People V San Diego G.R. No. L-29676. December 24, 1968

[G.R. No. L-29676. December 24, 1968.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO, as Presiding

Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch); MARIO HENSON y
DE GUZMAN; RAFAEL GONZALES y SINCHONGCO; ANGEL MENDOZA y MARQUEZ; ROGELIO
LAZARO y MAURICIO, and BIENVENIDO WIJANGCO, Respondents.
Solicitor Amores for Petitioner.
D. Castro for respondent Angel Mendoza.
Judge Lourdes P. San Diego in her own behalf as Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: BAIL OF DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY OF A CAPITAL

OFFENSE; RIGHT OF PROSECUTION TO PRESENT ALL EVIDENCE BEFORE MOTION FOR BAIL IS RESOLVED;
CASE AT BAR. — Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court. Should it be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and
the order of the court granting bail should be considered void.
2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COURT’S DISCRETION IN GRANTING BAIL IN CAPITAL OFFENSES; LIMITATION;

CONTENTS OF ORDER GRANTING OR REFUSING BAIL. — The court’s discretion to grant bail in capital
offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution;
otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court’s order granting
or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion
whether or not the evidence of guilt is wrong.
DECISION
CAPISTRANO, J.:
In criminal case No. Q-8711, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, the information charged
the defendants, Mario Henson, Rafael Gonzales, Angel Mendoza, Rogelio Lazaro and Bienvenido Wijangco, as
principals of the murder of Jesus Lapid with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation, and abuse of superior strength and with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, aid of
armed men and craft or fraud. The prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for bail of the
defendants would be considered in the course of the regular trial instead of in a summary proceeding. In the
course of the regular trial, after the prosecution had presented eight witnesses, the trial court resolved the
motions for bail granting the same despite the objection of the prosecution on the ground that it still had
material witnesses to present. The orders granting bail in the amount of P50,000.00 for each defendant on
the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong must have made Fiscal Oscar Inocentes very angry
because in his motion for reconsideration of the orders granting bail he used contumacious language for
which he was forthwith cited for contempt. Fortunately, after the Fiscal had submitted his answer and
explanation, the trial judge, in a forgiving mood, did not punish him for contempt on condition that the
contumacious words be deleted from his motion for reconsideration.
The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The
answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a
defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a
regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the
criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail
should be considered void on that ground. The orders complained of dated October 7, 9 and 12, 1968,
having been issued in violation of procedural due process, must be considered null and void.
The court’s discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of the
evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or
whimsical. Hence, the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The orders of October
7, 9 and 12, 1968, granting bail to the five defendants are defective in form and substance because they do
not contain a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution. They only contain the court’s
conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not strong. Being thus defective in form and substance, the orders
complained of cannot, also on this ground, be allowed to stand.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the orders of October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, are set aside. No costs.

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[G.R. No. L-29676. December 24, 1968.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO, as Presiding

Solicitor Amores for Petitioner.

D. Castro for respondent Angel Mendoza.

Judge Lourdes P. San Diego in her own behalf as Respondent.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: BAIL OF DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY OF A CAPITAL

2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COURT’S DISCRETION IN GRANTING BAIL IN CAPITAL OFFENSES; LIMITATION;

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