The Nature of Human Character A Socratic Perspective

One of my mentors ranked these three things in order of importance:

1. Character
2. Network
3. Knowledge/Skills

I got very interested in why we value “good” character so much. What even is a “good” character? What
are the fundamental ideas that shape our character? Do all humans have an instinct to benefit
themselves?

Socrates is a philosopher who answered a lot of these questions. First, let's figure out who he is.

 Socrates was a classical Greek philosopher who developed a lot of the fundamentals of modern
Western philosophy, along with his students Plato and Aristole.
 Socrates was a strange guy. Imagine a barefoot, muscular, thick-set man, with a snub nose and
heavy brows walking around and talking to you about wisdom, happiness, and philosophy? Yeah,
this was Socrates
 “An unexamined life is not worth living” — Socrates believed that the purpose of life was to grow
spiritually, and philosophically. This is why he questioned all values and beliefs in order to
determine if they were the correct ones.
 He was sentenced to death for “corrupting the youth of Athens”. He was teaching them to question
everything like government, god, among other things.
 Socrates was in constant search for definitions. He was very keen on developing knowledge. His
way of finding a definition was often the same:
 He would try to get a person — who claims to be knowledgeable in the field Socrates is trying to
find answers in — to discuss what an appropriate definition of the topic would be.
 This back and forth between Socrates and the other person would frequently take place in the
market square in Athens or in a private home. In many of Socrates’ discussions, a number of other
people would also take part and contribute different amounts of input to the debate.

 Through lots of pondering and debating, he formulated views around evil, good, virtue,
happiness and knowledge.

The virtue of human character

 A virtue is a trait or quality that is deemed to be morally (discipline of a person) good. Examples of
these are things like honesty, courage, compassion, generosity, and integrity.
 The virtue of human character is the central focus of Socrates’ perspective. Good living
through good character was the holy grail of Socrates’ ideal of the examined life.
 Socrates believed that knowledge is the fundamental good and the governing dynamic of all
human action.
 The ability to allow knowledge to influence our world view and behavior is the fundamental good
that makes all other human goods stand up and live. It is necessary to practice seeking knowledge
and seek improvement of our human character for the rest of our lives.

A Socratic View of Wrongdoing

 Socrates’ claim that nobody does wrong knowingly
 Morality- in one way or another addresses the human capacity to identify and choose between
right and wrong and then to act accordingly.
  Socrates believed that nobody willingly chooses to do wrong.
 He maintained that doing wrong always harmed the person doing it and that nobody seeks harm
on themselves. Because of this, all wrongdoing is the result of ignorance.
 This means that it is impossible for a human being to willingly do wrong because their instinct for
self-interest prevents them from doing so. If you have the knowledge to know what is good then
you will practice that.

Self-Interest and Morality

 The difference between objective knowledge and our personal intuitive insight into our own well
being is important.
 For example, people can know that stealing is wrong, but they experience a benefit through
theft that makes them feel the wrongful action results in obtaining some good, which
improves their lives.
 Psychological principle -is that there is no motive for committing actions that are right or
wrong, which bring no perceived benefit. If we keep the distinction between the ends and
means clear, we see that nobody commits an act for the sake of the wrong involved but with
a view to obtaining the perceived benefit or good.
 It is also our nature to see that which harms us as being bad and wrong. We may
objectively see that some particular circumstances may harm us in some way, but calculate
what is of overall benefit according to the character of our self-interest.

The Recognition of Evil

 Human evil is usually measured in terms of the intensity of its destructive result without
regard to understanding its nature. This makes no sense.
 Lets say you went to a doctor with a headache and the doctor just gave you aspirin for your pain
but failed to discover that the cause of the pain was a brain tumour. The identity of the problem is
not the pain, which is just a symptom. The identity of the problem is the tumour that causes pain.
This is the exact same way that the identity of human evil is in the cause of behaviours that harm
not in the harm itself.

 This Socratic perspective says that evil behaviour is evil because it is born of ignorance and fear,
not because of the relative measure of its harm.

Character and Knowledge

 Socrates lecturing others about knowledge and its power.
 For Socrates, wrongdoing through ignorance is the only harm and knowledge is the only
good.
 Socrates believed that the only life worth living is a life that is persistent in seeking good
character.
 In Socrates’ view, knowledge and character are developmentally linked. Both a pure lack of
knowledge. Essentially, ignorance = wrongdoing = harmful to human character.
 In this Socratic perspective, our potential for developing good character depends on the quality of
our practice of seeking to put reasoning and knowledge at the center of everything we do.
 Socrates’ theories helped me better understand that the ideal life recognizes there is a need for
daily practise and exercise to our ethical reasoning in order to strengthen our human character.
PLATO (428-348 b.C.)
Summary of his thought
  Plato conceives man as a compound of two different substances: the body, which ties us to the
sensible world and the soul,
 the soul - which removes us from this material sphere and relates us to a superior world.
 Human soul - is understood as immortal and it has a superior destiny than the body. This
superiority comes from the fact that the soul (contrary to the body) is, in essence, a rightness and
knowledge principle and moreover, the body is ruled by corruption and death whereas the soul is
immortal.
 Plato uses several arguments to demonstrate the immortality of the soul, emphasizing the one that
rests on the reminiscence theory: in his dialogue titled "Meno", Plato defends the thesis that TO
KNOW is TO REMEMBER: we do not have a genuine knowledge experience (of the universal
being): when we say a mathematical proposition is true, it is not because we have just learned it,
but rather because we remember the relations between the Ideas our soul knew in the world of the
Ideas before incarnating in our body.
 THEORY OF the REMINISCENCE- The perception of the sensible world cannot serve as
foundation for strict knowledge but, since we have such knowledge, it must come from a previous
experience.to know is to update a knowledge already experienced, to know is to remember.
 Plato defends the soul is a principle of movement in itself and a movement source.

Plato distinguishes three elements or functions in the human soul:

1. the rational element - is represented in the myth of the winged carriage by the
coachman, is the most dignified and elevated; its functions are the intellectual knowledge
and the direction and guide of the other two.
2. the irascible element- (quick tempered), represented by the good and beautiful horse,
symbol of the strength and the Will, which is easily leaded.
3. the concupiscent element -(immoderate or hot-headed), represented by the bad horse,
hard to guide, which symbolizes the immoderate desire and sensible passions.

 Plato’s anthropological dualism is characterized by a radical split in human being:

following the Orphic doctrine.
Plato declares there are two principles in human being;
 The immortal SOUL, our most divine part, principle of knowledge and morals.
 The BODY, the reason of our ignorance and our wrongness.
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 virtue, which means basically to sacrifice body desires, and secondly the practice
of philosophy.
 The purpose of moral and intellectual purification is to let the souls be guided by
rightness and straightness and thus fulfil their fundamental destiny:
 the divine dwelling - where they lived before; on the contrary, the impure ones,
those who let their uncontrolled passions rule their behaviour will have to undergo a
judgment and will be condemned to wander an mistake indefinitely, paying thus
their faults in life.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF THE THEORY OF THE IDEAS FOR ETICS AND
POLITICS
a) The virtue- The theory of the Ideas implies the overcoming of the sophistic moral
relativism: the Ideas of Justice and Rightness become the perfect criteria for distinguishing right
from wrong or fair from unfair. The Ideas are values themselves. Plato’s ethics tries to find out
what is the Highest Rightness for man, Rightness whose attainment implies happiness and which
is achieved by the practice of virtue.

 The Highest Rightness can be understood in two ways: a good life cannot be achieved
neither by the only means of moderate pleasures nor by the only means of wisdom, but by
a mixture of both, simply because man is a mixture of animal and intelligence.
 Highest Rightness - means contemplating the Ideas, contemplation which is the
supreme happiness.
 By means of the practice of virtue we achieve the Highest Rightness and, therefore,
the supreme happiness.
 Virtue- is the natural disposition for rightness of our souls

Souls have three elements there will be three peculiar virtues.

1. self-control -for the concupiscent element: "certain order and moderation of the
pleasures.
2. strength or braveness for the irascible element: the strength allows man surpasses
suffering and sacrifices pleasures if necessary;
3. wisdom or prudence - for the rational element, which rules the whole human
behavior.
 The virtue of the soul as a whole is justice, which settles order and harmony between
those three elements.

 Theory of the Ideas: virtue is the knowledge of what is right for man or, better, the
knowledge of the Idea of Rightness, and is mainly identified with wisdom or prudence.

b) The king-philosopher- Plato thinks man is naturally a social being; that’s why there are States
(Polis).
 The individual can reach his utmost accomplishment in the State, but only in a perfect State.

Plato divides the State or society in three classes following the three elements of the soul; the
State is a great organism with the same material and immaterial requirements and ethical aims as man
.

1. the governors- rational element of the soul

2. the soldiers- the irascible element
3. the craftsmen- the concupiscent element

 The philosophers, whose particular virtue is wisdom or prudence, are the only ones capable for
government; the soldiers, whose virtue is the strength, must defend and keep safe the polis; the
craftsmen, whose virtue is self-control, provide the commodities needed in the State.

 The aim of the State is justice

  natural philosophers guide society ruled by their superior knowledge; philosophers have to be
governors or governors have to be philosophers; of course, philosophers do not seek their own
interests but the community’s.
c) The "platonic Communism- Philosophers must seek the general welfare and so, trying to
avoid temptations and useless distractions, they neither have private property nor family; their
main purpose is wisdom which enables them to carry out their mission of government.
 Soldiers also sacrifice family and private property, only the craftsmen are allowed to them
(though limited and controlled by the State).
 Craftsmen do not need education, except the professional for their own tasks, and they
must obey political powers.

Plato describes and assesses the actual forms of government: there are five, but they all
come from the monarchy or aristocracy:

 military dictatorship, oligarchy, democracy and, the worse of all, tyranny. Monarchy or
aristocracy is the most perfect form of government: is the government of the best
individuals.

Enumerate and define briefly the three types of Greek citizens

. The 3 Greek citizens
▪︎The Idiots- A class of people
whose primary goal is maximizing personal gain by cutting corners at every turn and
overlooking ethical issues. They embezzle the national treasury in the name of development
as long as it helps their bottom line.

 The Tribalist - The tribal people has no way a reference to the fact of belonging to a
particular tribe or nationality. Belonging to a specific tribe is a natural thing, something to be proud
of and good. Tribal people, in this particular context, is a reference to a tribalist
mentality.
 The Citizen- The citizen describes the ideal or perfect class of people.Citizen, in this context, does
not refer to the legal or political status of a person as weunderstand it. Instead, the tag citizen
embodies the very idea and ideals of citizenship.

2. Differentiate virtue from vice. Give one example for each.

 Virtue is defined as: behavior showing high moral standards and vice on the other hand is
referred to as immoral or wicked behaviour.Vice is just a bad habit. It can either be a sin or virtue
or something completely irrelevant. For instance if you always bothered on focusing mobile or
online games all the time and forgetting to do some vital things such as studying and improving
yourself is neither sin nor virtue but it is a bad habit nonetheless. However, vice is commonly
associated with wickedness, immorality and personal immoral practices that affecting in our
behavior, and characteristics. On the other hand virtue when say virtue it is connected on our
deeds where has a good impact within self for example if I am always did my schoolwork and
didn’t to do some unnecessary things such as playing mobile and online games this act is
 classified as virtue wherein I rationally think if what is necessary or vital wherein help to set
myself on much good aspect.

3. Give the three types of Greek citizens. Write opposite eqach type the virtue they should
possess.
 The Ediots – they are self-centered and altruistic always looking out for their own gain and self-
interest. The lack of public philosophy. knowledge, and skill is very evident to this class of people.
Idiots do not have the virtue and the character to make a meaningful contribution towards the
flourishing of society and community.For the idiots, it is all about their own pleasures
andtreasures. According to the Greeks, the idiots wereno more than upgraded barbarians.
 The Tribalists- as a class of people who are not able to think beyond their small tribe or group.
For the tribespeople, their primary and ultimate allegiance is to their tribe.Their tribe is their God,
and their religion istribalism. They are bound to their local area and very narrow-minded.
▪︎The Citizen- they are well-equlipped with the knowledge and skills to live a respectable life in the realm
of the public. A citizen recognizes oneself as a member of the Commonwealth. The citizen has an
understanding and experience of civility, which fuels and striving for the common good of the nation or the
country. The citizen has a practical understanding of his rights in society. This class of people also
recognize that with these rights and freedoms, come responsibilities.

4. What is a virtuous person according to Aristotle?

 A virtuous person is person who have character qualities that lead to human flourishing. One
example, might be courage. If one certain person has a courage within her /his self it a good
manner aiming to act optimistically . Aristotle thought that virtues or vices were universal because
of their natural tendency toward realizing the “good”. That is, a virtuous person is one who acts
virtuously, the vices and virtues are part of good “intuition” of sorts on behalf of the virtuous
person. This has downstream effects in that somewhat who is not virtuous is also not properly
“rational” in a certain sense and thus makes more mistakes in perceiving the world than someone
who is not.
Basically virtues are virtuous because they are grounded in our human nature, and those
who act in accordance with the proper function of humans are those who are virtuous.
Thus, someone who is acting virtuously also becomes one who, ultimately lives the good
life and obtains happiness insofar as it is possible
ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS
Andrew Fisher and Mark Dimmock
To seek virtue for the sake of reward is to dig for iron with a spade of gold. – Ivan Panin

Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Introduction

 Aristotle (384–322 BC) was a scholar in disciplines such as ethics, metaphysics, biology and botany,
among others. It is fitting, therefore, that his moral philosophy is based around assessing the broad
characters of human beings rather than assessing singular acts in isolation. Indeed, this is what separates
Aristotelian Virtue Ethics from both Utilitarianism and Kantian Ethics.

The Function Argument

 Aristotle was a teleologist, a term related to, but not to be confused with, the label “teleological” as applied
to normative ethical theories such as Utilitarianism.
 Aristotle was a teleologist because he believed that every object has what he referred to as a final cause
 Telos refers to what we might call a purpose, goal, end or true final function of an object.
  Aristotle claims that “ all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the
function”.
 Aristotle’s claim is essentially that in achieving its function, goal or end, an object achieves its own good.
 Aristotle believes human beings have a telos. Aristotle identifies what the good for a human being is in virtue
of working out what the function of a human being is, as per his Function Argument.
Function Argument
1. All objects have a telos.
2. An object is good when it properly secures its telos.
Given the above, hopefully these steps of the argument are clear so far. At this point, Aristotle directs his
thinking towards human beings specifically.
3. The telos of a human being is to reason.
4. The good for a human being is, therefore, acting in accordance with reason.

True function, Aristotle looks to that feature that separates humanity from other living animals. According to
Aristotle, what separates humankind from the rest of the world is our ability not only to reason but to act on reasons.

 The notion that humanity has a true function may sound odd, particularly if you do not have a
religious worldview of your own.

Aristotelian Goodness
 The good life for a human being is achieved when we act in accordance with our telos.
 Aristotle uses the Greek term eudaimonia to capture the state that we experience if we fully achieve a
good life.
 eudaimonia is the state that all humans should aim for as it is the aim and end of human existence.
 eudaimonia understood as flourishing is perhaps the most helpful translation and improves upon a simple
translation of happiness.
 Aristotle concludes that a life is eudaimon (adjective of eudaimonia)
 Eudaimonia is secured not as the result exercising of our physical or animalistic qualities but as the result of
the exercise of our distinctly human rational and cognitive aspects.

Eudaimonia and Virtue

 According to Aristotle, virtues are character dispositions or personality traits.
 This focus on our dispositions and our character, rather than our actions in isolation, is what earns
Aristotelian Virtue Ethics the label of being an agent- centered moral theory rather than an act-centered
moral theory.

Act-Centered Moral Theories

 Utilitarianism and Kantian Ethics are two different examples of act-centered moral theories due to their
focus on actions when it comes to making moral assessments and judgments.
 Act-centered moral theories may be teleological or deontological, absolutist or relativist, but they share a
common worldview in that particular actions are bearers of moral value — either being right or wrong.

Agent-Centered Moral Theories

 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics is an agent-centered theory in virtue of a primary focus on people and their
characters rather than singular actions.
 Aristotle, morality has more to do with the question “how should I be?” rather than “what should I do?”
 Aristotle refers to virtues as character traits or psychological dispositions.
 Virtues are those particular dispositions that are appropriately related to the situation and, to link back to our
function, encourage actions that are in accordance with reason.
 For Aristotle, virtue is not a feeling itself but an appropriate psychological disposition in response to that
feeling; the proper response.
 The correct response to a feeling is described as acting on the basis of the Golden Mean, a response that is
neither excessive nor deficient. The table below makes this more apparent.
Feeling/Emotion Vice of Deficiency Virtuous Disposition Vice of Excess
 (Golden Mean)
Anger Lack of spirit Patience Irascibility
Shame Shyness Modesty Shamefulness
Fear Cowardice Courage Rashness
Indignation Spitefulness Righteousness Envy
 Anger is a feeling and therefore is neither a virtue nor a vice.
 Virtues are not feelings, but characteristic dispositional responses that, when viewed holistically, define our
characters and who we are.
 The Golden Mean ought not to be viewed as suggesting that a virtuous disposition is always one that gives
rise to a “middling” action.

Aristotle also suggests that we may virtuously respond to situations. He suggests the following examples
Feeling/Emotion Vice of Deficiency Virtuous Disposition Vice of Excess
(Golden Mean)
Social conduct Cantankerousness Friendliness Self-serving flattery
Conversation Boorishness Wittiness Buffoonery
Giving money Stinginess Generosity Profligacy
Developing the Virtues
 In a quote widely attributed to Aristotle, Will Durrant (1885–1981) sums up the Aristotelian view by saying
that “…we are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act but a habit”.
 Aristotle holds that the same is true for human beings attempting to develop their virtuous character traits in
attempt to live the good life.
 Cultivating a virtuous character is something that happens by practice.
 the virtuous individual will become comfortable in responding to feelings/situations virtuously just as the good
builder becomes comfortable responding to the sight of various tools and a set of plans.

Practical Wisdom (Phronesis)

 Aristotle does offer some specifics regarding how exactly we might, to use a depressingly modern phrase,
“upskill” in order to become more virtuous.
 by developing our skill of practical wisdom (translation of “phronesis”) that we become better at ascertaining
what exactly courage or generosity amounts to in a specific situation and how exactly we might achieve it.
 developing the skill of practical wisdom, we can properly put our virtuous character traits into practice.
 Aristotelian, practical wisdom may actually be the most important virtuous disposition or character trait to
develop as without the skill of practical wisdom it may be difficult to actually practice actions that are witty
rather than boorish, or courageous rather than cowardly.
 practical wisdom supports our instinctive knowledge of how to respond virtuously to various feelings,
emotions and situations.

Voluntary Actions, Involuntary Actions and Moral Responsibility

1. Voluntary actions
2. Involuntary actions
 an action is voluntary when it is freely chosen and involuntary when it is not — these terms are more
precisely defined next, in line with Aristotle’s ideas.
 According to Aristotle, an action is voluntary unless it is affected by force or ignorance, as understood in the
following ways.
Physical Force
 Imagine that Reuben is driving his car on his way home from work. Out of the blue, his passenger grabs his
hand and forces him to turn the steering wheel, sending the car into oncoming traffic. Without this physical
force, Reuben would not have turned the wheel and he very much regrets the damage that is caused.
According to Aristotle, Reuben’s action is involuntary because of this external physical force and so he is not
morally responsible for the crash.

Psychological Force
  Think of David, working at a bank when a group of thieves break in armed with guns. David is told that if he
does not open the safe then he will be killed. Under this extreme psychological pressure, Aristotle would
accept that David’s opening of the safe is involuntary, because David would not have opened the safe
otherwise and he very much regrets doing so. On this basis, David is not morally responsible in any way for
the theft.
 In addition to force, ignorance of a certain type can also support an action being labelled as involuntary.
Action from Ignorance
 Rhys, a talented musician, wishes to perform a surprise concert for a friend and has been
practicing songs from the Barry Manilow back catalogue for weeks. However, in the days
before the surprise concert his friend, unbeknown to Rhys, develops an intense and very
personal dislike for Manilow. Thus, when Rhys takes to the stage and blasts out his rendition of
the classic tune “Copacabana” his friend storms off in much distress. In this situation, Aristotle
would accept that Rhys acted involuntarily when causing offence because he was unaware of
the changed circumstances; he acted from ignorance when performing the song rather than
from malice. Without this epistemic (or knowledge-related) barrier, Rhys would not have acted
as he did and he very much regrets the distress caused. For these reasons, Rhys bears no
moral responsibility for the upset resulting from his song choice.
 Aristotle does not allow that all action that involves ignorance can be classed as involuntary,
thereby blocking associated claims of moral responsibility.

Action in Ignorance
 Laurence has had too much to drink and chooses to climb a traffic light with a traffic cone on his
head. Laurence’s alcohol consumption has made him ignorant, at least temporarily, of the
consequences of this action in terms of social relationships, employment and police action.
However, for Aristotle this would not mean that his action was involuntary because Laurence acts
in ignorance rather than from ignorance due to an external epistemic (or knowledge-based) barrier.
Laurence does not, therefore, escape moral responsibility as a result of his self-created ignorance.
 Finally, Aristotle also identifies a third form of action — non-voluntary action — that is also related
to ignorant action.

Action from Ignorance with No Regret

Objections to Virtue Ethics and Responses
Objection: Unclear Guidance
 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics, you may find cold comfort from suggestions that you act generously,
patiently and modestly whilst avoiding self-serving flattery and envy.
 Virtue Ethics may therefore be accused of being a theory, not of helpful moral guidance, but of
unhelpful and non- specific moral platitudes.
 Hursthouse suggests that Virtue Ethics provides guidance in the form of “v-rules”. These are
guiding rules of the form
“do what is honest” or “avoid what is envious”.
 “v-rules”.- These rules may not be specific, but they do stand as guidance across lots of
different moral situations. These rules may not be specific, but they do stand as guidance
across lots of different moral situations.

Objection: Clashing Virtues

 Related to the general objection from lack of guidance, a developed objection may question
how we are supposed to cope with situations in which virtues seem to clash.
 To this particular objection, the Aristotelian virtue ethicist can invoke the concept of practical
wisdom and suggest that the skilled and virtuous person will appropriately respond to complex
moral situations.
  Virtue ethicists have no interest in the creation of a codified moral rule book covering all
situations and instead put the onus on the skill of the virtuous person when deciding how to act.

Objection: Circularity
An entirely different objection to Aristotelian Virtue Ethics is based on a concern regarding logical
circularity. According to Aristotle, the following statements seem to be correct:
1. An act is virtuous if it is an act that a virtuous person would commit in that circumstance. 2. A person
is virtuous when they act in virtuous ways.

 circular reasoning - If virtuous actions are understood in terms of virtuous people, but virtuous
people are understood in terms of virtuous actions, then we have unhelpfully circular reasoning.
1. Great piano playing is what great pianists do.
2. A pianist is great when he “does” great piano playing.

Objection: Contribution to Eudaimonia

 The final distinct objection to Aristotelian Virtue Ethics considered in this chapter stems from
the Aristotelian claim that living virtuously will contribute to our ability to secure a eudaimon life.
 A challenge to this view may be based on the fact that certain dispositions may seem to be
virtuous but may not actually seem to contribute to our flourishing or securing the good life.
ASASASSASS
As an example of this possible objection in practice, consider the following. Shelley is often described as
generous to a fault and regularly dedicates large amounts of her time to helping others to solve problems
at considerable cost, in terms of both time and effort, to herself. Working beyond the limits that can
reasonably be expected of her, we may wish to describe Shelley as virtuous given her generous
personality. However, by working herself so hard for others, we may wonder if Shelley is unduly limiting
her own ability to flourish.

Moral Good and Individual Good

 For Aristotle, moral goodness and individual goodness may seem to be intimately linked. After all, a
virtuous person will be charitable and friendly etc. and as a result of these characteristics and
dispositions will both advance their own journey towards eudaimonia and make life better for others.
 Hedonism (which claims that pleasure is the only source of well-being.
 hedonists do not therefore live according to their telos or true function.
 Aristotle says of his ideally virtuous person that they will have a unified psychology — that their
rational and non-rational psychologies will speak with one voice.
 the non-virtuous person will have a psychology in conflict between their rational and non-rational
elements. In considering who has the better life from their own individual perspectives — the happy
Hedonist or the Aristotelian virtuous person — you should again form your own reasoned judgment.

Aristotle does not suggest that living a virtuous life is sufficient to guarantee a state of eudaimonia for a
person. External factors such as poverty, disease or untimely death may scupper a person’s advance
towards eudaimonia. However, for Aristotle, being virtuous is necessary for the achievement of
eudaimonia; without the development of virtues it is impossible for a person to flourish even if they
avoid poverty, disease, loneliness etc.

Summary
 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics is very different in nature to the other act-centered normative moral theories
considered in this book. Whether this, in itself, is a virtue or a vice is an issue for your own judgment. The
 lack of a codified and fixed moral rule book is something many view as a flaw, while others perceive it as the
key strength of the theory. Some, meanwhile, will feel uncomfortable with Aristotle’s teleological claims,
differing from those who are happy to accept that there is an objectively good life that is possible for human
beings. Regardless, there is little doubt that Aristotelian Virtue Ethics offers a distinct normative moral picture
and that it is a theory worthy of your reflections.

1. Give the etymological and formal definition of character. *

▪︎Etymological Definition -character” is derived from the Greek charaktêr, which was originally
used of a mark impressed upon a coin. Later and more generally, “character” came to mean a
distinctive mark by which one thing was distinguished from others, and then primarily to mean the
assemblage of qualities that distinguish one individual from another. In modern usage, this
emphasis on distinctiveness or individuality tends to merge “character” with “personality.”
▪︎Formal Definition-the totality of an individual's attributes and personality traits, particularly his or
her characteristic moral, social, and religious attitudes and the aggregate of features and traits
that form the individual nature of some person or thing. one such feature or trait; characteristic.
moral or ethical quality.
2. Define virtue and happiness and explicate the relationship between them. *
▪︎Happiness”, it is experience of joy, contentment, or positive well-being, combined with a sense
that one's life is good, meaningful, and worthwhile.”
▪︎Virtues it is a character strengths—such as generosity, loyalty, and honesty—that make it
possible for people to pursue worthwhile goals behavior showing high moral standards.
A happy life must give a prominent place to the exercise of virtue, for virtuous traits of character
are stable and enduring and are not products of fortune, but of learning or cultivation, virtuous
traits of character are excellences of the human being in that they are the best exercise of
reason. Living well or happiness is our ultimate end in that a conception of happiness serves to
organize our various subordinate ends, by indicating the relative importance of our ends and by
indicating how they should fit together into some rational overall scheme.Happiness is related to
virtue by means that virtue is something that he/she likes to do like vices; it makes him/her happy.
Lastly, happiness is related to pleasure because pleasure surely makes a person happy because
it is something that a person always wants but happiness is not pleasure, nor is it virtue. It is the
exercise of virtue. Happiness depends on acquiring a moral character, where one displays the
virtues of courage, generosity, justice, friendship, and citizenship in one's life. These virtues
involve striking a balance or "mean" between an excess and a deficiency.

3. What are the views on virtue according to dthe following Greek philosophers? *
3.1. ▪ Socrates -Socrates, virtue is knowledge, because:
□all living things aim for their perceived good; and therefore
□if anyone does not know what is good, he cannot do what is good -- because he will always aim
for a mistaken target.
□ if someone knows what is good, he will do what is good, because he will
 . For Socrates, it is wisdom that does the “purifying” necessary for the other virtues. Justice
needs courage to flourish, and courage requires modesty and so on. What all these
interdependent
3.2. Plato – virtue is on based eudaemonistic conception of ethics. That is to say,
happiness or well-being eudaimonia is the highest aim of moral thought and conduct,
and the virtues excellenceare the requisite skills and dispositions needed to attain it.
 According to Plato, virtue primarily takes on four separate components that are
necessary for a person to have moral standards
 According to Plato “virtue is a kind of mental health or beauty or fitness and vice a kind
of illness or deformity or weakness .He treated virtue in this light. It needs to be noted here
that for a better and enlightened polis Plato combined psychology with politics.
3.3. Aristotle -defines virtue is a disposition to behave in the right manner and as a mean
between extremes of deficiency and excess, which are vices. We learn moral virtue
primarily through habit and practice rather than through reasoning and instruction.
 Aristotle describes virtues in two types, one of character and another of
thought. Virtues of character include things like bravery, temperance, and
generosity, while virtues of thought include wisdom and prudence.
 According to Aristotle, virtues are character dispositions or personality traits.
This focus on our dispositions and our character, rather than our actions in
isolation, is what earns Aristotelian Virtue Ethics the label of being an agent-
centered moral theory rather than an act-centered moral theory.

4. Who are the Stoics? What is their perspective on virtue and virtuous life? Do you thinks ther
are people nowadays who are like the Stoics? If yes, who are they *
The Stoics have a view of character that is close to Socrates’, but they reach it through
agreement with Aristotle they are assume that the good life for human beings is a life in accord
with nature. They agree with Aristotle that the human being’s essence is a life in accord with
reason. Stoics elaborated a detailed taxonomy of virtue, dividing virtue into four main types:
wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation. I think there are some people like stoics today who
are promoting ,division of virtue , they are the people who have emotions, but only for the things
in this world that really matter they are also a humanitarian who always did spontaneous act
Remember , Gina Lopes ,she had a modest like a stoics who promotes foster in senvironment
badly she passed away , we have all rights to be stoics by having a solidarity promoting one set
of goals, we could set our society having a virtue of ,wisdom, justice ,courage ,and moderation
we are all hope of our society the entire world rather let unify our harmonious relationship.
5. What are the conceptions of the following philosophers on virtue and virtuous life?
5.1 ▪︎Early naturalists -virtue sometimes came under strong criticism tended to assimilate
virtue to continence, they still admitted that that there was an area of moral life in which motive
and character mattered.
5.2 Immanuel Kant -virtue is a kind of strength and resoluteness of will to resist and overcome
5.3 David Hume-virtue ethics is understood as response-dependent, being grounded in an
emotional kind of “moral sense” as suitably objective and as conforming to his basic empiricism.
• Hume distinguishes between virtue and vice. Hume claims these moral distinctions are
impressions, not ideas. While the impression of virtue is pleasure, the impression of vice is pain.
These moral impressions are only the result of human action and cannot be caused by inanimate
objects or animals
• Moral virtue is undoubtedly pleasing to us, sometimes powerfully so, but it does not
command a unique form of respect or reverence. Neither do the rules and ideals of morality,
which spring from the same propensities, ideas, and passions that drive the rest of human
behaviour.
5.4 Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill-states that people love virtue only because it constitutes a
part of happiness Anything that is desired beyond being a means to happiness is desired
because it is part of happiness.
5.5 T. H. Green- a person’s good consists in his “self-satisfaction” or “self-realization.” To
realize the self requires that one fully develop his capacities as a rational agent.
5.6 John Rawls – Rawls indicated a renewed philosophical interest in virtue and character was
defends two principles of justice as regulations for the basic structure of his just society:
(1) the equal liberties principle, according to which each person has the same claim to a fully
adequate scheme of basic liberties.
(2) and a second principle that specifies two conditions that must be satisfied in order for socio-
economic inequalities to be permissible.
6. Enumerate and discuss each of the contemporary questions on virtue/character.
▪︎Marx, Mill, and Rawls suggest how character can be molded by antecedent circumstances –
Marx by economic structures; Mill by paid work, political life, and family relationships; Rawls by
the institutions regulated by the two principles of justice. Yet these insights about the effect of
institutions on character seem to raise other, more troubling questions: if our character is the
result of social and political institutions beyond our control, then perhaps we are not in control of
our characters at all and becoming decent is not a real possibility.This is not to say that changing
one’s character is easy, straightforward, or quickly achieved. If character is formed or malformed
by the structures of political, economic, and family life, then changing one’s character may require
access to the appropriate transforming forces, which may not be available. In modern societies,
for example, many adults still work at alienating jobs that do not afford opportunity to realize the
human powers and to experience the pleasures of self-expression. In a family where economic,
and hence psychological, power is unequal between women and men, affection, as Mill
recognized, may harm both parties.
7. Cite some empirical studies on moral character. What are their findings?
▪︎The challenge posed by situationism-This section give brief discussion of some recent
philosophical work on character that relies on results in experimental social psychology. This
philosophical work calls into question the conceptions of character and virtue that are of concern
especially to the ancient Greek moralists and to contemporary philosophers whose work derives
from ancient views.
▪︎Some replies to situationism- These interpretations of the experiments in social psychology
have been challenged by both psychologists and philosophers, especially by philosophers
working in the tradition of virtue ethics (see related entry on virtue ethics), who claim that the
character traits criticized by situationists have little to do with the conception of character
associated with the ancient and modern moralists.
▪︎Empirical approaches to Aristotelian views of character- it aims to meet the skepticism of the
situationist challenge directly, by developing a theory of virtue grounded in psychological studies
that are compatible with the existence of robust traits. This section provides a brief summary of
two such approaches to virtue.

▪︎The challenge posed by situationism-This section give brief discussion of some recent
philosophical work on character that relies on results in experimental social psychology.
▪︎Some replies to situationism- These interpretations of the experiments in social psychology
have been challenged by both psychologists and philosophers, especially by philosophers
working in the tradition of virtue ethics (see related entry on virtue ethics), who claim that the
character traits criticized by situationists have little to do with the conception of character
associated with the ancient and modern moralists.
▪︎Empirical approaches to Aristotelian views of character- it aims to meet the skepticism of the
situationist challenge directly, by developing a theory of virtue grounded in psychological studies
that are compatible with the existence of robust traits

. Enumerate and define briefly the three types of Greek citizens

. The 3 Greek citizens

 ▪︎The Idiots- A class of people
whose primary goal is maximizing personal gain by cutting corners at every turn and
overlooking ethical issues. They embezzle the national treasury in the name of
development
as long as it helps their bottom line.

▪︎The Tribalist - The tribal people has no

way a reference to the fact of belonging to a
particular tribe or nationality. Belonging to a
specific tribe is a natural thing, something to be proud of and good. Tribal people, in this
particular context, is a reference to a tribalist
mentality.
▪︎The Citizen- The citizen
describes the ideal or perfect class of people.
Citizen, in this context, does not refer to the
legal or political status of a person as we
understand it. Instead, the tag citizen embodies
the very idea and ideals of citizenship.

2. Differentiate virtue from vice. Give one example for each.

▪︎Virtue is defined as: behavior showing high moral standards and vice on the other hand is referred to as
immoral or wicked behaviour.Vice is just a bad habit. It can either be a sin or virtue or something
completely irrelevant. For instance if you always bothered on focusing mobile or online games all
the time and forgetting to do some vital things such as studying and improving yourself is neither sin
nor virtue but it is a bad habit nonetheless. However, vice is commonly associated with wickedness,
immorality and personal immoral practices that affecting in our behavior, and characteristics. On the
other hand virtue when say virtue it is connected on our deeds where has a good impact within self
for example if I am always did my schoolwork and didn’t to do some unnecessary things such as
playing mobile and online games this act is classified as virtue wherein I rationally think if what is
necessary or vital wherein help to set myself on much good aspect.

3. Give the three types of Greek citizens. Write opposite eqach type the virtue they should possess.

▪︎The Ediots – they are self-centered and altruistic always looking out for their own gain
and self-interest. The lack of public philosophy. knowledge, and skill is very evident to
 this class of people. Idiots do not have the virtue and the character to make a meaningful
contribution towards the flourishing of society and community.For the idiots, it is all
about their own pleasures andtreasures. According to the Greeks, the idiots wereno more
than upgraded barbarians.

▪︎The Tribalists- as a class of people who are not able to think beyond their small
tribe or group. For the tribespeople, their primary and ultimate allegiance is to
their tribe.Their tribe is their God, and their religion istribalism. They are bound to
their local area and very narrow-minded.

▪︎The Citizen- they are well-equlipped with the knowledge and skills to live a respectable life in
the realm of the public. A citizen recognizes oneself as a member of the Commonwealth. The
citizen has an understanding and experience of civility, which fuels and striving for the common
good of the nation or the country. The citizen has a practical understanding of his rights in
society. This class of people also recognize that with these rights and freedoms, come
responsibilities.

4. What is a virtuous person according to Aristotle?

A virtuous person is person who have character qualities that lead to human flourishing. One
example, might be courage. If one certain person has a courage within her /his self it a good manner
aiming to act optimistically . Aristotle thought that virtues or vices were universal because of their
natural tendency toward realizing the “good”. That is, a virtuous person is one who acts virtuously, the
vices and virtues are part of good “intuition” of sorts on behalf of the virtuous person. This has
downstream effects in that somewhat who is not virtuous is also not properly “rational” in a certain
sense and thus makes more mistakes in perceiving the world than someone who is not.
Basically virtues are virtuous because they are grounded in our human nature, and those who act in
accordance with the proper function of humans are those who are virtuous. Thus, someone who is
acting virtuously also becomes one who, ultimately lives the good life and obtains happiness insofar
as it is possible.

ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS

Andrew Fisher and Mark Dimmock

To seek virtue for the sake of reward is to dig for iron with a spade of gold.

– Ivan Panin [1]

 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Introduction
Aristotle (384–322 BC) was a scholar in disciplines such as ethics, metaphysics, biology
and botany, among others. It is fitting, therefore, that his moral philosophy is based around
assessing the broad characters of human beings rather than assessing singular acts in
isolation. Indeed, this is what separates Aristotelian Virtue Ethics from both Utilitarianism
and Kantian Ethics.

The Function Argument

Aristotle was a teleologist, a term related to, but not to be confused with, the label
“teleological” as applied to normative ethical theories such as Utilitarianism. Aristotle was a
teleologist because he believed that every object has what he referred to as a final cause.
The Greek term telos refers to what we might call a purpose, goal, end or true final function
of an object. Indeed, those of you studying Aristotle in units related to the Philosophy of
Religion may recognize the link between Aristotle’s general teleological worldview and his
study of ethics.
Aristotle claims that “…for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is
thought to reside in the function”.[2] Aristotle’s claim is essentially that in achieving its
function, goal or end, an object achieves its own good. Every object has this type of a true
function and so every object has a way of achieving goodness. The telos of a chair, for
example, may be to provide a seat and a chair is a good chair when it supports the
curvature of the human bottom without collapsing under the strain. Equally, says Aristotle,
what makes good sculptors, artists and flautists is the successful and appropriate
performance of their functions as sculptors, artists and flautists.
This teleological (function and purpose) based worldview is the necessary backdrop to
understanding Aristotle’s ethical reasoning. For, just as a chair has a true function or end, so
Aristotle believes human beings have a telos. Aristotle identifies what the good for a human being
is in virtue of working out what the function of a human being is, as per his Function Argument.

Function Argument

1. All objects have a telos.

2. An object is good when it properly secures its telos.

Given the above, hopefully these steps of the argument are clear so far. At this point, Aristotle
directs his thinking towards human beings specifically.
3. The telos of a human being is to reason.
4. The good for a human being is, therefore, acting in accordance with reason.

In working out our true function, Aristotle looks to that feature that separates humanity from
other living animals. According to Aristotle, what separates humankind from the rest of the
world is our ability not only to reason but to act on reasons. Thus, just as the function of a
chair can be derived from its uniquely differentiating characteristic, so the function of a
human being is related to our uniquely differentiating characteristic and we achieve the
good when we act in accordance with this true function or telos.
The notion that humanity has a true function may sound odd, particularly if you do not have
a religious worldview of your own. However, to you especially Aristotle wrote that “…as eye,
hand, foot and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down
that man similarly has a function apart from all these?” [3]
On the basis that we would ascribe a function to our constituent parts — we know what
makes a good kidney for example — so too Aristotle thinks it far from unreasonable that
we have a function as a whole. Indeed, this may be plausible if we consider other objects.
The component parts of a car, for example, have individual functions but a car itself, as a
whole, has its own function that determines whether or not it is a good car.

Aristotelian Goodness

On the basis of the previous argument, the good life for a human being is achieved when we act
in accordance with our telos. However, rather than leaving the concept of goodness as general
and abstract we can say more specifically what the good for a human involves. Aristotle uses the
Greek term eudaimonia to capture the state that we experience if we fully achieve a good life.
According to Aristotle, eudaimonia is the state that all humans should aim for as it is the aim and
end of human existence. To reach this state, we must ourselves act in accordance with reason.
Properly understanding what Aristotle means by eudaimonia is crucial to understanding his Virtue
Ethical moral position.
Eudaimonia has been variously translated and no perfect translation has yet been identified.
While all translations have their own issues, eudaimonia understood as flourishing is
perhaps the most helpful translation and improves upon a simple translation of happiness.
The following example may make this clearer.
Naomi is an extremely talented pianist. Some days, she plays music that simply makes her
happy, perhaps the tune from the television soap opera
“Neighbors” or a rendition of “Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star”. On other days, she plays
complex music such as the supremely difficult Chopin-Godowsky Études. These
performances may also make Naomi happy, but she seems to be flourishing as a pianist
only with the latter performances rather than the former. If we use the language of function,
both performances make Naomi happy but she fulfils her function as a pianist (and is a good
pianist) only when she flourishes with the works of greater complexity.
Flourishing in life may make us happy but happiness itself is not necessarily well aligned
with acting in accordance with our telos. Perhaps, if we prefer the term happiness as a
translation for eudaimonia we mean really or truly happy, but it may be easier to stay with
the understanding of eudaimonia as flourishing when describing the state of acting in
accordance with our true function.
Aristotle concludes that a life is eudaimon (adjective of eudaimonia) when it involves “…the
active exercise of the mind in conformity with perfect goodness or virtue”. [4] Eudaimonia is
secured not as the result exercising of our physical or animalistic qualities but as the result
of the exercise of our distinctly human rational and cognitive aspects.

Eudaimonia and Virtue

The quotation provided at the end of section three was the first direct reference to virtue in the
explanatory sections of this chapter. With Aristotle’s theoretical presuppositions now laid out, we
can begin to properly explain and evaluate his conception of the virtues and their link to moral
thinking.
According to Aristotle, virtues are character dispositions or personality traits. This focus on
our dispositions and our character, rather than our actions in isolation, is what earns
Aristotelian Virtue Ethics the label of being an agent- centered moral theory rather than an
act-centered moral theory.

Act-Centered Moral Theories

Utilitarianism and Kantian Ethics are two different examples of act-centered moral theories
due to their focus on actions when it comes to making moral assessments and judgments.
Act-centered moral theories may be teleological or deontological, absolutist or relativist, but
they share a common worldview in that particular actions are bearers of moral value —
either being right or wrong.

Agent-Centered Moral Theories

Aristotelian Virtue Ethics is an agent-centered theory in virtue of a primary focus on people

and their characters rather than singular actions. For Aristotle, morality has more to do with
the question “how should I be?” rather than “what should I do?” If we answer the first
question then, as we see later in this chapter, the second question may begin to take care of
itself. When explaining and evaluating Aristotelian Virtue Ethics you must keep in mind this
focus on character rather than specific comments on the morality of actions.
Aristotle refers to virtues as character traits or psychological dispositions. Virtues are those
particular dispositions that are appropriately related to the situation and, to link back to our
function, encourage actions that are in accordance with reason. Again, a more concrete
example will make clear how Aristotle identifies virtues in practice.
All of us, at one time or another, experience feelings of anger. For example, I may become
angry when my step-son thoughtlessly eats through the remaining crisps without saving any
for others, or he may feel anger when he has to wait an extra minute or two to be picked up
at work because his step- father is juggling twenty-six different tasks and momentarily loses
track of time (how totally unfair of him…). Anyway, as I was saying, back to Aristotle,
“Anyone can become angry — that is easy. But to be angry with the right person, to the right
degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way — that is not easy”. [5]
For Aristotle, virtue is not a feeling itself but an appropriate psychological disposition in
response to that feeling; the proper response. The correct response to a feeling is described
as acting on the basis of the Golden Mean, a response that is neither excessive nor
deficient. The table below makes this more apparent.

Feeling/Emotion Vice of Deficiency Virtuous Disposition (Golden Mean) Vice of Excess

Anger Lack of spirit Patience Irascibility

Shamefulne
Shame Shyness Modesty
ss

Fear Cowardice Courage Rashness

Indignation Spitefulness Righteousness Envy

Anger is a feeling and therefore is neither a virtue nor a vice. However, the correct response
to anger — the Golden Mean between two extremes — is patience, rather than a lack of
spirit or irascibility. Virtues are not feelings, but characteristic dispositional responses that,
when viewed holistically, define our characters and who we are.
The Golden Mean ought not to be viewed as suggesting that a virtuous disposition is always
one that gives rise to a “middling” action. If someone puts their life on the line, when
unarmed, in an attempt to stop a would-be terrorist attack, then their action may be rash
rather than courageous. However, if armed with a heavy, blunt instrument their life-risking
action may be courageously virtuous rather than rash. The Golden Mean is not to be
understood as suggesting that we always act somewhere between complete inaction and
breathless exuberance, but as suggesting that we act between the vices of excess and
deficiency; such action may well involve extreme courage or exceptional patience.
In addition to feelings, Aristotle also suggests that we may virtuously respond to situations. He
suggests the following examples.
 Feeling/Emotio Vice of Virtuous Disposition (Golden
Vice of Excess
n Deficiency Mean)

Cantankerousnes Self-serving
Social conduct Friendliness
s flattery

Conversation Boorishness Wittiness Buffoonery

Giving money Stinginess Generosity Profligacy

We must keep in mind the agent-centered nature of

Aristotelian Virtue Ethics when considering these examples. A person does not cease to
have a witty disposition in virtue of a single joke that might err on the side of buffoonery, or
cease to be generous because they fail to donate to charity on one occasion. Our
psychological dispositions, virtuous or not, are only to be assessed by judgment of a
person’s general character and observation over more than single-act situations. If we act in
accordance with reason and fulfil our function as human beings, our behavior will generally
reflect our virtuous personality traits and dispositions.

Developing the Virtues

In a quote widely attributed to Aristotle, Will Durrant (1885–1981) sums up the

Aristotelian view by saying that “…we are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an
act but a habit”.[6] It is fairly obvious that we cannot become excellent at something
overnight. Making progress in any endeavor is always a journey that requires both effort and
practice over time. Aristotle holds that the same is true for human beings attempting to
develop their virtuous character traits in attempt to live the good life. You may feel yourself
coming to an Aristotelian Virtue Ethical view after reading this chapter and therefore be
moved to become wittier, more courageous and more generous but you cannot simply
acquire these traits by decision; rather, you must live these traits in order to develop them.
Cultivating a virtuous character is something that happens by practice. Aristotle compares
the development of the skill of virtue to the development of other skills. He says that “…men
become builders by building” and “… we become just by doing just acts”. [7] We might know
that a brick must go into a particular place but we are good builders only when we know
how to place that brick properly. Building requires practical skill and not merely intellectual
knowledge and the same applies to developing virtuous character traits. Ethical characters
are developed by practical learning and habitual action and not merely by intellectual
teaching.
In the end, the virtuous individual will become comfortable in responding to
feelings/situations virtuously just as the good builder becomes comfortable responding to
the sight of various tools and a set of plans. A skilled builder will not need abstract reflection
when it comes to knowing how to build a wall properly, and nor will a skilled cyclist need
abstract reflection on how to balance his speed correctly as he goes around a corner.
Analogously, a person skilled in the virtues will not need abstract reflection when faced with
a situation in which friendliness and generosity are possibilities; they will simply know on a
more intuitive level how to act. This is not to say that builders, cyclists and virtuous people
will not sometimes need to reflect specifically on what to do in abnormal or difficult situations
(e.g. moral dilemmas, in the case of ethics) but in normal situations appropriate responses
will be natural for those who are properly skilled.
It is the need to become skilled when developing virtuous character traits that leads Aristotle
to suggest that becoming virtuous will require a lifetime of work. Putting up a single
bookshelf does not make you a skilled builder any more than a single act of courage makes
you a courageous and virtuous person. It is the repetition of skill that determines your status
and the development of virtuous characters requires a lifetime of work rather than a single
week at a Virtue Ethics Bootcamp.

Practical Wisdom (Phronesis)

Aristotle does offer some specifics regarding how exactly we might, to use a depressingly
modern phrase, “upskill” in order to become more virtuous. Aristotle suggests that the aim of
an action will be made clear by the relevant virtuous characteristic as revealed by the
Golden Mean; for example, our aim in a situation may be to respond courageously or
generously. It is by developing our skill of practical wisdom (translation of “phronesis”) that
we become better at ascertaining what exactly courage or generosity amounts to in a
specific situation and how exactly we might achieve it.
By developing the skill of practical wisdom, we can properly put our virtuous character traits
into practice. For the Aristotelian, practical wisdom may actually be the most important
virtuous disposition or character trait to develop as without the skill of practical wisdom it
may be difficult to actually practice actions that are witty rather than boorish, or courageous
rather than cowardly. Imagine trying to be a philosopher without an acute sense of logical
reasoning; you would struggle because this seems to be a foundational good on which other
philosophical skills rely. So too it may be with the virtues, practical wisdom supports our
instinctive knowledge of how to respond virtuously to various feelings, emotions and
situations.
If this still seems to be somewhat opaque, then we may develop our sense of practical
wisdom by looking at the actions of others who we do take to be virtuous. A child, for
example, will most certainly need to learn how to be virtuous by following examples of
others. If we are unsure in our own ability to discern what a courageous response in a given
situation is, then we may be guided by the behavior of Socrates, Jesus, Gandhi, Mandela or
King, as examples. If we learn from the wisdom and virtue of others, then just as a building
apprentice learns from a master so too virtue apprentices can learn from those more skilled
than they in practicing virtue. Hopefully, such virtue apprentices will eventually reach a point
where they can stand on their own two feet, with their personally developed sense of
practical wisdom.

Voluntary Actions, Involuntary Actions and Moral Responsibility

Despite the focus on agents and not actions, Aristotle does have something to contribute
when it comes to discussions of potential moral responsibility as associated with particular
actions. We can separate actions into two obvious categories:
1. Voluntary actions
2. Involuntary actions

Very broadly, an action is voluntary when it is freely chosen and involuntary when it is
not — these terms are more precisely defined next, in line with Aristotle’s ideas. These
distinctions matter in ethics because a person might be held to be morally responsible
for their voluntary actions but not for their involuntary actions. According to Aristotle, an
action is voluntary unless it is affected by force or ignorance, as understood in the
following ways.

Physical Force

Imagine that Reuben is driving his car on his way home from work. Out of the blue, his
passenger grabs his hand and forces him to turn the steering wheel, sending the car
into oncoming traffic. Without this physical force, Reuben would not have turned the
wheel and he very much regrets the damage that is caused. According to Aristotle,
Reuben’s action is involuntary because of this external physical force and so he is not
morally responsible for the crash.

Psychological Force

Think of David, working at a bank when a group of thieves break in armed with guns.
David is told that if he does not open the safe then he will be killed. Under this extreme
psychological pressure, Aristotle would accept that David’s opening of the safe is
involuntary, because David would not have opened the safe otherwise and he very
much regrets doing so. On this basis, David is not morally responsible in any way for
the theft.
In addition to force, ignorance of a certain type can also support an action being labelled
as involuntary.

Action from Ignorance

Rhys, a talented musician, wishes to perform a surprise concert for a friend and has
been practicing songs from the Barry Manilow back catalogue for weeks. However, in
the days before the surprise concert his friend, unbeknown to Rhys, develops an
intense and very personal dislike for Manilow. Thus, when Rhys takes to the stage and
blasts out his rendition of the classic tune “Copacabana” his friend storms off in much
distress. In this situation, Aristotle would accept that Rhys acted involuntarily when
causing offence because he was unaware of the changed circumstances; he acted from
ignorance when performing the song rather than from malice. Without this epistemic (or
knowledge-related) barrier, Rhys would not have acted as he did and he very much
regrets the distress caused. For these reasons, Rhys bears no moral responsibility for
the upset resulting from his song choice.
Crucially, Aristotle does not allow that all action that involves ignorance can be classed
as involuntary, thereby blocking associated claims of moral responsibility.

Action in Ignorance

Laurence has had too much to drink and chooses to climb a traffic light with a traffic
cone on his head. Laurence’s alcohol consumption has made him ignorant, at least
temporarily, of the consequences of this action in terms of social relationships,
employment and police action. However, for Aristotle this would not mean that his action
was involuntary because Laurence acts in ignorance rather than from ignorance due to
an external epistemic (or knowledge-based) barrier. Laurence does not, therefore,
escape moral responsibility as a result of his self-created ignorance.
Finally, Aristotle also identifies a third form of action — non-voluntary action — that is
also related to ignorant action.

Action from Ignorance with No Regret

Return to the case of Rhys and his Manilow performance but remove any sense of
regret on Rhys’ part for the distress caused. If, at the moment that the epistemic gap is
bridged and Rhys learns of his friend’s newly acquired musical views, he feels no regret
for his action, then Aristotle would class it as a non-voluntary rather than involuntary
action. The action cannot be voluntary as Rhys acted from ignorance, but it is not
obviously involuntary as, without a sense of regret, it may have been that Rhys would
have performed the action even if he knew what was going to happen.
The detail above is important and your own examples will help your understanding and
explanations. The summary, however, is refreshingly simple. If an action is voluntary,
then it is completed free from force and ignorance and we can hold the actor morally
responsible. However, if the action is involuntary then the actor is not morally
responsible as they act on the basis of force or from ignorance.

Objections to Virtue Ethics and Responses Objection: Unclear Guidance

Consider yourself caught in the middle of a moral dilemma. Wanting to know what to
do you may consult the guidance offered by Utilitarianism or Kantian Ethics and
discover that various specific actions you could undertake are morally right or
morally wrong. Moving to seek the advice of
Aristotelian Virtue Ethics, you may find cold comfort from suggestions that you act
generously, patiently and modestly whilst avoiding self-serving flattery and envy. Rather
than knowing how to live in general, you may seek knowledge of what to actually do in
this case. Virtue Ethics may therefore be accused of being a theory, not of helpful
moral guidance, but of unhelpful and non- specific moral platitudes.
In response, the virtue ethicist may remind us that we can learn how to act from
considering how truly virtuous people might respond in this situation, but this response
raises its own worry — how can we identify who is virtuous, or apply their actions to a
potentially novel situation? Although a defender of Virtue Ethics, Rosalind Hursthouse
(1943–) gives a voice to this common objection, putting forward the worry directly by
saying that “‘Virtue Ethics does not, because it cannot, tell us what we should do… It
gives us no guidance whatsoever. Who are the virtuous agents [that we should look to
for guidance]?”[8] If all the virtue ethicist can offer to a person wondering how to act —
perhaps wondering whether or not to report a friend to the police, or whether or not to
change careers to work in the charity sector — is “look to the moral exemplars of
Socrates and Gandhi and how they would act in this situation”, then we might well
sympathize with the objector since very often our moral dilemmas are new situations,
not merely old ones repeated. Asking “what would Jesus do”, if we deem Jesus to be a
morally virtuous role model, might not seem very helpful for an MP trying to determine
whether or not to vote for an increase in subsidies for renewable energy technologies at
huge expense, and potential financial risk, to the tax-payer (to take a deliberately
specific example).
Despite her statement of the objection, Hursthouse thinks that this is an unfair
characterization of Virtue Ethics. Hursthouse suggests that Virtue Ethics provides
guidance in the form of “v-rules”. These are guiding rules of the form “do what is honest”
or “avoid what is envious”.[9] These rules may not be specific, but they do stand as
guidance across lots of different moral situations. Whether or not you believe that this
level of guidance is suitable for a normative moral theory is a judgment that you should
make yourself and then defend.

Objection: Clashing Virtues

Related to the general objection from lack of guidance, a developed objection may
question how we are supposed to cope with situations in which virtues seem to clash.
Courageous behaviour may, in certain cases, mean a lack of friendliness; generosity
may threaten modesty. In these situations, the suggestion to “be virtuous” may again
seem to be unhelpfully vague.
To this particular objection, the Aristotelian virtue ethicist can invoke the concept of
practical wisdom and suggest that the skilled and virtuous person will appropriately
respond to complex moral situations. A Formula One car, for example, will be good
when it has both raw speed and delicate handling and it is up to the skilled engineer to
steer a path between these two virtues. So too a person with practical wisdom can steer
a path between apparently clashing virtues in any given situation. Virtue ethicists have
no interest in the creation of a codified moral rule book covering all situations and
instead put the onus on the skill of the virtuous person when deciding how to act. Again,
whether this is a strength or weakness is for you to decide and defend. Objection:
Circularity
An entirely different objection to Aristotelian Virtue Ethics is based on a concern
regarding logical circularity. According to Aristotle, the following statements seem to be
correct:
1. An act is virtuous if it is an act that a virtuous person would commit in that
circumstance.
2. A person is virtuous when they act in virtuous ways.

This, however, looks to be circular reasoning. If virtuous actions are understood in terms
of virtuous people, but virtuous people are understood in terms of virtuous actions, then
we have unhelpfully circular reasoning.
Julia Annas (1946–) responds to this apparent problem by arguing that there is nothing
dangerously circular in this reasoning because it is simply a reflection of how we learn
to develop our virtuous dispositions.[10] Annas suggests the analogy of piano-playing:
1. Great piano playing is what great pianists do.
2. A pianist is great when he “does” great piano playing.

In this case, there does not seem to be any troubling circularity in reasoning. It is not the
case that whatever a great pianist plays will be great, but rather that great pianists have
the skills to make great music. So too it is with virtues, for virtuous people are not
virtuous just because of their actual actions but because of who they are and how their
actions are motivated. It is their skills and character traits that mean that, in practice,
they provide a clear guide as to which actions are properly aligned with virtues. Thus, if
we wish to decide whether or not an act is virtuous we can assess what a virtuous
person would do in that circumstance, but this does not mean that what is virtuous is
determined by the actions of a specifically virtuous individual. The issue is whether or
not a person, with virtuous characteristics in the abstract, would actually carry that
action out. Virtuous people are living and breathing concrete guides, helping us to
understand the actions associated with abstract virtuous character dispositions.
Objection: Contribution to Eudaimonia

The final distinct objection to Aristotelian Virtue Ethics considered in this chapter stems
from the Aristotelian claim that living virtuously will contribute to our ability to secure a
eudaimon life. A challenge to this view may be based on the fact that certain
dispositions may seem to be virtuous but may not actually seem to contribute to our
flourishing or securing the good life.
As an example of this possible objection in practice, consider the following. Shelley is
often described as generous to a fault and regularly dedicates large amounts of her time
to helping others to solve problems at considerable cost, in terms of both time and
effort, to herself. Working beyond the limits that can reasonably be expected of her, we
may wish to describe Shelley as virtuous given her generous personality. However, by
working herself so hard for others, we may wonder if Shelley is unduly limiting her own
ability to flourish.
Responses to this initial statement of the objection are not hard to imagine. We may say
that Shelley has either succumbed to a vice of excess and is profligate with her time
rather than generous, or we may accept that she is generous rather than profligate and
accept the uncomfortable conclusion and say that this virtuous character trait is helping
her to flourish. This second claim may seem more plausible if we ruled out a description
of Shelley wasting her time.
Still, this objection may stand up if you can envisage a situation in which someone could
be properly described as rash rather than courageous or wasteful rather than generous
and, because of these traits, actually be contributing to their own flourishing. You should
consider your own possible cases if you seek to support this general objection.

Moral Good and Individual Good

For Aristotle, moral goodness and individual goodness may seem to be intimately
linked. After all, a virtuous person will be charitable and friendly etc. and as a result of
these characteristics and dispositions will both advance their own journey towards
eudaimonia and make life better for others. Hedonism (which claims that pleasure is the
only source of well-being — see Chapter 1), as a rival theory attempting to outline what
is required for wellbeing, might be thought to fail because it downplays the importance
of acting in accordance with reason, so hedonists do not therefore live according to their
telos or true function.
Aristotle says of his ideally virtuous person that they will have a unified psychology —
that their rational and non-rational psychologies will speak with one voice. On the
contrary, the non-virtuous person will have a psychology in conflict between their
rational and non-rational elements. In considering who has the better life from their own
individual perspectives — the happy Hedonist or the Aristotelian virtuous person — you
should again form your own reasoned judgment.
It is important to note, as we conclude this chapter, that Aristotle does not suggest that
living a virtuous life is sufficient to guarantee a state of eudaimonia for a person.
External factors such as poverty, disease or untimely death may scupper a person’s
advance towards eudaimonia. However, for Aristotle, being virtuous is necessary for the
achievement of eudaimonia; without the development of virtues it is impossible for a
person to flourish even if they avoid poverty, disease, loneliness etc.

Summary
Aristotelian Virtue Ethics is very different in nature to the other act-centered normative
moral theories considered in this book. Whether this, in itself, is a virtue or a vice is an
issue for your own judgment. The lack of a codified and fixed moral rule book is
something many view as a flaw, while others perceive it as the key strength of the
theory. Some, meanwhile, will feel uncomfortable with Aristotle’s teleological claims,
differing from those who are happy to accept that there is an objectively good life that is
possible for human beings. Regardless, there is little doubt that Aristotelian Virtue
Ethics offers a distinct normative moral picture and that it is a theory worthy of your
reflections.

PLATO (428-348 b.C.)

Summary of his thought

Plato conceives man as a compound of two different substances: the body, which ties
us to the sensible world and the soul, which removes us from this material sphere and
relates us to a superior world. Human soul is understood as immortal and it has a
superior destiny than the body. This superiority comes from the fact that the soul
(contrary to the body) is, in essence, a rightness and knowledge principle and
moreover, the body is ruled by corruption and death whereas the soul is immortal. Plato
uses several arguments to demonstrate the immortality of the soul, emphasizing the
one that rests on the reminiscence theory: in his dialogue titled "Meno", Plato defends
the thesis that TO KNOW is TO REMEMBER: we do not have a genuine knowledge
experience (of the universal being): when we say a mathematical proposition is true, it is
not because we have just learned it, but rather because we remember the relations
between the Ideas our soul knew in the world of the Ideas before incarnating in our
body. The perception of the sensible world cannot serve as foundation for strict
knowledge but, since we have such knowledge, it must come from a previous
experience. Therefore: to know is to update a knowledge already experienced, to know
is to remember (this thesis is called THEORY OF the REMINISCENCE).
Like all ancient Greeks, Plato defends the soul is a principle of movement in itself
and a movement source. But the singularity of his conception is the soul distinguishes
itself from the body in a relevant feature: it makes us equal to Gods and allows us to
know the Ideas. Plato distinguishes three elements or functions in the human soul: the
rational element, which is represented in the myth of the winged carriage by the
coachman, is the most dignified and elevated; its functions are the intellectual
knowledge and the direction and guide of the other two; the irascible element (quick
tempered), represented by the good and beautiful horse, symbol of the strength and the
Will, which is easily leaded; and the concupiscent element (immoderate or hot-
headed), represented by the bad horse, hard to guide, which symbolizes the
immoderate desire and sensible passions. The soul seeks its freedom from the body
and practices philosophy as an intellectual approach to the world it authentically
belongs to. The rational element of the soul must try to purify the individual from his
sensible desires and that’s why it has got the ruling role of human behaviour.
 Plato’s anthropological dualism is characterized by a radical split in human
being: following the Orphic doctrine, Plato declares there are two principles in human
being: the immortal SOUL, our most divine part, principle of knowledge and morals; and
the BODY, the reason of our ignorance and our wrongness. Plato begins the Western
traditional thought for which the body and its passions are the main responsible for all
our pains, misfortunes and sufferings; man is guilty simply because he has a body, idea
particularly dear for Christianity. Therefore, our most important tasks will be, on the first
place, the practice of virtue, which means basically to sacrifice body desires, and
secondly the practice of philosophy. The purpose of moral and intellectual
purification is to let the souls be guided by rightness and straightness and thus fulfil
their fundamental destiny: those who practice philosophy and so know the world of the
Ideas will return to their original place (the divine dwelling), where they lived before; on
the contrary, the impure ones, those who let their uncontrolled passions rule their
behaviour will have to undergo a judgment and will be condemned to wander an
mistake indefinitely, paying thus their faults in life.

V. CONSEQUENCES OF THE THEORY OF THE IDEAS FOR ETICS AND POLITICS

a) The virtue. The theory of the Ideas implies the overcoming of the sophistic moral
relativism: the Ideas of Justice and Rightness become the perfect criteria for
distinguishing right from wrong or fair from unfair. The Ideas are values themselves.
Plato’s ethics tries to find out what is the Highest Rightness for man, Rightness whose
attainment implies happiness and which is achieved by the practice of virtue. The
Highest Rightness can be understood in two ways: a good life cannot be achieved
neither by the only means of moderate pleasures nor by the only means of wisdom, but
by a mixture of both, simply because man is a mixture of animal and intelligence. (Of
course, the pleasures we can indulge in are the purest ones). According other
philosophers, Plato’s Highest Rightness means contemplating the Ideas, contemplation
which is the supreme happiness. In this sense the virtue, as the method for achieving
the Highest Rightness, performs an analogous roll as dialectic, the method for achieving
the Intelligible World. By means of the practice of virtue we achieve the Highest
Rightness and, therefore, the supreme happiness; virtue is the natural disposition for
rightness of our souls, and as our souls have three elements, there will be three
peculiar virtues, one for each one of them: self-control for the concupiscent element:
"certain order and moderation of the pleasures"; strength or braveness for the
 irascible element: the strength allows man surpasses suffering and sacrifices pleasures
if necessary; and wisdom or prudence for the rational element, which rules the whole
human behaviour. The virtue of the soul as a whole is justice, which settles order and
harmony between those three elements and is, obviously, the most important virtue.
Along with this practical explanation of virtue Plato defends a more intellectual theory
particularly related with the theory of the Ideas: virtue is the knowledge of what is right
for man or, better, the knowledge of the Idea of Rightness, and is mainly identified with
wisdom or prudence. We should remember the Ideas allow Plato surpasses the moral
relativism of the sophists as the Idea of Rightness implies there is an absolute point of
view.

b) The king-philosopher. As every Greek, Plato thinks man is naturally a social being;
that’s why there are States (Polis). The individual can reach his utmost accomplishment
in the State, but only in a perfect State. Plato divides the State or society in three
classes following the three elements of the soul; the State is a great organism with the
same material and immaterial requirements and ethical aims as man. The rational
element of the soul is represented by the class of the governors, who are
philosophers; the irascible element is represented by the social class of the soldiers;
the concupiscent element by the craftsmen. The philosophers, whose particular
virtue is wisdom or prudence, are the only ones capable for government; the soldiers,
whose virtue is the strength, must defend and keep safe the polis; the craftsmen, whose
virtue is self-control, provide the commodities needed in the State. Thus, a total
parallelism between anthropology, ethics and policy is settled down. The three social
classes are needed, but each one enjoys different rank and dignity. The aim of the
State is justice: the common welfare of all the citizens, which would only be possible if
every class fulfil its own roll. Plato distinguishes the social class of the leaders: since the
Idea of Rightness can be known, it’s only natural philosophers guide society ruled by
their superior knowledge; philosophers have to be governors or governors have to
be philosophers; of course, philosophers do not seek their own interests but the
community’s.
c) The "platonic Communism". Philosophers must seek the general welfare and so,
trying to avoid temptations and useless distractions, they neither have private
property nor family; their main purpose is wisdom which enables them to carry out their
mission of government. Soldiers also sacrifice family and private property, only the
craftsmen are allowed to them (though limited and controlled by the State). Craftsmen
do not need education, except the professional for their own tasks, and they must obey
political powers. In this ideal State only a very best selected minority have power.
Though the social classes are not closed up, social mobility is controlled by rigorous
criterion. Plato’s ideal State is clearly aristocratic. Finally, along with this description of
the ideal society, Plato describes and assesses the actual forms of government: there
are five, but they all come from the monarchy or aristocracy by progressive decay:
military dictatorship, oligarchy, democracy and, the worse of all, tyranny. Monarchy
or aristocracy is the most perfect form of government: is the government of the best
individuals.
The Nature of Human Character

A Socratic Perspective

Alishba Imran

Sep 18, 2019·6 min read

One of my mentors ranked these three things in order of importance:

1. Character

2. Network

3. Knowledge/Skills
If you think about it, it makes a lot of sense why character is the most important thing.
After all, you need to be a good person for people to like you. But most people will only
focus on the last one.
I got very interested in why we value “good” character so much. What even is a “good”
character? What are the fundamental ideas that shape our character? Do all humans
have an instinct to benefit themselves?
Socrate is a philosopher who answered a lot of these questions.
First, let's figure out who he is.

Who is Socrates?
Socrates. 😎

Socrates was a classical Greek philosopher who developed a lot of the fundamentals of
modern Western philosophy, along with his students Plato and Aristole.
Socrates was a strange guy. Imagine a barefoot, muscular, thickset man, with a snub
nose and heavy brows walking around and talking to you about wisdom, happiness, and
philosophy? Yeah, this was Socrate.
“An unexamined life is not worth living” — Socrates believed that the purpose of life
was to grow spiritually, and philosophically. This is why he questioned all values and
beliefs in order to determine if they were the correct ones.
He was sentenced to death for “corrupting the youth of Athens”. He was teaching them
to question everything like government, god, among other things.
Socrates was in constant search for definitions. He was very keen on developing
knowledge. His way of finding a definition was often the same:
• He would try to get a person — who claims to be knowledgeable in the field
Socrates is trying to find answers in — to discuss what an appropriate definition of
the topic would be.
• This back and forth between Socrates and the other person would frequently take
place in the market square in Athens or in a private home. In many of Socrates’
discussions, a number of other people would also take part and contribute different
amounts of input to the debate.

Through lots of pondering and debating, he formulated views around evil, good, virtue,
happiness and knowledge.

The virtue of human character

A virtue is a trait or quality that is deemed to be morally (discipline of a person) good.

Examples of these are things like honesty, courage, compassion, generosity, and
integrity.
We all have a natural obligation to benefit ourselves. Everything we do, even if it’s
helping others is done because in one way or another it makes us feel good.
The virtue of human character is the central focus of Socrates’ perspective. Good living
through good character was the holy grail of Socrates’ ideal of the examined life.
Socrates believed that knowledge is the fundamental good and the governing
dynamic of all human action.
A Socratic View of Wrongdoing

Socrates’ claim that nobody does wrong knowingly

The ability to allow knowledge to influence our world view and behaviour is the
fundamental good that makes all other human goods stand up and live.
It is necessary to practice seeking knowledge and seek improvement of our human
character for the rest of our lives.
Generally, morality in one way or another addresses the human capacity to identify
and choose between right and wrong and then to act accordingly. Socrates believed
that nobody willingly chooses to do wrong.
He maintained that doing wrong always harmed the person doing it and that nobody
seeks harm on themselves. Because of this, all wrongdoing is the result of
ignorance.
This means that it is impossible for a human being to willingly do wrong because their
instinct for self-interest prevents them from doing so. If you have the knowledge to know
what is good then you will practice that.
Yeah, I know what you’re thinking. This can’t be true especially after personally seeing
people who did wrong and seemed to know full well that their behaviour was wrong.
I think generally this belief of Socrates is true in a clear and simple way.
It is true that people can choose to do things they know other people think are wrong. It
is even true that people can choose to do things that they believe are wrong for others
while trying to benefit themselves.
But people would never choose to do things that they perceive in the moment of
decision to be wrong (harmful) for themselves. Even when there is an obvious inherent
self-harm in the action, people can do wrong and cause harm while their goal is to seek
after the good they believe will benefit them.

Self-Interest and Morality

The difference between objective knowledge and our personal intuitive insight into our
own well being is important.
For example, people can know that stealing is wrong, but they experience a benefit
through theft that makes them feel the wrongful action results in obtaining some good,
which improves their lives.
The psychological principle is that there is no motive for committing actions that are right or
wrong, which bring no perceived benefit. If we keep the distinction between the ends and means
clear, we see that nobody commits an act for the sake of the wrong involved but with a view to
obtaining the perceived benefit or good.
It is also our nature to see that which harms us as being bad and wrong. We may objectively see that
some particular circumstances may harm us in some way, but calculate what is of overall benefit
according to the character of our self-interest.

The Recognition of Evil

Human evil is usually measured in terms of the intensity of its destructive result without regard to
understanding its nature. This makes no sense. Lets say you went to a doctor with a headache and
the doctor just gave you aspirin for your pain but failed to discover that the cause of the pain was a
brain tumour. The identity of the problem is not the pain, which is just a symptom. The identity of the
problem is the tumour that causes pain.
This is the exact same way that the identity of human evil is in the cause of behaviours that harm not
in the harm itself.
This Socratic perspective says that evil behaviour is evil because it is born of ignorance and
fear, not because of the relative measure of its harm.
For Socrates, wrongdoing through ignorance is the only harm and knowledge is the only good.
Socrates believed that the only life worth living is a life that is persistent in seeking good character.
When a human character is weak, this correlates with a lack of knowledge or the lack of ability to
allow knowledge to influence us.

Character and Knowledge

Socrates lecturing others about knowledge and its power.

In Socrates’ view, knowledge and character are developmentally linked. Both a pure lack of
knowledge. Essentially, ignorance = wrongdoing = harmful to human character.
In this Socratic perspective, our potential for developing good character depends on the quality of our
practice of seeking to put reasoning and knowledge at the center of everything we do.

Socrates’ theories helped me better understand that the ideal life recognizes there is a need for daily
practise and exercise to our ethical reasoning in order to strengthen our human character.

INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS IN
GEED 10023 UNDERSTANDING THE SELF

Compiled by:
HONESTO O. CAMINO

OVERVIEW

Knowing oneself is critical to being an effective team member as well as being successful in life, work, and
relationships. Your personal identity influences everything you do, and it changes and evolves over time. No
matter what your career stage, it's important to evaluate your personal goals, interpersonal skills, strengths,
weaknesses and passions to keep your career development in line with your personality and interests. ... It is
important to understand yourself so you can find a career path that is rewarding and satisfying.

A person's self-concept is their understanding of who they are and what makes them unique. This can include
the physical self, the social self, the competent self and the inner, or psychological, self (such as knowledge or
understanding of one's own capabilities, character, feelings, or motivations: self-knowledge human self-
understanding gaining a greater sense of self-understanding.

By knowing yourself you can utilize your strengths to help others around you, and to understand the things you
will excel at. By knowing where you struggle you have the opportunity to prevent these areas from damaging
you or affecting people around you. When you know yourself, you understand what motivates you to resist bad
habits and develop good ones. You'll have the insight to know which values and goals activate your
willpower. ... Tolerance and understanding of others. Your awareness of your own foibles and struggles can
help you empathize with others. Academic achievement is related to self perception, but improving self-
concept is an important goal for its own sake. It remains for curriculum people to carefully consider the
meaning of self- concept/esteem research for curriculum planning and development.

Knowing oneself is critical to being an effective team member as well as being successful in life, work, and
relationships. Your personal identity influences everything you do, and it changes and evolves over time. The
purpose of this module is to help you deepen your understanding and appreciation for who you are as a
person. You will explore how you see yourself through the lenses of personal identity, your skills and talents,
roles, values, personal core, and how you meet your psychological needs. You will also examine how you
respond to the pressures of changes and transitions in your life. You will have an opportunity to examine how
your personal identity has been shaped by a variety of people and experiences. You will also have
opportunities to think about and discuss your values, interests, hopes for the future, as well as your strengths
and challenges. You will learn about how your psychological needs are the primary source that motivates and
drives your behavior. You will also learn critical knowledge about change and how important it is in today’s
workplace to be adaptive and to embrace change as a personal and professional growth experience.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OVERVIEW ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS iii
COURSE OUTCOMES iv
LESSON 1 THE GREEK AND OTHER WESTERN PHILOSOPHIES OF THE PERSON AND RELATED
CONSTRUCTS 5
LESSON 2 THE EASTERN PHILOSOPHICAL BASES OF THE SELF 29
LESSON 3 THE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE SELF 64
LESSON 4 THE FILIPINO CONCEPT OF THE SELF 71
LESSON 5 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SELF 78
LESSON 6 SIGMUND FREUD’S PERSPECTIVE ON SELF (PERSONALITY) AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
84
LESSON 7 THE PHYSICAL SELF 91
LESSON 8 THE SEXUAL SELF 118
LESSON 9 THE MATERIAL/ECONOMIC SELF 154
LESSON 10 THE SPIRITUAL SELF 163
LESSON 11 EFFECTIVE LEARNING TECHNIQUES FROM COGNITIVE AND EDUCATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY 179
LESSON 12 GOAL SETTING FOR LIFE AND HAPPINESS 184
GRADING SYSTEM 196
REFERENCES 196
COURSE OUTCOMES

At the end of the course, the students will be able to:

The Self from Various Perspectives

1. Discuss the different representations and conceptualizations of the self from various disciplinal
perspectives.
2. Compare and contrast how the self has been represented across different disciplinal perspectives.
3. Examine the different influences, factors and forces that shaped the self.
4. Demonstrate critical and reflective thought in analyzing the development of one’s self identity by
developing a theory of the self.

Unpacking the Self

5. Explore the different aspects of the self.
6. Demonstrate critical, reflective thought in integrating the various aspects of the self and identity.
7. Identify the different forces, and institutions that impact the development of various aspects of self and
identity.
8. Examine one’s self against the different aspects of self as discussed in class.

Managing and Caring for Self

9. Understand the theoretical underpinnings for how to manage and care for different aspects of the self.
10. Acquire and hone news skills and learnings for better managing of one’s self and behavior.
11. Apply these ne skills to one’s self and functioning for better quality of life.

LESSON 1
THE GREEK AND OTHER WESTERN PHILOSOPHIES
OF THE PERSON AND RELATED CONSTRUCTS

LEARNING OUTCOMES
At the end of the lesson, the student must be able to:
1. define the etymological and formal definition of character.
2. define virtue and happiness and explicate the relationship between them.
3. discuss the views on virtue according to the following Greek philosophers:
3.1. Socrates 3.2. Plato 3.3. Aristotle
4. characterize the Stoics an give their perspective on virtue ad virtuous life.
5. compare and contrast the concept of virtue according the following philosophers or groups of philosophers:
5.1 early naturalists
5.2 Immanuel Kant
5.3 David Hume
5.4 Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill
5.5 T. H. Green
5.6 John Rawls
6. enumerate and discuss each of the contemporary questions about character.
7. cite some empirical studies on moral character.

COURSE MATERIALS

The term “self” if hardly treated in the realm of philosophy. Perhaps, the term nearest to it in philosophy is
virtue or character. This lesson provides a brief historical account of some important developments in
philosophical approaches to good moral character. Approximately half the entry is on the Greek moralists
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Of these, most attention is given to Aristotle’s views, since most other
philosophical discussions of character are indebted to his analysis. The latter half of the entry explores how
other philosophers have responded to the concerns first raised by the Greeks. Some philosophers, such as
Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant, represent a “modern” approach to character that subordinates it to other
moral notions such as duty and obedience to law. Other philosophers, such as David Hume, Karl Marx, John
Stuart Mill, and T. H. Green take an interest in the psychology of moral character that is more reminiscent of
the Greeks. Finally, this entry indicates the directions taken by some contemporary philosophers in recent work
on or related to moral character.
1. Terminology
The English word “character” is derived from the Greek charaktêr, which was originally used of a mark
impressed upon a coin. Later and more generally, “character” came to mean a distinctive mark by which one
thing was distinguished from others, and then primarily to mean the assemblage of qualities that distinguish
one individual from another. In modern usage, this emphasis on distinctiveness or individuality tends to merge
“character” with “personality.” We might say, for example, when thinking of a person’s idiosyncratic
mannerisms, social gestures, or habits of dress, that “he has personality” or that “he’s quite a character.”
As the Introduction above has suggested, however, the philosophical use of the word “character” has a
different linguistic history. At the beginning of Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tells us that there
are two different kinds of human excellences, excellences of thought and excellences of character. His phrase
for excellences of character – êthikai aretai – we usually translate as “moral virtue(s)” or “moral excellence(s).”
The Greek êthikos (ethical) is the adjective cognate with êthos (character). When we speak of a moral virtue or
an excellence of character, the emphasis is not on mere distinctiveness or individuality, but on the combination
of qualities that make an individual the sort of ethically admirable person he is.
This entry will discuss “moral character” in the Greek sense of having or lacking moral virtue. If someone lacks
virtue, she may have any of several moral vices, or she may be characterized by a condition somewhere in
between virtue and vice, such as continence or incontinence.
2. Some ancient Greek views
2.1 Why character matters
The views of moral character held by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics are the starting point for most
other philosophical discussions of character. Although these ancient moralists differed on some issues about
virtue, it makes sense to begin with some points of similarity. These points of similarity will show why the Greek
moralists thought it was important to discuss character.
Many of Plato’s dialogues (especially the early or so-called “Socratic” dialogues) examine the nature of virtue
and the character of a virtuous person. They often begin by having Socrates ask his interlocutors to explain
what a particular virtue is. In reply, the interlocutors usually offer behavioral accounts of the virtues. For
example, at the beginning of Plato’s Laches the character Laches suggests that courage consists of standing
one’s ground in battle. In the Charmides, Charmides suggests that temperance consists in acting quietly. In the
Republic, Cephalus suggests that justice consists in giving back what one has borrowed. In each of these
cases, Plato has Socrates reply in the same way. In the Republic Socrates explains that giving back what one
has borrowed cannot be what justice is, for there are cases where giving back what one has borrowed would
be foolish, and the just person recognizes that it is foolish. If the person from whom you have borrowed a
sword goes mad, it would be foolish for you to return the sword, for you are then putting yourself and others in
danger. The implication is that the just person can recognize when it is reasonable to return what he has
borrowed. Similarly, as Socrates explains in the Laches, standing firm in battle cannot be courage, for
sometimes standing firm in battle is simply a foolish endurance that puts oneself and others at needless risk.
The courageous person can recognize when it is reasonable to stand his ground in battle and when it isn’t.
The trouble one encounters in trying to give a purely behavioral account of virtue explains why the Greek
moralists turn to character to explain what virtue is. It may be true that most of us can recognize that it would
be foolish to risk our lives and the lives of others to secure a trivial benefit, and that most of us can see that it is
unjust to harm others to secure power and wealth for our own comfort. We don’t have to be virtuous to
recognize these things. But the Greek moralists think it takes someone of good moral character to determine
with regularity and reliability what actions are appropriate and reasonable in fearful situations and that it takes
someone of good moral character to determine with regularity and reliability how and when to secure goods
and resources for himself and others. This is why Aristotle states in Nicomachean Ethics II.9 that it is not easy
to define in rules which actions deserve moral praise and blame, and that these matters require the judgment
of the virtuous person.
2.2 Virtue and happiness
Most of the Greek moralists think that, if we are rational, we aim at living well (eu zên) or happiness
(eudaimonia). Living well or happiness is our ultimate end in that a conception of happiness serves to organize
our various subordinate ends, by indicating the relative importance of our ends and by indicating how they
should fit together into some rational overall scheme. So the Stoics identify happiness with “living coherently”
(homologoumenôs zên), and Aristotle says that happiness is “perfect” or “complete” (teleios) and something
distinctively human. When we are living well, our life is worthy of imitation and praise. For, according to the
Greek moralists, that we are happy says something about us and about what we have achieved, not simply
about the fortunate circumstances in which we find ourselves. So they argue that happiness cannot consist
simply in “external goods” or “goods of fortune,” for these goods are external to our own choosing and
deciding. Whatever happiness is, it must take account of the fact that a happy life is one lived by rational
agents who act and who are not simply victims of their circumstances.
The Greek moralists conclude that a happy life must give a prominent place to the exercise of virtue, for
virtuous traits of character are stable and enduring and are not products of fortune, but of learning or
cultivation. Moreover, virtuous traits of character are excellences of the human being in that they are the best
exercise of reason, which is the activity characteristic of human beings. In this way, the Greek philosophers
claim, virtuous activity completes or perfects human life.
2.3 Some Greek disagreements about virtue
Although the Greek philosophers agree that happiness requires virtue and hence that a happy person must
have virtuous traits of character such as wisdom, bravery, temperance, and justice, they disagree about how to
understand these traits. As explained in Section 2.1 above, several of Plato’s dialogues criticize the view that
virtues are merely tendencies to act in particular ways. Bravery requires more than standing up against threats
to oneself and others. Bravery also requires recognizing when standing up to these threats is reasonable and
appropriate, and it requires acting on one’s recognition. This led the Greek moralists to conclude that virtuous
traits of character have two aspects: (a) a behavioral aspect – doing particular kinds of action and (b) a
psychological aspect – having the right motives, aims, concerns, and perspective. The Greek philosophers
disagree mostly about what (b) involves. In particular, they differ about the role played in virtuous traits of
character by cognitive states (e.g., knowledge and belief) on the one hand and affective states (e.g., desires,
feelings, and emotions) on the other. Socrates and the Stoics argued that only cognitive states were necessary
for virtue, whereas Plato and Aristotle argued that both cognitive and affective states were necessary.
Socrates (469–399 BCE)
In Plato’s Protagoras, Socrates seems to identify happiness with pleasure and to explain the various virtues as
instrumental means to pleasure. On this view (later revived by Epicurus, 341–271 BCE), having a virtuous
character is purely a matter of being knowledgeable of what brings us more pleasure rather than less. In the
Protagoras, Socrates recognizes that most people object to this view. The “many” suppose that having a
virtuous character requires more than knowledge, because knowledge does not guarantee that one will act on
one’s knowledge and do the virtuous action. Someone may be overcome by anger, fear, lust, and other
desires, and act against what he believes will bring him more pleasure rather than less. He can, in other words,
be incontinent or weak-willed. Socrates replies that such cases should be understood differently. When, for
example, a cowardly person flees from battle rather than endanger his life, even though he may seem to be
pursuing the more pleasant action, he is really just ignorant of the greater pleasure to be achieved by entering
battle and acting bravely. In other words, incontinence is not possible, according to Socrates.
Plato (428–347 BCE)
The “many”’s worry about the inadequacy of knowledge to ensure virtuous action suggests that virtuous
character includes not only a cognitive element, but also some affective element. Both Plato and Aristotle
argue that virtuous character requires a distinctive combination of cognitive and affective elements. In the
Republic, Plato divides the soul into three parts and gives to each a different kind of desire (rational, appetitive,
or spirited). As types of non-rational desire, appetitive and spirited desires can conflict with our rational desires
about what contributes to our overall good, and they will sometimes move us to act in ways we recognize to be
against our greater good. When that happens, we are incontinent. To be virtuous, then, we must both
understand what contributes to our overall good and have our spirited and appetitive desires educated
properly, so that they agree with the guidance provided by the rational part of the soul. Plato describes the
education of the non-rational parts of the soul in Books II and III of the Republic. A potentially virtuous person
learns when young to love and take pleasure in virtuous actions, but must wait until late in life to develop the
understanding that explains why what he loves is good. Once he has learned what the good is, his informed
love of the good explains why he acts as he does and why his actions are virtuous.
2.4 Aristotle (384–322 BCE)
Aristotle accepts Plato’s division of the soul into two basic parts (rational and non-rational) and agrees that
both parts contribute to virtuous character. Of all the Greek moralists, Aristotle provides the most
psychologically insightful account of virtuous character. Because many modern philosophical treatments of
character (see Sections 3 and 4 below) are indebted to Aristotle’s analysis, it is best to discuss his position in
some detail.
Aristotle’s definition of good moral character
Aristotle defines virtuous character in Nicomachean Ethics II.6:
Excellence [of character], then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being
determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom (phronimos) would determine it.
Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect.
(1106b36–1107a3)
By calling excellence of character a state, Aristotle means that it is neither a feeling nor a capacity nor a mere
tendency to behave in specific ways. Rather it is the settled condition we are in when we are well off in relation
to feelings and actions. We are well off in relation to our feelings and actions when we are in a mean or
intermediate state in regard to them. If, on the other hand, we have a vicious character, we are badly off in
relation to feelings and actions, and we fail to hit the mean in regard to them.
So it is not easy to hit the mean. “Anyone can get angry – that is easy – or give or spend money; but to do this
to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right aim, and in the right way, that is not for
everyone, nor is it easy.” That is why goodness is praiseworthy (epaineton) and fine (kalon) (Nicomachean
Ethics 1109a26–30).
Virtue as a mean state
Aristotle emphasizes that the mean state is not an arithmetic mean, but one relative to the situation. The
different particular virtues provide illustrations of what Aristotle means. Each virtue is set over or concerned
with specific feelings or actions. The virtue of mildness or good temper, for example, is concerned with anger.
Aristotle thinks that a mild person ought to be angry about some things (e.g., injustice and other forms of
mistreatment) and should be willing to stand up for himself and those he cares about. Not to do so would, in
Aristotle’s view, indicate the morally deficient character of the inirascible person. It would also be inappropriate
to take offense and get angry if there is nothing worth getting angry about. That response would indicate the
morally excessive character of the irascible person. The mild person’s reactions are appropriate to the
situation. Sometimes intense anger is appropriate; at other times calm detachment is.
The psychological unity of the virtuous person and the disunity of non-virtuous conditions
That the virtuous person’s emotional responses are appropriate to the situation indicates that her emotional
responses are in harmony with her correct reasoning about what to do. Aristotle says that the non-rational part
of a virtuous person’s soul “speaks with the same voice” (homophônei, Nicomachean Ethics 1102b28) as the
rational part. That the virtuous person’s soul is unified and not torn by conflict distinguishes the state of being
virtuous from various non-virtuous conditions such as continence (enkrateia), incontinence (akrasia), and vice
(kakia) in general.
Aristotle seems to think that, at bottom, any non-virtuous person is plagued by inner doubt or conflict, even if
on the surface she appears to be as psychologically unified as virtuous people. Although a vicious person may
appear to be single-minded about her disdain for justice and her pursuit of material goods and power, she must
seek out others’ company to forget or ignore her own actions. Aristotle seems to have this point in mind when
he says of vicious people in Nicomachean Ethics IX.4 that they are at odds with themselves and do not love
themselves. Virtuous persons, on the other hand, enjoy who they are and take pleasure in acting virtuously.
Like the morally vicious person, the continent and incontinent persons are internally conflicted, but they are
more aware of their inner turmoil than the morally vicious person. Continence is essentially a kind of self-
mastery: the continent person recognizes what she should do and does it, but to do so she must struggle
against the pull of recalcitrant feelings. The incontinent person also in some way knows what she should do,
but she fails to do it because of recalcitrant feelings.
Aristotle’s position on incontinence seems to incorporate both Socratic and Platonic elements. Recall that
Socrates had explained apparently incontinent behavior as the result of ignorance of what leads to the good.
Since, he thought, everyone desires the good and aims at it in his actions, no one would intentionally choose a
course of action believed to yield less good overall. Plato, on the other hand, argued that incontinence can
occur when a person’s non-rational desires move him to act in ways not endorsed by his rational desire for the
greater good. Aristotle seems to agree with Socrates that the cognitive state of the incontinent person is
defective at the moment of incontinent behavior, but he also agrees with Plato that a person’s non-rational
desires cause the incontinent action. This may be what Aristotle means when he writes that “the position that
Socrates sought to establish actually seems to result; for it is not what is thought to be knowledge proper that
the passion overcomes … but perceptual knowledge” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1147b14–17).
Moral education and the human function
Because Aristotle thinks that virtue is a unified, unconflicted state where emotional responses and rational
assessments speak with the same voice, he, like Plato, thinks that the education of our emotional responses is
crucial for the development of virtuous character. If our emotional responses are educated properly, we will
learn to take pleasure or pain in the right things. Like Plato, Aristotle thinks that we can take a person’s
pleasures and pains to be a sign of his state of character.
To explain what the virtuous person’s pleasures are like, Aristotle returns to the idea that virtue is an excellent
state of the person. Virtue is the state that makes a human being good and makes him perform his function
well (Nicomachean Ethics 1106a15–24). His function (his ergon or characteristic activity) is rational activity, so
when we exercise our fully developed rational powers well, when we realize our nature as rational beings, we
are good (virtuous) human beings and live well (we are happy) (Nicomachean Ethics, I.7).
According to Aristotle, human beings can reason in ways that non-human animals cannot. They can deliberate
about what to do, about what kind of lives to live, about what sort of persons to be. They can look for reasons
to act or live one way rather than another. In other words, they can engage in practical reasoning. They can
also think about the nature of the world and why it seems to behave as it does. They can consider scientific
and metaphysical truths about the universe. This is to engage in theoretical reasoning (“contemplation” or
theôria). There is no agreement among scholars as to whether, and how, these types of reasoning can be
distinguished. (For a discussion of theoretical and practical reason in Aristotle, see the related entry on
Aristotle’s ethics.) But as we shall see when we discuss Aristotle’s Politics, we can assume, for the purposes of
this discussion, that theoretical and practical rational activity are at least related types of rational activity, in that
each involves exercising one’s abilities to think and to know and to consider truths that one has figured out.
How do one realize these powers fully? Not by becoming adept at every kind of activity in which deliberating
and judging on the basis of reason is called for. For then one would have to master every kind of cultural,
scientific, and philosophical activity. Rather, Aristotle’s idea is that an individual develops these abilities to the
extent that he enjoys and values the exercise of his realized rational powers in a wide variety of different and
even seemingly unconnected activities. When that happens, his exercise of these abilities is a continuing
source of self-esteem and enjoyment. He comes to like his life and himself and is now a genuine self-lover
(Nicomachean Ethics 1168b28–1169a3).
In Nicomachean Ethics) IX.8, Aristotle clarifies the motives and reasoning of virtuous people by contrasting
genuine self-love with a defective type that is reproachable. People with reproachable self-love want most to
have the biggest share of money, honors, and bodily pleasures (cf. Nicomachean Ethics I.5). Because one
person cannot have a big share without denying these goods to others, these are the goods that are contested
and fought over. This competitive approach to these external goods leads to all sorts of morally vicious
behavior, for example, overreaching (pleonexia), aggression, wasteful luxury, intemperance, boastfulness, and
vanity. In contrast to reproachable self-lovers, genuine self-lovers will take pleasure in the right things (they will
enjoy the exercise of their deliberative and decision-making powers rather than the accumulation of wealth or
power). As a result, they will avoid many of the actions, and will be unattracted to many of the pleasures, of the
common vices. Because they have the proper attitude toward external goods, they will be ready to sacrifice
such goods if by doing so they achieve what is fine. They recognize that when everyone concentrates on doing
what is fine, their actions promote the common good (Nicomachean Ethics 1169a6). The virtuous person’s
reasoning reflects his correct conception of how to live (he has phronêsis or practical wisdom) and his concern
for the fine: he sees that his own good is included in the good of the community (Nicomachean Ethics 1169a3–
6).
The need for relationships and community
Because an individual’s good is included in the good of community, the full realization of an individual’s rational
powers is not something he can achieve or maintain on his own. It is hard, Aristotle says in Nicomachean
Ethics IX.9, for a solitary person to be continuously active, but it is easier with others. To realize our powers
fully we need at least a group of companions who share our interests and with whom we can cooperate to
achieve our mutually recognized goals. In this kind of cooperative activity, we are parts of a larger enterprise,
so that when others act, it is as though we are acting, too. In this way, these activities expand our conception
of who “we” are, and they make the use of our powers more continuous and more stable. Examples listed by
Aristotle include sailors on a ship, soldiers on an expedition, members of families, business relationships,
religious associations, citizens of a political community, and colleagues engaged in contemplative activity. As
Aristotle explains in Rhetoric II.4, if we and our cooperative partners do their parts responsibly, each will
develop feelings of friendship for the others involved. In this way, successful cooperative activity transforms
persons’ desires and motivations. Although we may have initiated activity for self-interested reasons, the
psychological result is that we come to like our cooperative partners and to develop a concern for their good for
their own sakes. This change, Aristotle indicates, is caused to occur in us. It is not chosen. Once bonds of
friendship are formed, it is natural for us to exhibit the social virtues Aristotle describes in Nicomachean Ethics
IV.6–8, which include generosity, friendliness, and mildness of temper.
Aristotle thinks that, in addition to friendships, wider social relations are required for the full development of our
rational powers. He says in Nicomachean Ethics I.7 that we are by nature political beings, whose capacities
are fully realized in a specific kind of political community (a polis or city-state). Aristotle’s ideal political
community is led by citizens who recognize the value of living fully active lives and whose aim is to make the
best life possible for their fellow citizens, thereby promoting the common good (Politics 1278b19–26, cf.
1280b8–12). When citizens deliberate and legislate about the community’s educational, office-holding, and
economic policies, their goal is to determine and promote the conditions under which citizens can fully develop
their deliberative and decision-making powers (Politics 1332b12–41).
Thus Aristotle recommends in Politics VII-VIII that the city provide a system of public education for all citizens,
a recommendation that was radical for his time. He envisions that young people will learn not simply to read
and write, but also to appreciate the beauty of the world around them and to gain some understanding of how
the universe works. If education is successful, young people will want to use their powers in deciding, judging,
and discriminating. They will then be well-positioned to take their place as decision-makers in the citizen
assembly and judicial system and, because of sortition and a system of office rotation, as eventual holders of
public office. The city’s economic policies support the aim of the political and educational institutions. Because
Aristotle sees that citizens need material resources if they are to participate fully in public life, he recommends
that the state distribute parcels of land to all. Yet there is no need, in his view, to establish economic equality,
as long as existing inequalities are not large enough to promote the formation of elite groups or to provoke
justified anger or envy. These various policies – educational, political, economic – make it possible for a sense
of justice to pervade the city, as they serve to confirm that all citizens are valued as equal practical deliberators
and policymakers.
Aristotle’s criticisms of deviant political states take a related line: states that encourage the consumption and
accumulation of external goods for their own sake, or states that promote warfare and military supremacy as
an end in itself, mistake the nature of the best human life. Citizens of such states will grow up to love most
something other than the exercise of realized human rational powers, and as a result they will be prone to such
traditional vices as injustice, lack of generosity, and intemperance.
That living well requires active political deliberation and policy-making explains why Aristotle excludes natural
slaves, women, and manual workers from citizenship, and helps to clarify his view that citizens should be
private property-owners. In Aristotle’s view, natural slaves lack the capacity for deliberation and decision-
making that is required for living well. Women have a deliberative capacity, but it is not “authoritative.” Manual
laborers are occupied with the production of necessities. They have decision-making powers, but their exercise
is limited by the laborer’s need to survive, for he must conform to the demands of his working conditions.
Moreover, manual work is often dull and repetitive, making little demand on workers’ rational powers. As
private property-owners, citizens are not vulnerable to these problems. With private property, an individual has
a supply of resources that is under his control; his decision determines what happens to it. Thus he is able to
take pleasure from generous action – from helping his friends, guests, and companions.
For more detailed discussion of the relation between Aristotle’s ethical and political views, see Irwin (1985,
1996, 2007), Kraut (2002) and Schofield (2006). On Aristotle’s discussions of friendship, see Cooper (1980).
Summary
Plato and Aristotle agree that excellent moral character involves more than a Socratic understanding of the
good. They think that virtue requires a harmony between cognitive and affective elements of the person.
Aristotle tries to explain what this harmony consists in by exploring the psychological foundations of moral
character. He thinks that the virtuous person is characterized by a nonstereotypical self-love that he
understands as a love of the exercise of fully realized rational activity. Yet this self-love is not an individual
achievement. Its development and preservation require (a) friendships in which individuals desire the good of
others for others’ own sakes and (b) a political community where citizens are equal and similar, and where
political and economic arrangements promote the conditions under which self-love and friendship flourish.

2.5 Stoic views of character

The Stoic school of philosophy existed for about five centuries, from its founding around 300 BCE to the
second century CE. Like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the Stoic philosophers differed on some issues about
the virtues, but they seemed also to have shared a common core of views. This section of the entry on
character will briefly discuss their common views.
The Stoic philosophers have a view of character that is close to Socrates’, but they reach it through agreement
with Aristotle. The Stoics assume that the good life for human beings is a life in accord with nature. They agree
with Aristotle that the human being’s essence is a life in accord with reason. So to find what accords with
nature, they look to the development of the human being’s rational powers. They think that as a person begins
to use reason instrumentally to satisfy and organize his desires and appetites, he comes to value the exercise
of reason for its own sake. He realizes that conduct that exhibits a rational order is far more valuable than any
of the natural advantages (such as health, friendship, or community) pursued by his individual actions. Human
good, after all, as Aristotle argued, should be stable, under our control, and hard to take from us. The Stoics
conclude that human good consists in excellent rational activity, for a person can guide his actions by rational
choice, no matter what misfortunes he may encounter. The virtuous person becomes the sage (sophos) who
has and acts on knowledge of the good. His actions are informed by his insights about the advantages of
perfecting one’s rationality by acting in agreement with the rational order of nature. Like Socrates, the Stoic
view of virtue focuses on the virtuous person’s cognitive state: it is his knowledge of the rational order of the
universe and his desire to accord with that rational order that leads him to act as he does.
To be virtuous, there is no need to develop any capacities other than cognitive capacities, for the Stoics claim
against Plato and Aristotle that there is really no non-rational part of the soul. Although the Stoics admit that
there are passions such as anger, fear, and so on, they treat them as mistaken judgments about what is good
and evil. Since the sage or virtuous person is wise and has no mistaken judgments about the good, he has no
passions. So if the sage loses any natural advantages in misfortune, he has no emotion about them. Rather,
he views them as “indifferents” (adiaphora). One might wonder, then, how the sage can truly be said to be
virtuous. For if he views the health and welfare of himself and others as indifferents, why would he act to
secure or protect his or others’ welfare, as presumably a virtuous person would? The Stoics reply that natural
advantages are still pursued, but only to achieve agreement with nature and to realize fully one’s rational
powers. They are “preferred indifferents.”
Unlike Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics did not think virtue was developed and sustained by any particular kind of
community. Granted, social relationships and community are among the preferred indifferents in that they are
to be preferred to the opposite conditions of hostility, war, and enmity. But they are not necessary for anyone’s
happiness. If we lose them, it is not a loss of a genuine good. So the Stoic Epictetus (c. 55–c.135), a freed
slave, argued that the death of one’s family members is no real loss and is no worse than the breaking of a
cup. The community that did matter to the Stoics was cosmic. When persons achieve perfect rationality, they
accord with the rational order of a universe ruled by divine reason. This shows that all of us, virtuous or not, are
ruled by one law and so belong to one universal community. As rational beings, we recognize this for we
recognize that we share reason with other human beings. The Stoic Marcus Aurelius (121–180), a Roman
emperor, makes the connections in this way: “If this be so [i.e., that reason is shared], then also the reason
which enjoins what is to be done or left undone is common. If this be so, law also is common; if this be so, we
are citizens; if this be so, we are partakers in one constitution; if this be so, the Universe is a kind of
Commonwealth” (Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations, iv.4). The Stoics concluded that, as rational beings, we
have no reason not to extend our concern beyond our family, friends, and immediate community to our fellow-
citizens of the world community.
The Stoics came to represent a way of life according to which someone might strive for the well-being of
others, whether friend or stranger, without caring about material rewards or worldly success. Because their
view of virtue was independent of any particular social or political structure, their message held an appeal for
all sorts of people, Greek or non-Greek, slave or free, rich or poor.
For more detailed discussion of Greek views of character, see Dent (1975), Irwin (1989, 1996), and Sherman
(1989).
3. Virtue and moral character after the Greeks
Since the publication of Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” in 1958 (see Introduction above), it has
become routine to say that virtue and moral character have been neglected topics in the development of
western moral philosophy since the Greeks. Rather than thinking about what it is to flourish and live well, moral
philosophers, it is argued, became focused on a different set of notions: obligation, duty, and law.
Anscombe and others have suggested how such a move might have taken place. The Stoic ideas outlined
above may have influenced early Christians such as St. Paul to develop the idea of a natural law that applies
to all human beings. Once Christianity became more widespread, natural law could be understood in terms of
God’s directives in the Bible. Still later, after the European political revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries,
there was intellectual room for secularized versions of the same idea to take hold: duty or obligation was
understood in terms of obedience to moral law(s) or principles that do not come from God but are devised by
human beings. Morally right action was action in accord with moral law(s) or principles. On such a view, where
the central focus is on obedience to moral law, the virtues and moral character are secondary to action in
accordance with law. Someone who acts rightly may develop standing habits or dispositions of doing so, and
these habits then constitute the virtues or good character.
This section of the entry on moral character will provide a brief summary of some important developments both
in this “modern” approach to moral character and in what appear to be revivals of the pre-Christian Greek
interest in the psychological foundations of character.
3.1 Early natural law theorists
In the writings of the early natural law theorists, Greek views of virtue sometimes came under strong criticism.
Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), for example, objected to Aristotle’s approach to virtue and especially to his
attempts to find a mean in terms of which to understand justice. It does not matter, Grotius complained, what
moves someone to act unjustly – the only thing that matters is that unjust action violates the rights of others.
Grotius acknowledged that one may develop emotional habits that support right action, but he thought this was
a matter of having reason control passions and emotions so that they do not interfere with right action. That
reason should control passions indicates that the desired state is for one part of us to rule the other, not for
both parts, in Aristotle’s words, to speak with the same voice. On this view, moral character is a state closer to
what the Greeks considered self-mastery or continence than it is to what they considered virtue.
Even though the natural law theorists tended to assimilate virtue to continence, they still admitted that that
there was an area of moral life in which motive and character mattered. That was the area of “imperfect duty”
(as contrasted with “perfect duty”). Under a perfect duty what is owed is specific and legally enforceable by
political society or courts; but action in accord with imperfect duty cannot be compelled, and what is owed
under an imperfect duty is imprecise. Generosity is an example of the latter, justice of the former. In the case of
generosity, one has a duty to be generous, but one cannot be legally compelled to be generous, and when or
how generosity is shown is not precisely specifiable. But in the case of generosity, the motive of the agent
counts. For if I give money to a poor person I encounter on the street and do so because I want others to think
well of me, I have not acted generously and performed my imperfect duty. When I give generously, I must do
so out of concern for the good of the person to whom I give the money.
For more detailed discussion of Grotius and the natural law theorists, and of the modern developments
Anscombe attacked, see Schneewind (1990, 1998). For a discussion of the persistence of Aristotelian ethics in
the early modern period and a response to Schneewind, see Frede (2013).
3.2 Kant
The tendencies to find room for motive and character in the area of imperfect duty, and to assimilate virtue with
continence, resurface in the writings of several moral philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries. Immanuel
Kant (1724–1804) is an illustrative case. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant divides moral philosophy into two
domains, that of justice or law on the one hand (the Doctrine of Right), and that of ethics or virtue on the other
(the Doctrine of Virtue). The duties that form the subject matter of the Doctrine of Right are like the natural law
theorists’ perfect duties: they are precise, owed to specifiable others, and can be legally enforced. They require
that we take or forego certain actions. Other duties (which form the subject matter of the Doctrine of Virtue) are
duties to adopt certain ends. Many of them are imperfect, in that they do not specify how, when, or for whom
(in the case of duties to others) they should be achieved. Examples are the duty not to let one’s talents rust or
the duty not to deny help to others. Because we cannot be compelled to adopt ends, but must do so from free
choice, these duties are not legally enforceable. They require inner, not outer, legislation, so we must impose
them on ourselves. Because, according to Kant, we are always fighting against the impulses and dispositions
that oppose the moral law, we need strength of will and self-mastery to fulfill our imperfect duties. This self-
mastery Kant calls courage.
That virtue is a form of continence for Kant is also suggested by his treatment of other traits such as gratitude
and sympathy. Although Kant thinks that feelings cannot be required of anyone, some feelings are
nevertheless associated with the moral ends we adopt. If we adopt others’ happiness as an end, we will not
take malicious pleasure in their downfall. On the contrary, we will naturally feel gratitude for their benevolence
and sympathy for their happiness. These feelings will make it easier for us to perform our duties and are a sign
that we are disposed to do so. Kant remarks of sympathy that “it is one of the impulses that nature has
implanted in us to do what the representation of duty alone would not accomplish” (Kant, Metaphysics of
Morals, Ak. 457).
Thus it matters to Kant that we perform the duties of virtue with the properly cultivated emotions. But to do so is
not to develop our nature so that the two parts of us, reason and passion, are unified and speak with the same
voice. Rather, if we perform our duties of virtue in the right spirit, one part of us, reason, retains control over the
other part, passion. Kant writes that virtue “contains a positive command to a man, namely to bring all his
capacities and inclinations under his (reason’s) control and so to rule over himself … for unless reason holds
the reins of government in its own hands, man’s feelings and inclinations play the master over him” (Kant,
Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. 408).
For more detailed discussion of Kant’s views on virtue, see O’Neill (1996).
Yet there are other philosophers for whom an interest in virtue or good character takes a turn more reminiscent
of the Greeks. This revival of Greek ideas can be seen in philosophers who show an interest in the
psychological foundations of good character.
3.3 Hume
David Hume (1711–1776) explicitly professes a preference for ancient ethics (Hume, Enquiries, 318), claiming
that morals are the one science in which the ancients are not surpassed by the moderns (Hume, Enquiries,
330). Like some of the Greek moralists, Hume thought morality must be rooted in our passional nature. For
morality moves us to action whereas reason alone, Hume thought, does not. His preference for ancient ethics
is most obviously seen in his focus on the nature of the virtues and in his efforts to explain how virtues arise
from our feelings and desires.
Hume divides the virtues into two types: artificial and natural. Artificial virtues include justice, promise-keeping,
and allegiance to legitimate government. Natural virtues include courage, magnanimity, ambition, friendship,
generosity, fidelity, and gratitude, among many others. Whereas each exercise of the natural virtues normally
produces good results, the good of artificial virtues is indirect in that it comes about only as a result of there
being an accepted practice of exercising these virtues.
Hume’s discussion of justice illustrates how the artificial virtues emerge from our feelings and desires. Hume
notes that following the rules of justice does not always produce good results. Consider the judges who
“bestow on the dissolute the labour of the industrious; and put into the hands of the vicious the means of
harming both themselves and others” (Hume, Treatise, 579). Hume thinks that as persons become aware that
stability of possessions is advantageous to each individually, they also realize that stability is not possible
unless everyone refrains from disturbing others’ possessions. As this awareness becomes more widespread
and effective in people’s behaviors, there arises a convention to respect the possessions of others. This
redirection of self-interest, aided by our natural tendency to sympathize with the feelings of others who benefit
from stability of possession, gives rise to our approval of justice. In this way, Hume argues, the virtue of
obeying laws arises naturally from our feelings and desires.
Hume’s indebtedness to Greek ethics can be seen even more clearly in his discussion of the natural virtues. Of
these, one important group (consisting of courage, magnanimity, ambition, and others) is based on, or may
even be a form of, self-esteem: “[W]hatever we call heroic virtue, and admire under the character of greatness
and elevation of mind, is either nothing but a steady and well-established pride and self-esteem, or partakes
largely of that passion. Courage … and all the other shining virtues of that kind, have plainly a strong mixture of
self-esteem in them, and derive a great part of their merit from that origin” (Hume, Treatise, 599–600). Yet
these virtues based on self-esteem must be tempered by a second group that includes generosity,
compassion, fidelity, and friendship; otherwise traits like courage are “fit only to make a tyrant and public
robber” (Hume, Treatise, 603). This second group of virtues is based on broadly-based feelings of good will,
affection, and concern for others.
Hume acknowledges that his second group of natural virtues owes a debt to the Stoic view that a virtuous
person ought to be concerned with the welfare of all human beings, whether they be intimate or stranger; and
in describing the first group of natural virtues, Hume looks to Socrates as someone who has achieved a kind of
inner calm and self-esteem. In addition, his general approach to the natural virtues, that some are based on
self-esteem and others on friendly feelings and good will, is reminiscent of Aristotle’s exploration of the
psychological foundations of virtue.
Hume believes that we develop self-esteem from what we do well, if what we do well expresses something
distinctive and durable about us, and he seems to recognize that realized deliberative abilities are among the
most durable features of ourselves. As we gain a facility at deliberation, we come to develop self-esteem and
enjoy who we are, like Aristotle’s virtuous person who enjoys most the exercise of his developed deliberative
powers. Moreover, Hume’s recognition that self-esteem must be tempered by benevolence is reflected in
Aristotle’s argument that the development and preservation of proper self-love requires friendships in which
persons come to care for others for others’ own sakes.
In addition to exploring these psychological foundations of virtue, Hume seems to accord them a role that is
reminiscent of the Aristotelian view that virtue is a state in which reason and passion speak with the same
voice. Instead of making virtue and good character subordinate to the requirements of reason, as we saw in
the natural law theorists and in Kant, Hume appears to give virtue and good character room to guide and
constrain the deliberations of agents so as to affect what they determine to be best to do. By doing so, Hume
goes some way toward indicating how good character is different from continence.
Hume’s account of how we determine what is right and wrong illuminates the role character plays. When
Hume’s “judicious spectator” determines what is right and wrong, she fixes on some “steady and general” point
of view and “loosens” herself from her actual feelings and interests. It appears that someone who has
developed an enjoyment in the activities of deliberating and reflecting, and whose self-esteem is based on that
enjoyment, will be more likely to take up the point of view of the judicious spectator and to perform the subtle
corrections in response that may be necessary to loosen oneself from one’s own perspective and specific
passions. Someone whose self-esteem is based on an enjoyment taken in deliberation will be attuned to wider
complications and will have the wider imaginative powers needed for correct deliberation from a steady and
general point of view. Hume’s view of the relation between passion and deliberation is reminiscent of the
Aristotelian view that someone with proper self-love will also be practically wise, in that his self-love will enable
him to size up practical situations correctly and determine correctly what it is best to do.
For more detailed discussion of Hume’s view of the virtues, see Baier (1991). On Hume’s indebtedness to
Greek ethics, see Homiak (2000).

3.4 Marx and Mill

Another illustration of the use of Greek views of character can be found in the writings of Karl Marx (1818–
1883) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). Although Marx is best known for his virulent criticism of capitalism
and Mill for his exposition and defense of liberal utilitarianism, these philosophers are treated together here
because their approach to character is at crucial points deeply Aristotelian. Both Marx and Mill accept
Aristotle’s insight that virtue and good character are based on a self-esteem and self-confidence that arises
from a satisfaction taken in the fully realized expression of the rational powers characteristic of human beings.
They also accept Aristotle’s recognition that the production and preservation of this type of self-esteem require
that individuals be part of specific socio-political structures. Aristotle emphasized the need for a special type of
political community. Marx attended to smaller democratic workplaces. Mill’s focus, still different, was on
political equality and equality in the family.
Marx’s early Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 is famous for the discussion of how the
organization of work under capitalism alienates workers and encourages them to accept the values of capitalist
society. Workers who are committed to capitalist values are characterized primarily by self-interested attitudes.
They are most interested in material advancement for themselves, they are distrustful of others’ seemingly
good intentions, and they view others primarily as competitors for scarce positions. Given these attitudes, they
are prone to a number of vices, including cowardice, intemperance, and lack of generosity.
Marx’s discussion of alienated labor suggests how work can be re-organized to eliminate alienation, undermine
commitment to traditional capitalist values and goals, and produce attitudes more characteristic of Aristotle’s
virtuous person. The key to this transformation lies in re-organizing the nature of work so that workers can
express what Marx calls their “species-being” or those features of the self that are characteristically human.
Very much like Aristotle, Marx seems to mean by this an individual’s ability to reason, and in particular his
powers of choosing, deciding, discriminating, and judging. If work is re-organized to enable workers to express
their rational powers, then each worker will perform tasks that are interesting and mentally challenging (no
worker will perform strictly monotonous, routine, unskilled tasks). In addition, workers will participate in
deliberations about the ends to be achieved by the work they do and how to achieve those ends. And, finally,
these deliberations will be organized democratically so that the opinions of each worker are fairly taken into
account. When these conditions are put into place, labor is no longer “divided” between skilled and unskilled or
between managerial and non-managerial. Marx suggests that if work is reorganized in these ways, it will
promote feelings of solidarity and camaraderie among workers and eventually between these workers and
those in similar situations elsewhere. For the fact that workers can express their characteristic human powers
in action, coupled with the egalitarian conditions in the workplace, can upset competitive feelings and promote
respect by removing the bases for inferiority and superiority. Workers then come to exhibit some of the more
traditional virtues such as generosity and trustfulness, and avoid some of the more traditional vices such as
cowardice, stinginess, and self-indulgence.
That Marx’s views seem derivative of Aristotle’s in important ways is not surprising, for, unlike Hume whose
knowledge of Aristotle is not fully known, Marx explicitly drew upon Aristotle’s works. For further discussion of
the extent to which Marx drew on Aristotle, see DeGolyer (1985).
John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) defended a version of liberal utilitarianism, but scholars disagree about what kind
of utilitarianism that was. We can safely say that, as a utilitarian, Mill thought human conduct should promote
the happiness or welfare of those affected. But was Mill an act-utilitarian, who thought that right acts are those
that promote as much happiness as can be done on the particular occasion, given the alternatives available to
the agent? Or was he a rule-utilitarian, who thought that right conduct was conduct permitted by rules that,
when publicly known to be generally accepted or followed, would maximize happiness or welfare? Or was he a
motive-utilitarian, who thought that one should act as the person with the motives or virtues most productive of
happiness should act? (For a discussion of these interpretive questions, see the related entry on Mill’s moral
and political philosophy.) Although this entry will steer clear of these interpretive hurdles and will concentrate
on Mill’s discussion of the nature of happiness and of some of the institutional structures that can promote
happiness, these questions of interpretation will be relevant to a final assessment of Mill in Section 4, below.
In his essay On Liberty Mill claims that his version of utilitarianism rests on a conception of happiness that is
appropriate to people as “progressive” beings (Mill 1975, 12). And in Utilitarianism he suggests that this
conception is focused on the “higher pleasures” that serve to distinguish humans from animals (Mill 1979, 7–
11). These higher pleasures turn out to be the activities and pursuits that exercise what in Aristotle’s view are
our powers of practical deliberation – of choosing, judging, deciding, and discriminating. In On Liberty, Mill
writes: “He who lets the world … choose his plan of life for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-
like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself employs all his faculties. He must use observation to
see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and
when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold his deliberate decision” (Mill 1975, 56). As a person
develops his powers of practical deliberation and comes to enjoy their exercise, he gains the self-esteem that
is the basis of a virtuous and well-lived life.
For further discussion of Mill’s view of happiness, see Brink (1992).
Mill argued that seriously unequal societies, by preventing individuals from developing their deliberative
powers, mold individuals’ character in unhealthy ways and impede their ability to live virtuous lives. For
example, Mill argued, in deep disagreement with the views of his own time, that societies that have
systematically subordinated women have harmed both men and women, making it almost impossible for men
and women to form relationships of genuine intimacy and understanding. In The Subjection of Women, Mill
wrote that the family, as constituted at his time, was a “school of despotism,” which taught those who benefited
from it the vices of selfishness, self-indulgence, and injustice. Among working class men, the fact that wives
were excessively dependent on their husbands inspired meanness and savagery. In chapter IV of The
Subjection of Women, Mill goes so far as to claim that “[a]ll the selfish propensities, the self-worship, the unjust
self-preference, which exist among mankind, have their source and root in, and derive their principal
nourishment from, the present constitution of the relation between men and women” (Mill 1988, 86). Women
who have been legally and socially subordinated to men become meek, submissive, self-sacrificing, and
manipulative. In brief, men evidence the vices of the slave master, while women evidence the vices of the
slave. For moral lives and psychologically healthy relationships to be possible, Mill called for altered marital
arrangements, supported by changes in law, that would promote the development and exercise of women’s
deliberative powers along with men’s. Only under such conditions could women and men acquire feelings of
real self-esteem rather than feelings of false inferiority and superiority.
Like Aristotle, Mill recognized the power of political institutions to transform individuals’ desires and aims and to
improve them morally. In chapter III of Considerations on Representative Government, Mill writes approvingly
of the democratic institutions of ancient Athens. He believed that by participating in these institutions,
Athenians were called upon to rise above their individual partialities and to consider the general good. By co-
operating with others in governing their community, he wrote, each citizen “is made to feel himself one of the
public, and whatever is their interest to be his interest” (Mill 1991, 79).
And like Marx, Mill recognized the morally disturbing effects of a life limited to routine and unskilled labor. In
Principles of Political Economy, he recommended that relations of economic dependence between capitalists
and workers be eliminated in favor of cooperatives either of workers with capitalists or of workers alone. In
these associations members were to be roughly equal owners of tools, raw materials, and capital. They worked
as skilled craftspersons under self-imposed rules. They elected and removed their own managers. By elevating
the dignity of labor, Mill thought such cooperatives could convert “each human being’s daily occupation into a
school of the social sympathies and the practical intelligence” and bring people as close to social justice as
could be imagined (Mill 1900, vol. 2, 295).
3.5 T. H. Green
T. H. Green (1836–1882) began as a student and teacher of classics before turning to philosophy. He knew
Plato’s and Aristotle’s Greek texts well. In developing his view of a person’s good in Book III of his
Prolegomena to Ethics, Green finds his own views anticipated in Plato and Aristotle and especially in Aristotle’s
treatment of happiness, the human good, and the particular virtues. Green aims to show that a person’s good
consists in his “self-satisfaction” or “self-realization.” To realize the self requires that one fully develop his
capacities as a rational agent. And that requires aiming at the good of others for their own sake. Green thought
Aristotle was right about the nature of the virtuous person’s motive. In Prolegomena 263 he notes Aristotle’s
view that the virtuous person acts tou kalou heneka (for the sake of the fine), and he recognizes that acting in
this way requires that the agent have concern for the good of the community. So the agent’s good is connected
to the good of others.
To illustrate his reading of Aristotle, Green discusses two of Aristotle’s virtues: courage and temperance. He
notes that both virtues appear to be more restricted in scope than commonsense would suggest. In discussing
courage, Aristotle limits courage to facing fear in danger of death in defense of one’s city (Nicomachean Ethics
1115a25–29). A man who faces death by drowning or disease is not courageous. Courage is restricted to
facing death in battle for one’s city because such action aims at the common good and is the finest form of
death. Green uses these points in Aristotle’s discussion to show that Aristotle’s view rests on a general
principle that can widen the circumstances of courage in a way that Green accepts. In Green’s view, courage is
a matter of facing the danger of death “in the service of the highest public cause which the agent can conceive”
(1969, 260).
Green explains Aristotle’s restrictions on temperance in a similar way. Not every form of restraint counts as
temperance for Aristotle. It is limited to restraint of the pleasures of appetitive desires for food, drink, and sex,
the pleasures we share with non-human animals. The intemperate person is like the gourmand who prayed
that his throat might become longer than a crane’s: he is interested in sensation and does not value the
exercise of his rational capacities. Green recognizes that Aristotle needs to check these appetitive desires
because intemperance is a danger to the common good. He writes: “such a check should be kept on the lusts
of the flesh as might prevent them from issuing in what a Greek knew as hubris – a kind of self-assertion and
aggression upon the rights of others … which was looked upon as the antithesis of the civil spirit” (1969, 263).
Green was right to find his views anticipated in the Greeks. He saw, as Aristotle did, that living well requires the
exercise of one’s developed rational powers, and that persons who have realized their powers and have
formed virtuous traits of character aim at the common good, which is a part of their own good. Like Aristotle,
Green thought that such development required that one be a participant in a special kind of political community
– one “where the free combination of mutually respecting citizens” enact equal law and the common good
(1969, 263).
For further discussion of Green’s interpretation and use of Aristotle’s views, see Irwin (2009).
3.6 Rawls
As indicated in the introduction to this entry, a renewed philosophical interest in questions of virtue and
character was indirectly the result of the publication in 1971 of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. In contrast to
many of his contemporaries who focused on meta-ethical questions and the meaning of moral terms, Rawls
(1921–2002) moved moral and political philosophy in a practical direction and stimulated modern philosophers
to explore the psychological grounding of good moral character. Early in Part II of A Theory of Justice, Rawls
makes what he calls a “perfectly obvious” point – that the social system shapes the wants and aspirations that
its citizens come to have. It determines “in part the sort of persons they want to be as well as the sort of
persons they are” (1999a, 229). These points, Rawls claims, have always been recognized.
How do just institutions shape our wants and aims and affect the sort of people we become? The institutions of
interest to Rawls are those that make up a society’s “basic structure”. These are the institutions that make
social cooperation possible and productive. They include the political constitution, the structure of the
economy, legalized forms of property ownership, the family in some form, and others. Rawls defends two
principles of justice as regulations for the basic structure of his just society: (1) the equal liberties principle,
according to which each person has the same claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties. (2) and a
second principle that specifies two conditions that must be satisfied in order for socio-economic inequalities to
be permissible. These conditions are fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle.
Consider Rawls’s discussion of the guarantee of equal liberties under the first principle of justice. This principle
covers two types of liberties, personal liberties and political liberties. Under this principle, each person is
entitled to liberties of both kinds as a basic right. But Rawls goes further to argue that political liberties must be
assured their “fair value” (1999a, 243). This means that chances to hold office and to exercise political
influence must be independent of socio-economic position. Otherwise, “political power rapidly accumulates and
becomes unequal” (1999a, 199). To preserve fair value, Rawls does not follow Aristotle’s strategy of making
political participation a requirement of all citizens. Yet he shares with Aristotle the view that the guarantee of
fair value has the aim of promoting and sustaining citizens’ common status as equal citizens (1999a, 205–206).
Moreover, Rawls agrees with Mill that political participation contributes to the moral development of citizens. As
noted in Section 3.4 above, when praising Athenian democracy, Mill writes that when a citizen participates in
public deliberation, “he is called upon … to weigh interests not his own, to be guided, in case of conflicting
claims by another rule than his private partialities; to apply at every turn principles and maxims which have for
their reason of existence the general good … . He is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is
their interest to be his interest” (1991, 79). The guarantee of political liberty both strengthens citizens’ sense of
their own value and enlarges their moral sensibilities.
In part III, Rawls turns to the question of how individuals acquire a desire to act justly, and to do so for the right
reasons, when they have lived under and benefited from just institutions (1999a, 399). Rawls’s account is
indebted to Aristotle’s views in several ways. First, Rawls holds, as Aristotle did, that if proper institutions are in
place, then the attitudes and behaviors associated with the desire to act justly will emerge naturally, as a result
of psychological tendencies persons experience in ordinary life. For, other things being equal, it is part of
human psychology to enjoy most the exercise of one’s realized powers (see Rawls’s discussion of what he
calls the Aristotelian Principle), to enjoy the realization of others’ powers (see his discussion of the “companion
effect” to the Aristotelian principle), and to form ties of attachment and friendship to persons and institutions
who promote one’s good. Second, and again like Aristotle, Rawls argues that if citizens are fortunate to live in
a community that provides the basic goods they need for realizing their powers and that offers them
opportunities to develop and use their abilities in shared activities with others, then they will develop a stable
sense of their own value that is based on their own accomplishments and their status as equal citizens, rather
than on a position more advantaged relative to others. With a stable sense of their own value and a reasonable
hope of achieving their aims, citizens will want to act justly for the right reasons. They will not be prone to
rancor, jealousy, and hostile envy, “one of the vices of hating mankind” (1999a, 466).
Only a brief discussion of these points of coincidence is possible here. Consider, first, sections 72–75 of A
Theory of Justice, where Rawls outlines what he calls the three stages of moral development, governed by
three psychological laws. These laws explain how individuals come to have new, non-derivative, final ends as
they acquire ties of love, friendship, affection, and trust. As Aristotle recognized, these ties are caused to occur
in individuals as they come to recognize others’ evident intention to act for their good, and to enjoy what they
and others can do.
At the first stage of moral development, on the assumption that family institutions are just, children come to
love their parents as a result of their parents’ demonstrating clearly that their children are enjoyed and valued.
At the second stage, on the assumption that cooperative associations are fairly arranged and known to be so,
members of reasonably successful cooperative associations (Rawls’s “social unions”) come to enjoy and value
their cooperative partners. This happens when members do their parts responsibly, each contributing to a
mutually recognized goal, and where all participants display appropriate abilities. Under these conditions,
participants come to enjoy their own participation, to enjoy the display of others’ skills and abilities, and to form
ties of friendship and trust with their cooperative partners. Because the activities are complementary,
individuals can see themselves in what others do. In this way, individuals’ sense of what they are doing is
worthwhile. Their self-love, to use Aristotelian language, becomes a group achievement.
Finally, at the third stage, as individuals come to realize how the institutions regulated by the principles of
justice promote their good and the good of their fellow citizens, they become attached to these principles and
develop a desire to apply and to act in accordance with them. Like the major institutions of Aristotle’s ideal
polis, the institutions regulated by Rawls’s two principles of justice have as their aim to promote citizens’ good
by providing the social bases of individuals’ self-worth (Rawls’s primary good of “self-respect”). The provision
of equal liberties in accordance with the first principle of justice enables citizens to form the associations in
which their common aims and ideals can be pursued. As we have seen, these associations are necessary for
self-respect to be produced and maintained. The guarantee of the fair value of political liberty, along with fair
equality of opportunity under Rawls’s second principle of justice, prevent excessive accumulation of property
and wealth and maintain equal opportunity of education for all, enabling everyone with similar motivation and
ability to have roughly equal prospects of culture and achievement (1999a, 63). Taken together, these two
principles ensure that persons have reasonable hopes of achieving their aims. Finally, the difference principle
serves to ensure everyone a decent standard of living, no matter what individual citizens’ social position,
natural talents, or fortune may be. The difference principle, Rawls writes, corresponds to the “idea of not
wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less well off” (1999a, 90). In
these various ways, the two principles, in combination, amount to a publicly acknowledged recognition that
each citizen has equal worth.
Once these just institutions are in place, Rawls thinks that the worst aspects of the social division of labor can
be overcome. No one, he writes, “need be servilely dependent on others and made to choose between
monotonous and routine occupations which are deadening to human thought and sensibility” (1999a, 464).
Here Rawls notes the same problems with many types of paid labor that so disturbed Aristotle. Paid labor often
limits the worker’s exercise of her decision-making powers and requires her to conform to the direction of
others. Of course, Rawls does not suggest solving these problems as Aristotle did. But he thinks that they
need to be solved, and that a just society can solve them, perhaps by adopting Mill’s proposal (see Section 3.4
above) to restructure workplaces to become worker-managed cooperatives (2001, 178).
For further discussion of Rawls’s views on how institutions shape our characters, see Freeman (2007, ch. 6)
and Edmundson (2017, ch. 3).
4. Contemporary Questions About Character
Marx, Mill, and Rawls suggest how character can be molded by antecedent circumstances – Marx by
economic structures; Mill by paid work, political life, and family relationships; Rawls by the institutions regulated
by the two principles of justice. Yet these insights about the effect of institutions on character seem to raise
other, more troubling questions: if our character is the result of social and political institutions beyond our
control, then perhaps we are not in control of our characters at all and becoming decent is not a real possibility.
Among contemporary philosophers, Susan Wolf is one of several who address these worries. In her Freedom
Within Reason Wolf argues that almost any morally problematic upbringing could be coercive and could render
a person unable to see what he ought morally to do or render him unable to act on that recognition. As
examples, Wolf cites ordinary citizens of Nazi Germany, white children of slave owners in the 1850s, and
persons brought up to embrace conventional sex roles. Wolf thinks that there is no method for determining
which upbringings and influences are consistent with an ability to see what should be done and to act
accordingly, and hence she thinks there is always the risk that we are less responsible for our actions than we
may hope.
Such skepticism may be misplaced. For if good character is based on naturally occurring psychological
responses that most people (including persons brought up to embrace racist and sexist beliefs) experience
without difficulty, then most people should be able to become better and to be responsible for actions that
express (or could express) their character.
Still, this is not to say that changing one’s character is easy, straightforward, or quickly achieved. If character is
formed or malformed by the structures of political, economic, and family life, then changing one’s character
may require access to the appropriate transforming forces, which may not be available. In modern societies,
for example, many adults still work at alienating jobs that do not afford opportunity to realize the human powers
and to experience the pleasures of self-expression. Women in particular, because of unequal domestic
arrangements, nearly total responsibility for childcare, and sex segregation in the workplace, often endure low-
paying, dead-end jobs that encourage feelings of self-hatred. In a family where economic, and hence
psychological, power is unequal between women and men, affection, as Mill recognized, may harm both
parties. Thus many women and men today may not be well-positioned to develop fully the psychological
capacities Aristotle, Marx, Mill, and Rawls considered foundational to virtuous character.
These considerations indicate why character has become a central issue not only in ethics, but also in feminist
philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of education, and philosophy of literature. If developing good moral
character requires being members of a community in which citizens can fully realize their human powers and
ties of friendship, then one needs to ask how educational, economic, political, and social institutions should be
structured to make that development possible. Some contemporary philosophers are now addressing these
issues. For example, Martha Nussbaum uses Aristotelian virtues to outline a democratic ideal in (1990b). In
(1996) Andrew Mason explores how capitalist market forces make it difficult for virtues to flourish. In (1987)
Jon Elster interprets Marx as offering a conception of the good life that consists in active self-realization, which
can be promoted or blocked by economic and political institutions. In (1993) John Bernard Murphy reconstructs
Aristotle’s views on practical deliberation and decision-making to show how they can yield a theory of
productive labor that helps us see what is wrong with work in the contemporary world and how to re-organize
it. Rosalind Hursthouse applies an Aristotelian view of the emotions to an investigation of racist attitudes in
(2001). In (2010) Marcia Homiak develops Aristotle’s and Mill’s views on the transformative power of
institutions to explore the possibilities for living virtuously in an imperfect world. Laurence Thomas (1989) uses
Aristotle’s discussions of self-love and friendship to argue that friendship helps to develop and maintain good
moral character. And if one is interested in understanding what the nature of moral character is and the extent
to which it can be altered, one will find useful examples of both good and bad moral character in literary
writers. For philosophical discussion of literary writers’ use of character, see Taylor (1996) and Nussbaum
(1990a).
Finally, it might be useful to note that this brief discussion of the history of philosophical views of character
indicates that character has played, or can play, an important role in a variety of western ethical traditions, from
Greek virtue-centered views to Kantianism to utilitarianism to Marxism. So Anscombe’s provocative claim with
which this entry began – that the two major traditions in modern moral theory (Kantianism and utilitarianism)
have ignored questions of virtue and character to their detriment – does not seem altogether true.
Nevertheless, some of the views surveyed here seem to give a more prominent role to character and virtue
than do others. It is not easy to explain precisely what this prominence consists in. Although a full treatment of
these issues is beyond the scope of this essay, a preliminary indication of how they might be addressed can be
provided. For further discussion of these questions, see Trianosky (1990), Watson (1990), Homiak (1997), and
Hursthouse (2001).
As this entry has indicated, Kant’s views do provide a role for virtue, for it matters to Kant that we perform our
imperfect duties with the right spirit. The virtuous person has the properly cultivated tendencies to feel that
make it easier for her to perform her imperfect duties. These feelings support her recognition of what is right
and are a sign that she is disposed to perform her duties. Because Kant views the emotions as recalcitrant and
in continual need of reason’s control, virtue amounts to a kind of self-mastery or continence. One might put this
point by saying that, for Kant, virtuous character is subordinate to the claims of practical reason.
Aristotle’s view, on the other hand, is usually considered a paradigm example of a “virtue ethics”, an ethical
theory that gives priority to virtuous character. To see what this might mean, recall that Aristotle’s virtuous
person is a genuine self-lover who enjoys most the exercise of her abilities to think and know. This enjoyment
guides her practical determinations of what actions are appropriate in what circumstances and renders her
unattracted to the pleasures associated with the common vices. Her properly cultivated emotional tendencies
are not viewed as recalcitrant aspects of her being that need to be controlled by reason. Rather, her practical
decisions are informed and guided by the enjoyment she takes in her rational powers. One might put this point
by saying that, in Aristotle’s view, practical deliberation is subordinate to character.
One might then ask of other ethical views whether they take practical deliberation to be subordinate to
character or vice versa. As this entry has indicated, Hume appears to side with Aristotle and to give character
priority over practical deliberation. For he suggests that someone with the natural virtues based on self-esteem
will have the wider imaginative powers needed for correct deliberation from the standpoint of the judicious
spectator. Whether character is subordinate to reason for Mill may depend on what sort of utilitarianism Mill
can be shown to espouse. If he is a motive-utilitarian who thinks that one should act as the person with the
motives or virtues most productive of happiness would act, then a case could be made for his giving character
priority over practical reason. If, on the other hand, he is an act- or rule-utilitarian, he would seem to give
character a role that is subordinate to reason. These brief remarks indicate that the question of whether an
ethical theorist gives priority to character can only be determined by a thorough analysis of the various critical
elements of that philosopher’s view.
5. Moral Character and Empirical Studies
5.1 The challenge posed by situationism
This section will begin with a brief discussion of some recent philosophical work on character that relies on
results in experimental social psychology. This philosophical work calls into question the conceptions of
character and virtue that are of concern especially to the ancient Greek moralists and to contemporary
philosophers whose work derives from ancient views. Philosophers impressed by this tradition in experimental
social psychology – which is often labeled “situationism”– have denied that traits of character are stable,
consistent, or evaluatively integrated in the way that ancient or contemporary philosophers suggest. The
ancient moralists assumed that virtues are, in John Doris’s description, “robust traits: if a person has a robust
trait, they can be confidently expected to display trait-relevant behavior across a wide variety of trait-relevant
situations, even where some or all of these situations are not optimally conducive to such behavior” (2002, 18).
Doris and others argue that traits are not robust in this sense. They are not stable or consistent and are
wrongly invoked to explain why people act as they do. Rather, these philosophers argue, and as the
experimental tradition indicates, much of human behavior is attributable to seemingly trivial features of the
situations in which persons find themselves. Hence the appropriateness of the label “situationist” for the
philosophers espousing these views. For variations on this view, see Harman (1999, 2000), Doris (2002), and
Vranas (2005).
It is beyond the scope of this entry to discuss this work in detail. Some summary remarks, however, are in
order. (For a detailed discussion, see the entries on empirical approaches to moral character, section 1, and
moral psychology: empirical approaches, section 4.)
Skepticism about robust traits of character emerges from some famous experiments in social psychology. For
example, in one experiment persons who found a dime in a phone booth were far more likely to help a
confederate who dropped some papers than were those who did not find a dime. Another experiment involved
seminary students who agreed to give a talk on the importance of helping those in need. On the way to the
building where their talks were to be given, they encountered a confederate slumped over and groaning. Those
who were told they were already late were much less likely to help than those who were told they had time to
spare. These experiments are taken to show that minor factors without moral significance (finding a dime,
being in a hurry) are strongly correlated with people’s helping behavior.
Perhaps most damning for the robust view of character are the results of the experiments conducted by
Stanley Milgram in the 1960s. In these experiments the great majority of subjects, when politely though firmly
requested by an experimenter, were willing to administer what they thought were increasingly severe electric
shocks to a screaming “victim.” These experiments are taken to show that if subjects did have compassionate
tendencies, these tendencies cannot have been of the type that robust traits require.
Philosophers influenced by the experimental tradition in social psychology conclude that people do not have
the broadly based, stable, consistent traits of character that were of interest to the ancient and modern
moralists, or to contemporary philosophers working with some version of those views. Rather, the
psychological studies are taken to show that persons generally have only narrow, “local” traits that are not
unified with other traits into a wider behavioral pattern. Persons are helpful when in a good mood, say, but not
helpful when in a hurry, or they are honest at home but not honest at work. This skepticism about robust traits
thus poses a challenge to contemporary philosophers, especially those who work with some version of the
ancient views, to develop an account of character that is consistent with empirical results.
5.2 Some replies to situationism
These interpretations of the experiments in social psychology have been challenged by both psychologists and
philosophers, especially by philosophers working in the tradition of virtue ethics (see related entry on virtue
ethics), who claim that the character traits criticized by situationists have little to do with the conception of
character associated with the ancient and modern moralists. The objectors say that the situationists rely on an
understanding of character traits as isolated and often non-reflective dispositions to behave in stereotypical
ways. They wrongly assume that traits can be determined from a single type of behavior stereotypically
associated with that trait.
Consider again the payphone and seminarian studies. It may seem obvious that one cannot respond to all
appeals for help, and it may seem doubtful that any reflective person thinks one should. This suggests that
being a helpful person requires some thinking about what is most important in one’s life, for calls of help can
justifiably go unanswered if the individual believes that responding will interfere with her doing something else
that she takes to be of higher moral importance. So we should not expect helping behavior to be wholly
consistent, given the complex situations in which persons find themselves. Some of the philosophers
discussed in this entry, such as the natural law theorists (in section 3.1) and Kant (in section 3.2), might make
this point by reminding us of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. Unlike perfect duties, which
require that we take or forego certain actions, the duty to assist others in need is imperfect, in that how, when,
and whom we assist is not precisely specifiable and so is within the individual’s discretion. The general point,
on which most of the ancient and modern moralists would agree, is that being helpful cannot be understood in
isolation from other values, aims, and traits that the individual has. (For discussion of how values can be
unified, see Wolf 2007.)
Or consider the Milgram experiments. During the experiments, many of the subjects protested even while
continuing to obey the experimenter’s commands. In post-experiment interviews with subjects, Milgram noted
that many were completely convinced of the wrongness of what they were doing. But the presence of conflict
need not indicate an absence, or loss, of character. On a traditional conception of character, as examined in
this entry, many of Milgram’s subjects are best described as incontinent. They have character, but it is neither
virtuous nor vicious. Many of us seem to fall into this category. We often recognize what it is right to do but we
nevertheless do not do it.
In short, the objectors say that the situationists rely on a simplified view of character. They assume that
behavior is often sufficient to indicate the presence of a trait of character, and they ignore the other
psychological aspects of character (both cognitive and affective) that, for most of the philosophers discussed in
this entry, form a more or less consistent and integrated set of beliefs and desires. In particular, the objectors
say, the situationists ignore the role of practical deliberation (or, in the case of virtuous character, practical
wisdom).
For variations on these replies to the situationists, see Kupperman (2001), Kamtekar (2004), Radcliffe (2007),
Sabini and Silver (2005), Sreenivasan (2013), and cf. von Wright (1963,136–154).
5.3 Some empirical approaches to Aristotelian views of character
Some recent philosophical work on character aims to meet the skepticism of the situationist challenge directly,
by developing a theory of virtue grounded in psychological studies that are compatible with the existence of
robust traits. This section provides a brief summary of two such approaches to virtue.
For extensive and nuanced discussion, see Miller (2013, 2014) and Section 2 of the entry on empirical
approaches to moral character, section 2.
One approach is inspired by the “cognitive-affective personality system” (the so-called CAPS model) that has
been developed by social and cognitive psychologists. Rather than looking for empirical evidence of robust
traits in behavioral regularities across different types of situations, the CAPS model (and philosophers
impressed by this model) focus on the importance of how agents understand the situations they are in. The
model views the structure of personality as the organization of relationships among “cognitive-affective units”.
These units are clusters of dispositions to feel, desire, believe, and plan that, once activated, cause various
thoughts, feelings, and behavior to be formed. Philosophers who ground their understanding of virtue in this
type of psychological theory extend the CAPS model to cover robust virtuous traits of character. These traits
are viewed as enduring dispositions that include the appropriate clusters of thinking (practical reason), desire,
and feeling, manifested in cross-situational behavior.
For detailed discussion of the CAPS model and its possible value to philosophers, see Miller (2003, 2014),
Russell (2009) and Snow (2010).
Other philosophers do not find the extension of the CAPS model especially helpful, for it does not seem to
move us past what we commonsenically recognize as virtue. We are prepared to begin with the idea that being
virtuous is not just being disposed to act, but also to feel, respond, and to reason. And not simply to reason,
but to reason well. For this approach to be helpful, we need some account of what excellent practical
reasoning consists in.
Some philosophers aim to provide what is needed by looking to psychological studies of enjoyment. They
propose that virtues are analogous to (some) skills, in that the kind of habituation involved in developing and
acting from virtuous character is like the sort of intelligent habituation typical of the development and exercise
of (some) complex skills. The empirical studies of enjoyment show that, other things being equal, we enjoy the
exercise of developed abilities, and the more complex the ability, the more we enjoy its exercise. If the
acquisition and exercise of virtue is analogous to the development and exercise of complex ability, we can, this
approach suggests, explain a variety of central points about virtuous activity – for example, that, like (some)
skills, virtuous activity is experienced as being its own end, as being enjoyable in itself, and thus as valued for
its own sake. For discussion of virtue as similar to complex skill, see Annas (2011), Bloomfield (2014), Stichter
(2007, 2011), and cf. Sherman (1989).
Situationists might nevertheless reply that to emphasize the role of expertise in practical reasoning is to make
good moral character an ideal that too few of us, if any, can achieve. On some conceptions of moral
knowledge, such as that proposed by Plato in the Republic, acquiring the knowledge necessary for virtue takes
over 50 years of psychological and intellectual training. And on Aristotle’s view, as this entry has indicated in
Section 2.4 above, the full realization of our rational powers that is required for good moral character is not
something that we can achieve on our own. The development and preservation of good moral character
requires political institutions that promote the conditions under which self-love and friendship flourish. The
situationist might wonder how useful traditional conceptions of good character can be, if acquiring virtuous
character is a long and difficult process made possible by social institutions that do not yet exist. The
situationist may take these problems as support for his view that we are better off thinking in terms of local
traits rather than robust traits.
In ending, it is appropriate to recall the discussion in Section 4, above. On the one hand, on a view of character
such as Aristotle’s, which relies on ordinary capacities to experience the pleasures of self-expression and to
respond with friendly feelings to others’ efforts to help, almost everyone is capable of becoming better. On the
other hand, if Aristotle and others (such as Marx, Mill, T. H. Green, and Rawls) are correct that character is
shaped by the institutions of political, economic, and family life, then becoming good will require access to the
appropriate institutions. Yet this is not to suggest that becoming good is out of our reach. It may be helpful here
to recall Rawls’s description of a “realistic utopia” in The Law of Peoples when, following Rousseau in The
Social Contract, he writes that just institutions take “men as they are” and “laws as they might be.” (Rawls,
1999b, 7) Our psychological natures and the institutions that promote good qualities of character are, in his
view and in the views of others discussed

ACTIVITIES/ASSESSMENT
1. Give the etymological and formal definition of character.
2. Define virtue and happiness and explicate the relationship between them.
3. What are the views on virtue according to the following Greek philosophers?
3.1. Socrates 3.2. Plato 3.3. Aristotle
4. Who are the Stoics? What is their perspective on virtue and virtuous life? Do you thinks ther are people
nowadays who are like the Stoics? If yes, who are they
5. What are the conceptions of the following philosophers on virtue and virtuous life?
5.1 early naturalists
5.2 Immanuel Kant
5.3 David Hume
 5.4 Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill
5.5 T. H. Green
5.6 John Rawls
6. Enumerate and discuss each of the contemporary questions virtue/character.
7. cite some empirical studies on moral character. What are their findings?

MIDTERM WRITTEN OUTPUT 1

Short Essay: In no more than 150 words, discuss what is a virtuous life according to Plato. Include in the
discussion how that virtuous life is acquired according to Plato.