vendors, while the name of Celino Paran, Jr. (Paran) appeared
as the vendee. 5

Jimmy and Juanita claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale was falsified. They alleged that they did not sign the
Deed of Absolute Sale. Moreover, they did not sign it before Atty. Cefra.  The National Bureau of Investigation’s
6

Questioned Documents Division certified that Jimmy and Juanita’s signatures were forged.  This is contrary to
7

Atty. Cefra’s acknowledgment over the document, which states:

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the Municipality of Sison, personally appeared JOHNNY ANUDON,
ALFONSO ANUDON, BENITA ESGUERRA, JIMMY ANUDON and JUANITA ANUDON, who exhibited to me
their respective Community Tax Certificates as above-indicated, known to me and known to be the same
persons who executed the foregoing Deed of Absolute Sale and acknowledged to me that the same is their
free act and voluntary deed.

This instrument, which refers to a Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of lot, consists of two pages and have
[sic] been signed by the parties and the respective witnesses on each and every page thereof.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL THIS 12TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1998.

(Sgd.)

ARTURO B. CEFRA

Notary Public

Until December 31, 1999

PTR NO. 2461164; 1-7-98

SISON, PANGASINAN 8

In addition to the forgery of their signatures, Jimmy and Juanita stated that it was physically impossible for their
brothers and sister, Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita, to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. Johnny and Benita were in
the United States on the day the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, while Alfonso was in Cavite. 9

Due to the forgery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, with Jimmy and Juanita
as witnesses, filed a case of falsification of public document against Atty. Cefra and Paran. 10

Jimmy and Juanita also initiated a disciplinary action by filing a Complaint  with this court on August 6, 2001
11

questioning the propriety of Atty. Cefra’s conduct as lawyer and notary public.

In the Resolution  dated September 19, 2001, this court required Atty. Cefra to comment on the administrative
12

complaint. Atty. Cefra filed multiple Motions for Extension of Time,  which this court granted.  Despite the
13 14

allowance for extension of time, Atty. Cefra did not comply with this court’s order to file a Comment. This court
fined Atty. Cefra in the Resolutions dated March 12, 2003  and November 17, 2003.  In both Resolutions, this
15 16

court directed Atty. Cefra to file his Comment. 17

Atty. Cefra’s continued refusal to file his Comment caused this court to order his arrest and
commitment.  Thus, the National Bureau of Investigation’s agents arrested Atty. Cefra at his residence on
18

January 14, 2007. 19

Atty. Cefra finally submitted his Comment  on January 15, 2008.
20

In his defense, Atty. Cefra stated that Jimmy and Juanita were aware of the sale of the property covered by
TCT No. 69244. He narrated that on July 10, 1998, Juanita and Jimmy’s wife Helen Anudon went to his
residence to consult him on how they could sell the land covered by TCT No. 69244 to Paran.  Atty. Cefra 21

claimed that he assisted in the preparation of the documents for the sale, which included the deed of sale and
the acknowledgment receipts for payment.  On August 13, 1998, Paran’s relatives, Viola Carantes and Lita
22

Paran, brought the Deed of Absolute Sale tothe residences of Jimmy, Juanita, and Johnny’s son, Loejan
Anudon (Loejan) to have the document signed.  Viola Carantes and Lita Paran informed Atty. Cefra that they
23

witnessed Jimmy, Juanita, and Loejan sign the document.  Loejan affixed the signatures for his father, Johnny,
24

and his uncleand aunt, Alfonso and Benita. 25

Atty. Cefra admitted knowing that Loejan affixed the signatures of Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita "with the full
knowledge and permission of the three[.]"  He allowed this on the basis of his belief that this was justified since
26

Loejan needed the proceeds of the sale for the amputation of his mother’s leg.  It clearly appeared that Loejan
27

forged the three (3) signatures. Loejan did not have formal authorization to sign on behalf of his father, uncle,
and aunt.

According to Atty. Cefra, he "notarized the questioned document in good faith, trusting in [complainants’] words
and pronouncements; with the only purpose of helping them out legally and financially[.]" 28

After receiving Atty. Cefra’s Comment, this court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report, and recommendation. 29

During the investigation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Juanita appeared without any counsel and
manifested her intention to solicit the services of the Public Attorney’s Office.  She also informed the
30

Investigating Commissioner that her co-complainant, Jimmy, had already passed away.  The mandatory 31

conference was held on February 20, 2009.  On the same day, the Investigating Commissioner issued an
32
Order  terminating the mandatory conference and requiring the parties to submit their respective Position
33

Papers.

The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Cefra’s conduct in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale
violated the Notarial Law.  In addition, Atty. Cefra violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
34

Responsibility,  which requires that "[a]lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
35

promote respect for law and legal processes." Hence, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the
revocation of Atty. Cefra’s notarial commission and the disqualification of Atty. Cefra from reappointment as
notary public for two (2) years. The Investigating Commissioner also recommended the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for six (6) months. 36

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-249  dated May 14, 2011, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
37

Philippines resolved to adopt the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.  However,
38

they recommended that the penalty imposed on Atty. Cefra be modifed:

Atty. Arturo B. Cefra is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and immediate
Revocation of his Notarial Commission and Perpetual Disqualification from re-appointment as Notary
Public.  (Emphasis in the original)
39

Atty. Cefra filed a Motion for Reconsideration,  asking the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to temper the
40

recommended penalty against him.  In Resolution No. XXI-2014-93  dated March 21, 2014, the Board of
41 42

Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines proposed to lower its original penalty against Atty. Cefra:

Atty. Arturo B. Cefra [is] SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, his notarial practice, if
presently existing, immediately REVOKED and his notarial practice SUSPENDED for two (2)
years.  (Emphasis in the original)
43

On September 9, 2014, the Office of the Bar Confidant reported that both parties no longer filed a Petition for
Review of Resolution No. XXI-2014-93. 44

We agree and adopt the findings of fact of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra
violated the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility in notarizing a document without
requiring the presence of the affiants.

The notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. As this court previously
explained:

Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to
rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Notarization
is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of
that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from
imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.  (Citation omitted)
45

The earliest law on notarization is Act No. 2103.  This law refers specifically to the acknowledgment and
46

authentication of instruments and documents. Section 1(a) of this law states that an acknowledgment "shall be
made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done."

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reiterates that acknowledgments require the affiant to appear in person
before the notary public. Rule II, Section 1 states:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—"Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and integrally complete instrument or
document;

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily
affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the
instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular
representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule IV, Section 2(b) states further:

SEC. 2. Prohibitions.—. . .

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document—

(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

The rules require the notary public to assess whether the person executing the document voluntarily affixes his
or her signature. Without physical presence, the notary public will not be able to properly execute his or her
duty under the law. In Gamido v. New Bilibid Prisons Officials,  we stated that "[i]t is obvious that the party
47

acknowledging must . . . appear before the notary public[.]"  Furthermore, this court pronounced that:
48

[a] document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the very same ones who are
personally appearing before the notary public. The affiants should be present to attest to the truth of the
contents of the document and to enable the notary to verify the genuineness of their signature. Notaries public
are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. In fact, it is their duty to demand that the
document presented to them for notarization be signed in their presence. Their function is, among others, to
guard against illegal deeds.  (Citations omitted)
49

Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document express the true agreement
between the parties. Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the integrity of notarized
documents. It is the notary public who assures that the parties appearing in the document are the same parties
who executed it. This cannot be achieved if the parties are not physically present before the notary public
acknowledging the document.

Atty. Cefra claims that Jimmy and Juanita wanted to sell their land. Even if this is true, Jimmy and Juanita, as
vendors, were not able to review the document given for notarization. The Deed of Absolute Sale was brought
to Atty. Cefra by Paran’s representatives, who merely informed Atty. Cefra that the vendors signed the
document. Atty. Cefra should have exercised vigilance and not just relied on the representations of the vendee.

It is possible that the terms and conditions favorable to the vendors might not be in the document submitted by
the vendee for notarization. In addition, the possibility of forgery became real.

In Isenhardt v. Atty. Real,  Linco v. Atty. Lacebal,  Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,  and Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe,  the
50 51 52 53

respondent notaries were all guilty of notarizing documents without the presence of the parties. In Linco,
Lanuzo, and Bautista, the respondents notarized documents even if the persons executing those documents
were already dead at the time of notarization. In Bautista, the respondent, like Atty. Cefra, also allowed another
individual to sign on behalf of another despite lack of authorization.  In these cases, this court imposed the
54

penalty of disqualification as notaries for two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

In the recent case of De Jesus v. Atty. Sanchez-Malit,  the respondent lawyer notarized 22 public documents
55

even without the signatures of the parties on those documents.  This court suspended the respondent-lawyer
56

from the practice of law for one (1) year and perpetually disqualified her from being a notary public. 57

Aside from Atty. Cefra’s violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty. Cefra is also guilty of violating Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. This canon requires "[a] lawyer [to] uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." He contumaciously delayed compliance
with this court’s order to file a Comment. As early as September 19, 2001, this court already required Atty.
Cefra to comment on the Complaint lodged against him. Atty. Cefra did not comply with this order until he was
arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation. Atty. Cefra only filed his Comment on January 15, 2008, more
than seven years after this court’s order. Atty. Cefra’s actions show utter disrespect for legal processes.

The act of disobeying a court order constitutes violation of Canon 11  of the Code of Professional
58

Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts[.]"

Under Rule 138, Section 27, paragraph 1  of the Rules of Court, "wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
59

superior court" constitutes a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Cefra’s
disobedience to this court’s directive issued in 2001 was not explained even as he eventually filed his
Comment in2008. Clearly, his disobedience was willful and inexcusable. Atty. Cefra should be penalized for
this infraction.

In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar,  this court suspended a lawyer who refused to comply with this court’s directives to
60

submit a Rejoinder and to comment on complainant’s Manifestation.  The lawyer complied with the order to file
61

a Rejoinder only after being detained by the National Bureau of Investigation for five (5) days.  Likewise, she
62

complied with the order to comment through a Manifestation filed after four (4) months without explaining her
delay.  This court found that the lawyer’s "conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. . . . [Her] obstinate
63

refusal to comply with the Court’s orders ‘not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also
underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.’" 64

We thus find that the penalty recommended against Atty. Cefra should be modified to take into account all his
acts of misconduct.

WHEREFORE, this court finds respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra GUILTY of notarizing the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated August 12, 1998 in the absence of the affiants, as well as failure to comply with an order from this
court. Accordingly, this court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years, REVOKES his
incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a
notary public. Respondent is also STERNLY WARNED that more severe penalties will be imposed for any
further breach of the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. NO. 6649 : June 21, 2005]

MARINA C. GONZALES, Complainant, v. ATTY. CALIXTO B. RAMOS, Respondent.

 DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document,
making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is,
by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. A notary public must observe with utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the public's confidence
in the integrity of the document would be undermined.1

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Marina C. Gonzales against Atty. Calixto B. Ramos
because of the latter's alleged misconduct in notarizing a Deed of Absolute Sale involving the
complainant. In her Affidavit-Complaint2 filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the complainant alleged that the respondent lawyer notarized a
Deed of Sale on March 27, 1996,3 where the complainant and her husband, Francisco T.
Gonzales, allegedly sold in favor of the spouses Henry and Mila Gatus a piece of land with a
building thereon located at Paranaque City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.)
No. (30643) 17223.4 Due to the execution of the Deed of Sale, T.C.T. No. (30643) 17223 was
cancelled and T.C.T. No. 108589 was issued in the name of spouses Henry and Mila Gatus.

The complainant, however, maintained that she and her husband never appeared before the
respondent to acknowledge the Deed of Sale on March 27, 1996.

When ordered5 to file his Answer,6 the respondent lawyer countered that the complainant's act
was motivated by malice. He alleged that sometime in January 1995, Francisco T. Gonzales went
to his office at the Adamson University Legal Aid Office, accompanied by a couple who were
introduced to him as Henry and Mila Gatus. Francisco showed the respondent a Deed of Sale
consisting of two (2) pages and requested him to notarize it. The respondent, however, noticed
that the Deed of Sale did not contain a technical description of the property being sold, so he
prepared another set of Deed of Absolute Sale. Thereafter, Francisco and the spouses Gatus,
together with a witness, Ms. Eva Dulay, signed the second Deed of Absolute Sale in his presence.
He then instructed Francisco to bring his wife, herein complainant, to his office so she can sign
the Deed of Absolute Sale in his presence.

When Francisco returned to his office, he brought with him the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by
Marina C. Gonzales. At first, he was hesitant to notarize the document because he did not see
the complainant sign the same, but due to Francisco's insistence and knowing them personally,
he eventually notarized the deed.

Respondent compared the signatures of Marina C. Gonzales on the Deed of Absolute Sale with
her other signatures in his files, the spouses Gonzales being his clients from way back.
Convinced that the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was indeed the signature of
complainant Marina C. Gonzales, respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 27,
1996.7

During the mandatory conference before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, the
respondent admitted that the complainant never appeared before him to affirm the genuineness
and authenticity of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 27, 1996.8

On July 30, 2004, the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report9 recommending thus:
In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that Respondent be suspended for a period of three
(3) to six (6) months for failing to act more diligently and prudently when he notarized the
subject documents. It is further recommended that Respondent's commission as notary public be
suspended for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
negligent act in the future will be dealt with more severely by this Commission.10

The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline but
modified its recommendation, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and for Respondent's failure to act more diligently and prudently when he notarized
the documents, Atty. Calixto B. Ramos commission as notary public is hereby SUSPENDED for
six (6) months with a Warning that a repetition of the same or similar negligent act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.11

On February 7, 2005, the parties were required to manifest whether they are willing to submit
the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.12 To date, only complainant submitted her
manifestation13 hence, the filing thereof was deemed waived by the respondent.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and personally appeared before the said notary public to attest
to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed
making the acknowledgment will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the affiant. A notary public is enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious
document. The function of a notary public, is among others, to guard against any illegal deed.14

By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent converted the Deed of Absolute
Sale, from a private document into a public document. Such act is no empty gesture. The
principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies
to the due execution and delivery of a document under his hand and seal, he gives the document
the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged
before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution and
delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their
execution and delivery. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgement executed before a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Hence,
a notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest,
with accuracy and fidelity.15

The respondent's act of notarizing the acknowledgment of a deed of sale even if one of the
signatories therein did not personally appear before him clearly falls short of the yardstick of
accuracy and fidelity referred to above. The respondent himself admitted his professional
shortcomings when he said that all he did to ascertain the authenticity of the signature of the
complainant was to compare her signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale with her other
signatures on pleadings on file with him. Such conduct of the respondent runs contrary to the
express wordings of the acknowledgment in the deed of sale which provides:

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public, for and in the City of Manila, personally appeared the Vendors and
Vendees with their Community Tax Certificate Numbers above-written, known to me and to
the (sic) known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing Deed of Absolute Sale
consisting of two (2) pages, duly signed by the parties and their two (2) instrumental witnesses
and they acknowledged to me that the same are their own free and voluntary acts and
deeds.16 (Underscoring supplied) Ï‚rαlαωlιbrαrÿ

The respondent's act of notarizing the document despite the non-appearance of one of the
signatories should not be countenanced. His conduct, if left unchecked, is fraught with dangerous
possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts
and the public accord to notarized documents. Respondent has clearly failed to exercise utmost
diligence in the performance of his functions as a notary public and to comply with the mandates
of law.

As a lawyer, respondent breached the Code of Professional Responsibility. By notarizing the

questioned deed, he engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.17 He also
committed falsehood and misled or allowed the Court to be misled by any artifice.18

We find the penalty recommended by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP to be in full
accord with recent jurisprudence. The Court, in Bon v. Ziga,19 Serzo v. Flores,20 Zaballero v.
Montalvan,21 Tabas v. Mangibin,22 and similar cases, found the revocation of the respondents'
notarial commission and their disqualification from securing their reappointment, insufficient to
punish them for their offense. Hence, the Court did not only revoke their notarial commission but
likewise suspended them from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the
notarial commission of respondent Atty. Calixto B. Ramos, if still existing, is REVOKED effective
immediately and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two
(2) years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective
immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of same or of similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this Decision in order to
determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to
the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.