Gowaty - 1992 - Evolutionary Biology and Feminism

EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AND FEMINISM
Patricia Adair Gowaty

Clemson University
Evolutionary biology and feminism share a variety of philosophical and

practical concerns. I have tried to describe how a perspective from both
evolutionary biology and feminism can accelerate the achievement of
goals for both feminists and evolutionary biologists. In an early section
of this paper I discuss the importance of variation to the disciplines of
evolutionary biology and feminism. In the section entitled "'Control of
Female Reproduction" I demonstrate how insight provided by participa-
tion in life as woman and also as a feminist suggests testable hypotheses
about the evolution of social behavior--hypotheses that are applicable to
our investigations of the evolution of social behavior in nonhuman
animals. In the section on "Deceit, Self-deception, and Patriarchal Rever-
sals" I have overtly conceded that evolutionary biology, a scientific
discipline, also represents a human cultural practice that, like other
human cultural practices, may in parts and at times be characterized by
deceit and self-deception. In the section on "Femininity" I have indicated
how questions cast and answered and hypotheses tested from an evolu-
tionary perspective can serve women and men struggling with sexist
oppression.
KEY WOROS: Evolutionary biology; Feminism; Sexual selection; Deceit;

Self-deception; Femininity.
"'Helped
are those who love and actively support the diversity of life; they
shall be secure in their differentness."
from "The Gospel According to Shug" (Alice Walker 1989)
Received May 13, 1991; accepted November 1, 1991.
Address all correspondence to Patricia Adair Gowaty, Department of Biological Sciences, Clemson
University, Clemson SC 296,34-1903.
Copyright 9 1992 by Walter de Gruyter, Inc. New York
Human Nature, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 217-249. 1045-6767/92/$1.00 + .10
217
218 Human Nature, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1992
Evolutionary biology and feminism have much in common. It is m y

purpose in this essay to point out several fundamental, overlapping
ideas and themes shared by thinkers informed by these two disciplines.
I stress areas in which ! think theory influenced by both evolutionary
and feminist ideas can be particularly productive. I discuss perspectives
of evolutionary biologists and feminists on variation and variability,
control of female reproduction, deceit and self-deception, and femi-
ninity. By describing parallels, correspondences, and opportunities I
hope to encourage more feminists to entertain the insights of evolution-
ary biology and more evolutionary biologists to recognize and respect
feminist insight.
My ultimate goal is to stimulate more open and constructive dialogue
between evolutionary biologists and feminists, something that histori-
cally has seemed difficult. One reason for this lack of dialogue is the
perception that examination of h u m a n behavior from an evolutionary
perspective is by definition genetically deterministic. I believe that this
need not be the case; in fact, I hope to illustrate to skeptical feminist
readers that an appreciation for contingent, historical, and even dialecti-
cal processes can be easily and profitably incorporated into evolutionary
models explaining the diversity of animal (including human) social
systems.
For this essay I assume that evolutionary biologists include both
women and men and feminists include both men and women. I specifi-
cally modify many phrases with "our" and " w e " because I am attempt-
ing arguments from an inclusive perspective. However, m y perspectives
on feminism (and on evolutionary biology) are necessarily particular,
bounded by my experiences as a white, upper middle-class, college-
educated, western woman. I believe that my perspectives on evolution-
ary biology and feminism are profoundly affected by these standpoints
and therefore cannot be taken as representative of other----especially
other feminist--perspectives that are illuminated by standpoints differ-
ent from my own.
WHAT IS FEMINISM? WHAT IS

EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY?
Feminism is a movement to end sexist oppression (Hooks 1984). Femi-

nist theorists are concerned with how gender (which is the social con-
struction of characteristics associated with sex) affects individuals' ac-
cess to control of their own and others' lives, power, and resources.
Feminist theorists, through women's studies programs, have reached
into all academic disciplines (see, for example, Tuana 1989), exploring
Evolutionary Biology and Feminism 219
a n d exposing h o w g e n d e r e d perspectives function in the m a i n t e n a n c e

of p o w e r of m e n over w o m e n (and s o m e m e n ) a n d the control of
economic resources in patriarchal societies. The feminist critique of
w o m e n ' s o p p r e s s i o n in sexist c o n t e m p o r a r y society has d e m o n s t r a t e d
that m a n y aspects of social life are g o v e r n e d by g e n d e r . The following is
a recent process-oriented definition of feminism:
. . . feminism raises issues that concern personal autonomy and

freedom--with constant reference to basic issues of societal organization,
which center in Western societies, on long standing debate over the family
and its relationship to the state, and on the historically inequitable distri-
bution of political, social, and economic power between the sexes that
underlies this debate. Feminism opposes women's subordination to men
in the family and society, along with men's claims to define what is best
for women without consulting them; it thereby offers a frontal challenge to
patriarchal thought, social organization, and control mechanisms. It seeks
to destroy masculinist hierarchy but not sexual dualism. Feminism is
necessarily pro-woman. However, it does not follow that it must be anti-
man . . . . Feminism makes claims for a rebalancing between women and
men of the social, economic, and political power within a given society, on
behalf of both sexes in the name of their common humanity, but with
respect for their differences . . . . The challenge is fundamentally a human-
istic one that raises concerns about individual freedom and responsibility,
the collective responsibility of individuals to others in society and modes
of dealing with others. Even so, feminism has been, and remains today, a
political challenge to male authority and hierarchy in the most profound
sense. (Often 1988:151-152)
T h e r e are m a n y expressions of feminist political theory, b o t h formal

and informal. The d o m i n a n t w e s t e r n t h e m e s h a v e b e e n liberal femi-
nism, Marxist feminism, radical feminism, a n d socialist feminism (Jag-
gar 1983). M y perspective in this essay is probably best described as
radical feminist, t h o u g h there are m a n y socialist feminist t e n d e n c i e s in
m y t h o u g h t and work. The idea that unites radical feminists a n d that
guides radical feminist analysis is that sexist o p p r e s s i o n is f u n d a m e n t a l
t o - - i s "at the r o o t " of--all o t h e r s y s t e m s of oppression. Radical femi-
nism is a grass-roots m o v e m e n t (some participants call t h e m s e l v e s "cul-
tural feminists") a n d unlike Marxist feminism, for example, is not identi-
fied b y explicit a n d systematic political t h e o r y (Jagger 1983). T h e
d e v e l o p m e n t of radical feminist political t h e o r y is b e i n g i n f o r m e d b y
systematic, political theories of socialist feminism a n d the insights of
feminists from marginalized minorities (e.g., African A m e r i c a n s a n d
lesbians). Gross-roots feminism is global in character, and as feminists
have b e g u n to c o m m u n i c a t e across national borders, feminism m o r e
and m o r e is taking on an international character. In the m o s t p r o f o u n d
sense, feminism is still in the process of d e v e l o p m e n t . It is b e c o m i n g
(Prigogine 1980). Feminism is evolving. It is not static, or monolithic. I

prefer to label myself as "feminist," an unmodified feminist, for reasons
that will be made clear later in this essay.
Evolutionary biologists seek to understand the origins and processes
that result in the organization of the biotic world. Evolutionary biolo-
gists study a vast variety of life processes, but the practice of evolution-
ary biology is unified by the idea that evolutionary changes and biotic
diversity are the result of a few processes, most prominently natural
selection. Evolutionary biology applied to investigations of social behav-
ior in sexual species covers conceptual terrain similar to feminism's
focus, in that one of evolutionary biology's crown jewels is the articula-
tion of natural selection, the force that theoretically accounts for the
variation in the relationships between and among the sexes. Many
evolutionary biologists study how the competitive and cooperative in-
teractions of female and male individuals are organized into patterns of
social organization. Yet evolutionary biology focuses on a different
range of problems in need of solution than "simply" understanding the
power relationships between the sexes. For example, evolutionary biolo-
gists study kinship systems and patterns of parental care, and some
evolutionary biologists study organisms that lack sex and gendered roles
altogether, investigations that may be particularly illuminating to femi-
nists (because understanding that which is unfamiliar or rare often
illuminates that which is familiar or common). Nevertheless, under-
standing the causes and consequences of social behavior in species in
which all the social actors are female or male is one of the most promi-
nent of the modern goals of evolutionary biology.
So, it appears to me that there are fundamental shared interests
between feminists and evolutionary biologists. It seems logical that
feminists and evolutionary biologists may have constructive things to
say to each other. Feminism and evolutionary biology are inextricably
linked along many edges. Feminists building critiques of the rules of
social life that place women in subordinate positions to men and as
objects of sexist oppression are confronted with questions about the
nature of women and men. Thus, feminist theorists implicitly develop
theories of h u m a n nature (Jaggar 1983), which I think could be a i d e d - -
explicitly and implicitly--by knowledge of the diversity of the biotic
world and use of the comparative method, some of which can be
supplied by evolutionary biologists. Theories of h u m a n nature devel-
oped by evolutionary biologists can likewise be aided by a feminist
standpoint. As Haraway (1989) has so persuasively demonstrated for
primatology, knowledge is socially constructed. Sex, race, culture, and
class "fundamentally determine the most intimate details of knowledge
and practice." Thus, the fact that evolutionary biology is practiced
mostly by white, western men in postindustrial societies suggests that

evolutionary biology is handicapped and would benefit from the inclu-
sion of more women and people of color and those from a diversity of
cultural backgrounds and even ages (particularly youngsters, w h o
might better provide the "juvenile" perspective)--whether feminist or
not in our ranks. This diversity would yield a more indusive evolu-
tionary biology with the benefit of other experiential lenses, and it
would provide enhanced resolution of our questions.
I n o w continue my exploration of commonalities by invoking a rule of
pedagogic discourse from evolutionary biology to explain one of the
most seriously misunderstood insights of feminism. I then describe and
discuss the correspondences in other pivotal central insights of the two
disciplines: the meanings of variation, the centrality of control of female
reproduction, the role of deceit and self-deception in communication
systems, and the meanings and abuses of femininity. I end by describ-
ing a question in a more inclusive research agenda.
"THAT'S NOT WHAT I MEANT"
Much feminist writing that describes the proximate mechanics and con-
sequences of societywide, seemingly worldwide power asymmetries
describe in detail the things men do to keep the power advantage over
women. To some readers, especially some men, these descriptions feel
like "male bashing." The responses I have heard from some men have
occasionally struck me as poignant, especially when they say, "But, I
really don't think that way." I want to short-circuit that response and
persuade readers that the arguments offered by feminists may be legiti-
mate, even if everyone doesn't think or feel "that way." Consider an
alternative mechanism for the evolution of patriarchal practices that
does not depend on conscious participation by individuals. This alterna-
tive argument is analogous to one that evolutionary biologists use w h e n
we remark that no consciousness is required to explain the evolution of
animal behavior that appears strategically motivated and tactically exe-
cuted by savvy decision-making n o n h u m a n animals. What we explain
to our students in this case is that the behavior has been subject to
natural selection, a force capable of leaving individuals that appear
conscious, w h e n in fact no consciousness is required for the execution of
the behavior. By analogy to these arguments from natural selection, it
seems just as likely that "the conspiracy theories" that explain the
subordination of w o m e n by men need not be implemented by strategi-
cally motivated, tactically savvy men, only that cultural forces that result
in sexual oppression appear to be the result of individual men in con-
spiracy against women. I find this analogy liberating because it relieves

individuals of inappropriate guilt and defensiveness, while simul-
taneously freeing them to explore h o w they unconsciously participate in
the creation of sexist oppression, thereby providing the possibility that
some will change their unconscious behavior. (Despite my caveat, some
patriarchal participants do consciously conspire to oppress women, and
I am not claiming that they do not.)
VARIATION
I have often been stuck by similarities in the conceptual development of

the evolutionary theory of natural selection and the grass-roots expres-
sions of feminist political theory. The development of both was associ-
ated with the recognition of the importance of variation. Variation in
traits is the source of evolutionary change. Variation in women's lives,
creative talents, and aspirations is the handmaiden of autonomy. Varia-
tion is an expression of our Selves (I capitalize "self" when I am referring
to the Jungian archetype, which is a reference to the paradoxical and
liberating idea that individuals' definitions of their lives and desires are
nonessentialistic processes; cf. Daly 1975, 1978; see also Daly and Caputi
1987). I hope the points that follow will demonstrate that the importance
of variation in the development of feminist practice and evolutionary
biology runs along parallel trajectories and will underscore the impor-
tance of avoiding essentialism for evolutionary biologists and feminists.
Variation and Evolution
Darwin's idea about the premier mechanism of evolution, natural

selection, would not have occurred to him unless he was thoroughly
familiar with the variability in nature: between species and among
individuals within populations. He, more than any other author, moved
us beyond the typologies, archetypes, and essentialism of earlier think-
ers and times (Mayr 1982). He was a keen observer of the natura~ world;
he realized that the variation in traits that he observed everywhere in
nature was the substrate on which environments worked in the process
of natural selection.
I have inferred that Darwin thought the recognition of variation im-
portant, because he presented his ideas via litanies of variation (Darwin
1859, 1871). Perhaps these litanies were his defense; after all, his stress
on variation went against a dominant philosophical notion of his time,
essentialism (Mayr 1982). Essentialism is associated with Platonic ideals
and holds that individuals or groups (e.g., a species or population) have
an essence or an intrinsic invariant nature, which serves to define their

group membership. Was the idea of variation in traits among individu-
als of a population, or within the same individual (temporal or situation-
dependent variation), difficult to understand? Probably not. Even Victo-
rians understood themselves as individuals. So, the question becomes,
why was Darwin so sensitive to alternative sources of variation besides
the agencies of God, Satan, spirits, etc., and w h y has the significance of
variation to the process of evolution become so obvious to us?
Darwin's life experiences especially his travels---allowed him to ex-
perience natural variation firsthand, in a way that many postmoderns
can enjoy, but many Victorians and pre-nineteenth century folk could
not. Perhaps it is our ability to experience many worlds beyond our own
doors via movies, television, and actual travel that has facilitated the
"death of essentialism in evolutionary biology" (Marc Ershefsky, per-
sonal communication in a seminar at Clemson University, 1991; see also
Mayr 1982 for a description of the philosophical underpinnings of essen-
tialisrn's "death"), because we can see firsthand that nature is variable.
No doubt part of the justification for essentialist thinking in people of
earlier ages is ignorance, but for some current thinkers there must be
other sources of the reluctance to fully incorporate the profound conse-
quences of variation into their thinking. For example, to some thinkers
the idea of "types" is politically useful (e.g., racists).
In the early twentieth century, after the rediscovery of Mendel's
genetic rules, Fisher, Haldane, and Wright proclaimed the necessity of
variation for evolution. The Neosynthetic Theory of Evolution, which
they fashioned, is based on phenotypic and genotypic variation. Evolu-
tion is not possible without variation, because without variation there is
no substrate on which natural selection can act. Furthermore, a central
tenet of evolutionary biology holds that the rate of evolutionary change
is proportional to the amount of phenotypic variation; thus, the engine
of creative natural force is fueled by variation. This powerful, transfor-
mative notion changed the face of biology, so much so that "Nothing at
all in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution" (Dobzhansky
1973).
Observations of animals living under natural conditions have focused
attention on new models of evolutionary variation that account for
behavioral variation within as well as between individuals. Variation is
not just something in the process of being weeded out, it is often the
trait of interest itself; for instance, biologists seem far less interested
today in statistical means than in statistical variances. Within-individual
variation is an important area of current study. Individuals can vary
depending on different stages in their life cycles or even different sub-
stages within stages (seasonal variations, hormonal cycle variations,
etc.). And, behavioral biologists are giving more empirical attention to

the biological correlates of within- as well as between-individual differ-
ences. Increasing methodological, philosophical, and statistical sophis-
tication means that even in the subparadigm of the study of sex differ-
ences, differences between sexes are compared with differences within
sexes, so similarities between the sexes can be and are observed.
Seeing beyond the prominent "typologies" and archetypes to the
truer nature of life was revolutionary and critical to understanding the
evolutionary mechanism of natural selection (Mayr 1982) and is still
critical today in its implications for late twentieth century biologists. It is
also important for understanding the causes and consequences of femi-
nism.
Variation and Feminism
What does variation have to do with feminism? H o w do evolutionary

notions about the importance of variation connect with feminism? Many
feminists (e.g., Haraway 1989) argue that strong typological thinking
serves and reflects patriarchal political agendas. One of the means by
which patriarchal ideologies and institutions constrain the lives of worn-
en for the benefit of some men is through a limited definition of what
w o m e n are or can be. For example, the double standard teaches us that
there are only two types of women, defined in relationship to our sexual
relationships to men as either "virgin mothers" or whores. (Of course,
the "virgin mother" role is impossible, guaranteeing failure for any
woman who tries to fit that stereotypical ideal and thereby aiding the
patriarchal agenda by encouraging low self-esteem among those w h o
fail when they try to live up to it.) These limited dual perspectives center
on women's sexuality. Women's sexuality is thus socially determined;
the rhythms of their days narrowly constructed, the passages of their
life-histories a function of their reproductive values, mostly for the
benefit of men.
This limited and limiting construct engenders resistance. Western
women n o w often seek to define themselves not just in relation to
husbands or fathers, but in their o w n terms, which sometimes explicitly
excludes reference to men. Feminists refute the limited view of w o m e n
as property by focusing on the myriad ways that w o m e n do (and do not)
express their creativity in general and, in particular, their sexuality (e.g.,
see Hite 1987 for descriptions of w o m e n ' s sexuality in their o w n words),
including ways that do not involve motherhood or men.
The many ways in which women's economic options are limited are
fundamentally associated with the control of w o m e n ' s sexuality. Obvi-
ously, it is easier to control and exploit individuals sexually if they are
economically dependent. Limited economic options have focused femi-

nist interest in gaining women's access to professional and employment
opportunities. Economic parity is part of what w o m e n need to gain full
control of their sexuality. The main ideological obstacle to economic
parity and access to the varieties of professional and employment oppor-
tunities is the continued patriarchal definition of w o m e n as at least
deficient or deviant, or not fully human, and therefore not capable of
performing the jobs that men perform. Resistance to this limited and
limiting view brings feminists to emphasize the vast varieties of female
experience, aptitude, capability, creativity, and desire--in each instance
at least equal to men's. As feminists, many of us respect and even
celebrate, rather than fear and belittle, the differences among us, for it is
these differences, these variations, that offer us collective and individual
freedom from the economic, social, and personal bondage of patriarchy.
Seeing beyond "'two types of w o m e n " to the truer natures of the lives
of women was revolutionary and perhaps critical to understanding the
mechanisms of patriarchal control of women's lives. The current west-
ern expression of feminists" efforts to achieve autonomous control for
women can be characterized as being about multiplicities. There seem to
be many kinds and varieties of feminism, as many kinds and varieties as
there are individual feminists, with individual desires, notions, and
conceptions of what we are and want. The issues have to do with the
opportunities we want for ourselves; our wishes are reflections of our
definitions of ourselves and our potential for control over all aspects of
our lives. Central to the issue of a u t o n o m y - - i n our times in westernized
worlds--is economic opportunity and control of our reproductive capac-
ities, our sexuality. Our efforts mean that some women are no longer
experiencing life as only mothers or whores, the roles afforded women
in the limited patriarchal-controlled dramas, but more and more often as
actors in leading, proactive roles centered on personal power over our
own lives. When we are "free to be," we define ourselves variously.
This is the most important theme---with variations---of feminism.
A corollary of feminism's nonunitary theme is that we have come t o m
are learning t(y--recognize and respect the utility in w o m e n ' s choices
and the diversity of women's voices (Hooks 1989). Variation is assumed,
a function of the standpoints of individual women, as is respect for the
variations and various choices feminists (women and men) may make in
our efforts to define our lives and to live our lives creatively. Yet, in
recent years, feminists and feminism have gone through changes as we
have forged our strength from unity in diversity (a phrase that will be
familiar to every evolutionary biologist). Black feminists, lesbian femi-
nists, religious feminists, Marxist feminists, socialist feminists, intellec-
tual feminists, cultural feminists, feminist sex workers, individualist
feminists, relational feminists, structural feminists, etc., have become,
for some, feminists unmodified (MacKinnon 1987). We are uniting

around an emerging, grass-roots, feminist political theory centering on
control of our sexuality. Perhaps we are all Womanist (Walker 1983). To
my mind, lack of respect among feminists for the variations on the
themes of feminist thought, originating from divergent standpoints, is
retrograde and atavistic. Unmodified feminism does not discount these
valuable perspectives, but it does focus on what unites us, our resistance
to control of our sexuality by others. So, for me and I think for many
others, the very stuff of feminism is our respect for each other's individ-
uality along with the explicit recognition that the diversity of particular
experience legitimates diverse standpoints.
Like the rate of genetic evolution, the rate of cultural evolution de-
pends on variation--variation in the substrates of culture, which include
imagination, practice, fad, serendipity. I suggest that one important w a y
in which the evolutionary notion of variation connects directly with
feminism is that it demonstrates the power of our imaginations as tools
for struggling against sexist oppression. It seems to me that in the
history of ideas, the almost simultaneous timing of the recognition of the
importance of variation to evolutionary biology and to feminism is
worthy of scrutiny. For me the co-occurrence of variation as central tenet
has been illuminating.
CONTROL OF FEMALE REPRODUCTION
Feminist ideas about autonomy in the lives of w o m e n relate to promi-

nent ideas in evolutionary biology. As an evolutionary biologist in-
formed by feminist ideas, I have reacted to the existing limitations of
evolutionary theory. I do not claim that evolutionary biology has got it
wrong, only that the typical constructions seem incomplete. In this
section, I describe why feminists and how evolutionary biologists dwell
on the control of female reproductive capacities, and I describe some of
these unfinished evolutionary stories in detail. I offer novel interpreta-
tions about the relationships of some ideas in evolutionary biology. My
perspective on evolutionary biology is informed by my experience as a
woman, as a feminist, as a field naturalist, as a behavioral ecologist, and
as an evolutionist. I hope other evolutionary biologists will be able to see
that this perspective is potentially informative to them as well in our
efforts to explain the way the world works. I hope other feminists will be
able to see that evolutionary perspectives need not be prototypically
"sexist," but inclusive and empowering, suggestive of ways we can
further foster our efforts for women's autonomy.
The Battles of the Sexes
Autonomy and control by w o m e n of sexuality and economic re-

sources are central to feminism's goals. Radical feminists believe that the
fundamental oppression of w o m e n by men is sexual; most western
feminists take the subordination of w o m e n as their central concern, and
some have concluded that the control of females is through sexualized
aggression (MacKinnon 1987). Furthermore, it is the sexual, reproduc-
tive capacities of women that are the focus of male control.
The antithetical icon of autonomy for many w o m e n is rape. Marital
rape and date rape and acquaintance rape and stranger rape and wife
beating and degradation and humiliation and sexual harassment in the
work place of women by men are dramatic evidence that some men seek
to control some women. Many have argued that although rape is not
psychologically a crime of sexual passion, it is a crime of aggression
toward women, and it contributes to the ideology that helps to keep the
control of women and their reproductive capacities in the hands of men
(Brownmiller 1975; Frieze 1983). In addition, despite alternative claims,
aggression against women is sexualized--those that do it, "get off"
sexually (MacKinnon 1987). The insight that violence against w o m e n is
sexy (turns men on) provides a powerful proximate analysis that ex-
plains what many of us know in our guts---sexuality is the fulcrum of
subordination/domination. The horrible part is not only that violence is
sexualized, but that sexual abuse is a form of terror that works prox-
imately to create the subordination of women.
These ideas seem right-headed to me, emotionally because they are
consistent with my experiences and rationally because of the data: there
is at least a 26% probability that a young w o m a n in the United States will
become a victim of completed rape (forced intercourse) at some time in
her life, and a 46% probability that she will become a victim of rape or
attempted rape (Johnston 1980; Russell and Howell 1983). Rape is so
common here and elsewhere that "To be about to be raped is to be
gender female in the process of going about life as usual" (MacKinnon
1987:7). The magnitude of the problem is also indicated by the fact that
only 7.8% of the women in the United States have not been sexually
assaulted or harassed in their lifetime (MacKinnon 1987).
The control of women's reproductive capacities by men takes less
overtly aggressive turns as well. For example, consider some of the new
reproductive technologies, such as fertility drugs and artificial insemina-
tion or surrogate parenting. These reproductive technologies claim to
assist women and sometimes do, but most often they do not. What
many of the practitioners of these reproductive technologies func-
tionally do is use women in attempts to increase their o w n direct control

over women's reproductive capacities (see Corea 1985 for a compelling
discussion of the effects of new reproductive technologies). I stress that
this is what the new reproductive technologies functionally do, not what
the practitioners or patients may think or say that they are doing. In the
current state of development of various reproductive technologies, des-
perate women who seek their "healing" functions actually offer them-
selves unwittingly as experimental material (Corea 1985). To alerted
feminist w o m e n and men these reproductive technologies are little more
than the patriarchal urge to control women's reproductive capacities
(Atwood 1986)! I again stress that I am focusing on the processes and the
outcomes for the vast majority of w o m e n exposed to the new reproduc-
tive technologies and for the doctors and practitioners w h o administer
these options. Usually, in the vast majority of attempts, and finally, for
the vast majority of w o m e n and men w h o undergo them, the technolo-
gies do not produce the desired outcomes; the w o m e n and men suffer,
often horribly, and the doctors receive large premiums to get additional
data for their "experiments." These are the outcomes, and from an
evolutionary perspective the "benefit" that fuels the continued use of
the technologies. From my feminist perspective, the new reproductive
technologies are often "patriarchal reversals" (see the section on deceit
and self-deception for an explicit definition).
The control of women's sexuality also provides ample reason for men
to keep women economically dependent. Economic dependence seems
to be the main reason women are sometimes unable to leave mentally
and physically abusive relationships. In fact, "feminism fundamentally
identifies sexuality as the primary social sphere of male power. The
centrality of sexuality emerges . . . from feminist practice on diverse
issues, including abortion, birth control, sterilization abuse, domestic
battery, rape, incest, lesbianism, sexual harassment, prostitution, fe-
male sexual slavery, and pornography. In all these areas, feminist efforts
confront and change women's lives concretely and experientially"
(MacKinnon 1982:529). It is but a short step to imagine that an indirect
method of control of women's sexuality is through economic domina-
tion.
Women are not always, everywhere, subordinated, but w h e n they
are, they resist control (just as all exploited individuals do). Resistance to
control is as fundamental to the relationship between the genders as is
control. Resistance to control is the essence of the current western
expression of feminism, but it is my thought that women's resistance to
control is an ancient, deep-seated, gynocentric, frequency-dependent
force. Indeed, women's history has been the history of resistance move-
ments (Lerner 1986), which explains w h y most of the written history of
w o m e n has suffered erasure and attempted erasure and is distorted

(Spender 1982). Most of written history "tells the story from the view-
point of the male half of humanity only" (Lerner 1986:4).
Reading feminist political theory as an evolutionary biologist, I am
impressed by the power of the analysis, and the strength of feminist
method. Feminist method is based on paying attention to the experi-
ences of women: what comprises w o m e n ' s lives and, most important,
what w o m e n say they feel about their experiences. Feminist political
method--from grass roots to ivory tower--focuses on the "proximate"
issues of what happens to women, h o w males get control, h o w males
maintain control, and how w o m e n resist control. Feminism is currently
developing a robust comparative method as well, as more and more of
us from divergent standpoints voice our experiences. In contrast, evolu-
tionary theory, which also centralizes female reproductive capacity, is
focused on w h y things are as they are, i.e., the "ultimate" issues of
current functionality and adaptive significance (including evolutionary
history) of sex similarities and differences in behavior and variation in
social systems.
Female Choice and Anti-Female Choice
Along with the insights of natural selection, Darwin taught us about

the force of sexual selection, a type of natural selection having to do
exclusively with reproductive competition. Reproductive competition
occurs between individuals of the same sex and species. Darwin said
there were two types of sexual selection: intra- and intersexual selection.
He introduced the two types of sexual selection by their examples,
male-male competition and female choice, and today sexual selection is
best known through these two behavioral mechanisms. Darwin impli-
cated male-male competition in the evolution of many traits, and he said
that female choice was as important as male-male competition. For
example, he said, "The exertion of some choice on the part of the female
seems a law almost as general as the eagerness of the male" (Darwin
1871:579). As I indicate below, there are intuitive, logical, and empirical
reasons to think that female choice is a more primary selective force than
male-male competition and that male-male competition is derivative to
other, even more primary forces in sexual selection. I further point out
that there are other behavioral mechanisms of sexual selection that
Darwin did not catalogue. Some may consider my points subtle. Nev-
ertheless, I consider the long-standing theoretical primacy of male-male
competition to be one of the most potentially misleading notions in
evolutionary biology. It sometimes seems so misleading that I w o n d e r
what maintains its standing. A more inclusive list of behavioral mecha-

nisms of sexual selection seems important not only theoretically but also
as an imaginative source of behavioral alternatives for people seeking an
end to sexist oppression.
Female choice has been controversial throughout most of the history
of evolutionary biology. Resisters to the idea that females choose their
mating partners claimed that female animals lacked esthetic sensibilities,
making choice behavior impossible (e.g., Huxley 1938). The secondary
role that female choice has usually played in the thinking of evolution-
ary biologists would seem to be exceedingly fertile ground for review by
feminist historians of science, something that I do not want to attempt
here. Nevertheless, along with the current western expression of femi-
nism, the past twenty years has seen a flowering of research into
mechanisms of female choice (e.g., Kirkpatrick and Ryan 1991; Wade
and Arnold 1980).
In one of the central tracts of modern evolutionary biology, Williams
(1966) remarks at length about the selective pressures that have led to
"characteristic" males and females. Because in most animals females
bear the greater costs of reproduction, while males bear relatively minor
costs, females should be selected to be "coy" about mating, whereas
males should be selected to mate with as many females as possible. The
emphasis here is on females, but relatively passive ones without the
power to influence directly and pro-actively; these females were left only
with the option to be "coy" or indirectly manipulative.
Six years later, Trivers (1972) published a remarkably durable paper in
which he clarified the relationship between Darwin's two kinds of sexu-
al selection and parental care. Trivers's insight is that because the repro-
ductive output of females is limited by their intrinsic ability to produce a
few offspring for which they may then care, and because the reproduc-
tive output of males is limited by their access to females, by and large,
sexual selection would operate so males would compete for access to
females and females would be choosy about their mating partners.
Thus, Trivers says that, in general, females should emphasize choice
and males should emphasize male-male competition. In its simplest
form, Trivers's view of females seems to speak of choosy, self-
determining females.
Female choice may often result in increased variance in reproductive
success among males, because some males may be preferred over other
males. Thus female choice is the behavioral mechanism of competition
among males' gametes, and it is this emphasis on the result of female
choice rather than on the behavior that has led to the impression that
male-male competition primarily shapes and controls the mating op-
tions of females and males. In much of current evolutionary thinking,
reproductive competition is a matter among males, a conceptualization

that has called forth responses from other feminists, mostly nonevolu-
tionists (Harding 1986) but including other biologists and scientists
(Bleier 1979; Hubbard 1990; Lowe and Hubbard 1979) as well as feminist
evolutionary biologists (e.g., H r d y 1981). Nevertheless, female animals
are often still seen as without options in the face of male-male competi-
tive interactions.
Some researchers seeking to understand the basis of female choice
devise experimental schemes that limit the ability of males to fight and
compete directly among themselves for access to females, so female
choice can be observed unaffected by male--male competition. These
research paradigms have been successful in exposing some of the truly
remarkable variations in nature (Burley 1986; Zuk, Johnson et al. 1990;
Zuk, Thornhill et al. 1990). These successes notwithstanding, male-male
competition and female choice cannot be the entire story of sexual
selection.
The notion that females are second-hitters in contexts of male-male
competition is ironic, because among the most compelling logical argu-
ments of evolutionary biology is the one that posits a difference b e t w e e n
the sexes: The limiting resources for female reproduction are those that
allow females to complete the physiological processes associated with
the production and maintenance of offspring. The limiting resource for
male reproduction is access to females. These are first principles from
which hypotheses about the direction of evolution proceed. Despite the
power of these logical facts, many evolutionary biologists have over-
looked what might be seen as the central organizing principles of rela-
tionships between the sexes, ideas that derive directly from these logical
first principles. For example, only recently has it been emphatically
emphasized that there should be strong selection on males to control
females' reproduction through direct coercive control of females (Smuts
and Smuts 1992; Thornhill 1980). More notable is the general lack of
emphasis on or even absence of the idea that there also should be strong
selection on females to resist male control of essential resources and
perhaps even stronger resistance to male coercive control of female
reproduction and sexuality.
The points that I am stressing are twofold: (a) there should be strong
selection on males to control females over and above all other sexually
selected behavior, because females limit males' reproduction; and (b) in
response to male efforts to control females' reproduction, females should
be selected to resist male control. Because female reproduction d e p e n d s on
their access to resources and males on their access to females, it seems
logical to me to expect not that males would compete among themselves
for access to females and the resources females need, but primarily that
males would seek to control females, and that females would resist
those efforts to be controlled. Male contests over access to females and
the resources females need logically follow after males' efforts to control
females and females' efforts to resist control. Furthermore, these selective
pressures acting on females to control their own reproductive capacities
through access to resources or through physical autonomy should in
turn provide additional selection on males. Variation among males
should track variation among females; the battles of the sexes should
result in frequency dependence of "sexual" traits (Gowaty 1992). What
is remarkable to me is that what seems to have been left out of evolution-
ary biology is a discussion of the multiplicities of strategies of females to
retain reproductive autonomy. I find this ironic, because if the "battles
of the sexes" have any meaning for evolution, that meaning surely
resides in these contests and their frequency-dependent outcomes.
I suspect that failure to make these issues primary in evolutionary
biology is the result of the patriarchal ideology that fosters deceit and
self-deception even in the lives and minds of evolutionary biologists,
whether these biologists are men or women. I do not mean that evolu-
tionary or selectionist thinking is necessarily sexist, just that those who
have been the most prominent contributors (including many women)
have been constrained by sexist and patriarchal constructs. Failure to
expose these logical defects---some seemingly simple and as plain as the
noses on our faces--raises the question of whose interests the continu-
ance of incomplete stories serves, something that I take up again later in
this essay.
Male dominance over females is often seen as a by-product of intense
male-male competition. In a more logically complete discussion of the
relationships of female and male animals, male dominance over females
would not be relegated to epiphenomena associated with male-male
competition (see Smuts and Smuts 1992). Wilson (1975) provides one
example of the many times it has been written that male-male competi-
tive interactions select for dominance among males, and that the con-
tests among males have selected for sexual dimorphism with males
bigger than females. This has been taken to mean that male dominance
over females is a side-effect of male-male competition. My feminist
perspective suggests that the "fact" that in m a n y animal societies all
males have priority of access to resources over females may sometimes
be fiction, and when it is, it should not be explained away as an
epiphenomenal process ancillary to male-male competition; rather, it
should be at least hypothesized as a process of sexual selection in which
males compete with females for control of resources essential to female
reproduction. Perhaps male-male competition is a derivative process
ancillary to competition between females and males (Gowaty 1992;
qmuts and Smuts 1992).
Evolutionary thinkers, whether informed by feminist ideas or not, are

not surprised by one of the overwhelming facts of patriarchal cultures,
namely that men (and their intergenerational supporters) seek to con-
strain and control the reproductive capacities of women. What is sur-
prising is that other equally compelling, theoretically predictable evolu-
tionary forces are at work in our cultures and in the social lives of
n o n h u m a n animals besides male-male competition and female choice:
most notably, in this context, forces that oppose female choice (i.e.,
anti-female choice) and forces that oppose anti-female choice (i.e.,
resistance to male control of female reproduction). In my own effort to
help make evolutionary biology more inclusive, I hope to bring these
other evolutionary forces to the fore.
Sexual selection is "reproductive competition between members of
the same sex and species." The currency of competition is genetic. The
behavior of individuals is favored because some behavior is more suc-
cessful than other behavior in getting individuals' genes into future
generations. Gametic competition is difficult to see. What we are able to
see is the behavior that mediates gametic contests. Behavior mediating
gametic contests may take many different forms; in contrast, there are
only two gametic contests: between males' genes, and between females'
genes. Behavior that leads to a male attracting more females than anoth-
er male is one sort of behavioral process that mediates the gametic
contest between males. There are many others. Yet discussants since
Darwin have focused on only two. Competition among males' genes
and competition among females' genes apparently have been con-
founded with the behavioral processes that mediate the gametic contest
for the insertion of one's genes into future generations. As Darwin
pointed out, sexual selection includes within- and between-sex behav-
ioral processes. Some of the many behavioral processes that may medi-
ate the gametic contest include female-female competition or coopera-
tion, male-male competition or cooperation, female choice, male choice,
and other behavioral mechanisms we might call anti-female choice and
anti-male choice. For example, Smuts and Smuts (1992) describe a type
of sexually selected, anti-female choice behavior that they call "intersex-
ual coercion," which is defined as "the use of force, or the threat of the
use of force, by a member of one sex (A) that functions to increase the
probability that a member of the other sex (B) will mate with A and/or
decrease the probability that B will mate with a rival of A's." In addition,
female-male contests over resources and female-male cooperative be-
havior could also be included as behavioral mechanisms of sexual selec-
tion. I am not saying that these behavioral mechanisms are always
mechanisms in sexual selection, just that they may function in sexual
selection. By analogy, not all male-male competition is sexually selected;
for example, behavioral competition over something besides reproduc-
tion or reproductive success need not be a mechanism in sexual selec-

tion. My point is that our previous emphasis on only two of the behav-
ioral mechanisms of sexual selection has obscured the operation of
sexual selection through other behavioral means. The relationships of
these behavioral mechanisms of sexual selection to each other can be
argued from the perspective of which selective forces are (or were) likely
to operate first.
Females' access to essential resources is fundamental, even for male
reproduction. This fact implies a suite of selective forces, including
female-female competition for resources; female choice of mates; anti-
female choice behaviors by males, such as intersexual coercion (Smuts
and Smuts 1992); resistance by females to coercive control; competition
among males for coercive access to females (these male-male interac-
tions are secondary to coercive interactions between males and females);
competition between males and females for control of resources essen-
tial to reproduction; and male-male competition for resources (these
male-male behaviors are secondary to female-male competition). This
list of behavioral possibilities is informed both by feminist political
insight and by women's experiences in patriarchal culture. What has
been less obvious to feminists, and unfortunately not obvious to most
evolutionary biologists, is that in the evolution of most social systems
there should be selection for males with multiple, conditional strategies;
the variation among males should occur in proportion to the variation
among females. Females should be variable in their tactics for retaining
control of or resisting male control over their reproduction and in their
tactics for retaining control of essential resources for their reproduction.
For example, one scenario from this logic provides for the evolution of
varieties of males or for individual males with multiple, conditionally
expressed strategies, each a function of the variety of females. One type
is behaviorally nonaggressive toward females (and perhaps also toward
males), in which males may be sexually selected through female choice
to emphasize sperm competition; the second is behaviorally aggressive,
in which males may be sexually selected through anti-female choice to
control females directly and coercively or through intersexual and intra-
sexual contests for the control of resources. A society with at least these
conditional strategies for males or varieties of phenotypically fixed males
should evolve whenever females' abilities to resist direct coercive control
are variable. In this scenario I have imagined only two conditional
strategies for females, those able to resist control and those not able to
resist control (keep in mind, however, that more than two conditional
strategies are possible and probable). Male strategies should co-evolve
in response to females' abilities to resist coercive control, so that coerc-
ing males will increase when females are less able to resist coercive
control; noncoercing males will track females more resistant to coercive

control.
My arguments, which I express graphically and mathematically else-
where (Gowaty 1992), hinge on females' abilities to (a) resist direct
coercive control attempts, such as rape or forced copulation; and (b)
garner access to essential limiting resources for reproduction. Variation
in females' abilities could select for more intensive cooperative interac-
tions between females and males so that pairs would compete with the
most able individual females for essential resources. Increased oppor-
tunities for cooperation also increase opportunities for males to exert
control over females, which in turn will select for females that resist
control. These multiple selective pressures acting on females and males
simultaneously mean that at any given time there will be several kinds
of co-evolving females (or even more likely, females that facultatively
exhibit conditional strategies given variation in the environments in
which they find themselves) and thus multiple kinds of males, also co-
evolving with females. In terms of variation in human societies, this
selective regime could provide for male tacticians we might call "sexy,"
selected by the existence of "competent" females able to garner essential
resources alone; "rapists," selected by the existence of "highly physi-
cally vulnerable" females unable to resist forcible coercion; "cooperative
partners," selected by the existence of "less competent females" unable
to compete successfully with "competent females" more able at garner-
ing essential resources alone; "resource-holders," who trade access to
resources for access to females' reproductive capacities; and "patri-
archs," who directly coercively control females (and others) through
their totalitarian control of resources. The point is that there should
seldom be only one avenue for reproductive competition for males,
because there should seldom be only one avenue for access to essential
resources for females; there should be several varieties of males within
most animal populations, or several conditional strategies that individu-
al males might adopt, depending directly on strong selection on females
to retain control of their own reproduction and essential resources for
reproduction.
The ideas presented above are subject to empirical investigation.
There are as yet few answers to the questions this perspective suggests.
What is clear is that theoretically prominent notions have canalized the
attention of male and female evolutionary biologists on conveniently
discerned, limited types, rather than on the ranges of variation that are
more likely to exist among both females and males in sexually reproduc-
ing populations.
One immediate positive value of this suggested perspective is that it
encourages new questions. For example, several behavioral ecologists
have mentioned to me that they see no evidence in the species they

study of males' tendencies to control females directly and coercively. In
response, I have asked them if there are intrinsic characteristics of
females relative to males or of the habitats in which females and males
live that make coercion by males impossible or unnecessary. That strikes
me as a new question worth examining.
Control of female reproduction has been an issue in evolutionary
biology, as it is in feminism. Feminism has reminded me that resistance
to males' efforts to control females' reproduction might also logically be
a part of evolutionary biology. Feminists and evolutionary biologists
obviously have much to say to each other about this issue. Did the issue
of control of female reproduction and the idea that females should be
strongly selected to resist come late to evolutionary biology because
until very recently there have been so few w o m e n in our discipline
(Hrdy 1986), or has the blindness to this logical idea served patriarchal
agendas directly? Why until recently (Borgia 1979; Maynard Smith 1977)
have the co-evolutionary battles between the sexes received considera-
bly less emphasis in evolutionary biology than the co-evolutionary bat-
tles within each sex? This question implies reference to deceptive as-
pects of dominant political ideologies and to evolutionary analyses of
the function(s) of deceit and self-deception in communication systems,
which I take up in the next section.
DECEIT, SELF-DECEPTION,
A N D PATRIARCHAL REVERSALS
Feminists have realized that patriarchal ideology is deceptive in that its

primary function is to mold women to the purposes of the patriarchs;
that is, patriarchal ideology functions in the control of w o m e n by men
and their intergenerational supporters. Ideology is a way of seeing and
being in the world, a system of perception engrained through communi-
cation systems. Mary Daly argues these points in her demystifying book
Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism, a book I consider impor-
tant for evolutionary biologists interested in sexually selected behavior
in people. She says that deceptive perceptions are implanted through
language," the all-pervasive language of myth, conveyed overtly and
subliminally through religion, 'great art,' literature, the dogmas of pro-
fessionalism, the media, grammar. Indeed, deception is embedded in
the very texture of words" (Daly 1978:3).
Daly and other feminists (e.g., Woolf 1938; Penelope 1990) before and
since show that patriarchal ideology serves the interests of some men at
the expense of most women. Ideology is not necessarily created by
conscious conspiracy, but as I discussed above, the outcome of the

individual and collective behavior of patriarchal men and w o m e n ap-
pears conspiratorial (and sometimes is). Whether we like it or not,
whether we are conscious of it or not, each of us has probably at some
time in her or his life unconsciously participated (maybe consciously
too) in the politics or practices that foster patriarchy. I also anticipate
that most readers of this essay would characterize themselves as nonsex-
ist and in favor of the feminist agenda of economic opportunities for
w o m e n equal to those for men. This means that some of us are lying, to
others and to ourselves. Living in patriarchy means that some of us
consciously conspire against w o m e n and some of us do it uncon-
sciously. Patriarchal ideology---characterized by deceit and self-
deception--might be productively viewed as an emergent property of
human communication systems. Patriarchal reversals--societywide lies
that foster sexist oppressionmare all around us (Daly 1978).
Like feminists, behavioral ecologists (a subdisciplinary band of evolu-
tionary biologists) have recently emphasized that communication sys-
tems "are not systems for the dissemination of the truth" (Trivers 1985);
rather, at least in part, they are systems of manipulation of the receiver
of a signal by the sender. Theoretically, the relationship of deceptive
signal to truth is a co-evolutionary, frequency-dependent oscillation: as
deception increases, so too does selection for detection of deception; as
detection spreads, selection on deceit increases (Krebs and Dawkins
1984). In animal communication systems, self-deception may then arise.
Self-deception functions to make deception an unconscious practice of
the deceiver, because it hides from others the subtle physiological and
behavioral signs that the deceived may use to detect deception (Trivers
1985).
The power of deception in communication systems is evidenced by
morphological lies, such as camouflage and mimicry, that serve to hide
individuals from their predators. Insect examples abound. Plants use
the chemistry of moth sex to trick moths into visiting them so the moths
will disseminate pollen from one plant to another. Within-species de-
ceptive communication has been described in sparrows, chimpanzees,
and, of course, among people. "Deceit and self-deception" n o w stand
for an important subparadigm in the study of animal communication
systems.
If Daly and Trivers are right about deceit and self-deception, and I
think they are, some obviously flawed dogmas of professionalism--in
this case, the profession of evolutionary biology--can be explained. The
failure of earlier evolutionary biologists to infer (a) the logical interrela-
tionships of a full suite of behavioral mechanisms of sexual selection,
especially anti-female choice, and (b) the importance of strong selection
on males to control female reproduction and the equally strong selection

on females to resist male control can be explained by the workings of
deceit and the workings of self-deception in the maintenance of patri-
archy; these logical failings can be seen as patriarchal reversals.
The argument I am making is a meta-analysis of evolutionary biology;
that is, I am making an argument about the evolution of some traits of
evolutionary biology. Deceit and self-deception in communication sys-
tems are biologically, evolutionarily relevant. Evolutionary biology itself
is a discipline of communication. Deceit and self-deception seem to
function in the communication system of evolutionary biology. I ask
about the causes and consequences of the evolution of deceit and self-
deception in evolutionary biology: a meta-analysis. In other words,
evolutionary biology is no exception to the rule that it is difficult to see
past the constraints of patriarchy. If evolutionary biologists--both wom-
en and m e n - - s a w the centrality of control of female sexuality in nonhu-
man animal systems, by analogy control of w o m e n would necessarily
need to be examined in human social systems. Similar analyses by
feminists--without reference to nonhuman animal systems--make the
argument that even in the face of extreme brutality in efforts to control
women (e.g., suttee, footbinding, clitorectomy, and infibulation), ob-
servers, researchers, and writers have failed to characterize these hor-
rors truthfully from the perspective of the victims, because the truth
does not serve patriarchy, i.e., it explicitly does not serve the interests of
men and their intergenerational supporters, who maintain the control of
women, their resources, and their sexuality (Daly 1978). Is this one of
the reasons that that so few of us know what clitorectomies and infibula-
tions are, much less that they happen to millions of women?
A psychological argument provides a proximate explanation for some
of the deceit and self-deception surrounding these horrors. Being blind
to a horror may be a psychological defense against pain. Members of the
victim group can respond to the truth of horrors with righteous anger;
however, when those who perpetuate horrors face the truth, they must
also face victims of horrors (whose victimization is thus acknowledged
and recognized), something that is not only painful but also may reduce
the advantages the oppressor group enjoys. Whatever proximate expla-
nation holds, deceit and self-deception characterize the behavioral prac-
tices that surround suttee, footbinding, clitorectomy, infibulation, and
other practices that serve the patriarchal agenda to control w o m e n (Daly
1978).
Another aspect of deception in human communication systems is
"femininity." In the next section, I describe how evolutionary biologists
might look at what w o m e n do to ourselves in our efforts to be "femi-
nine" (i.e., our efforts to make ourselves attractive to men), and I
advance the hypothesis that femininity is self-deceptive, offering short-

term advantages for w o m e n attempting to make the best of a bad job
under patriarchal constraints.
FEMININITY
In the previous two sections of this essay I have tried to show h o w

evolutionary biology would benefit from attention to issues raised by
feminists. In this section I want to explore h o w evolutionary perspec-
tives might serve feminists in our efforts to understand femininity. What
I want to stress is that evolutionary biology suggests strategies for
women to use in our efforts to gain, regain, and maintain autonomy.
Femininity is controversial within the lives of w o m e n and within
feminist discourse. Two recent protagonists came to my attention after I
had written most of what follows and illustrate just how controversial
the topic is. These w o m e n take opposite stands on femininity. One, a
feminist, free-lance writer, says femininity is an expression of and a
mechanism of women's oppression (Wolf 1991). The other, a psycholo-
gist interviewed on a popular television show, emphasizes the power
that the trappings of femininity provide. I mention these alternative
interpretations and experiences to set the stage for those readers w h o
might not appreciate the power the idea of femininity has in our minds
or the power the practice of femininity has in w o m e n ' s lives. Fashion (as
in fashion magazines, which sell the latest fads in femininity), is political
too. Furthermore, it is often painful (Chapkis 1987). I think the approach
an evolutionary biologist would take to understand femininity should be
useful to feminists. In what follows I outline an approach I would take. I
would first operationally describe what femininity is; I would ask about
how it varies (through time, in modern times, within and between
populations, over the lifetime of individuals, and--for individuals and
populations---under varying ecological circumstances). I would then ask
questions about the functional significance of femininity in terms of the
social organizations in which the traits are expressed. What follows is
my anticipation of some of the answers and would best be read as a
series of working hypotheses about femininity.
Femininity is what w o m e n do to ourselves to make ourselves attrac-
tive to men. Note that my attention is not on the evolution of traits that
make w o m e n attractive to men; rather my attention is on those things
we do to ourselves to make ourselves attractive to men. I am leaving
aside the interesting question of whether our attempts achieve what we
are hoping for. Because fashion varies, descriptions of femininity vary,
often in ways that seem to be arbitrary. Whatever expressions femininity
takes seem to increase the differences between men and women. A

classical ethological approach might profitably view femininity from the
perspective of "baby releasers" and "super normal stimuli" (see the
discussion below). In western culture, femininity is associated with size
(petiteness), color (fairness), increased contrast between w o m e n and
men for such traits as amounts and distribution of body hair and voice
pitch, among others.
Feminist analyses of femininity (e.g., Brownmiller 1984) show that
devices of and behavior associated with femininity restrict w o m e n ' s
freedom to move (to think, to work); sap women's strength; and set up
obstacle courses that rob w o m e n of time, energy, and financial resources
that would productively be used in other ways. I call these aspects of
femininity "hobbling." The "hobbling" standard of femininity raises the
question of the development in men of attraction toward feminine traits.
Why should men find hobbled w o m e n attractive? Evolutionary biolo-
gists probably cannot argue convincingly against the feminist insight
that the functional significance of femininity is to handicap women,
making them more controllable (sexually and economically) and less
competitive with men (think of a highway worker in a dress). This
functional hypothesis strikes me as a testable one, and it raises the very
interesting question of h o w mutable femininity might really be, and the
even more interesting question of what femininity signals.
It is easy to explain the attractive force of some characteristics associ-
ated with femininity that do not seem particularly hobbling. I argue that
shaved legs and underarms, madeup faces, and exaggerated thinness
are neotenic characteristics that signal juvenilization and its attendant
dependence and subordination (for a methodology for additional re-
search, see Gould 1977). Juvenilization decreases the threat some men
may feel w h e n confronted with women; many men are comfortable
around w o m e n w h o m they can clearly dominate and are profoundly
uncomfortable around w o m e n w h o m they cannot so clearly dominate.
The hypothesis that femininity signals ability to be dominated through
juvenilization is an alternative to, but not necessarily mutually exclusive
of, other evolutionary hypotheses that posit that femininity signals,
sometimes deceptively, reproductive value and fertility. Keep in mind
that I am considering "what w o m e n do to ourselves to make ourselves
attractive to men." Thus, I am not making an explicit argument about
the genetic substrate of this variation; I am referring to traits that are
cultural, learned, exclusively facultative, and highly variable.
Apparently, men see juvenilization as feminine. Recently a male
friend told me the Miata (the new, trendy automobile that, like Mickey
Mouse [Gould 1979], is cute) was feminine, something that surprised
me, because ! see the Miata as cute--little and young. It is low to the
ground (has shortened extremities), has an exaggeratedly rounded hood

(flattened nose, chin, and rounded cheeks), and is small relative to other
cars (diminutive), so it elicits responses from many of us that are usually
reserved for "cute" living things. Like most adult mammals, I find cute
things attractive (Darwin 1915). What is curious in this context is that
men find juvenilized women feminine and associate femininity with
sexual attractiveness. The function of this second aspect of femininity
deserves scrutiny, and it might not be different from my functional
explanation for w h y "hobbled" women are attractive to men.
Thus, in my mind there are two classes of traits associated with
femininity, those that hobble and those that juvenilize. Two questions
follow: Are hobbling and juvenilization really attractive to men? If they
are, does this attraction preclude being attracted to other traits (i.e., is
there a fuller suite of attractive traits)?
In m a n y cases the practice of femininity is deceptive. Women contrive
to make men think we are attractive: we force ourselves into thinness (in
western societies), we paint our faces, we modify our voices and behav-
ior. Femininity is also self-deceptive; rarely does a woman who engages
in the rituals of femininity realize that the fashionable nature of femi-
ninity changes, increasing the likelihood that her efforts will become less
and less effective, and that the underlying standard of much of femi-
ninity is "hobbling," making it more difficult for her to move and act
freely. One explanation for the evolution of femininity seems to be that
it offers women a short-term (perhaps a null) advantage in contests over
access to the resources men control.
In some cases, to the evolutionary biologist the variation in hobbling
femininity looks much like frequency-dependent selection, with advan-
tage going to the bearers of the rarer trait. In other cases it appears as if
Zahavi's (1975) handicap principle is at work, in that women who are
able to live and work while bearing the handicap signal their quality
relative to other women. Both of these arguments focus the attention of
evolutionary biologists on the fact that in h u m a n societies, w o m e n
compete for men, as though men were the limiting resource for wom-
en's reproduction, and not the other way around, as it is for Williams's
(1966) typical mammal! Is this h u m a n cultural pattern a patriarchal
perversion?
Women displaying to men is partially explained by the relatively high
level of paternal investment in some h u m a n cultures compared to that of
other primates, but it cannot be the entire explanation. Cross-cultural
and within-culture studies indicate that paternal investment strategies
are highly variable (Lancaster and Kaplan 1991). Furthermore, the num-
ber of female-headed, single-parent families is increasing at an explosive
rate worldwide (Lancaster 1989), in what appears to be a return to,
rather than a departure from, the historic economic role of w o m e n

(Smuts 1989). Women exploit variable strategies in their efforts to gain
access to economic resources, including resources acquired by their male
mates, their own kin, and their o w n efforts (Lancaster 1989). Thus, any
explanation of femininity that d e p e n d s on the relatively high standard
of male parental investment in humans must take into account the
variation in female dependence on male parental investment.
Mildred Dickemann's (1979a, 1979b, 1981) ideas about the effects of
hypergyny (the cultural practice of w o m e n marrying into social classes
above that of their parents) on such cultural practices as claustration (the
secluding, veiling, protecting, defending, and controlling of women)
might profitably be applied to a discussion of the meanings and abuses
of femininity. Dickemann's analyses suggest quite strongly that claus-
tration is associated with concerns about paternity assurance. That is,
claustration serves to increase or guarantee paternity confidence for men
and their intergenerational supporters. One important aspect of claus-
tration should not be forgotten, however: "claustration and veiling are
also prestige matters: the higher the socioeconomic status of the family,
the greater the intensity of the practice, both as regards degrees of
seclusion and of veiling and as regards their duration extending from
the centerpoint of puberty toward the termini of birth and death"
(Dickemann 1981:419). Thus, its strongest manifestations are in the
higher-status groups, in which women's access to resources depends
most strongly on men who provide resources for them. In other words,
w o m e n in these socioeconomic classes may submit more readily to these
practices because of the resources to which it allows them access.
The parallels between claustration and hobbling femininity are strik-
ing. The occurrence and particular manifestations of hobbling femininity
are variable, and its most extreme practice seems to be in the highest
socioeconomic groups. By analogy to claustration, I hypothesize that
hobbling femininity is a result of economic and social variation among
men in their ability to provide paternal investment; the men who control
economic resources can control the reproductive lives of the w o m e n
who submit to or are dominated by them. Hobbling femininity may
therefore be a display through which w o m e n compete for the attention
of resource-controlling men. In these displays, w o m e n who practice
hobbling femininity (unconsciously, self-deceptively, and perhaps de-
ceptively) signal their vulnerability to control or their willingness to be
controlled. Nevertheless, the selective pressure oil females to control
their own sexuality and resources essential for reproduction will also
operate. That resulting dynamic suggests that there will always be
important variation in our societies, and that w o m e n and men should be
able to capitalize on this variation to decrease the power of the patri-
archs.
Women are always the limiting resource for male reproduction, which
means that men will always be attracted to w o m e n - - w h e t h e r w o m e n
are juvenilized or hobbled or not. The traits and strategies of men will
track the traits and strategies of women. Or, individual men will adopt
conditional strategies, finding some w o m e n attractive in some circum-
stances and other w o m e n attractive in others.
Some say, "There's no accounting for taste." I think there is, and I
think women--individually and collectively---can affect the expression
of preferences of men. Empirical evidence of this fact is in the perceived
attractiveness to some men of the many w o m e n w h o forego makeup
and wear sensible shoes and even trousers. Femaleness, frank female-
ness, is attractive to many men. I think it is possible for w o m e n individ-
ually or collectively to avoid the traps of hobbling femininity and juve-
nilizaiton without incurring devastating effects (either economically,
sexually, or reproductively). Certainly in our culture it is now possible
for many middle-class professional w o m e n to emphasize their o w n
abilities to garner resources for themselves, rather than to display vul-
nerability via hobbling or juvenilization. Whether I am right about this
or not, my point is that evolutionary biology suggests strategies for
feminists in our efforts to gain, regain, and maintain autonomy for
women.
The combined perspective of evolutionary biology and feminism also
suggests research in human behavior. Below I describe some of the traits
that I think will characterize an inclusive evolutionary biology, and I
briefly describe a question I think amenable to testing.
RESEARCH IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY

INFORMED BY FEMINIST INSIGHT
Evolutionary biology emphasizes process and variation. Rather than

limiting attention to secondarily derived sexually selected behavior,
such as male-male competition, evolutionary biologists informed by
feminist ideas, experiences, and perspectives also attend to the behav-
ioral causes and consequences of the control by females of their o w n
reproduction, and to the factors that contribute to the lack of female
control when it occurs (Smuts and Smuts 1992). Evolutionary biologists
informed by feminist ideas ask explicitly evolutionary questions, such as
what ecological, phylogenetic, and developmental forces account for the
"evolution of patriarchy" (Smuts 1991).
Research in inclusive evolutionary biology is not motivated by feminist
political goals any more than research in "pop sociobiology" (Kitcher
1985) is motivated by concern to maintain patriarchy. The difference is
that evolutionary biologists informed by feminist ideas--by definition--
are aware of the political sources of some of their o w n theoretical ideas

and of the potential political uses of their results, whereas pop socio-
biologists are generally unconscious participants in status quo political
agendas. Furthermore, unlike pop sociobiologists, evolutionary biolo-
gists informed by feminist ideas are not genetic determinists.
Given this background, ! would like to suggest a topic for study.
Feminists and evolutionary biologists claim that m e n think of w o m e n as
property to be o w n e d and used. The proprietariness of m e n toward
w o m e n seems to arise from the idea that w o m e n are resources for m e n ' s
reproduction. The evidence of proprietariness is e v e r y w h e r e (Daly et al.
1982). Despite its frightening manifestations a n d apparent ubiquity, a n d
despite the fact that violence toward w o m e n becomes a tool of patri-
archal ideology that serves to control w o m e n (even w h e n t h e y are not
direct victims of violence; Brownmiller 1969), it has been m y observation
that m e n are not universally proprietary toward w o m e n . I think this is
something that both feminists and evolutionary biologists forget w h e n
they suggest scenarios of h u m a n evolution. I think it is s o m e t h i n g that
m a n y of those w h o are sensitive to the effects of female victimization
forget too. A n o t h e r feminist once said to me, "All m e n have r a p e d . "
(But, then again, prominent evolutionary biologists also have posited a
sex-specific, species-typical tendency for rape in h u m a n s ; Thornhill and
Thornhill 1991.) I resist this essentialist notion a n d all notions of mono-
lithic character a m o n g w o m e n and men from an evolutionary perspec-
tive, and I hope other feminists and evolutionary biologists will be able
to accept m y a r g u m e n t s on this point.
What I would like to k n o w is, h o w c o m m o n l y do m e n consider
w o m e n property? My question is about within-individual as well as
within- and between-population variation. My predictions about the
answer to this question come from m y hypothesis that m e n ' s attitudes are
shaped by the options they have for associations with w o m e n . I h y p o t h -
esize that the relative vulnerability or invulnerability of w o m e n to direct
coercive control and indirect control via control of resources by males are
the factors contributing to the evolution of relatively more or less propri-
etary men or of facultatively proprietary men. Furthermore, I suspect
that some m e n facultatively adopt conditional strategies in their relation-
ships with w o m e n . It seems most likely to me that individual m e n have
the potential to exhibit variable behaviors d e p e n d i n g on the variable
behavior of w o m e n . I predict that there is quite a range of variation in the
presence or absence of proprietary attitudes of m e n toward w o m e n . I
predict (in the language I used above about varieties of m e n that coevolve
with varieties of women) that " s e x y " (or gynocentric) men w h o coevolve
with w o m e n w h o are able to garner access to essential resources w i t h o u t
help will lack p r o p r i e t a r y attitudes t o w a r d w o m e n . If I a m right, w o m e n

have m a n y options. As m o r e a n d m o r e w o m e n refuse to be treated as
property, m e n will co-vary with w o m e n , a n d p r o p r i e t a r y attitudes will
decrease in frequency.
A c o m p r e h e n s i v e t h e o r y including g y n o c e n t r i c orientations will incor-
porate these i d e a s - - a b o u t selection for females to retain control of their
o w n r e p r o d u c t i o n , their resistance to the efforts of males to w r e s t
control from females, a n d v a r i a t i o n - - i n t o theories of the evolution of
h u m a n social behavior. These h y p o t h e s e s a b o u t the n a t u r e of evolution-
ary process in h u m a n s , apart from the directions for empirical research,
are i m p o r t a n t stories, because t h e y m a y p r o v i d e direction a w a y from the
most d e a d l y p a t h s that h u m a n b e h a v i o r takes. W h e n we tell each o t h e r
stories a b o u t w h e r e we came from, w h o w e are, a n d w h a t w e w a n t , w e
s h o u l d r e m e m b e r that existing variations in behavioral alternatives---
including those variations w e imagine---are essential to the evolution of
a future free of sexist o p p r e s s i o n for both m e n a n d w o m e n .
! thank Jane Lancaster first for facilitating my writing about these issues; I've
intended to do this since 1983. I thank the bluebird watchers in my lab, Nancy
Buschhaus, Dale Droge, Nadine Nienhuis, Jon Plissner, and Steve Wagner, for
reading and commenting on my first draft. I thank Gabe Acebo, Lee Drickamer,
John Endler, John Gittleman, Russell Gray, Marion Petrie, Vicki Sorbel, Bob
Warner, and Darrell Yardley for useful comments on a second draft. My greatest
debt is to readers Jeanne Altmann, Gordon Burghardt, David Crews, Jerry
Downhower, Jane Lancaster, Barbara Smuts, Judy Stamps, and Marlene Zuk,
whose critical insights improved my efforts enormously. Most of all I thank
Gabe Acebo for his continuing creative support. I wrote this article while funded
by a Research Scientist Development Award (NIMH).
Patricia Adair Gowaty studies the evolution of social behavior, particularly mating systems
and sex allocation, primarily in birds. She is most well-known for her long-term studies of
eastern bluebirds, which began in 1977 and are on-going. She was an undergraduate at H.
Sophie Newcomb College of Tulane University (1963-1967). In the late sixties and early
seventies, while employed at the Bronx Zoo (New York Zoological Society), she belonged
to a feminist "consciousness-raising" group. She started graduate school in 1974 at the
University of Georgia and received her Ph.D. from Clemson University (1980). She had a
postdoctoral position at the University of Oklahoma (1982-1983) and a visiting faculty
position at Cornell University through the Visiting Professorships for Women NSF pro-
gram (1983-1984) before returning to her bluebird study sites at Clemson in 1985. She has
supported herself and her research efforts throughout her academic career on a series of
awards and grants. She is currently (1990--1995)supported by a Research Scientist Devel-
opment Award from The National Institute of Mental Health.
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EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AND FEMINISM

Patricia Adair Gowaty

Evolutionary biology and feminism share a variety of philosophical and

KEY WOROS: Evolutionary biology; Feminism; Sexual selection; Deceit;

Evolutionary biology and feminism have much in common. It is m y

WHAT IS FEMINISM? WHAT IS

Feminism is a movement to end sexist oppression (Hooks 1984). Femi-

a n d exposing h o w g e n d e r e d perspectives function in the m a i n t e n a n c e

. . . feminism raises issues that concern personal autonomy and

T h e r e are m a n y expressions of feminist political theory, b o t h formal

(Prigogine 1980). Feminism is evolving. It is not static, or monolithic. I

mostly by white, western men in postindustrial societies suggests that

"THAT'S NOT WHAT I MEANT"

spiracy against women. I find this analogy liberating because it relieves

I have often been stuck by similarities in the conceptual development of

Variation and Evolution

Darwin's idea about the premier mechanism of evolution, natural

an essence or an intrinsic invariant nature, which serves to define their

etc.). And, behavioral biologists are giving more empirical attention to

Variation and Feminism

What does variation have to do with feminism? H o w do evolutionary

economically dependent. Limited economic options have focused femi-

for some, feminists unmodified (MacKinnon 1987). We are uniting

CONTROL OF FEMALE REPRODUCTION

Feminist ideas about autonomy in the lives of w o m e n relate to promi-

The Battles of the Sexes

Autonomy and control by w o m e n of sexuality and economic re-

tionally do is use women in attempts to increase their o w n direct control

w o m e n has suffered erasure and attempted erasure and is distorted

Female Choice and Anti-Female Choice

Along with the insights of natural selection, Darwin taught us about

what maintains its standing. A more inclusive list of behavioral mecha-

reproductive competition is a matter among males, a conceptualization

Evolutionary thinkers, whether informed by feminist ideas or not, are

tion or reproductive success need not be a mechanism in sexual selec-

control; noncoercing males will track females more resistant to coercive

have mentioned to me that they see no evidence in the species they

Feminists have realized that patriarchal ideology is deceptive in that its

conscious conspiracy, but as I discussed above, the outcome of the

on males to control female reproduction and the equally strong selection

advance the hypothesis that femininity is self-deceptive, offering short-

In the previous two sections of this essay I have tried to show h o w

takes seem to increase the differences between men and women. A

ground (has shortened extremities), has an exaggeratedly rounded hood

rather than a departure from, the historic economic role of w o m e n

RESEARCH IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY

Evolutionary biology emphasizes process and variation. Rather than

are aware of the political sources of some of their o w n theoretical ideas

help will lack p r o p r i e t a r y attitudes t o w a r d w o m e n . If I a m right, w o m e n

An Evolutionary Approach, second ed., J. R. Krebs and N. B. Davies, eds. Pp.

Rosenblatt, M. Milinski, and C. T. Snowdon, eds. New York: Academic

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